An Update on the A330 MRTT: 2010

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06/19/2010

SLD visited Airbus Military during the third week of May 2010 as part of the Trade Media Briefings 2010. Senior Military Airbus officials provided the media with programmatic overviews and opportunities to visit final assembly lines.  Recently we posted an overview of our visit to the CN-235 and C-295 Final Assembly lines, which highlighted production of two of the USCG Ocean Sentry aircraft.

***

Antonio Caramazana

In total, Airbus gave four major briefings on the A330 MRTT program. Antonio Caramazana, the head of Airbus Military Derivatives, gave the overview briefing.  Eduardo Cuadrado Garcia, chief test pilot, summarized the flight test program. Miguel Angel Morell, Senior VP for Engineering and Technology, highlighted  the challenges of adapting the civilian A330 to a tanker.  And finally, Richard Thompson, Senior Vice President for Customer Services, discussed the service model underlying the A330 MRTT.

Rather than trying to summarize all of the briefs and to provide a sense of the state of the program, excerpts from these briefings, as well as comments by the principals, are included in below.

Several points are worth highlighting regarding the state of the program.

  • First, the tanker program is a relatively mature program, with the A330 MRTT virtually finishing both civilian and military certifications.  The Australian tanker, which is very close to the configuration desired by the USAF, is nearing final delivery.
  • Second, the flexibility of the aircraft is a major reason why customers with smaller tanker fleets would gravitate to the A330 tanker.  Refueling is provided through storage in the wings, allowing the fuselage to be used for either cargo or passengers.  Indeed, no modifications were made on the original aircraft to meet the basic fuel load requirements.
  • Third, the ability of the tanker to be refueled while in the air gives the aircraft greater range, durability and allows for the tanker to be parked on station if equipped with crew rest areas. For example, the Australian tanker is configure with an in-air refueling capability.
  • Fourth, the boom for delivering fuel is a well-developed capability with a number of advanced capabilities, which allow operation of the aircraft to refuel a wide-range of aerial vehicles.

The following slide show provides some of the data provided by Antonio Caramazana. Highlights of the presentation provide insights into the basic configuration of the aircraft, a customer update, and some interesting comments on the engineering and industrial solutions for working with partners.

Basic Configuration of the Aircraft

In total, the A330-200 has in its internal fuel tanks up to 111 tons of fuel.  So this gives the A330-200 the basic platform adapted for the tanker capabilities, so we maintain at the same time the cargo and the passenger capabilities intact […] So the passenger capabilities are maintained so we can transport up to 300 troops.  Depends very much on the seat pitch selected.  For instance, in the case of the FSTA with 34 inches seat pitch, in the aircraft we can install 291 passengers.  So the passenger capability is totally maintained, and at the same time, we maintain the cargo capability up to 45 tons, without compromising either the fuel tank content or the passenger transport or the cargo transport.

On top of that, we have as well capabilities for medical evacuation by removing the seats on the main deck and installing the medevac stretchers.  And depending on the configuration and depending on the medical situation that you want to allow, you can install up to 150 stretchers.  In the case of the FSTA, maintaining part of the cabin for medical stretchers and part of the cabin for passengers – we’ve got up to 40 stretchers.

The boom program started in early 2000.  We did the development, as well. We did a ground test rig with a full boom capability located in a tower that you probably have already seen, or if not, you will see in the visits in the factory.  And after that we moved the boom into the A310 before installing it into the A330, so all these phases – the initial engineering development, the development of the ground test rig with the tower in the A310 – have served the purpose of getting to the installation in the A330 with a mature boom.  All that we are doing on the A330 is to fine-tune, improve, and enhance what has been done during these ten years of boom development.

As well, together with the boom, we‘ve got the Fuselage Refueling Unit.  It’s coming from Cobham as well, and this combination is also possible – to have boom and FRU.  There are some other combinations in which you can have a boom only or FRU only.  But as well there is the option, and the design has been done in such a way that you can combine and install both together – the boom and the FRU.

Another capability that we have included is the enhanced video system.  In general this is a video system for controlling the panoramic situational awareness of the receivers.  And, as well, enhances a three dimensional video system for the boom operation.

Another modification to the MRTT is the modification in the cockpit area.  What we have done is to enlarge the cockpit area to move out the bullhead of the cockpit in order to install in the rear part of the cockpit a mission console.  And we’ve got in there the two solutions – a dual mission console when we’ve got the aircraft configured with boom, for boom operator and mission console operator or a single position mission console in the case of the configurations that do not integrate the boom – that are pods and FRU only case, for instance of the UK FSTA.

Customer Update

In terms of the Australian MRTT, the total number of aircraft that were contracted were five.  This was the first contract that we got for the A330 MRTT.  The configuration is a configuration including boom under-wing pods, UARRSI for being a receiver defensive aid subsystems.  And it has GE engines.  The total number of passengers in this particular case – they selected a two class configuration – [is] 270 passengers.

The situation of the MRTTs is that we are at the final stages of the development process.  The certification is very close to completion, and we’ve got serial number one and serial number two in Spain under the final stages of the flight test campaign.  And the number three is in the latest stages of conversion in Australia.

The plan that we’ve got for Australia is to deliver this year serial number two and serial number three.  And already all the details to get up to the acceptance and to the release into service in Australia have been negotiated with the Australian DMO and the Australian air force, and that is the situation there.

Number four, we’ll test our conversion early June.  The plan is to fly the aircraft number four that is sitting here in Getafe – to fly to Australia on the first week of June, and therefore, as the time that the serial number three conversion is being completed, we will be preparing the aircraft for starting the conversion.

We signed a contract with UAE for three aircraft. The aircraft number one is under conversion.  We started the conversion early this year, and the conversion is progressing in accordance to plan.  This is a conversion that the conversion process is getting mature, so the conversion is going pretty smoothly.  The configuration of a the UA MRTT is boom, two under-wing pods, UARRSI and is with Rolls Royce engines.

For the FSTA, we’ve got a total order of 14 aircraft, 7 of them are two-point tankers with under-wing pods only and 7 of them are three-point tankers with FRU as well.  And it has a Rolls Royce engine.  As I have mentioned before 291 passengers in a single class, 34 inches seat pitch with medevac capability.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, we received an initial order of three aircraft, and we have received last year as well the second order for the additional three aircraft, so in total, we’ve got six aircraft on order, and the number one is in conversion in Spain.  The structural conversion is about to be finished by the end of May, and we will be starting the systems conversion in June.  So the conversion is as well pretty well underway.  The configuration is similar to the Australian configuration, with boom, two under-wing pots, UARRSI and GE engines

And as well, we are incorporating the Universal Aerial Refueling Receptacle Slipway Installation (UARRSI) onto the A330 as well as a receiver, and these will provide even longer-range mission capabilities.

Comments on Engineering and Industrial Solutions

The other important thing that we have not focused on, but I think it is time that we focus on as well, is the engineering and industrial solution.  And I’m going to focus on the industrial solution.  We have not only, you know, proven that the conversion is possible in Spain under our premises, very close to our individual resources, but as well we have proven that the conversion can be done externally.  We have done that in Qantas in Australia.  In Australia MRTT-2 was converted in Australia. Right now MRTT-3 is at the latest stages of the conversion.  So this means that these processes have been already proven for Qantas, and we are in the process as well of taking the lessons learned of the transfer of this industrial capability into Australia to do exactly the same for the FSTA.  As you know, we have already mentioned externally to you and externally to our customer base that we’ve got as well a commitment to convert 12 FSTA aircraft in Cobham Aviation Services.  Right now, with the lessons learned from the transfer of conversion from Spain into Australia, we are applying all the lessons learned for the UK MOD

Richard Thompson provided some additional comments with regard to the industrial or service approaches associated with the tanker program.  With regard to the Aussie tanker, Thompson added:

We’re ramping up to deliver the first of the MRTT’s, the KC-30A to Australia, our launch customer, and I’ve recently just come back from Brisbane and the RAAF base there in Amberley and the facilities are looking good.  They’re all ready to go – 33 squadrosn all geared up anxiously waiting for the first plane to arrive and they’re all fired up.  The DMO people who are at the base who represent the customer, the end user, 33 squadrons and Qantas Defense Services with whom a couple of weeks ago we signed the contract which is effectively a through-life support agreement for the next 22 years.  QDS will be the prime contractor delivering that through-life support in front of the customer.  They have their offices there in Amberley, as well, and they’re all ready to go and we will be supporting them locally in Australia through our subsidiary, Australian Aerospace, who will be doing some specific work packages on behalf of QDS and also remotely back from here in Madrid with all our technical support and other services that we will provide QDS.

We’ve hit a major, major milestone in the sense that we’ve actually started delivering some real hardware to the Australian Airforce – the first piece of hardware that we’ve actually delivered, the first of some 500 pieces of support – ground support and test equipment, and the first of some 4,000 spare items that we will be delivering to the Commonwealth over the next few months.  It’s a complex process but we’ve put it to the test, we’ve done the first deliveries and it all works.  And so, good news, and everybody’s keen, ready to go.

We will also be placing there a total of six field reps, of which two will be ours.  We will be placing those two field reps at Amberley over a three-year period to ensure a smooth entry into service.

———-

*** Posted on June 20th, 2010

An Update on F-35 Manufacturing: The Case of Wing Assembly

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06/18/2010

6/20/2010 SLD visited the Fort Worth assembly plant for the F-35 in late April.  During the visit, the focus was upon the transformation of the outer wing box assembly production approach. During the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, wings have been built in the more traditional military aircraft assembly approach of building around stations. 

The parts and components come to the station and the wing is assembled over a period of months at the station.

The plant is undergoing change as overhead rail track systems are being installed, after which the outer wings boxes will be assembled using a flow process, rather than a station process.  The wing will be assembled by going through two broad flows lines for each side of the wing, with stops along the way at 34 individual stations.  Each station does “an individual statement of work” on the wing after which the wing is moved to the next station for the next “statement of work.” Each station within the flow is organized around a work team, which standardizes the effort for that statement of work.

The shift from focus on the stations to flow will enhance production rates and efficiency of the manufactured aircraft, and this is supported by significant capital investment in advanced technologies such as the automated drilling machines seen in the production process today.

The overhead rails should be fully in place by October with the flow process unfolding early next year.The slide show below shows the progress underway.

  • The first slide shows a wing in the traditional station approach.
  • The next slides show the construction of the overhead rails.  After the slides showing the construction of the rails, a wing machine near the overhead rails is pictured.
  • And the final slides show a wing entering the overhead rail area.

The tour and interview were conducted by Don Kinard, Technical Deputy for JSF Global Production Operations and lead for Development of the F-35 Fighter Production System.  The Fighter Production System was established to facilitate transition from a current 1 aircraft per month production rate to a 20 aircraft per month production rate in 7 years. Prior to this assignment Don was Director of F-35 Production Engineering and held various positions in both Engineering and Manufacturing during his 18 years on the F-22 Program.

What follows are some excerpts from the discussion during the plant visit, which highlights some of the key elements of the shift from the static station to flow process.

SLD: How would you describe the basic difference between the wing assembly approach under SDD and under the production approach?

Don Kindard: I think the basic difference is flows.  We are trying to move the product in the wing areas wherever we can.  For instance, when we produce one aircraft a day, we want to move the wings from station to station each day.   We want to create rhythm in the factory so that everything flows, everything moves at a standard pace all through the factory.  That’s the number one thing.  So everywhere we can we’ll be moving it with overhead rail systems to get flow on the parts.

SLD: What’s the difference between station and flow?

Don Kindard: Station build is essentially that I move a wing to a station and it stays there for the entire span time of that build.  For example, if I had 20 days of span I’d move to a station and stay there 20 days.  When I use flow, I have 20 stations but each one of them is doing a standard set of work.  The product moves from one station to another in a standard time span.

The advantage of that is that I get the mechanics performing standard tasks in a standard time.  They learn much quicker, they do the same thing basically every day.  All the parts and tools they need are right there delivered to that point of use for that particular station, so everything is optimized all the way down the line. Ultimately, you will find that you don’t need 20 stations because the work is performed more efficiently and you save labor and facilities costs.

SLD: We are looking at an auto-drilling machine.  Tell me the advantage of being able to use this machine in the manufacturing process?

Don Kindard: Here’s a wing auto drill; it drills about 3,500 holes per side of the wing, upper and lower wing.  So, 7,000-plus holes, and it drills, reams, and countersinks-the wing and substructure in one step, with essentially perfect quality. The yield on auto drilling about 99.8%, which is amazing compared to manual drilling.

So, for example, the forward fuselage we are looking at takes about two shifts to drill the subassembly.  It takes about two weeks to accomplish the same thing on a legacy aircraft.

The wing is very much the same thing.  If we didn’t use an auto drill, I’d have all these manual tools (drill templates) that I have to locate on each wing, I’d have to drill them up, then take the wings off, and manually countersink them. This automated equipment does all that in one step.  Again, it’s about almost a 10 to 1 difference in span, plus the added benefit of perfect quality.

SLD: We are at a substation where the technician is preparing drawings for the wing subassembly work.  Tell me how the digital thread process helps precision and savings of time in this process?

Don Kindard: You’ve heard us talk about digital thread before and this is a perfect example.  Again, we take the bulkheads and first thing we do before we load them in the assembly tools is to do as much work at a subcomponent level as we can. So this is an example.

The wing has about 2,000 brackets, which hold tubes, wires and systems. With legacy technology, we would have built individual locating tools, for each of these brackets.  The tools would have bumped against a flange of the bulkhead in a particular location to position the bracket.

Using the digital thread, what we do now and what we started doing on F-22 that we transitioned out to F-35, is these bulkheads go to a machine that marks the position of the brackets directly on them using the digital thread.  It puts an inkjet mark where these brackets go; it gives you a little outline. I, as the mechanic, take the bracket, apply double-back tape and stick it to the bulkhead using the inkjet marks. The brackets have pilot (undersized) holes for the fasteners. I just transfer those holes into the structure then install the bracket.

So, using the digital thread, I eliminate 6,000 tools, or 2,000 per variant, plus all the time it takes to do configuration management on those tools, plus finding them and getting them to the mechanic.  Once again, because of the digital thread, I also eliminate mistakes positioning and locating brackets, which is normally one of our high drivers for quality.

SLD: The composite machine we are standing in front of also suggests an interesting approach to manufacturing which shapes a new way to build a composite wing.  Could you describe the approach being followed here?

Don Kindard: I mentioned the key to what we call supportable LO, meaning that the aircraft can go and be Very Low Observable (stealthy) and also very supportable, meaning low maintenance hours for every flight hour. The magic is here in controlling the thickness of the skins.  By controlling the thickness of the skins, we’re controlling the mismatch from one skin to the other across the joint. Eliminating those mismatches means less radar reflectivity, which is what a stealth fighter is all about.

Maybe one of the cleverest things that I’ve ever seen in composites – I mean I started in the composites world, and the Holy Grail has always been to build composites to a precisely controlled thickness.  One way we do it on most of the other components (forward fuselage, aft fuselage and empennage) is to add sacrificial material to the skins and then we machine it to a nominal thickness with a high-tolerance machine because we’re trying to control thickness plus or minus a particular tolerance, which is tremendously better control than we’ve ever had.

For our wings, we invented and patented a process were we measure the cured wing thickness using a laser radar system, calculate where we need to add material to compensate for the thickness, transfer this data to an automated ply cutter, and then transfer this data to a laser projector, which tells the mechanic where to add the plies.  The main benefit is lower capital and facilities cost.

SLD: We are standing in front a wing-skin machine.  I see the technician is using the digital thread technology.  Could you describe what he is doing and how the technology impacts on the time necessary to do the task, as well the precision of the task?

Don Kindard: This is a wing skin – the outer surface of the wing — and this wing skin would normally have three drawings to put in fasteners on the wing skin. Because it’s all digital technology, he is using a laser to mark down on the wing skin which engineering fastener goes in each hole.

Before we were using the lasers, we were getting out the drawings, which would take us about four days to do this.  Now it is much faster. Everything marked on here goes to the final installation area, and the guys don’t look at drawings, they just put in fasteners.

Now, at some point we may end up doing this real-time, fully integrated within production flow, but today it’s much better to do everything off critical path.  Now this is only the beginning – you can also do it optically, you don’t have to use lasers.  But we can do this in a shift now, when than it used to take us about four days.

***Posted on June 20th, 2010

The Coast-Guard: A True 911 Force

Posted on | by SysAdmin
06/09/2010

An interview with Rear Admiral Branham

Commander Seventh Coast Guard District

Rear Admiral Branham has commanded the Seventh Coast Guard District for about two years; his AOR covers parts of the waters of South Carolina, all of Georgia, Florida, the Caribbean and some waters off Central America and Northern South America. He has a strong background of operational experience in going to sea and an understanding of national issues after extensive service “Inside the Beltway.”

We were especially impressed by his quick reaction to the recent Haiti Earthquake where he was the task force commander. He epitomized the Coast Guard’s philosophy of on-scene initiative by quickly moving units into place that provided the first look and assessment at the horrible damages there. The Coast Guard was first in and last out, and in fact is still there. For the first critical hours and days, they were the U.S. government’s only effective representatives given the widespread destruction.

USCG at Port-Au-Prince on January 17, 2010SLD: Your District played a key role in the Haiti Operation.  Could you describe your approach and role in the crisis intervention?

Admiral Branham: With respect to Haiti, obviously that was one of those “ah-hah!” moments that focuses the Coast Guard on a critical mission and in this case, as usual, it taxed us resource-wise. I was a Resource Director from 2005 to 2008, so I spent a number of years in that shop, and I got a perspective on that end of the resource there. Right now, I’m obviously a tactical guy and an operational guy running these programs down here.

But Haiti was just another opportunity to demonstrate the Coast Guard’s flexibility and responsiveness, in my view. And one of the reasons we can be that way is because we’re in this theater all the time down here. We live here. We work day-to-day on different missions in the region here and in this case we were able to redirect a number of key assets immediately to the task.

I’ll just run down the chronology a little bit. On the 12th of January, the earthquake hit at about ten minutes of five and within an hour I had redirected aircraft and ships to go to Port-au-Prince and help. They were very responsive. Some had to get fuel and supplies and that kind of stuff, but we had the helicopters on the ground at the Embassy the next morning at first light because they were based in the Bahamas doing Coast Guard and international missions. And we would have had them there even earlier except it was dark. I didn’t want to send them in there and put them at risk in an unfamiliar area.

SLD: If I could just insert one thing, one thing one of your staff members made a point to us during our visit to Miami, that because of the disruption of continuity of U.S. representation in Haiti because of the earthquake, you guys basically played that function as well when you inserted yourselves into Haiti.

Admiral Branham: Yes, we did. We have two senior officers based at the Embassy constantly. One is the MLO and one is the Coast Guard Liaison Officer, and that’s one of the few countries where a Coast Guard Officer is the Military Liaison Officer and works for the Combatant Commander. Because of our close working relationship with Haiti – and we’re engaged with them on a daily basis in their government, not just with respect to the Haitian Coast Guard and supporting them, but in port safety and security and in the course of the counter drug effort, and the migration effort as well, just to name a few – we helped them with aids to navigation. And we do humanitarian missions in there as well, helping out schools and hospitals and that kind of thing. So we are a frequent flyer, if you will, in Haiti, and it’s all familiar ground to us.

USCG HH-60 helicopter brings injured Haitians to the USNS Comfort for medical treatment January 20, 2010 (Credit Photo: USMC)

Admiral Branham: We’re normally there on a daily basis, and we bring the Coast Guard boats – the Haitian Coast Guard boats – back here to Miami and refurbish them and take them back down there. I routinely send the Coast Guard Cutter Oak down there, which is a 225-foot buoy tender, to train and equip and help the Haitian Coast Guard. They are 105 people, and they need our help.

And quite honestly, it’s a good investment for us because their help is essential for us to do repatriations and help to ensure that the Port-au-Prince facility is secure and safe, to help ensure security of flow back and forth, cargo back and forth, between Haiti and here, which a lot of that cargo that goes down-range that way comes out of the Miami River here.

So we were in there immediately, and I would say within three days we had ten ships and a dozen aircraft and about 700 people involved down there. As DOD phased in with what I call the heavy iron, the big ships and the large cargo aircraft and the thousands of people, we held the fort until they got there and provided a lot of basic first-aid and saved a lot of lives, providing help for people needing their essential medical care, and amputation of limbs.

We tried to help restore some order in the port so that when DOD got there, we could start working in earnest to restore the port. The airport was basically unusable because there was no air control – the tower had been knocked out. Two of our ships in succession provided air control capability until DOD could get temporary facilities there and restore that.

We hauled a lot of American citizens out of there on our fixed-wing aircraft back to safety and medical care on the order of about 1,500 in the first three days. We brought urban search and rescue teams down there from CONUS (Continental United States), a couple of them here in Miami, and all kinds of relief supplies.

So I think if you could characterize it, we were the 911 force for the first three or four days, and we’re still there, even after most of the DOD goes home. But we phased in and dovetailed in with the DOD and augmented their force, and we did some things they can’t necessarily do and vice-versa, so it was a great team, along with all the other agencies like State, Justice, Health and Human Services, and DOD.

A Navy helicopter delivers humanitarian supplies to the USCG Cutter Mohawk off of Port-au-Prince January 15, 2010 (Credit Photo: USMC)

SLD: Well one of the things I don’t think is fully recognized outside of the Coast Guard is that people see that 911 functionality. What they don’t see is when everybody else has left, you’re still operating in the Caribbean dealing with a lot of the follow-on consequences from Haiti, whether it be immigration management, or disaster relief, or whatever, and that ties up a reasonable amount of your resources.

Admiral Branham: Yeah it does. In fact we dedicate significant resources each and every day to countering potential migration flow out of several countries here, but in this case, Haiti. And we have a force down there now that’s patrolling, making sure they’re visible. And in fact, that is what I call a normal flow out of that country that is pretty much invisible to the average American. That there’s a normal flow out of there on any given day and we’re interdicting Haitian migrants. We get spikes every once in awhile and sometimes we get a mass exodus, but we’re there every day.

Now there’s an opportunity cost. When we divert those kinds of resources from their current missions to a contingency operation like Haiti, obviously there’s an opportunity cost to pay, and we pulled on the order of four ships from joint task force south, which is focused on counter drug detection and monitoring. Of course, we run the end game here with the Coast Guard doing the interdictions, but we pulled the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton from the Eastern Pacific, and at least two, maybe three, what we call major cutters from the Caribbean area, from Joint Interagency Task Force South, to work specifically for the 7th District and the taskforce – Homeland Security Task Force – to focus on the Haiti mission. So to some degree the door is open for bad guys to exploit that situation of resource diversion.

SLD: One of the missing metrics from the USCG budget is the recapitalization costs of discretionary operations like Haiti.  You go to Haiti, accelerate the life cycle utilization of your assets, and there are no replacement costs put into the budget kitty to accompany costs for increased or additional operation tempo.

Admiral Branham: What we call “fully-loaded costs;” they tend to use up useful service life at accelerated pace, obviously, when you’re running these kinds of operations. And there’s a price to be paid, as you say, and it’s not reflected in the recapitalization plan. And you’re right: we are chewing up resources and not replacing them quick enough.

SLD: Another issue I find of interest is the core role, which the USCG plays as the central partner for agencies in such crises like Haiti or the Gulf oil spill.  If we were to draw up a Venn diagram with the USCG as the center of the diagram and map out the other agencies playing a role, those agencies expect the USCG to show up with resources.  What I do not see is the budget built around paying the USCG to have those resources able to be in place and “rented out” to shape a partnership coalition performance.

USCG Partnerships (Credit Graph: USMC)Admiral Branham: I can tell you from my own experience here in Miami from sharing or directing this task force, that I have a unified command that surrounds me in that role. It’s made up of representatives from a number of DHS agencies, regional chiefs down here, and some folks from the State of Florida, and a couple of other representatives. And they look to the Coast Guard to be the center of that Venn diagram, if you will. We bring, such as it is, the most robust capability. We also bring, I think, leadership that they look to focus on as well, to rally around. And it’s flattering, but it’s true, they view the Coast Guard as the driving force between conducting these operations and these programs so it would be worth exploring the challenge of getting funded for playing that role.

Again, I think the viewpoint of those folks that are our partners – and I can give you a list as long as your arm that we haven’t talked about here – it would also be interesting to see what their viewpoint is about their own resourcing because particularly the DHS partners have their own requirements, which they need to further. And so at some point they’ll be reluctant to rally around the Coast Guard resources.

SLD: From your experience in your district, what investments in the near term would you like to see plused up?

Admiral Branham: Well a couple of things. One of the big payoff items is command and control and interagency command centers where we can actually pull together a group in a region. Right now we’ve got one up in Charleston. That’s an excellent facility and does great things in pulling together command and control and daily operations across the interagency and state partners. And for the lack of a little bit of bricks and mortar money, we’re not able to pull those types of things together where they need to be. And that’s something that if I were to invest money at this point, it would be in interagency command and control centers that truly get at what the department was established for, which is to consolidate operations and to share information and intelligence and reduce overhead.

The other area that I’d invest money in is exactly in what we’re doing right now: recapitalizing our ships and at this point focusing heavily on replacing our patrol boats. I’ve run about 25 patrol boats in this district, which is about 25 percent of what the Coast Guard has, and they are falling apart. And they’re the backbone of us getting our mission done down here, with respect to counter drug and migrant operations. So if I were to invest money, that’s exactly where I’d put it. And in that response boat medium as well, which is the future backbone of our search and rescue capability in the coastal regions.

———-

***Posted June 8th, 2010

Turkey-Israeli Defense Relations under Strain

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By Richard Weitz

Photo credit: Israeli flags are burnt during a protest in Turkey, AFP/GETTY
(as printed in the Telegraph, June 6th, 2010)

On the heels of a flawed June 1, 2010 Gaza maritime interception operation, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel are at an unprecedented low. Three of the six ships in the Gaza flotilla came from Turkey, including the largest, which was the site of an armed clash that killed several Turkish nationals wounding many others. The Turkish government has responded by canceling military exercises and defense agreements with Israel as well as by recalling its envoy from Tel Aviv. Further exacerbated by other divisive issues, the once thriving bilateral security ties between Israel and Turkey is under great strain. Although some Israeli-Turkish arms sales are expected to continue, Turkish authorities will likely seek to manufacture more weapons systems, which were previously imported from Israel or acquired from other foreign suppliers. Other NATO countries, including the United States, provide an obvious source, but so does Russia, whose defense companies have launched a strong campaign to expand their military sales to Turkey.

During the second half of the twentieth-century and the first decade of the twenty-first, several strategic concerns led Israel and Turkey to collaborate closely on defense and other security issues. Given that both are non-Arab nations with strong historical and cultural ties, Israel and Turkey often interpret regional security developments from a similar perspective. Turkey received Israeli assistance on many difficult security issues during and after the Cold War, while the latter acquired a powerful regional ally, which proved especially important after Israel lost its Iranian ally, the Shah, following Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Israeli-Turkey partnership has included weapons contracts worth billions of dollars; joint military exercises and reciprocal training opportunities; and military, intelligence, and defense technology collaboration. In recent years, however, bilateral tensions over Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians as well as due to the emergence of an avowedly Islamic government in Ankara has presented serious, perhaps insurmountable barriers to a continuation of a comprehensive defense alliance between the two countries.

Formal relations between the modern states of Israel and Turkey date back to March 1949, when Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize the newly formed Jewish state. Until the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979, Turkey remained the only Muslim nation to have diplomatic ties with Israel. Mutual strategic concerns led the two states to forge a unique geopolitical balance in the Middle East. Israelis reached out to Turkey as a crucial partner in helping to ensure Israel’s security, while the partnership reaffirmed Turkey’s predominantly Western orientation in international affairs, while perceived common threats posed to both countries underpinned their defense relationship. The Turkish and Israeli national security establishments perceived themselves as besieged Middle Eastern outliers who needed to band together. Turkey’s primary military threats have historically emanated from either pro-Soviet socialist regimes, like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Hafez Assad’s Syria or theocracies such as Iran. Israelis likewise felt besieged by hostile Arab neighbors aligned with Moscow or under the influence of zealous religious elements. In addition, these states also sponsored terrorists hostile to Israel and Turkey. Syria served as headquarters of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which has conducted numerous terrorist attacks on Turks, and gave PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan asylum in Syria until 1997. Syrians also supported Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Assad’s regime in Damascus also allegedly serves as the conduit for the safe transport of Iranian arms sales to its proxy, Hezbollah. Turkey has also had intense conflicts over water rights and border lands with Syria.

The end of the Cold War actually facilitated their defense ties by removing several obstacles to a more cooperative and publicly supported alliance between Israel and Turkey. For example, as more Arab states began normalizing relations with Israel, Turkey’s close ties with Israel could be seen as less of a departure from its traditionally cautious and hands-off approach to the Middle East. Israel’s participation in the Middle East peace process made it easier for Turkey to defend its policies as being simultaneously pro-Arab and pro-Israel. Having served as critical stalwarts against the spread of communism throughout the Cold War, moreover, both states wanted to ensure that their strategic value to the West would continued into the new era.

As a result of these conditions, defense cooperation between Israel and Turkey continued to grow during the 1990s, expanding to include joint military exercises and increased bilateral arms sales. In November 1994, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s paid a visit to Tel Aviv in which she described the partnership between the two countries as a “strategic relationship.” Çiller signed a formal defense cooperation agreement with Israel in February 1996. It established a broad framework for collaboration that expanded long-standing intelligence ties, initiated joint military exercises and increased military exchanges, and improved coordinated bilateral defense planning. The agreement also included provisions for carrying out electronic surveillance flights and intelligence sharing to neutralize mutual threats, paving the way for regular joint exercises between the two nations’ army and navy. Moreover, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) gained access to Turkey’s vast airspace for in-flight pilot training and Israeli helicopters gained the use of Turkish bases. Turkish planes also trained in Israel regularly starting in June of that year. Israel reaped strategic rewards from this training in Anatolian airspace by being able to fly close to hostile states—such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran—in order to gather valuable intelligence. Benefiting from another geographical feature that Israel lacks, the Bolu Mountains served as a training ground for Israeli snow commandos. The agreements have also involved the United States, which began participating in trilateral “Reliant Mermaid” search-and-rescue operations in the eastern Mediterranean in 1998.

The 1990s even saw the two countries publicize their joint military ties in a move to enhance their combined deterrent capabilities. For example, Turkey highlighted its connections with Israel to reinforce its threat to destroy any Russian-made S-300 SAMs delivered to the Government of Cyprus. These surface-to-air missiles could threaten Turkish warplanes defending the Turkish separatists on the northern half of the island. One reason the alliance continued despite a lack of public support in Turkey has been due to the influence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). The TAF succeeded in coercing Necmettin Erbakan, the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey, to reverse his initial opposition and implement the agreement before being ousted by the military the following year.

During the 1990s, Turkey developed important arms supply ties with Israel. According to some estimates, these relations have accounted for more than half of the value of their bilateral trade relationship in recent years—amounting to approximately $2.6 billion in 2007 and $2.9 billion in 2009. Starting in 1996, Turkey and Israel engaged in joint production of Popeye-1 Air-to-ground missiles in a contract worth around $150 million. Turkey soon also awarded Israeli defense firms some $700 million worth of contracts to upgrade one hundred Turkish F-4 and F-5 fighter planes (colloquially known as the “Phantom Fleet”) as well as provide rockets and electronic equipment to the Turkish Armed Forces. In 2002, Turkey gave Israeli Military Industries another $700 million contract to modernize 170 Turkey M60 tanks. Israel Aerospace Industries partnered with Turkish firms in a joint venture that in 2005 won a contract worth almost $200 million dollars and supplied Turkey with 10 unmanned aerial vehicles, along with related surveillance equipment.

On the Turkish side, the benefits of increased cooperation have also included learning about Israel’s expertise in the “security zone” of Lebanon, which helped Turkey prevent penetration by PKK forces across its borders with Syria and Iraq. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also provided training and supplies to Turkish security forces monitoring its borders between Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israel in turn was in a better position to interrupt trafficking of arms from Iran to Hezbollah that reportedly occurs near the Iranian-Syrian-Turkish border regions. After 1996, bi-annual meetings between their defense establishments, as well as other exchanges of military officers and defense officials, further strengthened the partnership. In early October 1997, Israel’s Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak visited Turkey and made arrangements to conduct joint naval exercises and enhance intelligence sharing. The visit by Shahak and many other high-ranking Turkish and Israeli officials led the way for further strategic gains on both sides of the alliance. For Israel, it constituted its highest level of security cooperation with a country other than the United States. According to General Çevik Bir, this increased cooperation helped Turkey coerce Syria to end its asylum for PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. After an earthquake devastated northwestern Turkey in 1999, Israeli soldiers led international rescue efforts there, with one complex of prefabricated homes in the region subsequently named the “Israeli village.” The September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent global war on terror also served as catalysts for strengthening Israeli-Turkish strategic relations. Both states were entrenched in struggles with terrorist groups before 9/11. After 2001, they were key players in U.S. efforts to root out Islamic extremism.

After coming to power, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP), initially continued the close Turkish-Israeli security ties. Following a string of terrorist bombing attacks in November 2003 against two synagogues, a bank, and the British Consulate that left 57 people dead and 700 wounded Istanbul, Erdogan accepted the need for intelligence and counterterrorist cooperation with Israel. Israeli Public Security Minister Tsahi Hanegbi visited Turkey in December 2003 and forged a new agreement whereby Turkish police would train with Israeli police, leading to an intensified relationship between the two countries’ internal security establishments.

In September 2007, the Jerusalem Post reported that Turkey had provided Israel with intelligence on Syria. Prior to an IAF flyover into Syrian territory, the TAF gave Israeli pilots authorization to use Turkish airspace and provided “precise information regarding targets in Syria that were to be hit by Israeli planes.” Signaling the rift between the military establishment and the AKP, the TAF reportedly did not inform Prime Minister Erdogan prior to the arrangement. On security issues, the TAF, Turkey’s intelligence community, and its police forces have typically favored maintaining strong security ties Israel. Conversely, the Foreign Ministry, Executive Office of the Prime Minister, and pubic opinion have tended to advocate a weaker relationship between Turkey and Israel.

In recent years, Israel’s policies towards Gaza have increasing alienated Erdogan and other members of the AKP. After Israel’s fatal incursion into Gaza and assault on Rafah in 2004, which killed more than 60 people and left some 1,600 homeless, Erdogan first used the term “state terrorism” in characterizing Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, with whom he personally had great sympathy. Relations deteriorated following Israel’s military attack on the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip in December 2008 designed to coerce Palestinian militants from launching rocket attacks against nearby Israeli civilians. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009, Erdogan stormed off the stage after getting into a public altercation with Israeli President Simon Peres at the end of a debate over the Gaza War. The Turkish leader has also shown an inclination to improve relations with Iran despite its government’s harsh rhetoric regarding Israel. He frequently criticizes Western governments for seeking to sanction Iran for its nuclear activities while downplaying Israel’s failure to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Israelis have looked askance at Turkish-Brazilian efforts to mediate the dispute.

Syria and Turkey have improved their bilateral relations since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Syrian government stopped supporting the PKK and Syria dropped claims to Turkey’s Hatay province. Bilateral trade has increased. Turkey recently conducted its first-ever joint land forces exercise with Syria, symbolizing the strategic rapprochement between these two former rivals. At the same time, Syrian-Israeli relations remained strained despite Turkish efforts to mediate their dispute. Turkish officials have tended to blame Israel more than Syria for the failure of these mediation efforts.

All these sources of Israel-Turkey tension have negatively affected the weapons trade between the two countries. For its part, the Israeli government in April 2010 decided to suspend the sale of advanced military platforms to Turkey because of the deteriorating relationship, exemplified also by Turkey’s decision to deny Israeli military aircraft rights to participate in NATO military exercises in Turkey. Israel declined Turkey’s request to purchase different military systems, including an anti-tank guided weapon and a naval missile system.

Until now, the temporary freeze has not excluded the option of some sales on a case-by-case basis. The Israeli government has been willing to sell Turkey a non-line-of-sight anti-tank guided weapon, a theater defense naval missile system, and a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. Another exemption has applied to  joint discussions with Colombia about the sale of upgraded M60 main battle tanks (MBTs). Thus, Israel Military industries and Turkey’s Aselsan produced more than 170 upgraded General Dynamics M60A1 MBTs for the Turkish military. A Colombian representative attended the handover ceremony. In March 2010, the Israeli army chief visited Turkey for the first time in five years to participate in a NATO conference on terrorism and international cooperation, as well as to hold a meeting with his Turkish counterpart.

The strained bilateral relationship has also not yet further impaired the long-delayed implementation of the $183 million contract for Israel to provide Turkey with its advanced Heron unmanned air vehicles, four of which were delivered in March 2010; six more are scheduled for transfer in November 2010. On June 2, Turkey Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said the current Gaza crisis would not disrupt the planned delivery of the Heron drones to Turkey. Even so, the reason for the latter sale may be due most to Israelis’ desire to avoid the international arbitration Turkey has threatened to file in case Israel sought to breach the sales contract.

———-

***Posted on June 9th, 2010

Earning a Seat at the Table: Powered-Lift Bridges Beyond Concept and Into Reality

Posted on | by SysAdmin
06/08/2010

By Vince Martinez

Vince Martinez is a regular contributor to SLD and is the President and Founder of Affinity Fidelis Consulting and Technologies; a defense consulting firm in Northern Virginia.

V-22 Osprey

The successful deployment of both V-22 tilt-rotor variants for the U.S. Marine Corps and the Air Force Special Operations Command to various theaters in the Middle East will force the defense industry, along with military forces worldwide, to accept that powered-lift is now an effective and operational capability.  And this capability has brought with it an evolutionary leap forward for rotary wing operations.

With the operating characteristics of a typical helicopter and the efficiencies, capacities, and capabilities of a turbo-prop aircraft, the Osprey has successfully integrated the benefits of both types of platforms into a futuristic, hybrid aircraft.

As many will attest, the fielding of these powered-lift platforms has been challenging at times; indeed many would continue to argue that there are still many issues that need to be resolved with this type of technology.

One thing is certain, though: the battlefield has changed as a result of this technology and the benefits of speed, range, and capacity of the first powered-lift transport (the V-22 Osprey) over traditional medium-lift rotorcraft now must be considered by military decision-makers as they move toward defining a future for their rotary wing forces.

It is precisely because of these unprecedented deployments, and because of the successful operational history of predecessor platforms like the AV-8 Harrier, that powered-lift has now earned its rightful place in aviation history.

Powered-lift aircraft should be considered closely by all for its role in the future aviation spectrum.
In July 2007, the U. S. Defense Science Board (DSB) cited the need for Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) and Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft so that the military can meet the demands of the 21st century.  Although the study focused primarily on transport aircraft, specifically in addressing many of the shortfalls of transporting the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), the lessons drawn from their conclusions are equally compelling across other types of aircraft.

V-22 Landing

Reeling from heavy combat losses for helicopters in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the performance enhancements of a hybrid aircraft like the Osprey could have possibly prevented some of the losses, according to the DSB.  With the ability to fly above or around a significant portion of the ground-based threat, along with the many survivability enhancements that come with a modern aircraft, the benefits of powered-lift in the future were more apparent with every rotary wing loss.

Although aircraft survivability was certainly a significant component of their findings, the study was also clear in defining that the future role for VTOL/STOL transports really had much more to do with enhancements for maneuvering ground forces rather than simply aircraft survivability.  The appeal of having a family of VTOL/STOL transports of all sizes simplified, in their minds, many maneuver and sustainment issues associated with forces of the 21st century, and were key to solving multiple dilemmas for both ground and sea-based resources – many of which are relevant issues even today.

As the battlespace continues to expand, and as operational requirements dictate the necessity to influence entire regions vice specific area of operations, it is clear that the maneuvering forces of the future will demand additional aviation capabilities in terms of range, speed, lift, kinetic and non-kinetic delivery, and command and control in order to support a newly expanded operational reach.

VTOL/STOL aircraft will be part of that solution, and will allow warfighters to do exactly that: operate at extended distances while providing the same types of objective area impacts that are expected of a modern force.  These platforms will enhance the ability of the military to influence a myriad of climates and places, at distances unprecedented by legacy platforms, with minimal losses to the effectiveness of ground force in terms of maneuverability, sustainment, or delivery of fires.  Ground forces will be free to move rapidly without the need for significant infrastructure to support their aviation element, and will be able to keep their aviation assets in closer proximity to the battlefront.

Soldiers waiting for OspreysThe warfighter will also be better postured to react to the unknown by having tighter control over their aviation resources – simply due to enhanced flexibility of a VTOL/STOL force – and will have the ability to tailor their aviation assets more readily for the fight at hand.

There are other benefits to VTOL/STOL:

  • transit times for re-supply will be truncated,
  • subsequent maneuver will become less challenging,
  • intangibles like replacement of aircrew and length of  “crew day” are maximized due to the aviation element being in close proximity to the actual fight,
  • quick turnarounds for refueling and reloading, and
  • response times for time-critical mission sets like casualty evacuation will be cut in half due to not only the close proximity of VTOL/STOL aircraft, but also due to the speed and range of these types of hybrid platforms.

Additionally, with the ability for many of these platforms to operate in maritime environments, advancing from a sea-base can also circumvent restrictions that typically inhibit land-based or overwater transit, which also adds to increased operational flexibility.

V-22 at night

While there are those who will remain distracted with the metrics of performance for singular platforms, it is clear that a larger strategic picture has emerged which has defined a significant role for VTOL/STOL in the future.  Whether these aircraft manifest in the form of transports, fighter/attack aircraft, or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), the measuring stick for the efficacy of these platforms must be shifted to the ground forces that they will ultimately support.

Questions regarding their utility in the future battlespace should be approached from the proper perspective:

  1. What are we asking our operational forces to accomplish;
  2. How do we maximize our investment in terms of operational flexibility and tactical agility with limited resources; and
  3. What makes the most sense in terms of fiscal investment with our uncertain political climates, ever-changing operational requirements, and in a world where the military is continually being asked to accomplish more with less?

VTOL/STOL will never be the panacea that will tilt aviation toward what was espoused by “Billy” Mitchell’s or Giulio Douhet’s visions of air dominance.  But when combined effectively with other martial capabilities across the operational spectrum, the benefits of fielding VTOL/STOL aircraft that are capable of accomplishing a myriad of tasks while operating across a wide array of tactical environments and scenarios, will truly have a tangible impact on the ground commander’s ability to influence and control the future battlespace.

For the visionaries, now is the time to start looking toward the “what next” with VTOL/STOL aircraft and that is largely due to the fact that powered-lift has now successfully earned a right to have a seat at the table.

———-

***Posted June 9th, 2010

The F-35 Pilot: An Interview with Test Pilot Squirt Kelly at Pax River

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The F-35 Pilot: An Interview with Test Pilot Squirt Kelly at Pax River
05/28/2010

SLD went to Pax River in April 2010 to interview several members of the Pax River test team.

In this interview, Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird talked with test pilot “Squirt” Kelly about his thoughts on the F-35 experience.

[slidepress gallery=’the-f-35-pilot-an-interview-with-test-pilot-squirt-kelly-at-pax-river’]

SLD: You’ve been testing the helmet and the plane. What’s the synergy between the helmet and the plane?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Well, it is quite a nice synergy, actually. The helmet becomes very natural to the pilot, because it mimics what we have in legacy systems, but it presents it in a way that’s clean and easy to understand, and is the building block for the DAS system, for the night camera, and all of the situational awareness that can be provided to the pilot.

SLD: And you don’t need night vision goggles?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: You don’t need night vision goggles; it’s all built into the helmet.  So, depending on the conditions — the light levels, environmental factors, and cultural lighting — you may choose to use the night camera or your DAS system, depending on what gives you the best situational awareness.

SLD: And presumably, because if the helmet is spherical, as opposed to using night vision goggles, you have a much better peripheral vision?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Yes.  The night vision goggle — the Legacy Night Vision Goggle is just a sensor.  It doesn’t provide you with an integrated picture.  The F-35 night camera as it’s projected in the helmet is really more like using your own vision, rather than looking through a narrow sensor, or soda straw, so to speak.

SLD: There must be a significant adjustment involved when you will start using this in the airplane and figuring out how to use the capability?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: We think there will be a building block approach, as we integrate more of the capabilities into the aircraft and the helmet.  We saw the same jump in tactics development in the simulator when we first added the helmet capability.  We had to take a step back and rethink some of the ways we were performing the mission, because now we had more information, better information, more situational awareness, and we could be even more efficient and effective at performing the mission with this helmet, with this additional tool that we could use.

SLD: Give me an example of the difference this makes?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: With the F35, if my wingmen finds a target on the ground, he can data-link that information to me and now my helmet will tell me where to look on the ground to find that target and I know we are looking at the same target EXACTLY.

SLD: So, in other words, it’s shared information?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Yes.  It’s shared information and the helmet will tell the pilot where to employ sensors and weapons while providing threat information. You get more awareness, throughout your flight, on friendly and enemy positions.  So you have shared situational awareness across the board to understand who are the friendlies, the hostiles, what the order of battle is, and what the current situation on the ground is real time.

SLD: Presumably, another aspect is depending on what the ground situation is or what you’re looking at and how rapidly you have to make a decision, you’re also building a consensus between you and your mate on what you think you’re seeing?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Absolutely.

SLD: So you have confidence you’re looking at the same thing?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Absolutely.  Between you, your wingmen, and the ground.

SLD: So presumably, in an era where we’re very concerned with collateral damage, this builds into a better consensus about what you’re looking and what needs to be prosecuted?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: That consensus allows for not only a safer, but more rapid employment of weapons with less potential for collateral damage.

SLD: So situational awareness, which you guys often talk about, is a higher sense of confidence in the decision you’re about to take.  And also, presumably one of the advantages is going to be your ability to share this information to a ground decision-maker as well rapidly.  So obviously over time, you’re going to get a better ability to manage, in terms of ground stations, the kind of information that we’re talking about here.

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Yes, based on the information you and your wingmen obtain, you can make timely decisions more effectively as a team, and rapidly pass that information to the ground without relying on other assets.

As you add the F-35, you are going to reshape other capabilities on the battlefield as well, and provide the foundation for managing battlefield assets, UAVs, intelligence, and other tactical information.  The F-35 will change the way we think about the role of tactical aviation.

SLD: Clearly, there is a cultural challenge to learn how to maximize the impact of the F-35 and to adjust con-ops?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Yes.  But one of the things we made sure of with the F35 was that it is and will be compatible with Legacy systems, like link 16. Legacy platforms of U.S. and various nations are going to be around for quite a number of years.  The F35 will have the ability to interact with those platforms in a large force coalition CAOC environment where there are multiple platforms and multiple services.  And then also provide the ability to have a separate communication system that’s designed for low observable aircraft, which provides the flexibility to operate differently and more independently.

SLD: I assume that the F-35 will be able to operate more effectively in airspace from the pilot’s point of view?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: One of the other great things about the F35 is that it is a first day of the war airplane, but not just a first day of the war airplane.  So in those situations where have to support Marines on the ground in a rapidly changing environment, the F35 will be able to safely operate in that environment because of its sensors and the threat information is presented to the pilot.

In a high-threat, close air support environment, the F-35, through the helmet, will enable the pilot to focus on employing weapons on time, on target, while giving you the information to avoid threats where that’s possible, or defeat those threats where that’s necessary to perform the mission.  And the helmet is the key to getting the pilot looking in the right direction.  We all know a picture is worth a thousand words, so, hearing something is nice, but being able to see it on the ground in relation to the battlefield really builds the pilot’s knowledge and awareness.

SLD: So enhancing the probability of looking at the right thing?

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: Yes.  Whether it’s friendly or hostile, and then having the aircraft, through the helmet, alert the pilot to what action he needs to take in a particular scenario, to either avoid or defeat that threat and then perform the mission.  In a legacy aircraft, depending on what that threat is, you may have to abort your mission.  You wouldn’t have the real time situational awareness of all the threats, so there could be confusion about whether I can still perform my mission, how safe is it to continue.  I will have to abort missions in a legacy aircraft that I will continue in an F-35.

SLD: Tactically, the big deal used to be to get your opponent to jettison his ordinates.  To react to you, he punches everything off, and you’re fighting and you want to kill him if you can’t get the silver scar, but at least you’ve stop your opponent from doing something ugly to your guys.  And they’re telling you, basically, you’re not going to throw anything over the side, you’re going to press on with the fight, with enough confidence that you — to the best of the ability of humanity to survive a fight and get the mission done.

Test Pilot “Squirt” Kelly: With this aircraft, I could take off, and after employing weapons on my primary target, my wingmen or someone on the ground can say okay, I’ve got another threat over here, can you provide me some information.  Instantly, you can become a flying ISR platform, and adjust to provide the context for that ground commander.  So even after employing your weapons, which was your initial goal, you can continue maximizing your capabilities.

Posted May 28, 2010

The Manas Challenge

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Manas Challenge

As we highlighted shortly after the Obama Administration decision to surge troops to Afghanistan in the middle of winter, the logistics costs would be significant for such a decision.  One of these costs was the leverage which the Russians would gain from the logistics underbelly to Afghan operations.

In this piece Richard Weitz discusses a key element of the leverage challenge, which the Afghan operations have underscored.

***

 

 

 

“U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Nathaniel Starks 376th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron,
Visitor Control Center, welcomes Colonel Melis Duchenbiev, Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior,
to the Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, March 19th, 2010.
The Kyrgyz MOI toured the installation to get an overview of entry procedures,
security posts and patrols.”
(Credit: Senior Airman Nichelle Anderson, U.S. Air Force,
Transit Center At Manas, Kyrgyzstan, March 2010)

Although the debate continues over the origins and consequences of the regime change in Kyrgyzstan, attention in Washington, for better or worse, is fixated on whether the new Kyrgyz government will continue the U.S. lease to the air base at Manas international airport. The Pentagon considers the base vital for sustaining coalition military operations in Afghanistan. Although alternative routes for shipping U.S. and NATO military personnel and other urgent military exist, they have less capacity, take longer to use, are more expensive to operate, or are less secure.

After Uzbekistan evicted American military personnel from its territory in 2005, the Manas Air Base became the main U.S. military installation in the region. The base is co-located at Kyrgyzstan’s international airport, located over 30 kilometers (18 miles) east of the capital of Bishkek. The Pentagon has used the base to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan since late 2001. The facility houses approximately 1,100 coalition military personnel. These are mostly French, Spanish, and especially Americans associated with the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW). Australia, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and South Korea have also used Manas to support their national contingents in Afghanistan, which under the auspices of the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).  The main purpose of the base is to provide logistical support for military operations in Afghanistan. Neither the 376th AEW nor any other NATO forces stationed at the base engage in direct combat operations.

Almost all American soldiers who deploy on the ground in Afghanistan enter and leave through Manas. They typically only remain for a day or two in Kyrgyzstan, sequestered on base and isolated from the Kyrgyz population to avert incidents. The base also serves as a major hub for moving other international troops into and out of Afghanistan, as well as for delivering equipment needed urgently or that is too sensitive to risk transporting by truck through Pakistan, where it could more easily be stolen or seized by Islamist insurgents, or by the northern distribution network, a lengthy rail and road system, with several routes that pass through the territories of Russia and various Central Asian countries. The recent surge in NATO military personnel operating in Afghanistan has considerably increased the coalition’s use of the Manas facility in recent months. Whereas in early 2009, some 15,000 American military personnel and 500 lbs. of cargo passed through the base while moving into or out of Afghanistan,  in March 2010, the Air Force transported 50,000 NATO soldiers and even more equipment to and from Afghanistan on its C-17s.

“Tech. Sgt. Antonio Mu’oz, NCOIC and instructor loadmaster from the Transit Center C-17 detachment, guides an MRAP-all terrain vehicle into a C-17 Globemaster III prior to shipment to Afghanistan. The new M-ATVs are better equipped to withstand current combat conditions.” Credit: Senior Airman Nichelle Anderson, USAF, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, Transit Center At Manas, Kyrgyztan, January 2010

In addition to ferrying forces and cargo into and out of Afghanistan, the personnel at the base support aerial refueling, airlifts, airdrops, and medical evacuations. In 2008, the American, French, and Spanish aerial tankers based at Manas, which includes a U.S. KC-135 Stratotanker squadron, conducted 3,294 in-flight refueling missions over Afghanistan, providing 194,453,400 lbs of gas to 11,419 aircraft.  The base can also provide emergency aeromedical evacuation from the Afghan theater to hospitals in Europe or North America.  Manas served as a staging area for relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.  The international airport’s two main assets are its relatively advanced facilities and its pivotal location. Its 4,200 meter runway, shared between the military and civilian airports, was originally constructed for Soviet bombers. It has proved uniquely capable among Kyrgyzstan’s airports of sustaining round-the-clock support for large military aircraft such as cargo and tanker planes. Their crew can make the 1,000-mile flight to Afghanistan in 90 minutes. The next closest air logistics hub, at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, requires an 8-hour flight, along with mid-air refueling over the Black Sea, to Afghanistan.

 

Since the March 2005 Tulip Revolution, the Kyrgyz government has periodically threatened to abrogate the basing agreement or limit U.S. military operations at Manas. During the presidencies of both Askar Akaev, who governed Kyrgyzstan until March 2005, and his successor, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who ruled until April 2010, the base’s use appeared to have involved some controversial American payments, sometimes seen as bribes, to the president and other key Kyrgyz and their families. Some members of the Kyrgyz government criticized this practice, while others became annoyed when they did not receive similar inducements.

The U.S. government compensates Kyrgyzstan for use of Manas by negotiating commercial leases for various privately owned facilities and land in the base’s vicinity. The work at Manas also generates revenue and employment opportunities for local contractors and workers. The most valuable service contract is the millions of dollars spent each month on fuel for the airplanes. About 600 of the 750 contract employees at the base are Kyrgyz nationals. They receive wages that are approximately three times greater than that of the typical Kyrgyz worker.   The personnel at the base also support local charities and community services.  According to one calculation, the commercial activity associated with the base amounted to 7% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 2006.

Despite these contributions, opinion surveys regularly show widespread opposition to the base among the Kyrgyz public. The widespread perceptions of corrupt business deals involving the base, as well as a series of bizarre incidents—a mysterious alleged kidnapping of an American female soldier, the collision of a U.S. plane with the Kyrgyz presidential jet, and the 2006 killing of a Kyrgyz truck driver and the subsequent decision to remove the soldier to the United States before he could stand trial in a local court—turned much of the population against the foreign military presence.

Observers have suspected that some Russian and Chinese officials have encouraged the Kyrgyz government to end the U.S. lease at Manas. In 2006, the Kyrgyz government signed a “protocol of intentions” that permitted U.S. access to the base under one-year renewable leases through July 2011.  At the time, Kyrgyz authorities indicated they intended to allow American military deployments at Manas as long as the war in Afghanistan continued.

Starting in late 2008, rumors again surfaced that Russian representatives were pressing President Bakiyev to close Manas. Some sources reported that the Russians were offering large sums of money for the eviction. Influential members of the Kyrgyz parliament were also pressing the government to close the unpopular base, though others considered it important to keep both a Russian and an American military presence in their country as a form of geopolitical balance. On February 3, 2009, Bakiyev announced that he would end the lease because the United States had failed to pay sufficient rent for the base and because the Pentagon had repatriated an American soldier who killed a Kyrgyz truck driver rather than allow him to go on trial in Kyrgyzstan.

Credit: Senior Airman Nichelle Anderson, USAF,
376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs,
Transit Center At Manas, Kyrgyztan, January 2010

U.S. officials and commentators perceived a Russian hand behind the Kyrgyz decision. Bakiyev announced the closure in Moscow following a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, immediately after the Russian government pledged to write off $180 million in debt, give $150 million in direct aid, and help subsidize the construction of the $1.7 billion Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with a special credit line. After several months of additional bargaining, however, Kyrgyzstan and the United States signed a new one-year lease on June 22. Under its terms, the Pentagon agreed to rename the facility a “Transit Center,” pay more rent and other financial benefits. The annual rent tripled from $17 million to about $63 million. In addition, the U.S. government is paying about $67 million for improvement to the navigation systems and other airport functions. An additional $51.5 million in U.S. assistance is to help the Kyrgyz government combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism as well as promote economic development.  Whether Bakiyev had double-crossed Moscow or was simply leveraging Moscow’s offers of assistance to bargain for higher U.S. payments is still unclear. Although Russia provided $450 million in loans and other aid in late March 2009, it never opened the line of credit line for the Kambarata-1 plant.

Members of the transitional Kyrgyz government have made conflicting comments regarding the base’s future. No definitive decision looks likely until after the next Kyrgyz national elections occur later this year. Any Kyrgyz government would find it hard to relinquish the approximately $200 million in annual rent and additional U.S. payments directly related to the Manas base. Combined with other U.S. assistance, this sum is a large amount for an impoverished country whose annual government budget is only $5 billion and where the average per capita income is around $2,000.  But the Russian government might be willing to offer more to secure the Americans’ removal, or at least threaten such action to coerce Washington and its allies to make concessions on other issues.

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***Posted on May 28th, 2010

Biography : Former Lieutenant-General Gaviard

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Lieutenant General Jean-Patrick Gaviard retired mid 2006.

He has been, since January 2007, a consultant with French think tanks and since November 2008 a “senior concept developer” with Nato/Sact, Norfolk (USA).

  • From 2005 to 2006, he was advisor to the French defence Minister. He worked at this time particularly on C4ISR and NEC issues.
  • Prior to this from 2003 to 2005, Lt General JP Gaviard was the French Air Defence and Air Operations Command, Commander. Responsible, for example, after 9/11 for launching Mirage 2000 and helicopters against renegade aircrafts and slow movers directly under the authority of the French Prime minister. During this period, he was also responsible for the certification of the French Air Force as a Nato Reaction Force (NRF5) and the qualification of the French Forces Head Quarter (FHQ) for EU operations.
  • From 2001 to 2003, Major-General JP Gaviard was chief of retstaff for operations within the Joint Defence Staff. He was responsible for the commitments of the French armed forces with the US forces in Afghanistan, under Nato in the Balkans and under EU in Africa (DRC, Chad, Ivory Cost).
  • From 1999 to 2001, he was in charge for International relations within the Air Staff.
  • In spring of 1999, as a young Brigadier General he was commanding, during the Nato Kosovo Air campaign, the 100 French combat aircrafts including navy air assets. He was as well as the French senior representative for this important Air operations “Allied Action”, and posted at the Nato Air operations Center at Vicenza (Italy).
  • Before, he spent four years (1995-1999) in charge of the French Air Force’s budget and finances, where he oversaw a budget of 6 billions euros.
  • From 1993 to 1995, the Colonel JP Gaviard was Dijon Air Force Base (AFB) commander and previously a Reconnaissance squadron commander at Strasbourg AFB.

He accumulated over 4000 flying hours.

His education includes time spent at the Air Force Academy, between 1971 and 1973 as well as at the Air War College and the Special Joint Course (“Cours Special Interarmées”) at Paris, from 1989 to 1991.