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During these dangerous times it is important for all enemies and Allies of America to know that we are a peaceful nation until aroused.
Make no mistake there is a fighting thread in America with undaunted battlefield courage. Commanders and troops who fought for both the Blue and Gray understood modern war and many made the ultimate sacrifice.
This defining time in American history is being presented by Ron Maxwell. He is creating an anthology series of Classic tales of the Civil War to be brought to the screen.
Ron Maxwell’s project is reported on “Kickstarter:”
Ron Maxwell has been heralded by the Los Angeles Times as our foremost filmmaker of the American Civil War.
His three epic motion pictures – Gettysburg in 1993, Gods & Generals in 2003 and Copperhead in 2013 – are unrivaled in their scope, historical veracity, dramatic impact and depth of understanding of the issues that tore the country apart in the middle of the 19th Century.
No other filmmaker has brought so many Civil War era characters to vivid life on the screen: Robert E. Lee, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Winfield Scott Hancock, Stonewall Jackson, Meade, Longstreet, Burnside, Hood, Stuart, Pickett, to name just a few.
His battle scenes are unique in their authentic tactical re-creations, their intensity, their drama: Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg.
Ron Maxwell’s Civil War Classics!
Each episode will feature a well-known actor in the leading role, and each will be filmed in the landmark Maxwell style: historically true, first rate production values, fascinating stories, great performances, dramatic action.
And each episode, in the footsteps of the iconic series hosted by Alfred Hitchcock and Rod Sterling, will be hosted and introduced by Ron Maxwell.
The first episode of the anthology series will be developed and produced with additional production funding from Westie Films. Award winning filmmaker McKay Daines will produce the series.
Ron Maxwell’s Civil War Classics archive of titles.
Over a lifetime of reading and research, Ron Maxwell has accumulated an amazing collection of short stories written about the war, a priceless treasure trove of Civil War fiction written by both obscure and famous American authors over the hundred and fifty years since the war was fought.
This is a partial list from the hundreds of titles, novellas and short stories for adaptation to hour-long films for the continuing anthology series to be hosted by Ron Maxwell.
Journey to Shiloh, by Henry Allen
Seven young Texans who set out in 1862 for Richmond are recruited into the Army of the Mississippi and see action under General Bragg at the battles of Corinth and Shiloh.
Action at Aquila, by Hervey Allen
Picture of the war in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
Watchfires, by Louis Auchincloss
An upper-class NYC man and his wife aid the Underground Railroad.
The Valiant Virginians, by James Bellah
The Virginia Cavalry in the Army of the Shenandoah under Jubal Early and their defeat by Sheridan.
The Amulet, by Hal Borland
Confederate sympathizers making their way from Denver to join the Confederacy in 1861 become involved in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Missouri
Kingdom Coming, by Roark Broadford
Life on a Louisiana planatation during the war.
Salisbury Plain, by Henry C Branson
The experiences of a young Union officer during the war.
Boy in Blue, by Royce Brier
The war in the Cumberland Valley and the Battle of Chicamauga as it appeared to a Union soldier.
Wild is the River, by Louis Bromfield
Life in New Orleans during the occupation by Union troops under General Butler.
Rat Hell, by Peter Burchard
Twenty Yankee officers, captive in Libby Prison, tunnel to freedom.
Banners at Shenandoah, by Bruce Catton
Story of General Phil Sheridan’s Union cavalry operations in the Shenandoah Valley culminating at Cedar Creek.
The Crisis, by Winston Churchill
Hero is an anti-slavery New Englander.
The Red Badge of Courage, by Stephen Crane
A young Union soldier in his first action at the Battle of Chancellorsville.
The Far-side of Home, by Maggie Davis
Moving story of a Georgia soldier and his young bride facing the hardships of war.
The Kays, by Margaret Deland
Experiences of a conscientious objector during the war.
The Border, by Dagmar Doneghy
Picture of the ravages of war on the Missouri-Kansas border.
Shiloh, by Shelby Foote
Centers around the Battle of Shiloh, 1862.
Eight April Days, by Scott Hart
Story of the campaign of Robert E. Lee in the days preceding the surrender at Appomattox.
Seek Out and Destroy, by James David Horan
Based on the raiding trip of the Confederate ship Shenandoah in the last months of the war.
Elkhorn Tavern, by Douglas C. Jones
The Confederate and Union armies destroy a settlement in Arkansas as they wage a battle. The Hasford family watch as the wr rolls over their farm.
Bride of Fortune, by Harnett T. Kane
Story of Varina Howell Davis’s meeting and courtship with her future husband.
City of Two Flags, by Clark McMeekin
The conflict between Union and Confederate sympathizers in Louisville, who refused to accept Kentucky’s neutrality.
No Tears for Christmas, by Helen Topping Miller
Christmas at a Tennessee plantation house used as headquarters by Union troops.
Unvexed to the Sea, by Gerry Morrison
The siege and capture of Vicksburg.
Woman with a Sword, by Hollister Noble
Story of Anna Ella Carroll, newspaper woman and writer who is credited with planning the Tennessee campaign.
Company Q by Richard O’Connor
Hero undertakes an undercover spying mission into besieged Atlanta.
Untold Glory by Cothburn O’Neal
The spy activities of Felicia Shover in occupied Memphis.
Many are the Hearts by Bruce Palmer
Four vignettes with various aspects of the war as background.
The Bright Sword, by Eleanor Perenyi
John B. Hood’s campaign in Tennessee in 1864.
Crescent City, by Belva Plain
A Jewish immigrant family settles in New Orleans where their loyalties are tested by the opposing sides.
When the Music Changed, by Marie R. Reno
Romance set in wartime Washington and New York.
The Unterrified, by Constance Robertson
Copperheads in upstate NY.
Weep No More, by Janet Stevenson
Elizabeth Van Lew, a Southern abolitionist in Richmond, serves as spy for the North.
The Fathers, by Allen Tate
Conflicting ideas in Virginia, just across the Potomac from Washington.
Katy of Catoctin, by George A. Townsend
A romance involving the German-American settlers of the Blue Ridge mountains of Maryland. Story begins with John Brown’s raid.
Wilderness, by Robert Penn Warren
Story of a crippled German Jew who finds his courage on the battlefield.
By Ambrose Bierce:
A Horseman in the Sky, An Occurance at Owl Creek Bridge, A Son of the Gods, One of the Missing, Killed at Resaca, A Tough Tussle, The Affair at Coulter’s Notch, George Thurston, The Coup de Grace, One Officer, One Man, A Resumed Identity, The Damned Thing, The Man and the Snake, Moxon’s Master, The Secret of Macarger’s Gulch, The Moonlit Road, Beyond the Wall, A Jug of Syrup, A Watcher by the Dead, A Vine on a House, The Boarded Window, The Stranger.
The Unvanquished, by William Faulkner
Drusilla Sartoris, disguised as a Confederate soldier, goes to war with the men to avenge her sweetheart’s death.
First Blood at Harper’s Ferry, by James W. Bellah.
2014-05-30 Clearly, Russian actions in the Ukraine have focused the attention of the Baltic states as well as of the Nordics who are intimately involved in the Baltic region as well.
The recent piece by a Latvian researcher suggesting that the Russians are evolving their techniques and approaches to pressuring states via leveraging military power while avoiding direct military combat reflects concerns of states who see their national survival at stake.
The Russians are inventing a 21 Century approach to military power. It is neither hard nor soft power, but the use of hard power as the underwriter of a strategic communication strategy to achieve objectives short of an all out war.
Neither asymmetric nor convention, the Russians are shaping what this researcher calls a strategic communications policy to support strategic objectives and to do so with a tool set of various means, including skill useful of military power as the underwriter of the entire effort.
Now the Lithuanians are raising concerns about a particular form of Russian military harassment.
According to a Reuters story published today, Lithuania accuses Russia of harassing ships in the Baltic Sea.
“The Ministry of Foreign affairs expressed concern due to recurring Russian military fleet actions in the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone, which violate the sovereign rights and freedoms of Lithuania and other countries,” the ministry said after the acting head of the Russian embassy was summoned to the ministry on Friday.
“We encourage Russia to keep to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international law consistently and ensure that such incidents would no longer occur,” the ministry said.
Lithuania’s defense ministry said Russian warships were found ordering civilian vessels off Lithuania to change course twice this week and once in April, referring to safety concerns due to military exercises in nearby Russian waters.
Modern Russian warships, capable of hitting targets 150 kilometers (95 miles) away, were involved in policing this week. The ships left immediately after a Lithuanian warship arrived on the scene, the ministry said.
A vessel involved in laying an electric cable on the floor of the Baltic sea between Lithuania and Sweden was ordered to move in one of incidents, the ministry said.
Russia’s strategy is becoming clearer by the day. The natural gas deal with China enhances Russia’s position in the east. China provides a guaranteed long-term market for Siberia’s vast reserves of natural gas.
Vladimir Putin has also succeeded to obtaining new natural resources to the west. The seizure of the Crimea brings with it Russian control over the off-shore energy resources of the northern Black Sea.
Western sanctions do not seem to have had much impact on the biggest western companies, many of which are continuing to do deals with Russia, even with the sanctioned members of Putin’s inner circle. BP signed a shale oil deal with Igor Serhin, chief executive of the Russian state owned oil company, Rosnef, last week in St Petersburg, with Putin looking on with a smile.
China has already retaliated against the US for the indictment of five People’s Liberation Army’s officers for cyber spying and stealing trade secrets by ordering that Chinese state enterprises to cut ties with McKinsey and Boston Consultancy, because of the fear that they are spying on behalf of the US government.
Russia is playing an increasingly important role as the Arab spring is transformed into a deep Arab winter.
The new president of Egypt, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was received warmly by Putin in Moscow where he was negotiating a US$2 billion arms deal after the US suspended some of its annual military assistance. Russia continues to support the Assad regime in Syria.
In Libya the fall out from the overthrow of Gaddafi continues, and Hillary Clinton and the White House are fighting off claims of a cover up involving the murder of the American Ambassador in Benghazi.
The US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan. Iraq remains grotesquely unstable. Neither says much for the years devoted to two chimerical overseas adventures.
Russia could, if it so chooses, help to broker a deal on the Nuclear issue with Iran, something Obama desperately needs. But the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia are increasingly uncomfortable with Washington’s retreat. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief said recently: “While the wolf is eating the sheep, there is no shepherd to come to the rescue of the flock.”
In India, Narendra Modi, head of the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata party, surprised many when he invited India’s neighbors from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, including Nawaz Sharif of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to his elaborate swearing in ceremony in New Delhi as the new Indian prime minister following his overwhelming victory in the recent Indian general elections.
Yet no one knows whether Modi will embrace the US-India relationship, and he remains highly resentful that the US denied him a visa in 2005 for his role in the 2002 Gujarat massacres.
Mr. Modi has already visited China three times, and on his most recent visit he was received in the Great Hall of the People. President XI Jinping clearly saw Mr. Modi as a rising star.
All of which will make for an interesting time in Fortaleza, Ceara, during the 6th BRICS summit on July 15th, when the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, will meet two days after the World Cup final at the Maracana stadium in Rio de Janeiro.
The host, Dilma Rousseff, after all, also has had her own problems with Washington.
2014-05-29 When Washington has a problem, it is good to have a study announcing that whatever Administration moving ahead on the problem, which most often has been caused by the opposition party in earlier years, with little or no causative impact from that Administration’s party.
Brussels has a variant of the same approach – issue a policy paper if you have a problem and come up with a complicated statement of the problem and assert that a resolution is on the way, given time and enough money and enough consensus among the national governments.
With the Russians moving rapidly forward on the use of energy as a policy tool, it is not surprising that the EU has now issued a policy paper assuring us that a different future is at hand, in which the EU will be much more effective in deflecting Russian pressures.
Yesterday, the EU issued its latest energy security policy statement.
According to the Press Release accompanying the announcement of the advocacy for a new policy.
The European Commission reacts on the current geopolitical environment and the EU´s import dependence: It advocates a new European Energy Security Strategy. Diversifying external energy supplies, upgrading energy infrastructure, completing the EU internal energy market and saving energy are among its main points. The strategy also highlights the need to coordinate national energy policy decisions and the importance of speaking with one voice when negotiating with external partners. It builds on the progress already achieved since the gas crisis in 2009. The proposals of the Commission, including actions to ensure uninterrupted supplies this winter, will be discussed by EU Heads of State or Government at the European Council on 26-27 June.
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said: “The EU has done a lot in the aftermath of the gas crisis 2009 to increase its energy security. Yet, it remains vulnerable. The tensions over Ukraine again drove home this message. In the light of an overall energy import dependency of more than 50% we have to make further steps. The Commission has tabled a comprehensive strategy today which will be discussed by EU leaders in June. I count on their strong support, since increasing energy security is in all our interest. On energy security, Europe must speak and act as one.”
European Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger said: “We want strong and stable partnerships with important suppliers, but must avoid falling victim to political and commercial blackmail. The EU and its Member States have a long list of homework in front of them: Collectively, we need to reinforce our solidarity with more vulnerable Member States. We also need to complete the internal energy market, improve our infrastructure, become more energy efficient and better exploit our own energy resources. Moreover, we need to accelerate the diversification of external energy suppliers, especially for gas. Only concrete actions will help.”
To ensure uninterrupted supplies this winter, the Commission proposes comprehensive risk assessments (stress tests). These would be conducted on the regional or EU level by simulating a disruption of the gas supply. The aim is to check how the energy system can cope with security of supply risks and based on that develop emergency plans and create back-up mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include increasing gas stocks, decreasing gas demand via fuel-switching (in particular for heating), developing emergency infrastructure like, for example, completing reverse flow possibilities and pooling parts of the existing energy security stocks.
To address the medium- and long-term security of supply challenges, the Commission proposes actions in several key areas:
Completing the internal energy market and building missing infrastructure links is essential to quickly respond to possible supply disruptions by directing energy flows across the EU as and where needed. The Commission has identified 33 infrastructure projects which are critical for the EU’s energy security. Apart from that, the Commission proposes to extend the target as regards interconnection of installed electricity capacity to 15% by 2030 while taking into account the cost aspects and the potential of commercial exchanges in the relevant regions. (Member States have already committed to ensure interconnectivity of 10% by 2020.)
Diversifying supplier countries and routes. In 2013, 39% of EU gas imports by volume came from Russia, 33% from Norway and 22% from North Africa (Algeria, Libya). While the EU will maintain its relationship with reliable partners, it will seek ties to new partner countries and supply routes, e.g. in the Caspian Basin region by further expanding the Southern Gas Corridor; by developing the Mediterranean Gas Hub and by increasing LNG supplies.
Strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure. In this respect the Commission will for example review the provisions and implementation of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation.
Increasing indigenous energy production: This includes further deployment of renewables, and sustainable production of fossil fuels.
Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external energy policy. The Commission aims to be involved at an early stage in envisaged intergovernmental agreements with third countries that could have a possible impact on security of supply. Moreover, the Commission will ensure that all such agreements and all infrastructure projects on EU territory fully comply with the relevant EU legislation.
Further developing energy technologies.
Increasing energy efficiency. As buildings are responsible for 40% of our energy consumption and a third of natural gas use, this sector plays a crucial role.
Background
Recent events have raised EU-wide concerns about ensuring uninterrupted energy flows as well as stable energy prices. At the European Council of March 2014 the Commission committed to conduct an in-depth study on European energy security and to present a comprehensive plan on how to reduce EU energy dependence. The findings and the proposals will be discussed at the European Council on 26-27 June.
On the one hand global energy demand is growing and is expected to increase by 27% by 2030. On the other hand EU domestic energy production has decreased by almost one-fifth between 1995 and 2012. Today more than 50% of the EU’s energy needs are covered by external suppliers: in 2012 almost 90% of oil, 66% of gas and 42% of solid fuels consumed in the EU were imported, representing a bill of more than €1 billion per day.
A recent piece published by theEU Observerprovides a perspective on the context in which such an effort is being generated:
Although EU countries import 88 percent of the oil that they use, as well as 42 percent of solid fuel, the main concern of the commission and governments is gas – 66 percent of Europe’s gas is imported at a cost of more than €1 billion per day.
Of the 400 billion cubic metres of gas consumed in the EU each year, around 40 percent comes from Russia’s state-owned Gazprom. The majority of this is piped through Ukraine, currently embroiled in a dispute with Russia over how much it owes Gazprom for its past and future gas supplies…..
“We want to complete the internal energy market … and move away from a monopoly, Russia in this instance,” (EU Energy Commissioner) Oettinger noted.
The commission is also anxious to increase the amount of gas it buys from Norwegian company Statoil, which currently provides 33 percent of the bloc’s gas compared to 39 percent from Russia’s Gazprom.
But while Oettinger said a further 10 billion cubic meters per year could come from Norway in the short-term, EU officials have indicated that a larger increase in long-term supply will depend on whether Norway develops new gas fields in the Barents Sea.
In the meantime, the commission wants to run “stress-tests” over the summer to assess whether European countries could cope if Russia turned off the gas taps during the winter.
The bloc also urges governments to increase their gas storage facilities and agree more reverse flow deals allowing gas to be transferred to needy countries.
“We will look at an energy efficiency strategy for the next decade,” said Oettinger.
The paper confirmed that a terminal to handle imports of Liquified Natural Gas in Lithuania will be completed by the end of 2014.
Even though a small state, Denmark is providing intellectual and practical leadership in shaping Arctic policy for the Western states.
In part, this in the absence of the kind of Canadian and US leadership one should expect, but has not really been evident to date.
An example of this was leading a search and rescue exercise in the Arctic in September 2013.
The location of the rescue effort in SAREX 13. Credit Canadian Air Force
The scenario focused on a real world problem, namely a cruise ship in distress with the need to both search and rescue passengers and crew.
Because situational awareness is difficult, communications episodic and the ability to reach the right point to make a difference with the right rescue means, the challenge to do “normal” S and R is formidable.
The exercise demonstrated how difficult it is to do “routine” S and R.
The Danes have released a report, which suggested that some things went well, but clearly many did not, which, of course, is the point of running exercises.
The gaps in the ability of the nations to work together, the absence of enough S and R platforms, the real shortfall in SA, and the pot holes associated with communication were all highlighted in the after action report.
One of the more dramatic lessons learned was high significant is the shortfall in basic communications which undercuts significantly S and R capabilities.
Hence this was a recommendation about how to build a patch work solution:
As recommended during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, a simple and self sustained satellite internet transceiver solution, easy put on a mountain top, capable of covering at least 10 Nm, is recommended as the interim solution until internet SATCOM coverage in the fiord systems and above 72N is available.
Such systems are recommended to be tested and implemented immediately. If an area is covered with internet the Tetra-Flex system can link-up and Tetra-Flex data be exchanged.
Otherwise, it must be investigated if it is possible to deploy larger generators or attached fuel tanks for the Tetra-Flex relay stations, which was tested and failed during SAREX 2013.
As an alternative to internet SATCOM and Tetra-Flex the Greenlandic Police used HF making the lines of communication long and the risk of losing information higher.
Another alternative could be the newest Iridium phones.
It is possible to share data “raw text messages” using the newest Iridium pilot data connection (like the ATW-690 and the ICESAR solution) used on Ella Island and Mestersvig.
The system could be useful for all actors as an alternative until having full internet coverage and Tetra-Flex running.
During my visit to Denmark in May 2014, I had a chance to discuss with Danish analysts and policy makers various aspects of Danish assessments of Baltic defense and Arctic defense and security issues.
One of those analysts was our strategic partner, Hans Tinon Hansen, founder and CEO of Risk Intelligence based in Denmark.
He works extensively with the shipping, offshore, oil & gas companies in the Nordic countries as well as worldwide.
He is well connected throughout the Nordic defense and security circles and during my visit to Denmark; we had a chance to discuss Nordic thinking about the future of Baltic defense after the Russian map rewriting exercise in Ukraine.
Question: I would like to start by discussing Sweden and its reactions to Russian actions.
The Swedes clearly are taking Russian actions quite seriously.For example, they announced recently that they are increasing their defense budget by nearly $900 million per annum and adding new cruise missile capabilities to their aircraft.
What is your sense of the Swedish dynamic?
HTH: I think that what has happened in Sweden is like with any other Western European country.
They have been reducing their defense to such an extent that they are at the lowest level possible to actually withhold or maintain a credible defense – or even below.They got their first wake up call last year when Russian air exercises were targeted against Swedish installations.
And they didn’t actually have the 24/7 Quick Alert Reaction (QRA) fighter capability to show sovereignty against the Russians.
Ironically, the Russian planes were intercepted by Danish F16s operating from Lithuania during the NATO Air-Policing mission in the Baltic countries.
The second wake-up call is of course Ukraine and the Crimea. They have increasingly been talking about building a defense that can actually, interact with NATO in defending the Baltic area. Not only the Baltic area as a sea area, or a region, but also actually within the Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania themselves.
Of course, Sweden is not a member of NATO. Sweden has always said that they are not necessarily neutral, but they are alliance-free, and that is not necessarily the same thing.
We also know from the Cold War that they actually worked very closely together with the Danes, and the Germans, and the Americans, and the Norwegians. We could say that it’s actually going back in some ways to how it was before.
But they’ve simply reduced too much in their defense, and they have been focusing on “out of area operations” as has Denmark and this has reduced the importance of direct defense and the planning for it as well.
In contrast, the Norwegians and the Finns, have maintained a tradition of direct defense, which is, of course the target of defending their own sovereign area against the opponents that might be in that area, which is, of course, Russia.
I’ve been to several conferences during the last 10 years where the Norwegians constantly have to put up a map on the over-head, or the computer, showing the Arctic, which to others was a little bit strange, while everybody else is talking about the Horn of Africa, anti-piracy operations, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and Eastern Mediterranean and so on.
The Norwegians have been constantly focused the Arctic as a key domain to protect their interests.
For the Finns, they know from historic experience what their core requirement clearly is, namely national survival. They don’t need to engage and do all the out of area operations, and that’s why they still have these 14 brigades, more than any other Western European country. They are not confused about the need for direct defense against Russia.Here they have been a constant.
Question: How might Denmark reset its forces to do a more effective direct defense effort in the Baltics and in the region?
HTH: You can say that in some respect we’ve partly maintained the ability to do direct defense, however, that’s probably quite hollow, because the army has been fully engaged in Iraq and then Afghanistan, and we’re just pulling out now.
Which means that the army has been basically designed to deliver a battalion battle group for 6 month periods, twice a year, for the last 7 years. This is what we’ve been doing.
The problem is also that we are below the lowest numbers that should be in the system, should be in the structure, in order to actually both develop, train, and exercise an army.
When it comes to a navy, the assets are quite different from during the Cold War.
Through the Cold War, the Danish navy was based on fast, small, very agile, but very lethal units. We had fast missile boats and submarines to protect the Danish Straits and operate far into the Baltic Sea.
Since then they have been transformed into a real blue water navy, with three air defense frigates and the two command and support ships and they have been engaged in anti-piracy operations at the Horn of Africa, more or less, constantly since 2008.
That’s of course more of a policing function. You can argue it has to do with security, but it’s nothing to do with defense.
Question: I assume this is has to do in part to the Danish stake in merchant shipping?
HTH: It does. It is about free trade flows, global free trade flows, and you can only protect them at sea with naval assets of some size.
The shipping industry is very important to Denmark because the net currency inflow is about 150-200 billion Danish Krone per year, which is quite significant and about 10-12% of the world’s trade is moved on Danish operated or owned vessels.
That says something about the magnitude of the interest in free-trade flows for Denmark. This is also partly why Risk Intelligence has been so successful in the maritime domain with over 12% of the World fleet operated by clients Worldwide. We have been able to combine an understanding of international shipping and offshore operations together with intelligence products, which fit the needs of modern shipowners and oil companies.
The expanded role for the navy has affected direct defense as well.
The missile air defense frigates was designed to play the role of defending Danish territory as the Air Force missile defense role was disbanded.You can cover all of Danish territory with two missile defense frigates if properly armed.
And actually one of the discussions that have come up due to Ukraine is the need to bring forward the acquisition process for arming the air defense frigates with medium range missiles and potentially missiles for the ballistic air defense program.
I think that most people understand that we are not returning to the Cold War. And I think that’s also the general understanding of Danish defense and among Danes’ positions.
But the crisis has raised issue of, have we actually reduced the defense too much?
I think many among the parties behind the Defence Agreement actually agree that we have probably gone beyond the limit of how much we can reduce in order to have a defense that is robust and designed to actually meet the operational requirements set by the very same politicians.
We need to expand a defense capability that plays into the security role, and at the same time can perform tasks in the whole Kingdom of Denmark area including Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
Question: We’re talking about a flexible air and naval force that works effectively together?
HTH: Absolutely.
I think that since the Cold War, the Danish military has been forced by circumstances, to pursue the flex concept that was made for the navy, that you can actually use containerized positions on different ships and configure them in different roles.
That was out of necessity and out of financial constraints.
And that is a concept that has been applauded by many, many nations around the world, and I think you can even do it further when you look at the defense. Right now the Arctic patrol frigates are actually financed outside the defense budget because of their fishery protection role.
One could argue that it’s probably time to look at when these ships are going to be replaced that need to build a multi-role platform and not only one that can be search and rescue and fishery protection, but also more robust in performing security and defense related tasks.
Question: Do you think that mainstream Europe has grasped the growing importance of the Arctic and the role of the Northern European states, or put in other words, one can foresee a shift in power northward due to Arctic resources, in contrast the general dependence of the rest of Europe on outside energy resources?
HTH: Frankly, no.Generally speaking Europe needs to shape a greater effort for energy independence.For example, the dependence of Germany on Russian gas imports clearly limits its sovereignty and ability to play a key foreign policy role. But I do not think that the full strategic impact of the Northern Region is fully understood in the capitals of Europe. Not at the moment.
Question: Thinking about the Baltic defense and the Arctic opening, what are the realistic expectations about Baltic defense and what the United States will or will not do?
HTH: If we look at the role in the Baltic since the 1990’s, the different countries in the region have assisted one of the Baltic Republics in building up their army, building their navy, or similar. And we should just continue to do that.
The Danish army division actually has the Baltic brigades as component units. The Danish division that actually organizes and exercise, maybe with an American battalion coming over or a Polish company battalion, then that demonstrates in practical ways NATO’s exercising in these 3 countries. We are building capacity, we are helping them getting new equipment and shaping new approaches.
The same goes for the Arctic and the need to build a grid of communications, especially north of 70 degrees north, ISR and safety, search and rescue and defense capability to help develop and protect the region.
It is about actually knowing where the problem may arise, having the assets to find operate in the region. By laying down a grid, defense could built from that grid.
The American role could be enhanced if Americans design, or re-design some of their own capability to be able to actually be an active partner in the region.
At the moment US capability in the Arctic is almost non-existent.
There are a number of areas where the Americans could do a lot if they so chose and would be important for security and defense in the region such as communications, ISR and logistics.
Sweden’s centre-right government coalition announced plans on Tuesday to pump more funds into the military if the four parties win the September elections, with an emphasis on more fighter jets and submarines.
In an article published in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) the four party leaders wrote about the crisis in Ukraine and how Russia had now ramped up both its military and propaganda machines.The leaders said they had previously welcomed Russia’s attempts to embed itself deeper in the global community, despite harbouring fears that the tide could turn at any point.
“What we see today is a Russia that acts in a way that confirms and surpasses the fears we had then,” the leaders of the Moderate, Liberal (Folkpartiet), Centre and Christian Democrat Parties wrote. If the coalition were to remain in power, it would aim to increase the military budget by five billion kronor ($760 million) annually, starting in 2015.
“Seen against the backdrop of developments in our region it can be particularly motivated to increase Swedish presence on the Baltic Sea and on Gotland Island,” the op-ed text stated.It would also order Saab to provide the Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) with 70 rather than 60 of the new generation of Jas Gripen E fighter jets. Adding more submarines to the naval fleet would also be on the cards if the government’s proposals make it to the negotiation table with other parliamentary parties. Sweden has traditionally anchored much of defence policy across party lines to secure longevity.
“Sweden should have an accessible and useful defence, adapted to a rapidly changing world,” Fredrik Reinfeldt, Jan Björklund, Göran Hägglund and Annie Lööf wrote.
Defense News said Sweden’s Defense Ministry is set to discuss the implementation of new advance warning and rapid reaction structures after the disclosure that Russian aircraft conducted a nighttime “simulated” attack on key Swedish military and civilian installations last month.
“We have observed that Russia has stepped up its training exercises and that they are behaving in a different way than before. We intend to maintain a close watch on the situation,”Defense Minister Karin Enström said in a statement.
The Swedish Air Force reportedly failed to monitor exercises ostensibly aimed at Swedish targets, because no planes or pilots were available.
The newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reports that during Easter weekend the Russian Air Force held maneuvers in the Baltic just outside Sweden’s territorial boundary. Held off of the island Gotska Sandön, military sources tell the newspaper that the fictitious targets of the exercise were two of Sweden’s most important military bases.
“It is a decidedly serious matter if we discover that Swedish preparedness does not work. We must have a 24/7 rapid reaction capability. For Russian aircraft to run a mock bombing exercise apparently simulating attacks against Swedish targets reminds me of the Cold War era. This confirms our image that Russia means business when it comes to raising its military capacity.” said Peter Hultqvist, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense (PCoD), to Defense News
Following the crisis in Ukraine, Sweden’s government has proposed increasing the Nordic country’s military spending by 5.5 billion Swedish kronor ($830 million) a year.
The four-party center-right coalition said Tuesday it is deeply concerned by the recent events in Ukraine and wants to raise the military outlays gradually in coming years to reach the proposed figure by 2024.
Among other things, it wants to buy 10 more fighter jets and two more submarines to improve the defense of the Baltic Sea and the island Gotland.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Sweden’s defense budget was slashed and its military emphasis shifted toward international peacekeeping operations. Now, however, both the left-leaning opposition and the government agree that the country’s military readiness is inadequate.
A Danish story at the time of the Russian incursion into Swedish air space underscored the importance of the Nordics supporting one another.
April 23, 2013
Danish F-16s confronted Russian fighter jets approaching Sweden
The Russian military has increased its presence in the Baltic region over the past few years, much to the consternation of the Swedes
On Good Friday, March 29, two bombers and four fighters from the Russian Air Force approached Swedish airspace, completely catching the Swedes by surprise.
With the Swedes asleep at the wheel, two Danish F-16 jets under NATO command were sent up to face the approaching Russians. The Russian jets turned around just 30-40 kilometres, a couple of minute’s flight time, from Sweden’s border and the Danish F-16’s fell in to ‘shadow’ the Russians, or “fly the flag” as the defence minister, Nick Hækkerup (Socialdemokraterne), put it.
Had the two Danish jets not arrived, the Russians could have easily entered Swedish airspace unhindered (Photo: Colourbox)
“The Danish planes did exactly as they should have and it’s completely standard procedure that they fly up and show that they are aware of the other airplanes,” Hækkerup told Jyllands-Posten newspaper. “The difference in this case was that the planes were Russian and not something we are used to seeing in these parts.”
The mission over the Baltic Sea had been kept under wraps until yesterday when Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet revealed the details.
The Russian mission has sparked great political debate in Sweden due to the fact that no Swedish jets were sent up to ‘greet’ their Russian counterparts.
Had the Danish fighters, which flew in from the NATO base in Lithuania, not been sent up, the Russian jets could have theoretically entered Swedish airspace without confrontation.
Swedish military experts told Svenska Dagbladet that the Russians were most likely testing the possibility of bombing two central targets in Sweden – one near the capital of Stockholm and one in southern Sweden.
Hækkerup said that the Russian action would not lead to an official inquiry from the Danes, but the Swedish authorities have found it “deeply concerning” that Russia has found it necessary to train “that type of mission”, according to Svenska Dagbladet.
According to reporting from Sweden’s English-language news source, The Local, the country’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, said that the Swedes would not demand an official explanation from Moscow.
“We don’t react to everything, we’re not up in the air for everything and we shouldn’t be,” Bildt told TT news agency.
The four Russian fighters, or ‘flankers’ as they are known in NATO jargon, were of the SU-27 make, while the two bombers were TU-22M3s, bombers which, in theory, are able to carry atomic weapons.
The Danish air command, Flyvertaktisk Kommando, confirmed that the two Danish fighters had been in action over Easter, but refused to elaborate further. NATO has said that it will reveal details of the situation within a few days.
TALLINN, Estonia – NATO has opened its second Baltic air base in Estonia as part of the military alliance’s increased regional air policing mission during the Ukraine crisis.
Estonia’s military says four Danish fighter jets arrived at the Amari air base, some 40 kilometers (25 miles) southwest of the capital Tallinn on Wednesday.
The Royal Danish Air Force F-16 planes will patrol the skies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for four months in coordination with NATO fighter jets stationed in Lithuania. After that, Germany will take over the rotational mission.
The aircraft and a supporting team of 60 people arrived at the Amari air base in the west of the Baltic state at a time when NATO is reinforcing its presence in the region to allay concerns triggered by the Ukraine crisis.
“Your arrival in Estonia and the opening of the Amari base to regular NATO flights increases the security of our region,” Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas said at a ceremony.
“But work on the security of Estonia and Europe is far from over. We are working to make our NATO allies’ stay in Estonia permanent.”
Until now the Western defense alliance’s sole Baltic air base was in Siauliai in northern Lithuania, Estonian defense forces spokesman Roland Murof said.
The evolving nature of 21st century military threats and challenges have shaped a common challenge for Japan and Latvia – countering indirect threats serving a competitor’s national agenda.
The Japanese are dealing with China and Latvia with Russia, but in each case the state working to gain an advantage has built up military power but is seeking to use at as part of an influence package.
Protesters clash with police in Kiev, Ukraine, on Sunday, January 19, 2004.
It is not about going to general war or even deliberately building a ladder of escalation to dominate an adversary.
It is about using paramilitary forces, surrogates, strategic communication, and economic pressure backed up with an insertable military force at the appropriate time to achieve the national strategic objectives.
It is neither hard nor soft power, but the use of hard power as the underwriter of a strategic communication strategy to achieve objectives short of war.
Now both Japan and Latvia are facing exactly the reality of what one might call military leveraging as part of proactive strategic communication. It is speaking loudly, and carrying an effective stick.
The Japanese Case: How to deal with military challenges disguised as security ones?
We have written at length about the reworking of Japanese defense. But underlying the reworking effort is the nature of the threat, which they face from China, which is clearly to work to shift the region and global balance in their direction. And the PRC leadership is positioning itself to operate in ambiguous situations and shape outcomes in the favor using their security and defense forces.
The dilemmas which Japan faces in working a new defense policy precisely rests on the challenge of how to engage defense forces in dealing with the military leveraging pressures operating in gray areas.
A recent piece in The Japan Times provided a very good overview on the nature of the challenge and the dilemmas for Japan.
With tensions in Asia growing, the greatest risks involve low-intensity conflicts rather than full-scale military attacks. But critics say that Japan’s dependence on the policing function of the Coast Guard or Self-Defense Forces isn’t enough to respond swiftly and effectively to such threats.
Low-intensity conflicts, also called gray zone scenarios, fall short of full-scale military attacks but can pose major security problems. In Japan, these potential attacks are viewed as a dilemma because they are too big to be addressed by one or the other, but might fall short of the conditions that would be required to launch an armed response by the SDF, which requires aggression deemed as a premeditated attack by a sovereign nation…..
It is believed that gray-zone scenarios can be handled without the use of collective self-defense, which is a more contentious issue. Coalition partner New Komeito is against legalizing the use of the right since it involves reinterpreting the pacifist Constitution instead of amending it. The coalition has thus decided to discuss the gray-zone cases first.
The center of this discussion revolves around whether and how the SDF should take on more of the coast guard’s policing roles and whether the SDF restrictions on weapons use can be eased without increasing political tensions, especially when Japan and China are chasing each other around the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
The number of Chinese ships entering contiguous waters and intruding into Japanese waters has spiked since the Democratic Party of Japan-led team of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda put the Senkakus into state ownership in September 2012. Even though there no serious clashes have occurred, any mismanagement could spiral into a military confrontation.
One scenario presented earlier this month by a panel of experts hand-picked by Abe involves a surprise landing on remote islands by commandos disguised as fishermen. Many politicians assume this would take the form of Chinese commandos raising a flag on the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed both by China and Taiwan.
At the moment, the Coast Guard has the primary responsibility for patrolling Japanese waters. But the defense minister can order the SDF to assume its policing authority, with the prime minister’s approval, if an incident develops into a low-intensity conflict that exceeds the Coast Guard’s policing abilities.
The SDF can’t use lethal force except for self-defense or during evacuations because commanders are bound by the law governing police officers and the Japan Coast Guard Law.
New Komeito says the restriction should be relaxed so that the SDF can counter the threat more effectively without a full-scale counterattack.
Critics also point out that transfers of responsibility should be done swiftly because aggressors could land while the government is still debating whether to pass enforcement authority to the SDF….
The challenge is heightened when one understands that the Russians are demonstrating innovations in working gray zone scenarios through military leveraging in shaping what one analyst calls a new form of strategic communication to achieve national objectives.
The Russian Engagement in Ukraine
In a seminal piece on the Ukrainian crisis by a Latvian researcher, new ground has been laid to shape a clearer understanding of the evolving nature of 21st century military power.
Neither asymmetric nor convention, the Russians are shaping what this researcher calls a strategic communications policy to support strategic objectives and to do so with a tool set of various means, including skill useful of military power as the underwriter of the entire effort.
According to Janis Berzinš, the Russians have unleashed a new generation of warfare in Ukraine. The entire piece needs to be read carefully and its entirety, but the core analytical points about the Russian approach and the shaping a new variant of military operations for the 21st century can be seen from the excerpts taken from the piece below:
The Crimean campaign has been an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one which shares many similarities with their intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, while at the same time being essentially different, since it reflects the operational realization of the new military guidelines to be implemented by 2020.
Its success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel.
The Russian Approach to 21st Century Military Operations. Credit: Janis Berzinš
In addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personal carrier.After blocking Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians started the second operational phase, consisting of psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda to undermine resistance, thus avoiding the use of firepower.
The operation was also characterized by the great discipline of the Russian troops, the display of new personnel equipment, body armor, and light wheeled armored vehicles. The result was a clear military victory on the battlefield by the operationalization of a well-orchestrated campaign of strategic communication, using clear political, psychological, and information strategies and the fully operationalization of what Russian military thinkers call “New Generation Warfare”…..
Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population.
The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country.
The Latvian analysis has been widely read in the Baltic Republics. It is not a question simply of think tank meetings, but one of national survival.
Interestingly, the Estonian leaders have directly taken up the themes of the Latvian analysis and provided his own assessment of what needs to be done to deal with the threat.
Dealing with new-generation warfare shows the need for a more comprehensive national-security strategy. According to Estonian leaders, Estonia has already made such preparations.
For example, Riho Terras, the chief of the country’s armed forces, said at a conference in Tallinn on Apr. 26.
“We have put a lot of emphasis in the last years to create units that are able to deal with unconventional threats,” Terras said. The government needs to have clear crisis procedures and be legally prepared “to take a swift decision to shoot and kill the first green man and the second one won’t come.”
Putin may target the Baltic and Balkan regions after Ukraine if the U.S. and its allies fail to show “serious counterbalance,” Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos Oil Co. owner freed from jail last year, said in an interview with Lithuanian daily Lietuvos Rytas…..
NATO has to adjust to having “very little if any warning time” from Russia, where decision-making is centralized, Mikser said. A revision of long-term plans for defense and military exercises would boost security in the Baltic region, which the Kremlin views as the alliance’s “soft underbelly,” he said.
“Russia’s conventional military is still far inferior to NATO collectively and they know that,” Mikser said. “But the modernization effort that they have undertaken in the last few years has delivered a Russian military capable of acting against individual neighboring countries.”
For Steve Blank’s look at the new face of warfare see the following:
In an interview with Prime Minister Abe, the Wall Street Journal summed the discussion up with this title for their article:
“Abe’s Strategy: Rearrange Region’s Power Balance.”
According to the article:
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe laid out an assertive foreign policy agenda, saying he hoped to accelerate maritime aid to Vietnam amid its territorial standoff with China and host Vladimir Putin this year despite the Russian president’s isolation from the West.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Bank of Japan Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda each sat down with Wall Street Journal Editor in Chief Gerard Baker, who offers his analysis of their conversations. Photo: Ko Sasaki for The Wall Street Journal
Beijing’s “unilateral drilling activities” for oil in waters claimed also by Hanoi have led to “heightening of tensions,” Mr. Abe told The Wall Street Journal in an interview Friday. “We will never tolerate the change of status quo by force or coercion,” added the Japanese leader, who has assiduously courted Southeast Asian leaders during the past year and offered himself as a counterweight to China’s muscle-flexing.
As part of his broader strategy to rearrange the region’s power balance, Mr. Abe also signaled a desire to keep alive his diplomatic overtures to Russia. He condemned Russia’s annexation of portions of Ukraine and noted that Japan has imposed sanctions in coordination with the U.S. and Europe. But he made clear that he also hoped to maintain the dialogue he has intensified through five summit meetings with Mr. Putin, more than Mr. Abe has had with any other head of state…..
Mr. Abe’s remarks came a day before tensions flared anew in Japan’s dispute with China over a small group of islands in the East China Sea as well as the surrounding airspace. Twice on Saturday, Chinese fighter jets flew perilously close to Japanese reconnaissance craft, leading both governments to file protests. Japan said China’s actions were “meant to intimidate,” while China said Japan had “carried out dangerous actions, in serious violation of international laws.”
The weekend exchange underscored a theme of Mr. Abe’s administration—that the region around Japan is increasingly dangerous, and that Tokyo has no choice but to embrace a more muscular foreign policy in response.
In our book on The Rebuilding American Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy, the entire second part of the book deals with Japan and the projected re-working of the Japanese-US working relationship in the Pacific. And the key role falls to Japan in re-shaping what they refer to as a “dynamic defense” strategy. Much of the work in this second part was done by our colleague Richard Weitz in carefully chronicling the path the Japanese have taken and are likely to take.
The bottom line is rather simple: the Japanese are reshaping their capabilities to provide for much more credible perimeter defense against the threats from North Korea and China.
The Japanese have published their 2014 budget documents which indicate their thinking about the way ahead; and those slides can be seen below:
In other words, Japanese national security strategy is in evolution.
In the most recent national security strategy, the Japanese government highlighted its latest iteration of what they called earlier “dynamic defense.”
In an earlier piece, I wrote about the Japanese defense white paper of 2012 and highlighted the following:
This is the first white paper released since they announced their decision to acquire the F-35, and provides a further elucidation upon the new defense policy announced in 2010.
The Japanese announced in that year, that they were shifting from a static island defense, which rested upon mobilization, to a “dynamic defense” which required more agile forces able to operate in the air and maritime regions bordering Japan.
Notably, the Japanese recognized the need for these “dynamic defense” forces to be interoperable with allies to provide for the kind of defense Japan and the allies needed in light of changing dynamics in the region.
As the White Paper puts it:
It is necessary that Japan’s future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force without basing on the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that place priority on “the existence of the defense force.”
To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of “Dynamic Defense Force” that has readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of this “Dynamic Defense Force” focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.
Rather than simply focusing upon a narrow understanding of the defense of Japan proper, the shift was being made to extended defense of Japan understood as an extended perimeter of defense.
Now the Japanese government has released a new National Security Strategy, which highlights an even more comprehensive look ahead built around what they call building a “comprehensive defense architecture.”
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JS Kurama leads ships during a rehearsal for the 2009 fleet review. More than 8,000 civilians toured selected ships and viewed the rehearsal. Credit: USN, 10/21/09
Such an architecture is built on effective joint forces, a close working relationship with key allies, such as the United States, Australia and Japan and a proactive approach in which “Japan will maintain an improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”
Clearly this approach is not just a briefing board document.
Recent events have demonstrated the Japanese engagement in the Philippine relief mission, including closely working with US forces in coming quickly to the aid of the Philippines and then moving out when no longer needed, and scrambling their Air Force in response to the Chinese unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone.
The new strategy highlights the importance of Japan being a “proactive contributor to peace,” rather than just sitting back and hoping someone else takes care of their defense interests. The strategy focuses on the importance of protecting Japanese access to global supply chains and to natural resources, including energy.
And in so doing, protection of sea lines of communication is a key challenge facing Japan and its allies.
The document clearly underscores a Japanese approach to be more proactive but in a broader alliance context, within which the relationship with the United States. But message to the US: you need to be proactive as well.
And part of the SLOC issue involves the Arctic, which is part of an expanded Pacific in any case.
“The Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.”
Japanese Air Self-Defense Force F-15J Eagles fly in formation during RED FLAG-Alaska 12-2 June 11, 2012, Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Credit: 354th Fighter Wing
The document makes it clear that Japan is not simply going to sit back and be intimated by North Korea and China. And Japan is not simply arguing in black in white terms, war or peace, but the necessity to be engaged in shaping a security environment which meets the interests of Japan and its allies.
“In addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests.
There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.”
And later in the document, the importance of being able to operate across the spectrum of security and defense is highlighted as well, including an ability to operate in such “gray zone” situations.
“Even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”
What is underscored in the new strategy is the importance of blending military, security and political initiatives together in expanding effective Japanese alliance relationships.
This approach is highlighted in the discussion of how to deal with SLOC defense.
In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East.
In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.
Japan will play a central role in the reshaping of Pacific defense in response to the challenges of the second nuclear age, China and the Arctic opening. This is not the early post-war Japan.
This is a Japan which correctly recognizes the 21st century is not the 20th.
In effect, since the end of the Cold War, Japan is evolving through two clear phases with regard to defense and security policy and is about to enter a third. The first phase was extended homeland defense, where the focus was primarily on defending the homeland from direct threats to the homeland. A more classic understanding of defense was in play, whereby force had to be projected forward to threaten Japan and as this threat materialized, defenses need to be fortified.
It was defense versus emergent direct threats to Japan.
Life changed. Technology made warfare more dynamic, and the nature of power projection has changed.
The reach from tactical assets can have strategic consequences, the speed of operations has accelerated and operations highlighting the impact of “shock and awe” high speed operations made it clear that relatively static defenses were really not defenses at all.
At the same time, globalization accelerated, and with it the global significance of maritime and air routes and their security for the viability of the Japanese way of life. When terrorists crashed directly into the World Trade Center, Japanese got the point.
No man was an island, and neither was an island economy simply protected by having a global policy of shopkeepers.
More was required to defend the Japanese way of life.
The Evolution of Japanese Defense and Security; Credit: Second Line of Defense
The emergence of the Chinese colossus and the greater reach of the Korean crisis into a direct threat to Japan, and the resurgence of Russia, its nuclear weapons and its military forces, all posed the question of threats able to reach Japan rapidly and with significant effect.
A static defense made no sense; a “dynamic defense” became crucial. This meant greater reach of Japanese systems, better integration of those systems within the Japanese forces themselves, more investments in C2 and ISR, and a long-term strategy of re-working the U.S.-Japanese military relationship to have much greater reach and presence.
The “dynamic defense” phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase – the shaping of a twin anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.
Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves, and requires close integration with the United States and other allies. And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.
The great strength of U.S.-Japan alliance rests not only on a linage of mutual respect for sea operations, and now shared technology, but also Japan also creates a North/South Combat Axis for operations.
Instead of leaving the United States with a Hawaiian-centric strategy with the need to focus on going to West Pac East-West, the Japanese contribution is a very strong (or at least growing again) as a maritime ally which can, in partnership with the United States, help the US go North-South from Japanese Bases to cover an operational area ranging from Pacific Arctic to the Indian Ocean.
And U.S. systems are a key part of the Japanese approach. Clearly, at the top of the list is building out from the Aegis global partnership to include Ospreys and F-35s as centerpiece items. Japanese F-35s would be part of the Pacific fleet of US and allied F-35s and Japan is where the first F-35s are coming in 2015 and by 2020 there could be as many as 5 squadrons of F-35s, USMC, USAF, and Japanese.
This will clearly be the center of excellence for the fledgling F-35 enterprise.
And added to this, the Japanese will build their F-35s in rebuilt Mitsubishi facilities, thus becoming the third final assembly line for F-35s, with Fort Worth, and Cameri, Italy, the other two.
The cross domain synergy among these new systems combined with Japanese integration with their legacy systems are the building blocks for the new “comprehensive defense architecture.”
And to conclude: there is a fundamental difference from PRC and Japanese goals and context. The PRC is an authoritarian regime seeking to reshape international rules to their benefit; Japan is a democracy embedded in alliances seeking to see that international rules are crafted and created which support globalization, not domination.
There is no moral equivalence here.
Rather than asserting that there is a “global commons,” the US and its allies are working to ensure that there will be a functioning global commons in the decades ahead.
This is not about conceptual dominance, but about realpolitik.
