

EUROPEAN DEFENSE, THE ARCTIC AND THE FUTURE



In this Special Report, *Second Line of Defense* looks at the evolving defense and security situation in the Baltics and in the Arctic. Russian actions in Crimea have returned direct defense to the European agenda, a fact not missed by the Northern European powers and the Baltic states.

This report is divided into three parts.

The first part is based on interviews conducted in Denmark in May 2014 and provides Danish perspectives on the evolving defense and security situation in their neighborhood.

The second part examines how the Crimean crisis is affecting broader global relations, and the direct defense of Europe, in particular.

The third part then focuses upon the Arctic opening and ways the developmental, safety and security dimensions intersect with Arctic defense.

Russian map making is having its impact on Northern Europe. This report focuses on some aspects of that impact.

European Defense, the Arctic and the Future

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PART ONE: DANISH PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALTICS AND THE ARCTIC: POST CRIMEA

Admiral Wang on Baltic and Arctic defense

By Robbin Laird

Earlier, I had the chance to interview Admiral Wang on [Arctic issues](#).

In that interview, the Admiral provided an overview on the various states involved in Arctic security and focused on the key challenges facing the Kingdom of Denmark, which is to say managing the relationships among Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

In this interview conducted at his office in Copenhagen, the Admiral focused on the impact of the Ukrainian events on Danish thinking about Baltic defense and residually upon the Arctic.

The Admiral is now in charge of the integrated Danish military colleges and is focused on shaping a more integrated inter-service perspective, which will allow Denmark to shape the kind of 21st century force needed for Danish defense.

The new position was described in [a press release](#) earlier this year:

The command of the three academies was handed over to rear admiral Nils Wang, Commander of the Royal Danish Defence College, at ceremonies on January 6.

The move to consolidate the three institutions under Royal Danish Defence College is a consequence of the latest Danish defence agreement.

We have now reached another milestone in the defence agreement and in our plans for the educational field.

With the merger a foundation is laid for an even better link between the craftsmanship and professionalism of the three military services on the one hand and the research and development to support it on the other hand, says rear admiral Nils Wang.

The establishment of new relations both internally between the academies and the Royal Danish Defence College as well as between the three services and the new Royal Danish Defence College will have a major focus in the near future, says Nils Wang.

Question: How do you see the way ahead for building a more integrated Danish force?

Admiral Wang: Being a small country with a small defense force, the most important thing is that you are actually able to plug and play with something bigger.

That is the first consideration.

You'll always have to be able to answer the question: who will be my strategic partners?

That can then vary from scenario to scenario, but you really have to focus your attention on the coalition and your potential role within that coalition.

Question: In other words, you need to make certain that you have built a modular force?



FIGURE 1 LT. CMDR. BOUDEWIJN BOOTS, COMMANDING OFFICER OF HNLMS EVERTSEN (F805), WATCHES A DANISH HELICOPTER FROM THE SHIP'S BRIDGE AS IT PREPARES TO COME ALONGSIDE DURING BALTIC OPERATIONS (BALTOPS) 2013.

NOW IN ITS 41ST YEAR, BALTOPS IS AN ANNUAL, MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE TO ENHANCE MARITIME CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARTNER NATIONS TO PROMOTE MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA. US NAVY MEDIA CONTENT SERVICES, 6/10/13

Admiral Wang: Modular but also a plug and play capability as well.

We need to have hardware that is flexible, compatible and with the ability to operate on the same frequencies, use the same spare parts, and having the same flight systems, etc.

Also important is what I would call the “software” issue or our way of thinking about operations.

This is where education is a vital part of the equation.

Question: How do the demands of Baltic or Arctic Defense affect this approach?

Admiral Wang: When you're talking about Baltic dependence or Arctic dependence, these are two different scenarios where you will have to employ equipment and personnel in very different cooperative framework or coalition dynamics.

I think that the Ukraine crisis has drawn attention to the fact that the three Baltic states took a very bold decision ten years ago. They applied for a NATO membership, and NATO accepted them.

That is a commitment that goes both ways, and when you have a scenario like the one that we are experiencing right now with Russia and their intervention in Ukraine, I think it's very, very important for NATO to send a message that the three Baltic states are NATO members and we are prepared to defend them in a clear manner.

That is why Denmark is deploying F-16s to the Baltic states, and the reason why we can deploy F-16s to the Baltic states without any problem as a routine operation, is basically because we have made it the entire Danish defense force, including our fighter aircraft deployable over the last ten, fifteen years.

Question: Clearly, the main issue for the Arctic is development and security, but defense issues could be raised as well.

How do you see these possibilities?

Admiral Wang: As you know from our earlier discussions, I see the safety and security dimensions of Arctic development as the most pressing.

But clearly, conflict can develop, most likely as a result of spill over from other issues.

It would most likely be triggered by something that happens somewhere else.

It could be the Ukraine crisis but it can also be a U.S., Chinese confrontation in the South China Sea that suddenly sets a new agenda in the Arctic.

If that is the case, then I think the Arctic would turn into an Article Five scenario, as the Arctic area is an area that is included in the NATO treaty. In the Arctic there are five coastal states and four of them are actually members of NATO.



FIGURE 2 THE FINNISH SHIP FNS POHJAMA (01), RIGHT, SAILS NEXT TO THE ROYAL DANISH NAVY SHIP HDMS ABSALON (L16) DURING EXERCISE BALTIC OPERATIONS (BALTOPS) 2013. NAVY MEDIA CONTENT SERVICES, 6/11/13.

There you suddenly have a game changer.

However, in the most likely situation, what you need are capabilities such as: largely coast guard functions which is search and rescue, oil spill management, and surveillance so that you actually know what is going on out there.

The convergence between Baltic defense and arctic defense is clearly around shaping flexible forces, which have the ability to plug and play with others.

Question: How does the Ukrainian situation refocus European attention?

Admiral Wang: The Ukraine situation has in fact put emphasis to our own region after having the luxury I would say for maybe ten or fifteen years to see security issues as largely being about national interests in a global setting such as in Afghanistan, Libya or wherever and now suddenly it is not as much a matter of national interest, it is actually a matter of national defense.

I'm sure that the European politicians will need to consider seriously whether they are investing enough money on defense forces. We have had a long period where you can actually take money from the defense forces and put it into other areas because of the absence of concern for direct defense.

There is an interesting potential linkage between the Ukraine and the Arctic.

Russia might have won a tactical victory but I think Russia might suffer a strategic defeat.

Because of the annexation of Crimea and the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the European politicians will have to address how to free themselves from energy imports from Russia, and if they do so this will have a clear impact on Russian interests.

Question: How might the Ukraine crisis affect Scandinavian cooperation?



FIGURE 3 THE FLEET REPLENISHMENT OILER USNS JOHN LENTHALL, LEFT, TRANSFERS FUEL TO THE ROYAL DANISH NAVY C2 AND SUPPORT SHIP HDMS ESBERN SNARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, MARCH 26, 2014. CREDIT PHOTO USN

Admiral Wang: For many years, there has been talk of greater Scandinavian cooperation. The problem has been that the Nordic countries might share values, but we do not always, at least not in the past, share the same perception of security issues.

You have Denmark and Norway being NATO members but two very different NATO members. Denmark has the expeditionary extreme and Norway has focused more on territorial defense.

The Swedes are very EU-centric and has put their eggs in the EU Battle Group basket.

Then there is Finland that has maintained their skepticism towards Russia and maintained a territorial security approach like during the Cold War.

Nonetheless, both the Baltic and Arctic issues might well create a situation where you have more common ground for the Nordic countries to build cooperation in practical ways.

The Ukraine incident actually also could accelerate the establishment of missile defense in Europe as well. If the upcoming NATO summit in Wales were to push the missile defense agenda forward that could

demonstrate to the Russians that they do no longer have a say on this issue and that there are costs to their actions.

Question: How do you view the way ahead with regard to Baltic defense?

Admiral Wang: We have shaped a number of solid building blocks with the Baltic states already, but I think we need to bring these efforts together into a more comprehensive defense strategy so that the Russians understand how integrated the Balts are into NATO defense and also into the defense policies of the Nordic states.

Two examples of the building blocks, which I have in mind, are the BALTOPS exercises and the integration of the Baltic Brigades into a Danish division.

We could easily expand these efforts into more joint and integrated training activities, which apart from good training also could be part of the trip wire that NATO needs to establish along the Alliance borders in the Baltic region.

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: The Head of Nato Focuses on the Challenge

By Robbin Laird

With the return of direct defense considerations, the Western Alliance will need to focus on what needs have to be addressed and how.

But has the Russian action in Crimea as well as earlier actions in Georgia raised the prospects that NATO territory is not really considered indivisible?

Putin is acting under the assumption that Ben Franklin was right: the European nations will hang separately.

His actions are really designed to shape disaggregated responses to pressures on the key points within the European Union, for he really does not fear an American surge of leadership of NATO that would lead to the kind of cohesion to head off piecemeal threats.

Perhaps what is emerging is a situation in which lead states need to express their core commitments to proximate defense.

Poland and the Baltic states are clearly in the front lines, and the question becomes then who really is committed to support the actions of these states in providing for their direct defense?

This means that for the Baltic states, the Nordic states are crucial front line states providing defense in depth for the Baltics and then the question is what or who does what to augment capabilities in a crisis situation.



FIGURE 4. FOGH RASMUSSEN: 'IN THE RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE NATO IS CONSIDERED AS AN ADVERSARY, AND I THINK WE SHOULD TAKE THAT SERIOUSLY' (PHOTO: NATO.INT)

Whether the Germans like or not, they are the key state backing Poland in terms of proximity and if they fail in some fundamental way to be able to reinforce Polish defense in depth, the ripple effects from Ukrainian instability and fragmentation will be directed at the heart of Poland.

According to a recent piece by Andrew Rettman in the *EU Observer*, the head of NATO clearly is very concerned about Russian actions and the return of direct defense as a core European concern.

Nato chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said Russia's partition of Ukraine has created "a completely new security situation in Europe."

"What we have seen in Ukraine is outrageous", he told press at a regular briefing in Brussels on Monday (19 May).

"For more than 20 years we have based our defence planning on the assumption that there would be no imminent threat from Russia, but now we have seen the Russian doctrine that Russia reserves the right to intervene in other countries to protect the interests of Russian communities and we have seen in Crimea and in Ukraine that this doctrine is not just words – it can easily be turned into action."

"We have seen that in the Russian military doctrine Nato is considered as an adversary, and I think we should take that seriously – it's not just words."

He accused Russian leader Vladimir Putin of lying about his troops.

Referring to a Kremlin statement earlier in the day that it had pulled back forces, Fogh-Rasmussen said: "Now, I think, it's the third Putin statement on withdrawal of Russia troops, but so far we haven't seen any withdrawal at all. There's absolutely no reason why the Russians should mass a military force of this scale along Ukraine's borders."

He noted "there is a clear risk instability in [Ukraine's] eastern regions will make it difficult to conduct elections in that part of the country" and "there's no doubt Russia is deeply involved in the destabilisation of the situation in eastern Ukraine".

He also predicted more trouble in the run-up to EU plans to sign free trade pacts with Georgia and Moldova in June.

"It's my assessment that we will see the same [Russian pressure] as Moldova and Georgia are going to finalise these agreements," he said.

“Based on previous experience, that might include gas prices, gas supply, trade restrictions and also attempts to further destabilise the situation in these countries through exploiting the protracted conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.”

But make no mistake; this is NOT the Cold War where the U.S. will shape as cohesive an alliance as possible to deal with the Soviet Union.

It is about Europe shaping and deploying capabilities to deal with the indirect and direct pressures of a Russia set to reverse course within European security.

We have heard much in the past twenty years about European defense, which now needs to see an effective light of day.

The Nordics and Baltic and Arctic Defense: A Discussion with the Head of Risk Intelligence

2014-05-27 by Robbin Laird

During my visit to Denmark in May 2014, I had a chance to discuss with Danish analysts and policy makers various aspects of Danish assessments of Baltic defense and Arctic defense and security issues.

One of those analysts was our strategic partner, Hans Tino Hansen, founder and CEO of Risk Intelligence based in Denmark.

He works extensively with the shipping, offshore, oil & gas companies in the Nordic countries as well as worldwide.

He is well connected throughout the Nordic defense and security circles and during my visit to Denmark, we had a chance to discuss Nordic thinking about the future of Baltic defense after the Russian map rewriting exercise in Ukraine.

Question: I would like to start by discussing Sweden and its reactions to Russian actions.

The Swedes clearly are taking Russian actions quite seriously. For example, they announced recently that they are increasing their defense budget by nearly \$900 million per annum and adding new cruise missile capabilities to their aircraft.

What is your sense of the Swedish dynamic?



FIGURE 5 BALTIC AND ARCTIC SECURITY ARE CRUCIAL TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, WHICH ARE OF INCREASING SALIENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE TO EUROPE AS A WHOLE. CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

HTH: I think that what has happened in Sweden is like with other Western European countries.

They have been reducing their defense to such an extent that they are at the lowest level possible to actually withhold or maintain a credible defense – or even below. They got their first wake up call last year when Russian air exercises were targeted against Swedish installations.

And they didn't actually have the 24/7 Quick Alert Reaction (QRA) fighter capability to show sovereignty against the Russians.

Ironically, Danish F16s operating from Lithuania during the NATO Air-Policing mission in the Baltic countries intercepted the Russian planes.

The second wake-up call is of course Ukraine and the Crimea. They have increasingly been talking about building a defense that can actually, interact with NATO in defending the Baltic area. Not only the Baltic area as a sea area, or a region, but also actually within the Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania themselves.

Of course, Sweden is not a member of NATO. Sweden has always said that they are not necessarily neutral, but they are alliance-free, and that is not necessarily the same thing.

We also know from the Cold War that they actually worked very closely together with the Danes, and the Germans, and the Americans, and the Norwegians. We could say that it's actually going back in some ways to how it was before.

But they've simply reduced too much in their defense, and they have been focusing on "out of area operations" as has Denmark and this has reduced the importance of direct defense and the planning for it as well.

In contrast, the Norwegians and the Finns, have maintained a tradition of direct defense, which is, of course the target of defending their own sovereign area against the opponents that might be in that area, which is, of course, Russia.

I've been to several conferences during the last 10 years where the Norwegians constantly have to put up a map on the over-head, or the computer, showing the Arctic, which to others was a little bit strange, while everybody else is talking about the Horn of Africa, anti-piracy operations, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and Eastern Mediterranean and so on.

The Norwegians have been constantly focused the Arctic as a key domain to protect their interests.

For the Finns, they know from historic experience what their core requirement clearly is, namely national survival. They don't need to engage and do all the out of area operations, and that's why they still have these 14 brigades, more than any other Western European country. They are not confused about the need for direct defense against Russia. Here they have been a constant.

Question: How might Denmark reset its forces to do a more effective direct defense effort in the Baltics and in the region?

HTH: You can say that in some respect we've partly maintained the ability to do direct defense, however, that's probably quite hollow, because the army has been fully engaged in Iraq and then Afghanistan, and we're just pulling out now.

Which means that the army has been basically designed to deliver a battalion battle group for 6 month periods, twice a year, for the last 7 years. This is what we've been doing.

The problem is also that we are below the lowest numbers that should be in the system, should be in the structure, in order to actually both develop, train, and exercise an army.

When it comes to a navy, the assets are quite different from during the Cold War.

Through the Cold War, the Danish navy was based on fast, small, very agile, but very lethal units. We had fast missile boats and submarines to protect the Danish Straits and operate far into the Baltic Sea.



FIGURE 6 THE SUN SETS ON HER DANISH MAJESTY'S SHIP, HDMS THETIS (F357), DURING THE SECOND DAY OF THE UNDERWAY PHASE OF BALTIC OPERATIONS (BALTOPS) 2013. DENMARK IS ONE OF 10 COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 41ST ITERATION OF THIS MULTI-NATIONAL EXERCISE THAT IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE MARITIME CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARTNER NATIONS TO PROMOTE MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA. (DANISH NAVY PHOTO BY USN MEDIA SERVICES).

Since then they have been transformed into a real blue water navy, with three air defense frigates and the two command and support ships and they have been engaged in anti-piracy operations at the Horn of Africa, more or less, constantly since 2008.

That's of course more of a policing function. You can argue it has to do with security, but it's nothing to do with defense.

Question: I assume this is has to do in part to the Danish stake in merchant shipping?

HTH: It does. It is about free trade flows, global free trade flows, and you can only protect them at sea with naval assets of some size.

The shipping industry is very important to Denmark because the net currency inflow is about 150-200 billion Danish Krone per year, which is quite significant and about 10-12% of the world's trade is moved on Danish operated or owned vessels.

That says something about the magnitude of the interest in free-trade flows for Denmark. This is also partly why Risk Intelligence has been so successful in the maritime domain with over 12% of the World fleet operated by clients Worldwide. We have been able to combine an understanding of international shipping and offshore operations together with intelligence products, which fit the needs of modern shipowners and oil companies.

The expanded role for the navy has affected direct defense as well.

The missile air defense frigates was designed to play the role of defending Danish territory as the Air Force missile defense role was disbanded. You can cover all of Danish territory with two missile defense frigates if properly armed.

And actually one of the discussions that have come up due to Ukraine is the need to bring forward the acquisition process for arming the air defense frigates with medium range missiles and potentially missiles for the ballistic air defense program.

I think that most people understand that we are not returning to the Cold War. And I think that's also the general understanding of Danish defense and among Danes' positions.

But the crisis has raised issue of, have we actually reduced the defense too much?

I think many among the parties behind the Defence Agreement actually agree that we have probably gone beyond the limit of how much we can reduce in order to have a defense that is robust and designed to actually meet the operational requirements set by the very same politicians.

We need to expand a defense capability that plays into the security role, and at the same time can perform tasks in the whole Kingdom of Denmark area including Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

Question: We're talking about a flexible air and naval force that works effectively together?

HTH: Absolutely.

I think that since the Cold War, the Danish military has been forced by circumstances, to pursue the flex concept that was made for the navy, that you can actually use containerized positions on different ships and configure them in different roles.

That was out of necessity and out of financial constraints.

And that is a concept that has been applauded by many, many nations around the world, and I think you can even do it further when you look at the defense. Right now the Arctic patrol frigates are actually financed outside the defense budget because of their fishery protection role.

One could argue that it's probably time to look at when these ships are going to be replaced that need to build a multi-role platform and not only one that can be search and rescue and fishery protection, but also more robust in performing security and defense related tasks.

Question: Do you think that mainstream Europe has grasped the growing importance of the Arctic and the role of the Northern European states, or put in other words, one can foresee a shift in power northward due to Arctic resources, in contrast the general dependence of the rest of Europe on outside energy resources?

HTH: Frankly, no. Generally speaking Europe needs to shape a greater effort for energy independence. For example, the dependence of Germany on Russian gas imports clearly limits its sovereignty and ability to play a key foreign policy role.



FIGURE 7 THE KNUD RASMUSSEN CLASS OPVS ARE DEPLOYED IN A RANGE OF MISSIONS INCLUDING SEARCH AND RESCUE, SOVEREIGNTY ENFORCEMENT, FISHERIES INSPECTIONS, ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION, ICEBREAKER ASSIGNMENTS, TOWAGE AND SALVAGE OPERATIONS, AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DANISH AND GREENLAND GOVERNMENTS. CREDIT PHOTO: ROYAL DANISH NAVY.

But I do not think that the full strategic impact of the Northern Region is fully understood in the capitals of Europe. Not at the moment.

Question: Thinking about the Baltic defense and the Arctic opening, what are the realistic expectations about Baltic defense and what the United States will or will not do?

HTH: If we look at the role in the Baltic since the 1990's, the different countries in the region have assisted one of the Baltic Republics in building up their army, building their navy, or similar. And we should just continue to do that.

The Danish army division actually has the Baltic brigades as component units. The Danish division that actually organizes and exercise, maybe with an American battalion coming over or a Polish company battalion, then

that demonstrates in practical ways NATO's exercising in these three countries. We are building capacity, we are helping them getting new equipment and shaping new approaches.

The same goes for the Arctic and the need to build a grid of communications, especially north of 70 degrees north, ISR and safety, search and rescue and defense capability to help develop and protect the region.

It is about actually knowing where the problem may arise, having the assets to find operate in the region. By laying down a grid, defense could be built from that grid.

The American role could be enhanced if Americans design, or re-design some of their own capability to be able to actually be an active partner in the region.

At the moment US capability in the Arctic is almost non-existent.

There are a number of areas where the Americans could do a lot if they so chose and would be important for security and defense in the region such as communications, ISR and logistics.

But we shall see.

Perspectives on Sweden and the Russian Factor

Sweden to beef up air force to counter Russia

4/23/14

Sweden's centre-right government coalition announced plans on Tuesday to pump more funds into the military if the four parties win the September elections, with an emphasis on more fighter jets and submarines.

In an article published in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) the four party leaders wrote about the crisis in Ukraine and how Russia had now ramped up both its military and propaganda machines. The leaders said they had previously welcomed Russia's attempts to embed itself deeper in the global community, despite harbouring fears that the tide could turn at any point.

"What we see today is a Russia that acts in a way that confirms and surpasses the fears we had then," the leaders of the Moderate, Liberal (Folkpartiet), Centre and Christian Democrat Parties wrote. If the coalition were to remain in power, it would aim to increase the military budget by five billion kronor (\$760 million) annually, starting in 2015.

"Seen against the backdrop of developments in our region it can be particularly motivated to increase Swedish presence on the Baltic Sea and on Gotland Island," the op-ed text stated. It would also order Saab to provide the Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) with 70 rather than 60 of the new generation of Jas Gripen E fighter jets. Adding more submarines to the naval fleet would also be on the cards if the government's proposals make it to the negotiation table with other parliamentary parties. Sweden has traditionally anchored much of defence policy across party lines to secure longevity.

"Sweden should have an accessible and useful defence, adapted to a rapidly changing world," Fredrik Reinfeldt, Jan Björklund, Göran Hägglund and Annie Lööf wrote.

Sweden ups readiness for new Russian 'attack'

5/3/13

Defense News said Sweden's Defense Ministry is set to discuss the implementation of new advance warning and rapid reaction structures after the disclosure that Russian aircraft conducted a nighttime "simulated" attack on key Swedish military and civilian installations last month.

"We have observed that Russia has stepped up its training exercises and that they are behaving in a different way than before. We intend to maintain a close watch on the situation," Defense Minister Karin Enström said in a statement.

The Swedish Air Force reportedly failed to monitor exercises ostensibly aimed at Swedish targets, because no planes or pilots were available.

The newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reports that during Easter weekend the Russian Air Force held maneuvers in the Baltic just outside Sweden's territorial boundary. Held off of the island Gotska Sandön, military sources tell the newspaper that the fictitious targets of the exercise were two of Sweden's most important military bases.

"It is a decidedly serious matter if we discover that Swedish preparedness does not work. We must have a 24/7 rapid reaction capability. For Russian aircraft to run a mock bombing exercise apparently simulating attacks against Swedish targets reminds me of the Cold War era. This confirms our image that Russia means business when it comes to raising its military capacity." said Peter Hultqvist, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense (PCoD), to Defense News

Ukraine Crisis Prompts Sweden to Boost Arms Budget

4/22/14

Following the crisis in Ukraine, Sweden's government has proposed increasing the Nordic country's military spending by 5.5 billion Swedish kronor (\$830 million) a year.

The four-party center-right coalition said Tuesday it is deeply concerned by the recent events in Ukraine and wants to raise the military outlays gradually in coming years to reach the proposed figure by 2024.

Among other things, it wants to buy 10 more fighter jets and two more submarines to improve the defense of the Baltic Sea and the island Gotland.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Sweden's defense budget was slashed and its military emphasis shifted toward international peacekeeping operations. Now, however, both the left-leaning opposition and the government agree that the country's military readiness is inadequate.

A Danish story at the time of the Russian incursion into Swedish air space underscored the importance of the Nordics supporting one another.

April 23, 2013

Danish F-16s Confronted Russian fighter jets Approaching Sweden

The Russian military has increased its presence in the Baltic region over the past few years, much to the consternation of the Swedes

On Good Friday, March 29, two bombers and four fighters from the Russian Air Force approached Swedish airspace, completely catching the Swedes by surprise.

With the Swedes asleep at the wheel, two Danish F-16 jets under NATO command were sent up to face the approaching Russians. The Russian jets turned around just 30-40 kilometres, a couple of minute's flight time, from Sweden's border and the Danish F-16's fell in to 'shadow' the Russians, or "fly the flag" as the defence minister, Nick Hækkerup (Socialdemokraterne), put it.



FIGURE 8 HAD THE TWO DANISH JETS NOT ARRIVED, THE RUSSIANS COULD HAVE EASILY ENTERED SWEDISH AIRSPACE UNHINDERED (PHOTO: COLOURBOX)

"The Danish planes did exactly as they should have and it's completely standard procedure that they fly up and show that they are aware of the other airplanes," Hækkerup told Jyllands-Posten newspaper. "The difference in this case was that the planes were Russian and not something we are used to seeing in these parts."

The mission over the Baltic Sea had been kept under wraps until yesterday when Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet revealed the details.

The Russian mission has sparked great political debate in Sweden due to the fact that no Swedish jets were sent up to 'greet' their Russian counterparts.

Had the Danish fighters, which flew in from the NATO base in Lithuania, not been sent up, the Russian jets could have theoretically entered Swedish airspace without confrontation.

Swedish military experts told Svenska Dagbladet that the Russians were most likely testing the possibility of bombing two central targets in Sweden – one near the capital of Stockholm and one in southern Sweden.

Hækkerup said that the Russian action would not lead to an official inquiry from the Danes, but the Swedish authorities have found it "deeply concerning" that Russia has found it necessary to train "that type of mission", according to Svenska Dagbladet.

According to reporting from Sweden's English-language news source, The Local, the country's foreign minister, Carl Bildt, said that the Swedes would not demand an official explanation from Moscow.

"We don't react to everything, we're not up in the air for everything and we shouldn't be," Bildt told TT news agency.

The four Russian fighters, or 'flankers' as they are known in NATO jargon, were of the SU-27 make, while the two bombers were TU-22M3s, bombers which, in theory, are able to carry atomic weapons.

The Danish air command, Flyvertaktisk Kommando, confirmed that the two Danish fighters had been in action over Easter, but refused to elaborate further. NATO has said that it will reveal details of the situation within a few days.

<http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-f-16s-confronted-russian-fighter-jets-approaching-sweden.5052.html>

Rear Admiral (Retired) Henrik Kudsk on Understanding the Arctic Challenges

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Denmark, I had a chance to discuss the Arctic challenge with a Danish naval officer with many years of Arctic experience.

Rear Admiral (Retired) Henrik Kudsk has 41 years of experience in the Danish Navy with much of that in the Arctic, including being the commander at one time of the Greenland-based Danish forces.

Question: How important is Arctic experience to understanding the Arctic challenge?



FIGURE 9 REAR ADMIRAL KUDSK SPEAKING AT HIS TIME OF DEPARTURE FOR COMMANDER OF THE GREENLAND COMMAND IN THE FALL OF 2012.

Kudsk: It is very important because of how unique the terrain actually is. In many parts of the world, one can forget how dominant nature is in reality; you cannot forget that a single day in the Arctic.

In the Arctic your mentality changes because you know that nature sets conditions, in quite a different way for normal Western life.

Operations are challenging as well. When you sail your ship, when you fly an aircraft, there are times in which you have to apply power.

You have to push forward. Whereas, other conditions, if you do that, **even a small mistake will kill you.**

With several years of operational experience, you can become attuned to how best to survive and persist in the Arctic.



FIGURE 10 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RAY MABUS SPEAKS WITH ROYAL DANISH NAVY REAR ADM. HENRIK KUDSK, ISLAND COMMANDER OF GREENLAND, ABOARD THE ROYAL DANISH NAVY ARCTIC PATROL VESSEL HDMS EJNAR MIKKELSEN. USN MEDIA CONTENT SERVICES, 10/10/10

Question: What is the challenge for the Danish Navy to operate in the Arctic?

Kudsk: Our presence is 365 days a year. That means a ship up there will meet the monster wave, will meet the perfect storm. You will experience both.

Also, you will have the very beautiful nature. You will have the sunny day in the high Arctic, but also you have extreme weather that exceeds hurricane force winds, with deep chilling temperatures that will exceed what you're experiencing in temperate parts of the world.

If you're not prepared, and if you're equipment is not designed to operate in the Arctic, you'll flounder.

I can give an example of the design aspect.

For instance, our patrol frigates weigh around 3,500-4,000 tons; helicopter carrying, and looks like a frigate. They are double-crewed: they swap the crew, like an A and B team.

We fly people up to a relevant harbor and then swap crew every 2nd or 3rd month.

For the daily work, you will need Coast Guard-type equipment. You have a relatively small crew for the size of the ship as well.

The other point is that our ships are geared low.

They have a lot of power, relative to their size. They are more like a Jeep than a Ferrari. That means that our ships up there have a maximum speed of around 20-21 knots and they are the fastest ships you can employ in the Arctic.

Our ships are designed to propel in even the most severe weather. They can propel through ice and ice-filled areas as well.

Question: What is the most basic need to operate in the Arctic in the decade ahead as the Arctic opening proceeds?

Kudsk: Clearly, the most basic need is to build out ISR and, in effect, build out a communications and sensor grid to provide for the kind domain awareness most central to development, safety and security in the region.

And this is doable, because compared to other regions; there is significantly less traffic and human habitation. This makes it easier to identify the anomalies and threats, which need to be monitored.

You have a pristine environment up there where human activity is relatively visible, when compared to the rest of the world, where you can disappear in a crowd. But you still need systems, which can help you, see over vast distances and in difficult communications conditions.



FIGURE 11 THE CREW OF COAST GUARD CUTTER TIGER SHARK, HOME-PORTED IN NEWPORT, R.I., PULLS ALONGSIDE THE VAEDDEREN, A ROYAL DANISH NAVAL SHIP, IN CAPE COD BAY, MASS., MARCH 26, 2008. THE TIGER SHARK HOSTED THE ROYAL DANISH NAVY FOR A DAMAGE CONTROL EXERCISE AS PART OF A TWO-DAY EXERCISE TO ENHANCE TEAMWORK BETWEEN THE COAST GUARD AND ROYAL DANISH NAVY. USCG DISTRICT 1, 10/21/07

For example, I believe that leasing capability from the Canadian Radarsat system might make sense for Denmark as we build out the grid, which we will need to operate in the region as it opens up.

There are major challenges for communication systems in the region as well.

Today, most systems are designed to operate always on and always connected. This is impossible in the Arctic where you have only windows where you can communicate, not a constant capability to do so.

Question: We have had agreement by the Arctic five about working together to deal with the Arctic opening. The Russians are key member of the Arctic council, and how do you see the way ahead in shaping operative collaboration?

Kudsk: The key is to push collaboration down to the operational level and to get the safety and security capabilities of the key players in the region able to work together. This requires exercises as well as enhancing ability to share data and communications as well.

It also has to be remembered that the Arctic is not Antarctica. Antarctica is a land mass and can be divided up as such.

The Arctic is dominated by the sea and requires cross-national cooperation in providing for the safety and security required as the Arctic opens up.

The Russians are the largest stakeholders in the Arctic with roughly 50% of the known resources under their control; obviously, cooperation with the Russians is part of the way ahead.

SAREX 13 and the Arctic Challenge

Even though a small state, Denmark is providing intellectual and practical leadership in shaping Arctic policy for the Western states.

In part, this in the absence of the kind of Canadian and US leadership one should expect, but has not really been evident to date.

An example of this was leading a search and rescue exercise in the Arctic in September 2013.




FIGURE 12 THE LOCATION OF THE RESCUE EFFORT IN SAREX 13. CREDIT CANADIAN AIR FORCE

The scenario focused on a real world problem, namely a cruise ship in distress with the need to both search and rescue passengers and crew.

Because situational awareness is difficult, communications episodic and the ability to reach the right point to make a difference with the right rescue means, the challenge to do “normal” S and R is formidable.

The exercise demonstrated how difficult it is to do “routine” S and R.

The Danes have released a report, which suggested that some things went well, but clearly many did not, which, of course, is the point of running exercises.

The gaps in the ability of the nations to work together, the absence of enough S and R platforms, the real shortfall in SA, and the pot holes associated with communication were all highlighted in the after action report.

One of the more dramatic lessons learned was high significant is the shortfall in basic communications which undercuts significantly S and R capabilities.

Hence this was a recommendation about how to build a patch work solution:

As recommended during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, a simple and self sustained satellite internet transceiver solution, easy put on a mountain top, capable of covering at least 10 Nm, is recommended as the interim solution until internet SATCOM coverage in the fiord systems and above 72N is available.

Such systems are recommended to be tested and implemented immediately. If an area is covered with internet the Tetra-Flex system can link-up and Tetra-Flex data be exchanged.

Otherwise, it must be investigated if it is possible to deploy larger generators or attached fuel tanks for the Tetra-Flex relay stations, which was tested and failed during SAREX 2013.

As an alternative to internet SATCOM and Tetra-Flex the Greenlandic Police used HF making the lines of communication long and the risk of losing information higher.

Another alternative could be the newest Iridium phones.

It is possible to share data "raw text messages" using the newest Iridium pilot data connection (like the ATW-690 and the ICESAR solution) used on Ella Island and Mestersvig.

The system could be useful for all actors as an alternative until having full internet coverage and Tetra-Flex running.

[SAREX Greenland Sea 2012-2013 Lessons Identified-Lessons Learned \(Final\)](#)

[SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Final Exercise Report \(Final\)](#)

PART TWO: UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND THE RETURN OF THE DIRECT DEFENSE OF EUROPE CHALLENGE

Crimea, Russia and the Ukraine: The "Findlandization" Phase of 21st Century Security?

By Harald Malmgren

In March, world attention turned to fast moving events in Ukraine which set in motion a direct clash between Russia, on one side, and the EU and US, on the other. Viewed as an unexpected, but isolated event in the Ukraine, press and media focused primarily on whether or not Russia would use military force, and whether or not the breakoff of Crimea from Ukraine and application of Crimean Parliament for annexation to the Russian Federation could be reversed.

President Obama declared that the US would "never" recognize the referendum for independence of Crimea as legitimate. (US Presidents rarely ever state that something would "never" happen, as it would imply all future Presidents would be bound by the current President's decision.)

EU leaders made strong condemnations of President Putin's bullying tactics, including his evident threat of military force, and declared that the Crimea attempt to exit Ukraine was illegitimate and contrary to the integrity of a sovereign state.

When President Obama and some European leaders decided that costs should be imposed on Russia to alter Putin's calculations, press attention shifted to what kind of penalties or sanctions the US and Europe might impose, and whether such penalties could be effective.

U.S. and European leaders soon found themselves caught in domestic political resistance to harsh confrontation with Russia.

American and European business and banks had become deeply entangled not only in the Ukraine economy but, more importantly, in the Russian economy. If a confrontation with Russia were to impose serious damage on the Russian economy, concern was expressed that Russia in turn would impose damage on Western businesses and banks.

Weighing the pros and cons, European leaders recognized that Europe was far more vulnerable to Russian reprisals than the U.S. might be.

Russia had become the key energy supplier for Germany and the West European grid, and was capable of imposing significant pain through manipulation of supply and pricing. Export dependent Germany also faced the reality that its primary growth focus in recent years had shifted from North America and recessionary EU towards expansion eastwards to Russia, China, and the rest of Asia. Exposure of European banks to Ukraine and Russia was huge, at a time when European financial institutions were still under stress and in transition to some new form of Europe-wide oversight. Europe essentially found that it was unwilling to put its banks in the path of Russian tanks.

The US and European conclusion was to impose limited sanctions which were focused on specific individuals and interest groups in Russia and the Ukraine, in an effort to alter Russian calculations.

However, it became evident that pains imposed on Putin's aides and supporters did not alter Putin's own decisions.

American and European leaders found themselves at an impasse, unable to alter the loss of Crimea to Russia, or reduce the threat of further fragmentation of the predominantly Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine population.

The March 2014 political and media obsession with the Ukraine and Crimea distracted attention from the historic consequences of such a clash between Russia and the West.

From Putin's perspective, the collapse of the USSR was an historic catastrophe for Russia. The gradual encroachment of Western Europe, NATO, and even the US into Eastern Europe through such means as membership in NATO, in the EU, or cooperation in military training and defense continued to aggravate Russia's sense of catastrophe.

Moscow's efforts to limit fragmentation of Yugoslavia and protect the integrity of Serbia had previously been swept aside by American diplomacy. It was only in 2008 that the Russian incursion into Georgia marked a point of reversal. Russia's modest success in Georgia may have helped the writing of Putin's new playbook for what was formerly the Soviet space, or Russia's "near abroad".

The great global financial crisis, which unfolded after the Lehman collapse no doubt pushed Putin's historic ambitions aside while Russia, dealt with the global recession and prolonged debt market storm. Nonetheless, there was continuing discussion in Moscow of the need to "protect" fellow Russians and their Russian-speaking progeny in the neighboring areas. The idea of providing Russian passports to people of Russian origin was given periodic consideration in the Kremlin.

Areas of concentration of Russian diaspora were scrutinized for potential political exploitation among the Baltics and the other nations in proximity, among them especially the Ukraine. The deal to keep a strategic

military presence in Crimea, especially the port of Sebastopol, was always perceived in Moscow as an essential segment of Russia's long-term military strength.

The same thinking lay behind Russia's determination to keep its naval base in Syria, although other motivations were also in play in support of continuation of Assad's control.

For example, the Gulf kingdoms desired to build a gas pipeline from the Gulf to Western Europe through Syria, but Russia did not want to yield its vital gas grip on Ukraine, Germany and other nations in Europe. Keeping Assad in power and Gulf interests absorbed in conflict was important for Russia's energy power, as well as for Russia's exploitation of relations with Iran.

Most likely the recent Syria "red line" drawn by President Obama revealed a new opening for Putin's complex, strategic focus on a need to reshape the power structure between Russia and the West.

When President Obama hesitated to carry out his threatened "calibrated" punishment of Syria for breach of the red line, Putin leaped to the opportunity to take a leadership position in a role of easing the risk of conflict and clearing away Assad's holdings of chemical weapons.

For Obama, the Putin initiative was felt to be a tactical victory for both him and Putin, with hope for a new, pragmatic relationship. For Putin, the reluctance, hesitation, and political division of views in Washington revealed a strategic opportunity for reversing the deterioration of Russian influence in its neighborhood.

Putin's efforts to manipulate Ukraine's relations with Europe and Russia through Yanukovych as puppet seemed to be moving in Russia's favor until the uprisings of indigenous Ukrainians not only overturned the Ukraine government but overturned Putin's strategy for reclamation of hegemony over Ukraine.

Determined to rescue his ambition for restoration of Russian power in the near abroad, and avoid loss of domination of Crimea, Putin initiated a clever "quasi-military" intervention combined with large scale movements of military forces in nearby Russia to intimidate Ukraine's new leadership as well as the U.S. and Europe.

Protecting fellow Russians evolved into Russian diaspora self-determination through an overwhelming referendum, followed by a declaration of the new Crimean Parliament of desire to become part of the Russian Federation. Putin declared Russian recognition of the new "independent" republic of Crimea, and waited a little to see if the US and Europe would take definitive new steps to prevent absorption of Crimea into Russia.

The Western response of sanctions did worry some of the key players in Russia and Russian quadrant of Ukraine, but Putin evidently concluded he was finally on a new path, with a new template:

Exploit fragmentation of the nations in the former Soviet space, encouraging devolution of central power to local governments in each country, leaving national capitals ill-positioned to engage with the West economically or strategically, and gaining political influence through the Russian diaspora in each East European nation.

A small-scale experiment with this stratagem has been exploitation of continuing tensions between Russian-speaking Eastern Estonia, close to St. Petersburg, and the central government of Estonia in Tallinn. Putin's original home was in St. Petersburg, so he was personally familiar with that terrain and clear separation of

the Russian-dominated Narva environment from the rest of Estonia. Where to place the national border had been a continuing issue, but more recently it was refined into shift from the Russian side to the Estonian side of the river which was the primary water source of the region, leaving Estonia in a scramble for alternative water supply.

Western press, media, and diplomatic discussion of Putin's latest, seemingly erratic move, failed to recognize the larger design of incremental steps to fragment and weaken neighboring central governments in favor of decentralization, and close engagement of Russians with Russians.

Estonians in particular have long been wary of this potential incremental strengthening of Russia's grip westwards. Latvia, with a much larger Russian presence in and around Riga, is especially sensitive. Lithuania, more dependent on Russian gas and being a corridor for Russian access to Kaliningrad, also sees itself vulnerable to Putin's incremental ambitions.

A fragmentation-decentralization process has not been openly exploited until now, but Putin's tactics with regard to Crimea make sense in a context of a longer-range stratagem for gradual regaining of political influence in the near abroad.

In the long-run, this may take the form of a patient, incremental, but relentless effort to "Finlandize" the vast area between Russia and the West.

China surprised some Western officials when it supported Russia's arguments about legitimacy of Crimean self-determination, and opposed the use of Western sanctions against Russia.

However, it was most likely recognized in Beijing that Putin's successful initiative to reconfigure the boundaries of his neighborhood could potentially be exploited in the same way in the South and East China Sea, gradually moving China's military reach into close proximity with Taiwan while denying US the same degree of proximity. The ADIZ initiative was clearly designed to narrow the scope of maneuver of US and other forces in that geographic area.

Having watched U.S. hesitation and indecisive, tentative responses to Putin, there should be little doubt that China's PLA apparent itchiness to have armed conflict with one or more of its neighbors may soon be scratched. Limited, but violent engagement with Philippines, Vietnam, or even Japan is increasingly likely.

Moreover, as the Chinese economy slides into a period of financial market turbulence and slowdown, it may become necessary to offset domestic economic discomfort with a surge of nationalist sentiment against perceived foreign "threats". In such a context, it would not be surprising to have a limited conflict take place between PLA and Japanese SDF ships or aircraft. It should also not be surprising if China simply forcefully were to establish control over the Spratlys, Senkakus, and other disputed islands in the China Sea.

In this bigger perspective, the Crimean independence event likely signals an inflection point in Russia's relations with the West, and may signal an opening for an inflection point in China's relations not only with its neighbors but with Taiwan and ultimately with the U.S.

Washington thinking has primarily been focused on the immediate tactics of responding to Putin.

The idea that terminating Russia's role in the G8 and reestablishing the G7 would hurt Putin's feelings seems farfetched in this context. Washington's declared intention to "isolate" Russia and hurt its standing in global power circles also seems flawed, especially since Putin probably thinks he has finally found means for altering Russia's position from a center of centrifugal forces to a core of centripetal forces.

From the perspective of Russia's place in the world economy, Putin's ambitions will likely be blunted by forces of globalization of markets, including resumed turbulence as the US, Europe and China all pass through an historic period of financial restructuring and economic stabilization.

Russia's economy is highly vulnerable to external demand for its resources and the fundamental, inherited weakness of its economy. The concept of the new BRIC powers was always a flawed idea. Russia is no more a great economic power than Brazil or India.

As for China, it may be entering a period of being humbled by domestic economic failures as its export engine inevitably falters. An internal power struggle may be the consequence of unanticipated financial or economic management failures.

Command economies are inevitably vulnerable to highly concentrated negative economic and political surprises.

The Upcoming BRIC Meeting in Brazil: The Changing Global Context

By Kenneth Maxwell

Russia's strategy is becoming clearer by the day. The natural gas deal with China enhances Russia's position in the east. China provides a guaranteed long-term market for Siberia's vast reserves of natural gas.

Vladimir Putin has also succeeded to obtaining new natural resources to the west. The seizure of the Crimea brings with it Russian control over the off-shore energy resources of the northern Black Sea.

Western sanctions do not seem to have had much impact on the biggest western companies, many of which are continuing to do deals with Russia, even with the sanctioned members of Putin's inner circle. BP signed a shale oil deal with Igor Serhin, chief executive of the Russian state owned oil company, Rosneft, last week in St Petersburg, with Putin looking on with a smile.

China has already retaliated against the US for the indictment of five People's Liberation Army's officers for cyber spying and stealing trade secrets by ordering that Chinese state enterprises to cut ties with McKinsey and Boston Consultancy, because of the fear that they are spying on behalf of the U.S. government.



FIGURE 13 THE PHOTO OF THE MARACANA STADIUM WAS SHOT BY A EUROPEAN SATELLITE. CREDIT: AIRBUS DEFENCE AND SPACE

Russia is playing an increasingly important role as the Arab spring is transformed into a deep Arab winter.

The new president of Egypt, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was received warmly by Putin in Moscow where he was negotiating a US\$2 billion arms deal after the US suspended some of its annual military assistance. Russia continues to support the Assad regime in Syria.

In Libya the fall out from the overthrow of Gaddafi continues, and Hillary Clinton and the White House are fighting off claims of a cover up involving the murder of the American Ambassador in Benghazi.

The US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan. Iraq remains grotesquely unstable. Neither says much for the years devoted to two chimerical overseas adventures.

Russia could, if it so chooses, help to broker a deal on the Nuclear issue with Iran, something Obama desperately needs. But the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia are increasingly uncomfortable with Washington's retreat. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief said recently: "While the wolf is eating the sheep, there is no shepherd to come to the rescue of the flock."

In India, Narendra Modi, head of the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata party, surprised many when he invited India's neighbors from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, including Nawaz Sharif of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to his elaborate swearing in ceremony in New Delhi as the new Indian prime minister following his overwhelming victory in the recent Indian general elections.

Yet no one knows whether Modi will embrace the US-India relationship, and he remains highly resentful that the US denied him a visa in 2005 for his role in the 2002 Gujarat massacres.

Mr. Modi has already visited China three times, and on his most recent visit he was received in the Great Hall of the People. President Xi Jinping clearly saw Mr. Modi as a rising star.

All of which will make for an interesting time in Fortaleza, Ceara, during the 6th BRICS summit on July 15th, when the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, will meet two days after the World Cup final at the Maracana stadium in Rio de Janeiro.

The host, Dilma Rousseff, after all, also has had her own problems with Washington.

Germany, Ukraine and Russia: The Sudden Return of the European Defense Question

2014-03-30 By Robbin Laird

In the mid-1980s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, I established a working group on Germany and we looked long and hard at the potential for German reunification to emerge from the dynamics of the 1980s. When the opportunity emerged in the late 1980s, through the leadership from the administration of President Bush and Chancellor Kohl, as well as the Soviet administration, reunification became possible.

I wrote a number of books in the 1980s on Europe and the Soviet Union, including a book looking at the German reunification issue and the Soviet Union.

The book entitled *The Soviets, Germany and the New Europe* was published by Westview Press in 1991 and the book looked at how the Soviets dealt with the European security in the 1980s and eventually the Russian leadership accepted reunification as the lesser of multiple evils as the Soviet Union faced collapse.

It should never be forgotten that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany are twined events.

The Soviets, Germany and the New Europe

In the conclusion to the book I wrote the following:

Throughout 1990, not only did the Gorbachev administration have to deal with the German unification process and the explosion of political change in Eastern Europe, but it had to deal with the explosions of tensions within the USSR as well.

Suddenly the Russian leadership was faced with the twin pressures of Westernization moving East (to the GDR and to Eastern Europe) and the pressures to create a new Russian and/or Soviet development model as well.

This book closes with the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of December 1990, but this treaty and the process, which led to its conclusion, are clearly not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

With the annexation of Crimea, the Putin Administration is writing a new chapter in the story of European security and the return of Russia in global affairs.

And the linkages here are real and clear.

The President of Russia was a German expert and who witnessed the collapse of East Germany and the Soviet Union. This is not some 19th century history for Vladimir Putin; it is part of the living present and shaping his approach to the future.

A clear step in the process of moving beyond German unification to setting in motion a counter-reaction was the Georgian crisis and the ability of Russia to reassert its role within European security and to roll back a NATO expansion approach seen as out of control.

A good friend, who participated in my German working group in the 1980s, was the late Ron Asmus. We discussed many things European and Russian over the years, and certainly saw a major challenge for Europe was the need to deal with the power vacuum created between Western Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ron's answer and that of the Administration within which he would eventually serve was to expand the EU and NATO to encompass the states in the in-between regions.

He was an enthusiastic supporter for NATO expansion; I was not.

From my perspective, the question always to be answered is when the Russians strike against some state in the future what will Western Europe do and what will the US do CONCRETELY?

The danger is always that agreements in principle are simply that unless one has a clear path to defend those principles.

With Ukraine, we do not; and with regard to Poland and the Baltic states we better clearly sort that out, now and not in the future. For the annexation of Crimea has returned attention to the question of European security and the expansion of the challenges associated with the Arctic dimension to European security will only augment the challenges.

NATO can think about so-called out of area issues; but the primary concern is to defend the NATO area and to stop any threats to map re-writing. The challenge is that the map will most likely be rewritten by the Euro Crisis itself and with the dynamics of change in the Middle East as well as the Arctic.

And although the United States is certainly a player in sorting out solutions, it is not the only and perhaps not even the most important player.

We have heard for years about the coming of European defense; and the forging of a unified Germany certainly highlights the emergence of the state in Europe most DIRECTLY concerned with the defense of Poland and of the Baltic states. Germany is the leading state in Europe concerned with these issues, and needs to not just be INVOLVED in defense but to actually LEAD in providing for a European defense RESPONSE to the return of Russia.

Shortly before he died, Ron took a hard look at a problem, which he believed pushed the European defense challenge directly back on the plate of European development, namely the Georgian crisis.

In my last meeting with Ron, he dealt with why he saw the Georgian crisis as what I referred to in my book on the Soviets and Germany as the inevitability of new chapters being written on the Russia-German security relationship, which was not ending simply by an initial reunification of Germany.

History was moving again; not receiving a plaque for ending of the Cold War.

In the discussion, which occurred in March 2010, this is what Asmus argued:

Robbin Laird: My final question is what is the longer-term significance of this kind of snapshot that you've taken of a moment in European security history? What do you think the longer-term consequences might be of the inability to really deal with this issue in a way that fully reinforces western values?

Ronald Asmus: 2010 is the 20th anniversary of the signing of Charter of Paris, and Charter of Paris was signed of course shortly after the Iron Curtain had come down, when there was a sense of a new unified democratic Europe, cooperative security. The Charter of Paris is supposed to establish a new set

of rules of the game for how European security was going to function. 20 years later, there's no longer any agreement on them.

Russia believes that we used those rules to facilitate a geopolitical moves against it. It no longer, I would argue, accepts the fundamental premises of the Charter of Paris, even though it's signed up to them a dozen if not dozens of times over the last 20 years, and the key question now is: Do we fight for those values?

Because the Charter of Paris said "No spheres of influence, the right of countries to choose their own alliances, equal security for all countries big and small," and we wrote them because we had concluded that the 20th Century had taught us that spheres of influence were a bad thing. They led to conflict and not to security. We wanted to move beyond them.

But it's now all coming back. So do we acquiesce to Russian demands to legitimate a sphere of influence? Finlandization has come back as a phrase and a conflict that you hear whispered in quarters across Europe, or do we fight for or do we hold firm in somewhat up come up with a policy that tries to get the Russians to go back to those principles?

And I think that is the key question because today there is no more agreement on the rules of the game in European security. We talk the talk of cooperative security, but we're sliding back into geopolitical competition. Institutions like NATO and EU are weak. The consensus that drove EU and NATO enlargement in the outreach to Russia is fragmenting. The OSCE is paralyzed because of the lack of agreement on what it's all about.

So we've all moved on, and we're all focused on the problems beyond Europe – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East.

But I think you're starting to see the first cracks and fissures in the foundation of European security and stability, and part of my book is a plea to focus on those and to come up with the policies to repair them before they get worse and before **Europe really faces a much more serious risk of instability.**

Unfortunately, this was pretty good forecast of where we are now.

When Germany was reunified, it was expected to play a key role in the reshaping of Europe into a global power. The soft power side of European influence is clearly threatened with the deepening of the Euro Crisis and with a shrewd chess player like Putin playing on that crisis to redraw the European map, not just once but twice in the past few years.

German leadership has insisted that there is no military solution in Ukraine, but that only misses the core point. Hard power – including that provided by Germany – is essential to ensure that map rewriting stops with Crimea. Germany has the capacity by itself or working with NATO or working with "Europeans" who have talked more about European defense than having created it to reinforce the defense of Poland and the Baltic states.

It can be understood why Germany did not want to participate in the Libyan operation. But if there is no deployable and useable Germany military capability to defend its interests in Poland and the Baltics, then

this is really the end of NATO. If the largest and wealthiest country in Europe cannot invest in the air and naval power, which can reinforce Poland and the Baltics, then we really are at a dramatic turning point in European history.

With regard to the current crisis, Germany, Norway, Denmark, France and the UK could undertake the reinforcement of the Baltic States by exercising an integrated air-naval force to make clear to the Russians, that the inclusion of the Baltic states is not a candidate for Russian map makers. And exercises now can be used as templates for doing their own version of something like the Bold Alligator exercises but in delivering support to the Baltic states when it might matter. And this process could encourage the kind of cross cutting integration and modernization of European forces which are central in the period ahead.

And working Norwegian, Danish, UK, French and German integration to support the Balts can prepare the ground for dealing with the Arctic as well, an area of increasing significance in the decade ahead.

With regard to Poland, the integration of air and missile defense systems within and around Europe and the ability to rapidly deploy airpower could be emphasized. Here again Europe can take a leading role with the USAF and USN in a support role. Clearly, a state like Italy can play a major role here with Germany, France, and the UK as well.

By highlighting a European leadership role, Putin would get the point, that it is not just about beating the US on the chessboard or his judgments about the relative weakness of any particular administration. By a small number of European states working more closely together, the US role can be augmented as a force multiplier capability, rather than a force that needs to show up every time to deter the Russians.

Putin is clearly playing a game of chess here. No credible response by Germany to defend Europe's interest will be a statement beyond that of Crimea taking back the "gift" of Crimea to Ukraine made in 1954 by then leader of the Soviet Union, soon to be UN-shoe pounding Nikita Khrushchev.

The point of German unification by the partners of Germany was not about enhancing the wealth of Germany; it was about enabling a people to play their proper role in history.

Putin's actions clearly challenge them, and to correct the American Secretary of State, this is not about the 19th century it is very much about this one.

Another key element of a proper response to the Russian gambit has been suggested by Vice-Admiral (Retired) Sabatie Garat, a former French naval officer with many years of diplomatic experience dealing with the EU and NATO:

Putin is playing chess, but seating on a worm-eaten chair. Despite his fifteen years long stronghold on Russia, V. Putin didn't really succeed in transforming Russia in a prosperous economy, attracting enough for its "near abroad".

Russia is more or less behaving like a big emirate, with most of its oil and gas revenues fleeing abroad, and struggling with highly inefficient companies like Gazprom. Therefore V. Putin needs external successes, with Duma's standing ovations.

But he needs as well European know-how in many fields, without hurting his nationalist pride. Here is what EU needs to understand. The way Russia has been left aside from the very beginning of the Syrian affair, and then pointed at as defending a bloodthirsty despot, was politically correct for European public opinion. It was neither realistic nor efficient keeping in mind that nobody wants Islamic extremists funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to rule Syria, and knowing that, due to its long presence

in Syria, Russia is the only player to be in a position to find out an acceptable political solution while preserving its own interests in the region.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian crisis, like the 2008 Georgian crisis was, has not been included in a comprehensive bargain leading to a real strategic dialogue.

Thus at every crack of his worm-eaten chair, V. Putin is tempted by a new chess move, easily disguised in a helpful answer to oppressed Russian minorities.

But at each new move the chess game is evolving towards a more dangerous poker game. Without a clear strategic vision and a common will to implement it, EU won't be able to prevent the next move, be it in the Donbas or in the Baltic countries.

It should be noted that the new German defense minister seems especially interested in reinforcing the German defense role and the government appears to be moving up their game.

According to a piece in the EU Observer by Andrew Rettman published on March 31, 2014:

Germany has said its air force is ready to increase security on Nato's border with Russia, despite Moscow's promise not to escalate the crisis in Ukraine.

A German defence ministry spokeswoman told the Reuters news agency on Sunday (30 March) "the army could take part in flights to patrol airspace with Awacs machines [surveillance planes] over Romania and Poland as well as training flights in the framework of a Nato air policing mission over Baltic states".

The statement comes after Denmark and the US in the past few weeks agreed to send more than a dozen extra F-16 fighter jets to the region.

It also comes after the Pentagon, on Friday, told Nato's military chief, US general Philip Breedlove, to return from Washington to the Nato HQ in Brussels.

Its spokesman said the move "does not foreshadow imminent military action in Ukraine". But he added that "lack of transparency" and "growing uncertainty" over Russia's mobilisation of tens of thousands of troops on Ukrainian borders merits caution.

Russia has not made any explicit threats to former Communist or former Soviet countries in the Nato alliance.

But Russian leader Vladimir Putin's speech on 18 March, in which he promised to protect ethnic Russians abroad, has raised concerns he could stir up trouble among Russian minorities in Baltic states.

A clear statement of the new phase of the Russian relationship to the West was made in a recent article by Fyodor Lukyanov, Ogonyok magazine and published on Mar 26, 2014:

This reluctance of the West to stare the facts in the face is because, ever since the late 1980s, Europe and U.S. have become used to Moscow always leaving room for compromise, no matter how loudly it initially protested. And relations themselves with the West have always been valued and worth protecting.

That was the case even at moments of heightened tension — for example, in 1999, when Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov ordered his plane above the Atlantic to turn back on news of the bombing of Yugoslavia, and in 2008, when Russian tanks rolled through the Rostov tunnel to protect South Ossetia from Tbilisi's attempts to "restore constitutional order."

Now Russia is acting regardless of the costs, which renders the previous model of relations with its leading Western partners obsolete. But that means its relations with the East, too, need to change, since the global system is closely interconnected.....

Let's start with the main world power — the United States. All this conflict has confirmed the old adage: If you don't want to engage in foreign policy, it will engage with you. Barack Obama's administration reacted sluggishly to the Ukrainian crisis, and for a long time limited itself to general exhortations and gestures by keen promoters of democratic values, such as Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland....

Europe is in the opposite position. It has already demonstrated to the world its total political failure as an international player, and its economic interdependence with Russia is great. The Old World may be among the main losers from the crisis. Under pressure from the U.S., which is annoyed by the EU's incapacity, it may have to impose sanctions against Moscow that are mutually disadvantageous and harmful to sections of its own economy, while also picking up the tab for saving Ukraine from collapse.

The EU's ambitions of self-sufficiency are likely to be buried eventually as it returns under the wing of the U.S., which will consolidate the arrangements on transatlantic trade and investment partnership on its own terms. Especially at risk is Germany, for which the Ukrainian crisis marked not only the country's debut as a political leader, but also its role as Europe's frontman.

The mere fact that a power of this caliber, used to a shadow role, was forced to act as the mouthpiece of the anti-Russian campaign shows that the EU mechanism works very inefficiently.

Coping with Military Leveraged Power

By Robbin Laird

The evolving nature of 21st century military threats and challenges have shaped a common challenge for Japan and Latvia — countering indirect threats serving a competitor's national agenda.

The Japanese are dealing with China and Latvia with Russia, but in each case the state working to gain an advantage has built up military power but is seeking to use it as part of an influence package.



FIGURE 14 PROTESTERS CLASH WITH POLICE IN KIEV, UKRAINE, ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 19, 2004.

It is not about going to general war or even deliberately building a ladder of escalation to dominate an adversary.

It is about using paramilitary forces, surrogates, strategic communication, and economic pressure backed up with an insertable military force at the appropriate time to achieve the national strategic objectives.

It is neither hard nor soft power, but the use of hard power as the underwriter of a strategic communication strategy to achieve objectives short of war.

Now both Japan and Latvia are facing exactly the reality of what one might call military leveraging as part of proactive strategic communication. It is speaking loudly, and carrying an effective stick.

The Japanese Case: How to deal with military challenges disguised as security ones?

We have written at length about the reworking of Japanese defense. But underlying the reworking effort is the nature of the threat, which they face from China, which is clearly to work to shift the region and global balance in their direction.

And the PRC leadership is positioning itself to operate in ambiguous situations and shape outcomes in the favor using their security and defense forces. They are positioning themselves to try to dominate in “gray zone” areas.

The dilemmas which Japan faces in working a new defense policy precisely rests on the challenge of how to engage defense forces in dealing with the military leveraging pressures operating in “gray zone” areas.

A recent piece in The Japan Times provided a very good overview on the nature of the challenge and the dilemmas for Japan.

With tensions in Asia growing, the greatest risks involve low-intensity conflicts rather than full-scale military attacks. But critics say that Japan’s dependence on the policing function of the Coast Guard or Self-Defense Forces isn’t enough to respond swiftly and effectively to such threats.

Low-intensity conflicts, also called gray zone scenarios, fall short of full-scale military attacks but can pose major security problems. In Japan, these potential attacks are viewed as a dilemma because they are too big to be addressed by one or the other, but might fall short of the conditions that would be required to launch an armed response by the SDF, which requires aggression deemed as a premeditated attack by a sovereign nation.....

It is believed that gray-zone scenarios can be handled without the use of collective self-defense, which is a more contentious issue. Coalition partner New Komeito is against legalizing the use of the right since it involves reinterpreting the pacifist Constitution instead of amending it. The coalition has thus decided to discuss the gray-zone cases first.

The center of this discussion revolves around whether and how the SDF should take on more of the coast guard's policing roles and whether the SDF restrictions on weapons use can be eased without increasing political tensions, especially when Japan and China are chasing each other around the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

The number of Chinese ships entering contiguous waters and intruding into Japanese waters has spiked since the Democratic Party of Japan-led team of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda put the Senkakus into state ownership in September 2012. Even though there no serious clashes have occurred, any mismanagement could spiral into a military confrontation.

One scenario presented earlier this month by a panel of experts hand-picked by Abe involves a surprise landing on remote islands by commandos disguised as fishermen. Many politicians assume this would take the form of Chinese commandos raising a flag on the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed both by China and Taiwan.

At the moment, the Coast Guard has the primary responsibility for patrolling Japanese waters. But the defense minister can order the SDF to assume its policing authority, with the prime minister's approval, if an incident develops into a low-intensity conflict that exceeds the Coast Guard's policing abilities.

The SDF can't use lethal force except for self-defense or during evacuations because commanders are bound by the law governing police officers and the Japan Coast Guard Law.

New Komeito says the restriction should be relaxed so that the SDF can counter the threat more effectively without a full-scale counterattack.

Critics also point out that transfers of responsibility should be done swiftly because aggressors could land while the government is still debating whether to pass enforcement authority to the SDF....

The challenge is heightened when one understands that the Russians are demonstrating innovations in working "gray zone" scenarios through military leveraging in shaping what one analyst calls a new form of strategic communication to achieve national objectives.

The Russian Engagement in Ukraine

In a seminal piece on the Ukrainian crisis by a Latvian researcher, new ground has been laid to shape a clearer understanding of the evolving nature of 21st century military power.

Neither asymmetric nor convention, the Russians are shaping what this researcher calls a strategic communications policy to support strategic objectives and to do so with a tool set of various means, including skill useful of military power as the underwriter of the entire effort.

Figure 1
Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War). - Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units. - Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control. - Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation. - Combat operations on land, air and sea. - Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all). - Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups. - Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure. - Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc). - Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military). - Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory. - Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space. - Use of asymmetric and indirect methods. - Management of troops in a unified informational sphere

Source: Герасимов, 2013.

According to Janis Berzinš, in his study of the evolving Russian approach to using military power, the Russians have unleashed a new generation of warfare in Ukraine. The entire piece needs to be read carefully and its entirety, but the core analytical points about the Russian approach and the shaping a new variant of military operations for the 21st century can be seen from the excerpts taken from the piece below:

The Crimean campaign has been an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one which shares many similarities with their intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, while at the same time being essentially different, since it reflects the operational realization of the new military guidelines to be implemented by 2020.

Its success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000

assault troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel.

n addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personal carrier. After blocking Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians started the second operational phase, consisting of psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda to undermine resistance, thus avoiding the use of firepower.

The operation was also characterized by the great discipline of the Russian troops, the display of new personnel equipment, body armor, and light wheeled armored vehicles. The result was a clear military victory on the battlefield by the operationalization of a well-orchestrated campaign of strategic communication, using clear political, psychological, and information strategies and the fully operationalization of what Russian military thinkers call “New Generation Warfare”.....

Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population.

The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country.

New Generation Warfare

An Estonian Perspective on How To Respond

The Latvian analysis has been widely read in the Baltic Republics. It is not a question simply of think tank meetings, but one of national survival.

Interestingly, the Estonian leaders have directly taken up the themes of the Latvian analysis and provided their own assessments of what needs to be done to deal with the threat.

Dealing with new-generation warfare shows the need for a more comprehensive national-security strategy.

According to Estonian leaders, Estonia has already made such preparations.

For example, Riho Terras, the chief of the country’s armed forces, said at a conference in Tallinn on Apr. 26.

“We have put a lot of emphasis in the last years to create units that are able to deal with unconventional threats,” Terras said. The government needs to have clear crisis procedures and be legally prepared “to take a swift decision to shoot and kill the first green man and the second one won’t come.”

Putin may target the Baltic and Balkan regions after Ukraine if the U.S. and its allies fail to show “serious counterbalance,” Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos Oil Co. owner freed from jail last year, said in an interview with Lithuanian daily Lietuvos Rytas.....

NATO has to adjust to having “very little if any warning time” from Russia, where decision-making is centralized, Mikser said. A revision of long-term plans for defense and military exercises would boost security in the Baltic region, which the Kremlin views as the alliance’s “soft underbelly,” he said.

“Russia’s conventional military is still far inferior to NATO collectively and they know that,” Mikser said. “But the modernization effort that they have undertaken in the last few years has delivered a Russian military capable of acting against individual neighboring countries.”

The West and the Next Reset in Russian Policy

By Robbin Laird

Vladimir Putin has pursued an agenda to expand his role within Russia and Russia’s role within the world since at least 2005. The roll back of EU and NATO expansion is clearly part of the agenda, but rebuilding Russia’s ability to be a key player in the Middle East and the Mediterranean is certainly another.

And throughout this period, he has clearly underscored that the Arctic opening is a key event during which Russia, as the largest stakeholder, will prepare itself to play a key role.

At the same time, it must be realized that Russia remains very economically dependent upon energy exports and exploitation of raw materials. It has not really made a significant transition to a 21st century economy.

And it must be realized as well that within Russia, Putin is not Stalin, and certainly not in the dominant position which outsiders might assume.

This has meant that for Putin playing a foreign policy and defense card is a key element of solidifying his position at home while pursuing the strategic objectives, which he has clearly identified.

With the elections in Ukraine, which the Russians have clearly positioned themselves to influence, the next phase of the Ukrainian crisis will unfold.

But what certainly is clear is that the West cannot hope for easy solutions or inevitable reversals in Russian policies which they find “unacceptable.”

What the events of the past few months clearly should demonstrate is that a strategic adjustment is long overdue. Simply coming up with a way to facilitate the Russian role in Western policies on the grounds of building multiple sum policies for the future of the “global commons” as the way ahead is clearly wrong headed. Cooperation may be desirable but cannot be assumed.

And everyone is not playing by the same rules or using the same playbook.

One of the greatest failures of Western strategic thinking and of the strategic class is to assume progress for the inevitability of globalization when history does not operate that way. There is no inevitability of progress; there is the certainty of conflict, entropy, collapse and development.

The 21st century is not one of the making of thought of Condorcet but of one where progress can be forged only in the midst of conflict and for the democracies this always is a challenge to manage an effective way ahead where dictators and authoritarian regimes persist in setting global agenda items.

As Putin rewrites the map and inserts his interpretation of Russian interests into the Western calculus, Western states need to rethink and rework a number of core agenda items to ensure that Putin and like-minded Russians understand that aggression has a significant cost.

Simply generating sanctions as a substitute for more fundamental shifts in policy will be seen as a short-term and short-sighted solution that will go away as vested interests in the West succeed in their rollback.

To be effective, key Western states need to take hard decisions and to shape new strategic realities, which the Russians will themselves need to adjust to in order not be marginalized in the global competition.

Re-set German Energy Policy

For the Germans, this means having a deliberate and clear energy policy, which diminishes significantly their dependency on the Russians.

To do so will require taking on tough issues whether they be nuclear energy, the role of shale oil, or becoming a key player with the Nordic states in the Arctic opening.

As [Caroline Mükusch](#) wrote in 2011 with regard to German energy policy:

Germany is, in terms of oil and gas, an energy dependent country as it is importing 80 percent of its energy resources. Almost 50 percent of oil and gas are coming from the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily Russia; 30 percent from Norway and Great Britain; 15 percent from Africa and 5 percent from the Middle East (see Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2009): Energierohstoffe 2009, Hannover: BGR, p. 34.)

Obviously, a 50 percent dependency on Russia – despite all special relations – is no energy security at all. While some top political leaders in Germany appear to believe in Germany's special relationship with Russia to secure its energy supply, Russia, most recently at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, made it very clear that it plays according to the rules of geopolitics, interests and power.

What happens, if Russia turns its energy supply to Germany off or more likely follows its own interests in determining the most desirable energy partners, in dynamic circumstances?

Re-set the French Sale of the Mistral to the Russians

The Russians are the throes of buying 2-4 ships from the French. These ships are sold as basic entities, which then the Russians will arm and equip.

But these amphibious ships will include ice-hardened versions, which certainly the Nordics and the Balts understand where they will be used, and as these countries focus on deepening their joint defense, adding new capabilities to the Russians who are precisely the threat makes little sense.

Amphibious ships have gone from the category of being useful to becoming central to 21st century operations. Their role expands as the focus of much military action is upon the exercise of influence in a dynamic and fluid global environment.



FIGURE 15 THE INCOMPLETE FORWARD SECTION OF THE SEVASTOPOL, SEEN AT SAINT-NAZAIRE IN MID-APRIL. SEVASTAPOL IS THE SECOND OF TWO MISTRAL-CLASS SHIPS TO BE DELIVERED TO RUSSIA, WITH THE OPTION OF TWO MORE. (COURTESY OF LEO VAN GINDEREN)

Amphibious ships and the evolving aviation capabilities operating from these ships allows the military to operate in a variety of settings from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to engaging in support of allies for their own military operations, or to asserting the national interest in the face of adversarial conflict.

In a recent piece in *Defense News*, Paris-based correspondent, [Pierre Tran](#), has focused on the challenge for the French of reversing course on the Mistral sale.

As Tran notes:

French defense officials are exploring ideas to avoid delivering a second helicopter carrier to Russia, including looking for an alternative client for the Sevastopol, analysts and an industry executive said.

A highly discreet review is being held as armed strife rises in eastern Ukraine and top US officials call for NATO allies to boost defense spending and act as a counterweight to Russia.

Although clearly a French problem, it is in the interest of the US and other Western allies to sort out a way to shift course on the Mistral sale as part of a comprehensive response.

Tran added:

A French naval expert said a hold on the second ship would show President Vladimir Putin that Europe could harden its position and perhaps re-arm its forces.

This message would be strengthened if a solution could be found, be it through NATO or the EU, to have this ship reinforcing European navies, the expert said.

Also, Brazil is seen as a possible client for the Sevastopol, as the regional power bought the French Navy's retired Foch carrier and renamed it the Sao Paulo.

Re-set US Space Policy

In many ways, U.S. space policy and its dependence on the Russians is the functional equivalent of the Mistral challenge.



FIGURE 16 ENERGOMASH COMPANY EMPLOYEES STAND NEAR RD-180 ENGINES PREPARED FOR SHIPMENT TO THE UNITED STATES IN A SHOP AT THE ENERGOMASH, LEADING RUSSIAN ROCKET ENGINE COMPANY, IN MOSCOW, THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 2002. ENERGOMASH AND U.S. COMPANY PRATT & WHITNEY HAVE CREATED A JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD AND TEST THE RD-180 ENGINE. THE ENGINE HAS SUCCESSFULLY FLOWN TWICE AS THE FIRST STAGE ENGINE OF LOCKHEED MARTIN'S ATLAS 3 ROCKET. CREDIT PHOTO: US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

Dependency is significant in terms of the engines used by one of the two key rockets used by the Pentagon, and indeed in the views of many experts, the better of the two rockets.

Also, with the retirement of the Space Shuttle, only the Soyuz is available currently for moving humans to the Space Station. And with the Russians in a central place in Space Station policy, the Russians can play havoc with the U.S. equity in the Space Station.

Reversing course is doable but costly. But in the presence of Russian map-making, it is essential.

And [past decisions](#) such as NOT building a domestic variant of the RD-180 engine, not pursuing an effective alternative to the Space Shuttle, and not working with the Europeans on ATV as a player in an alternative Space Station policy are all parts of taking a relaxed view of Russian involvement in a number of strategic areas for US space policy.

Such a relaxed view, which really was done because of the absence of U.S. effort and investment, will only aid and abet further Russian map making.

Re-Set of Baltic Defense

The Nordics are clearly very concerned with indirect as well as direct threats, which the Russians can generate to the Baltic states. Sweden is increasing its defense budget after a period of decline, and is focused specifically on the direct defense of the Baltic states.

In discussions in Denmark, Danish officials underscored that a number of core building blocks are in place for Baltic defense, such as the Baltic air policing effort, but these building blocks need to be brought together into a more cohesive ability to defend the Baltic republics and reassure their leadership and publics that no indirect strategy of pressure will be acceptable to the core European states directly affected by such a strategy.

There is clearly concern with being in a position to counter an indirect Russian strategy in the Baltics, which is viewed as the most pressing need and requirement.

And clearly for the Danes and the Norwegians, a key element of the broader security and defense challenge is the Arctic. The Arctic is emerging as the major safety, security and defense challenge facing Norwegian and Danish security and defense forces, and the Russians as the largest stakeholders in the development of the Arctic are clearly key players.

And such a reality is a good way to end this discussion.

For conflict and collaboration is at the heart of dealing with the Russians.

On the one hand, reinforcing Baltic defense in effective ways can shape Russian understanding of what the Nordics can do backed by other NATO states.

On the other hand, it is not simply a zero sum confrontation, for Arctic development really requires a long-term cooperation strategy.

As one Danish official put it: "The Russians are really mortgaging their long term interests with short term policies. And we need to demonstrate to them that this is true."

The Nordics, The Russians and Defense: The Baltic and Arctic Security Convergence

By Robbin Laird

The Russians have been map-making in Crimea. With the Ukraine in play, close observers of Russian behavior are taking their measure of what such behavior might mean elsewhere.

Clearly, an area of note is the Baltics.

With Putin's emphasis on Russian ethnic solidarity trumping international borders, the Baltic area is an area ripe for scrutiny.

For the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes what this means is that Baltic defense comes into focus.

Notably, if one would look at the map, the Russian challenge in the Baltics and the Arctic requires integrated air and naval forces to defend Nordic interests, whether in NATO or not.

The map below provides one with a clear view of the confluence of challenges:

The Baltic and Arctic Challenges Viewed from the Nordic Countries

- The Defense of the Baltics and Arctic Interests Involves Nordic Air and Sea Power and Those of Their Allies



FIGURE 17 CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

Certainly, the Baltic States have gotten the Russian message.

The demand side on the Nordics and NATO is shaped in part by Baltic expectations.

And those expectations are clear: to up the capability to defend the Baltic States.

Already in February of this year PRIOR to the seizure of Crimea, [the President of Estonia](#) underscored the reality of what needed to be done:

Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who congratulated the Baltic Defense College for its 15th anniversary on Thursday, Feb. 27, said in his speech that the current events in Ukraine prove that the Baltic States have to do more in the state defense sphere, reports Public Broadcasting.

“The events in Ukraine show that this fight goes on inside Europe, too. This sends a clear message to Estonia and the Baltic Sea region: we have to do more in the state defense sphere. Sufficient defense expenditures continue to be very important from the point of view of our security – this is valid for both Estonia as well as Latvia and Lithuania,” said Ilves.

The president stressed as his main message that NATO is trustworthy only as far as the member states of the alliance are trustworthy and responsible. “NATO’s credibility in our region depends both on the readiness of other allies to defend us as well as the efforts of the Baltic States to spend money on their own defense,” said Ilves.

He called the Baltic Defense College to speak up more in the regional security issues and increase the share of cyber and IT topics in the military education curriculum.

The Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) is a multi-lateral cooperative military college which educates officers from not only the three Baltic States, but also from NATO and EU states and other European states.

It was founded in 1999 by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together with supporter states Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.

The reaction of one state – Sweden – captures the sense of importance in shaping an effective defense to deal with Russian maneuvers in Europe.

According to an AFP report, [Sweden has decided](#) to arm its Gripen fighters with a longer-range missile capable of operating across a wider area of interest.

“In the future the ability to combat longer range targets can be important,” Defence Minister Karin Enstroem told public broadcaster Sveriges Radio, adding that the missiles would have “a high precision which acts as a deterrent.”

“So it would raise our collective defense capabilities and thus raise the threshold effects of our defense.”

On Tuesday the center-right government announced plans for a 5.5 billion kronor (€604 million, \$835 million) rise in annual defense spending by 2024 — on top of the current annual budget of close to 50 billion kronor — including an additional 10 Swedish-made Saab Gripen fighter jets, bringing an air force fleet upgrade to 70 planes.

In a statement the government referred to the “deeply unsettling development in and around Ukraine” and Russia’s occupation of “parts of a sovereign state.”

The Swedish defense forces have argued for longer range missiles to deter Russia from destroying Swedish weapons from a distance. The new missiles — to be fitted on Gripen jets — would double the current range at 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).

“It shows a potential opponent that we can fight at long distances and therefore we believe it is a deterrent,” Colonel Johan Hansson told Sveriges Radio.

“If we are detected early we must be able to have a firing range that is much longer than what we’ve previously been used to.”

A Swedish analysis of the shift highlights its importance.

Defence Minister Karin Enström said the high-precision missiles would chiefly act as a deterrent to other countries that might be considering an attack on Sweden.

“They would give new capabilities by offering a longer reach, but also the ability to fight targets that are further away,” she told Sveriges Radio (SR) on Thursday.

She said the move would “increase the effectiveness” of Sweden’s defense.

The cruise missiles would be added to the next generation of Gripen jets, and would be able to cause severe damage to targets 1,000 kilometers away. Current cruise missiles can only travel half that distance. The new missiles can fly at low altitude, have GPS guidance, and can maneuver like an aircraft.

And a Swedish analyst added:

“It’s not just a defense thing. In fact, the perception that weapons are ‘defense or attack’ is old-fashioned,” Hult told The Local.

“There is no static front these days. Modern Russian doctrines say that if war starts then they will strike at depth into any enemy territory.”

Norway and Denmark are also in the throes of sorting out their way ahead given the challenges to both the Arctic and the Baltic states and the need to ensure integrated air and naval capabilities to operate throughout the region.



FIGURE 18 CREW MEMBERS OF NORWEGIAN MINESWEEPER OTRA STAND ON THE BRIDGE AS THEY SET SAIL TOGETHER WITH DUTCH MINEHUNTER MAKKUM, BACKGROUND, AND THREE OTHER SHIPS OF BELGIUM AND ESTONIA FROM KIEL, GERMANY, TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 2014. THE WARSHIPS ARE PART OF THE STANDING NATO MINE COUNTER-MEASURES GROUP ONE, ONE OF NATO’S FOUR STANDING MARITIME FORCES, DEPLOYING TO THE BALTIC SEA TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY AND READINESS IN THE REGION. THE MARITIME GROUP WAS REACTIVATED BY A NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECISION TO ENHANCE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND ASSURANCE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE. (AP PHOTO/GERO BRELOER)THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

In the current crisis, Norway is [spearheading](#) a modest NATO naval task force operating in the Baltic sea.

Five NATO mine-hunting ships set off Tuesday on a deployment in the Baltic Sea, part of the alliance’s efforts to strengthen its presence in Europe’s ex-communist east as members there worry about Russia’s intentions in Ukraine.

The ships — a minesweeper and a support ship from Norway and one mine-hunter each from the Netherlands, Belgium and Estonia — left the German port of Kiel for an exercise that will continue under Norwegian command until the end of May. Germany will then take command of the deployment.

Ironically, the 10th anniversary of Baltic membership in NATO was commemorated this month by a conference in [Denmark at the Royal Danish Defence College](#), which simply amplified the impact of the Crimean seizure.

The Crimean crisis added a disturbing gravity to the conference entitled “10 Years After NATO Membership”, which was jointly organized by the Royal Danish Defence College, The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association, and the three Baltic embassies in order to mark the tenth anniversary of Baltic membership of NATO. Speakers at the conference included, among others, the three Baltic defense ministers, Danish Defence Minister Nicolai Wammen and NATO’s Deputy General Secretary Alexander Vershbow.

The Baltic defense ministers did not hesitate to underline the gravity of the situation and strongly urged that NATO increase its focus on territorial defense. Their intent was not to detract from NATO's efforts outside its borders over the past 20 years, but, as Lithuanian Defence Minister Juozas Olekas put it, the time has come for NATO to engage with Europe once again.

"NATO's Article 5 is more important now than it was at the end of the Cold War, he continued, referring to the confusion that Russia's activities have created in the international security arena."

The rhetoric was no less solemn with Estonian Defence Minister Sven Mikser, who compared the Crimean crisis to a ghost whom all had hoped to be a mere dream, but who now had turned real.

"9-11 changed our perception of security – the entire world spoke of a new threat, about asymmetric threat assessment. This promoted an illusion that traditional threats no longer existed.

The world has become more complex, but it would be wrong to ignore security threats, including those that threaten the territorial security of NATO countries," said the Estonian defense minister, and added that just a few months ago a statement like this would have been labeled as paranoid.

However, the situation between Russia and Ukraine is exactly this type of ghost that also NATO must prepare for in the future.

And Russia being on both sides of the Nordics as a Baltic region power and an Arctic power focuses one's attention.

The Russian European ports can look forward to be directly connected with the Pacific ports and with it the growth of infrastructure, ports, facilities and shipping, along the way.

This transforms the Russian defense and security challenge to one of securing the trade and resource development belt. It also will see a significant upsurge over the next thirty years of traffic, commercial and military, through the area.

It will be in Russia's interest to build air and naval assets, which can provide for the various needs for defense and security in the region.

Search and rescue, communications, maritime domain awareness, significant ISR capabilities, bomber coverage, submarine and surface fleet coverage and related efforts will become prioritized as well.

A new Arctic activism by Russia may well be part of the resurgence of Russia seen in recent Ukrainian developments.

A [recent piece on RT](#) (previously known as *Russia Today*), the international multilingual Russian-based TV network created in 2005 underscores a Russian perspective on the heating up of the Arctic competition.

But actions often speak louder than words. As the icecaps are melting, a military race is also building up in the region.

The US Navy recently debuted a revised roadmap focused on expanding America's muscle in the world's coldest ocean over the next decade, increasing the number of personnel trained in Arctic operations, advancing technical equipment and surveillance needs.

The ultimate goal appears to be establishing international order under US leadership.

“They want to be a leader and they see themselves as a driving force in the future planning of the Arctic,” Canadian journalist Ed Struzhik told RT.

Earlier this year, NATO countries participated in a Norwegian-led Cold Response exercise in the Arctic, rehearsing high intensity operations with 16,000 troops deployed in extreme conditions. Non-NATO participants, Sweden and Switzerland, also took part.

“The United States is anxious to militarize the Arctic Ocean. It has to do it via its relations with Canada and it is also seeking to do it via NATO, through the participation of Norway and Denmark in NATO. And now it is calling upon Sweden and Finland to essentially join NATO with a view to establishing a NATO agenda in the Arctic,” Michel Chossudovsky, from the Centre for Research on Globalization in Montreal, revealed.

Meanwhile, Canada has been staging its own independent drills with hundreds of soldiers participating in cold-weather winter warfare exercises.

Not to be left out, last year Russia announced the resumption of a constant armed presence in the Arctic, which was abandoned by the military after the fall of the USSR.

The Russian Navy’s task group headed by the country’s most powerful battleship and the flagship of the Northern Fleet, cruiser Peter the Great (Pyotr Veliky) went on a long-distance cruise in the Subarctic along the Northern Sea Route, which became a flagship mission in the region.

The group was accompanied by four nuclear icebreakers facilitating the passage through areas with particularly thick ice.

Now the once deactivated infrastructure will resume operation, with Russian strategic bombers patrolling the Arctic on a regular basis.

Last month, Russia’s Airborne Troops parachute-landed on drifting ice flows in the Arctic Ocean near the North Pole in a first-ever daredevil training search-and-rescue operation.

Moscow has been calling for tighter security along the country’s arctic frontiers and along its maritime transportation routes in the polar region.....

After highlighting that international cooperation in the Arctic was the best way to proceed for the use of Arctic resources, the piece then noted the following:

Back in 2012, Russia’s former envoy to NATO and current Vice Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, said that by the middle of the 21st century the fight for resources between various states will become “uncivilized.”

In about 40 years, Russia may lose its sovereignty if it fails to clearly set out its national interests in the Arctic, Rogozin said.

“It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence,” Rogozin stated at a Marine Board meeting in Moscow.

But the Arctic is clearly not a pure hard or soft power domain.

The area needs significant cooperation to work. This does not imply that military means are not part of the equation in assisting in core ISR, C2, Search and Rescue and other tasks. Military means are part of the Arctic security as well as defense equation.

In short, the Crimean land grab opens up questions at the heart of Europe and in the Arctic opening at the same time.

And the Nordics are at the center of any Western response.

PART THREE: THE ARCTIC OPENING: SHAPING A GRID FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS

The Arctic Opening: Co-opetition in the High North

In this section, we are examining the challenge of Arctic safety-security-defense and how to understand the dynamics of change in the Arctic.

Based on discussions with Arctic experts and practitioners from the US, Canada, Norway and Denmark, how best to understand the relationship among the safety, security and defense demands in the region in the period ahead?

Clearly defense is a contextual issue, not the defining issue. And as such how can the defense challenge within the Arctic best be understood?

What follows in this piece are excerpts from a chapter in our book *Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific* which deals with the Arctic as one of the four key factors defining 21st century defense challenges in the Pacific.

The gradual melting of Arctic ice is creating the beginnings of a very different strategic situation affecting the Pacific states, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Europe.

The operational geography for trade, exploitation of raw materials, and military forces is becoming altered by that most powerful of forces— nature.

The opening of the Arctic is an event somewhat parallel to the building of the Suez or Panama Canal. The two great canals of the 19th and early 20th centuries changed the face of the United States and Europe.

North and South Sea Routes



FIGURE 19 NORTH AND SEA MARITIME TRANSIT ROUTES. CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

The new significance of the northern routes could well do the same for Russia.

The impact of the Suez Canal was considerable in changing the 19th century.

As one analyst of the geography of transportation has put it:

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 “brought a new era of European influence in Pacific Asia by reducing the journey from Asia to Europe by about 6,000 kilometers.

The region became commercially accessible and colonial trade expanded as a result of increased interactions because of a reduced friction of distance.

Great Britain, the maritime power of the time, benefited substantially from this improved access.” ¹

With regard to the Panama Canal, the east and west coasts of the United States became part of the same country in a fundamental way. And the U.S. transition to becoming a global power was facilitated by the opening of the “big ditch” as well. The Panama Canal shortened the maritime distances between them by a factor of 13,000 kilometers.

It will take a while for the full impact of the opening of the Arctic to be realized, but the country whose destiny will be most altered will be Russia, **an emerging maritime country**. Yes, you read that correctly; the great landlocked power will emerge as an important maritime player and with it different roles for Canada, the United States, Asia, and Europe.

The Strategic Opening: Co-opetition at the Top of the World

To get a sense of what is involved one needs to look at a map from the top of the world down.

As the sea lanes in the Arctic-bordered regions become capable of longer periods of transit, the Northern sea routes or the Northwest passage becomes a link at the top of the world that can connect Europe and the northern Pacific in ways that rival the traditional transit routes Southward through the world’s great canals.

But it is not simply about transit.

It is about access to raw materials as well.

The Arctic holds significant oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and other commodities vital to global economic development. Exploitation is challenging and costly, but the long-term trajectory is very clear: the region will be a central economic zone for the global economy.

The two trends— transport and raw-material extraction— will become combined.

For example, for states like Japan and South Korea, which have no landward reach to raw materials as does China, these states will now have an alternative path to acquire raw materials and have them transited to their factories. Rather than simply relying on the Middle East, for example, South Korea and Japan can work with Russia and others to gain access to liquid natural gas and then have that product transported directly to their ports.

Russia is at the center of these developments, but the infrastructure investments required for full success are challenging. It can be anticipated that outside engagement and capital will be involved, which in turn will pressure the Russians to be more effective in shaping capital investment and foreign engagement policies more conducive to regularized foreign firm involvement.

Yet the erratic behavior of the Russian state is as important a limiting factor as the harsh climate of the Arctic on the prospects for development in the region.

The impact on Russia on the Arctic opening is really central. The Russian European ports can look forward to being directly connected with the Pacific ports and along the way with the growth of infrastructure, ports, facilities, and shipping.

This transforms the Russian defense and security challenge to one of securing the trade and resource development belt. It also will see a significant upsurge over the next 30 years of traffic, commercial and military, through the area.

It will be in Russia's interest to build air and naval assets that can provide for the various needs for defense and security in the region. Search and rescue, communications, maritime domain awareness, significant ISR capabilities, bomber coverage, submarine and surface fleet coverage, and related efforts will become prioritized.

This will dramatically change the situation for Canada.

During the Cold War, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was built around close American and Canadian cooperation to defend their territories against various Russian threats, first bombers, then strategic submarines, and then ICBMs. As this threat receded, Canada was able to focus on military operations of "choice" rather than necessity.

The emergence of the Arctic as a strategic zone ends this situation and puts Canada on the front lines. To secure its own claims to resources, and to exploit and protect those capabilities, Canada will itself need to augment its efforts. And along with those efforts will be a need to enhance significantly its relevant security and defense capabilities as Russia is transformed by the Arctic opening and along with it the growing presence of other powers as well.

Russia and Canada Have Longest Maritime and Air Space Areas in Arctic



FIGURE 20 RUSSIA, CANADA, AND THE ARCTIC. CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

The other core players in the Arctic opening are members of what is called the Arctic 5 or the core members of the Arctic Council—the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway. These states have the rights to 80 percent of the known Arctic resources.

But as already noted, other powers are increasingly involved in shaping transit and infrastructure projects.

For example, the Chinese are building icebreakers and are engaged in a significant expansion of their engagement in the region.

The Chinese are actively engaged in shaping an Arctic strategy. According to Danish sources, the Chinese have targeted rare earth mineral supplies in Greenland and have used a variety of means to achieve a key role in leveraging these assets.

The Chinese as well are looking at the maritime routes likely to emerge in the Arctic over time. These interests are both commercial and military, and Canadian sources have made it clear that they are concerned about the prospects of enhanced maritime activity by the Chinese by the Chinese navy.

In a very useful input to understanding the Chinese and the Arctic, Linda Jakobson wrote a piece published by SIPRI in 2010:

Because China's economy is reliant on foreign trade, there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are shortened during the summer months each year.

Nearly half of China's gross domestic product (GDP) is thought to be dependent on shipping. The trip from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northern Sea Route—which runs along the north coast of Russia from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west—is 6400 kilometers shorter than the route via the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal . . .

Moreover, due to piracy, the cost of insurance for ships travelling via the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal increased more than tenfold between September 2008 and March 2009

The author also cited a Chinese article dealing with the Arctic in briefly discussing the military dimension:

*The Arctic also “has significant military value, a fact recognized by other countries.” In a rare open-source article about the Arctic by an officer of the People’s Liberation Army, Senior Colonel Han Xudong warns that the possibility of use of force cannot be ruled out in the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.*²

With transport over the northern routes becoming part of the global scene with transit of resources as well from within the region, a new center of energy— figuratively and literally— is opened.

With this new dynamic, Russia can become a maritime power able to bridge Europe and the Pacific and redefine the “top of the world” aspect of Pacific and European defense and security. And more to the point, a consolidation of capabilities able to be projected either into the Pacific or Europe is on offer.

A glimmer of the future has been provided by recent agreements between South Korea and Norway.

According to *The Barents Observer*:

Both Norway and South Korea are major global players in shipping. Norway is home to many of the world’s largest shipping companies, while South Korea is home to some of the largest shipbuilding yards in the world.

Establishing new shipping routes over the Arctic is a key agenda item for President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Norway. Yesterday he had lunch at the Royal Castle in Oslo, while today starts with political discussions with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, according to the portal of the Norwegian Government.

“New shipping lanes will significantly boost economic exchange between Asia and Europe,” President Lee said to the new-agency Yonhap on his first day in Norway.

*“It takes about 30 days to go from South Korea to Europe by ship, but if Arctic routes are created, I think travel time will be halved. If that happens, economic exchanges between Europe and Asia will become very brisk. In particular, if Norway cooperates with us, Asian routes will be established, which will be very good for its future.”*³

Another key dimension of map redrawing will be among the Pacific states themselves.

In the focus on the defense of Japan, naturally the attention has been upon the areas west of Japan -- Korea and China. But as China comes further out into the Pacific, militarily and globally commercially, the “map” changes. It is east, south, and north of Japan that become part of the security and defense zone affecting Japanese interests.

A vignette of the future along these lines was provided by a piece by Mia Bennett on the Foreign Policy Association website:

*An LNG tanker sailing from Hammerfest, Norway to Tobata, Japan is due to arrive today. This is the first time that a ship carrying LNG has transited the Northern Sea Route. Developments in shipping LNG in the Arctic have picked up pace lately. Only recently did Norwegian company Knutsen OAS Shipping receive permission from Russian authorities to begin shipping LNG from Snøhvit to Japan. In October, Gazprom’s Ob River became the world’s first LNG tanker to transit the NSR, sailing from South Korea to Murmansk.*⁴

Even a quick review of likely national responses underscores the co-opetition aspect of the Arctic competition.

“Co-opetition” is a term used in business literature about the need to cooperate while competing to achieve market leadership. “In most of the modern theories of business, competition is seen as one of the key forces that keep firms lean and drive innovation.”

Adam Brandenburger of the Harvard Business School and Barry Nalebuff of the Yale School of Management have challenged that emphasis. They suggest that businesses can gain advantage by means of a judicious mixture of competition and cooperation.

“Cooperation with suppliers, customers and firms producing complementary or related products can lead to expansion of the market and the formation of new business relationships, perhaps even the creation of new forms of enterprise.” ⁵

The co-opetition concept seems appropriate to the Arctic engagement.

To facilitate transit and exploitation of raw materials in the region, the major states involved will need to work out arrangements for joint operations. At the same time, rivalries are inevitable in a relatively undefined situation whereby boundaries can be disputed and access routes contested. Hence, posturing for advantage in a situation where cooperation is crucial seems evident.

There will obviously be key collaborative elements.

The Arctic 5 will shape several key collaborative tool sets and agreements. But it will not end there. Conflicts over sovereignty historically can involve more than simply verbal disagreements.

Rather than a contest of soft versus hard power, states will try to combine their assets and press their advantage to gain ascendancy, and the Arctic opening is likely to be part of the emergent global game.

Although a game of diplomacy, it will be characterized by the success of states that are able to combine diverse assets of power into an effective combination of effective global strategy.

Notes:

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This part has been adapted from a section in *The Rebuilding of American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy*.

The Russian Dynamic in the Arctic: Strategic Positioning

Although Norway and Canada are very engaged in the Arctic area, the policy stage is still set by the Cold War superpowers Russia and the United States.

Russia has a proactive policy; the United States has a reluctant policy.

In 2008 after Canada, the United States, and Denmark criticized Russia's territorial claims to the continental plateau of the Arctic, Russia set out training plans for military units that could be engaged in Arctic combat mission, extended the "operational radius" of its northern naval forces, and reinforced its army's combat readiness along the Arctic coast -- just in case of a potential conflict.

In its new national security strategy, Russia raised the prospect of war in the Arctic Ocean if Russia's interests and border security were threatened by neighboring nations, likely considering the current circumstances of pending border agreements and disagreements between Russia and those nations.

To secure and guarantee its overall energy and security interests, Russia stated that "in a competition for resources it cannot be ruled out that military force could be used to resolve emerging problems that would destroy the balance of forces near the borders of Russia and her allies." ¹

According to authoritative Russian sources, Russia is willing -- and able -- to use the entire spectrum of instruments to settle legal status problems in disputed regions such as the Arctic, Caspian, and South China seas.

Russia's 2007–15 rearmament program plans to rebuild the submarine force, recommending building several dozen surface ships and submarines, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates, and five Project 20380 corvettes.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States steadily closed some northern military bases, including the naval base on Adak and Fort Greely. These developments reflected the United States' perception that a significant military presence is -- since Soviet Union submarine force collapsed -- no longer needed in the Arctic. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to make the challenges easier to resolve, the challenges in the Arctic facing now U.S. policy makers are much more complicated than expected in 1991. Threats are much more nebulous, long term, and complex.

Given the importance that Putin assigns to maintaining control of Russia's energy resources, it is unsurprising that he has already outlined ambitious goals to develop Arctic hydrocarbon resources in coming years.

Indeed, the Arctic can be seen as to be part of the overall expansion of Russia's role in providing global energy and shaping its influence via these means.

The Russians have issued several key policies on the evolution of their Arctic policies. For example, on January 14, 2011, the Russian newspaper *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* published an interview with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, on what he called an issue of "an enormous strategic and economic significance." Patrushev stated that the council had directed that the government approve a long-term program to extract the mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas, located on Russia's Arctic shelf by the end of 2011. ²

That same day, two of the world's giant oil companies, Russia's Rosneft and BP, announced an unprecedented partnership that will see them exchange shares and expand their joint ventures, including launching a new Arctic oil-drilling project. Both companies bring important assets to their new alliance, but the deal has

alarmed foreign governments and environments due to its potential commercial, security, and ecological implications.

The deal also raises interesting questions related to the Russian government's economic modernization program.

In terms of Arctic and energy security issues, the new partnership could mark the commencement of a major Russian government drive to develop the energy resources that fall within the boundaries of Moscow's territorial claims in the Arctic. In recent years, the Russian government has set forth ambitious territorial claims in the Arctic reinforced through recent scientific research expeditions and military measures.

Despite losing considerable territory with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation still has the world's longest Arctic border at over 17,500 kilometers, which amount to one-third of the entire length of Russia's national frontiers.

The Russian Federation also possesses several Arctic archipelagoes, including Franz Josef Land and Wrangel Island.

Furthermore, the Russian government claims its continental shelf extends up to the North Pole -- and is taking steps to strengthen and enforce this claim in the face of opposition from Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States. For example, the Russian government believes that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which lies on the North Pole's seabed, along with the Mendeleev Ridge and Alpha Ridge, are part of Russia's continental shelf.

As with the case with Canada and the Northwest Passage, Russia also seeks to exercise exclusive control over a burgeoning shipping lane of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is a system of sea-lanes from the straits between the Barents and Kara seas (south of Russia's Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site) to the Bering Strait, a distance of approximately 5,000 kilometers.

This route connects Asia and Europe and when navigable saves transportation time and costs as compared with using the Suez Canal. Russia's Arctic policy defines the NSR as a core national interest. In contrast, the U.S. government considers the NSR as an international shipping route.

In an effort to bolster its claims of ownership over the NSR, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced on March 18, 2010, that it is drafting legislation to define the route's precise dimensions and to create a federal agency that would regulate and collect fees from foreign vessels using the NSR.

During the Cold War, the Arctic region was a place of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both operated nuclear vessels, long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region. Following the USSR's collapse in 1991, Russian government interest in the Arctic decreased considerably.

During the 1990s, Moscow's concerns were maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in the face of secessionist threats in the North Caucasus and elsewhere. During the 1990s, Russian military overflights and naval patrols in the Arctic declined significantly as the Russian military faced drastic funding and fuel shortages. The Russian army withdrew from many Arctic bases. The inward concentration of the Russian government's attention and resources hampered the development of a comprehensive policy toward the Arctic. Furthermore, the economic problems that Russia confronted in the 1990s also made it difficult for Russians to conceive of resource-intensive plans to exploit the Arctic region's mineral wealth.

But the rise in world oil and gas prices that began in the late 1990s simultaneously provided the Russian government with increased revenue and renewed Russian interest in developing the increasing valuable

energy resources in the Arctic region. The renewed attention was evident on September 18, 2008, when the Russian government issued a “Framework for the Arctic to the Year 2020 and Subsequent Perspectives.”

More recently, the “Russian National Security Strategy for 2020” illustrates the growing importance that Russian strategists attribute to exerting control over the maritime domains around Russia, especially the resource-rich Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea, and Caspian Sea.

After a series of incidents in the late 1990s, in which several foreign research ships allegedly trespassed into Russian territorial waters, the Russian government began taking steps to secure its northern border. In recent years, Russia has taken more concrete measures than any other country to assert its Arctic claims. Russian warships and warplanes have increased their military activities in the region. The Russian government also began sending more scientific research expeditions to the Arctic.

In the past, Russia relied heavily on military personnel and equipment in its Arctic expeditions, but now is using primarily civilian technologies since these can be more readily detailed to the United Nations and other international bodies to justify Russia’s Arctic claims. Russia’s earlier submission to the UN regarding its territorial claim to the Lomonosov Ridge was rejected due to a lack of supporting evidence, which Moscow declined to provide for fear of revealing military secrets.

The 2007 Arktika expedition represented a dramatic, high-profile assertion of Russian interest in the region. In August the research expedition climaxed when ship Akademik Fedorov and icebreaker Rossiya sent two specially designed submersible vessels, Mir-1 and Mir-2, 4,300 meters deep to the North Pole seabed. After collecting soil samples and further mapping the Lomonosov Ridge, the expedition planted a Russian flag made of titanium on its floor. Reacting to foreign criticism of the flag ceremony, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “The aim of this expedition is not to stake Russia’s claim but to show that our shelf reaches to the North Pole.”

Russian government claims and actions regarding the Arctic stem not only from economic and domestic political considerations but also from offensive and defensive strategic considerations that encourage a greater Russian military presence in the Arctic. The Eurasian landmass of Russia is effectively “walled in” by Siberia and the Pacific to the east, Asia and the Middle East to the south, and Europe to the west.

The Arctic has for centuries served as the “fourth wall,” restricting Russian maritime activity to areas largely controlled by other powers. As the Arctic climate changes to open more waters to navigation and exploration, the Russian Federation can extend the range of its military operations. Russia’s Northern Fleet, the largest element of the Russian navy, is based in the port city Severomorsk on the Barents Sea.

Although the Northern Fleet maintains year-round access to the north and south Atlantic, its mobility could be strictly limited to the Barents Sea by a Western naval power in the event of unrestricted warfare. An ice-free Arctic would negate this advantage but also present new strategic challenges to Russia.

The opening of the Arctic Ocean makes vulnerable Russia’s northern ports, particularly those in the Kola Peninsula that house the majority of Russia’s ballistic-missile submarine fleet. Furthermore, the opening of the NSR could serve as a maritime link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through which warships could pass. At present warships in the NSR are susceptible to structural damage from floating ice, weather conditions, and icing. These conditions will become less severe on a seasonal basis as climate change progresses.

Russia is partly able to address the issue of Arctic maritime conditions by maintaining a fleet of icebreakers. There are 18 icebreakers of various sizes in Russia’s military fleet. Seven of these are equipped with nuclear

reactors, rather than conventional diesel engines, allowing them to break through ice twice as thick as can be breached by standard icebreakers.

The most capable Russian icebreakers are operated not by the Russian navy but by privately owned mining giant Norilsk Nickel. Its icebreakers can penetrate ice up to 1.5 meters thick. But Russia needs to rebuild its icebreaker fleet since all the existing ships except one are scheduled for decommissioning in the next decade. Russia's economic troubles have delayed the construction of new, third-generation icebreaking vessels.

Russia must acquire at least three new vessels of this type in the next several years in order to maintain adequate icebreaking capabilities. Russia must also expand its coastal border guard to better accommodate increased commercial and military traffic.

In addition to Arctic regions, the coastal border guard patrols the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas as well as Russia's Pacific coast. Changing Arctic conditions could double this area of responsibility. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 includes provisions to strengthen and upgrade the coastal border guard. In 2009 border guard units based on the Barents Sea began patrolling the NSR for the first time since the Soviet era.



FIGURE 21 ARCTIC SEAPORTS. CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

Russia is also expanding its military presence in the Arctic region. The Russian Presidential Security Council has called for establishing a military force and several new bases in the Arctic, while the Federal Security Service will use its coast guard ships to collect maritime intelligence in the region.

The Russian government is moving swiftly to expand its sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic.

Russia has resumed air patrols over the Arctic, and in June 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that it would increase submarine operations if Russian national interests in the Arctic were ever threatened.

In October 2010, Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said that Russian naval ships and submarines had already conducted about a dozen military patrols in the Arctic during the first three quarters of that year. Vysotsky explained that "in accordance with the Russian Armed Forces' plan of strategic deterrence we take measures aimed to demonstrate military presence in the Arctic."

Russia's strategic ballistic missile launching submarines use the North Pole region because the ice helps shield them from U.S. space satellites and other overhead sensors. In addition, launching a missile from the Arctic can reduce the flight time to U.S. targets. In July 2009, the Russian navy boasted that it had succeeded in launching two long-range ballistic missiles from under the Arctic Ocean without the Pentagon detecting their preparations.

Supposedly, Russian attack submarines prevented U.S. surveillance ships from learning of the arrival of two Russian strategic submarines before the missile launches. The state-run RIA Novosti news agency quoted a high-ranking navy source as saying that the successful drill disproved skeptics in Russia and elsewhere that the Russian navy had lost its combat effectiveness: "We slapped these skeptics in the face, proving that Russian submarines are not only capable of moving stealthily under ice, but can also break it to accomplish combat tasks."

Russian officials have sought to downplay the prospects of military conflict in the Arctic region. In late 2010, the special representative of President Medvedev, Anton Vasilyev, stated that "Russia does not plan to create 'special Arctic forces' or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic," which contradicts provisions stated in Moscow's security doctrine. ³

In his year-in-review press conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that all Arctic border disputes could be settled through negotiations and that "rumors that a war will break out over the resources in the North are a provocation." In 2012, after 40 years of negotiations, Russia and Norway signed a deal to delimitate their maritime border. The two countries have been disputing the 175,000 square kilometer area in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean since 1970. The disputed maritime border has resulted in both parties seizing fishing vessels in the area.

Then President Medvedev and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg signed an agreement dividing the contested area into two equal parts. Meanwhile, while Russia still contests ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge with Canada, both countries have agreed that the United Nations would be the final arbiter of who owns title to the ridge.

And as part of improving Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, the Russians have moved two motorized infantry brigades to the region. Moving a Polar Spetsnaz to the Norwegian border is apparently in the Russian perspective part of a broader cooperative Arctic strategy:

By 2020, Russia will have increased the number of brigades from today's 70 to 109, said General Colonel Aleksander Postnikov at a meeting in the Federation Council's Committee for Defense and Security yesterday.

One of the new brigades is to be located in the settlement of Pechenga, some 10 kilometers from the Russian-Norwegian border and 50 kilometers from the Norwegian town of Kirkenes, Nezavisimaya Gazeta writes.

This brigade will be specially equipped for military warfare in Arctic conditions. It will be set up with DT-30P Vityaz tracked vehicles, in addition to multi-service army equipment, other armored vehicles and tanks. ⁴

One analyst has underscored that the Arctic opening could well see the emergence of an anomaly in Russian history -- Russia as a maritime power. According to a perceptive article by Caitlyn Antrim:

Russian geopolitics of the 21st century will be different from the days of empire and conflict of the nineteenth and twentieth. The increased accessibility of the Arctic, with its energy and mineral resources, new fisheries, shortened sea routes and shipping along the rivers between the Arctic coast and the Eurasian heartland, is both enabling and propelling Russia to become a major maritime state. ⁵

This means as well augmenting the role of the Russian navy, coast guard, and various air assets over time. The augmentation of the maritime reach of Russia— through ships, submarines, C2, ISR, and air means— can be anticipated.

This part has been adapted from a section in The Rebuilding of American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy.

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5. Catilyn Antrim, “The New Maritime Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs, October 15, 2010, [http:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/ The-New-Maritime-Arctic-15000](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-New-Maritime-Arctic-15000). ↩

The Russian Approach to the High North: Shaping a Way Ahead

By Robbin Laird

In a comprehensive look at Russian strategies in the High North, Marlene Laruelle has published a recent book entitled [*Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*](#).

The book provides a number of key elements whereby one can puzzle over the approaches which the Russians are pursuing in the High North as well as to shape an understanding of what one might call the “policy culture” which will shape Russian approaches.

The author looks at the dynamics of cooperation which are crucial to success in the region and which encourages the Russians towards a cooperative policy agenda. But at the same time, the Russians are pursuing a Russian-centric policy of inclusion of the Arctic in a nationalist agenda.

The author suggests that the Russians are pursuing two differing Arctic strategies.

The first one “focuses on a “security first” reading of the region while the second is a “cooperation first” policy shaped by Russian economic interests.

“The Arctic could see the emergence of a new Russia, or a resurgence of the old” (page 202).

This hydra-headed approach to shaping its Arctic policy is at the heart of what one might call the “policy cultural” approach, which the Russians bring to the Arctic mission.

Each of the five key players in the Arctic, which have control over 80% of the known Arctic resources, brings a different “policy cultural” approach to the Arctic opening.

And conflicts are inevitable given these different perspectives.

Co-operation is also inevitable given the nature of the Arctic environment and the nature of the Arctic opening as discussed in an earlier piece.



FIGURE 22 THEN PRIME MINISTER PUTIN ADDRESSING THE ARCTIC FORUM IN MOSCOW, 2010 (CREDIT: SLD)

But the words “co-operation” and “sovereignty” or “national interest” do not all have the same meaning for Americans, Canadians, Danes, Norwegians or Russians.

And the question of forging a consensus in the midst of diverse understandings of the proper mix of approaches is a key aspect of the challenge in managing Arctic safety, security and defense.

The Russian “policy culture” with regard to the Arctic clearly is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Russia. It is part of Putin’s reassertion of the role of Russia in the world, the most recent manifestation of which has been the incorporation of Crimea and the expansion of Russian energy resources.

The Russian state’s renewed interest in the Arctic is also part of a larger context – the reassertion of patriotism as a tool fostering political legitimacy....From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the return to a great power status materializes via Russia’s reassertion of its role in the international arena, and via the revival of sectors that classically define a great power, such as the military-industry complex, in particular aviation and the navy. This Soviet style “great power” model goes hand-in-hand with the domestic legitimacy strategies put in place by Putin since the start of the 2000s. (p. 9)

The author also highlights the Russian effort to shape a brand with the Arctic context.

“The creation of this Arctic brand is part of a more general reflection on the question of nation-building. In Russia the general feeling is that formerly the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has systematically lost the information war....The Russian official narrative (with regard to the Arctic) has evolved toward a celebration of the Arctic region as a space of international cooperation. (p. 13).

A good manifestation of this was seen in 2010 with the Russian sponsorship of the international arctic forum. Caroline Mükusch attended [the forum](#) and highlighted the nature of the Russian branding effort.

The International Arctic Forum was Russia's first high-level international platform for scientific discussion, expert exchange of opinion and issuing recommendations on the Arctic region. Russia held this international Arctic event of such high level to set up the stage for further engagement.

Although the Arctic ecosystems have undergone enormous change in recent years due to the effects of climate change and anthropogenic activity, which are the main threats to the region's sustainable development, Sergei Shoigu, Emergency Situations Minister and President of the Russian Geographical Society, emphasized that the Arctic is and will remain a “zone of peace and cooperation.”

According to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin peace and cooperation are proven crucial in the race for Arctic resources. He underlined: “We think it is imperative to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation”.

Also clear from the Forum, that Russian territorial claims in the Arctic underscore their legitimate role in shaping the Arctic future. Russia builds its territory claim over the Arctic on the following key arguments:

- *Russia is a northern country. Seventy percent of its territory is located in northern latitudes.*
- *History and geography posed the challenge of developing these territories before our people.*
- *Russia has played a leading role in charting the Northern Sea Route also founded the Arctic icebreaker fleet, polar aviation and created an entire network of stationary and drifting stations in the Arctic.*
- *And, finally, Russia has gained the unique experience of building major cities and industrial facilities above the Arctic Circle.*

Russian speakers made clear some Russian priorities in the Arctic, notably the development of the Yamal Peninsula, the Shtokman deposit in the Barents Sea, the northern sector of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Yakutia and at hundreds of other production and infrastructure facilities in the region.

Russia's top priorities in the Arctic as articulated at the Forum include:

- *The creation of top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local people and the pursuit of a frugal attitude towards the indigenous and small Arctic nations' socio-economic infrastructure and traditions;*
- *The support for new economic-growth points and incentives for large-scale domestic and foreign investment – currently about 20 percent of Russia's GDP and 22 percent of Russian exports are produced in the Arctic;*
- *Substantial investment in the scientific and nature-conservation infrastructure.*

Russian speakers underscored that Russia, as one of the claimants, is responsible for the sustainable development of the Arctic. The Arctic will become a major source of energy resources and a key global transport hub in the next 50 years.....

Putin declared in his speech to the Forum that he was in no doubt whatsoever that the existing problems of the Arctic, including those of the continental shelf, can be resolved in a spirit of partnership, through negotiations, on the basis of existing international legal norms. Russia will prove its claims with the required scientific data.

Clearly, this “branding” effort of Russia the collaborative and cooperative reflects some fundamental underlying realities, namely the need for significant cooperation for the development and security of the Arctic. And Russian efforts to do so are real and part of the fabric of the Arctic opening.

At the same time, the “policy culture” is not defined by the collaborative dynamic: it is part of the more nationalistic dynamic.

A key element of this nationalistic dynamic is that rooted in the demographic pressures in Russia, the declining numbers and the significance of the Arctic region to what many Russians believe is a key element of a nationalistic revival.

In an interesting section of the book entitled “The Nationalist Reading of the Arctic: Russia’s New Lebensraum,” the author underscores a core aspect of current Russian thinking, with deep roots in the Russian past. Russian authors have also highlighted the “lost” Alaskan and Californian territories and the “idea of a former Russian Empire stretching from Finland to California fuels nationalist resentment, focused as it is on the importance of geography in the assertion of Russian great power” (page 42).

There is a strong “white” racial element of the narrative as well, as the Russians with the largest Arctic population (3/4 of the total) and it should be noted that this population is primarily Russian, not indigenous people. There is also a strong statement of concern about the “yellow peril” from China to Siberia as well.

Whereas Russia was withdrawing into itself territorially for the first time in a millennium, the Arctic seems to revive an expansive, and no longer retractive, vision of the country: a potential new space is opening up to it.

This reading of the Arctic is particularly operative in military circles, which see this region as being Russia’s most important “reserve of space. (page 49).

Clearly, safety and security are dominant elements in an Arctic development strategy, and capabilities such as search and rescue (and cooperation with other Arctic powers is crucial.

Yet the military dimension is central as well and is clearly being blended in by the Russians.




FIGURE 23 RUSSIA HAS 2/3 OF POPULATIONS WHICH CURRENTLY LIVE IN THE ARCTIC. CREDIT: RUSSIA'S ARCTIC STRATEGIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE FAR NORTH.

Notably, the region is important in and of itself to the Russian forces. "The Arctic Oceans guarantees access to the Atlantic Ocean and is therefore vital to the Russian Navy" (page 113). It is also a crucial region for the nuclear deterrent, notably the installations and forces positioned on the Kola Peninsula.

The author makes an interesting case that for the Russian military it is important to adapt its forces to the nature of the diverse challenges in the Arctic and not simply straight line from past capabilities. In so doing, she makes a forceful argument for Russian military modernization as part of the Russian Arctic future.

Most oil facilities are not mobile, and this will force the Ministry of Defense to put in place the infrastructure to ensure their protection in the event of interstate conflict.

Even if the Russian military considers these risks minimal, the potential for localized conflict must be taken into account.

The securing of the platforms, pipelines, and ships against possible terrorist attacks accentuates the role for the special services deployed against non-traditional threats.

It entails that defense be reoriented around mobile units able to react rapidly and equipped with high-technology hardware"(page 124).

She adds that:

"The Arctic theater will be more subject to non-traditional threats than to classic military-centered conflicts. Security will have to be assured at least in part in a collegial manner through international cooperation" (page 129).

A source of conflict as well cooperation is managing shipping the context of the Arctic opening as well. There are sovereignty disputes in the area among the Arctic powers, and clearly the Russians will be keen to project their sovereign claims on a regular basis.

Yet there is a fundamental tension between the powers transiting the region, and the Russians using the region as an integral part of their national development.

“The actors that will specialize in Arctic traffic will chiefly be Asian companies as China, Japan and South Korea seek to become less depend upon the southern straits and diversify their supplies, even at a higher cost. Their concerns are thus more geopolitical than purely commercial....

For the Russians, the stakes are of an entirely different nature: the NSR (Northern Shipping Route) is above all a domestic route, and a driving part of its strategies devised for developing the Siberian regions.... Destination traffic is indeed bound to play a growing role in the energy-based revival of the Arctic regions....

Although the NSR is highly unlikely to become a very busy trade route, the high potential for accidents, the fragile ecosystems, and the increasingly international character of shipping will force Moscow to emphasize soft security issues alongside growing international cooperation, the latter mainly focuses on search and rescue systems” (page 190-191).

In short, the Arctic is a key region for national assertion, national identity and national development for Russia. At the same time, international cooperation is crucial for development, safety and security in the Arctic.

As the largest stakeholder in the Arctic opening, how Russia forges these potentially conflict elements into a common approach will shape a key region in 21st century global completion.

Shaping Arctic Defense: Leveraging the Grid

By Robbin Laird

The Arctic opening is a significant global event.

There are a number of key stakeholders in the opening up of the Arctic, with both convergent and conflictual elements at play.

Any time conflict is part of the equation, defense capabilities come into play, and they come into play in reinforcing so-called soft power as well. 21st century military power is clearly interwoven with 21st century security and diplomacy. It is not to be understood primarily as the sledgehammer but as a key contextual element integrated within diplomacy and security efforts to protect national operational sovereignty.

Because each of the key five stakeholders in the Arctic all have different perspectives as well with regard to even something as simple as “collaboration,” conflict can be built into a cooperative process.

But defense in the Arctic is a contextual capability.

To develop the Arctic requires shaping infrastructure for communications and situational awareness in an area with limited “traditional” infrastructure. It is about leveraging air breathing and space systems, and crafting appropriate land based towers and systems, which can create a grid for development and safety operations.

Shaping and Crafting an Arctic Grid

This is not a task for a year, but for the decade ahead. In an interview, which I did with Chris McLean and Richard Bray of [Frontline Defence](#) during a visit to Ottawa, we discussed the importance of shaping an Arctic grid.

Question: If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and build out to that direction.

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments. It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

Bray: That makes a great deal of sense, and could focus our attention on the ISR and C2 streams, which we need to build out over time.

I'm not convinced we understand what the data from surveillance platforms and other tools will be like, the challenges that such a data stream will present to the operator, or the opportunities it will present to the commander. It's like being given access to a giant database without the software tools to extract meaning.

As it gathers and sifts more data (and faster), will it be like antilock brakes, allowing you stay 30 feet closer to the vehicle ahead of you? Or will it allow you to complete the mission in a completely different way?

These kinds of assets allow you to get yourself deeper and faster into a situation. So, if the speed of engagement and the amount of data being acquired could quickly become overwhelming without effective software.

The challenge will be to have the data, to verify the data against cyber spoofing, and to integrate enough of the data in order to have the kind of decision-making necessary in a fluid environment.



FIGURE 24 SEVERAL KEY BUILDING BLOCKS NEED TO COME TOGETHER TO SHAPE A REAL ARCTIC GRID WHICH THEN CAN BE LEVERAGED FOR THE DIVERSITY OF INTER-RELATED MISSIONS. CREDIT GRAPHIC: SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

Bray and I continued to focus on the grid in [a later piece](#) on *Front Line Defence*.

A key requirement for Canada will be to shape a grid to cover the full geography, including her Arctic interests. If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and built out to that direction.

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments. It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

And in the recent discussion with Danish Rear Admiral (Retired) presented earlier in this report, this experienced Arctic operator, highlighted the importance of building the grid:

Question: What is the most basic need to operate in the Arctic in the decade ahead as the Arctic opening proceeds?

Kudsk: Clearly, the most basic need is to build out ISR and, in effect, build out a communications and sensor grid to provide for the kind domain awareness most central to development, safety and security in the region.

And this is doable, because compared to other regions; there is significantly less traffic and human habitation. This makes it easier to identify the anomalies and threats, which need to be monitored.

You have a pristine environment up there where human activity is relatively visible, when compared to the rest of the world, where you can disappear in a crowd. But you still need systems, which can help you, see over vast distances and in difficult communications conditions.

For example, I believe that leasing capability from the Canadian Radarsat system might make sense for Denmark as we build out the grid, which we will need to operate in the region as it opens up.

There are major challenges for communication systems in the region as well.

Today, most systems are designed to operate always on and always connected. This is impossible in the Arctic where you have only windows where you can communicate, not a constant capability to do so.

Defining the Challenges

An exercise sponsored by Denmark last year highlighted the shortfalls facing Arctic safety and security and the need to shape an operational grid.

Search and Rescue Exercise Greenland Sea 13 ran from Sept. 2 to Sept. 6, and was hosted by Denmark near Ella Island off Greenland's east coast. There were several international participants in the exercise, including Canada, Iceland, the US, and the Norwegians with their Joint Rescue Coordination Center at Bodø. The scenario focused on a real world problem, namely a cruise ship in distress with the need to both search and rescue passengers and crew.

According to the Danish report:

The scenario involved a medium-sized cruise ship the “ARCTIC VICTORY” (simulated by HDMS VAEDDEREN) with 250 passengers and crew, which first went missing in the Greenland Sea and later ran aground in King Oscar’s Fiord off Ella Island, followed by an explosion and resulting fires on board. For this exercise, operations were minimized during the night due to insufficient EXCON personnel for 24-hour operations.



FIGURE 25 MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, AN AUTHOR EMBEDDED WITH THE JOINT RECOVERY MISSION – GREENLAND, SIGNALS TO HELICOPTER PILOT TOM ANDREASSEN, OF AIR GREENLAND, WHERE TO LAND NEAR THE NUNATAK ON A GLACIER NEAR KOGE BAY, GREENLAND, AUG. 16, 2013. ANDREASSEN, ALONG WITH ANOTHER AIRCREW, EVACUATED THE EXPEDITION TEAM FROM THE GLACIER DUE TO AN APPROACHING PITERAQ STORM WITH HURRICANE FORCE WINDS FORECASTED TO IMPACT THE CAMPSITE. U.S. COAST GUARD PHOTO BY PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS JETTA H. DISCO.

The exercise setup called for a multitude of tasks in the operational response, including maritime search and rescue; fire fighting at sea; evacuation by sea and air; deployment of emergency medical personnel, fire and rescue personnel, and police registration personnel; use of a specialized search team with cameras and listening equipment to locate missing persons below deck; triage and emergency medical treatment by doctors and paramedics at sea and on shore; establishing a reception facility for evacuees on land, establishing guard duty to protect evacuees against the possibility of attacks by polar bears; continuous updating of the SAR service’s Persons On Board (POB) list and the police’s Disaster Involved Registry (DIR) with identities and medical status of evacuees, etc, etc.

All in all, the intent was to closely simulate the many challenges of coordinating a multinational search and rescue effort in the high Arctic.

Although the report highlighted successes, the evident shortfalls were significant. Because situational awareness is difficult, communications episodic and the ability to reach the right point to make a difference with the right rescue means, the challenge to do “normal” S and R is formidable. The exercise demonstrated how difficult it is to do “routine” S and R. The gaps in the ability of the nations to work together, the absence of enough S and R platforms, the real shortfall in SA, and the pot holes associated with communication were all highlighted in the after action report.

And a recent US assessment of the challenges facing the USCG dealing with Alaska and the Arctic highlighted similar shortfalls.

According to [Heath C. Roscoe, Paul F. Campagna, and David McNult](#):

The authors developed a list of probable incidents/events from Coast Guard SAR historical documents that may require a U.S. safety response in the future. Although not all-encompassing, the 10 potential scenarios are listed most to least likely. The wide array demonstrates the fragility of the Arctic and the scenarios serve as driving factors as the United States considers future capacities and capabilities:

- *Medical Evacuation/nonmaritime medical transports (currently 3 percent of all SAR cases)*
- *SAR operation small maritime vessel (fishing/recreational)*
- *small oil spill/discharge in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas*
- *downed aircraft (small passenger) SAR mission*
- *vessel runs aground, caught in ice, or sinks*
- *emergency barge resupply for North Slope community*
- *large oil spill from drilling operation*
- *large oil spill from tanker operating in Arctic*
- *mass rescue operation (MRO) downed jetliner*
- *MRO cruise ships/ferries.*

Despite assuming a lower position on the list due to probability of occurrence, MROs would be nearly impossible to carry out given currently assessed response shortfalls.

For example, if an MRO or large oil spill incident occurred on the North Slope of Alaska, the closest Federal SAR and oil spill response is 820 miles away in Kodiak.

Current oil spill response capabilities include four Spilled Oil Recover Systems equipped on 225-foot buoy tenders home ported in Alaska at Kodiak, Sitka, Cordova, and Homer; an aerial dispersant delivery system staged in Anchorage as a backup to commercial vendors; and Federal on-scene coordinators located in Juneau, Anchorage, and Valdez with incident management expertise and limited prepositioned oil response equipment.

Given these sparse and widely dispersed assets, the long-term environmental impacts of a spill in the Arctic Ocean could prove cataclysmic.

ISR capabilities, communications systems, search and rescue assets, unmanned and manned systems of various sorts, appropriate ships and finding ways to connect these assets in a very difficult region to do connectivity is the challenge facing developmental, safety, security or defense activities.

Defense as a Contextual Capability

The shaping of the grid will be done primarily for developmental, safety and security issues. But shaping a grid will lay down a foundation on which appropriate defense systems can operate to protect the sovereignty of key states and their national territories.

Given the importance of the High North, for Russian nuclear operations, the growth in military traffic through the Northern passages, inevitable sovereignty disputes, the high probability the Russians will build flexible forces at the top of the world in order to influence events either in Europe or Asia, defense or military considerations are built into the Arctic opening.

An element of the Russian defense capability, which might be deployed for Arctic missions, could be the venerable Mig-31.

According to the **TTU** French defense newsletter in its May 12, 2014 edition.

It appears that command of the air and space forces is about to extend the MiG 31, which was to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2028.....

As new tensions appear in the Arctic, as a result of climate change, Moscow has rediscovered the capability advantages of the MiG 31 and could, as a deterrent, redeploy its 12 squadrons of Foxhounds, as they are known in NATO nomenclature, near the North Pole.

This would be not only to protect its strategic resources, since 90 per cent of Russian oil is found there, but also to seat its authority over new navigation routes which, by offering shorter journeys, will draw maritime traffic towards Russia's north coasts and offer Moscow an unprecedented means of geostrategic pressure.

In addition, as part of a large-scale air defense exercise involving 100 aircraft, some MiG 31s intercepted a cruise missile launched from a Tu-95MS strategic bomber above the Telemba military ground.

But given the central importance of the kind of cooperation necessary to provide for development, safety and security in the Arctic, the region will not be primarily defined by defense systems, but the Grid will enable them and participate in security missions in any case.

And with the addition of new capabilities, such as fighters, the question will be how do they contribute to and live off the grid while doing their missions? An advantage of an ISR-enabled fighter is obvious: it can live off and contribute to the grid.

Also, training and operational missions will allow the pilots to provide real time information back to military, security and various policy officials about anomalies or threats, which may need to be dealt with. According to Ed Timperlake, "The advantage of a man in the loop generated by fighter operations is to contribute rapidly available information and judgments about what an overall Arctic policy process might need to deal with in the near term."

My own look at what I would consider to be an Arctic-enabled fighter can be seen in the briefing slides below. Key elements would include, being ISR and communications capable with an ability to operate as an airborne command center to support both security and defense operations.

What is an Arctic-Enabled Fighter? from **Second Line of Defense**

Earlier, I discussed the nature of **an Arctic enabled fighter** with a Canadian Air Force pilot with significant Arctic experience. In that piece, published by **Front Line Defence**, I looked at the F-35 and the Arctic mission sets.

I started with the assumption that building an Arctic C2 and ISR grid to cover Canada's needs across the High North is a central and strategic task.

Over time, the F-35 will clearly become a potential contributor to this effort. Norway has bought the F-35 and is shaping its fleet with the Arctic in mind. The U.S., Japan, and most probably Denmark are among the allied states that will operate F-35s with Arctic security and defence in mind.

There are two key considerations. The first is the emergence of a 21st century fleet. Pacific allies are buying the F-35 and will be looking to shape integration.

The second is the nature of the combat systems. The F-35 systems make it a C2 and ISR aircraft, notably when the planes are considered as a deployed grid able to cover significant space. For instance, in the 2011 Northern Edge exercise, its radar mapped the maritime surface of 500 square miles. According to a report released by the Joint Program Office at the time: F-35 combat systems “searched the entire 50,000 square-mile Gulf of Alaska operating area for surface vessels, and accurately detected and tracked them in minimal time.”

During recent interviews with General Hostage (the Air Combat Commander), General Jacoby (the NORAD/NORTHCOM commander), Lt. General Jouas (the 7th USAF Commander), Lt. General Robling (MARFORPAC), and most recently with General Hawk Carlisle (the AFPAC commander), I was able to discuss the emerging role of the F-35 fleet and how it figured into their considerations for the future of air operations. Each, in one way or another, emphasized the key role the combat systems of the fleet would play in cueing up other military and security assets for the full spectrum of missions.

Communication linkages is a crucial aspect, not only for combat but for security operations as well. Recently, in the Philippines, the USMC brought its Osprey and KC-130J package as the initial force in shaping relief efforts. But the only communications they had was the Commanding Officer's Blackberry. The Marines emphasized that their F-35Bs will have the mapping, ISR and communications capability crucial to their full range of operations – something they do not have now.

Billie Flynn, former Canadian Air Force fighter pilot, is now an F-35 test pilot with Lockheed Martin. Flynn started flying the CF-18 some 30 years ago and retired after commanding 441 squadron and leading the Canadian task force involved in Kosovo.

Given the importance of CFB Cold Lake in any Arctic strategy, Flynn's operational experience is suggestive of the way ahead if F-35s become the mainstay Canadian aircraft. “Because the F-35 is clean in design and operation, it goes further and stays longer in the airspace. This allows it to patrol the Arctic without the same level of tanker support that the CF-18 requires. It can stay over the Arctic area of operation to be able to see at distance,” he says.

“It will allow the Canadian Air Force to patrol areas with fighter aircraft in way they could not do before. As the CO of 441, to fly out of Cold Lake for Arctic sovereignty missions required a significant logistical support just to operate in the areas crucial for the mission. With 18,000 pounds of fuel on board the F-35, the pilots will operate longer and at greater range than with the CF-18.”

We then discussed impacts of combat systems for the Arctic sovereignty mission set. “Stealth allows the F-35 to patrol with impunity. The combination of 360° multi-spectral sensor, sensor fusion shared information among members of the network allows the F-35 to serve as a key node to a much broader grid than anyone would have thought possible with a tactical fighter,” he asserts.

Flynn believes that patrolling and guarding Canadian resources in the Arctic will be done on a order of magnitude more effectively with the F-35 than any legacy fighter platform. “The F-35 sees in depth and breadth and across many electronic spectrums as well. It can see hundreds of miles around itself and does so in a moving space as it operates. The pilot is in a shared sensor space – he is not operating as a unit of a squadron defined by wingmen.”

Thinking forward to the Arctic Grid concept, a key challenge will be to factor in the F-35 as a fleet (Canadian and allied) in shaping the other ISR and C2 elements.

“You will not use the F-35 as a classic tactical aircraft,” explains Flynn. “It will be part of the grid you are talking about. As the Canadian military determines how to deal with its evolving Arctic mission, it will be crucial to understand the F-35 fleet impact and to then sort out what else is needed and how other systems can be most effectively used. It is a definitional asset, not simply an additive platform. It is a foundational element for reshaping the approach to Arctic sovereignty.”

Re-working the Defense of Greenland

A clear example of working through new relationships among the elements of the grid and defense assets will be in shaping a new approach to Greenland defense.

The Russian actions in Ukraine have reminded Europe of the [direct defense](#) of Europe challenge. And part of Europe is clearly the Arctic and securing their Arctic interests during the Arctic opening.

And a key element of managing that opening is safety, security and defense, with the Russians as a key player, either in working the problem collectively or positioning for dominance.

The Ukraine events have gotten the attention of the Nordic states with regard to the second might be more important in the near and mid-term than the former. Indeed, discussions in Denmark have highlighted growing concern with how best to deal with both Baltic and Arctic security and defense.

A recent comment by the [Prime Minister of Iceland](#) highlights the concerns:

Russia’s actions in Ukraine could cause problems for international cooperation in the Arctic, says Iceland’s prime minister. Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson said Russia’s strong-arm tactics in its former satellite could make it harder for the eight nations on the Arctic Council to reach agreements at a time when the region faces a series of critical issues.

This has a ripple effect, even though the actual events are far from the Arctic,” said Gunnlaugsson, in Edmonton on a trade mission. “Clearly, it has made many players in the Arctic quite worried about developments and whether they might be a sign of what is to come.”

What the Ukrainian dynamics have underscored is the need for practical actions to bolster Baltic security and defense as well as that of the Arctic.

From the Nordic standpoint, one simply has to look at the map, to understand the relationship of Russia to both Baltic and Arctic concerns.

With regard to the Arctic, a key concern for Denmark clearly is the development of Greenland and the defense and security of the country as well.

What makes Greenland a tricky issue is that Denmark is responsible for security and defense, yet Greenland is quasi-independent, and clearly aspires to see development and the enrichment of what is essentially a poor country.

A small population, which lives in the perimeter of the country, largely occupies Greenland and yet the opening of the country to mining is bringing with it significant outside influence, which can clearly disrupt the security and defense situation for Greenland as well.



FIGURE 26 THE HMDS KNUD RASMUSSEN, A ROYAL DANISH NAVY PATROL VESSEL, TRANSITS OFF THE BOW OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD CUTTER JUNIPER, HOMEPORTED IN NEWPORT, R.I., DURING A TOWING EXERCISE WHILE UNDERWAY OFF GREENLAND'S WEST COAST FRIDAY, SEPT. 7, 2012. THE EXERCISE WAS CONDUCTED AS PART OF AN ARCTIC DEPLOYMENT TO ENHANCE INTEROPERABILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES AND TO PROVIDE THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKING AND RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS IN THE HARSH ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT. (U.S. COAST GUARD PHOTO BY PETTY OFFICER 3RD CLASS CYNTHIA OLDHAM)

Certainly, one of the outside powers which concerns Denmark most is China, and its engagement in the opening of Greenland.

A recent conference held by the Centre for Military Affairs in Copenhagen focused on the Chinese challenge in the Arctic.

As one contributor to the conference put it:

In Greenland, big scale mining in need of foreign investments are not only seen as a possibility for obtaining economic growth and the maintenance of welfare systems in Greenland, but also as one of the few possibilities for obtaining a sustainable economy, which is a prerequisite for obtaining political independence that is the promise on the Self-Government Act adopted in 2009 by the Greenlandic and the Danish parliaments after a Greenlandic referendum in which about 75 percent of the voters voted yes.

This could, of course, cause alarm in Denmark, and raise questions concerning whether Denmark, eventually, will lose the current arrangement with Greenland as part of the Danish community of the realm – if Greenland decides for independence.

So, the issue of China's Arctic aspiration in the Danish political debate is clearly intertwined with the issue of the future of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship.

[Conference report China's Arctic aspirations](#)

But more broadly, there is the defense challenge, which is a Danish, NATO, and a U.S. challenge.

Greenlanders live in the more temperate coastal areas; the rest of its two million sq km are covered in ice.

The US has had a presence in Greenland and took primary responsibility for the defense of Greenland throughout the Cold War. Yet the uncertainties of US policy, more generally and in the Arctic, as well as the

dynamics of the Danish-Greenland relationship create an open-ended problem of how the security and defense of Greenland will be conducted in the period of the Arctic opening.



FIGURE 27 A ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE CH-149 CORMORANT HELICOPTER LIFTS OFF AND HEADS OUT TO EIELSON AIRFIELD DURING A SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISE IN JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, ALASKA, OCT. 31, 2013. (PHOTO: MASTER CPL. PATRICK BLANCHARD, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA)

In an [interview in 2011](#), Admiral Wang, highlighted the possibility of Canadian, US, and Danish defense collaboration at the Thule Air based turning into an Arctic hub.

Russia has a very clear strategy closely connected with their approach towards energy policy. They were building significant resources for their Arctic strategy. He noted that the Russians bought two of the Mistral class helo carriers for deployment by the Northern Fleet and would be ice hardened.

The Russians had reorganized existing forces to create two new Arctic brigades, which made a strategic point.

The United States had a strategy but few resources. Indeed, the strategy was signed the last month of President Bush's Administration. There is a series resource gap on the US side, and the allied countries in the Arctic look to the US to have resources, including C4ISR capabilities.

A possibility was to shape a hub in Northern Greenland at the Thule air base to provide for such capabilities.

And in an excellent overview to the challenge for the development and defense of Greenland, [Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen](#), the head of the Centre for Military Studies, provided a way to conceptualize the problem. The problem really is about the development of Greenland, the role of the local government in that development, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in combining greater autonomy for Greenland while providing for defense and security and what role the US will have in the overall process.

In other words, the challenge will be to sort out in PRACTICAL terms how Greenland will be defended in the presence of greater outside powers influence through the mining companies, the dynamics of change between Denmark and Greenland, and the uncertainty about US policies and capabilities for Greenland defense and Arctic operations.

And in such a situation certainly, the Russians will play a role with a significant possibility of driving wedges among the players. The sort of game they have played in Georgia and Ukraine or Syria for that matter would seem to fit a Russian opportunity in the High North.



FIGURE 28 THE SUN PEEKS THROUGH THE CLOUDS REFLECTING ON THE ICEBERG-LADEN WATERS NEAR KOGE BAY, GREENLAND, AUG. 5, 2013. DESPITE THE ARCTIC WATERS, THE AIR TEMPERATURE AVERAGED 50 DEGREES THROUGHOUT THE DAY. (U.S. COAST GUARD PHOTO BY PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS JETTA H. DISCO)

In Rasmussen's words:

The military remains a Danish responsibility after the 2009 self-rule legislation. The Danish military presence in the Arctic is of a different nature than the American one, however. The Danish military presence relates to the internal affairs of the territory rather than to the geopolitical position of Greenland.

The United States military is stationed in Greenland for purely geopolitical reasons, and the bulk of the US forces left when these concerns could be dealt with differently and at lower cost. The Danish military presence was and has remained primarily a naval presence. The Royal Danish Navy is also the national coast guard and naval operations in the Arctic were primarily coast guard operations like Search and Rescue (SAR) and fishing inspection.

Apart from this the air force operated a few platforms for logistics and surveillance and the army operate the SIRIUS PATROL – a ranger unit that patrols the Northern territories by sled. The increasingly independent-minded government in Nuuk has been making demands of the Danish military in ways, which would never have been done of the US military.

With prospect of more traffic in the territorial waters and the need to more inspections following from prospecting etc. the call from greater resources have been heard from the military⁴⁰ and politicians in Greenland, like the Greenlandic MP Sara Olsvig who argued that an increased defence presence was needed because ‘the minerals – including radioactive material – must be secured’

‘Greenland is a part of the Kingdom which will play an important global role in the future,’ defence minister Nick Hækkerup noted in 2012. Minister Hækkerup added that he believed operations in the Arctic would be ‘one of the areas where we will use more money in years to come’.

Rasmussen added that:

A key interest of the United States in Greenland will be the stability that allows access and which prevents Greenland from being a problem in Canada-US relations. As Natalia Loukacheva notes, the most important security relationship between the Inuit in Nunavut and Greenland is not with Ottawa or Copenhagen but with Washington.

For Canada and Denmark the risk of decoupling is part of the geopolitics of the Arctic. Perhaps one reason why the State Department did not grant the ambassador his wish for an office in Nuuk was that the United States might be more interested in Greenland remaining a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, if Greenland independence would create problems within the Canadian federation, this would lead to demands for more independence to Nunavut. The fact that military forces in the Arctic have come from the outside has made it obvious for the Inuit to focus on human security concerns, the fact that military forces has been non-indigenous have reflected the fact that the areas have been governed from the outside and with a geopolitical importance that attracted foreign forces.

The ambition of independence puts these geopolitical questions on Greenland’s political agenda for the first time.

The geopolitics of Greenland dictates that Greenland can only be a sovereign, independent country by providing for stability and control over its own territory in a way that ensures the United States of access and that the access of potentially hostile powers can be confidently denied. This is an issue anyone arguing for the independence of Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark will have to be able to address.

[Greenland Geopolitics Globalisation and Geopolitics in the New North](#)

And in another Danish paper which considers the evolving Greenland agenda, [Admiral Nils Wang](#) along with one of his colleagues adds that the quest for sovereignty by Greenland will occur in a tough period where pressure from the outside is going up dramatically.

As a result, Greenland might well consider working with Denmark closely on sorting out security and defense arrangements as the Arctic opening unfolds.

[In the paper](#), Dr. Damien Degeorges and Rear Admiral Nils Wang argue the following:

Greenland achieved self-rule in 2009, just as the Arctic was starting to draw global attention. This was by no means the beginning of the state-building process, but an important step on a long journey towards increased sovereignty and independence.

The big challenge for Greenland is to achieve economic independence and become a respected sovereign actor in the international system, capable of standing up to other regional actors such as Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States. After nearly 300 years of economic and political dependency on Denmark, economic independence now seems to be achievable within a foreseeable future.

However, the growing international interest for the Arctic in general is compounding the challenges for Greenland's small population and its plans to develop a robust state apparatus, with the necessary institutional volume.

Greenland and the New Arctic.

In short, working the specifics of how the Greenland defense and security challenge is worked with Denmark, the Nordics, the United States and other Europeans is a key part of the future of Western defense and security.

It is not simply about an abstract Arctic security problem.

It is integral to the evolution of Europe and of NATO in the years ahead as wealth and influence shift North within Europe as a whole.