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SERVICES COMMITTEE

**STATEMENT OF
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS**

**BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON**

**THE IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION ON THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE**

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Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the Committee thank you for the opportunity to testify about the impact of sequestration on the national defense.

In this statement I will explain the impacts of sequestration having occurred in FY 2013 and why I believe current law imposing reduced discretionary caps in future years will preclude our ability to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) in the long term. In the near-term, sequestration in FY 2014 will negatively impact our readiness and investments, further degrading programs in all appropriations except military personnel. Combined with the restrictions associated with a continuing resolution on transferring funds, increasing program quantities and starting new projects, these impacts will be considerably worse in FY 2014 than they were in FY 2013.

The Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) directed by the Secretary of Defense was an exercise to produce options and identify choices that would prepare the way for the Department of Defense to comply with the BCA. Now that the SCMR is complete, the Navy's focus is development of a balanced portfolio of programs within the fiscal guidance (fiscal reductions) provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). That work is in progress. It is not complete.

The standard that guides our current planning, programming and budgeting is the DSG and its objectives for the Joint Force; this guidance is benchmarked to the year 2020. The DSG incorporated the first set of BCA-mandated budget reductions and directed the military to address "the projected security environment" and to "recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the missions" of the Armed Forces.

Our President's Budget submission for FY 2014 (PB-14)

Our PB-14 submission was designed to execute the DSG with acceptable risk. Applying the reduced discretionary caps through 2021 will prevent the Navy from executing the DSG. Our January 2013 "Force Structure Assessment" (FSA) is foundational in this discussion as it is our DOD-validated requirement for ships and reflects the direction of the DSG in each mission of the Armed Forces.

The DSG highlights the value of forward presence to support partners, sustain U.S. influence and maintain stability. The Navy's PB-14 submission and associated plans build a fleet that will provide the presence required by the DSG. If executed as planned, it will result in a fleet of approximately 295 ships in 2020 (300 in FY 2019), about 10 more than are in service today. This “2020 Fleet” would do the following in support of the DSG mission to *Provide a Stabilizing Presence*:

- Increase our global deployed presence from about 95 ships today to about 115 in 2020.
- Increase presence in the Asia-Pacific from about 50 ships today to about 60 ships in 2020, consistent with the DSG’s direction to rebalance to that region.
- “Continue to place a premium on U.S. military presence in—and in support of—partner nations” in the Middle East, with about 30 ships. This will include continuous presence of a rotationally-deployed Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), ballistic missile defense (BMD) capable destroyers, and attack submarines. These rotational forces will be augmented by an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), patrol coastal (PC) and mine countermeasures (MCM) ships homeported in Bahrain, which (late in this decade) will be replaced by forward-stationed littoral combat ships (LCS).
- “Evolve our posture” in Europe by meeting our ballistic missile defense European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain and two land based sites in Romania and Poland. Additional presence will be provided by forward operating Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships, an AFSB, and rotationally deployed combatants.
- Provide “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to security in Africa and South America by deploying on average one JHSV and one LCS continuously to both regions, and maintaining an AFSB off of Africa.

Our PB-14 budget submission invests in the capabilities and capacity required for the other missions described in the DSG with the following results:

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW). We would have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions. According to our FSA, this requires one AFSB in the Arabian Gulf and one AFSB in the Gulf of Aden, four LCS, with two deployed in various locations worldwide and six MQ-8B/C *Fire Scout* unmanned air vehicles operating from these platforms.

Deter and Defeat Aggression. We would be able to “conduct one large-scale operation and also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor” in a second theater as required by the DSG. According to the analysis conducted as part of our FSA, this requires 11 aircraft carriers (CVN), 88 large surface combatants (LSC) - cruisers (CG) and destroyers (DDG), 48 attack submarines (SSN), 11 large amphibious assault ships (LHA/D), 11 amphibious transport docks (LPD), 11 dock landing ships (LSD), 52 small surface combatants (LCS, frigates and MCM) and 29 combat logistics force (CLF) ships. Maintained at an appropriate level of readiness in accordance with our Fleet Response Plan, this force structure yields three non-deployed CSG and three ARG ready to deploy in response to a contingency within about 14 days and an appropriate number of CSG, ARG, LSC and SSN able to surge forward in response to crisis. These forces would augment and relieve our presence forces described above, which includes two CSG and two ARG. Our FSA analysis also determined this overall force at the appropriate level of readiness would be sufficient to execute Navy elements of the DSG mission to *Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations*.

Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. The Joint Force requires assured access to meet security commitments to allies and partners, deter aggression and conduct military operations from counterterrorism to disaster response. Our PB-14 submission would implement the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the Air-Sea Battle concept through investments in:

- Undersea capabilities, including:
 - An inventory of P-8A *Poseidon* maritime patrol aircraft that meets the program and warfighting requirement of 117 aircraft in 2019, completing transition from the legacy P-3C *Orion* by 2019.

- Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat system upgrades will be installed in all DDG forward homeported in the Western Pacific by 2018, including addition of a Multifunction Towed Array (MFTA) sonar.
 - An ASW mission package that will be fielded on LCS in 2016, which increases surface ship ASW capacity and delivers improved capability by using a MFTA in combination with a variable depth sonar (VDS).
 - Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedoes to equip all of our helicopters, SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018. PB-14 includes 1,286 Mk 54 advanced lightweight torpedoes for aircraft and 809 improved Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes for submarines.
 - The Virginia Payload Module (VPM) fielded in *Virginia* class submarines in 2027 to enable Virginia-class SSN to replace land attack capacity from guided missile submarines (SSGN) that begin retiring in 2026.
 - An LCS mine countermeasures mission package that employs unmanned vehicles and offboard sensors to locate and neutralize mines while keeping the LCS and its crew outside the mine threat area. The first increment of this mission package will be fielded in 2015, and the second in 2019.
- Air and missile defenses, including:
 - The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP), that delivers upgraded electromagnetic sensing capabilities in 2014 and upgraded jamming and deception capabilities in 2017. Both of these upgrades are required to counter advances in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.
 - The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) to be fielded on seven Flight III *Arleigh Burke* DDG that deliver between 2021 and 2024. Longer-range, more accurate, and more agile than legacy ship-based radars, AMDR is needed to counter advanced anti-ship weapons and jamming.
 - The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II, an improved short-range, ship-based missile that counters attacks by multiple cruise missiles at low altitude, as well as adversary jamming and radar deception. It will be fielded in 2020 with 80 missiles going to the fleet.

- The F-35C *Lightning II*, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, introduced into the fleet by 2019, will integrate into our carrier air wing (CVW) forward homeported in the Western Pacific in 2020. The F-35C's advanced sensors, coupled with its data sharing capability and ability to operate closer to threats, will enhance the CVW's ability to find targets and coordinate attacks.
- An improved air-to-air “kill chain” based on infrared (IR) sensors and weapons that circumvent adversary radar jamming and deception. The Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor system will be fielded in 2016 and an improved version with extended range will be fielded in 2019. The longer range and accuracy of IRST will be employed by the AIM-9X Block III IR-guided missile that delivers in 2021.
- An improved air-to-air radio-frequency (RF) “kill chain” that defeats enemy jamming and operates at longer ranges through upgrades to every F/A-18E/F Block II *Super Hornet* will be fielded by 2018. This radar will be used with the longer-range “fire and forget” AIM-120D, which will be fielded in 2014 and integrated into all Pacific CVW by 2020.
- The Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) network, which integrates aircraft and ship sensor and weapons capabilities. Fielding begins with the E-2D *Advanced Hawkeye* aircraft in 2015 and fully equips six CVW by 2020. Full transition to the E-2D will be complete by 2022.

Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space. Cyberspace is a domain in which attacks and intelligence gathering already occur every day. In a conflict, we will use our advantages in this domain to help defeat adversaries' ability to see, communicate and coordinate their forces. Our PB-14 submission places priority on cyber defense and efforts to build the Navy's portion of DoD's Cyber Mission Forces. It would recruit, hire and train 976 additional cyber operators and form 40 computer attack and defense teams by 2017.

Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. We would sustain today's ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force and ensure the future SSBN(X) delivers in 2030 to replace retiring *Ohio*-class while meeting requirements for SSBN presence and surge.

Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. In accordance with Secretary of Defense direction and the FSA, the capacity required for these missions is one CSG, one ARG, two P-8A, four CG or DDG and 10 LCS that are not deployed and ready for all homeland defense missions. Our PB-14 submission would maintain this capacity.

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. Our FSA analysis determined that these missions will be met by sustaining a continuous overseas presence of two CSG with an additional CSG half the year and three ARG to conduct counter-proliferation activities and six BMD DDG to counter weapons delivered by ballistic missiles. Our PB-14 submission would maintain this level of presence.

Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. Our FSA analysis determined that a presence of 2 ARG and 9 JHSV is sufficient to conduct these operations. Our PB-14 submission would maintain this level of presence.

Impact of a Potential Future Scenario: “Fiscally Constrained to BCA Caps: FY 2015-2023”

Consistent with what the Deputy Secretary of Defense told this committee in August, if fiscally constrained to the revised discretionary caps, over the long term (2013-2023), the Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in the DSG. There are numerous ways to adjust Navy’s portfolio of programs to meet the BCA revised discretionary caps. These are currently under deliberation within the department. As requested, the following provides perspective on the level and type of adjustments that will need to be made.

Any scenario to address the fiscal constraints under current law must include sufficient readiness, capability and manpower to complement the force structure capacity of ships and aircraft. This balance would need to be maintained to ensure each unit will be effective, even if the overall fleet is not able to execute the DSG. There are, however, many ways to balance between force structure, readiness, capability and manpower.

One potential fiscal and programmatic scenario would result in a “2020 Fleet” of about 255-260 ships, about 30 less than today, and about 40 less than Navy’s PB-14 submission. It would include 1-2 fewer CSG, and 1-2 fewer ARG than today. This 2020 fleet would not meet the DSG requirements for the mission to *Provide a Stabilizing Presence*. As a result, Navy

would be less able to reinforce deterrence, build alliances and partnerships and influence events abroad.

- Navy would not increase our global deployed presence, which would remain at about 95 ships in 2020. The lethality inherent in this presence, based on ship type deployed, would be less than today's 95-ship presence.
- Navy would not increase presence in the Asia-Pacific, which would stay at about 50 ships in 2020. This would largely negate the ship force structure portion of our plan to rebalance to the Asia Pacific region directed by the DSG.
- Navy would not “place a premium on U.S. military presence in—and in support of—partner nations” in the Middle East, since presence would decrease and, assuming we use the same ship deployment scheme in the future, there would be gaps in CSG presence totaling 2-3 months each year.
- Navy would still “evolve our posture” in Europe by meeting our ballistic missile defense European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable DDG homeported in Rota, Spain and two land based sites in Romania and Poland. Additional presence would still be provided by forward operating JHSV, MLP, AFSB and some rotationally deployed combatants.
- Navy would still provide “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to security in Africa and South America by deploying, on average, one JHSV and one LCS continuously to both regions and maintaining an AFSB in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility.

In order to sustain a balance of force structure (current and future), modernization and personnel within our portfolio, continued compliance with the BCA revised discretionary caps would compel us to reduce our investments in force structure and modernization, which would result in a “2020 Fleet” that would not meet DSG direction in the following mission areas:

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW). We would not have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions, as defined in the DSG. There would be inadequate LCS available to allocate to this non-core Navy mission, in the amount defined by the FSA and concurred upon by Special Operations Command.

Deter and Defeat Aggression. We would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation and also counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second theater. In this scenario, the fleet would have 9-10 CVN/CSG and 9-10 LHA/D and ARG. We would be able to sustain about one non-deployed CSG and one non-deployed ARG fully certified and able to surge on required timelines. Together, our presence and surge forces would be sufficient to conduct all missions associated with only one large scale operation, as defined today. This overall force and associated readiness would, however, be sufficient to execute Navy elements of the DSG mission to *Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations*.

Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Overall, in this scenario, development of our capabilities to project power would not stay ahead of potential adversaries' A2/AD capabilities. We will not meet the projected capability requirements to assure Joint access in a plausible operational scenario in 2020 due to shortfalls, in particular, in air and missile defense:

- Some undersea capabilities will be slowed:
 - Attainment of the required P-8A inventory (117) would be delayed from 2019 to 2020, and transition from the P-3C to the P-8A would be delayed from 2019 to 2020.
 - Anti-submarine warfare combat system upgrades for DDGs and MFTA installations would not be affected.
 - The LCS ASW Mission Package would be delayed from 2016 to 2017.
 - Upgraded sonobuoys and advanced torpedo procurement would still equip all of our helicopters, SSN, and P-8A in the Western Pacific by 2018.
 - Virginia Payload Module (VPM) would still be fielded in 2027 to enable Virginia-class SSN to replace SSGN that begin retiring in 2026.
 - The LCS mine warfare mission package would still field its first increment in 2015 and the second in 2019.
- Air and missile defense improvements would be slowed:
 - SEWIP upgraded electromagnetic sensing and upgraded jamming and deception capabilities would both be delayed one year (to 2015 and 2018,

respectively). Both of these upgrades are required to counter advances in adversary anti-ship cruise missiles.

- The new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) would be delivered on only four ships, as compared to seven under our PB-14 submission, between 2021 and 2024.
- The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II would still be fielded in 2020, with 80 missiles being delivered to deployed ships.
- The F-35C *Lightning II*, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, would still field in 2019 and join our CVW forward homeported in the Western Pacific in 2020. Overall, the number of F-35 procured would decrease by about 30 aircraft in 2020.
- All components of the improved air-to-air IR “kill chain” that circumvents adversary radar jamming would be delayed by two years. The Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor system would field in 2018 and the improved longer-range IRST would not deliver until 2021. The new longer-range AIM-9X Block III missile would not be fielded until 2023.
- Improvements to the air-to-air RF “kill chain” would be slowed down as F/A-18E/F Block II *Super Hornet* anti-jamming upgrades would be delayed to 2020. The longer-range AIM-120D missile would still field in 2014 but equipping of all Pacific carrier air wings would be delayed by two years to 2022.
- The Navy Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) network would still initially field with the E-2D *Advanced Hawkeye* in 2015, but only four CVW (compared to six in our PB-14 submission) would have it by 2020. Transition to the E-2D would be delayed three years to 2025.

Operate Effectively in Space and Cyber Space. Plans to recruit, hire and train 976 additional cyber operators and form 40 computer operations teams by 2017 would not be impacted. This is a priority in any fiscal scenario. However, the BCA’s reduced funding levels would delay replacement of our cyber systems and decrease our ability to defend our networks.

Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. We would still be able to sustain today’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The SSBN(X) would still deliver in 2030 to

replace retiring *Ohio* class SSBN while meeting requirements for SSBN presence and surge. This is the top priority program for the Navy.

Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. We would still meet the capacity requirements for these missions.

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. We would still meet the presence requirements for this mission.

Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. We would still meet the presence requirements for this mission.

The extent of the fiscal changes in the BCA, when compared to current program and budget levels, would compel Navy to request relief from several program mandates and force structure capacity limits, in order to sustain and build a fleet with a balance of ship types. For example, mandated limits govern the size of the force, minimum funding for certain activities and facilities, and changes to the number of personnel at a base.

The impact of FY 2013 sequestration

Looking at the nearer term, the FY 2013 sequestration reductions compelled us to reduce our afloat and ashore operations and created a significant shore maintenance backlog. However, the effects were barely manageable because we received authorization to reprogram funds into appropriate maintenance accounts, and we were able to use prior-year investment balances to mitigate reductions to investment programs. Impact to Navy programs, caused by the combination of a continuing resolution and sequestration, included:

- Cancelled five ship deployments.
- Delayed deployment of USS HARRY S TRUMAN strike group by six months.
- Planned inactivation, instead of repairing, USS MIAMI due to rising cost and inadequate maintenance funds.
- Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by about 30%.
- Furloughed DON civilian employees for 6 days, which, combined with a hiring freeze, reduced our maintenance and sustainment capacity by taking away logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers, and planners.

- Reduced base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 20%.
- Cancelled the Blue Angels' season and most non-essential port visits for Fleet Weeks.

The prospect of sequestration and a continuing resolution in FY 2014

Sequestration in FY 2014, particularly if combined with restrictions of a continuing resolution (CR), will reduce our readiness in the near-term and in the long-term exacerbate program impacts from budget reductions required under current law. The impacts below assume an approximate 10% cut to the Navy's budget; however, with military personnel accounts exempted, the cut could increase to 14% in all other appropriations. In addition, the restrictions imposed by a CR will reduce our ability to manage the impact of sequestration. The impacts of this reduced funding will be realized in two main categories of budget accounts: (1) operations and maintenance and (2) investments.

(1) *Operation and maintenance* accounts will absorb a larger reduction than in FY 2013 from a smaller overall amount of money; in addition we must begin to address deferred "carry over" bills from FY 2013 that total approximately \$2.3 billion over the next five years. Because we will prioritize meeting current presence requirements, we will be able to preserve 95% of the forward presence originally directed under the FY 2014 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). However, this is still only about half of the Combatant Commander's original request. To ensure adequate funding for the most important deployments, we were compelled to adjust the plan in advance of FY 2014 to remove the deployment of one CG to the Middle East, two salvage ships to Africa and South America and five large surface combatants to the Western Pacific. Most concerning, however, we will have two thirds less surge capacity in FY2014. Our planned presence to meet the GFMAP in FY 2015 and beyond will also be at risk because maintenance cancelled in FY2014 may result in ships being unable to deploy in future years. At a minimum this lost maintenance will reduce the service life of these ships.

Because of the mechanics of sequestration, we cannot reprogram (move) funds from other accounts into operations and maintenance to make up for the sequestered amount. As a result, within operations and maintenance, we have to "go where the money is" and find savings in training, maintenance, civilian personnel, and shore facilities. The reductions in fleet training we are compelled to make will result in only one non-deployed CSG and one ARG trained and

ready for surge operations – notionally without these reductions there would be three of each ready to deploy within about two weeks.

We will be compelled to cancel or defer planned FY 2014 fleet maintenance, including 34 of 55 surface ship maintenance periods totaling about \$950 million – all in private shipyards – and 191 of about 700 aircraft depot maintenance actions. This missed maintenance will inevitably take time off the expected service life of our ships and aircraft, which in turn will make it harder to sustain even the smaller fleet we will have if the BCA caps remain in place for the long term. For example, a recent Center for Naval Analysis study estimated cancelling and not making up one maintenance period at the ten-year point in a DDG’s life will shorten its overall service life by about five years.

We will be compelled to keep in place our freeze on hiring for most civilian positions. Ashore we will continue to conduct only safety-essential renovation and modernization of facilities, further increasing the large backlog in that area.

(2) *Investment* accounts will be particularly impacted by sequestration in FY 2014, and we will not be able to use prior-year funds to mitigate shortfalls as we did in FY 2013. Without Congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the reductions imposed by sequestration and the limitations of a CR will compel us to:

- Cancel planned FY 2014 procurement of an SSN, an LCS and an AFSB; also, delay an SSN planned for FY 2015 procurement. Each of these would further worsen the reduction in fleet size, described earlier in this statement, that the BCA would compel us to make over the long term.
- Delay the planned start of construction on the first SSBN(X) from FY 2021 to FY 2022. This would cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence requirements when the *Ohio*-class SSBN retires.
- Cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft (4 EA-18G *Growler*, 1 F-35C *Lightning II*, 1 E-2D *Advanced Hawkeye*, 2 P-8A *Poseidon*, 3 MH-60 *Seahawk*) and about 400 weapons, exacerbating future BCA-driven reductions in our capabilities to project power despite A2/AD threats.
- Delay delivery of USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN-78) by two years, extending the period of 10 CVN in service, and lowering surge capacity.

- Delay the mid-life overhaul of USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) scheduled for FY 2016, disrupting today's "heel-to-toe" CVN overhaul schedule and reducing near-term CVN capacity.

In order to avoid or remedy some of the FY 2014 impacts described above, we need Congress to approve authorization and appropriations bills. This would enable the Navy to transfer funds, pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase production quantities, and complete ships. This would:

- Keep SSBN(X) on schedule to sustain required SSBN capacity after the *Ohio* class begins to retire.
- Buy two *Virginia* class SSN in FY 2014 as planned and keep FY 2015 SSN procurement on schedule. These actions will help maintain our undersea dominance and ability to project power despite A2/AD threats.
- Protect CVN-73's mid-life overhaul and complete CVN-78 on time to sustain CVN capacity.
- Build the planned AFSB in FY 2014, which is needed to meet DSG and combatant commander presence requirements for CT/IW capability.
- Restore half of the cancelled surface ship maintenance availabilities to protect FY 2015 presence.

Conclusion

We understand the pressing need for the nation to get its fiscal house in order. DOD should do its part, but it is imperative we do so in a coherent and thoughtful manner to ensure appropriate readiness, warfighting capability, and forward presence – the attributes we depend upon from our Navy. Specifically, we need to be able to establish and pursue a deliberate plan for future force development. Regardless of the level of funding we receive, having a predictable budget and associated authorities will enable us to develop and execute an achievable strategy. This strategy would guide our efforts to sustain the appropriate readiness in today's Navy while building a future fleet that is able to deliver the most important presence and capabilities and address the most important warfighting scenarios.

We will continue to view each of our choices through the lens of the three tenets I established when I took office as CNO: *Warfighting First*, *Operate Forward*, and *Be Ready*. But with each year of sequestration, the loss of force structure, readiness, and future investments will cause our options to become increasingly constrained and drastic; our ability to contribute to the nation's security will be reduced.

We look forward to working with the Congress to find solutions that will ensure our Navy remains preeminent and preserve the nation's security and prosperity.