SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

A Forgotten Page in History?

Posted on March 22, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/22/2011

By Jean-Marc Tanguy

Memorial to the La Fayette Squadron (Credit: www.souvenir-francais-92.org)

03/22/2011 – The La Fayette Memorial in Marne-la-Coquette (Hauts de Seine) has come upon difficult times. It’s there, in the lush greenery, that some of the 68 pilots of the legendary American squadron that was created during World War II rest. As of 1915, 16 American pilots flew under French roundels, even as officially, the United States had not entered the war.

Today, the foundation that maintains the memorial has no money. It had been created by the American William Nelson Cromwell in 1930, two years after the construction of the building which cost a million French francs at the time. Cromwell replenished the account in 1945 with $500,000 dollars. The DRAC—Regional Directorate of Cultural Affairs—and the American Congress had already together planned for the renovation of the premises, at the beginning of the decade. Congress had spent two million dollars.

The building dates to 1928: the crypt, where the aviators rest—and their two French officers, Brocard and Thénault—is subject to reoccurring water leaks, while the memorial requires regular renovations. Without funds, the maintenance of landscaping is no longer provided for as of January 1^st, and the moles have gone into attack mode. The employee who works there is from here on out only working part-time

A letter sent to the French Defense Minister four months ago received no response. Sent likewise to the French President, it received no response save a terse one: the letter had been forwarded… to the Defense Minister. Time has passed, and the situation has become critical.

The La Fayette squadron is, in fact, the birthplace of the current U.S. Air Force. Major Raoul Lufbery, the first American ace (17 official victories) was a pilot in the squadron, before perishing May 19^th, 1918. Eugène Jacques Bullard, the first Black pilot, also flew in the La Fayette Flying Corps, subsequently created to include all the pilotes.

The adventure of the pilots of the squadron was immortalized in the Hollywood movie Fly Boys, a film of Tony Hill, with James Franco and Martin Henderson, with Frenchmen Jean Reno and Augustin Legrand playing the roles of the French officers.

For the past two years, an old cukoo coming from la Ferté Alais passes above Marne-la-Coquette for Memorial Day at the end of May, with the four Mirage 2000N of the French squadron 2.4, “La Fayette,” and American fighter pilots, F-15s coming from Great Britain or F-16s coming from Germany.

In the summer, the French squadron La Fayette had to leave its camp in Luxeuil—where the squadron was based during World War I—for Istres. This squadron, equipped by Mirage 2000N, is currently involved in deterrence.

Shaping the F-35 Combat System Enterprise

Posted on March 22, 2011 | by SysAdmin

03/22/2011 – The F-35 is the first combat aircraft that sees completely around itself, thanks to its Distributed Aperture System, a new sensor concept in air combat. All told, the F-35’s internal sensor suite can see hundreds of miles on a 360-degree basis. And, unlike legacy aircraft, which add systems that need to be managed by the pilot, the F-35’s core combat systems work interactively.

In this interview, Pete “Toes” Bartos of Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems, a former F-15/F-18 pilot and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) requirements officer at the Air Combat Command, explains the nature of the F-35 combat systems and how they work together.

SLD: Could you give a sense of how the integration of a new generation of sensors really makes this a different aircraft? And describe the advantage of having a 360-degree capability.

Bartos: There are a couple components to the answer. It starts with the building blocks.

The Joint Strike Fighter was designed so that the different elements could be mutually supportive of each other. For example, the advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and Electronic Warfare (EW) suite didn’t have to do everything by themselves; the Electrical Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and Distributed Aperture System (DAS) didn’t have to independently answer every infrared (IR) requirement. These sensors were designed to work together as a combat system with system level capabilities.

SLD: You were looking for interactive supportability?

Bartos: Absolutely. Fusion is the way to leverage the other sensors’ strengths. The sensor building blocks were designed to be flexible multi-function avionics that could reinforce the others.

Take the AESA radar as an example. We commonly refer to it as an MFA, a multi-function array. It has, of course, many air-to-air modes, and many air-to-ground modes. But it also offers capabilities as a fully capable EW aperture. For EW, I mean electronic protection, electronic attack, and electronic support, the latter of which involves sensing or passive ops.

The bottom line is the AESA design incorporated as much connectivity, processing and as wide a bandwidth as technology allowed in order to maximize flexibility and spectrum coverage.

F-35 Combat System Enterprise (Credit: SLD)

The radar interacts directly with the EW gear, which is imbedded on the F-35’s wing lines and other surfaces. The EW system gives you 360-degree coverage, and covers the radio frequency (RF) spectrum on the battlefield. The F-35 CNI system—communication, navigation and identification—is another flexible, reprogrammable system that further expands 360-degree RF spectrum coverage.

The radar and the EW system are symbiotic and are linked via a high-speed data bus built upon high-speed fiber optical systems. And the systems communicate virtually pulse-to-pulse to assist each other within the RF spectrum. So the radar can draw on advanced jamming resources, and the EW techniques can be channeled through the radar.

The AESA itself has its own attack modes as well and a very sensitive, precise geo-location capability, which can work in conjunction with EW gear. The CNI system is also linked via the high-speed data bus.

On the infrared side, you have DAS and EOTS. DAS was made sensitive enough, precise enough, and long-range enough to include aircraft detection and track capabilities. For even longer-range IR functions and targeting, EOTS can be used in conjunction with DAS.

Whether it’s detected passively via the EW system, DAS or EOTS, or whether the target is in the field of view of the multi-function radar, the F-35 can find it.

SLD: So you were looking for synergy among the systems, because you were designing from the ground up?

Bartos: The sensor systems are built to work together. I’ll focus primarily on the multi-functionality of the DAS and the AESA radar since both of these sensors were designed and built at Northrop Grumman.

DAS’ high-resolution sensors are used to provide missile warning, imagery, and as I’ve mentioned, aircraft detection. Since DAS tracks missiles at long range, it can see where the missiles came from as well as cue countermeasures. By slewing EOTS or the AESA to the launch point, you can identify the target and return fire. With the DAS visual mode, imagery is ported to the pilot’s helmet and over to the displays, and in the future perhaps even off board to other users.

A threat detection originating from the EW system could be instantly verified and refined with the radar, a DAS track, via EOTS or all four systems, depending on the geometry. A wingman’s sensors can add to the answer via the CNI system. The JSF mission fusion software has wide-ranging algorithms and the ability to task the various sensors to create and maintain target tracks and IDs.

In other words, you’ve got multiple tiers of capability.

SLD: Although designed for high-threat environments, in actual fact, the F-35 functions as a Swiss army knife able to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict?

Bartos: Yes, that’s the point. We find that we have tremendous flexibility built into the AESA radar and the DAS to address evolving mission needs.

Here’s an illustration of sensor flexibility. Northrop Grumman conducted a DAS test flight in June against a commercial space launch vehicle, a two-stage rocket. The DAS tracked the missile’s second stage for more than 800 miles. At the same time DAS also tracked aircraft all around our test jet, and even saw the re-entry of the rocket’s first stage. While DAS was never intended for ballistic missile defense missions, this flight test demonstrated that the capability already exists within the sensor.

We’re running down all sorts of threads right now with experiments and discovering multiple uses well outside the original intent of the DAS system

With the APG-81 radar, we’re currently testing advanced combat ID modes and identifying additional maritime uses as well.

SLD: This is an ID issue?

Bartos: An ID issue and a structural issue.

At the core of the F-35’s avionics capabilities is a very high-speed state-of-the-art processor, and there is a roadmap to continue advancing it. Every couple of years, every block or every two blocks at least, there’s a new generation of processor planned that fits right into the existing hardware and software architecture

When you have flexible avionics designs, like the F-35’s AESA, DAS, EW or EOTS, the sky is the limit on the number of applications you’ll want to incorporate, and you’ll need increased processor speeds for even more advanced modes

SLD: Does this mean that we can expect a significant growth path for data generated by the F-35 to support ground, maritime and distributed air operations?

Bartos: That is correct. The F-35 already has significant inherent capability, but the flexible sensor/fusion architecture can capitalize on the vast amounts of data generated by the F-35 to affordably meet new mission requirements. For example, right now in the baseline F-35, DAS is only tasked to provide air tracks and missile tracks, but we’re sure that will evolve. The moving targets, artillery, and other things DAS is also seeing and tracking could be integrated and reported simply by refining the DAS and fusion algorithms, and ensuring the processor capacity matches the data load.

SLD: Let us return to a point you made earlier. Could you highlight what you meant by the mental structure of a classic fighter versus the new approach?

Bartos: With a standard aircraft acquisition model, you’re going to have some static elements within the architecture—you’re going to build your core processor and you may integrate the radar. But then, somebody will come along and say, “Hey, I’ve got a great idea, let’s add a targeting pod.” So a podded sensor is added, but it is not integrated with the radar or any other add-ons.

F35 Combat System Integration (Credit: SLD)

SLD: So, the difference would be the classic aircraft is an additive structure, whereas this is a flexible architecture that allows the F-35 to operate like a smart phone.

If I’ve got a traditional aircraft and I’m adding to it, there’s no interaction among the systems. The pilot would have to be looking at the displays and making the interaction happen. With the F-35, we’re describing a variety of tools that interact with one another so the pilot doesn’t have to spend a lot of time doing that.

Bartos: I think that’s a great summary. You’re not passing on raw data and making the pilot the integrator. You’re taking the sensor data from mutually supportive sensors, the architecture is integrating the data, and you’re presenting actionable information to the F-35 pilot.

During my combat missions over Iraq, the enemy was constantly shooting at me from the ground. I spent 90 percent of my time staring outside, scanning the ground and horizon for SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery, and 10 percent doing the F-15 air-to-air radar mission. That’s about all I could process.

The F-35 is going to do that scanning and processing for you, so you can determine how to most effectively employ or position the aircraft and create the battlefield effects you’re looking for.

In Iraq, it sure would have been better to have the aircraft just tell me if and when someone was shooting at me, from where, and with what type of weapon. Better still would be to have fed the threat coordinates directly to my weapons or offboard to my wingman to enable the immediate return of fire, like the F-35 will be able to do.

SLD: Could you explain the difference between the AESA system on the F-35 and a more conventional AESA?

Bartos: AESAs generally are distinguished by resolution, sensitivity, range and integration. The biggest hurdle to overcome is the ability of the radar to coexist and leverage the other RF systems, and the ability to do something with that RF data when it arrives. The APG-81 was built from the get-go for electronic warfare and for integration with other onboard EW systems.

The building blocks enable the APG-81 to outperform other radars, whether it be ID, electronic attack, electronic protection or stealthy operations. We’ve built in all these key features knowing that the F-35 is going to need to do much more than a traditional fighter. And these key features all have payback in the standard air-to-air and air-to-surface radar functions.

SLD: So we are talking about a combat system enterprise that allows you to start with the first F-35s and build out from the foundation?

Bartos: The core elements of the integrated enterprise are the AESA radar, the EW system, DAS, and the EOTS. But there are other key elements as well such as the CNI technology, the advanced processors, and the high-speed data bus using fiber optic transmission systems aboard the aircraft.

These enablers allow the synergistic capability to be crafted, enhanced, and communicated.

SLD: And this is a major shift from legacy aircraft?

Bartos: It’s akin to broadband versus dial-up modems. Yes, they both have Internet access, but non-integrated avionics are all doing dial-up because they’re stuck with a 1553 data bus and incompatible applications. In contrast, the F-35 has a brand new high-capacity data bus, along with integrated avionics.

Legacy aircraft can have additive tracks, but they’re not going to exploit multi-spectral data on a real-time basis the way the F-35 can.

SLD: As a former fighter pilot, you have much F-15 experience. How will pilots perform air-to-air operations differently with the F-35? It appears to be a big culture change.

Bartos: Well, it is. And without getting into all the tricks that the F-35 has up its sleeve, because you’re stealthy, you can get a lot closer to the adversary and your missile shots are now lethal, no-escape shots. With the F-15 today, you’re very wary of the range of the other guy’s missile, and you basically have to assume that he’s locked on to you, or at least knows where you are since you are in a big, non-stealthy airframe. And since you don’t have a missile warning system, you have to always assume that there is a missile headed your way when you get near an adversary.

You wind up playing this game of chicken, where you get close enough to throw a rock, and then you run away to avoid any rock coming back at you. And then you try to sneak back and throw another rock from a closer range. And then you run again and try to avoid his next rock. You hope he runs out of rocks first, or that he’s not looking when you throw one of your rocks. But you never get in there and throw rocks without the fear of retribution.

Like the F-22, the F-35 can maneuver right in there and attack with a close-in kill shot without playing chicken. If the F-35 gets in a bad situation, the pilot can extract himself a heck of a lot easier than in an F-15. The F-35 can turn away and still attack because it has eyes in the back of its head coupled with high off boresight missiles.

DAS is always tracking every aircraft nearby, in every direction, simultaneously, and looking for inbound missiles at the same time. F-35 mission fusion software keeps targets and IDs sorted out, even in a dynamic turning dogfight or when a target is directly behind you.

While flying an F-15 in a dogfight, I have to constantly swivel my head to manually detect and track adversaries and wingmen with my eyes. Situational awareness breaks down quickly, and I’m suddenly wondering if that distant object I’m looking at is an F-15 or an adversary aircraft.

I’ve flown against MiG-29s, and it wasn’t until I was up close and saw the paint job that I could be positive it wasn’t an F-15. With your head and eyes shifting back and forth under high G loading in a turning fight, it is very easy to lose sight, get confused, and misidentify aircraft.

Data link update rates are too slow for ID purposes in a dogfight. ID correlations frequently are swapped from wingmen to bandits and vice versa as they streak past your jet and swap sides.

The F-35 isn’t going to lose those IDs; it isn’t going to lose that situational awareness because there is always at least one sensor with high update rates tracking the various aircraft. In fact, you may even do better by just looking at your situational awareness displays or helmet symbology rather than at the confusing swirl of airplanes to visually sort out good from bad.

And if a missile is shot at you in the F-35, you’ll see it coming whether it is smokeless or not. You can take the appropriate measures, or just let the aircraft automatically provide the countermeasures.

In 95 percent of the air-to-air kills in history, the victim had no idea he was being shot at. Unless you’re referring to the other guy’s loss rate, that won’t be the case with the F-35.

Death of a Soviet Aviation Legend

Posted on March 22, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

By Dr. Richard Weitz

03/22/2011 – The famed Russian aircraft designer Mikhail Simonov died earlier this month, at the age of 81, after a long illness. His Sukhoi fighter jets represented the best of the Soviet defense industry and continue to dominate Russia’s arms sales to foreign countries.

Mikhail Simonov (Credit: http://www.legacy.com/legacies/2011/obituary-photo-gallery.aspx?photo=mikhail-simonov&pid=149081887)

Born in 1929 in Russia, Simonov began working as an aviation engineer in the 1950s. He joined the design bureau of the state-owned OAO Sukhoi aircraft corporation as the first deputy chief designer in 1970. During the following nine years he led the development of the Su-24 bomber, the Su-25 ground attack plane and began work on the Su-27. After serving as deputy minister of aircraft industries in 1979-1983, Simonov was named the top Sukhoi designer and continued work on the Su-27 Flanker. This plane—along with its later variants, the Su-30 air superiority fighter, the aircraft carrier-based Su-33, and the Su-34 bomber—was clearly Simonov’s most successful product.

The Su-27 was an agile long-range air superiority plane that entered the Soviet Air Force in the 1980s. It was designed as a highly maneuverable, well-armed twin-engine fighter capable of contesting the skies with the F-15, the premier U.S. Air Force 4th-generation fighter of the time.

The Su-27 could fly more than twice the speed of sound and more than 3,000 kilometers in distance. Perhaps only the rival MiG warplanes and the Kalashnikov assault rifle offered an equally prominent symbol of Soviet military power. The Su-27 always was a hit an air shows because its sophisticated control system allowed a skilled pilot to conduct stunning maneuvers at very low speeds. One stunt—called “the Cobra”—would involve the plane’s raising its nose and literally standing on its tail for several seconds.

During the lean days following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the Russian government could not afford to buy more than a few warplanes each year, exports of Simonov’s Sukhoi planes helped generate the revenue needed to sustain the irreplaceable Sukhoi design bureau, its production facilities, and its education and mentoring system.

Sukhoi fighters still occupy a prominent role in the air fleets of China, India, and many other countries. Simonov received a Lenin Prize and two state prizes along with the Order of the Red Banner during the Soviet times. He was awarded with the Hero of Russia medal in 1999. He will be buried in Moscow’s prestigious Novodevichy cemetery.

SU-27 Flanker (Credit: http://www.noahshachtman.com/images/Su-27-Flanker.jpg)

Simonov’s last major contribution to his company and country was his valiant attempt to develop a Russian fighter that could compete with the U.S. F-22 Raptor. Although the definition of a “fifth-generation” fighter is imprecise, it is generally agreed to have stealth (low-observable) characteristics, making the aircraft almost invisible to conventional radar. These include extensive use of composite materials, reduced engine heat signatures, internal weapons carriage, and other advanced technologies that minimize the aircraft’s optical, infrared, and radio-frequency visibility.

In addition, fifth-generation warplanes possess advanced integrated weapons, avionics, and navigation control systems that use state-of-the-art technology, such as artificial intelligence, to achieve enhanced maneuverability and network centric warfare capabilities. Furthermore, they can fly at sustained supersonic speeds (“supercruise”) of over 2,000 km/h. Most other planes can only attain such speeds for a limited time by using afterburners.

Russian aircraft makers have been seeking to manufacture such a fifth-generation warplane since the 1980s. The Sukhoi design bureau has been working on this project since April of 2002, when it won the tender as the prime contractor. In developing and manufacturing this plane, Sukhoi has functioned as a systems integrator for more than a hundred suppliers and strategic partners, a difficult challenge now that the centralize Soviet planned economy is gone, even in the defense sector.

Quality control at the level of sub-contractors has been a recurring problem challenging the reliability of Russian weapons systems. For example, poor components from sub-contractors likely explain the varied test performance of Russia’s new Bulava Submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Bulava has failed for different reasons in past tests, making it difficult for engineers to identify a single solution to its troubled performance.

With the Russian defense industry in disarray, Sukhoi could only field its fifth-generation plane some two decades after the U.S. Air Force began to acquire 5th-generation stealth planes. In January 2010, a pilot conducted a test flight of the T-50, the first Russian warplane entirely designed and built in Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The new warplane, of which the T-50 is a prototype, is formally known as the Advanced Front-Line Aviation Complex (PAK FA), [(Russian: Перспективный Авиационный Комплекс Фронтовой Авиации, Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally “Prospective (Promising) Aircraft Complex (System) of Front line Aviation”] Sukhoi manufactured it at a plant located at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East, where the long-awaited January 2010 47-minute test run occurred.

It was only last week, on March 3, that the second T-50 model began flying its tests. A third T-50 prototype consists of an airframe being used for load testing on the ground. The first and second prototypes lack radar and weapon control systems, but the next two test aircraft, schedule to enter the program this year, will be fully functional.

According to Sukhoi, the T-50 has a new advanced avionics suite, a sophisticated phased-array radar, more automatic controls, and a very low radar cross-section. The new all-weather plane will be equipped with new high-precision air-to-air, air-to-surface and air-to-ship missiles and two 30 mm cannons in order to allow it to function in multiple roles, including dog fighting other planes and striking multiple ground and maritime targets simultaneously.

Russian defense analyst Konstantin Makienko asserts that the T-50, which borrows much equipment and techniques developed for Su-35S, would have less sophisticated features than the F-22. The Russian Ministry of Defense is still deciding whether to contract the development of a fifth generation engine. The T-50 prototypes are presently equipped with modified fourth-generation A-31FN engines built by the Saturn Corporation. These are more visible in the infrared range than desirable in fifth-generation plane. The Defense Ministry must decide whether to develop the fifth generation engine now, which will take 5-7 years, or defer its development for a completely different aircraft in the future. According to Makienko, modernized fourth-generation engines, build by “Saturn” and “Salut,” should be sufficient for the T-50 for several years until the plane grows in weight and sophistication.

T-50 in Flight (Credit: http://data.primeportal.net/hangar/mu_yeol_lee/rokaf_t-50_golden_eagle/images/rokaf_t-50_golden_eagle_03_of_14.jpg)

When the first T-50 enters service around 2015, it will be the Russian Air Force’s first all-new warplane since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Some analysts anticipate that the T-50 might not enter into service until several years later. But even the 2015 date would be several decades after the U.S. Air Force began operating similar fighters.

The T-50 is designed to compete with other fifth-generation fighter planes. In this class, only the U.S. Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter is presently in operation. It conducted its first test flight in September 1997 and formally entered into service with the U.S Air Force in December 2005.The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II multi-role fighter conducted its first test flight in December 2006. It is currently being developed with several international partners sharing their advanced aviation expertise. It will soon enter service with the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and other possible clients.

The US Air Force expects to have 325 of its new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by the end of 2016. By 2020, it will have about 850 5th-generation aircraft by 2020 when one includes the F-22s. Even China, whose best planes until recently consisted of Soviet-era Sukhoi’s purchased from Russia a decade ago, has developed its own J-20 stealth fighter. It is possible that China will soon have more 5th-generation planes than Russia.

The new T-50 planes will serve alongside the other new frontline warplane Sukhoi has recently provided the Russian Air Force, the Su-35s multi-role fighter. The Su-35 is considered a “four++” generation plane, with only some fifth-generation capabilities. The Russian government hopes to have 48 heavy Su-35S by 2015. The Russian Air Force plans to backload some of the new technologies developed for theT-50, especially the AESA Radar, as mid-life upgrades onto its existing Su-35BMs, Su-30MKIs, and Su-30MK2s. The military expects to receive 60 serially produced T-50 fighters between 2015 and 2020, but some independent observers expect that it will take several more years for the T-50 to enter into serial production. In any case, the integration of this new fighter into the Air Force will stretch out over a long period. Su-35 will remain the most advanced Russian aircraft for most pilots for the foreseeable future.

Until a few years ago, the Russian military aviation sector, like many other Russian defense firms, simply struggled to keep Soviet-era weapons platforms operational through upgrades of their computers or ordinance. The Russian military-industrial complex rarely produced any new complicated weapons systems. When it did, it would most often manufacture a few “prototypes,” but then resource constraints would prevent their “mass production.” Trying to “modernize” old airplanes, tanks and missiles that were designed in the 1970s and 1980s proved more costly and ineffective than anticipated.

In addition, Russian defense firms used to sell their most advanced weapons systems to wealthy foreign customers—who would pay in hard currency—before, and sometimes rather than, they would make them available to the cash-strapped Russian armed forces. During the 1990s, China, India, and other countries were able to buy more sophisticated aircraft than the Russian Air Force from Russian defense firms. Sales to foreign air forces still account for about a half of Russia’s annual arms sales, which amounted to $8.35 billion in 2008. Exports of Sukhoi systems account for about half of these, or one-quarter of the annual total.

Russian defense industry representatives have cited the development as demonstrating that the country’s military industrial complex had recovered from the period of post-Soviet collapse.

“This is a unique achievement for post-Soviet Russia, and we’re leaving Europe, China, and Japan far behind” in the race to build a fifth-generation fighter, says Alexander Khramchikin, an expert with the independent Institute of Political and Military Analysis. “This puts Russia at the top level in military development, and even higher.”

It will take a few more years before analysts can confirm that the Russian defense industry has fully recovered from the Soviet Union’s collapse.

In the interim, and as a bonus to SLD readers, I am relating a helpful list of Russia’s current air force bases that the scholars at the Center for Strategies and Technologies in Moscow have provided in their book, Новая Армия России (New Russian Army), published last year and available for free download on the internet (in Russian) at http://www.cast.ru/news/?id=403:

Operational Strategic Command for Air-Space Defense (Moscow)
4th air-space defense brigade (Dolgoprudnyi, Moscow Oblast)
5th air-space defense brigade (Petrovskoe, Moscow Oblast)
6th air-space defense brigade (Rzhev, Tver Oblast)
6963rd aviation base (Kursk) (Mig-29SMT)
6968th fighter aviation base (Khotilivo, Tver Oblast) (Su-27, Mig-31)
First Air Force and Air Defense Command (Voronezh) (Western OSK)
1st air-space defense brigade (Severomorsk)
2nd air-space defense brigade (St. Petersburg)
6961st aviation base (Petrozavodsk) (Su-27)
6964th aviation base (Monchegorsk, Murmansk Oblast) (Su-24M, Su-24MP)
6965th aviation base (Viaz’ma, Smolensk Oblast) (Mi-8, Mi-24)
7000th aviation base (Voronezh) (Su-24M, Su-24MP, Su-34)
Second Air Force and Air Defense Command (Ekaterinburg) (Central OSK)
8th air-space defense brigade (Ekaterinburg)
9th air-space defense brigade (Novosibirsk)
10th air-space defense brigade (Chita)
6977th aviation base (Perm) (Mig-31)
6979th aviation base (Kansk, Krasnoyarskii Krai) (Mig-31)
6980th aviation base (Cheliabinsk) (Su-24M)
6982nd aviation base (Domna, Zabaikalskii Krai) (Mig-29)
Third Air Force and Air Defense Command (Khabarovsk) (Eastern OSK)
11th air-space defense brigade (Komsomolsk-na-Amure)
12th air-space defense brigade (Vladivostok)
6983rd aviation base (Vozdvizhenka, Primorskii Krai) (Su-25, Mi-8, Mi-24)
6987th aviation base (Komsomolsk-na-Amure) (Su-27SM)
6988th aviation base (Khurba, Khabarovsk Krai) (Su-24M, Su-24M2, Su-24MR)

Lafayette Escadrille Memorial

Posted on March 22, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Lafayette Escadrille Memorial – The Monument to America’s First Combat Aviators

By Robert C. Dooley, Col (ret), USAF

03/22/2011 – The monument to the first Americans to fly, fight, win, and for some, to die in combat resides at the edge of Paris, France. Forty-nine of America’s first combat aviators lie in rest at the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, a majestic monument erected over eighty years ago to honor all US volunteer pilots that flew with the French in World War I. These pilots played a significant role in the genesis of US combat airpower, which ultimately led to the establishment of the US Air Force.The future of the Memorial is in serious doubt. The intent of this article is to emphasize what these men and the Memorial represent to the US Air Force’s heritage and to draw attention to the Memorial’s needs.

Col. Dooley with Secretary Wynne, Normandy 2007 (Photo Credit: SLD)

The United States’ first combat aviators were the American volunteers who flew with the French Air Service in World War I prior to the US’s entry into the “Great War.” Most of these pilots transferred to the US Army after the US entered the war and provided the backbone of combat experience for the fledgling Air Service. These gentlemen came from all walks of life – Ivy League bluebloods, mechanics, farm hands and even an expatriate boxer. Despite their social differences, they were all equal if they could hack it in the cockpit, and the impact they made on aviation would resonate well beyond the end of the war.

There were 265 Americans volunteers who started flight training with the French before the US entered the war. 225 would get their wings and about 180 would fly in combat with French front-line units. These pilots, as a whole, would eventually be referred to as the “Lafayette Flying Corps.” As part of a strategy to get the US to commit to the war, an idea was hatched to form an all-American fighter unit, give it copious media attention, and heighten awareness of the conflict back in the States.In April 1916, after a concentrated effort by influential Americans in France and with the assistance of French military and government officials, the “N-124 L’Escadrille Americaine” (“The American Squadron”) was stood up. More than a token gesture on the part of the French, the squadron went to the head of the line to receive factory-fresh Nieuport fighters, personnel, and support equipment.

The initial squadron cadre was made up of seven American pilots under the command of a French officer, Capt Georges Thenault. The unit did initial training at Luxeuil airfield, then quickly transitioned to combat operations. First blood was drawn on 20 May 1916, when Kiffin Rockwell shot down a German observation plane. Other kills would follow and the squadron would gain its desired notoriety in the press while participating in almost all major battles of the war. In fact, the unit drew so much attention that the German Ambassador to the United States lodged a formal protest to the US government about the “American Squadron’s” operations, given that the US was supposed to be neutral at the time. The incident led to changing the squadron’s name to the “Escadrille Lafayette” or “Lafayette Squadron,” an apropos reference to General Lafayette’s and France’s assistance to the US during the Revolutionary War.

The squadron performed on par with its French counterparts and developed its own identity, given its mix of blue bloods and working-class members. The first squadron mascot was a lion cub named “Whiskey,” purchased by squadron members while on leave in Paris. They later got another one to keep it company, which they appropriately named “Soda.” The animals were noted on deployment paperwork as “African guard dogs.” The squadron also kept a bottle of 80 year-old bourbon whiskey on-hand called “The Bottle of Death.” Originally given to Kiffen Rockwell by his brother to celebrate his (and the squadron’s) first aerial victory, the only pilots to swig from it were those that scored confirmed kills.

The US ultimately entered WW I in April 1917. The squadron remained an all-American unit until February 1918, when most pilots in the squadron and the Lafayette Flying Corps were given the opportunity to transfer to the US Army Air Service. Most transferees were initially assigned to the 103rd Pursuit Squadron then farmed out to other US squadrons to spread their wealth of combat experience to uninitiated US pilots. Some former Lafayette members even went on to command US squadrons during the war. While most Lafayette Escadrille members remain obscure to history, Raoul Lufbery is a familiar name to most US fighter pilots, earning seventeen confirmed kills during the war and while also developing a defensive tactic called the “Lufbery Circle.” He became a well known instructor to US pilots after his transfer to the US Army and was praised by Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, who said, “Everything I learned, I learned from Lufbery” (AF Magazine, 2000, “Rickenbacker” Boyne).

America’s first black fighter pilot, Eugene Bullard, while not a member of the Lafayette Escadrille, was a member of the Lafayette Flying Corps. He left the farms of Georgia as a teenager, made his way to Europe and enlisted in the French Army at the outbreak of the war. While recuperating from wounds suffered in the trenches, he was given the opportunity to enter flight training and flew combat missions with a French Squadron.Thirty-eight Americans passed through the squadron ranks during its existence as an all-American unit. Ultimately, twelve would die before the war’s end. Of the other American pilots flying with French units, another forty-six would not survive the war. Many died wearing American uniforms, having made the transfer to the US Army Air Service. Lufbery himself was a US Army Major when finally shot down in 1918. Sixty-eight out of the one hundred-eighty didn’t make it – proof that the “glamorous” profession was, in reality, a most dangerous one.

The legacy of the Lafayette pilots continues today within the US and French Air Forces. The historical lineage of the 103rd Pursuit Squadron is directly tied to today’s 94th Fighter Squadron flying F-22s at Langley Air Force Base. The Lafayette Squadron itself never ceased to exist with the French – its current pilots now fly Mirage 2000Ns based at Luxeuil Air Base, France. A movement started in the mid-1920’s to build a fitting monument to America’s first combat aviators and symbolize the Franco-American military relationship. The French government granted eight acres of land on the edge of Paris towards the effort, and with funding provided largely by the wealthy families of many Lafayette pilots, the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial became a reality. It was inaugurated on 4 July 1928 in a ceremony attended by an estimated 10,000 people.

The name belies the true intent of the memorial – it pays tribute to all American volunteer pilots that flew with the French. The names of the sixty-eight pilots who died are etched on both sides of the grand facades of the memorial’s soaring arch.Beneath the memorial lies a crypt with sixty-eight sarcophagi, forty-nine of which contain actual remains (some pilots’ families chose to bury their loved ones closer to home – and for others, no remains existed). The crypt is also the resting place for its French commander, Lt Col Georges Thenault, along with French General Antonin Brocard, who was influential in establishing the squadron.

A $1.5 million endowment was provided in 1930 by an American, William Cromwell, to create a private Franco-American “Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation” to care for the monument. The Foundation’s other missions were to provide for suitable ceremonies, to “keep alive in the hearts of men the spirit which inspired the members of the Escadrille Lafayette and the Flying Corps,” and to educate French and American youth on the histories of their respective countries and the sacrifices men made in the defense of freedom. The Foundation continues to exist today, but faces serious financial challenges. Eighty years took its toll both on the monument and the resources left to sustain it. In the late 1990’s, its white surfaces were covered in black soot, marble floors were breaking up and the crypt was regularly invaded with water. Senior Air Force leadership took note and spearheaded an effort that lead to a US government grant in 2003 of $2 million to renovate the memorial. The French government concurrently donated $1 million of its own.

The grants were a lifesaver for the Memorial – but the challenge is far from over. This eighty year-old monument looks outstanding from an external point of view, but renovation work revealed further problems needing repair that exceeded the grants’ funding. Another challenge is sustainment. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial requires systematic maintenance to prevent returning to its previous deteriorated state. Surfaces require periodic cleaning and sealing, structural integrity demands regular inspections by engineers, and someone has to cut the grass, provide security, and pay the water and electric bills. An effort was started about six years ago to find a long-term care solution for the Memorial, buttressed by the steadfast support of General Moseley and Secretary Wynne. Ambassador Craig Stapleton, the US Ambassador to France at the time, bolstered the effort by highlighting the needs of the Memorial to the Bush Administration.

The stars were lined up for Presidential action to bring the monument under US care…until the unplanned change in USAF leadership. The lack of senior AF advocacy coupled with the change of the White House administration brought the effort to a quiet halt. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation needs a minimum of $100,000 a year to maintain the monument and its surrounding grounds. Unfortunately, the Foundation has less than a year’s worth of operating funds left and lacks the resources to conduct active fundraising (total donations last year were less than $3000). The fate of the Memorial and the aviators buried there is unknown once the Foundation is forced to cease operations. The Marines have Belleau Wood, the Navy has the “USS Constitution,” and the Army has battlefield monuments throughout the world that testify to their heritage and growth as services. The USAF also has a stunning memorial across from the Pentagon honoring it as a military service, but we’ve got another one honoring the actual men who represent our genesis – the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial.

If one has the means to assist the Foundation in maintaining this memorial to America’s first combat aviators or would like to arrange an escorted visit, please contact the Foundations Treasurer, Mr Alexander Blumrosen at [email protected] , +33 -1-4318-8080.

Getting Ever Closer

Posted on March 10, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/10/2011

Natanz Uranium Enrichment Site (Credit: http://publicintelligence.net/iran-nuclear-site-natanz-uranium-enrichment-site/)

Iran’s Nuclear Program Keeps on Coming

By Dr. Richard Weitz

Photo Credit: Natanz Uranium Enrichment Site, http://publicintelligence.net

03/10/2011 – According to the latest information of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other studies, Iran’s nuclear program continues to make progress despite international sanctions, cyber attacks, and other impediments. Iran will soon be in the position to develop nuclear weapons should its leaders decide to pursue them.

A country normally needs to complete three steps to have nuclear weapons. The most difficult obstacle is producing sufficient weapons-grade fissile material — normally highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium — to fuel the explosion. Then the nuclear weapons aspirant must be able to design and physically assemble nuclear explosive devices from this material. Finally, the country must acquire a means to deliver the weapon to a target—normally by designing and building a small nuclear warhead that can be carried by a ballistic missile.

Iranian leaders deny that they seek nuclear weapons, claiming it is prohibited by their religion as well as Iran’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They justify their expanding domestic nuclear program by professing a need to develop a civilian nuclear energy capacity that would allow them to earn export revenue from oil and gas that Iranians would otherwise consume themselves.

Iranian leaders also describe having nuclear technology for non-military purposes as their legal right and as a natural development for a proud country like theirs with a sophisticated scientific and technological base. They pledge to make any civilian nuclear program safe, secure, and under international safeguards.

Nonetheless, the IAEA became sufficiently alarmed by Iran’s nuclear activities, and non-cooperative responses to agency requests for additional data regarding them, that the agency requested a few years ago that the UN Security Council intervene on its behalf. The Council has passed numerous resolutions some with sanctions, obliging the Iranian government cease its sensitive nuclear activities — such as enriching uranium — that could be used to make nuclear weapons until the IAEA has become convinced that Iran’s nuclear activities have no military purpose.

According to the latest IAEA quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, dated February 25, the country continues to enrich increasing quantities of low-enriched uranium (LEU) at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and to construct a IR-40 heavy water nuclear research reactor at Arak despite several UN Security Council resolutions instructing Tehran to halt such activities. Iran has already manufactured sufficient LEU, about 4,000 kilograms, to make a nuclear weapon or two if the LEU were enriched further to weapons-grade HEU.

According to the latest IAEA quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, dated February 25, the country continues to enrich increasing quantities of low-enriched uranium (LEU) at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and to construct a IR-40 heavy water nuclear research reactor at Arak despite several UN Security Council resolutions instructing Tehran to halt such activities. Iran has already manufactured sufficient LEU, about 4,000 kilograms, to make a nuclear weapon or two if the LEU were enriched further to weapons-grade HEU.

Despite various technical setbacks and the recent Stuxnet virus, IAEA inspectors found that Iran is increasing the number of centrifuges operating at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Since Iran started enrichment operations in February 2007, the country’s first-generation IR-1 centrifuges, based on Pakistan’s P-1 centrifuges acquired through A.Q. Khan’s illicit procurement network, the volume of low-enriched uranium (uranium whose proportion of the fissile isotope Uranium-235 has been artificially raised to 3.5%) produced at the FEP has steadily increased. While the number of IR-1 centrifuges in operation in 2010 decreased as compared with 2009, the IAEA reports that Iran’s total enrichment capacity increased. Indeed, the increase in enrichment capacity from 2009 to 2010 is greater than from 2008 to 2009.

Iran is also developing and testing several new and presumably more efficient centrifuge models at its testing facility, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The February 2011 IAEA report indicates that Iranians intend to begin deploying two of these next-generation centrifuges, the IR-4 and IR-2m, soon at FEP. Since they operate more efficiently and require less physical space, these centrifuges can more easily be used at clandestine sites. They might also more easily be able to produce HEU than the problematic IR-1.

The PFEP is also producing uranium fuel enriched to 20% Uranium 235 for use as fuel in Tehran research reactor (TRR), which has almost exhausted its original fuel supply. Iran and foreign partners tried to negotiate a uranium swap agreement whereby Iran would surrender large quantities of its 3.5% LEU in exchange for foreign fuel rods containing the 20% LEU. After these negotiations failed, Iran decided to try to produce the 20% LEU fuel rods itself. The agency carried out an on-site inspection of the TRR on February 6 and found no improper activities at the site. Still, being able to manufacture 20% U-235 makes it easier for Iran to make weapons-grade uranium, which is normally enriched to 90%.

Despite Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to cooperate with the IAEA about provide the agency with the information required for the IAEA to confirm the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, Iran has ignored many agency requests to provide important information.

For example, Iran refuses to provide the agency with further information regarding its possible possession of laser enrichment technology or third-generation centrifuges. Tehran has also declined IAEA requests for access to other nuclear sites, such as where Iranians research and develop their enrichment technologies and manufacture their centrifuges.

Furthermore, Iran refuses to give the agency information about the history of the Fordow Enrichment Site near Qom, which Iran kept secret from the IAEA until September 2009, when Western governments were about to announce its detection. Finally, Iran has not provided the agency with the requested details about Iranian announcements that it plans to construct ten additional uranium enrichment facilities. “As a result” of all these denials, the IAEA report notes that, “the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s enrichment activities to diminish.”

Iran also refuses to provide the IAEA with design information about many of its heavy water projects, including the 40-megawatt heavy water moderated research reactor under construction in western Iran at Arak. Iranians insist they will use this IR-40 Reactor, which is under IAEA safeguard, only to produce isotopes for medical care and agriculture, but the reactor is similar in size and type to the reactors used by India, Israel, and Pakistan to make plutonium for fissile material in nuclear weapons. Along with highly enriched uranium, plutonium is a prime fissile material for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Still, Arak will take at least several more years to complete. Although Iran told the IAEA it plans for Arak to enter into service in late 2003, Iranians are encountering difficulties obtaining through its clandestine sanctions-busting nuclear procurement activities some of the technologies and materials, such as large metal components, it needs to complete the Arak facility. Iran also lacks a reprocessing capability that would allow Tehran to convert the separated plutonium into weapons-grade material.

The latest IAEA report indicates that Tehran is still not providing the agency with the information it needs to confirm that all Iran’s past and current nuclear activities were for exclusively peaceful purposes. For the last few years, the IAEA has sought to clarify the accuracy of information acquired through its own efforts as well as supplied by Western intelligence agencies that Iranians earlier conducted “alleged studies” regarding the military application of nuclear technologies. The subjects of these studies purportedly included how to make a nuclear warhead and a reentry vehicle capable of delivery on based on a Nagasaki implosion bomb that could be launched on a long-range ballistic missile.

Iranian officials either characterized some activities as military “studies” involving non-nuclear materials whose substance could not be revealed because they concerned Iran’s national security, or dismissed the documents altogether as forgeries. They have repeatedly denied IAEA requests for access to essential data, sites, and individuals that might clarify these activities.

In February 2010, the IAEA for the first time acknowledged that it had evidence of undisclosed Iranian activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. The media reports that the IAEA recently acquired new information about past or current undisclosed activities related to the military application of nuclear technologies. All IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano will say in public is that, “We don’t have a smoking gun; we have concerns.”

Iran’s controversial LEU-power nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, under construction for some 30 years, continues to suffer from further setbacks that repeatedly delay when it will start producing civilian nuclear power. The latest problem occurred in February and March 2011, when fears that metal from a defective cooling pump were contaminating the reactor’s Russian-supplied uranium fuel rods led its operators to remove some of the assemblies from the reactor’s core.

The more recent incident has heightened concerns about the safety of the plant, which has been built intermittently by several different foreign companies whose technologies and techniques do not always harmonize. Iran has also declined to sign the Nuclear Safety Convention and other international nuclear agreements.

The Bushehr reactor is not considered an immediate proliferation risk. Iran has placed the reactor on extensive IAEA safeguards, which allows agency inspectors to monitor the facility’s operations through remotely controlled measuring sensors and closed-circuit cameras. IAEA experts can also conduct on-site inspections at the plants. Its spent fuel cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium without further reprocessing. In return for completing the plant, Russian negotiators adamantly insisted that Iran had to use Russian-made fuel for the reactor, rather than make its own, and return the used fuel rods to Russia rather than retain then. Such “spent” fuel contains plutonium, which technicians can separate and use to manufacture nuclear weapons. At present, Iranians lacks the reprocessing technologies or training to separate the spent fuel into weapons-grade plutonium even if they tried.

Iranian scientists and technicians are undoubtedly learning knowledge and skills that assist them to conduct their own nuclear fuel program. The Iranian government justified its pursuit of an indigenous fuel-manufacturing capacity by citing its need to manufacture uranium fuel for Bushehr and the dozens of additional civilian nuclear plants Iran aims to build.

Iranian scientists and technicians are undoubtedly learning knowledge and skills that assist them to conduct their own nuclear fuel program. The Iranian government justified its pursuit of an indigenous fuel-manufacturing capacity by citing its need to manufacture uranium fuel for Bushehr and the dozens of additional civilian nuclear plants Iran aims to build.

In December 2010, the Iranian government declared that it plans to build at least ten additional uranium enrichment facilities at various locations. Iran does not presently have sufficient natural uranium or centrifuges for so many new plants, but it could build a few more in secret. Iran is the only state to contest the view that its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement requires early notification of design information for, among other things, its new enrichment facilities.

The IAEA expects to be informed whenever Iran decides to construct a new nuclear facility and to receive additional design information as the project develops. In contrast, the position of the Iranian government is that nuclear facilities need not be disclosed to the IAEA until construction is almost completed, which effectively presents the agency with a fait accompli. In practice, Iran has only reported new facilities to the agency after they have been discovered by other parties. That happened with the gas uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz in 2003 and at the Fordow Enrichment Site near Qom in September 2009.

Like previous reports, the latest one indicates that the IAEA has no evidence of significant diversions of nuclear materials or technologies from Iran’s 16 safeguarded nuclear facilities.

Nonetheless, the agency cannot exclude that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program using undeclared materials and facilities since the Iranian government is not allowing agency monitors access to non-safeguarded sites. If Iranians seek to build a nuclear weapon, they will do so not at Natanz, Bushehr, or at other declared facilities under IAEA supervision. Instead, they will design and build an atomic bomb at some clandestine facility such as the one exposed at Qom. That enrichment complex is remote and deeply buried, shielding it from foreign surveillance satellites and possible air strikes.

Estimates regarding how soon Iran could acquire nuclear weapons vary from one to five years. The divergent assessments reflect several objective and subjective factors. In terms of fissile material, Iran already has enough LEU that, if further enriched to weapons-grade HEU, could be used to make at least two nuclear explosive devices. The same centrifuges that produce low-enriched uranium for reactors can make highly-enriched uranium for a bomb. In addition, the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak would give Iran the technical capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium directly, though the anticipated date for the Arak reactor to begin operating keeps on receding. Therefore, the question of intent aside, Iran certainly is acquiring the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon.

Converting the LEU to HEU and fashioning it into a nuclear explosive device or two could perhaps take one to two years depending on which production method Iran might pursue. The potentially faster batch enrichment process would entail more risk than the four-stage method traditionally favored by the A Q Khan network. The two other barriers to Iran’s acquisition of a working nuclear arsenal—the development of a nuclear bomb and warhead sufficiently small and a ballistic missile sufficiently reliable to deliver a warhead from Iran to a distant target—likely would not present major technical impediments since Iran has already demonstrated an ability to launch a satellite into outer space.

Many analysts believe Iranian leaders would prefer that their country become a virtual nuclear power, i.e. having the capacity to rapidly deploy nuclear weapons when their leaders decide on such a course. Tehran might prudently want to detonate a device to confirm its validity, and having a single warhead is not really a deterrent; if anything, it is an invitation for pre-emption. Before making its nuclear capacity undeniably public through a nuclear weapons test, Iran would probably want to have a few additional nuclear weapons to guard against technical failure, including of the initial test, or a pre-emptive attack.

Tehran might prudently want to detonate a device to confirm its validity, and having a single warhead is not really a deterrent; if anything, it is an invitation for pre-emption.

An Update on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

Posted on March 10, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Photo Credit: SM3 Missile Launch, http://news.cnet.com

03/10/2011 – The Obama Administration has placed significant emphasis on continuing the upgrade path for the Aegis BMD program. By cancelling the Bush missile defense program in Europe, de facto, the Administration highlighted its commitment to Aegis as a key element for global missile defense. But the evolution of the program depends upon a continuing significant commitment of increasingly scarce resources to testing and using test results to shape the concurrent development and manufacturing program. And as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter comes on line, the integration of Aegis with F-35 will provide a powerful capability for the US and its allies. It must always be remembered how significant numbers of allied partners are in the Aegis deployed fleet, and that there are several joint Aegis and F-35 allies in prospect.

Photo Credit: F-35C in Flight, Credit, Lockheed Martin

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to conduct several ballistic missile defense flight tests during the remainder of fiscal year 2011.In April, the MDA will conduct its first “launch-on-remote” test of the Aegis BMD system against a “separating target,” i.e., a warhead separating from its booster missile. The Flight Test Maritime (FTM) 15 event will consist of an Aegis BMD-equipped ship firing a Standard Missile-3 Block IA missile in response to remote sensor data provided by a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar. During the third quarter of fiscal year 2011, MDA plans to conduct Aegis BMD FTM-16, the first intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB missile.Later in the summer, MDA plans to conduct a test of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in which two THAAD interceptors will attempt to engage two short-range ballistic missile targets. Similar to the successful two-shot salvo test by a single Aegis BMD ship against two ballistic missiles in 2007, this 2011 THAAD test will mark the first time the ground-based system is engaged in a multiple intercept scenario.

Finally, MDA also plans to hold a test involving the U.S. and Japanese navies where the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 software system conduct a “simulated intercept” of various medium-range ballistic missile targets.The FTM-15 event will be a test that features a “straight-stick” ABMD system installed on board the guided-missile destroyer USS O’Kane (DDG 77) and pits for the first time an in-service SM-3 Block 1A missile against a modified intermediate-range Trident I/C-4 ballistic missile target, called the “LV-2.” Although this is the first ABMD/SM-3 attempt to intercept this type target, the LV-2 has flown in previous BMD live-fire tests and has never been hit. If FTM-15 is successful, this will expand the Aegis envelope far beyond what was originally planned. This is part of the evolution of the Aegis Weapons System accomplishments going back to 1983, when Aegis first put to sea in the cruiser USS Ticonderoga (CG 47). Aegis BMD’s 84 percent success rate––21 successful intercepts out of 25 attempts since January 2001––includes several tests of multiple “shooters” against multiple targets of increasing complexity and difficulty. Truth be told, one of the misses, in December 2006, was actually a “no-fire” test resulting from a “logic error” on board the ship.

In comparison, THAAD went zero-for-six during the 1990s before two successes, then a five-year hiatus. After a redesign, the system has had an eight-for-eight record. And, the last two tests of the Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system, in January and December 2010, were failures. The GMD system has had eight successful intercepts in 15 attempts. This performance was behind the MDA decision in February to restructure the GMD test program, including cancelling this year’s buy of ballistic missile targets that replicate the long-range threat that GMD is designed to defeat. Importantly, the FTM-15 test uses technologies and systems that are at sea, in service. There will be no changes to the destroyer USS O’Kane’s BMD suite for this challenging event.

Photo Credit: www.navy.mil

Thus the success of this test will reveal a new realm of possibilities for Aegis BMD using technologies and systems available today––taking advantage of a half-century of design, engineering and operational excellence and some $50 billion investment in Aegis technologies, systems and ships. In this regard, important to note that ABMD has only recently reached approximately 25% of the MDA’s annual budget, after years of hovering around 10% of the total––an impressive return investment.FTM-15 is different than the Navy’s experience in February 2008, when the cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) carried out a spectacular demonstration of “exo-BMD envelope” missile-intercept capabilities. In Operation Burnt Frost, Lake Erie used a specially modified SM-3 Block 1A missile to intercept and destroy the failing satellite USA-193.

The USA-193 was a classified U.S. reconnaissance satellite launched in December 2006; in early 2008, refusing radio commands, it was falling toward earth with some 1,000 pounds of unused hydrazine propellant that could have been highly dangerous if the satellite had landed in a populated area. After an intense two months of materiel, electronic and training preparations (including one-time modifications to the SM-3 missiles), the Lake Erie launched a single SM-3 that intercepted the satellite at an altitude of some 150 miles and a closing speed greater than 22,000 miles per hour, resulting in no danger from debris. The ship was returned to the standard BMD configuration after the successful shoot.

What’s important about the FTM-15 launch/engage-on-remote concept is that it links the ship to remote sensor data to increase the coverage area and responsiveness. Once this capability is fully developed, the SM-3 missiles––no longer constrained by the range of the Aegis radar to detect an incoming missile––can be launched sooner and therefore fly farther in order to defeat the threat. Imagine this capability linked to an F-35, which can see more than 800 miles throughout a 360-degree approach. US allies are excited about the linkage prospects and the joint evolution of two highly upgradeable weapon systems. A further set of evolutionary upgrades is planned. Notably, the Administration is focusing upon an “Aegis Ashore” in 2015. “This new approach will provide capabilities sooner,” the President stated in September 2009, “build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.”

The first phase of the new approach focuses on existing sea-based Aegis missile defense ships and radars will be deployed in southern Europe to defend against short/medium-range ballistic missiles. Future decisions might also see Aegis Ashore in the Middle East and East Asia.Because of the inherent multi-mission qualities of the ABMD warships and their strategic and tactical mobility, they are highly survivable against a broad spectrum of threats, not just ballistic missiles.The focus of FTM-16 is on the SM-3 Block IB, the next-generation sea-based missile spiral upgrade. The seeker, signal processor, and propulsion system of the SM-3 Block IB missile kinetic warhead are improved versions of the Block IA missile and will result in increased missile effectiveness against longer-range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles.

These engineering upgrades have already undergone laboratory and ground tests, and flight-testing of the SM-3 Block IB missile is scheduled for this year. Fleet deployment could begin soon thereafter––roughly 18-24 months ahead of the test/deploy schedule defined by the Phased Adaptive Approach. Aegis BMD in 2010 began sea trials Aegis BMD 4.0.1, the next-generation system that will fire the SM-3 Block IB missile. The 4.0.1 signal processing capability greatly improves Aegis BMD performance and will enable Aegis BMD to remain well ahead of the threat. In short, Aegis BDM continues to “press the envelopes” of national and global BMD capabilities against a growing threat. It is already deployed and is being upgraded over time. It is a high-value system and a high-value capability.

A French Battalion And U.S. Legacy

Posted on March 5, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/05/2011

By Jean-Marc Tanguy

Photo Credit: 1st RCP, Jean-Marc Tanguy, Cahors, France, 2011

03/05/2011 – Legend already has it that it is to remind us that the First Parachute Chasseurs Regiment – Premier Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes – (1^st RCP), a French Army airborne unit and the very first French parachute regiment, was formed and equipped by the 82^nd Airborne during World War II, that the combined arms battalion formed by this regiment from Pamiers will sport an English name in Afghanistan.

The 1^st RCP, one of the older parachutist regiments of the French army, will deploy in April to Kapisa. The “Rapaces”, as one calls them in France, will be baptized with the name “Raptor” in Kapisa.

The 1^st RCP, one of the older parachutist regiments of the French army, will deploy in April to Kapisa. The “Rapaces”, as one calls them in France, will be baptized with the name “Raptor” in Kapisa.

Each French combined arms battalion adopts a name before deploying in Afghanistan, and often, in Kapisa, a province under American command, this name is English: often, but not systematically: after arriving in 2008, the 8^th RPIMa chose the name “Chimera”; the 27^th BCA, “Tiger”; the 3^rd RIMa, “Korrigan,” which is from Brittany; the 13^th BCA, “Black Rock”; the 21^st RIMa, “Hermes”; and the 7^th BCA, “Allobroges”. The name of the French brigade, La Fayette, under American command, was purposely chosen to honor French-American relations.

The name of the French brigade, La Fayette, under American command, was purposely chosen to honor French-American relations.

More than 650 parachutists will come from Pamiers, with reinforcements from the 17^th RHP (engineering), the 35^th RAP (artillery), and the 1^st RHP. These 850 or so soldiers from the 11^th parachutist brigade will be deployed on two forward operating bases (FOBs), Morales Frazier (Nijrab) and Kutchbach (Tagab). The first is home to a FARP (Forward Air Refueling Point) for US Army Aviation, and the second is home to about a dozen American personnel. The parachutists of the 1^st RCP will be the first French to deploy in Afghanistan with Javelin missile, acquired last summer and tested since December in Canjuers. Firing tests must be carried out by the 1^st RCP in Canjuers, following an operational readiness milestone set for March.

China’s Innovation Dilemma

Posted on March 3, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/03/2011

Basic Patent Trends (Credit: http://ip.thomsonreuters.com/media/pdfs/WIPTChina08.pdf)

China’s Innovation Policies Will Create Greater Imbalances

Originally published in Manufacturing and Technology News, February 18, 2011

03/03/2011 – China’s strategy of forcing western multinational companies to transfer their most innovative technologies, research and design to China in order to continue doing business there is succeeding, and it is succeeding to the detriment of the U.S. economy, according to a recent article in the Harvard Business Review.

China’s government has been “disenchanted” by the way foreign companies have set up production of high tech goods in China and are reaping most all of the revenues and profits. A series of recent Chinese policies aimed at creating high tech state-owned competitors has stirred alarm among some multinational corporations. But the companies are more interested in staying involved in the booming Chinese market and are acquiescing to China’s demands despite the risks.

China’s requirement that companies transfer their leading edge research to China along with production is leading to an even more imbalanced trade relationship. It also is increasing the potential for conflicts between two incompatible economic systems, according to Thomas Hout, a fellow at the Center for Emerging Market Enterprise at Tufts University, and Pankaj Ghemawat from the IESE Business School in Barcelona.

Credit: Basic Patent Trends, http://ip.thomsonreuters.com

“This is fueling tensions between Beijing and foreign governments and companies and it raises the critical issue of whether the Chinese brand of socialism can coexist with Western capitalism,” they write. “Above all, China’s strategy casts into doubt the optimistic premise that engagement and interdependence with the West would cause capitalism and socialism to converge quickly, reducing international tensions. . . This isn’t just a fight over the rules of globalization; it’s a larger issue about the inherent difficulties of connecting two big, very different economic systems.

Textbook theory suggests that imbalances trigger adjustments, but when economies are very different structurally and follow rigid policies, yoking them together will generate more imbalances — not equilibrium — and heighten tensions. CEOs eager to add another chapter to their lucrative China stories would do well to remember that the relationship between China and the West is historically unstable and to be prepared for unexpected twists and turns.”

Hout and Ghemawat note that China has already been successful at extracting technologies out of western companies, building their own internal capabilities and then excluding the companies from the Chinese market. Alstrom of France, which built the TGV high speed rail system there, Kawasaki of Japan, the builder of Japanese Bullet trains, and Siemens of Germany have all been supplanted by Chinese state owned equipment suppliers and onetime partners. The foreign firms now control little of the booming Chinese market for high speed rail equipment and systems. The same has occurred in the wind, solar and telecommunications hardware industries. China is broadening that strategy to aerospace, semiconductors and electronics. “Chinese officials have learned to tackle multinational companies, to the two authors. “Companies that resist are simply excluded from projects.”

China has already been successful at extracting technologies out of western companies, building their own internal capabilities and then excluding the companies from the Chinese market. Alstrom of France, which built the TGV high speed rail system there, Kawasaki of Japan, the builder of Japanese Bullet trains, and Siemens of Germany have all been supplanted by Chinese state owned equipment suppliers and onetime partners. The foreign firms now control little of the booming Chinese market for high speed rail equipment and systems. The same has occurred in the wind, solar and telecommunications hardware industries. China is broadening that strategy to aerospace, semiconductors and electronics.

China is able to get away with these tactics because the World Trade Organization does not crack down on them and because China has not signed international treaty provisions covering government procurement. “The WTO’s broad prohibition on technology transfers and local content requirements are more complex and easier to subvert than its rules pertaining to international trade in products,” say the two authors.

The United States needs to develop an effective response to the Chinese challenge, they add. The U.S. must overcome its “passive reliance on markets” because China will not back down.

“It might be useful for the U.S. to dispense with the premise that it can have an economically compatible relationship with China,” Hout and Ghemawat write in the article titled “Chinese vs the World: Whose Technology Is it?” “That would clarify China’s development strategy and its adverse affects on Western interests, thus heightening the lines the U.S. simply cannot allow China to cross.”