The three colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis

Marlene Laruelle

To cite this article: Marlene Laruelle (2016) The three colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32:1, 55-74, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2015.1023004

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1023004

Published online: 20 Mar 2015.

Article views: 880

Citing articles: 2
The three colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis

Marlene Laruelle*

Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

(Received 11 November 2014; accepted 9 February 2015)

While the annexation of Crimea boosted Putin’s popularity at home, the Donbas insurgency shattered the domestic ideological status quo. The Kremlin’s position appeared somehow hesitant, fostering the resentment of Russian nationalist circles that were hoping for a second annexation. In this article, I explore the term Novorossiya as a live mythmaking process orchestrated by different Russian nationalist circles to justify the Donbas insurgency. The powerful pull of Novorossiya rests on its dual meaning in announcing the birth of a New Russia geographically and metaphorically. It is both a promised land to be added to Russia and an anticipation of Russia’s own transformation. As such, Novorossiya provides for an exceptional convergence of three underlying ideological paradigms – “red” (Soviet), “white” (Orthodox), and “brown” (Fascist). The Novorossiya storyline validates a new kind of geopolitical adventurism and blurs the boundaries, both territorial and imaginary, of the Russian state.

Keywords: Russia; Ukrainian crisis; Putin; Donbas; nationalism

The crisis in Ukraine is a game changer for Russia’s domestic landscape, more so than the 2011–2012 anti-Putin protests when minority “liberals” and “nationalists” came together to denounce President Vladimir Putin’s regime. While the annexation/reintegration of Crimea boosted Putin’s popularity at home, the Donbas insurgency shattered the domestic ideological status quo: the Kremlin’s position appeared somehow hesitant, fostering the resentment of Russian nationalist circles that were hoping for a second annexation. At the same time, the large consensus gained by the regime around its management of the Ukrainian crisis helped consolidate popular geopolitics (Dittmer 2010), where Russia is depicted as a country under siege, having to fight for its great power status to be recognized against a large coalition of enemies, and whose territorial expansion – real with Crimea, symbolic with Donbas – has been “sacralized” (Suslov, forthcoming).

I argue here that one of the most eloquent engines of this game changer is the spread of the concept of “Novorossiya.” In this article, I explore this term as a live mythmaking process orchestrated by different Russian nationalist circles. I focus
on a period extending from March to August 2014, the central moments of this myth-shaping, and stop at the Minsk agreement of 5 September 2014. I try to encapsulate the interaction among actors, networks, and narratives that nurtures this Novorossiya terminology. The concept does not only legitimize the insurgency; it has further implications for the Russian political landscape as it carries multiple, overlapping ideological meanings, ranging from paralleling the official narrative to calls to overthrow the Putin regime.

Novorossiya exemplified the exceptional convergence of three underlying ideological paradigms. The first can be defined as “post-Soviet,” in the sense that it develops new concepts to reformulate Russia’s great-powerness and messianism. The second paradigm is inspired by Tsarist nostalgia and the reactivation of ultraconservative Orthodox circles that benefit from the Kremlin’s “conservative turn.” The third paradigm comes from the European Fascist tradition and claims that Novorossiya will be the battleground that gives birth to a new revolution that will overthrow the current regimes. The complexity of these three paradigms resides in their overlapping doctrines, trajectories, and networks. The article concludes by examining the long-term impact of the Novorossiya mythmaking – namely, its role in attempting to reunify “red,” “white,” and “brown” nationalisms.

A brief history of “Novorossiya”

Use of the term “Novorossiya” has been documented since the end of the eighteenth century. It designates the regions north of the Black Sea that Catherine the Great won from the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish wars of 1768–1774. In the nineteenth century, Novorossiya was the name of the general governorate in Odessa. For a few months in 1918, a pro-Russian, self-proclaimed Donetsk–Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic, headquartered in Lugansk, sought to protect industrial regions from the then-independent Ukrainian central government. The Bolsheviks disbanded it with the creation of Soviet Ukraine (Korrespondent, June 21, 2014). As mentioned by Ralph Clem and several other scholars, at the 1926 census the regions grouped under the Novorossiya label – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Zaporizhya, Donetsk, and Luhansk (in their Ukrainian variants) – had only about 17% of their population self-defined as ethnic Russian, with a majority declaring their ethnicity as Ukrainian, with some important Jewish, Romanian, and Tatar minorities (Washington Post, September 4, 2014). Ethnic Russians arrived en masse later, during the Soviet industrial development of the region.

The term Novorossiya seems to have re-emerged in 1994 among Transnistrian separatists, who wanted to substantiate their rights to join the Russian Federation. In his book Post-Imperium, the director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Dmitri Trenin, stated, without providing additional detail, that in the mid-2000s,

Some not entirely academic quarters in Moscow played with the idea of a major geopolitical redesign of the northern Black Sea area, under which southern Ukraine, from the Crimea to Odessa, would secede from Kiev and form a Moscow-friendly buffer state, ‘Novorossiya’. (Trenin 2011, 100)
The term was not uttered by Putin during his famous speech of 18 March 2014 endorsing Crimea’s annexation: Crimea is not considered part of Novorossiya, it has a legitimacy of its own. In his declaration, the Russian president stirred historical memory and invoked great power status by recalling the glorious feats of the Russian army on the peninsula – during the Ottoman wars, the Crimean War (1853–1856), and World War II – and the importance of the port of Sevastopol in Russia’s assertion of its strategic autonomy (Putin 2014a). However, Putin did use the term in his 17 April speech, when he described the situation of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine:

I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows. They were won by Potemkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The center of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained. (Putin 2014b)

Since then, Putin has not used the term himself. Novorossiya was promoted by other actors than the presidential administration. On 24 May 2014, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics decided to unite as a new “Union of Novorossiya.” On 29 August 2014, Putin issued a statement addressed to the “Insurgents of Novorossiya,” but the actual text does not use that specific phrasing, instead unassumingly mentioning “the representatives of Donbass” (Kremlin.ru, August 29, 2014). In his address to the Federal Assembly on 4 December 2014, Putin underlined the meaning of Crimea’s reintegration, adding some religious overtones by using the ancient name of the region, Chersonesus, and equating its importance for Russia with the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism (Putin 2014b). But here, also, the word “Novorossiya” was absent; neither did he mention the situation in Donbas, referring instead only to the broad Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, if it is not Putin and his inner circle advancing the idea of Novorossiya, who is?

**Red Novorossiya: consolidating Russia’s great-powerness**

I name the first ideological motif behind the mythmaking of Novorossiya “red,” as it emphasizes the memory of the Soviet Union in a blend promoting a large unified territory, great-powerness, opposition to the West, and a socialist mission. For some Russian nationalist circles, Novorossiya is both a spatial and an ideological justification for Russia’s legitimate reassertion as a great power: it includes a new territory that was inequitably lost in 1991, Crimea, and a new socialist mission in the industrial region of Donbas. This “red” interpretation of Novorossiya is mostly the product of two ideologists: Alexander Dugin, for the territorial reasoning, and Alexander Prokhanov, for the socialist one. But both views resonate largely among Russia’s population and with the Kremlin’s perspective, which explains in part the overlapping aspects of their storylines.
Crafting Red Novorossiya: the Izborsky Club

The Izborsky Club quickly became the main platform promoting the Donbas insurgency and shaping the “red” interpretation of Novorossiya. Created in late 2012, the Club brings together some 30 anti-liberal figures, including some of the most prominent intellectuals to emerge since the collapse of the Soviet Union—and some from even before: Prokhanov, Dugin, Natalia Narochnitskaya, Vitaliy Averyanov, and Father Tikhon (Shevkunov). Some of them call for ethnonationalism (Narochnitskaya, Mikhail Kalashnikov), others are proponents of a Russian empire (Dugin and Mikhail Leontev), some advance Soviet great-powerness (Prokhanov), and others are more leftist (Mikhail Delyagin, Sergey Glazyev). Many of them have constructed distinct political and intellectual paths, and the disagreements among them are plentiful. However, the change of atmosphere in the Kremlin following Putin’s return to power has helped them move beyond their divisions and come together within a single structure that seeks to influence the presidential administration (Svobodnaya pressa, July 7, 2014).

The Izborsky Club has been very vocal during the Ukrainian crisis, and Prokhanov appears to be its main spokesman. An exceptionally eloquent author, he is the one offering a consensus-driven narrative for all nationalist voices. In an August 2014 interview, Prokhanov boasted about his close ties with the Novorossiya leadership:

All the current military elites of Novorossiya are authors of my newspapers, Den’ and Zavtra. Aleksandr Boroday is my preferred author, he wrote crucial articles from the Chechen front. Igor Ivanovich Strelkov is also one of my authors. Pavel Gubarev, I call him often, he reads my newspapers, books, articles, we totally share the same viewpoints, he is a comrade. These people are like my younger brothers. (Rambler, July 1, 2014)

The Izborsky Club goes well beyond simple discursive support for Donbas secessionism; rather, it was directly involved on the ground during the first months of the insurgency. The Club’s main representative there was Aleksandr Boroday, a former prime minister and deputy prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk Republic. He had volunteered to fight in Transnistria in 1992, when was he was just 19, and then became a journalist, covering the first war in Chechnya for RIA Novosti and, after 1996, for Prokhanov’s weekly, Zavtra (RBK Daily, May 26, 2014). In 2014, he became an adviser to the pro-Russian governor of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, and then went to Lugansk at Strelkov’s request. Boroday is the son of a respected philosopher, Yuriy Boroday, who was a friend of Lev Gumilev (1912–1992), the famous Eurasianist historian and Soviet-era semi-dissident. Prokhanov has confirmed that he met Aleksandr at a very young age through his acquaintance with the elder Boroday (Navigator, May 19, 2014; Russkaya sluzhba novostey, May 20, 2014). Prokhanov’s enthusiasm for Boroday may be due to their similar career paths: Prokhanov became known for his war reporting during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and has always valued the romantic notion of intellectuals taking up arms. In December 2011, the two men founded an online
television station, Den’-TV, which sought to be a patriotic answer to the liberal atmosphere of the anti-Putin protests (see http://dentv.ru/pages/item/about-us/).

Boroday is also acquainted with Dugin through the Zavtra network; the relationship between the two men has varied over the years. The two men hit a rough spot in June, when Boroday sharply disapproved of Dugin’s criticism of the Kremlin and challenged him to stop talking and offer real assistance (Aktual’nyye Kommentarii, June 16, 2014; Novorossiya, June 16, 2014). They later “reconciled” online (Karpets LiveJournal, June 17, 2014). While Dugin himself did not travel to Donbas, many members of his Eurasianist Union of Youth (ESM) went to fight alongside the insurgents. The ESM Facebook page actively recruits online (see https://vk.com/wall-23755719_13077). The most well-known Eurasianist in Donbas, Aleksandr Proselkov, has led the Rostov-on-Don ESM branch since the 2000s, and also founded a local branch of the Izborsky Club. He became deputy foreign minister of the Donetsk Republic but was killed on 31 July 2014, near Lugansk (RBC.ru, August 1, 2014). Without giving further details, Boroday also has claimed to be a longtime friend of the famous journalist Mikhail Leontev – made Rosneft’s press officer in January 2014 – who always championed Dugin (Russkaya sluzhba novostey, May 20, 2014).

In June, the Izborsky Club agreed to advise the Donetsk Republic in drafting its constitution and even provided a draft document (Nakanune, June 6, 2014), which has not been acted upon. The Club officially opened a branch in Donetsk, comprised of a dozen or so local university professors and led by Pavel Gubarev. Dugin and Prokhanov attended the opening via videoconference (Yevraziya, June 15, 2014). In August 2014, Boroday ceded the post of Donetsk prime minister to Alexander Zakharchenko, leader of Oplot, a martial arts club promoting pan-Slavic ideas that constitutes one of the main units of the Donbas People’s Militia (Socor 2014). Between the summer and fall of 2014, Boroday and, through him, the Izborsky Club have lost their behind-the-scenes advisory role in Donetsk in favor of more direct control by the Kremlin and the Russian military of the secessionist authorities. However, the process of crafting ideologies continues.

**A new “Large Russia” in the making**

Aleksandr Dugin has been the driving force generating the territorial meaning of Novorossiya, by proposing to merge the Kremlin’s two main foreign policy canons for the post-Soviet space – those of “Eurasian Union” and “Russian World.” Until the Ukrainian crisis, the two concepts were considered mutually exclusive. The first one reads Russia as the leader of a multicultural Eurasia promoting deeper integration with the Central Asian republics, whereas the second emphasizes Russia as a “divided nation” that must defend its compatriots abroad (Laruelle, forthcoming). As early as 2013, Dugin began working to demonstrate the complementarity of the two narratives. His Eurasianist International Movement was awarded a presidential grant to launch a new website, called “Eurasia’s Russian World” (Russkiy mir Yevrazii). The site (http://eurasia.su/about/), which singles out the “hot spots” of Novorossiya, Crimea, and

---

**References**

Transnistria, was conceived as a news portal offering information from the post-Soviet republics, and it focuses on the plight of Russians and Russian-speaking minorities outside the Russian Federation.

Dugin has also tested new concepts in an effort to Russify his calls for a Eurasian expansion and to make them more palatable to public opinion. One of them, mentioned in his interview with the famous television journalist Vladimir Pozner in April 2014, is *Bol’shaya Rossiya* (Large Russia; Pozner 2014). Dugin reclaimed the term from Yuriy Krupnov and applied it to the 2014 situation, outlining the annexation of Crimea as the beginning of the “reassemblage of Russian lands” (*sobiraniye russkikh zemel’*), a powerful historical allusion to the rebirth of Russia after Mongol domination in the fifteenth century. This metaphor supposedly parallels a new phase of territorial expansion for today’s Russia. According to him, *Bol’shaya Rossiya* means “the Russian world, the Russian civilization. I think the territory of the Large Russia approximately overlaps, with some minuses and pluses, the territory of the Russian Empire and of the Soviet Union” (Pozner 2014). When Pozner asked him to specify the exact borders of this *Bol’shaya Rossiya*, Dugin acknowledged excluding the Baltic countries and Western Ukraine, but included the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria. Even if the notion of *Bol’shaya Rossiya* had not taken hold among the Russian public, Dugin’s strategy offers one possible formulation for the presidential administration: it allows for the Russification of the concept of “Eurasia,” which too often has been accused of betraying Russia’s national interests in favor of backward, peripheral regions, and, therefore, it keeps pace with increasingly xenophobic public opinion.

Dugin also launched a Novorossiya website (novorossia.su), which gave him unique visibility to users searching online for information about the situation in Eastern Ukraine. Dugin and Gubarev wrote most of the site’s content. Smaller Eurasianist movements, such as Young Eurasia (*Molodaya Yevraziya*), led by Yuriy Kofner, also promote the Novorossiya concept (which they also apply to other Ukrainian territories and Transnistria) as a first step toward reconstituting Eurasia. Even if the Kremlin’s narrative, Young Eurasia tries to avoid emitting a whiff of imperialism and modestly invited Novorossiya to join the Eurasian Union as a federal republic – with the same status as Belarus and Kazakhstan. Unlike Dugin’s group, Young Eurasia is explicitly nonviolent and has proposed a list of peaceful activities to defend Novorossiya (*Molodaya Yevraziya*, May 18, 2014).

**Novorossiya as new socialist Russia**

Alexander Prokhanov offers a different take on this “red” Novorossiya, one focused on Russia’s traditional messianism and anti-Westernism. He is supported in this reading by many other members of the Club, including Vitaliy Averyanov, one of its co-founders and director for the Club’s predecessor, the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism. Averyanov summarizes the general opinion among this anti-liberal club by claiming that “Novorossiya is the answer of the Russian world,
the Russian civilization to the Western aggression” (2014b, 91). Prokhanov openly insists that he is not encouraging an interpretation of Novorossiya on the basis of political Orthodoxy, stating:

There was the idea of making Orthodoxy the state religion [of Novorossiya – ML] but I think that, thinking rightly, the new architects of Novorossiya will refuse this idea. Because state religion and clericalization of state structures, that is a dangerous thing. (Rambler, July 1, 2014)

Prokhanov prefers to emphasize economic issues and Russia’s socialist mission: Novorossiya will be above all a non-oligarchic state. Big owners such as Akhmetov will be expelled . . . I went to see the huge industries there that work with Russia. They are the products of Soviet impulse, of Soviet elites. They are the future industry of Novorossiya, this is a powerful industry which will cooperate with Russia. (Rambler, July 1, 2014)

To Prokhanov, Novorossiya is a renewed form of the Soviet Union, which will be liberated from oligarchs, have its enterprises renationalized, and see a new Russian socialism emerge. This viewpoint is shared by many other Club members, but often in a very catch-all interpretation that combines all the ideological arguments. Averyanov states, for instance, that “the ideology of Novorossiya will be built on three principles: Russian identity – brotherhood of Eastern Slavs, Orthodoxy, and an avant-garde socialist construction” (2014a, 24–25). This leftist, oligarchy-free interpretation of Novorossiya is also displayed by Club’s economists such as Sergey Glazyev (Putin’s adviser for regional integration issues, including the Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Union) and Mikhail Delyagin (director of the Institute for the Study of Globalization).

Among the other proponents of Novorossiya as a new socialist Russia are the so-called leftist nationalist movements and, especially, the National-Bolshevik Party led by Eduard Limonov. Limonov’s “Other Russia” party opened an office in Donetsk, and the leader and writer publishes regularly his viewpoint in support on the Donetsk and Lugansk authorities (Drugaya Rossiya, July 10, 2014). He was hoping for a general insurrection by the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine that would herald the beginning of a larger revolution in Russia against the Putin regime (Pravdoryb.ru, June 2, 2014). His paramilitary section Interbrigade (a reference to the communist international brigades) recruits and sends volunteers to the Donbas. The movement is said to have its own “corridor” of access to Eastern Ukraine and a small training base near Rostov.

White Novorossiya: building an orthodox theocracy

The second ideological motif legitimizing Novorossiya is less popular in public opinion and among the Russian political class. It is motivated by political Orthodoxy, a trend that claims a worldview inspired by religious precepts (Mitrofanova 2004; Verkhovskiy 2004). It sees Orthodox Christianity as a civilizational principle that makes Russia a distinct country with strong religious
values that should shape the theocratic nature of the regime. The main heralds of this interpretation are personalities such as Natalia Narochnitskaya, who directs the Paris-based Institute of Democracy and Cooperation, and Father Tikhon – a prominent cleric, best-selling writer, and editor of the conservative web portal Pravoslavie.ru – who is rumored to be Putin’s personal confessor. There are also myriad small political orthodox groups in this category. In some other contexts, such as Serbia, this trend could be defined “black” – as expressed, for instance, by Norman Cigar in his analysis of Slobodan Milosevic’s ideological symbiosis among communism, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and some paramilitary groups (Cigar 2000). But in the Russian context, expressions of political Orthodoxy are traditionally symbolized by white, in reference to the White movement following the Bolshevik Revolution.

A shade of Romanov nostalgia

One of the main ideological purveyors for this brand of political Orthodoxy is the news portal Russian Popular Line (Russkaya narodnaya linya), whose slogan “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” is borrowed from the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). Its editor-in-chief, Anatoliy Stepanov, was close to Metropolitan Yoann Snychev (1927–1995), known for his ultraconservative, monarchist, and anti-Semitic views, and he has published many pieces devoted to the Black Hundreds and major monarchist figures. He is a founding member of another institution, the Popular Council (Narodnyy sobor), connected to the Moscow Patriarchate. These monarchist movements fall under the protective umbrella of the International Fund for Slavic Writing and Culture, created in 1989 with the blessing of then-Patriarch Aleksii II. All members of the political Orthodoxy group have personal connections with senior clerics at the Moscow Patriarchate, which directly or indirectly support them. Patriarch Kirill has been at the forefront of integrating Crimea into his encompassing vision of a “Holy Russia,” and visited the peninsula in 2009, celebrating its role in Russia’s Christian baptism (Suslov 2014).

All of these movements make use of Tsarist imagery, including pictures of Nicholas II and his family. Many of their members are associated with monarchist associations linked to the Romanovs. Their visions of Novorossiya are profoundly shaped by their references to Tsarism: they hope for the restoration of autocracy (as it existed prior to the revolutions of 1905 or February 1917, depending on the group), and encourage a (quasi)religious reading of the Maidan events in Ukraine that conflate them with “diabolical” action against Holy Russia. The Ukrainian state is decried as an artificial construct sponsored by the Bolsheviks to weaken Russia. Many of the insurgent groups are rooted in the same ideological brand. One of them, the “Russian Orthodox Army,” stresses its religious identity. Its fighters added an Orthodox cross to the Novorossiya flag and present themselves as “crusaders” and “soldiers of Christ” (voiny khristovyye). Their website justifies violence, stating, “Orthodoxy is the religion of the strong.” On one of the official sites of the Donetsk Republic, ikorpus.ru, an anonymous text declares, “Above all, we are fighting for Christ, transmitted to us by our parents and ancestors” (Ikorpus, n.d.). Igor Strelkov,
the most famous Donbas warlord, known for trying to restore order within the ranks of insurgents and demanding a more hierarchical chain of command, tried to substantiate military order with religious arguments. At the end of July, a few days before his resignation, he prohibited the use of obscene language among his troops, alleging that Russia’s enemies used obscenities to insult holy icons, and thus this practice should be considered a sin (Ikorpus, July 28, 2014).

Even if their ideological background is only vaguely formalized, the massive presence of Cossack troops in Eastern Ukraine favors the revival of this “white” reading of Novorossiya. The largest Cossack group to have joined the insurgency – between 2000 and 4000 troops – is under the direction of Ataman Nikolay Kozitsyn. This self-proclaimed Cossack National Guard is comprised of Cossacks from both Ukraine and Russia, the latter group having seceded from the regular Don Cossack troops. Relations between the Donetsk government and Kozitsyn’s troops are tricky: the former has accused them of disobedience, in particular when they took OSCE observers hostage, and they have a reputation for engaging in massive extortion (Rosbalt, June 16, 2014). However, their high media presence and their display of a Cossack “brand” – Cossacks as the last bearers of Russian authentic national traditions and memory – encourage their association, in public opinion, with the revival of political orthodoxy.

The crisis in Ukraine happened to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of World War I. Until recently, the Great War had been largely obliterated from collective memory and official commemorations in Russia. It was not until preparations for the centennial that the Russian authorities adopted a more structured approach, to be sure that Russia would not be forgotten in the pan-European commemorations. Paradoxically, the Ukraine-linked visibility of groups referring to the political Orthodoxy legacy partly overlaps with this newly rediscovered memory of the war (Rutland 2014). As an historian and specialist on the Russian civil war, Strelkov has participated over the years in historical reenactments, playing the role of a White officer. The Imperial flag was often flown at combat sites in the Donbas and at meetings to support Novorossiya in Russia. On 13 August 2014, the previously adopted flag of Novorossiya (red and blue, inspired by the Tsarist naval flag) was downgraded to a battle flag in favor of the Russian Imperial white-yellow-black tricolor flag. The secessionist authorities stated that through the adoption of the new flag, used as a symbol of the Russian Empire from 1858 to 1883, they “integrate their own history into the historical course of the Russian state” (Dni.ru, August 13, 2014). Positive memories of Russia’s Tsarist past are thus experiencing an unprecedented boost from the Novorossiya mythmaking process.

A Black Hundreds – style revival?
In many regards, this political Orthodoxy draws its inspiration from the Black Hundreds (Chernaya sotnya), a far-right movement created during the Revolution of 1905 and dissolved in February 1917. The painful memory of the Black Hundreds has marked Russia’s twentieth century. The Soviet regime denounced
it as the embodiment of Tsarist decadence, and it became one of the reference points for rightist émigré interwar groups and for the rightist Soviet underground in the 1960s to 1980s. The term resurfaced within the Pamyat movement during the perestroika era, when many small groups, often claiming monarchist influences, invoked it (Laqueur 1994). One of them, calling themselves the Black Hundreds, today presents itself as “a patriotic movement of Orthodox Christians created in order to bring the rebirth of Holy Russia and to defend Russian from internal and external enemies.” It calls for a monarchist regime with Orthodoxy as its official religion and ethnonationalism as its political tenet. In 2006, a posthumously published work by the nationalist publicist Vadim Kozhinov, The Truth About the Black Hundreds, argued that the notion of “Black Hundreds” encompasses all manifestations of Russia’s national defense, from the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, when the Golden Horde was defeated, to the heroic actions of Minin and Pozharskiy in 1612, during the siege of Moscow by the Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita, to the Soviet Union’s struggle against Zionism (Kozhinov 2006). This encompassing definition of Black Hundreds, understood as Russia’s accumulated historical struggles for survival, is widespread among the nationalist spectrum.

Interestingly a Novorossia.ru website, different from Dugin’s site (the former is. ru, while his is.su), managed by an enigmatic group called the “Orthodox of the Moscow region,” launched as early as 2008. The website calls for the “construction in Russia of a state that pleases God (bogougodnoye) in which the fundamental national values will be spiritual and moral, based on Orthodoxy, and not the material and liberal values of a consumer society” (Novorossia.ru, August 25, 2010). The website, which predates the Ukrainian crisis, interprets Novorossiya literally, as the “New Russia” and does not refer to any Ukrainian territory. This website is integrated into a wide group of fringe websites that promote political Orthodoxy and monarchism. This is the case for the movement “For Faith and Fatherland” (Za veru i otchestvo), the Russian Imperial Movement (Russkoye imperskoye dvizheniye), and the Union of the Russian People (Soyuz russkogo naroda), the heir to the movement of the same name, started in 1905 in the same vein as the Black Hundreds. All advocate for Novorossiya, this time understood as a Donbas insurgency, and many of them recruit online. The Imperial Legion, the paramilitary arm of the Russian Imperial Movement, calls, for instance, for “young Orthodox men” to commit themselves to defending Novorossiya. The movement announced the deaths of some of its fighters in June 2014 (Pravyy zglyad, July 7, 2014) and sent at least one new brigade of about a dozen people in August (Pravyy zglyad, August 6, 2014). Several related websites advocate anti-Semitism, among them ZhBCI (the Russian abbreviation for “Living without Fear of Jewry,” Zhit’ bez strakha yudeska), confirming the profoundly anti-Semitic convictions of these Black Hundreds heirs.

Orthodox “adventurism”: the figure of Konstantin Malofeyev

A key Russian player in Donbas belongs to this political Orthodoxy network: Konstantin Malofeyev, an “Orthodox businessman,” has suddenly entered the
spotlight during the Ukrainian crisis. A lawyer by training, Malofeev founded Marshall Capital Partners, an investment fund specializing in the telecommunications market, and has close political and personal connection to former communications minister Igor Shchegolev. Both men appear to have common financial interests in the telecommunications sector and are committed to the so-called Clean Internet project. The aim was both symbolic, in line with the Kremlin’s morality turn, and financial: large telecommunication companies would be responsible for developing software to control Internet media outlets (Polit.ru, February 28, 2013).

Since the early 1990s, Malofeyev has been a leading supporter of the Russian Orthodox Church and was close to Metropolitan Yoann Snychev. Using the funds raised by Marshall Capital, Malofeyev founded the Philanthropic Fund of St. Basil the Great, which now boasts some 30 programs advocating family values (anti-abortion groups, assistance to former convicts and single mothers, etc.), Orthodox religious education, and assistance to Orthodox churches and monasteries. These activities have earned him warm relations with Father Tikhon (Shevkunov) (Bugriy 2014). Malofeyev met Aleksandr Boroday in the 2000s, when Marshall Capital hired his consulting firm for some public relations events (RBK, May 23, 2014). Strelkov was said to have led the investment fund’s security service, which Malofeyev has denied (Vedomosti, May 16, 2014; News Liga, May 21, 2014). During the Ukrainian crisis, Malofeyev quickly became active on the side of Crimea. His St. Basil the Great Fund provided $1 million to the pro-Russian mayor of Sevastopol, Aleksey Chalyy, and a similar sum to the Republic of Crimea once it was integrated within the Russian Federation (RusCharity, April 9, 2014). Malofeyev denied funding the Donbas insurgency, saying he simply provides humanitarian assistance in line with an agreement between the St. Basil the Great Fund and the Donetsk Republic (Novorossia.su, June 18, 2014). However his name is increasingly associated with the insurgency, and he benefits from the support of Father Tikhon, a fervent sympathizer of the secessionist cause in Eastern Ukraine.

Malofeyev is also relatively close to Dugin. The two men met in the late 1990s or early 2000s (Slon, May 19, 2014). In June 2014, Malofeyev financed a so-called secret meeting in Vienna celebrating the 200th anniversary of Metternich’s Holy Alliance. The occasion brought together Dugin, the well-known nationalist painter Ilya Glazunov, and the leaders of several European far-right and monarchist groups: Americ Chaupadre, the right-hand man of Marine Le Pen in the Front National; Prince Sixtus Henry of Bourbon-Parma, leader of the Catholic-monarchist Carlist movement in Spain; Heinz-Christian Strache, chairman of the right-wing populist Freedom Party in Austria; Viennese FPÖ politician Johann Herzog; Volen Siderov, the chairman and founder of the far-right Atak party in Bulgaria; several right-wing extremists from Croatia; and noblemen from Georgia and Russia (Tages Anzeiger, June 3, 2014). These contacts may seem disparate at a first glance, but they are not. All these figures are campaigning for the establishment of a European conservative international, which would bring together monarchists, far-right parties, Catholics, and Orthodox groups.
Malofeyev has cultivated these European networks for several years, and tries now to advance his projects through the new dynamics created by the Donbas insurgency (Grani, May 19, 2014).

Brown Novorossiya: exporting the neo-fascist revolution

The third ideological thread feeding the Novorossiya concept is the “Russian Spring” (Russkaya vesna). Unlike the first two motifs, this one does not enjoy any Kremlin support because the Putin regime considers itself – rightly – to be its next target. Indeed this “Russian Spring” motif claims that the Russian “national revolution” should fight not only Kyiv, but export itself to Russia. Although this third paradigm is openly anti-regime while the two previous are not, its narrative is often superimposed on – or parallel to – the two others. Moreover, it groups people with contrasting views: so-called democrat-nationalists such as Konstantin Krylov and neo-Nazi groups, otherwise at two extremes of the political spectrum, share the same terminology of a “Russian Spring” to call for a popular uprising against the current regime.

The Russian Spring: a new war theater targeting Kyiv . . . and Moscow

The Russian Spring movement plays on the dual significance of Novorossiya: it announces the birth of a New Russia both geographically, in Eastern Ukraine, and metaphorically, in Russia itself. Once again Dugin has been one of the driving forces beyond this interpretation of Novorossiya, offering the most elaborate narrative:

The new party of Pavel Gubarev [called Novorossiya–ML] embodies the way to a Russian future, the path to the New Russia. Novorossiya here has both a direct and a metaphorical sense. Russia itself should be reborn, become another, cleanse, wake up, come back to its Russian, Eurasian identity. In freeing Novorossiya from Kiev’s junta, the Russian heroes free Russia itself from the leftovers of the 1990s, the oligarchic system, Western influence, and spiritual and moral decadence. (RIA Novosti, May 19, 2014)

Dugin carefully avoids threatening Putin in person and confines himself to targeting his inner circle. To justify this ambivalence, he explains: “Putin embodies simultaneously Crimea and hesitations on Donbas. He is simultaneously Glazyev and Kudrin, Rogozin and Surkov, Sechin and Dvorkovich. He combines in himself contradictions that cannot coexist anymore” (Eurasia Inform, August 2, 2014). Dugin has thus sought to open a new front in the ideological war of Novorossiya, this time a domestic one. A champion of denouncing the liberal and pro-Western “fifth column,” with the Novorossiya concept he creates a “sixth column” of internal enemies – the Kremlin’s modernizers. These consist of those who are for Putin and for Russia but for a liberal, modernizing and Westernizing Russia, for its globalization and integration into the Western world.... The sixth column is not enemies of Putin but his supporters . . ., they don’t attack him at each of his patriotic moves, they support him. (Yevrazia, April 29, 2014)
Dugin particularly targets Vladislav Surkov as the sixth column’s leader, as well as Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich and Sergey Kurginyan, a nationalist publicist who rallied to the regime. For Dugin, Moscow’s hesitancies to intervene in the Donbas can only be explained by the hidden competition between the real patriots and the sixth column. He is concerned that the Malofeyev line, dominant until April, has now lost the upper hand to Surkov, who turned down the opportunities for military intervention in – and annexation of – the Donbas (Svobodnaya pressa, August 22, 2014).

The Dugin-style “Russian Spring” has the explicit goal of exporting the Russian national revolution to Moscow. Many traits allow for this Russian Spring narrative to be associated with the fascist tradition. First, it calls for a totalitarian “national revolution” that would transform society, overthrow the current regime, and start over with a tabula rasa. It sublimates violence, filling the Russian nationalist Internet and social media world with images of volunteers in khaki uniforms, proudly displaying their weapons and posing in macho ways around tanks or destroyed military equipment. The narrative – and the nationalist hard rock music – that accompanies these images promotes violence, sacrifice, and death in the name of the greater national cause. Second, it combines the classic traits of almost all fascist movements, a leftist-style discourse that denounces corporations and oligarchs and a focus on the “dangers” threatening the survival of the nation.

Many groups of nationalist volunteers active in the Donbas display fascist symbols, offering all possible versions of the swastika. These include the neo-Nazi group Restrukt, famous for its anti-immigrant violence (Restrukt, n.d.). Another example of fascist references is the Varyagi brigade (referring to the Varangians who conquered Novgorod and participated in founding the first Russian state), which was sent by the Eurasianist Falanges, a youth group close to Dugin but more openly fascist than the Eurasianist Union of Youth. The Falanges, as their name implies, draw their inspiration from Franco’s Spain. The Varyagi brigade has as its emblem the eagle of the 1920s German National Bolsheviks. 17

Anti-Semitic slogans also are growing in visibility. The narratives on the need to get rid of the “international Jewry” represented by Kyiv’s power and its oligarchs are increasing in frequency. In an interview with Open Revolt, an English-language website that calls for a revolt of the white working classes, Dugin celebrates the “fight to the death” against Ukrainian nationalism and especially the Right Sector political party, which “serves the Jewish oligarch Kolomoyski” (Open Revolt, May 21, 2014). He also denounced the election of President Petro Poroshenko: “Nationalists, who were giving the tone on Maidan, said they need to have a Ukrainian as a president. As a result, they elected a Jew, and not a Slav, whoever he could be” (Euromaidanu.net, June 26, 2014). Many websites promoting the “Russian Spring” are associated with both Russian- and English-speaking portals from the fascist anti-globalization movement. They combine a discourse condemning Western capitalism and liberalism with support for the Islamist cause, and therefore sometimes add an Islamic veneer to their anti-Semitism.
The myth of the Russian National Unity renaissance

This “brown” reading of Novorossiya was amplified by the media hype surrounding the alleged rebirth of the Russian National Unity (RNU) party alongside the Donbas insurgency. RNU is a unique case of a defunct nationalist organization whose name became such a brand that it can be instantly revived, based only on its faded glory.

RNU was one of the first parties to form after Pamyat’s collapse at the end of the 1980s. Very early its leader, Aleksandr Barkashov, rejected Pamyat’s Orthodox and imperial nostalgia and moved toward a more muscular defense of the Russian national cause by borrowing many symbols from Nazism (Dunlop 1996; Simonsen 1996). However, the success of RNU in the early 1990s was not the result of this Nazi-style ideology, but of its role in the October 1993 conflict between President Boris Yel’tsin and parliament. During the conflict, the RNU militia sided with the insurgent parliamentarians and controlled entry to the Supreme Soviet building. Several of its members were killed, the movement was temporarily banned, and Barkashov evaded the police for many months before finally being arrested and imprisoned. When he was set free in February 1994, his prestige within the nationalist movement was at its peak, buoyed still further by the participation of RNU volunteers in the separatist conflicts in Transnistria and Ossetia. At the time RNU was considered to be the country’s foremost radical nationalist organization, with 350 regional branches, of which 100 were officially registered; a newspaper Russkiy poryadok (Russian Order) with a circulation in the tens of thousands; between 50,000 and 200,000 supporters; as well as the implicit backing of approximately 10% of the population (Jackson 1999; Shnirel’man 2007). The party militia incited several racist incidents and apparently infiltrated certain key ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior (Verkhovskiy, Mikhailovskaya, and Pribylovskiy 1999). Barkashov had secured personal links with some MPs from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Dmitriy Rogozin’s Congress of Russian Communities, as well as with General Aleksandr Lebed (Likhachev 2002). RNU regularly collaborated with regional military units and, with the discrete backing of the authorities, with law enforcement agencies in Voronezh, Krasnodar, and Stavropol.

However, RNU gradually petered out as an organization, overtaken by new structures and new generations (Verkhovskiy and Kozhevnikova 2009). In 2009, Barkashov unsuccessfully tried to re-launch the movement as the “Union of the Defenders of Russia—October 1993,” whose name alone reflected its backward-looking nature. However, even if the well-organized paramilitary body of the 1990s has ceased to exist, the RNU’s prestige remains strong, and small groups continued to claim to be its heirs. The movement’s website (http://soratnik.com), dormant since 2006, was reactivated only with the crisis in Ukraine. Many central figures in Donetsk themselves referred, directly or indirectly, to RNU. The most famous of them, Pavel Gubarev, a prominent spokesman with multiple titles (leader of the Donbas militia, governor of the Donetsk People’s Republic, its
foreign affairs minister, and the founder of the Novorossiya Party), claimed to lead the RNU section in Donetsk. He thanked the movement for providing him with military training in the early 2000s, and videos from the RNU congress confirm his attendance. However, there is no reliable information about when RNU affiliates in Ukraine were created (Pauluskp, March 9, 2014). An RNU office is said to have opened at the central administration of Donetsk in the early months of the insurrection. Dmitriy Boitsov, leader of the so-called Orthodox Donbas organization, has been rumored to have taken orders from Barkashov. Mikhail Verin, commander of the “Russian Orthodox Army,” also is suspected of being close to Barkashov, but these links are mentioned by unreliable Ukrainian sources, and the movement’s Facebook page displays no particular link to RNU. The fact that Barkashov celebrates the insurgents’ actions on his Facebook page does not mean that they take orders from him.

How to explain this inconsistent media hype on the alleged rebirth of the RNU, with almost no open sources to confirm it? RNU is the only nationalist paramilitary organization whose memory has left such a powerful imprint on the nationalist scene, and Barkashov could, at the height of his influence, lean on an exceptional political network, thanks to the legitimacy he earned on the barricades in October 1993. However, today the “brown” color of the Donbas insurgency relies on other, less known and more fragmented, neo-Nazi groups.

The neo-Nazi international fighting in Donbas

Several dozen foreigners, who are neither Ukrainian nor Russian, fight in Donbas, many of them with neo-Nazi views. Donbas insurgents have received the support of dozens of individuals from Italy, France, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states. Serbian troops appear to be the most numerous, followed by Belarussians and some former Soviet citizens from Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and so on, mostly interested in personally experiencing war (Voenkor, August 8, 2014; Vzglyad, August 12, 2014). Among the Western European fighters, some young people coming from France and Italy are identifiable as close to radical far-right groups such as Les Identitaires or the Eurasianist Italian youth; others have several years of military experience in the regular army and consider it is their duty to fight against what they see as NATO and US involvement in Ukraine to weaken Russia. Some of them also mention the need to defend the white race, symbolized by Putin’s leadership, against decadency coming from corrupt European and US elites and their unlimited promotion of all kinds of ethnic and sexual minorities.

Interestingly, Russian neo-Nazi groups are divided. The majority support the Russian side over the Ukrainian one, but call for Novorossiya to remain free and avoid unification with a corrupt Russia. A minority saw in Maidan a genuine democratic revolution against a corrupt regime backed by Putin and support the current Ukrainian government (Yudina and Alperovich 2014). This is the case, for instance, for some members of Restrukt who have joined the Ukrainian Right Sector and its different brigades. The Russkiye movement, which brings together former
members of Belov’s Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and Dmitriy Demushkin’s skinhead Slavic Union, is also divided. Some of its members left to join the Donbas insurgency, but the Facebook page of the movement is more focused on defending political prisoners and criticizing the Kremlin than on Novorossiya. For Demushkin, Novorossiya is a lost fight, as it is backed by a corrupt and inefficient Russian regime (Den’-TV, August 27, 2014). This opinion is shared by Yegor Prosvirnin, the founder of the website “Sputnik and pogrom” (http://sputnikipogrom.com), which is very critical of the insurgency’s ability to succeed and the Putin regime’s chances of becoming a responsible stakeholder in the defense of ethnic Russians. Among the Russkiye movement, some pro-Ukrainians created Russkiy Sektor, which stands with Kyiv and denounces the Kremlin in a way inspired by the 2011–2012 anti-Putin protests. Some Russian neo-Nazis are involved in the Azov battalion, which serves as a street patrol under the command of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry (Vzglyad, June 15, 2014). They stand alongside neo-Nazis coming from all over Europe, particularly Sweden, Italy, Germany, and Finland, to help Ukraine against Russia.

Conclusions
One way to interpret the Novorossiya mythmaking is to compare it with the fight for the Supreme Soviet of October 1993. For the first time since 1993, Russian nationalists finally have a story that celebrates their achievements in words, images, even music, offering the whole array of heroic battles and martyrs. Igor Strelkov, transformed into a living icon over several months, fully embodied this epic. Posters with images of his face have covered the Russian Internet, and Strelkov has come to personify the Russian heroes of all eras. His face has been “Photoshopped” to adorn various posters, made into cartoons, and a mushrooming cult of personality has taken shape. Similar ideological groups can be identified in 1993 and 2014, intertwining the “colors” of Russian nationalism. Eastern Ukraine came to succeed Transnistria, at that time the main war theater for nationalists. The defunct RNU movement even seems to be rising from the ashes for the occasion. In both cases, paramilitary groups embody the fight, benefiting from some personal protection from the security services and the military. The Izborsky Club stands as an ideological successor to the Supreme Soviet and Prokhanov’s weekly newspaper Den’, trying to synthesize a spectrum of nationalist doctrines into a coherent policy. Political orthodoxy and “Orthodox businessmen” update the Black Hundreds legacy of Pamyat that shaped so deeply the Russian nationalist spectrum in the final years of perestroika and the first years of the post-Soviet era.

Novorossiya is thus a unique theater for Russian nationalism, nurturing simultaneously a “red,” “white,” and “brown” reading of the events occurring in the Donbas. The red one justifies the insurgency in the name of an anti-Western geopolitics, Russia’s destiny to be a large territory, and the Soviet memory that makes Donbas a region proud of its industrial legacy and showing the way for a new socialist Russia. The white one hopes the current insurgency opens the path to a renewal of political Orthodoxy that would confirm Russia’s status as the herald
of conservative Christian values and, for some, spreads nostalgia for monarchy. The brown one sees in Donbas a new battlefield where Aryan supremacy could defeat Europe’s decadence, and where young people can be trained in urban warfare to prepare for an overthrow of the regimes in power across Europe.

The three interpretations compete, and partly overlap, in some of their doctrinal contents. Anti-Semitism is one of them, as Jews can be concurrently denounced as oligarchs and capitalist bankers, as enemies of Christianity and of Russia, and as polluting the White Aryan race in Europe. Anti-Westernism is obviously the second shared doctrinal element, but it is sometimes “softened” due to a complex relationship to Europe. In fact the second and third ideological themes behind Novorossiya exhibit anti-liberalism but a pro-European posture: through the Christian connections for the former, and through the White Power slogan for the latter, they developed deep interactions with some of their Western European counterparts. These three motives also overlap in some of their networks. Dugin is a producer of both the first and the third interpretations, faithful to his dual Eurasianist and fascist stance. Some youth groups play on both the Black Hundred and neo-Nazi imagery, such as the Russian Imperial Legion. Last but not least, the third motif is the most paradoxical, as it reveals an open fracture within the neo-Nazi groups between pro-Ukrainians and pro-Russians.

Putin has disappointed all three Novorossiya camps: they were hoping that Donbas would be integrated with Russia, following Crimea’s happy destiny, while Moscow saw it only as a way to have its say in Ukraine’s future. They also had to accept an obvious disappointment – many regions of Eastern Ukraine with important Russian-speaking populations did not follow the Donbas path and remained loyal to Kyiv. Since the Minsk agreement the ideological “nurturers” of Novorossiya have been partly shut down and have lost some of their media visibility. The process of normalization of Donbas as a second Transnistria under Moscow’s stranglehold has been successful so far, even if the secessionist leaders were able to preserve some of their autonomy on the ground, as seen by the refusal to respect the ceasefire agreement and their move forward in Debaltseve and Mariupol.

The Kremlin silenced the more radical figures linked to the Izborsky Club and organized Strelkov’s removal from his pedestal, while being cautious to avoid any uncontrolled “heroization” of the insurgents and of the fallen soldiers. The Russian regime has thus succeeded in keeping these nationalist forces in check, but rising nationalism of various strains has been an undeniable trend for many years. Since the emergence of the concept of Novorossiya, the Kremlin’s room to maneuver while crafting multiple ideologies and playing with their contradictions has been diminished. The Novorossiya storyline validated a new kind of geopolitical adventurism and blurred the boundaries, both territorial and imaginary, of the Russian state, with possible boomerang effects that are difficult to forecast.

Acknowledgements
This paper was written as a part of a research project “The Vision of Eurasia,” organized by the Center for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University and supported
financially by the Baltic Sea Foundation (Stockholm). A first, short version of the main argument has been published in “Novorossiya, a Launching Pad for Russian Nationalists,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 357. September 2014. I am very grateful to Peter Rollberg, Maria Lipman, Alexander Tarasov, Gerard Toal, and Robert Orttung for their comments on this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. The term first appeared in 2005, propagated by Yuriy Krupnov, a scholar at the Institute for Demography, Migration, and Regional Development who participated in writing Russia’s demographic doctrine and is known for his nationalist views. Krupnov’s concept of Bol’shaya Rossiya, established in response to an alliance between “Orange” Ukraine and Saakashvili’s Georgia, asserted Russia’s responsibility as an empire in a regional space where other states are “failing or illegitimate” (APN, January 31, 2005).
2. Interbrigada (http://interbrigada.org/sample-page/). See also “Limonov’s Boys in Novorossiya” (https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/509316380131221505/photo/1).
3. I thank Alexander Tarasov for providing this information.
4. See Stepanov’s biography at http://ruskline.ru/about/redakciya_rnl/.
7. See their website at rusarmy.su.
8. The status of Cossacks has been recognized by the Russian state since 1996–1997, and in 2005 a federal law “On State Service of the Russian Cossacks” enabled them to work for the Interior Ministry, especially the border guards, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Ministry of Defense. Their field of action covers forest conservation; providing assistance during natural disasters, accidents, and other emergencies; and firefighting; educating children and young people in patriotic values; and preparation for military service. In southern Russia, especially in Krasnodar and Rostov-on-Don, Cossack guard formations work not only as border guards but also as municipal police, valorizing their role of guarantors of the city’s “law and order.” See Don Info Buro, June 6, 2014; Novaya gazeta, July 18, 2014; Big Rostov, June 9, 2014; and Rostovskiy Moskovskiy Komsomolets, June 18, 2014.
9. They were instrumentalized by the Tsarist security services, the Okhrana, and supported by the ultra-conservative clergy close to Father Johann Kronstadtsky (1829–1908). The Black Hundreds defended the most reactionary elements of autocracy, opposed any liberalization of the Russian political regime, organized pogroms in the name of a fierce anti-Semitism based on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and were also violently anti-Ukrainian (Rawson 1995).
10. See the movement’s website at http://www.sotnia.ru.
14. Marshall Capital Partners was later accused of “raiding” its competitors. It took a 10% stake in Rostelecom (making it the largest minority shareholder until Malofeyev sold a great part of its shares) and purchased some of the assets of state monopoly SvyazInvest. Malofeyev was briefly a member of the boards of directors
of both companies. In 2012, he entered politics and was elected an MP for a small district in the Smolensk region, mostly with the goal of being protected by parliamentary immunity. The most complete biography (in Russian) is at http://comnarcon.com/444. In English, see Arkhipov, Meyer, and Reznik (2014). See also Novaya gazeta, November 21, 2012.


18. The year the videos were made remains contested (see Glavcom, March 8, 2014; Lenta, March 5, 2014; and Novorossia.su, June 7, 2014).

19. A phone recording released in May 2014 by the Ukrainian Security Services that purportedly shows this to be the case is certainly a forgery: no one can prove it is from 2014 or that Boitsov is actually responding to Barkashov. A video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J18RziLII30#t = 22. Barkashov denied it was his voice (see http://vk.com/wall247656085_1400). Barkashov’s presence in Donetsk has not been confirmed.

20. See the movement’s Facebook page at https://vk.com/topic-67964475_30103543.

21. Many of these groups have been advertised on the Eurasian Falanges website (http://falangeurasia.blogspot.com). On the French participants, see RIA Novosti, August 21, 2014.

22. See, among others Sautreuil (2014) and War (n.d.).


24. See, for instance, the Topwar.ru website, which displays many of them, and the website http://superstrelkov.ru.

References


Laruelle, Marlene. forthcoming. “Russia as a ‘Divided Nation’: Assessing Nationalism in Russia’s Foreign Policy from Compatriots to Crimea.” Problems of Post-Communism.


Suslov, Mikhail. forthcoming. “Crimea is Ours! Russian Popular Geopolitics in the New Media Age.” Eurasian Geography and Economy.


War. n.d. “War in Ukraine. Volunteers from Italy Go to Donbass to Fight against the Kiev Junta.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDsTaQSjhYE