The Aeromedical Evacuation Piece at the TACC

05/26/2011

The Aeromedical Evacuation Piece

06/26/2011 – In the roundtable at the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) , Major Charles Marek led off the discussion of the aeromedical evacuation operations of the TACC.  The command focuses upon inter-theater lift while the COCOMs focus on intra-theater support.  A key strategic development has been a shift from relying upon specialized support aircraft to providing modules throughout the fleet to provide for aeromedical support.  This significantly changes the approach to such operations.

SLD: We were discussing earlier the role of modules inserted into lifters as opposed to the use of specialized aeromedical aircraft.  Where are the modules kept?

Marek: They are stored in our various strategic hubs.  For the C-17s we have things like the litter stanchion augmentation sets  and those help give us more litter stanchions if we have patients that are critically injured.  For the KC-135s, we have patient support pallets, which have both seats and litter stanchions built on them.  They just clip right into the aircraft.  Alternatively, we have some that are just seats or some that are just litters.

Major Marek during the SLD interview April 2011

Credit: SLD 2011

SLD: And these are stored at major air bases?

Marek:  Correct, at hub locations.  We can then fly them to the air base from which we are going to fly the patient.

SLD: There has been a significant increase in the survivability of wounded servicemen.  Presumably, this system is part of the reason why.

Marek: It is due to two factors.  First, it is due to the way we can get to the patient within the first hour of injury.  The Army and the Marines use their Medevac rotary wings to do most of that.  They get to the patient and get them to the hospitals that are located in different strategic locations throughout the theater.  Second, it is due to our ability to move the patient from there to longer, more definitive care, say to Ramstein or back in the states. If we get a call that we have a critical or an urgent patient that needs to be moved we’ll  work with the DO/DDOs, BSD, TDD as well as the “senior” on the floor to select the best mission that will meet the request and cause the least glass to be broken in the system.  It could be a mission that’s already in execution and we could be kicking off cargo.  But our first action is to find a mission that is going back empty or a minimum amount of cargo so that we can still get that cargo to where it needs to go. In addition, we would also work with the tanker guys if the mission required an aerial refueling to get that patient back (depending on the actual distance).

U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Zachary Johnson, 451st Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Flight, aeromedical technician, cares for a patient during an Aeromedical Evacuation mission to transport patients from Kandahar Air Field to Bagram Air Base July 19

Credit: US Air Force, 8/20/09

SLD: When did this system operating now actually begin to come together?

Marek: Pretty much in the last 5-10 years.  The main shift has been from using dedicated aircraft to AE delivered by any opportune aircraft.

SLD: What were the dedicated aircraft?

Marek: The C-9 Nightingale (which was the military version of the DC-9 airliner).  And the C-141 was also one, as well.

SLD: What’s the biggest challenge to making this all work from your point of view?

Marek: It is not knowing the location of our tasking.  We don’t know who’s going to get injured and when.  And then there is the challenge of trying to get the technology into the back of the aircraft, such as radiological technology (to do radiographical pictures) and sending that information back to the facility to give them a heads up on what’s coming their way, as well as providing electronic health records.

The progress has been significant.  The average time to return a patient stateside was 45 days in Vietnam.  In Desert Storm, it was ten days to get back to the U.S. Today, we’re down to three. Col. Mintzlaff: And the equipment they carry is pretty incredible too. If you go to the Pacific, it’s really a good quality of life for U.S. military families.  For example, in the case of neonatal, you see the equipment come up and they can transport somebody from incredible distances, whether you’re going from Kadena to Hawaii or back to the states with an infant baby.

Sometimes we overlook those normal things because we focus so much on getting wounded warriors home quickly.  But we’re moving neonatal babies in the middle of nowhere with an airplane setup that will take just that baby and mom to a hospital. And it’s not just one aircraft.  It could be four or five different aircraft.  One aircraft could be coming out of Balboa Medical Center with personnel to help take care of that baby.  And the equipment’s coming from another location, so another aircraft might be bringing that to get it all married up into one location to pick up that neonate.  We do that for anyone, not just neonates.  We do it for coalition partners as well.

Transitioning from the P3 to the P8

05/24/2011

05/24/2011 Transitioning from the P3 to the P8: A Sea Change in Maritime Surveillance

During the visit in San Diego in late March 2011 to the Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Line of Defense sat down with Commander Jake Johansson to discuss the evolution of maritime surveillance.  Johansson discussed the transition from the P3 to the P8 and the evolution of the maritime surveillance mission area. As a lifelong maritime surveillance professional, Johansson provided a sweeping review of where the USN has come and where it is going in this vital mission area. Commander Johansson is CNAF Maritime Readiness/CNAP Deputy Operations.


Commander Johansson Druing the SLD Interview

Credit: SLD 2011

SLD: Can you provide us with an overview of the evolution of the mission area for maritime surveillance platforms?

Johansson: When I started on the P3s, there was definitely an ASW threat; 98-percent of the flights I flew where maritime missions.  We tracked other nation’s submarines just as often as we tracked our own when I first started out in the community in the early 80s.With the end of the Cold War, this changed and we re-focused our mission to remain relevant in the fight. We updated our aircraft with the AIP suite and began flying over land more than flying in the maritime eventually supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan quite extensively.

As I said, during my first tour, 98-percent of my flights were over water, and about 50 to 60 to 70-percent of those we’re doing ASW, whether it was search, localize or tracking other world submarines. During my last deployment, with few exceptions our squadron never flew over water except for transits. Most of my tactical flights were over land supporting OIF.  This is not true of all deployed squadrons but it happened to be true for my squadron and was representative of the last 4 or so squadrons that preceded ours in Iraq.

Even though we had migrated over land somewhat, our primary mission area has always been and will always be focused in the maritime environment. We are always striving to get back to the basics of our primary mission area, which is ASW. Our community feels that if you can grasp the complexity of ASW as a whole, then you can use those tactical and crew resource management skills over in our other mission areas of anti-surface warfare as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

SLD: The P8 is not a simple replacement for the P3.  Could you talk to the replacement approach and process?

Johansson: What the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force is moving toward is a family of systems that include the P8, the systems that are in our other variants of aircraft and the broad air and maritime surveillance UAV, or BAMS. Those platforms, supported by the Tactical Operations Centers and Mobile Tactical Operations Centers can provide 24/7/365 Maritime Domain Awareness if required. We have two variants of the baseline P-3 right now in addition to our P-3 AIP platform. The vision is to migrate the capabilities from those two variants into the Family of Systems offloading capabilities to BAMS and the P-8.  The P-8s open architecture lends itself to the migration of some of these systems from the current platforms and we hope to do that in future increments of the P-8.

SLD: What is the planned fleet size?

Johansson: The current thinking is we need 12 squadrons, 7 aircraft each, and so the total would be around 120.  The budget is tight so we will see what the final number in the future but 120 is what we would like to see.  The initial operational capability (IOC) is in 2013 and FOC is in 2020, for all increments.

SLD: How will you handle littoral operations, which are very challenging for maritime surveillance?

Johansson : First of all, the littoral is challenging for everyone, friend and foe and the MPRF will not be alone in the littoral accomplishing maritime surveillance. Our community can bring quite a few sensors to the fight in the littoral and we continue to develop capabilities that can withstand the harsh littoral environment.  The Family of Systems, P-8 and BAMS would be able to support the Maritime Component Commander in the Littoral within all our mission areas.  We will have the ability to off-load the tactical information we are receiving via multiple communication paths keeping the CSG/ESG/JFMCC/COCOM aware of what we are doing as well.  Obviously, queuing will go a long way to getting the MPRF where we are wanted and results in more time on the targets our warfare commanders are interested in.

I think as we migrate, and there are unresolved operational issues with working in the littoral with P8. The P8 is envisioned by some as being a higher altitude ASW platform.  I don’t foresee the P-8 primarily operating at higher altitudes in all tactical phases of flight and in fact, the P-8 is designed to fly through the entire range of the P-3 flight envelope.  This will be a process of education as we start fielding the P-8. How do we work in littoral with at a higher altitude with other players in the mix?  In the past during the Cold War in a blue water environment, we used to drop buoys from high altitude all the time, there was nobody else out there.  In a littoral, I envision multiple friendly surface and low flying aircraft below you, and all these surface warriors and aviators below you are a little concerned about you dropping sonobuoys from high altitude.  As our CONOPS matures we will have to work to ensure deconfiction and the safety of those below us.

SLD: What advantages does the P-8 bring to the overall maritime surveillance effort?

Johansson:  The P8 gives you a range of capabilities that could be flexibly used in different ways. They will allow you the ability to fly from different bases farther from the fight.  The ability to reach more distant operational areas may impact our onstation time but the increased reliability of the aircraft and the inflight refueling capability will ultimately result in a force with increased responsiveness as well as more capability and flexibility for Combatant Commanders. We can protect our P8 fleet a little bit better by having a little bit of distance between us and the fight as well.  We will also be able to rapidly get into theater or into that area of responsibility that we need to be in, do our business and come back.



A Boeing P-8A Poseidon test conducts a test flight June 5, 2009.

Credit: USN Visual News Service 06/05/09

SLD: What about the challenge of transition?

Johansson: The crews will experience a challenging transition. Most squadrons come home from deployment as a P3 crew, take their leave, and start the P8 transition.  Six months later, they will be P8 crews. It’s a very compressed transition.  We envision a squadron taking 18 months between deployments to transition and redeploy.

SLD: One advantage of a manned versus unmanned platform is the ability of the crews to communicate with ground forces.  Could you comment on your judgments in this area?

Johansson: Some of our most rewarding missions have been when a General from a ground force calls you directly on the radio and tells you what he needs.  You provide him with the surveillance or reconnaissance he required and a short time later you see Marines or soldiers taking care of the issue.BAMS is designed as a tactical adjunct to the P-8.  As long as BAMS remains in that role, the combined capability of the P-8/BAMS aircraft actually offers ground forces far more capacity and capability. However, if BAMS becomes more of a strategic asset, it may be more difficult for a war fighter on the ground to get it in a position where it will do him some good tactically.  The operators are not within line of sight of the ground forces so the command and control to move UAVs around gets a little tricky, especially if they are being employed strategically but are required tactically. I think the P-8 will continue to be used tactically and provide a little more flexibility for the ground forces to utilize tactically.  Persistence may not be as good as the BAMS with its long dwell time but there is some merit to having a man in the cockpit with eyes on overhead. I point out that you concentrated on ground forces.  I would like to mention again that our interest is getting back to the maritime environment where we would be able to provide maritime domain awareness for the Fleet with the persistence of BAMS and the capabilities of the P-8 Poseidon.

SLD: And these are really not unmanned, except airborne?

Johansson: I’m not a big fan of calling them unmanned anymore.  I call them remotely-piloted, because it takes a lot of people to operate these systems. We moved to the family of systems (BAMS and P-8) because we felt that we could move some of the persistent ISR capabilities to a more capable platform, BAMS.  BAMS long dwell time can provide the persistence necessary more efficiently than a rotation of P-8 24/7/365.  Also, if we used P-8 to do that we would have to increase squadron manpower to give them the necessary crews to fly 24/7 MDA in addition to the ASW/ASUW missions.  We hope to have 5 orbits flying 24/7/365 to cover the maritime picture were required. The great thing about BAMS and P-8 is that they can work together to meet the COCOMS requirements.  BAMS can provide the persistence and the P-8 can be used to conduct the specialized skill-sets that the BAMS cannot.  BAMS can provide you the maritime picture while the P-8 either responds to BAMS intelligence or conducts ASW/ASUW.  This Family of Systems concept can become quite a lethal combination if we employ it correctly.

Fifth Generation Aircraft and Disruptive Change

05/22/2011

05/23/2011

By:Robbin Laird

An Earlier Version of this piece first appeared on Defense News February 21, 2011 p. 61

U.S. air power is at a crucial turning point.  In a stringent budgetary environment and with a demand to shape a post-Afghan military, the crucial requirement is to invest in the future not the past.  President Obama is calling for a Sputnik moment in the investment in future technologies.  There is little reason to exclude the Department of Defense from such an effort.

Yet this is exactly what is happening.  After cancelling the F-22 without ever understanding what the F-22 brings to the joint warfighter, the Administration is slowing its investment in the F-35 and investing in legacy aircraft. Amazingly, policy makers have not taken on what the Indians grasped: why buy 40 year old airframes?

But is not just about airframes or stuffing as much as you can in legacy aircraft.  The new aircraft represent a sea change with significant savings in terms of fleet costs and overall capability at the same time. The sustainability of the new aircraft are in a world significantly different from legacy aircraft. Digital maintenance is part of the revolution in sustainability.

The cost of maintaining 4th generation aircraft is an oft-overlooked aspect of looking at cost of keeping the old and introducing the new. Here are some comments from a blog by an F-22 maintainer who sounds like the Maytag repairman.

http://www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtopic-t-9562-start-0.html

They say the 22 is small compared to the 15. Man they have no idea what small is. In the 22 I can stand in the nose wheel (I’m 5’10”) while the 16 I still had to kneel down. They said the AMAD (our ADG)on the 22 is bigger than the one on the 15. When me and the other 16 guy heard them talk about it we kinda just looked at each other and knew what the other one was thinking: they have no freaking clue how freaking small that thing is compared to an ADG.

To be honest the 22 is closer to the 16 then it is the 15 and for that I’m thankful. Course sometimes I wish I could go to the 16 again because the stupid jet doesn’t break. And when it does break its usually specs. And when specs “repair” it they just reboot it and badda bing badda boom jet is “repaired”.

It can be frustrating at times because there is not much for us to do except small stuff. Hell let me tell you guys something. R2 a flight control actuator takes about 45 minutes total and that’s including depanel, remove, install, ops check, put panel back on, clean up and sign off. Its beautiful yet frustrating. Kinda like being married I imagine. (https://sldinfo.com/?p=15082).

The sustainability revolution enables a significant increase in the sortie generation rates for the new combat aircraft.  And in addition to this core capability, there is a significant transition in combat approaches facilitated by the new aircraft.

The aircraft can shape disruptive change by enabling distributed operations.  The shift is from linear to simultaneous operations; it is a shift from fighters needing reach back to large aircraft command and control and ISR platforms to 360 dominance by deployed decision makers operating not in a network but a honeycomb.

Fifth generation aircraft both generate disruptive change and live off of disruptive change.  Taking a fleet approach, rather than simply focusing on the platforms themselves highlights their potential for disruptive change.  Properly connected or interoperable with one another, the new aircraft can work together to operate like a marauding motorcycle gang in an adversary’s battlespace.

Rather than operating as a linear force, the marauding motorcycle gang creates chaos within the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop of the adversary.  And by having an onboard combat systems enterprise able to respond in real time to the impacts, which the aircraft are creating in the battlespace, they can respond to the fractual consequences of the battle itself.  Rather than going in with a pre-set battle plan, the new aircraft can work together to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces within the battlespace. It is about on the fly (literally) combat system processing power which enables the pilots to act like members of a marauding motorcycle gang.

The 5th generation aircraft enable the pilots to become key decision makers within the battlespace; and if properly inter-connected shape a distributed operations approach to battle management and execution.  They are key elements of C4ISR D, which is deployed decision-making rather than data collection sent back to decsion-makers for less timely actions.  C4ISR D is the core capability which 21st century military forces need for strategic advantage (https://sldinfo.com/?p=12741).

For the United States to have an effective military role in the new setting of regional networking, a key requirement will be effective and assured combined command, control, and communications, linked by advanced computing capabilities to global, regional, and local intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets (C4ISR). The services will need to ensure that there is broad synergy among U.S. global forces fully exploiting new military technologies and the more modest capabilities of regional allies and partners. Indeed, C4ISR is evolving to become C4ISR D, whereby the purpose of C4ISR is to shape effective combined and Joint decision-making.

A key element of this new capability is the F-35 which functions as a flying combat system able to operate across the spectrum of warfare.  It is the first plane, which can manage 360 space and has the combat system to manage that space.  Deployed as a force, it enables distributed air operations, an approach crucial to the survival of our pilots in the period ahead.


The fifth generation aircraft are a benchmark for a new approach to airpower.

[slidepress gallery=’fifth-generation’]

Photo Credit: SLD 2011

This can clearly be seen in the F-35 combat system enterprise.  The classic aircraft adds systems to the aircraft to provide new capabilities. The pilot has to manage each additive system.  The F-35 has five major combat systems, which interact with each other to provide capabilities. Functional capabilities emerge from the interaction of the systems done by the machine and are not simply correlated with a single system.  For example, jamming can be done by several systems aboard the aircraft, the machine determine which one through interaction among the systems.  And the entire system rests on a common architecture with broadband capabilities.

The USMC clearly understands and embraces the disruptive capabilities of the 5th generation aircraft. For the USMC, tac air does not simply play a close air support (CAS) role in any traditional sense. It is an enabler for distributed operations when such operations are essential to either conventional strike or counter-insurgency warfare.

USMC aviation has allowed the USMC ground forces to operate with greater confidence in deploying within the civilian population in Iraq. Aviation’s roles in both non-kinetic and kinetic operations have allowed the USMC to avoid operating within “green zones” so as to facilitate greater civil-military relations. Aviation has also provided an integrated asset working with the ground forces in joint counter-IED operations.

And quite obviously, battlefields of the future will require the USMC to operate upon many axis of attack simultaneously. Such an operation is simply impossible without a USMC aviation element. For the USMC thinks ground in the air and the forces on the ground can rely 24/7 on USMC aviation forces to be with them in the ground fight.

An additional aspect of the expeditionary focus of the USMC is the central role of the seabase. In a famous moment in the initial Afghanistan operation, the USMC operated from ships to move deep inland to operate against the Taliban. Task Force 58 was in essence a seabasing operation as the USMC leadership sees it, and an example of what the USMC needs to be prepared and supported to do in the years ahead. Task Force 58′s (TF-58) combat operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 covered 450 nm to establish Camp “Rhino” and then operated over 750 nm to Kabul. Imagine even contemplating doing this with out integrated airpower!

The new air platforms fit into the overall approach taken by the USMC. The Osprey provides unique capabilities, which will allow the “ground” forces to engage in envelopment operations that Napoleon could only have dreamed about.

And in operations such as when the USMC flew their Osprey’s onto British warships demonstrating the versatility the USMC provides to maritime operations as well.

The F-35 will be a “first generation flying combat system” which will enable air-ground communication and ISR exchanges unprecedented in military history. The pilot will be a full member of the ground team; the ground commanders will have ears and eyes able to operate in a wide swath of three-dimensional space. (https://sldinfo.com/?p=54).

But if other airpower leaders simply mimic the operations of older aircraft with the fifth generation aircraft, the promise of the new air operations will not be realized.  The result would be that the U.S. and its allies will repeat the failures of the French facing the Germans in World War II where they had superior tanks with outmoded tactics and command structures, and with the predictable results. The new aircraft simply do not function, as do the old. Considerable cultural change will be required in moving away from reliance on the reachback to large aircraft and the centralized CAOC to distributed air operations and decision makers.

And the shift will require weapons and remotely piloted aircraft developers to think differently about how to leverage the new stealth-enabled distributed air operational capabilities. F-22 pilots have already called for the change.  They don’t want to be tethered to AWACS; they don’t want to be directed by the classic operations of a centralized CAOC. Another key part of the Cultural Revolution is the approach to maintainability.  To hear some Air Force officials they sound like the union members in the 1970s objecting to changes in the work force associated with digital production of the newspaper.  To recall the days of the controversy, union members wanted to keep their typesetting functions in spite of the elimination of the jobs necessary to produce a newspaper digitally.  They lost and Murdoch won.

The same is true of the shift from mechanical to digital maintenance regimes.

As General Corley, former ACC Commander, underscored, the new aircraft provide significant gains in sustainability and readiness, which, in turn, makes the new force more affordable from an operational point of view.

How could you ever argue against this digital world which yields more identification of fault if a fault does exist, helps you isolate where that fault is, helps you identify what in fact is going to be necessary to be done for maintenance. It is pooling that information in a careful protected manner, so that appropriate actors can interpret it, manipulate it back to those individuals responsible for the main incidents of support, but also could yield to the individual operator of that vehicle, whatever the impact of the fault happens to be. What are the ramifications? Operators would begin to understand they still have viability in the conduct of a mission that they’re currently performing.

https://sldinfo.com/?p=11615

Many jobs will be eliminated as the shift in the maintenance culture takes root– the USMC estimates 1/3 – and the tooth to tail ratio much improved.

The Administration’s ideological opposition to Performance Based Logistic systems is part of the problem of “union style” resistance to change.  The last Administration signed a PBL with the partners; the current Administration should honor it.  The benefits are clear; less cost for sustainment for a more capable aircraft.

In short, the U.S. and its partners are on the cusp of an airpower revolution if our leaders have the courage to embrace cultural change.  And there is a clear need to direct investments towards the future, not the past.  After all, this is change you can believe in.

The Tanker Piece at the TACC

05/19/2011

The Tanker Piece: Matching Limited Assets Against Significant Demand

05/19/2011 – The Tankers are clearly one of the key mobility assets in significant demand.  However, given the age of the fleet, readiness is an issue affecting availability. Master Sgt. Jeremiah Love kicked off the discussion at the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) about the tanker piece of the TACC puzzle during the roundtable.  Col. Mintzlaff, senior controller, added some important operational comments as well. Major Charles Marek also added some comments with regard to the KC-135s and aeromedical evacuations (AE).

Love: We deal with anything from the Coronets with fighters moving to and from the states or any [tanker] support to and from overseas locations, to more short notice type events such as contingency and Presidential support.  The Coronets are probably the most dynamic as far as planning and movement of assets just because it’s so much iron being put up in the air at the same time.  Taking three or four tankers to support a 12-ship fighter deployment from the states to an overseas location requires a lot of coordination.

Master Sgt. Love During the SLD Interview April 2011

Credit: SLD 2011

SLD: How do you work the short and long-term planning issues?

Love: We have three different divisions: Coronets, Short-Notice and Homeland Defense Tankers, and within the Coronet branch, we have a long-range and short-range planning. Our long-range Coronet planners take a look at the overall big picture according to ACC’s requirements, and determine what the tanker requirements are.  The long-range planners work hand-in-hand with the barrel because ACC [at times] may want to move a very large number of fighters all at one time, or within a two-week period, but the tanker assets just aren’t available.  Another planning concern is they may need a particular type of tanker, such as those required by the Navy because some of their assets require soft basket air refueling.

That might require managing the tradeoff of KC10s versus the 135s in the ratio. That is  why our long-range planners work with the barrel very closely.  During the mission launch, our detail planners actually come in and help assist the execution side of the house. They try to be a one-stop shop.The other two branches mostly work short-range taskings.  The Homeland Defense branch primarily works Operation Noble Eagle taskings, this could be anything from supporting NASA to the President, or special events such as the Olympics.The short-notice branch, like the Coronet shop, works tanker requirements around the world.   Anything from air bridge requirements at various locations to state-side support like high-priority test missions, exercises, and contingency operations.

The TACC operations floor

Credit: TACC

SLD: What’s the biggest challenge that you face from dealing with managing the tanker supply?

Love: It’s having enough assets available because there’s a huge demand for the tankers.  No matter where it is around the world, there’s such a demand for them that we just can’t be everywhere at the same time.  So, we balance out the requirements while trying to stay within the priority system (i.e what’s higher JCS priority than the other). We just don’t have the tankers we used to have at one point in time. Even in the couple of years that I’ve been here, our number of taskings have gone up that much.

SLD: Another aspect of the tanker issue which I think is not really focused upon outside of the USAF is the changing role of the tankers.  Historically, tankers were at the rear of the action.  Now they are part of the battlespace.

Mintzlaff:  When I did Desert Storm, tankers were way in the rear.  When I was in Afghanistan, we were looking down on the battle. When you bring that many assets that much closer to the fight, you start opening up the door to other things that can go on an airplane to help the folks on the ground.  These are things like helping with the convoy and mitigation as well as communications. I think as you change the way you fight, you need to take full advantage of the assets that are there to be used and figure out how to use them.

Marek:  We’re now utilizing KC-135s as well for aeromedical evacuation. The KC135s have patient support pallets, which have both seats and litter stanchions built on them. They just clip right into the aircraft or some actually have just seats or just litter stanchions.



Avoiding the Fair Fight

05/17/2011

05/16/2011 The Challenge of Avoiding the Far Fight

Excerpts from Keynote Speech

Armed Forces Communication and Electronic Association (AFCEA) Spring Symposia

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne

21st Secretary, USAF

May 11, 2011 Virginia Beach, Virginia

I salute your efforts throughout this assembly to protect America; and enhance our capabilities; and stand in awe of the shock effect of the Special Forces Team in taking down a compound this month.  At the same time; we should honor all the men and women who have given of themselves in this pursuit of justice, many of whom made the ultimate sacrifice. But this assembly deserves the taking of a small moment to revel in this success, because it was very much driven by the technology push, and the communications capabilities and the electronic installs that you all had a hand in conceiving , designing, developing, and training these magnificent warfighters to make this happen. For the capability to keep the situation room very well informed at internet speed and for the operational security that made the success real.

What you will hear today is my worry and concern that as a nation we are turning away from consolidating our gains and pushing new investment to maintain our Asymmetric Advantage. We have achieved much by effectively ‘owning’ the third dimension. Once you ‘own’ this advantage, gained through Dominating the Air and Space, exploiting it means getting your camera’s and telemetry gear ever closer to the ground. It means intimidating your enemy with fly by’s venting sound and fury.  It has meant filling the sky with watching and listening devices.  It allowed me to foster Spherical Situation awareness, and speak to West Point Cadets about how to be a three dimensional warrior. We developed films about ‘How we fight’ to press the issue about don’t engage without connected indirect shooters from Aircraft; as well as providing the force commander with a ‘God’s eye’ view. We passed out ROVERS wherever we could and connected them to over 80 air platforms.  The connectivity this offered protection for any mission anywhere in the theater.  We called for a joint operations order to combine all the force elements around the geo-spatial coordinates.



Lt. Col. Greg Harbin  patrols a village in Afghanistan while embedded with Canadian forces near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

A bullet struck from behind but did not penetrate Colonel Harbin’s body armor 10 minutes after the photo was taken. Trained and equipped with remotely operated video enhanced receiver or ROVER, Air Force ground combat teams work with assigned ground units. ROVERs heighten the effectiveness of and mitigate collateral damage by allowing ground troops to “see” what the aircrew sees with unmanned aircraft and fighter or bomber aircraft.

(Credit: USAF) http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123191966

But, at the time technology was moving too fast for the culture.  Now, first responders in state and local agencies have this capability; as I recently saw that Civil Air Patrol Aircraft can now be fitted with a portable predator track ball unit to provide them connectivity and spherical situation awareness whether in flood or fire.  I salute that fusion of military and civilian needs; and hope we can grow this to assist others in their first responder duties. This is a far cry from when during Katrina we were duct taping predator track balls to the railings on the 57th floor of the New Orleans Hilton to give police and fireman great visuals.  It also didn’t come without standards for ‘Eagle Vision’ and ‘Gateways’ for transmission, which you strive for here. This is exploitation of ‘owning’ the third dimension.

A second piece; during Vietnam, I never got to theater. I did have the privilege of receiving the Black Medal. The Black medal was the first creation of the Unit Recognition Medal; and was awarded to the developers of the AC-130 gunship.  I was on the team that installed the 105 gun, and was an analyst on the team to create the various autopilot functions to increase the accuracy of the entire weapons system.  The Black medal design we all thought was to allow for recognition of the team that put a big ugly paddle outside the side of a sleek transporter; and changed the culture in our air force.  I remember the phrase, Guns should shoot straight.  This pushed us far closer to Marine Aviation as a close fire support element; and many is the time that this closed form targeting system took data from a force commander and stopped an attack with a stream of tracers, licking the earth at night, or a single blast into the lead vehicle of a convoy.  But the real breakthrough, besides essentially bringing a tall hill to any battle zone was in the OODA Loop; this closed form kill system allowed transition from Observe to Action to be very fast.

Fast forward to the Air Force development of Predator, now that GPS allowed one to know where the Remotely Piloted Aircraft or RPA was; and suddenly we could replicate the Kill loop by allowing the RPA to be armed.  As well; from the earliest days; we worked the Gunship to be connected to the fire teams to bring support fire to within 50 meters of the friendly position.  Now GPS Offsets, coupled with the ‘John Madden’ ability to draw on a common screen provides for such great accuracy that every mistake appears deliberate.



An MQ-9 Reaper makes its final approach to the runway at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, following a mission, Dec. 16, 2010

Credit: 451st Air Expeditionary Wing: 12/17/10

Secretary Rumsfeld stated famously that you go to war with the Army you have; not the Army you want.  He really meant the Armed Forces, but the query at the time involved the protective capability of the military vehicles, especially the HMMWV.  Though he was excoriated at the time; he also told his staff privately that we should thank his predecessors for their continued investment in an uncertain future, and their stalwart belief in the Reagan theory that no one ever got into  a war because they were too strong.

It was pointed out to him that we needed to increase the leverage among all of our systems, and he gave me the task of fostering interoperability. There are times that those kind of missions would be intimidating; and cause one to pause. But, in this case was actually a thematic in each of the services; but the issue was cross service which remains in the seam of unfunded requirements.  As many of you had experienced; as we develop platforms, the expectation is that all of the information and intelligence required to maximize the capability of the system is simply expected to arrive in an orderly fashion and be made available.  I call those the ‘Lightening Bolt Charts’, cause they all had jig jag lines from one system to another; but during development, there is no assurance that thing will actually work that way.  But they form the core of interoperability, gaining information for the senior leaders; and maximizing the effectiveness of the entire force.

I can remember a second particularly interesting meeting when I was told that we should not be worried about the future, as we would not be fighting peers.  I responded that I lost my brother in Vietnam, flying an F-4 in the North. At the time no one in America would have given them peer status; but they were clearly using peer equipment.  The meeting became quite chilly as this dose of reality was unwelcome; but it was my reality.

My push to maintain the technology lead in our Asymmetric Advantage was not appreciated by the department leadership.  But my reality colored my desire to push a program called Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS), which I guess, now would be called J-RPA for Remotely Piloted Aircraft.   This introduced the stealth platform to RPA’s at a decent size construct; and at some point target replacing systems the scale of the B-2.  The Navy is now the remaining player in this program, I feel the Navy has been seeking a Stealthy platform ever since the A-12 cancellation killed their advanced future, yes, those of us that remember will acknowledge the Navy went first, then the F-22; and the Navy will, I’m sure, learn which missions are the right ones for this capable system, while I hope their stealthy manned quest can be fulfilled by the F-35C.Yes; I still believe that we need more 5th generation aircraft, lest we find ourselves unable to uphold General Curt Lemay’s mission to hold hostage any target in the world.   Isn’t this what we also saw in the terrific take down right out of the Tom Clancy novel, but sending a chilling message to all that ‘Make our List’ in the words of that country song.

In the meantime; we see glimpses of the real future through the Integrated Air Defense Systems; and the well designed competitor aircraft that are being offered on the market. We see the emergence of national strategic Naval assets that may begin to encroach on our mission space. We see the continued development of missiles that are designed to reach out and touch our shores; and as well the boundaries of our allies.I can remember well, that in the Pentagon they have a radio rodeo; not with horses but with talk show hosts. We were in line rotating through the various station hosts, some of whom were live, but many were in effect taping for some later time. In front of me about two interviews was Rumsfeld; and I overheard and so might more dimly recall his exchange; but I remember the essence.  He was asked why we needed the defense equipment when the likelihood of an invasion was so unlikely. His response designed my Mission Statement when I was confirmed to be Secretary of the Air Force. He said, “Our Freedoms have great reach; but once the President can not exercise a Sovereign Option because he could be dissuaded or deterred; all of us will lose a little of our Freedom as American Citizens.”

This translates into the following; the Defense the Country desired was not just to defend our shores; but also to be strong enough to allow our President to exercise restraint if it was his choice. This was a profound moment for me as I knew it, but I did not know it. I had lived it during my international travels both in uniform and out. My mission statement became that “The Mission of the United States Air Force was to deliver sovereign options for the defense of America and its global interests–to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.”  Further, this led to the argument to continue the investment in exploiting our Asymmetric Advantage of Air Dominance when I expressed a doctrine: If you ever find yourself in a fair fight; it is because of bad planning.  Planning is not just Tactical; but might also be Strategic, such as the QDR.

Now that I have laid the groundwork for you all; let me relate these experiences to the challenges that I see for AFCEA members; both currently serving and adapting the material solutions or designing TTPs around the kit you have; and those that are trying to discern the needs; requirements; and the desire, read funding, to move to a different future than the linear one that is always forecast. When Hitler turned the world upside down; his forces were awesome; and the word Blitzkrieg became the word of the day; but little known was the reality that only about 15%; if that; of his forces were modernized. Germany had its share of horse drawn artillery; and logistics trains. They went to great lengths to avoid taking bridges out; as did we later.

The real change was in the synchronization of the battle; the improvement of command and control; and the ability to coordinate the action truly underscored the impact on morale and the destruction of the Armies arrayed against this force.  The crudeness of the coordination would currently be ridiculed; but it is all a part of warfare and you have it or you don’t.

We here and now should take note of the 15% part; as this very well might be what we are afforded when next we are pushed into a war not of our choosing.

The lack of projected air power caught many ground commanders unawares and so Dunkirk happened; and the reaction of the citizenry to save their army in any way they could; but principally by returning them to friendly shores of England. That said; Germany actually lost the war in 1936; about the same time that Britain won it.   This startling element contains the seeds of the challenges for all of you. As found in wiki.

The German Dornier DO19 was a four-engine heavy bomber that was awarded in 1934, and first flew on October 28, 1936. Only one prototype flew, and it was converted to a transport in 1938.  The other two were scrapped.  The Luftwaffe therefore had a shortcoming in the lack of an efficient heavy bomber fleet. Generalleutnant Walther Wever the Luftwaffe’s first Chief of Staff was the most persistent advocate of a German long-range strategic bomber fleet.  The Technical Department issued a specification for a four-engine heavy bomber. But after Wever’s death in an airplane crash in June 1936, Wever’s successor, Albert Kesselring, canceled Germany’s long-range bomber project to concentrate on short-range bombers.



Dornier bomber

Credit: http://www.aviastar.org/air/germany/dorn_do-19.php

This cancellation allowed the British Air Force to move their bases to the North in Scotland, and the Range, Configuration and Payload made the German two engine bomber subject to harassment and allowed the British to fully recover until the American Eight Air Force showed up with four engine bombers; and took the fight to the German heartland.

The British were the first to fully exploit radar as a defense against aircraft attack. This was spurred on by fears that the Germans were developing death rays.  The Air Ministry asked British scientists in 1934 to investigate the possibility of propagating electromagnetic energy and the likely effect. Following a study, they concluded that a death ray was impractical but that detection of aircraft appeared feasible. Robert Watson Watt’s team demonstrated to his superiors the capabilities of a working prototype and then patented the device The British could detect the German air approach and thus direct the attacking British fighters and raids over Britain proved so costly to the German Air Force that they invested in missile bombardment.

Lest I digress to ‘Next war itis’-  Let’s get to the challenges.

First; Let’s talk Cyber.

Cyber is about spectrum and thus falls directly into your domain. There’s an argument as well that the information transmission from communication and electronics is actually a subset of Cyber; and the light spectrum was untapped.  For now, let’s not concern ourselves with spectrum PACMAN; but worry about its finiteness; and the fact that some in government see it as a profit center.  As you are likely aware; as Our ships approach the coast of Japan; many of their emitters must be turned off.  This can be dangerous for some ships with crews trained to operate in automatic.  This same issue is for Aircraft. Spectral control and jamming by cohabitating EMF thus is a major challenge as we take our architecture and move forward.   We lost to Tech Talk the LASER Satellite system, T-Sat; which would have increased the transmission speed and spread; as some in Congress and in DoD thought it OK to live with AEHF.   We need to have a coherent discussion about what means Wi-Fi in our future.

The next war could be first to fiber, as the ability to transmit might be corrupted and jammed. Resilient architectures to fight through even something as dramatic as an EMP detonation; or as open as the old loud jammers, where we need concentrated LPI transmissions. This leads me to the second part of Cyber, which is compressed data algorithms.   This branch of encrypted mathematics was abandoned with the ability to pump terabytes of data; but is that a resilient approach. We will be back to dormant Sioux dialects and little of them.  We need to compress video streams into relevant data, and then re-pix-late them for viewing. We are burying our transmission systems in non relevant imagery.



Methods of Cyber Operations

Credit: Bigstock

Third in Cyber is trusted information. I am tired of hearing that we can’t fix the problem. The band-aids piling up on the data overlays are a very bad answer; and sometimes introduce malware with the fixes. Kind of like going to the Hospital only to be infected by something they were harboring.  We need to get to the heart of the matter, rethink computational mathematics and restore order in this domain.  We invented it, and have pushed it for productivity. But in our zeal for productivity; we did not hire police and firemen.  I don’t think we can wait for Data Armageddon.

Second major Challenge: Antenna’s.

The Army has become very frustrated with the myriad antennas that have been foisted off on each system. As a result the command vehicles veritably bristle with forms and shapes that frankly offer terrific targeting opportunities. As a result they are now contemplating the Victory Architecture, which I don’t have any insight to the base mathematics. I can advise you that the specification for the Victory Architecture is contained in a two plus inch book; and so has not constrained the developer world; but will give the transmission world some design constraints reminiscent of JTRS; where the developers refused to be constrained in spectrum; and the program grew in an unconstrained way. I also know that the last time the government invented an architecture, it was ADA; cost many billions and continues to plague the F-22 and Spaced Based Infrared Satellite, two other victims were Crusader, and the Army Light Attack Helicopter, the Comanche.  I do know that the industry needs to get in the game, not simply as a contractor. We need a morphing antenna, and one that is far more easily attuned to high-speed data transmission.

But I offer that at some point there will no more tolerance for different transmission methodologies requiring different antennae.   Non-AFCEA members are culturally trained to expect transmissions from flat panels and common devices.  Here we need to better understand how to use Time division Multiply (TDMA) as well as Modulated Division architecture (CDMA).  The constraint is international as well; but I think the root is in design and then operator discipline.

Third Challenge: AESA RADARs.

We are in Kindergarten as to the utility of the breakthrough in Active Electronically Scanned Arrays.  AESA Radars have the potential to be way more than just radars.  Today the wide bandwidths and advanced waveforms we are achieving with AESA radars is opening up the possibility of whole new functions.  Why not use them for precision electronic and computer network attack?  At the same time we watch the Air Force give up on the MADL for the F-22, which means all that potential for a node on the net must be truncated, due to a lack of inventiveness, as was mentioned on Antennas, to accomplish high speed transmissions. We’ve already proven they can handle CDL like waveforms, so why not use the AESA for laser-like LPI communications? The Navy with larger versions of AESA on board their ships should drive experimentation, just as they have found function with Tactical Lasers, and have previously with Metal Storm.  Which leads me to the fourth challenge;

Fourth; Do we abandon the connectivity argument; or await the re-emergence of total Air Dominance as we currently enjoy in Iraq and Afghanistan?

We spent enormous resources combining with our coalition partners in Libya; to take down a crude Air Defense system. This because we were daunted by our ignorance of the capability of the system, and of course adverse to casualties.  How close to other Mid East or Far East competitors will we risk our Air Platforms. In another forum, on a different media; I argued that we should stand down the Large ISR Fleet; as they cannot penetrate defended airspace; and are targets in all of our war games. So we must concentrate on fulfilling the promise of making the F-35 and F-22 5th Gen platforms a true Air Battle Manager required to stay aloft and direct the battle.



The F-35 is a key part of the shift to distributed operations

Credit: Lockheed Martin

Denying the vulnerability of the large ISR platforms will lead to expectations that they will live and provide a contribution to the campaign.  In another paper that is coming; I ask why are we putting any money into upgrading 4th generation fighters; as they simply cannot participate in the first 48 hours of war with an adversary with a modern air defense system—for that matter a smart adversary will not expose all his IADS at the beginning of the war—the notion of being able to “kick down the door” is from the last century and will not be applicable in the future; and they should be slaved to the 5th Generation Target system; and dispense their weapons at the designated target.  This also allows for a true role for RPA’s when we lack total Air Dominance; and that is as mules for the F-35 and F-22. In a truly hostile environment; the 5th gen fighter must be the last to shoot; and should do so after all the other available missiles are gone. Again, this presumes we get the breakthrough for converting them to Air Battle Managers from current Air Warriors.

Fifth; Leverage and closed form solutions.

With the disestablishment of the Joint Forces Command, I ask where does this mission go. If to the Service Components, are we in full retreat. If to DISA and OSD do they have the time to devote to it. Communications and Electronics is all about leveraging our smaller forces against any combination of enemies. This means shared situation awareness; and putting the right gun on the right target. Such target matching can be done but will take a fast and adaptive Operations Center. I have long advocated for a truly joint operations order, combining all affected service players and cyber around a Geospatial line of attack.

To truly limit friendly fire; blue force tracking might not be enough. Active limits and time based constraints will be the limiting factor.  The Gunship control system taught me as well as being trained on the range that having the target presented to the shooter is the key to the kill.  It is the same with any indirect fire support system. There is no reason that Naval gunfire cannot be aimed and controlled by the joint force commander, so long as that commander can effectively share the target with the shooter. So Ladies and Gentlemen; we need breakthroughs; we can’t expect that future competitors will make an error in strategy as did the German’s. I worry that in our outlook; and in our Allies outlook for us; we are, by investment decision and the inherent aging of all of our fleets diminishing our Strategic Margin and unwittingly inviting competition.  Should some competitor surface; it will come at the time of maximum vulnerability; and so we must be electronically agile.

In any time where platforms are not drawing investment; we will find that investment going into the Communications and Electronics sector to leverage what we have in the best way possible.  We can expect that this assembly would be capable to drive innovation and provide that margin of excellence to sustain us through the fight. While we seek resilience in our technology; we have already determined that we have resilience in our population.I took a lot of assignments in my tenure; but the one that proved the most difficult is Interoperability, and I worked diligently with the Joint Forces Command to push this vital seam; and I fear that as we move into a Fifth Generation Environment; all of the capabilities we’ve enjoyed will be left behind.  Stealth is a wonderful thing; but when it leads to stove piped developments, one must be concerned. This regression to elements we’ve seen before, like replacing the F-117 Nighthawk; and then replacing the B-2; does not consolidate what we have accomplished in the joint exploitation of the vertical dimension which should push all of us to be three dimensional warriors. It is when we can truly leverage the best of each service we become truly joint; and that coordination, that shared situation awareness, that improved OODA loop will respond to that constitutional charge to ‘Provide For The Common Defense’

Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) : Shaping Global Con-Ops

05/11/2011

The Role of the Global Mobility Enterprise

An Interview With Lieutenant-General Allardice

SLD visited Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) and several inputs from practitioners of the art of global mobility have provided interviews which will be posted over the next few weeks.

05/11/2011 – In preparation for Second Line of Defense’s visit to Scott AFB and the 618th Air and Space Operations Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center)  which took place in April 2011, Lieutenant- General Allardice provided an overview and analysis of the role of the Global Mobility Enterprise as the backbone for joint military operations worldwide. Lieutenant-General Robert R. Allardice is the Commander, 18th Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. As Air Mobility Command’s sole warfighting numbered air force, 18th Air Force is responsible for the command’s worldwide operational mission. With more than 43,000 active-duty Airmen and 1,300 airlift and air refueling aircraft, 18th Air Force manages a streamlined organization that focuses the air mobility warfighting capability through the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), two expeditionary mobility task forces, 15 wings and two stand-alone groups.

The 18th Air Force and the TACC are true CONOPS commands.  They organize U.S. tanker, airlift and inter-theater aeromedical evacuation capabilities worldwide.  As such they manage the inevitable trade-offs between priorities and resources, as well as eke out capacity from a significantly aging fleet.  It is also not generally realized that as warfighting strategy has evolved, the demand on these assets has gone up and their engagement OVER the battlefield has been enhanced as well.  Historically, lift and tanking have been behind the front to support forces fighting forward. As the front and the rear become more of a marble cake, the insertion of force –including lift and tanking – has altered the deployed force mix.  This in turn has accelerated the pressures on the fleet.  Through a collaborative enterprise management system, the command has been able to much more effectively balance fleet capacity against requirements than they would be able to do without such tools.  The Null hypothesis would prove that we would already have experienced inabilities to deploy if we did not have a robust fleet management system.

 

In the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on Jan. 12, nearly 70 members of the 615th Contingency Response Wing deployed to the Dominican Republic in support of Operation Unified Response
Photo Credit: Contingency Response Wing, USAF

SLD: Could you provide our readers with a sense of the mission of the Command and how you have organized to execute the mission?

General Allardice: What we do and the “why” of our existence at the 18th Air Force level is to set the global mobility enterprise up for success.  In simple terms we are the warfighting headquarters for AMC.  What that means is that we support General Johns’ AFTRANS role by providing a robust mobility capability to the combatant commanders through U.S. Transportation Command. In practical terms, the first component of the enterprise is our active, reserve and guard air mobility wings in the continental United States.  They generate the airplanes, the crews to fly them, and then of course, they generate airmen that deploy out into the world to support a variety of Air Force missions, many of which directly support our global mobility enterprise.

Another key piece of the global enterprise is our two air mobility operations wings. They support the enroute structure, 16 main enroute locations and numerous other bases operating worldwide in the Pacific, throughout Europe, and in the Mideast.  It’s a fairly lean organization, ranging from small, two-person detachments all the way up to robust squadrons.  They’re the ones that catch the airplanes, refuel the airplanes, and fix the airplanes.  If a crew needs rest, they’ll make sure there’s billeting for them, and they’ll run a crew stage. Simplistically, what I say is they accelerate the flow of iron throughout the world. The third major piece is our contingency response wings, CRWs, and that’s the expeditionary part.  They’re not fixed.  The CRWs are made up of a variety of small teams, but in many ways the crown jewel is the contingency response group.  These are the expeditionary groups that can go out and open up a bare base anywhere in the world. They are self-contained organizations, about 110 people.  Their whole purpose is to act as a forward hub so that our airplanes can flow in, perform their mobility mission and flow back out again.

Simplistically, what I say is they accelerate the flow of iron throughout the world.

A key element of a contingency response wing is the mobility experts it provides to augment air operations centers, AOCs, throughout the world. For example, in the recent confluence of operations we were able to insert our mobility experts to plan and help organize our response to the concurrent demand.  What we did with the Japan response, with the Libya response, with Southern Command where we had presidential lift requirements, and our ongoing support to Central Command, was to populate the enterprise with mobility planners from the CRWs. All of this is pulled together in two layers.  Operationally we pull it together at 18th Air Force.  Every day at 10 a.m. we bring together the enterprise, on a classified system where we talk about global operations.

SLD: I assume that meeting focuses upon managing the mismatch or the challenge of matching needs with capabilities, deployed capabilities?

General Allardice: Absolutely. That’s exactly what we do, and at the TACC, they pull together the execution side of the effort.  At the headquarters where I sit, our job is to set the enterprise up for success.  TACC’s job is to execute within that enterprise.My staff is very small.  We only have about 40 people, and their task is to facilitate collaboration to shape the enterprise.  At TACC, they have the cross-functional experts that execute the plan.

SLD: Could you give us a sense of how you handled all the concurrent crises in the past month?

General Allardice:  The events of March give you an idea of how we balance capacity vs. requirements and swing from one theater to the next.  On the basis of the approach and focus which I just described, at least once a week we look at what we’ll call our enterprise in the United States, our enterprise to the West, the Pacific, and our enterprise to the East. When we look at the entire enterprise we look at the capacity of each of the places we’re operating from, our hubs or lily pads, and we consider the following elements:  We look at whether we have the right people, the right airmen, in place to perform the mission.  Do we have the right equipment in place to perform the mission?  Do we have the right infrastructure at a particular location to perform the mission?  And do we have the right command and control systems in place to perform the mission?

Last year for example, we were flowing supplies to Central Command through Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and then the volcano went off, so immediately we wanted to start moving our flow.  We looked at locations and said, “How much capacity would we need there?”  Normally, we only needed to have two or three airplanes a day at a specific location but then suddenly we needed the capacity to flow to about 10 to 12 airplanes a day. Although we had the equipment in place, we didn’t have enough airmen and our command and control system needed a little more robustness, so we immediately moved resources down from Ramstein to augment that capacity.  And then a week later when the volcano got even worse, we decided that we needed to flow not to the East, but that we would go around the world the other way through the Pacific, through a forward operating base in the Indian Ocean and up into Afghanistan.

We did the exact same thing. We looked at our enterprise.  We saw what we had in place.  We noted that we needed to augment the enterprise, and so we populated specific bases in a way that was sufficient to bring them up to the capacity that we required. We just turned on a dime and went the other direction and executed the mission that way.  That was last year’s example.

C-17 Air Drop over Afghanistan
Credit: US Central Command Air Forces: 10/11/07

We started the year in kind of a relatively easy pace, but of course, you know we have a heavy commitment to Central Command.  We’re flying multiple missions into Central Command every day.  From here we’re executing the C-17 airdrop mission.  Every day we have at least two missions that airdrop in Afghanistan. On top of that we have all the other mobility aircraft, both commercial and gray tails, that are flying into Afghanistan. In addition to the very heavy commitment supporting Central Command, the President went to South America, and that requires us to do the prepositioning and depositioning for that mission set.  We immediately identified eight different locations that we needed to have mobility expertise.  We provided the appropriate capacity from the enterprise. We set up a Director of Mobility Forces at AFSOUTH to ensure that we had the right mobility expertise there, and we ran an enterprise south to make sure that the missions getting in place and coming back out worked properly. All of these combined efforts put us near our normal max capacity, and then the Middle East heated up.

As soon as we saw what was happening in Egypt we sent mobility experts to Central Command to look at the potential mobility implications. And then Libya started to kick up so we sent planners to AFRICOM to start planning either air refueling and/or airlift missions in case we had to respond.  In other words, we looked at the enterprise to determine what we would need to respond to a Libyan crisis. We started identifying the different hubs we would require, what capacity we thought we would need, and we started to align ourselves to be prepared to flow forces there.

SLD:  The focus is upon the hub for going from point A to point B, and you have to determine what assets you need en route to support an anticipated level of surging and force?

General Allardice: Right and I’ll give you an example. When the situation in Libya started to evolve, it became evident we were going to have support operations with air refueling. We grabbed the refuelers that we were using to move fighters back and forth and placed them in Europe.  We called up the air reserve component, the National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command, and asked them if they could generate a couple squadrons worth, and within about 18 hours, said go.  We could do a quick assessment, place assets, and rapidly generate the capacity we needed.

Credit: C-5 Seen being Refueled by KC-135, Google Earth

At the same time, we didn’t drop a single sortie for Central Command.  We didn’t drop a sortie going to Southern Command. When we had the earthquake on the 11th of March in Japan, we did the same thing.  We sent planners out.  We placed them at several different locations: U.S. Forces, Japan; Task Force 519; Task Force 505; and then at PACAF.  We sent our liaisons and our mobility planners out so that we could effectively respond to the triple “Black Swan” threat that emerged: the earthquake and the tsunami followed by the reactor issues. All those things caused complexity in the problem set, and we kept adjusting our capacity based on the need. In some cases it was gray tail airplanes.  In some places it was just mobility planners.  When the Secretary of Defense signed the authorized voluntary departures for the return of the dependents out of Japan, we contracted civilian aircraft to go out and pick people up, and brought them back through SeaTac with military augmentation from McChord AFB, Washington, as well as through Travis Air Force Base, California.  All those things we coordinated and moved people around, in order to be in the right place right time. And of course everything I’m telling you here, when I say “we”, it’s the big WE.  Total force.  We had the Guard, the Reserve and the active duty forces all involved.

Let me give you three examples:

First, the Director of Mobility Forces for the Japan operation was a reserve Brigadier General, Arlo Guthrie.  He was in an exercise in Korea.  He had just flown all the way back to Florida when I reached him.  He was actually picking up his bags in Florida, and I said to him, “Hey, Arlo.  Where are you?” “Well sir, I’m actually getting my bags.”  I then said “Well get back on an airplane and fly back to Hawaii because we need you there.”  And so this great, reserve general officer went right back out and he was our Director for Mobility Forces there.

Second, the person we have with NATO as our liaison is a guard wing commander out of Lincoln, Nebraska.

Third, the general that we picked out to be our expeditionary refueling wing commander was a guard wing commander from Pittsburgh.

So when I say a total force, I mean total force.

All those things we coordinated and moved people around, in order to be in the right place right time. And of course everything I’m telling you here, when I say “we”, it’s the big WE.  Total force.  We had the Guard, the Reserve and the active duty forces all involved. (…) So when I say a total force, I mean total force.

Given the flexibility of our approach we can scale to task.  We conduct assessments on the capacity we need, almost daily.  For example, we might ask “How much capacity do we need to support this operation at Libya?”  We also moved several thousand people out of Japan.  We provided planners and some airlift to support Japan, and now that the operation has dwindled down we’ve pulled our planners back out.  We’re drawing down that enterprise as quickly as we can because we don’t need it anymore. On the other side of the earth we’re watching our Libya support very carefully and we’re trying to determine how much capacity we need there.

 

Staff Sgt. Nick Kolesnikov, 3rd Airlift Squadron loadmaster, marshals a loader carrying rescue equipment to the ramp of a C-17 Globemaster III, March 12, at Joint Base Andrews, Md. Air transportation airmen from the 89th Aerial Port Squadron at Joint Base Andrews created 14 pallets of technical search and rescue gear, to include inflatable swift-water rescue boats, generators, trench rescue and cutting equipment.
Credit: 11th Wing Public Affairs:  3/12/11

So what we do at 18th Air Force is try to continually assess the enterprise’s capacity and make the necessary adjustments to that capacity. What General Cox does at the TACC is execute within that capacity.  And if he thinks that he’s got a shortage or something going on one place or another, he’ll bring it up to the enterprise, and so when we have these collaborative sessions, we sort out priorities. These sessions are like a classified version of GoToMeeting.com.  It’s basically a slideshow on the computer. During the height of the concurrency of events last month, we had 134 different nodes worldwide plugged in.

For example, during a typical conversation, the person in Southern Europe will say, “Hey, I have an issue here.”  The Director of Mobility Forces up in Germany will say, “Well this is what I think I know.”  The guy supporting NATO will say, “Well here’s the other side of that,” and then the guy in the NATO air operations center in Italy will come back online and he’ll readjust.  And then back here in the TACC, they’ll say, “Well here’s what we’ll do to solve that,” and an issue will get solved in about 30 seconds during the enterprise discussion. Then all of the people in the subnets below, they hear that conversation.  They understand commander’s intent.  They understand the capacity directives, and they’ll spend the next 24 hours executing based on the conversations they heard. It is a collaborative enterprise in action.

SLD: If you did nothing but lift and tank to Afghanistan and Iraq, that would be a miraculous enough, and then the idea that you have multiple “Black Swans” as you’re describing is even more challenging.  The shortfalls have to be clearly there, and so then you have to manage to priorities obviously as well.  It seems you’ve crafted a system that would get best value out of any of the new assets that will be inserted into the fleet.

General Allardice: As we shape our collaborative efforts, we clearly feel dedicated to the effort to maximize the taxpayer’s investment, and I mean that in terms of both the iron and the aircrews.  You want to squeeze every bit you can out of every airframe.

SLD: And unfortunately, that’s what you’re forced to do, notably given the age of the tanker fleet.

General Allardice: I’m qualified in the KC-135, and when I flew the first one, it was born the same year I was, and I wish I was still a very young man.


 

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Joshua Hughes, aerial delivery for the 101st Sustainment Brigade, Sgt. Samuel Geerts, a rigger for the 11th Quartermaster Detachment, and Col. Michael Peterman, the commander of the 101st Sust. Bde, load bundles of fuel on to a truck as part of an aerial delivery using the Joint Precision Air Drop System
Credit: 101st Sustainment Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Public Affairs, 03/01/11

SLD: And the age of the fleet clearly affects readiness and availability and makes planning more difficult as well. The downtime and maintainability of the older aircraft really do affect availability rates.

General Allardice:  Absolutely. I think that in our calculus, we have to look at non-mobilized and mobilized, partially mobilized and fully mobilized, and contingency because you need to look at a system capacity…and that’s what we pay attention to. Obviously, we want to operate at a certain capacity, and then if a demand goes up like it did during the simultaneous Libya, presidential lift, and Japanese events, we had a situation where we had to generate capacity beyond normal levels. In fact, we generated beyond what we normally consider mobilization triggers. None of these three situations endured, so we were able to get up quickly and come back down. But at some point you hit a finite ceiling that you’re not going to be able to press past without full mobilization.  If you surge an airplane that has an 85% mission capability rate, you surge it and push it to 100%.  The general rule of thumb is it’s going to buy back that extra 15% eventually, so we may be able to get 100% for 30 days, 60 days, but then it’s going to drop down to 60% to make up for the surge. After all, it’s the average. And the older the system gets, the more time it needs in depot.  The more we surge it, the more depot time we need as well.

SLD: And air mobility has become central to the way we fight, to the way we do air operations currently.  And the fraying of the infrastructure has its impact.

General Allardice: I think that the mobility system is a key part of how we fight. We depend upon rapidly getting to the fight, and that’s totally based on the capability of global reach.  Many people like the outcome but may not fully understand and appreciate the cost of that and how much we’re cutting the margin as we continue to age the fleet.

SLD: Could you talk about the whole revolution in airdropping?

General Allardice: Absolutely.  Right now, I would say we are in the longest sustained airdrop in history.  Since 2005, we’ve been airdropping virtually every day.  We’ve doubled or tripled our load every year since then.  Last year we dropped about 60 million pounds of supplies.  This year we’ll exceed 100 million. The interesting thing is the revolution or leaps in the technology of not just the delivery but the rigging, as well as our understanding of collateral damage, et cetera.  We understand that when you’re dropping a pallet if it goes off the drop zone or even if it’s on the drop zone, if it kills somebody that’s no different than if a bomb killed somebody, so we really focus on that. I think there’s been a tremendous revolution and improvement in our airdrop rigging, and accuracy; and when you get into the Joint Precision Airdrop System, the JPAS, that’s even higher.

SLD: When you put that data out there about air dropping trends, it’s impressive in and of itself, but when you think of the CONOPS implications they are significant as well. I don’t even need to use roads to actually start inserting a force. Interestingly for the Marines when they’re looking at the amphibious ready group (ARG) and what they could do with the future ARG, with their MC-130Js that can land in 3,000 feet or less, the Ospreys and the B’s that they could put basically on almost any paved highway worldwide.  They could be anywhere in the world, and then people say, “Well how would you supply them,” and I would say, “Well what do you think we’ve been doing in the last ten years?” So if we marry up this revolutionary air dropping capability with projection of force from the sea, we could have a much more flexible and powerful insertion force if we wanted to.

General Allardice: I agree.  Our new air dropping capabilities can be used to support our global operations in new and innovative ways.  And honestly, innovation is really the essential takeaway.  Through collaboration we are able to optimize the performance of the global mobility enterprise and orient it toward the effect we need.  There will always be a tension between capacity and requirements, but we have found a way to manage it that allows us to respond rapidly and address those tensions in ways that would be much more difficult without the processes we have in place.

There will always be a tension between capacity and requirements, but we have found a way to manage it that allows us to respond rapidly and address those tensions in ways that would be much more difficult without the processes we have in place.

Global Airlift, Tanking and Medevac Missions and the TACC

A Roundtable with Subject Experts at the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)

05/04/2011 – During a mid-April 2011 visit to Scott AFB, Second Line of Defense sat down with a group of subject matter experts involved in planning and executing Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) missions.  This is a unique command, which directs — via a collaborative command and control enterprise — all U.S. tanker, airlift and aeromedical missions operating across theaters.  It is a true global command, and as such must make regular trade-offs matching assets to priorities.The wide-ranging conversation covered the planning approach, the operational dynamics, and the management of priorities worked by the TACC.  The TACC works closely with the regional COCOMs as well as TRANSCOM in shaping a global delivery system of goods, personnel, and air combat capabilities.

 

[slidepress gallery=’mission’]

Photo Credit: SLD 2011

 

The interviewees and their subject matter expertise were as follows:

  • Col Jeffrey Mintzlaff – senior controller – addressed command and control for missions while in execution;
  • Maj Corinne Bonner – addressed tanker allocation;
  • Maj Christopher Fuller – addressed airlift planning for missions into Iraq/Afghanistan and for humanitarian operations
  • Maj Charles Marek – addressed aeromedical evacuation planning/operations
  • 1Lt Adam Bennett – addressed weather forecasting/planning
  • SMSgt David Abuya – addressed the role of command post controllers
  • MSgt Jeremiah Love – addressed tanker planning
  • Mr. Harold Guckin – addressed airlift planning for channel missions (our
  • Fedex/UPS equivalent).

The planning and operations directed by the command are highly collaborative.  Most of the key elements for shaping the planning and operation C2 functions are located on the operations floor, which creates a highly collaborative enterprise in order for the command to be flexible in meeting demands.  The “barrel” is the term they use for the group within the command which makes trade-off decisions or recommendations. The team presented several pieces of the enterprise effort.

  • First, there is the planning piece.  The planning piece is worked closely with TRANSCOM.  And the effort is an ongoing one looking at constraints as a part of the process.
    As Major Fuller put it: We try to advertise what the capacity is but it’s difficult to always hammer it down. We’ll put a tail request in and then we’re somewhat at the mercy of what the barrel has available to give us.  The user will give us a window to move their stuff with an available to load date to a latest arrival date.  That window is usually no less than three days but it can be longer depending on the size of the movement and we’ll put that tail request in to the barrel and then the barrel will allocate us aircraft based on global availability.
  • Second, there is the question of highlighting what can go by commercial versus gray tails, the term for USAF lifters.  Over 80% of the lift done by the command is done commercially and is managed by what they call the Channel Missions.
  • Third, there was much discussion concerning the challenge of prioritization and managing trade-offs.
    But as Col. Mintzlaff put it: You have to maintain the discipline in the system.  Is it approved? If it’s something outside of the COCOM, through OSD, is it approved?  Is it funded?  Is it authorized to move? To keep discipline in that system is a challenge because airlift can often be an emotional thing.  I need my “something” and I need it now.  Or in the case of a humanitarian type of operation, they need it and they need it now. It still needs to work through the wickets.
  • Fourth, discipline is crucial for another reason.  The C2 fleet-wide management is highly correlated with the military’s global logistical supply chain.  The key is to shape realistic behavior on the demand side with regard to when parts and elements can be delivered, and to move appropriate items to be shipped by sea and have them taken out of the air delivery system.
    As Col. Mintzlaff underscored: If you predict out far enough, you can move it on the ship and get it there.  The other piece would be the reliability part.  If you’re sitting in the Philippines and you know that when you order a part it’s going to take 24 days to get there, or 14 days to get there from the time I order until I get it in my hand, then you start to build your processes around that.  Where you fail is when one time it’s there in a week, or two or three times, and then it is 24 days.  Now he doesn’t know what to do.  Now he’s ordering more than he needs.
  • Fifth, the demand for tankers is significantly greater than supply.MSgt Jeremiah Love commented that:We just don’t have the tankers we used to have at one point in time. Even in the couple of years that I’ve been here, our number of taskings have gone up that much.This is also due to the very different use of tankers in the battlespace.  Both lifters and tankers now enter the battlespace that was inconceivable twenty years ago.
    As Col. Mintzlaff, a KC-10 pilot put it: When I did Desert Storm, tankers were way in the rear.  When I was in Afghanistan, we were looking down on the battle. When you bring that many assets that much closer to the fight, you start opening up the door to other things that can go on an airplane to help the folks on the ground.  These are things like helping with the convoy and mitigation as well as communications. I think as you change the way you fight, you need to take full advantage of the assets that are there to be used and figure out how to use them.
  • Sixth, the aeromedical system has been revolutionized by the ability to put modular capabilities onto the standard airlifter, rather than relying upon specialized aircraft.  The task now is to marry kit to the lifter closest to where it is needed in order to medevac folks back to stateside medical facilities. Maj Charles Marek commented: I think the average patient return from Vietnam was 45 days. In Desert Storm it was about ten days to get back to the U.S.  Today, we’re down to three.
  • Seventh, a key element of the challenge is the ownership issue.  TACC can task only those assets it owns, and most of the tankers are in the reserves. As “Madame Barrel” or Maj Corinne Bonner put it: The demand for tankers significantly outweighs the availability of assets. Some of that goes to the fleet structure as to who owns what assets.  At TACC, we can only physically task active duty assets, unless we have some sort of contract, whether it’s long-term or short-term, with guard and reserve assets. So in real terms, we can’t task those assets if (a) we’re not paying to use it, or (b) it hasn’t been mobilized.

In short, as Col. Mintzlaff summarized the effort:

I think the system really works remarkably well.  The key to success is collaboration. Everybody’s right there on the floor and you can talk face to face.  Sometimes you still get things that slide through.  But if there’s a big issue that comes up, you pull everybody together at the table.  You sit there.  You paint a common sight picture, or they paint it and push it up to the senior.  The senior then makes a decision, or if it needs to be upchanneled, then you up channel it.  And it really works remarkably well.

Leveraging the Advantages of the USN-USMC Team

04/27/2011

04/27/2011 – In late March 2011, Second Line of Defense visited San Diego to discuss the evolution of the USN-USMC team as seen by key members of the staff of Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.  At a time when the nation is remembering the 100 years of Naval Aviation, it was very appropriate to visit a command central to shaping the next decades for Naval Aviation.

The Command Mission is identified as follows: The Naval Air Forces’ mission is to man, train, equip and maintain a Naval Air Force that is immediately employable, forward deployed and engaged.  We Support the Fleet and Unified Commanders by delivering the right force with the right readiness at the right time with a reduced cost…today and in the future.

http://www.cnaf.navy.mil/

In a wide-ranging discussion with Rear Admiral Jim Beebe USN, retired, currently the Executive Director of the command, the evolution of the USN and its air component was an important focus of attention.  Beebe had extensive experience in the submarine community, and served in his last active duty position as Deputy Commander Submarine force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.


http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=40



Rear Admiral (Retired) Beebe During the March Interview;  Photo Credit: SLD 2011

SLD: One of the challenges I see is that so much of the discussion about USN platforms is too often platform centric.  I like to argue that no platform fights alone, and we often lose sight of the broader mission sets and the capabilities necessary to achieve mission success.

Beebe: Right.  I think we have to fundamentally start with what the Navy’s all about. It has always been about protecting the sea-lanes and influencing coalitions.  And the tools that the Navy brings to bear with respect to being able to do this virtually anywhere in the world without reliance on sovereign territory are substantial and complimentary. That autonomy and extensive tool kit fundamentally defines what the Navy and USN-USMC Naval team brings to any contingency or issue that we have in the world.  The mission set spans the whole range of military operations from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to major combat operations and involves surface, subsurface and aviation assets in almost every scenario.  Naval tools work together and their sum is in fact greater than the individual parts..

If you look at points of engagement today, Naval forces are actively involved in protecting the sea-lanes and influencing coalitions.  The humanitarian assistance we have and continue to provide in Japan, the Naval assets that we have operating in the Mediterranean off the coast of Libya and certainly the sustained support we provide in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea points to the Navy’s relevance in helping shape and influence the global environment. As I think collectively about the capabilities our Navy brings to bear, it is the ability to flex to any of these contingencies at any given time and at any location throughout the world.  That is the fundamental nature of the way we operate. The value of our Navy is often found in its non-kinetic missions.  Our presence throughout the globe is essential in this day and age of a global economy and in the face of the Chinese and their resurgence and build-up of their military.  As well, clearly we are concerned with specific issues of anti-access and area denial throughout the global domain.

In the global scheme, this forward presence allows us to influence the sea-lanes and build coalitions and underscores the importance of our Navy as it relates to our economy and ability to support the free and open flow of trade and commerce.  In retrospect I feel that our Navy is the forgotten global economic insurance policy that many do not fully appreciate.

SLD: Clearly one challenge, notably in the Pacific with its immense size, is to have enough assets to influence actions in the maritime domain and deep inside the littorals.  And here we have been looking at the evolution of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), the introduction of the LCS, the evolution of Aegis and the concomitant evolution of the carrier battle group.

Beebe:  That makes absolute sense.  And really, what you’re hitting at is a point where again, what’s unique to the Naval service is our ability to flexibly adapt complimentary assets, tools in our tool kit, to bring the sea base into play.



A C-2A Greyhound assigned to the Providers of Fleet Logistics Combat Support Squadron 30 prepares to take off from the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan was operating off the coast of Japan to provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance as directed in support of Operation Tomodachi.

Credit: USN Visual Service, March 20, 2011

For example, the recent operations of the USS Ronald Reagan demonstrate that flexibility.  We configured the Reagan to be able to support Japanese relief efforts by steering operations toward the use of embarked and augmenting helicopters and even adjusting procedures to accommodate Japanese helicopters landing on board.  So certainly when we have that capability and inherent capacity of this sea base, we bring to any theater the opportunity and flexibility of the integrating weapon systems to that sea base to do what needs to be done.Another aspect, which will allow us to expand the influence of our sea base, is our basic acceptance and embracing of unmanned systems into not only the Navy, but the other services. When you think of unmanned systems, the ones that the Navy plans to field will expand the influence of that sea base.  It extends the reach, expands the geographic influence, and enlarges the functional effectiveness of the sea base in whatever theater it operates.

What’s critical in making that expansion effective is the linkage of sensors to deliverable weapon systems that we have in the inventory, both manned and unmanned.  The successful linking of sensors to weapon systems will act as a force multiplier that delivers more influence in any particular theater.  Obviously, with unmanned systems, the ability for these systems to loiter a lot longer in a particular area of interest, again brings capability that I think would be very advantageous to us in the future.

SLD: And of course adding the F-35B and the F-35C to the mix will add significant 360-degree situational awareness, and support for both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

Beebe: Absolutely.  The F-35 brings advanced capabilities in executing the Maritime strategy.  The F-35’s ability to link and leverage the system of systems is going to be critical.  You also want to do this with high confidence, so you don’t want single point failure vulnerability.  You also need to deal with the challenges of just being able to accommodate the required bandwidth and manage the analysis and movement of significant amounts of information.  These are known challenges that are being addressed as we field this new and exciting aircraft.



F-35C in Flight

Photo Credit: Lockheed Martin

SLD: One aspect of the evolving capability for the USN-USMC team is the modernization of Aegis and the introduction of the F-35.  How does this affect the future?


Beebe: From a Naval Aviation perspective, we’re very committed to the F-35.  And certainly, when you think of the F- 35 and the global Aegis partnership, our international partners play an important role in the F-35 acquisition strategy.The opportunity to work with international partners in the future with F-35 assuming that we share some of the inherent capabilities available with this aircraft creates tactical and strategic partnering venues and expands the capabilities and reach beyond just our Department of Defense (DOD) assets.

We need to think about that and how we leverage ourselves with our partners in the future with this very capable aircraft.  Obviously we are all sensitive to the current economic situation, and certainly, the potential pressures that it will have on DOD and Navy so it’s a win-win situation to at least be aware of opportunities where we can share deployed capabilities among our close international partners.

SLD: The newly enabled ARG and the deployments of the LCS suggest that the USN-USMC team will be engaged differently in the future in the littorals.  How do you approach thinking about the littorals, particularly coming from your submarine background?


The guided-missile submarine USS Georgia transits the Atlantic Intercoastal Waterway to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Ga. The sub was returning from pre-deployment testing.

Credit: USN Visual Services:  11/24/08

Beebe:  We have a certain way of defining littorals today.  The whole issue of anti-access area denial as influenced from the land base towards the sea is dynamic.  I think we’re going to have to be very careful on what we define as littorals in the future.  It could be several hundred miles out, it could even be a 1,000 miles out based on the proliferation of the type of weapons systems that are coming from the land base of the nation we’re trying to influence.  How do we protect and leverage the influence from these assets that we send in those “littorals” of the future?   The Navy’s role will be huge and how we operate will be critical in the debate and discussion to follow.

As a Navy we need to think differently regarding how we influence the littorals in the future.  I’m a submariner by professional experience, now living in the aviation world.  We have the ability to influence access and deny potential adversaries from the sea.  We must however be constantly aware of and flex to the changing landscape of risk from the land as it influences the littoral seas.

SLD: As a former submariner, how do you think the new SSGNs might be used in this mission set?

Beebe: The SSGN is a very exciting weapon system and I think the way that a lot of the combatant commanders look at this weapon system right now is from the perspective of strike.  The biggest benefit of SSGN is what I feel we haven’t thought about that could be delivered from this platform.  The SSGN bring the opportunity for delivering payload.  If you look at it as a stealth platform that can deliver payload and define payload however you want to in the future out of those 24 tubes, it brings unlimited war fighting capability to future challenges.