Egypt-US Security Ties Provide Possible Anchor for Stability

02/07/2011

By Richard Weitz


Further contacts between the U.S. and Egyptian armed forces
 arise from  their joint participation in combined military exercises.
 The best known  of these, the Egyptian-hosted Operation Bright Star exercise,
 is the  largest multilateral military exercise in the Middle East and occurs every other year.
Photo Credit : Soldiers of the Army National Guard's  42nd Infantry Division
 renew their enlistment vows while deployed to  Cairo, Egypt
 in support of the 2007 Bright Star exercise Nov. 12, 2007,
http://dmna.state.ny.us



02/07/2011 – Perhaps the main tool of influence available to the United States in the current crisis in Egypt is the decades-long relationship that Washington has cultivated with that country’s military and intelligence services. The recent experience reminds us that military-to-military relationships have important diplomatic and security functions when pursued with friendly nations.

Perhaps the main tool of influence available to the United States in the current crisis in Egypt is the decades-long relationship that Washington has cultivated with that country’s military and intelligence services. The recent experience reminds us that military-to-military relationships have important diplomatic and security functions when pursued with friendly nations.

Credit: President Anwar-El- Sadat, www.laguia2000.com

Egyptian-U.S. security ties originated during the presidency of Anwar Sadat, himself a former military officer. After assuming power in October 1970, Sadat spent several frustrating years trying to secure enough military assistance from the Soviet Union to enable the Egyptian armed forces to perform sufficiently well to revenge Israel’s rout of the Egyptian military in the Six-Day War. During that June 1967 campaign, which resulted in Israel’s capture of the Sinai Desert from Egypt as well as the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem from Jordan, Israel conducted perhaps the most effective preemptive air strike in history, destroying Egypt’s warplanes on their runways in the opening hours of the campaign.

Under Sadat’s leadership, Egypt defected from the Soviet camp soon after the October 1973 war with Israel (known as the October, Ramadan, or Yom Kippur War), in which the Egyptian army restored Arab pride by initially defeating the Israeli military and recapturing parts of the Sinai. Sadat then worked with Washington to travel to Jerusalem in November 1977, negotiate a peace settlement at Camp David in September 1978, and then sign a peace treaty with Israel in Washington on March 26, 1979. Under its terms, Israel returned all of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty and guaranteed Israel’s freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and other international waterways under Egyptian control. In return, Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize the state of Israel.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Egyptian and U.S. governments cooperated to counter what they both feared was the growing threat of Soviet-led influence in their region.

For example, the two intelligence communities collaborated to transfer weapons to the Mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Although Islamist terrorists assassinated Sadat in October 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, continued the close security relationship with the United States.

For instance, the two countries’ intelligence and military services jointly countered Libyan influence in Sudan and other African countries. After Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990, Mubarak assumed a lead role in mobilizing Arab support behind the subsequent coalition campaign under Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. He was rewarded after the conflict when his foreign allies forgave billions of dollars of Egypt’s debt.

There is some concern that a new Egyptian government — especially one under the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which has always opposed the peace agreement — could renege on the 1979 settlement. Many Egyptians dislike the peace deal because it resulted in their alienation from many other Arab countries (including a decade-long suspension from the Arab League from 1979-89) and because they believe Israeli governments have failed to honor their commitments to make peace with the Palestinians.

Yet, the Egyptian military leadership is perhaps the one important group in Egypt that supports the treaty since it has freed them from having to prepare for war with the strongest military force in the Middle East.

Any Egyptian government would also have economic reasons to adhere to the agreement since, under its terms, Egypt can earn revenue from the oil produced in the Suez, significant fees from international transits through the Suez Canal, and tourist revenue from foreign use of the Sinai reorts.

All three of these sources of income would be at risk if Egyptian-Israeli fighting resumed, though perhaps not if the relationship simply deteriorated to that of a “Cold Peace.”

The newly appointed Egyptian Vice President, Omar Suleiman, has been in charge of managing Egypt’s intelligence cooperation with Israel and the United States. A recent priority of the three governments has been to curb arms smuggling into the Hamas-run Gaza Strip along the Philadelphi corridor connecting Egypt and Gaza. All three governments have considered Hamas and the other militant groups active in Gaza as a common threat.

Before the December 2008 War, the movement’s armed wing used weapons smuggled through the intricate network of tunnels extending into Egyptian territory to launch ever-deeper attacks against Israelis as well as suppress opposition to its authority in Gaza itself. Egypt tried but failed to moderate this behavior and achieve a de facto settlement between Hamas and Israel. The failure of Hamas to heed Egyptian mediation efforts resulted in Israel’s military occupation of Gaza in early 2009.

Even an Egyptian government willing to respect the 1979 peace agreement could find it more difficult than Mubarak to use force against the Palestinians to keep the peace accord, as Mubarak did when he closed the smuggling routes and blocked international efforts to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza by moving goods through Egypt.

Although Israel is likely to react to current situation by adopting an even sterner stance and hunkering down to hedge against increased tensions with Egypt, Israel could ease pressure on the new Egyptian authorities as well as the other moderate regimes in the Middle East, especially Jordan, by helping to make more progress in their negotiating with the Palestinians.

Following the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the U.S. military aid to Egypt dramatically increased to $1.3 billion annually. Through various Foreign Military Financing programs, the United States has supplied Egypt with F-4 aircraft and F-16 jet fighters, M-60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, anti-aircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. The Egyptian military receives additional U.S. military equipment through the Excess Defense Articles program.

The U.S. Office of Military Cooperation – Egypt, based in Cairo, helps Egyptian Land Forces secure and use U.S. training and assistance. In addition, hundreds of Egyptian officers receive education and training in the United States each year, mostly through the International Military Education Programs. Retired Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, the former commandant of the US Army War College, recalls that since the early 1980s, Egypt “started sending a great many of their best and brightest to our schools.” By Scales’ reckoning, many of these Egyptian officers trained at U.S. war colleges have now become generals.

Further contacts between the U.S. and Egyptian armed forces arise from their joint participation in combined military exercises. The best known of these, the Egyptian-hosted Operation Bright Star exercise, is the largest multilateral military exercise in the Middle East and occurs every other year. “Eagle Salute” and other exercises and training programs also aim to deepen interoperability between the two militaries.

The government of Egypt has in turn provided important help to the Pentagon. For example, Egyptian authorities grant U.S. military aircraft with over-flight rights and expedited processing for U.S. Navy ships to transit the Suez Canal. Furthermore, U.S. Navy personnel are allowed to make rest and recreation stops at Egyptian ports.

Egyptian and U.S. intelligence cooperation is also extensive if less openly discussed. Some percentage of U.S. aid has supported building Egyptian intelligence capabilities, including elements within both the Egyptian military and the country’s internal security force. Egyptian and U.S. intelligence agencies have collaborated to counter Islamist extremist movements within Egypt as well as elsewhere in the Middle East.

They have worked closely on a variety of specific counterterrorist activities, from identifying and destroying terrorist cells to curbing the flow of finances and weapons to Islamist militants. For example the Egyptian government has supported U.S. requests to freeze the assets of Islamic charities suspected of helping to support terrorist movements.

According to some sources, as part of its extraordinary rendition process adopted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CIA has extradited suspected terrorists to Egypt for interrogation. Some critics denounce this practice as torture by proxy.

With its large Muslim population, Egypt also has produced its share of Muslim militants, including three members of the al-Qaeda team that conducted the 9/11 terrorist attacks within the United States as well as current deputy al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

But other Egyptians have reportedly joined al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups as double agents. Mubarak has claimed that Egyptian informants infiltrated al-Qaeda before 9/11 and alerted U.S. intelligence that al-Qaeda might attack U.S. targets in 2001, though American sources have stated that the information was too imprecise to avert the 9/11 attacks.

In recent years, the Egyptian and U.S. intelligence agencies have cooperated to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, promote peace and stability in Iraq, and bolster Lebanon’s independence from Syria and Iran.

Relations with Tehran have been strained since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to a militant Shiite government there exported terrorism and sought to subvert the moderate governments of the Middle East, including Egypt. Iranians still officially honor Sadat’s killers as Islamist heros.

Some Egyptians, including members of the current protest movement, object to their country’s security collaboration with the United States given Americans’ close ties with Israel and the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the crowds of demonstrators have not been shouting “death to America.”

Some Egyptians, including members of the current protest movement, object to their country’s security collaboration with the United States given Americans’ close ties with Israel and the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the crowds of demonstrators have not been shouting “death to America.”

Any Egyptian government will want to retain some security cooperation with the United States regardless of its composition or relationship with Israel. Indeed, should ties between Egypt and Israel deteriorate, U.S. government representatives could serve as a natural conduit for communicating messages between the two countries as well as helping to stabilize their bilateral relationship.

The Wikileaked cables have exposed some concerns among U.S. diplomats that the Egyptian military is preoccupied with acquiring hardware and reluctant to engage in foreign counterterrorist operations.

Conversely, U.S. intelligence failed to predict the rapid collapse of regime authority in Tunisia and Egypt despite all its assets and experience in both countries, and currently seems clueless about the key characteristics of the current Egyptian popular opposition.


U.S. intelligence failed to predict the rapid collapse of regime  authority in Tunisia and Egypt
 despite all its assets and experience in  both countries, and currently seems clueless
 about the key  characteristics of the current Egyptian popular opposition.
Credit:www.bbc.co.uk, February 2011


Nonetheless, U.S. ties with the Egyptian military and intelligence services could prove useful in promoting the transition to a democratic but still Western-oriented government. Although the recent contacts between American and Egyptian intelligence representatives have remained unpublicized, the personal ties that have developed between senior U.S. and Egyptian military officers have already demonstrated their utility in the current crisis.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has spoken several times with his Egyptian counterpart, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, to encourage a non-violent and constitutional resolution to the current crisis. Mullen also said he “expressed his confidence in the Egyptian military’s ability to provide for their country’s security, both internally and throughout the Suez Canal area.”

These military-to-military contacts have been sufficiently discreet to avoid giving the appearance that the Egyptian military leadership will simply follow Washington’s orders in the current crisis. Still, various members of the Pentagon and Congress have let it be known that the United States would suspend at least some aid should the Egyptian armed forces use excessive or inappropriate force against peaceful demonstrators. This may have helped avert a Tiananmen Square-like episode, although it is likely that President Mubarak opposed such an option in any case. His current strategy seems to be to simply play for time in the hopes the protests will lose steam.

The Pentagon has also reinforced the message that direct military rule is not the function of a professional military. Although the Egyptian military runs a surprisingly extensive network of business enterprises in Egypt, as an institution it is not structured or trained in the skills needed to manage a major modern economy in a country with 80 million people.

Furthermore, attempting to side too openly in favor of Mubarak or the protesters could lead to splits within the Egyptian military, both within the officer corps and between the officers and their conscripts. The divisions would weaken the institutional influence of the military and perhaps provide an opening for other groups more hostile to the United States to seize power.

At the same time, if the transition occurs as expected and a new Egyptian government takes power, American officers can build on their contacts to encourage the Egyptian armed forces to assume the kind of role the Turkish military used to play in constraining the influence of the anti-democratic Islamist forces in that country.

Iraq: The Missing Piece in the “Arab Awakening”

02/06/2011

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The Blindside of U.S. Strategy in the Middle-East
Photo Credit: Damir Sagolj, Iraq, Reuters, as posted in www.abc.net.au, December 2007


02/06/2011 – Notably absent from any Western commentary about the Tunisian and Egyptian “awakenings” is Iraq.  Yet Baghdad is only 806 miles or 1297 kms  from Cairo. And the American and UK intervention in Iraq has created a new political reality and dynamic.  Regardless of one’s views of the intervention, the reality is that the US is still in Iraq, and likely to be engaged.

Notably absent from any Western commentary about the Tunisian and Egyptian “awakenings” is Iraq.  Yet Baghdad is only 806 miles or 1297 kms. from Cairo.

After much DC political grandstanding by those opposed to the Iraq war as the situation on the ground deteriorated, President Bush said enough.  He showed leadership and issued his basic principles for Iraq and it turns out the Arab world in January 2007-“The New Way Forward”—or as history will say in shorthand  “the Surge.” The President’s New Iraq Strategy Was Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:

1.       Let the Iraqis lead;

2.       Help Iraqis protect the population;

3.       Isolate extremists;

4.       Create space for political progress;

5.       Diversify political and economic efforts; and

6.       Situate the strategy in a regional approach.


Number 6 had serious consequences.

First, the Iranian people tried to throw off their backward looking theocracy. Unfortunately, an Iranian “Tiananmen Option” was chosen. A countries’ leadership saying death to everyone, including their own citizens and remaining adamant that they are going to wipe Israel off the map is simply an enemy of humanity. The people of Iran showed the world that they are a country filled with courageous citizens who simply wanted freedom and a better life for their children. [1]

Now after the successful Iraq surge and the Iranian failure, Egypt and other Islamic states are following President Bush’s points numbers  4 and 5 taken  from his way forward. Words have consequences and America having committed to Iraq was prepared to excuse the cliché –not only talk the talk but “walk the walk.”

Unlike Iraq, America  has no military role in Egypt except as the US Navy/Marine has demonstrated over and over, America can insert forces to save lives and evacuate innocents. This is the capability that myopic “cost cutters” in our current debates want to cut way back — amazing.

We have launched an Iraq 2012 series, precisely because Second Line of Defense believes that the United States and the West should look upon its Iraq engagement as important in shaping its involvement in the Arab worl But currently it seems better for Washington to lecture the Egyptians in a very disjointed and confusing way  on what to do.  We can build from the moral authority of the Iraq engagement which is a force for good in demonstrating a fundamental re-shaping the Arab world and the Western involvement in that world.

A fact of life is we are in Iraq with a successful end-game in sight and this important fact should not be minimized or overlooked because of American domestic partisan politics.

A fact of life is we are in Iraq with a successful end-game in sight and this important fact should not be minimized or overlooked because of American domestic partisan politics.

Rather than a spirited debate about Iraq, America, the Arab Awakening and the future of Western-Arab relations we have nothing.  No debate; no consideration of what our evolving policy in Iraq might be or how the US power tools should be engaged in the Middle East.

Into The Dust of History ?
Photo Credit: U.S. Troops In Iraq, August 2008, http://patdollard.com

 

The Israelis are feeling increasingly threatened and the question of what the US will bring to the table to reassure Israel is also a missing ingredient.  As we have noted earlier, there are many dynamics of concern to the Israelis, which are simply not  part of the American focus on the Middle East.  It is important to take these considerations into account as the Egyptian-Israel relationships is the key to peace in the region; not the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

And most notably, those assets which some have considered anachronistic, the USMC MEU and US Navy amphibious ships are the first capabilities called upon to support the United States in the current Egyptian crisis.

Missing debate; missing support for core assets; but there is a reality in the Middle East outside of the Inside the Beltway deliberations.


—–

Footnotes

[1] http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/06/the_mullahs_and_the_tiananmem.html


Relevant SLD Articles

Systems Of Systems: Managing Complexity

01/28/2011

A French Take
By General Gaviard


«The  rational optimization of systems of systems (...) will profoundly
 change our operational concepts, but their  justification, ultimately, will
always depend on their  ability to still serve  the soldiers who implement them.»
Photo credit:  http://defensetech.org, 2006

 

01/28/2011 – The term “systems of systems” first appears to be an abstruse acronym, but it actually covers a quite simple reality: the networking of several systems, which will thus be able to exchange information and data in real time. The goal: get a more efficient operational synergy.

Regarding the networking itself, the Americans – who have taken the lead in this area – emphasize the word “NCW” (Network Centric Warfare), while NATO chose that of “NEC” (Network Enabling Capabilities). The semantic difference is rather significant, because in the first case the network is seen as a focal point (“Centric”) within the operational system, while in the second it is identified as a support capacity (“Enabling”) to the operations.

Regarding the networking itself, the Americans – who have taken the lead in this area – emphasize the word “NCW” (Net Centric Warfare), while NATO chose that of “NEC” (Net Enabling Capabilities). The semantic difference is rather significant, because in the first case the network is seen as a focal point (“Centric”) within the operational system, while in the second it is identified as a support capacity (“Enabling”) to the operations.

By choosing to emphasize the “NEC”, Europeans point out that men remain at the heart of complex systems. This is a fundamental point, which we shall return to in the conclusion.

Networks have long existed in the Air Force and Navy. Thus the treatment and data information system of Air Defense (Système de Traitement et d’Informations de données de Défense Aérienne:  STRIDA) has been implemented in the Air Force for over 30 years! On the one hand, given the lengthening of ocean communication lines, maritime operations have always been based conceptually on the networks. Regarding the army, on the other hand, the rise of the “digital battlefield” is more recent. This “NEB” is progressing rapidly, however, especially via the “Blue Force Tracking” which will, once mastered, enable us to obtain a geo-location of friendly ground elements. The tactical data links (TDL) are another example of networking. Thus, link 16 which is dedicated specifically to air operations, allows us to pass in real-time a lot of encrypted air defense information between the various platforms and the center of command and control (C2). These exchanges enable us to instantly develop a relevant assessment of situation to the benefit of all air assets, providing de facto a greatly increased capacity to act.

Meanwhile, the centers of command and control or C2 of Earth/Air and Sea composition, now real “cathedrals” of operations, where all missions are planned and conducted, will inevitably evolve. The change will rely tomorrow on lighter C2s, working in a more collaborative and horizontal way (that is to say, joint), as opposed to land, air and sea platforms, connected by tactical data links. These conceptual developments concerning “C2 constellations” are formalized today by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (Supreme Allied Transformation in Norfolk). To illustrate this evolution, we may note that the air support, for example, requires planning and a more integrated air-land action between decentralized ground and air C2s. These so-called “distributed” operations are, however, only achievable if the C2s in question locally benefit from an efficient situation assessment. The information must be based on a multi-sensor strategy, oriented and checked by the work of field agents. This data fusion was well highlighted, and rightly so, through the French White Paper’s new strategic priorities: “knowledge and anticipation”.

Transformation based on networks is now real. Slogans are far, and concrete achievements in this field are increasing throughout the industrial and technological base of French defense. What consequences should we  draw in particular as far as operations, industry and acquisition are concerned in order to better manage the complexity and security of these network systems?

Regarding operations, we must concentrate on four major topics:  writing the concept of operations ; the touchy subject of interoperability ; the transverse organization of command ; managing complex information flow.

  • The concept of operations is central to network operations. Unmanned Aerial Systems or UAS perfectly illustrate this topic.  UASs are indeed thriving, but there is no fully developed overall concept of operations to regulate or guide its use. Given the possibilities offered by their networking, we can all understand why it is so important to define beforehand a concept of use before accumulating platforms even if they are all individually quite efficient. Given its complexity, writing such a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) can only be reiterated: in France, the Joint Chief of Staff has understood it quite well and his institutions in charge of the “UAS” doctrine, such as the CICDE, rely heavily on the lessons learned on the ground to come up with operational and realistic concepts.

In France, the Joint Chief of Staff  (…) and his institutions in charge of the “UAS” doctrine, such as the CICDE, rely heavily on the lessons learned on the ground to come up with operational and realistic concepts.

  • Interoperability is also a central theme. This problem is indeed directly related to CONOPS and standards. The situation is not simple; strictly national networks exist in all multinational operations and consequently they are different levels of confidentiality which require appropriate gateways (Internal Exchange Gateway: IEG) to ensure a safe dialogue between the national and “shared” areas during the operation. NATO references are not enough anymore as can be seen today in open theaters. For instance, Americans in Afghanistan impose specific standards due to their massive presence in operations. The example of the American “Rover” system that transmits the video taken by the pod of the aircraft to the JTAC (ground leaders) largely illustrates their dominance in this area.  Rover has indeed never been a NATO standard. It went directly from American national standard to a “de facto” allied standard. Networks, in general, and their points of convergence and treatment (the famous “C2”) in particular are very much affected by this paradoxical model.
  • The organization of command is also very much affected by networking. The possibility of transversal information exchanges tends to “crush” the traditional levels of commands which have been rather vertical up until now. Hierarchy keeps its virtues! However, we cannot ignore the effects of the networks on sociology and command. Therefore, new concepts are now proposing a suitable command organization.  In the army, for instance, NEB ( “numérisation de l’espace de bataille“, i.e. battlefield digitization) experiments have shown that the battalion level (Joint tactical group or GTIA) corresponds to a synthesis level where information and decisions converge and focus. At the tactical level, networks allow for a more pertinent situation assessment than in the past.  Delegation – and thus the autonomy of action – are logically gaining in size as long as one strictly abides to the desired operational effect. On the contrary, the command of joint theater level– operational level that is, which also benefits from a potential “tactical zoom” capacity thanks to the networks, must avoid falling into the trap of “micro-management” that involves taking the role of tactical chief from the HQ: a common but incapacitating mistake,: network or not, it is the  Commander on the ground who can best analyze the situation he is facing. Networks are there to support (it’s the whole point of the word enabling in the “NEC” acronym mentioned above).
  • Managing information flow within a network is also essential: “too much information kills the information”! One must know how to merge all the gathered information to knowingly “sublimate” it (so called “information to knowledge” process, and then, using dedicated structures, to “route” this processed information to the various concerned officials with a targeted priority and confidentiality. This “military” issue is nothing specific: the processing algorithm of the Google search engine does the same thing with the requests it receives: sort, validate and propose limited choices sorted by relevance! Mutatis mutandis, such network management structures exist in NATO as “knowledge management cells” or “KMC”. However, this “real time” information management is still far from perfect even though the progress of “knowledge processing” within C2s is rapidly gaining in consistency. Here again, we clearly see that training of men using complex systems is at the heart of the matter. In this context, we can cite the example of the French Air Force CASPOA. As a training center for C2 officers, it is in fact NATO’s first French center of excellence in this strategic area.

(The) training of men using complex systems is at the heart of the matter. In this context, we can cite the example of the French Air Force CASPOA. As a training center for C2 officers, it is in fact NATO’s first French center of excellence in this strategic area.

Credit: DGA/com, 2010
LTO: Basilic Experimentation (DGA/com)

Regarding industries, we face a different problem. The development of complex networks requires skills of systems of systems’ architects.  Those rare specialists have to translate in technical terms the CONOPS described by the operations. To accomplish its mission, industry usually relies on a “Battle Lab”, private laboratory linked to a LTO (“laboratoire technico-opérationnel“, i.e. technical and operational laboratory) of the DGA (“Délégation générale de l’armement“, the MoD’s acquisition arm. The goal is to respond directly to the need by “transversal” work and not only in “series” following the classic pattern from the Cold War (by the rule: military feature sheet, invitation to tender and finally response from the industry). The new « in spiral » process thus combines operations, industries and weapons engineers on the same stage.  The DGA’s “Basilic” LTO dedicated to the army’s “Scorpion” program is a good example of this new integrated team work process. In the air field, the formation of a large State testing center of the “Air Warfare Center” (AWC) type where industries can make products available to operations while benefiting in return from feedback and maturing concepts is another interesting avenue to follow. Thus, Mont-de-Marsan’s Center for Military Air Experiments (CEAM) relies today on its definition, experimentation and validation center of the SCCOA (“CDEVS”) to shift towards an AWC type structure. A complex exercise (called ACTI) was done in this context at the CEAM last June.  It was supposed to allow Air Force pilots and controllers to model a daily use of the Link 16, without AWACS, using equipment made available by an industry specialized in tactical data links and simulation.  An example of the first tangible brick of a possible rise in power of the Mont-de-Marsan AWC.

In corollary, it raises however the sensitive issue of procurement.  Indeed, if the operations/ industries/ weapons engineers trio constitute the only solution to smartly developing complex systems of systems, it can also be, by design, that it will tend to depart by necessity from the procurement code.  In that case, could the industries make “unsolicited” offers to meet the complex operational needs while still respecting the market rules? It’s a lead. Are there more? In this area one should be first and foremost innovative and imaginative as our competitors do not refrain to do so.

As we have just shown, the subject is vast and touches on many aspects: political, operational, technical, organizational, and even ethical (we could have talked about network security and cyber warfare problems). Either way, one thing is clear: internet has changed our lives, and we don’t see why the reality of operations should escape from it. Specifically, it is already the case when we observe the technologies used by our state or non-state adversaries. The rational optimization of systems of systems is one of the answers to this reality. They will profoundly change our operational concepts, but their justification, ultimately, will always depend on their ability to still serve the soldiers who implement them. To have humans at the entrance and exit of any network process remains a major imperative.

Striking a few bad chords ?

01/26/2011

Tell it to the Marines
A Comment on Lang Lang’s Performance at the White House
By Ed Timperlake

Lang Lang's Jamming Session At The White House : "Diplo Speak" or "Diplo Gaffe" ?
 Credit photo: www.dispatch.com, January 26th, 2011


o1/26/2011 – Battle on Shangganling Mountain” : A Classic War Propaganda Movie
If one looks at the film segment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movie about their exploits in Korea, which theme song was recently played at the White House, it is a PLA propaganda movie.

Technically, it is much closer to the Soviet style of movies made for World War II : at the same time Americans were watching “The Bridges of Toko Ri,” or slightly later,  “Pork Chop Hill.” To be fair every country makes the type of film depicted by the song.

Technically, it is much closer to the Soviet style of movies made for World War II : at the same time Americans were watching “The Bridges of Toko Ri,” or slightly later,  “Pork Chop Hill.” To be fair every country makes the type of film depicted by the song.

The camera opens with the haunting playing of a flute and then we see battle weary apparently out numbered solders taking a moment of comrade and bonding. Longing pensive, but hopeful looks are being made by stalwart infantrymen as they listen to an attractive female singer in her combat uniform sing the lyrics.  Symbolically,  light filters into the guarded entrance of the cave. The move cuts away, while the song is being sung to show an emerging and industrializing China. Although it could be symbolic of their aspirations for Korea, the short segment was unclear.

Every fighting force has moments when music is played — some poignant some not. For example, the Mickey Mouse Club song being sung during the Battle of Hue City Vietnam at the end of “Apocalypse  Now” is very real. My USMC Basic School platoon at Quantico in 1969 use to sing it while marching. In America counter-culture and anti-war leftist  movies beginning in the late sixties tended to favor showing a guitar to introduce a musical interlude.

As an aside picking up on that symbolism, for real, leftist rebels in central and South America always appeared to pull out a guitar when news cameras were present. However, thankfully, the guitar as symbol died a violent death. The late great John Belushi ended all that foolishness by smashing a guitar in the movie Animal House.


The Song "My Motherland" From The Movie "Battle on Shangganling Mountain"
Credit photo: www.youtube.com


Tit For Tat ? Let us not forget the “Frozen Chosin”
Going back to the symbolism. If one listens to the song being sung with ears used to western music it sounds very high pitched and Chinese — and no one should have a problem with that. As far as musical taste, the PLA would probably cringe hearing Bag Pipes. However, being played in the White House is a different matter.

On a serious note high-pitched Chinese Opera is being used as a military weapon. When I was visiting a Taiwan AF F-16 Squadron in the late nineties, the Republic of China fighter pilots were complaining that the PLA was communication jamming all of their frequencies as they patrolled the Straits by playing Chinese Opera. They hated it and thought it was awful music — I guess Chinese Opera is an acquired taste for Fighter Pilots.

When I was visiting a Taiwan AF F-16 Squadron in the late nineties, the Republic of China fighter pilots were complaining that the PLA was communication jamming all of their frequencies as they patrolled the Straits by playing Chinese Opera.

Now the appropriate media fight is raging in America over the symbolism of Lang Lang playing the song from “Battle on Shangganling Mountain” (or Triangle Hill). It was rude no matter what the spin or nuance positions taken by individuals schooled in “Diplo Speak” — short for diplomatic language will say.

However, if the Pianist really wanted to play music that showed accurate deeds, then I rather he played the Marine Corps Hymn to remind the Chinese totalitarian dictators of what really happened in Korea. The movie is essentially a fraud. The PLA greatly outnumbered the American and UN forces. To claim as the central theme of the movie that the greatly outnumbered PLA rallied to defeat the imperialist aggressors is simply historically incorrect.

The great Marine combat leader  Major General O P Smith was the Ist Marine Division Commander in Korea. The Marines were out numbered around eight or nine to one by the PLA 9th Army. The 1st Marine Division was isolated cut off and given up for dead at a place called the Chosin Reservoir known forever more as “the Frozen Chosin.” The Marine’s battle cry announced by General Smith was “Retreat hell. We’re just attacking in a different direction“, as the Marines made their legendary fighting march carrying all killed  and wounded  to the Sea while chewing up and destroying an entire Chinese Army. The Marine Air/Ground team in Korean War became a true legendary force.

The fighting at the Chosin Reservoir was the most violent small unit fighting in the history of American warfare. No other operation in the American book of war quite compares with the show [the battle of the Chosin Reservoir] by the First Marine Division [and attached U.S. Army and British Royal Marines]“,  writes General S.L.A. Marshall, Prominent Army Historian of the Twentieth Century

So the next time the PRC Dictators visit the White House, the Marine Corps Band “The President’s Own” should simply play the Marine Corps Hymn, along with The Air Force Hymn since one cannot forget MIG Alley and the F-86’s Saber Jet Victories over the Mig-15.

Also remind them by playing – The Caissons Go Rolling Along — in honor of General MacArthur’s saying in his farewell address to Congress-“There is no substitute for victory.”

A rendition of Anchors Away would also be appropriate, because the simple question asked by the Admiral at the end of the Bridges of Toko Ri-“Where do we get such men”—now very appropriately it should be “where do we get such men and women.”

The PLA can talk the talk but haven’t walked the walk in a very long time. Finally, another cold dose of reality—if one looks at a night time Satellite photo of North Korea the entire country is dark and South Korea is filled with light and life — it looks like those PLA solders are still in their Korean cave fifty years later.

Lessons of Tunisia “Leaderless” Revolution

01/19/2011

By Dr. Harald Malmgren


01/19/2011 – The collapse of the 23+ year reign of Tunisia’s autocratic leadership was the result of a revolt in the streets without apparent political leadership. 21st Century technology enabled discontented citizens to interact and organize, in a kind of spontaneous combustion across the entire country. In spite of government security efforts to impede interaction across Twitter, Facebook, the internet, and cell phones, individual discontent assisted in multiplying and aggregating public demonstrations.

The process was said by some analysts to have been sparked by Wikileaks confirmation of US State Department appraisals that the political leadership was corrupt and operated in mafia style, thus confirming rumors and impressions of ordinary people. Some analysts attributed the sudden, massive revolution as the product of Twitter.

A more comprehensive assessment is that discontent was intensified by food inflation, generating combined food and anti-corruption demonstrations and riots. Demonstrators were enabled to coordinate and reinforce one another through cell phones, blogs, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and other digital tools.

This process took the form of what has been described by computer-communication scientists (at Mi2g in the UK) as self-assembling dynamic networks enabled in digital space. Food riots in many dispersed population centers clearly were a powerful accelerant.

This process took the form of what has been described by computer-communication scientists (at Mi2g in the UK) as self-assembling dynamic networks enabled in digital space. Food riots in many dispersed population centers clearly were a powerful accelerant.

The speed and comprehensive effect of this revolution in the streets has already been widely covered throughout the Islamic world in real time, through the functioning of al Jazeera. Warnings have already emanated from politicians and commentators in a number of Islamic countries that the same thing could happen to any other autocratic regime. Within a couple of days of the Tunisian government upheaval, Algeria appears to be suffering outbreaks of unrest, and political figures in Egypt are calling for fundamental change in the post-Mubarak transition. Riots have appeared in Yemen.

At first, this phenomenon of “leaderless revolution” seems primarily to threaten long entrenched autocratic families in Islamic countries. Businesses deeply involved in oil production and trading have become concerned on how this kind of spontaneous upheaval could work its way through to Libya, which does produce oil, primarily for Italy’s ENI, and to royal families in the Persian Gulf area who are related through birth and marriage with Yemen’s leadership.

However, Egypt seems vulnerable to growing sentiment in Egypt that the transition of leadership after Mubarak should not take the form of transfer of power to President Mubarak’s son, but instead should be democratized in a transition to parliamentary government.

The intellectual center of the Islamic world is in Cairo, and Egypt is full of well-educated but jobless youths who want to bring about “modernization” and an end to the dominance of a corrupt and autocratic regime. Upheaval in Egypt would likely have a chain reaction effect in other Islamic countries, and would catch Israel in a new, unbalanced predicament in relations with its neighbors.

But Tunisia has also posed a prototype for revolution from below in other countries — including in European debt-troubled nations suffering under what are perceived as Berlin-imposed austerity budgets and curtailment of national autonomy. Tunisia is a prototype for upheaval in Latin American nations, which have long histories of abrupt revolutions, even though there have been few such incidents in recent years.

Balancing China Through Vietnam

01/13/2011

By Richard Weitz

01/13/2011 – The public display of China’s new J-20 stealth fighter, the expected appearance soon of China’s first aircraft carrier, and Secretary Gates’ troubled visit to the PRC reaffirm the importance for the United States of having good security relations with China’s neighbors. Defense ties with the Republic of Korea remain strong, while those with Japan have recovered from last year’s downturn, thanks partly to China’s confrontational policies regarding the territories in dispute between Beijing and Tokyo. But U..S. -Vietnamese security ties lag somewhat due to the legacy of confrontation and other factors. Relations between the United States and Vietnam have become stronger in recent years despite continuing disagreements over Vietnam’s domestic human rights policies and other issues. Cooperation now extends beyond the realm of economics and the recovery of soldiers’ remains to include joint diplomatic initiatives to counter Beijing’s expansive maritime claims.

http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john_mauldins_outside_the_box/archive/2008/06/12/the-geopolitics-of-china.aspx 

In 2009, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced its willingness to permit the export of “non-lethal” military equipment to Vietnam.  In early August 2010, the Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry confirmed the commencement of U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations on a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. That same month, the U.S. and Vietnamese held their first formal defense talks and their navies conducted their first joint exercises since the Vietnam War ended. The destroyer USS John McCain conducted exercises with ships of the Vietnamese People’s Navy (VPN). The nuclear-powered USS George Washington aircraft carrier concurrently hosted a combined civilian-military delegation from Vietnam while sailing in the disputed South China Sea.

Threats
Vietnam has the misfortune of sharing a land border with China, which has led to centuries of invasions and armed conflicts between the two countries, most recently in the late 1970s. Still, Sino-Vietnamese tensions recently have involved primarily the South China Sea. This 3.5 million-square kilometer (km) body of water contains islands, minerals (oil and natural gas reserves lie below the sea), and maritime passages contested by the various littoral states. Vietnam and China claim all the small islands in the South China Sea, while Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan claim some of them. The Spratly and Paracel island chains are the most prominent of the islands, thought to be surrounded by undersea oil and gas reserved.

The Vietnamese Navy fought battles with the Chinese during the mid-1970s and late 1980s over these islands. The PRC seized the Paracels in 1974, when Vietnam was engulfed in civil war, and has since established military garrisons on them. Chinese authorities have also banned the Vietnamese from fishing in the South China Sea and seized fishing boats there, releasing their crew and ship only after they pay hefty fines. They also have been warning Western energy firms not to negotiate offshore drilling agreements with the Vietnamese government.

Most of Vietnam’s oil reserves are located offshore of the Mekong Delta. Furthermore, Vietnam has an interest in pursuing claims to the potentially energy rich Spratlys because declining domestic oil production and growing energy consumption may cause Vietnam to become an oil importing country. The Paracels and Spratlys also intersect maritime commerce lanes originating from Vietnamese ports and encompass areas of extensive Vietnamese fishing and aquaculture. Nationalist sentiments also play a role. Demonstrations erupted across Vietnam when China declared the Paracel Islands to be a part of the Hainan Province municipality in 2008. Another potential source of conflict with China is the Mekong River. Only a fraction of its course runs through Vietnam, but its waters irrigate the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. The Mekong Delta produces half of Vietnam’s rice crop, and makes Vietnam the world’s second largest national exporter of rice , which is a key source of foreign exchange for Hanoi. The Mekong Delta is threatened by both rising sea levels and the diversion and damming of Mekong River waters in the upriver areas of China, which leave the Mekong Delta provinces vulnerable to increases in soil salinity and land erosion.

 

Credit image : http://en.wikipedia.org

Response
Vietnam continues to cultivating a strong and militant form of national independence designed to make Vietnam a “poison shrimp” that China cannot digest. Following the end of the Cold War and the lavish defense and economic subsidies provided by other Soviet bloc members, Vietnam readjusted its military posture by withdrawing from Cambodia and settling land border disputes with China.

Still, with almost 500,000 soldiers under arms, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam possesses one of the world’s ten largest militaries. In addition, the government persists in purchasing foreign weapons systems to complement the troops’ extensive training in guerrilla warfare and more traditional combat techniques.

In 2009, Vietnam’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $92.4 billion and its 2009 defense budget amounted to $4 billion, or about two percent of the total GDP. The most optimistic projection for the budget of the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) in 2018, assuming that 5% of national GDP goes for defense, would be in the neighborhood of $10 billion, which is roughly equivalent to the 2009 defense outlays for Taiwan.

But spending five percent of GDP is more typical in more prosperous and developed states. Most ASEAN members spent three percent of their respective GDPs on defense With a defense spending share of three percent of GDP, Vietnam is calculated to spend around $5.5 billion by 2018.. Even so, foreign arms purchases could increase if the VPA reduced its personnel levels further.

Russia has succeeded the Soviet Union as the main provider of sophisticated weapons to Vietnam, though the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi is based now on business and strategic considerations rather than ideological commonality. Canadian and European companies have also sold some weapons to China.

Although the United States has not provided Vietnam with major weapons systems, the United States has relaxed Cold War-era transfer restrictions. In addition, American diplomats have evinced interest in working with their Vietnamese counterparts to counter Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea.

At present, the Obama Administration has indicated a willingness to sell non-lethal military goods to Vietnam. Of course, the exact definition of “non-lethal” is open to interpretation.

Navy
The Vietnamese People’s Navy (VPN) dedicates most of its resources to monitoring the activities of foreign navies and fishing fleets as well as for countering maritime smuggling and piracy. Vietnam’s naval strategy can be best summarized as sea denial, preventing enemy forces from operating in Vietnamese waters, rather than seeking to proactively project power. Russia is the main supplier of warships to Vietnam.

Russia delivered two Gepard frigates, each armed with eight KH-35U anti-ship missiles and displacing 1,500 tons, to the VPN in 2009 and 2010 . These are Vietnam’s largest surface combatants.

Russia and Vietnam are currently negotiating the delivery of two more Gepard frigates, to be possibly built under license in Vietnam’s shipyards. The primary mission of the VPN’s Gepard frigates would be to interdict enemy marine commerce and engage fast attack craft such as those possessed by rival claimants to South China Islands. Previously, the VPN received supersonic, Russian P-270 Moskit and P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles from Russia.

In 2009, Vietnam signed a $1.8 billion contract to acquire six Kilo-class conventional attack submarines. The deal also includes Russian technical support and Russia’s construction of bases to house the submarines. The Kilos, while suffering from speed and endurance limitations due to their limited battery capacity, are quiet and well-armed with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles.

They can exploit the PLAN’s longstanding weakness in the area of antisubmarine warfare to observe PLAN military exercises as well as those of other countries. They could also help Vietnam break out of any foreign naval blockade. Vietnam’s initial submarines came from  North Korea, which sold Hanoi two Yugo class midget submarines in 1997 for espionage and infiltration purposes .

In coming years, the VPN is likely to focus on acquiring new small surface warships in the corvette or frigate size range (displacement between 1,000 to 4,000 tons) to both support littoral operations and tp gain experience in operating capital ships. Vietnam also is likely to obtain additionally naval transports to re-supply islands garrisons

Air
Canada has emerged as a major source of military aircraft to Vietnam. Last year, Vietnam acquired six DHC-6 400 Twin Otter amphibious planes from Canada for $500 million. The DHC-6 400 is primarily a noncombatant aircraft designed for search and rescue, maritime patrol, and naval re-supply missions. The Vietnam Maritime Police (functionally equivalent to the U.S. Coast Guard) purchased three C212 surveillance aircraft and MSS 6000 radar in 2008 from European manufacturers. During the 1990s, Vietnam purchased a dozen Su-27 Flankers heavy fighters. Vietnam received 8 Su-30MMK strike fighters in 2009, and ordered a dozen more the following year for $1 billion

The most powerful airplane in the arsenal of the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) is the Sukhoi Flanker, Vietnam’s sole fourth-generation aircraft. They are highly maneuverable and can fly far. They are armed with R-77 long-range air-to-air missiles and R-27 short ranged missiles and, on paper, match anything China can field. In 2005, Vietnam also purchased 40 second-hand Su-22M fighter bombers.

 

 

The Su-22 is likely to be used to support the Su-30MKK in the maritime strike role and also as a close air support platform. The Czech Republic and Ukraine have also reported to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms that they respectively sold five and three Su-22M3s to Vietnam.

Looking ahead, the Vietnam People’s Air Force will most likely need a modern single engine fighter to replace its 200 obsolete MiG-21s. The MiG-21 replacement would most likely require multi-role capability for long-range air-to-air missiles and precision guided ground attack munitions. Possible low cost candidates would be the Indian LCA, MiG 29, Swedish Saab Gripen, Mirage 2000 and Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) F-16s. Ironically, Deputy Defense Minister Nyguen Huy Hieu’s Janurary 2008 meeting with the Chinese Defense Ministry’s Committee of Science, Technology and Industry raises the possibility of VPAF procurement of the low cost PRC JF-17 fighter, which is co-produced with Pakistan. The VPAF may also consider obtaining aerial refueling aircraft for its Flanker aircraft to increase their range and flight duration.

 

Ground

Russia has design and constructed Vietnam’s modern air defense system. Two batteries comprising a total of twelve launchers of the formidable S-300PMU1 long-range surface to air missiles were purchased in 2003 from Russia. They have a range of 125 kilometers. One battery of six launchers is deployed at the capital city of Hanoi and the economic hub of Ho Chi Minh city. Vietnam also has a large number of anti-aircraft guns dispersed throughout the country.

The Vietnam People’s Army has no modern self-propelled artillery or main battle tanks, leaving it at a disadvantage in a ground war with the PLA. Israelis have been upgrading Vietnam’s T-55s with improved passive and reactive armor, a larger 125mm cannon and Polish fire control systems, but this is a stopgap measure since Vietnam will need new tanks soon because of protection, ammunition and engine limitations imposed by the T55’s small size.

Since the terrain of most of Vietnam’s border consist of either swamps or mountains, the VPA is unlikely to seek to acquire main battle tanks in the 60+ ton weight category, which excludes most Western tanks such as the Leopard II and M1 Abrams. The VPA will most likely acquire a tank like the T-90, which is in the 45-to-50 ton weight range. The T-90 is also logistically less demanding than most NATO tanks, but still carries considerable firepower.

Vietnam has indigenously upgraded dozens of M113 armored personnel carriers captured from U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, but modernizing these platforms has proven challenging due to the U.S. arms sanctions on Vietnam. The VPA would like to upgrade these and its other armored personnel carriers with better cannons, secondary remote weapons stations, visual imaging equipment, and gas turbine or diesel engines. The VPA’s BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, first deployed in 1963, will probably be replaced by a new area suppression weapon.

Possible American Sales
In the past, domestic American political concerns have impeded U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. These have included painful memories of the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese government’s mistreatment of Hmong and Degar minorities and suppression of political dissent, and the Vietnamese-American community’s strong hostility towards the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party.

Foreign policy considerations have added additional obstacles. These have included concerns about harming U.S. relations with more traditional U.S. Southeast Asian allies, especially Singapore and Thailand. Both countries have been designated non-NATO major allies and Thailand fought extensive border skirmishes on the Cambodian border with Vietnam in the 1980s. Chinese officials would also presumably object to the U.S. transfer of many lethal weapons systems to Vietnam, and might retaliate by sending more weapons to regimes hostile to the United States.

Vietnam possesses sizeable quantities of U.S.-origin weapons captured during the civil war. These include F-5 Tiger fighters, OV-10 Bronco attack planes, C-130 Hercules Transports, UH-1 Huey helicopters, M113 APCs and M-48 tanks. Most of these platforms have been retired due to age and lack of maintenance and spare parts, but U.S.-made transport planes, helicopters and armored personnel carriers still serve in the VPA and could be upgraded by Americans to enhance their safety, range, payload, avionics, and engines for fuel efficiency.

The VPN has established re-supplying its island garrisons as a high priority, which suggests that Vietnam might be interested in decommissioned American amphibious warships stripped of offensive armament. The United States has sold Newport class Tank Landing Ships to Australia, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, Spain and Taiwan. The ships have ramps for offloading cargo in shallow waters, such as those in the Spratly Islands littoral. Ex-USN Anchorage Landing Ship Dock and Austin class Landing Platform Docks have been sold respectively to Taiwan and India. Compared to the Tank Landing Ships, these have increased capacities for supporting helicopter operations and would enhance Vietnam’s marine search and rescue capabilities.

Vietnam might also want to acquire U.S. transport helicopters. American S-70 Seahawks and UH-60 Blackhawks are attractive in that, in addition to carrying loads in excess of four tons, they can be optimized for marine environments, high altitudes, and night-time operations. Of additional interest are CH-47 Chinook heavy helicopters, which could be used both for airmobile operations and to re-supply distant mountain outposts near the Chinese border. The C-130J Super Hercules and C-27A Spartan transport planes would be ideal for Vietnam’s air transport needs. The two planes can carry 20 and 11 ton payloads, respectively, and provide short take off capabilities from rugged airstrips, thus having useful humanitarian applications for delivering relief in the aftermath of typhoons and other natural disasters.

Previous Vietnamese attempts to produce domestically made unmanned aerial vehicles with Israeli help have been unsuccessful. The MQ-1 Predator and tactical level RQ-7 Shadow would provide long endurance, low observable, and cost effective surveillance capabilities of Vietnam’s extensive land and marine boundaries.

UAVs would also help coordinate land and naval maneuvers. Vietnam could also profitably acquire AEW&C aircraft such as the E-2T Hawkeye, which would improve battlefield data processing, radar coverage, and communications. Such a move to acquire AEW&C capabilities would help Vietnam match the Chinese KJ-2000 and KJ-200 aircraft, Singapore’s Phalcon Gulfstream, and Thailand’s Erieye Saab 340.

Modernization of the VPA also requires the renovation of the VPA’s communications and control systems. If American-Vietnamese ties were to improve significantly, Vietnam could have opportunities to purchase Link 11 and 16 equivalent radios and communication datalinks like MIDS/LVT-1 for increasing information flow and security at both the strategic and tactical level . The increasing situational awareness and real-time decision-making capabilities from digitalized command systems would allow Vietnam to integrate air, land, and sea operations better..

Finally, the Vietnam War spewed tens of thousands of tons in unexploded landmines, artillery shells, bombs, booby traps and other explosives across Vietnam, including in heavily populated urban areas and farmland. U.S.-made de-mining vehicles such as the Cougar Mine Resistant Ambust Protected (MRAP) vehicle and M60 Panther drone would greatly improve the efficiency, speed, and safety of Vietnamese de-mining efforts, much of which is currently performed manually.

J-20 : Chain Reaction ?

01/12/2011

By Robbin Laird
01/12/2011


The J-20 : Putting us in the rear-view mirror ?
Credit picture : www.csmonitor.com


The introduction of a new test aircraft by the PRC has caught the attention of many in Asia and the United States; as it clearly should.  The new aircraft displaying stealth features, demonstrates if such a demonstration was need that the PRC is shaping new military capabilities for the period ahead.  New unmanned aircraft, new missiles, a whole new approach to building civil and military aerospace capabilities, augmenting its Navy, expanding its commercial and global reach, building presence through counter-piracy, etc.

Although some may have been surprised; some were not.

One difficulty with U.S reactions has been to see this largely as a challenge to the United States.  It is not.  The Asian powers understand that this is part of the declared Chinese strategy to expand their presence and power throughout the Pacific and to shape an active export policy globally.  The U.S. could stand in the way if it shapes effective capabilities in the decade ahead to play the crucial lynchpin role for allied forces in Asia to curtail Chinese ambitions.  The Chinese clearly seek to shape the Pacific agenda, up to an including the Arctic.

Another difficulty is that the platform-centric approach dominates in viewing the development.  If this is about an F-22 like aircraft, it is about F-22 like aircraft.  It should be about the Chinese building significant capability across the board while the U.S. is engaged in Afghanistan :  it is about continuing to build last generation aircraft and missiles, while delaying investments in today’s and tomorrow’s challenges which simply are not aligned with the Afghanitis strategy.

It is about continuing to build last generation aircraft and missiles, while delaying investments in today’s and tomorrow’s challenges which simply are not aligned with the Afghanitis strategy. (…) The Afghan engagement is eating up our military resources, which are no longer available to fund air and naval power transition.

Also, Chinese developments are not looked at by themselves, but are used by too many as a foil for their agendas. The anti-F22 community sees this new aircraft as simply a test aircraft, far from being an effective deployed asset.  The transparency community sees this as a deviation from the true path the Chinese should follow, namely to be good bankers without military geopolitical aspirations. What this should be seen as is a manifestation of the tip of the spear of a comprehensive effort to shape a new capability in the Pacific to enhance Chinese influence and power, and to shape perceptions in Asia of a very different century, than the last half of the XXth century.

What this should do is to challenge the strategic complacency of those in the United States who assume continued air and naval dominance in the Pacific.  As General Deptula put it:

Simply put, there is a group-think that has captured the security elite that since we’ve been dominant in conventional warfare over the past quarter-century, we’ll remain so in the future.  It’s a convenient presumption given the current economic environment, but a very dangerous one. It may play to conventional wisdom to state that the biggest threat to defense is the deficit, and while partially accurate, the immutable nature of conflict—and deterrence—is more basic—strength wins over weakness.  As one looks to the future—given the current investment path the United States is on—the United States and our allies are becoming weaker. The difficult position to take — given the current economic conditions and nation-building engagements we have elected to pursue — is to articulate the kind of investments we need to make in defense to secure a position of strength in the next quarter-century.

The Afghan engagement is eating up our military resources, which are no longer available to fund air and naval power transition.  And even more significant is the instinct to invest in the past rather than future.  The notion of funding 4th generation aircraft with the new generation already here in the F-22 and close at hand in the F-35 is truly amazing.  Funding a next generation jammer when the F-35 carries in its combat systems significantly greater capability is equally amazing.

The Chinese are clearly posing a threat to our way of doing air operations.  We need to shift to a new concept of air operations leveraging the new aircraft and capabilities, and to build forward from this point.

As we argued earlier:

The shift from “legacy” air operations to distributed air operations is a significant operational and cultural shift.  Characterizing the shift from 4th to 5th generation aircraft really does not capture the nature of the shift. The legacy aircraft operate in a strike formation, which is linear and runs from Wild Weasels back to the AWACS.  The F-22 and F-35 are part of distributed operational systems in which the decision makers are distributed and honeycomb structure is created around which ISR, C2, strike and decision-making can be distributed.
A new style of collaborative operations is shaped but takes away the ability of an adversary to simply eliminate assets like the AWACs and blind the fleet. Distributed operations is the cultural shift associated with the 5th generation aircraft, and investments in new weapons, remotely piloted aircraft and the crafting of simultaneous rather than sequential operations. Unfortunately, the debate about 5th generation aircraft continues as if these are simply aircraft, not nodes driving significant cultural changes in operational capabilities.

The other aspects of the J-20 worthy of note is its impact on Chinese aspirations and capabilities to export arms.  The capabilities which the Chinese are emphasizing – notably air and missile systems – are eminently exportable. By having a first class missile business a decade out, the Chinese can change regional power balances by export policy only incidentally supported by the power projection capability necessary to dominate in far away regions. The J-20 clearly helps in this effort.  It is the Le Mans event, which helps the manufacturer to sell his show room product.  There is a significant global market for combat aircraft over the next 30 years globally.  The Chinese have every intention of being the lead exporter in the second world; having the J-20 is a key driver for success in global export efforts.

The Chinese have every intention of being the lead exporter in the second world; having the J-20 is a key driver for success in global export efforts.

Another element of the global competition is the desire to respond to the Russian-Indian 5th generation aircraft.  The strategic competition with India is significant for China, and they have little desire to see the Indians position themselves ahead of China in air and naval systems.

The J-20 is built on the top of the global shift in manufacturing capability towards China, a significant investment by China in global commodities and the enhanced presence of China on the world stage are all significant developments. When married to a growing investment in the development and fielding of military capabilities, something globally significant is afoot –  of the sort which suggests changing epochs.

The Chinese can invest in technologies for global export, for enhanced “asymmetric” capabilities, and anti-access denial and it is enough to degrade declining numbers of U.S. forces. Indeed, unless the U.S. shapes innovative joint con-ops and invests in new technologies leveraging some of the core new capabilities, such as the fifth generation fighters, the ability to deter will go up for the Chinese simply by enhancing degradation of U.S. capabilities. Again, the lynchpin function for the United States is central to its Asian role.


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Relevant SLD articles on this topic

In Memory Of Our Friend Jack Wheeler

01/04/2011

By Robbin Laird


In Memory of John P. Wheeler III
John Wheeler will be remembered as a man of honor and commitment.
Among his numerous achievements, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial for which he fought stands out.
 Credit photo: www.cowetaschools.org

01/04/2011 – It is my sad duty to our readers to announce that one of the founding members of Second Line of Defense has been tragically removed from our family.

When I was preparing to return from Europe, I was sent late in the day an email from a close friend indicating that Jack had been murdered late last week.

To say the least, I was stunned.  My first thoughts were of his family and the heavy burden they must pay.

The second was for the legion of friends and colleagues of such a talented and powerful man.  In a world littered with needless tragedies and sufferings, why did we need yet another one?

Over the next few hours, hundreds of emails networked across my desktop, as Jack would expect, as a cyber person.

Indeed, one did not start a day without an email from Jack on one of his core passions and interests. 

It is only fitting that my nickname for Jack was the “bulldog.” 

Any of his friends will know that the name fits.

  Jack was, and the verb is sticking in my throat, a passionate man of high intelligence. 

When Jack focused on an issue, he was like a laser beam and bulldozer all in one. 

And his efforts were often rewarded with the creation of something the public could see, starting with the Vietnam Memorial.

He was dogged in pursuit of truth and justice for those core values, which he held dearly. 

Everything he did was for the warfighter and their families. 

Whether the defense of West Point, the exposure of universities whose moral duplicity with regard to the denigration of ROTC on their campuses, or the short-sided decision to terminate the F-22, Jack had his issues and he pursued them.

Jack was a rarity in this world: a man of passion, intelligence, caring and consideration for others. 

My 14-year-old daughter Chloe, recalled Jack as “the kind man who always gave us those great chocolates for Christmas.” And then she cried. 

This is something I am finding it difficult to do. 

Not because I do not love Jack, but I cannot bring myself to put him into the realm of remembering a great man. 

That is why I am writing this note. 

To confront the reality of a loss so great is simply beyond me at the moment.

I am including a personal picture of Jack in this column taken during a visit to Normandy. 

The 21st Secretary of the US Air Force and his team had finished a visit to Paris to make a speech and to conduct meetings. 

Jack flew over on the Secretary’s plane and was sick much of the trip. 

Typical of Jack, he was more concerned that he might make people sick, than with himself.

A friend of mine and a colleague who are specialists on the Normandy invasion conducted the visit to Normandy.

The enormity of the Normandy experience is a humbling one. 

I remember watching Jack with a tear in his eye as he looked at the military cemeteries and at Utah beach. 

In many ways, that moment is how I will always remember Jack, himself always remembering the contribution of Americans to the fight for freedom and justice. 

And he was a man who believed in freedom and justice in a world which too often is simply too cynical. 

Values matter; caring matters; and Jack always reminded us of that.

I raise my sword in honor of you Jack.

I just cannot believe that I won’t get an email from you commenting on my column.