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In light of Iran’s determined drive to acquire nuclear weapons, what options remain on the table for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
While the question of Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons has been raised many times in the past, news reports announced that Saudi Arabia was building nuclear power plants “tasked with the research and application of nuclear technology”.
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Credit: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org
A paper called “The Saudi Nuclear Option” authored by Yoel Guzansky of the Tel-Aviv based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) indeed explores the possibility of Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons. In this paper, the author draws a parallel between the aforementioned Saudi announcement and the publication of a memo from US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, which argued that “the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability.”
The paper goes on to analyze Saudi Arabia’s options in regards to a nuclear-armed Iran:
1) Are closer defense ties with the US the best course of action?
2) Should Saudi Arabia pursue its own nuclear weapons?
3) Should it come to terms with a nuclear neighbor and instead push for the idea of a nuclear-free Middle East?
Guzansky points out that in 2006, at the annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, Riyadh announced, along with the other countries in the GCC, their interest in developing peaceful nuclear programs. While being careful not to target Iranian ambitions, the objective was clear, as the author notes: “The primary motivation was Iran’s nuclear ambition.”
The author believes that Saudi Arabia has actually no other choice but to pursue its own nuclear program in the face of a growing Iranian influence in the region. He argues that in a context in which the Kingdom finds itself as the de-facto leader of the Arab world (in the face of an Egyptian steady eclipse as the leader of the Arab world ), if Riyadh wants to counterbalance the influence of the “ideological-religious rival and main competitor for regional influence” embodied by Tehran, it makes sense for the Saudi leadership to pursue its own nuclear program.
In order to do so, the author suggests that Riyadh could look towards its ally in Islamabad for help on this issue. Guzansky indicates that in 2003, the former Israeli head of military intelligence appeared in front of the Knesset’s Foreign Relations and Defense Committee and declared: “the Saudis are in contact with Pakistan for purchasing nuclear warheads for the surface-to-surface missiles in their arsenal…They have decided to act in order to redress the balance of terror vis-à-vis Iran’s armament, and intend to deploy Pakistani warheads on their soil.”
The reader is reminded of the close defense ties that exist between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, especially as it appears that it was in fact the former that was the financial catalyst behind the latter’s nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, “after the Islamic Revolution and throughout most of the 80’s Pakistan stationed military forces in Saudi Arabia and the two nations cooperated in assisting the Afghani mujahidin,” writes the author. In short, there is a history of defense ties and Guzansky depicts a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia “find itself in a sensitive security situation, it may well be that it would seek to capitalize on its investment in the Pakistani program.”
What brings together these two Sunni countries, notes the author are common interests. He describes what the two countries see in each other as follows: “Pakistan has the knowledge and skilled manpower but lacks the cash, while Saudi Arabia has vast cash reserves but lacks the relevant infrastructures and skilled manpower.”
Riyadh, suggests the author, could welcome Pakistani weapons on its soil and have those weapons being operated by Pakistan itself so as not to contradict its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This scenario, as far-fetched as it may sound, should not necessarily be rejected “especially if Iran decides that the circumstances are right for it to ‘break out’ for nuclear weapons,” analyses Guzansky’s paper.
Launch of China’s CSS-2 ballistic missile (Credit: MDA as quoted by www.missilethreat.com)
The Saudis have in their arsenal missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. In the 1980s, the Saudis acquired 36 Chinese CSS-2 surface-to-surface missiles in a secret deal. Guzansky believes that these missiles “supply a base for possible upgrade and for training professional teams” despite their age. In addition, news reports have recently circulated indicating that Saudi Arabia was “upgrading the strategic missile reserves” as well as the “the inauguration of a new command and control facility associated with the kingdom’s missile force”.
The Saudis are clearly growing wary over the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb. As recently expressed by the Kingdom’s Foreign Minister: “Sanctions are a long-term solution…But we are looking at an Iranian nuclear program within a shorter term because we are closer to the locus of the threat. We are interested in immediate rather than in gradual solutions.” The Iranian development, the author believes, might provoke an acceleration of Saudi plans and perhaps a defense treaty with Pakistan spurred by the urgency of the situation.
Guzansky believes that strategically Saudi Arabia is left with two options based upon “if and how” Iran decides to break the nuclear threshold:
If Iran does not break that threshold: Saudi Arabia “turns a blind eye” and works to deepen the cooperation among the Gulf states.
If Iran displays the acquisition of nuclear weapons and for example undertakes a nuclear test: Saudi Arabia would then feel compelled to acquire these same weapons.
Riyadh could well inform the United States of these strategic options in a bid to force the latter to increase its commitment to the Kingdom’s security as it recognizes that the United States has superior military capabilities. But let us make no mistake, warns Guzansky, Saudi Arabia is known to diversify its security options and apart from seeking a greater security commitment from the US, Riyadh will pursue other alternatives.
According to Guzansky, these other alternatives will respond to two imperatives: greater independence in decision-making, and the upholding of “a stable balance of deterrence” in the region for the foreseeable future.
However, it is clear that this palette of choices will not satisfy the United States. As the author recalls: “there are not many states that are as important to the United States as Saudi Arabia.” The author concludes that the mere existence of the “Saudi Option” will force Washington to enhance its commitment to the security of the Kingdom. Failure to do so will lead to a serious crisis between the two countries, concludes Guzansky.
The pilot on the F-35B is really a centerpiece of what we are calling the three-dimensional warrior. The new helmet and the interactions between the pilot and the systems on the new aircraft provide the hub for new operational capabilities. In this interview, SLD talks with USMC aviator Lt. Col. Dehner from Headquarters Marine Corps, Aviation. Lt. Col. Dehner is involved in shaping how the new helmet will enhance the warfighting capability of the F-35B. Lt. Col. Dehner is part of the JSF cell at HQMC. He is currently the USMC test coordinator for F-35 and has flown with prototype test helmets in the F-35 concept of operations simulators.
SLD: You are involved with the program for the development and testing for the new helmet for the F-35B. Could you describe how the systems on the aircraft shape a new environment within which the helmet functions as well?
Lt. Col. Dehner: One of the new operational capabilities of the F-35B is its ability to sense the IR energy or the heat coming off the environment, a full 360 degrees around the aircraft. It’s as if you are in the middle of a soccer ball is how I always picture it looking out through the facets. I have these IR sensors all around me. And then the aircraft also detects more of the electromagnetic spectrum similar to a Prowler. So, you do really have a lot more information that’s coming in or is available to be understood.
This capability shapes the classic question of how does one put information in a way that a human being can understand and act upon it? Part of the answer is the way the information is displayed which enables the pilot to be a tactical decision-maker. You gain this God’s eye perspective of the world. So, instead of being very mechanically-driven like we are in our current aircraft, in which I have to help move the radar around to make it do it’s thing, I can pull back and allow the systems on the aircraft to do that on it’s own.
Now, that’s only part of the answer. The next piece is the Distributed Aperture Systems (DAS), that is sensing the IR world all around me. You have camera eyes staring at all times around you, and how do I get that information across to a person that, obviously, can only look in one direction at any given time.
So the system’s interface, the DAS imagery, gets projected on a patch on your helmet, which is an improvement or a next a step from our current helmet. So now, I have a window into this other world and I can look at information in the IR. And as I turn my head I’m looking at the world surrounding me with the DAS information coming across.
SLD: So that the DAS system works closely with the helmet and it creates a new environment for the pilot to operate in. You also were alluding to something I find interesting, which is this whole relationship between the classic tactical fighter and a specialized war battle manager, who’s on electronic warfare aircraft. In fact those specializations will be broken apart by the F-35.
Lt. Col. Dehner: Absolutely. The classic tactical fighter was defined by the strike package where I’m going to have aircraft that will deliver weapons; I’m going to have fighters that will either clear the way or protect them while they go in. And then I’m going to have electronic attack aircraft to provide another level of support. In contrast the F-35, by design, will be able to do all three of those things with either the same aircraft or the same little family of aircraft. So, you can prioritize different roles such as the two on the front are the fighters today. The third is going to pick up electronic attack. And the fourth is going to do the strike. But depending on how we’re configured, we can actually flex that real time. “Hey, looks like the fight is actually more on your side. So, we can actually shift that focus of effort to the other aircraft.” So, it just allows us an extremely flexible platform.
But with all that increased capability, you still have the same human beings that are flying aircraft similar to what we did 50 years ago. Now, you just have to essentially build up those pilots a different way. You take all the very classic training techniques; teach them how to actually fly the aircraft, teach them how to use the aircraft as a weapon and then, you’ve got to go down a different route that’s more or less teaching them to be an information manager, because this aircraft really is an information sponge. This aircraft just creates this little information hub in the sky. And the pilots, their job is to be effective for their primary mission, but then also decide how to get this information to other people, not just other pilots but also to the ground, because maybe they’re in a better spot to be more effective?
SLD: Tell us a little bit about the role of the helmet in facilitating, what you described?
Lt. Col. Dehner: The helmet in the F-35 will display fused data, and creates a picture so that, literally, when I look down through what would be the skin of the aircraft, I still get that projection of the ground underneath me. So, if I am trying to locate a target, the current helmets will give you a little box or a symbol to highlight that target. But as soon as the wing of the aircraft gets in the way then I would have had to move the airplane physically to clear it out of the way. So, now I can see through the wing with this new system.
An immediate benefit is I don’t have to move my aircraft into a spot that I might not want. For example, when we set up an orbit for intel, surveillance, reconnaissance, that ISR mission which is a lot of what we spend time doing. There are better paths in the sky for us to just stay within a relative distance, and I want to get a really good picture, so I’m just going to set up an orbit. But that instantly can flex with, oh, my wing might be in my own way, so you’re going to end up flying these non-optimal formations. I’m going to move the wing out of the way so I can get a better look. Oh, now, I’ve got to get back on profile. That’s a lot of the work that the pilot is up to. Now, I don’t have to do that with the DAS.
SLD: So, how would you describe the changes in pilot behavior you see from this synergy of the DAS and the helmet? Or what kinds of changes might you see?
Lt. Col. Dehner: One of the other significant changes is just the way we actually can fly our formations and getting more out of the handful of aircraft in an area where we operate. With traditional tactics, we’re going to be tied relatively close to each other, because I’m going to be checking for anybody shooting at you from the ground. You’re going to be checking me. So, we tend to fly together. We don’t have to, but you take it at risk if you don’t.
But, all right, to get more aircraft over a larger area, we’re going to separate. And you can only do that when you have very fixed-wing tolerant conditions. I’m not going to be shot at a lot, because I’m either at a higher altitude or the threat is just not there.
With the DAS, the computer is working for me all the time looking all around, making sure that no one’s taking a shot at me. So that instantly is going to free up the pilot and then the squadron to just spread out over more space. And we’re not taking on risk, or adopting a different procedure, which is how we’d mitigate the risk today, because I have a system on board. So that’s the initial basic pilot behavior change that you’ll see right away.
SLD: I’ll ask you a final question, which is one of the controversies in Afghanistan has been control of collateral damage. It seems to me that this aircraft should help in this regard in a sense that by having a closer relationship enabled between the ground and the air element, the confidence level of using weapons in close support must clearly go up?
Lt. Col. Dehner: Precisely. The technology that we’ve enjoyed just in the last 10 years or so, has already improved that quite a bit. Now, this is going to be, again, that next huge step, because we’re getting more information to the pilots, so that’s going to make that pilot feel better about it. We’ve already started sending information down on our Legacy Aircraft. In the F-35, you’re actually going to have more options of information to push down to those ground commanders for shared decision-making.
An Interview with Tom Goudreau, Director Business Development, Information Systems and Global Services, Lockheed Martin
[slidepress gallery=’supporting-transcom’]
Source: Lockheed Martin, April 18th, 2010
SLD: Normally logistics and sustainment really don’t receive a lot of attention within the strategic debate, but clearly Afghanistan and Iraq have elevated the importance of these questions. Will there be more attention to these issues moving forward?
Tom Goudreau: I think there will from two perspectives:
One is there has been an ongoing strategic discussion about logistics, for no other reason than the operations and maintenance expense as a percentage of the Defense Department Budget continues to grow.
And that growth, in some ways, continues to put a lot of pressure on the recapitalization of the services.
So whether DoD wants to buy additional equipment like MRAPs or if they want to refresh and modernize tactical fighter aircraft, continued growth in the operations and maintenance budget has to be addressed. And so there continues to be an ongoing discussion about how to control costs and be more efficient without jeopardizing the service and support to the folks performing the mission.
SLD: I’m looking at General McNabb’s presentations of his command, the TRANSCOM, I note that one of the key emphasis that he puts on is what he calls transforming distribution and the importance of asset visibility as really the cornerstone for really modernizing how TRANSCOM operates. And I know Lockheed plays a key role in that effort, could you provide some insight with regard to the general idea that McNabb is focusing on and Lockheed’s role in kind of supporting that effort?
Tom Goudreau: There is no doubt that asset visibility and supply chain visibility are an important component of controlling bubbles in the supply chain. If you go back to earlier conflicts in the Second World War, Vietnam or even the first Gulf War, the military tends to have a process that they need something, they ask for it, they don’t get good feedback on what is coming and so they order it again. And then you end up having too many of the things you already have and maybe not enough capacity to get the things you need into theatre. And so giving everybody that awareness of where everything is at and when things are going to arrive really does prevent that from happening to the extent that it used to in the past.
SLD: I note that you have several contracts supporting TRANSCOM’s work in this area. Have those largely come from the acquisition of Savi and then carrying that Legacy capability forward or is this a new effort?
Tom Goudreau: This is an heritage Lockheed Martin started in the mid-1990’s leveraging our expertise working with the defense planning community on command and control systems. Savi certainly has added more technology and perspective on tools to equip items and collect more information about things in transit.
SLD: So it basically was a strategic effort that you already had underway and Savi just enhanced your capability to deliver in this strategic area.
Tom Goudreau: Correct.
SLD: Could you talk a little bit to the core contracts here, the Global Transportation Network and the whole Integrated Data Environment (IDE) Global Transportation Network (GTN) Convergence program (IGC program): what is the main focus of all that and what is the role of Lockheed Martin in all of that?
Tom Goudreau: In the case of the Global Transportation Network, that’s the mission system TRANSCOM uses to provide asset visibility for all the things that TRANSCOM is moving around the world. And the system has improved over time and become more comprehensive as far as an enterprise system, aggregating all of that distribution transaction activity information in a meaningful presentation of information for customers.
DLA in the 1990’s took responsibility for all DoD warehousing. And, in fact, operating those warehouses means that they do the majority of shipment preparationand physical dispatching of shipments than many in the defense supply chain.
DOD did designate TRANSCOM as the distribution process owner and the DLA director and the TRANSCOM commander jointly committed to move forward with a program called IGC, short for Integrated Data Environment (IDE) Global Transportation Network (GTN) Convergence. This program would like GTN and DLA IDE supply data joining DLA’s supply and warehouse management data with US TRANSCOM’sdistribution management data.
SLD: And IGC exists today.
Tom Goudreau: IGC does exist today. It’s in the process of expanding its operational user base, but the major event coming this year is the retirement of GTN. The team is on track to transition every GTN user to become an IGC user as of September 2010.
SLD: So there’ll be a common data system and a common concept of operations, is that the idea?
Tom Goudreau:Correct.
SLD: IGC’s supposed to basically synchronize all the elements of the logistics system and that’s the strategic objective for this effort?
Tom Goudreau: Correct. Having a single system of record for both supply and transportation allows supply chain stakeholders to effectively coordinate. IGC precludes logisticians from having a DLA system that has data coming from different locations and then a TRANSCOM system providing similar, but different, data. They deserve and accurate perspective on the status of materials moving into theatre and the availability of materials.
SLD: So common metrics and common data are meant to support an enterprise solution to managing the assets, while inventory of assets – so that you know where they are in the world – are aimed to have a much more accurate view of what’s where and what could be available from different global warehousing locations.
Tom Goudreau: Right. I think metrics also give you a sense of where you have choke points. TRANSCOM’s been keenly aware of the issues getting product from the shore into Afghanistan, whether it’s from Karachi up through Pakistan by road, whether it’s been our airlift assets and the availability of airlift, flying things into Afghanistan or the most recent initiative, which is basically to create a northern distribution network that really would handle a lot more volume more safely and securely into Afghanistan. So the metrics not only tell you what’s going on, but it also tells you what’s the limiting factors are in the distribution process. It doesn’t do any good to add capacity here in the U.S. if it’s not able to increase the responsiveness in theatre and vice versa.
SLD: Doesen’t it suggest that the coming up of the northern distibution network in Afghanistan, coupled with the air movement network, is really kind of a test case or a challenge to involve the new system?
Tom Goudreau: Right.GTN today does track all three modes of shipping. So they do have the tools to coordinate and track shipments and make effective decisions about where to expanding the distribution capacity.
SLD: What’s Lockheed’s role in helping support the GTN system and TRANSCOM and DLA?
Tom Goudreau: We both maintain and support the systems. So, if there are operational issues with the software, we support users to troubleshoot and determine whether it’s a user error or software error. We also manage and support all of the interfaces between GTN and the 30-plus systems that send it data on a daily basis. And then, of course, we ensure that the system has the capacity and technologies to absorb all that information in real time and responsibly.
SLD: So it’s a software development as well as data management support that you were talking about?
Tom Goudreau: We perform the actual systems support in a data center that’s operated by the government. We also perform software maintenance, software support, data integration and data quality management.
SLD: The Afghan mission will provide a new set of challenges to the efficiency of this overall system but also validates the need for such a system.
Tom Goudreau: Correct.
SLD: And your sense of the future evolution of both the network and perhaps Lockheed’s role in supporting that work, what would that be?
Tom Goudreau: I think the next step for the system is to extend the richness of information on the supply side of the supply chain, so that DLA’s purchasing activity, direct vendor delivery activity, warehousing and allocating activity is better tracked and aligned with the distribution process. A lot of that additional information right now is not visible in the IGC system. Rather than relying on someone having to send inquiries to DLA and ask, the system could be enhanced to integrate that data into IGC so that the user can see it all on a dashboard. And again, you can collect a richer set of metrics to ensure that you have balanced execution.
SLD: My own view is that this Afghan mission, the Logs and Sustainment Mission, is just very expensive and very demanding, so the ability to be more effective here is going to be absolutely essential not only to the success of the mission, but the ability to reduce the pressure on the recapitalization accounts.
Tom Goudreau: Right, the other challenge I think we have with Afghanistan, more so than we did with Iraq, is the need to be a responsible, multi-national partner. And so again, we want to do what’s efficient for ISAF as well as the U.S. forces and where our allies and ourselves can pool resources or balance what we do so that we can be efficient as a multi-national force. It’s an ongoing discussion as well. There are places where U.S. forces are providing support, whether it’s commodities, construction materials, food, fuel, ammunition, and partsto the NATO force in Afghanistan. We want to be able to give our NATO allies both awareness and understanding of what they can rely on and then vice versa, there are things that the NATO forces are providing to support the operation there, and we want to be able to share and collect data from our allies as well.
SLD: Well, that obviously puts a significant pressure on developing common metrics and common data protocols, I would assume.
General Duncan J. McNabb, Commander U.S. Transportation Command
SLD sat down with General Duncan J. McNabb, Commander U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and his staff to discuss the role of TRANSCOM in current operations, with a special emphasis on Afghanistan and Haiti. This part of the interview focuses upon TRANSCOM and its operational approach. For those of us old enough to remember when there was not a TRANSCOM, we tend to think of the Air Mobility Command. We tend to focus on the airlift component for military supply. As such, our understanding is really limited concerning how TRANSCOM really executes the joint mission and balances its capabilities to deliver goods and troops to the globally deployed warfighter.
In this interview, General McNabb explains the TRANSCOM approach and highlighted three overall points:
First, TRANSCOM is the Distribution Process Owner, or DPO, and has authority over the end-to-end delivery of kit and personnel. As such it is evolving data collecting techniques, shaping metrics and enhancing its ability to fuse data to understand options in delivering the capability to the warfighter. Transparency of data is a key requirement for full mission success.
Second, TRANSCOM emphasizes multi-modal operations and processes, selecting the right mode(s) of transportation to meet warfighter needs. The task is to balance efficiency and effectiveness. The command focuses on using commercial partners, military airlift, ground delivery or sealift options and looks for the optimal combination to deliver kit and personnel.
Third, in determining options, TRANSCOM works trade-offs among prioritization and speed of delivery, cost of delivery options, and security of supply.
This triangle, in effect, is how choice is determined (the first graphic in the slide show below was produced by SLD to illustrate the TRANSCOM Con-ops)
SLD: How would you describe the overall role of TRANSCOM for the joint forces?
General McNabb: We are the Distribution Process Owner, or DPA, for transportation for the joint forces. We exercise the enterprise for end-to-end delivery options to the warfighter. And we are evolving our approach over time, for we have eight years of lessons learned: this evolving concept of operations is a marriage of technology and organization in working with military and commercial assets to deliver goods and troops to the deployed warfighter.
SLD: You describe TRANSCOM as operating as having a multi-modal emphasis. What do you mean by this?
General McNabb: We manage the operation of those assets to deliver capability to the warfighter. As such, we use the military airlift and sealift available to us as well as work with our commercial air and sea transportation partners. We are looking for cost effective ways to deliver capability. Obviously, the priority is important as well. If it is time urgent, we will use air. If it is less time urgent, we rely on other assets. But in general we deliver about 90% of our equipment by surface modes and 10% by air. In Afghanistan, based on the threat, we deliver approximately 80% by surface and 20% by air.
SLD: What is the impact of TRANSCOM on overall US global presence?
General McNabb: We have responded to 50 major events since 1990. Nearly 2/3rds of these are for disaster or humanitarian relief. In many ways, we are the focal point for the blending of soft and hard power; we facilitate both. The existence and operation of TRANSCOM is unique and gives an asymmetric advantage for our nation and allows us to support our allies as well. At any point in time, our components execute missions to provide 35 ships loading under way or offloading, and more than 900 sorties each day.
SLD: What is the major effort by TRANSCOM on process improvements and approaches?
General McNabb: Asset visibility is the cornerstone of effective end-to-end delivery. We are working to enhance such visibility. Indeed, we are standing up a new fusion center, which will allow us to have real-time visibility on assets and to make better decisions that support the warfighter. TRANSCOM has and will always, always deliver.
SLD: TRANSCOM faces an ever-changing demand structure. How does it manage flexibility to adjust to changing demand?
General McNabb: We have several flexible tools, including the Transportation Working Capital Fund, a flexible acquisition system, in house commercial, and international legal expertise to facilitate contracting, a foreign policy advisory unit among other things. We have a flexible set of management tools, which allow us to adjust to the challenges. Taken together, these logistics tools give our nation an asymmetric advantage over any adversary.
SLD: Having an end-to-end management system would seem to allow you to squeeze out savings in operations through gaining an ability to make strategic choices over how best to ship specific assets?
General McNabb: Our analyses show that we are in effect supporting a brigade combat team by the savings we squeeze out from improved operations each year. In numerical terms, we save about $500 million a year and are working on further improvements across the Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) with our other JDDE partners.
SLD: There has been criticism of the inability to deliver M-ATVS on a timely basis. What is the source of the problem?
General McNabb: We were tasked to deliver 500 M-ATVs per month. We have been on line and poised to do so since November. We are now delivering 500 M-ATVs this month with a combination of air and surface assets.
A New Theme At Eurosatory This Year : Operational Medecine (Credit photo: 1er Régiment, Thomas Samson, French Ministry of Defense, ECPAD, Moselle, November 1997)
Retaining the same successful mixture of outdoor and indoor stands as in previous sessions, Eurosatory 2010 will include a full program of conferences, workshops and special features, strongly opening this year to security. As a matter of facts, Eurosatory will gather once again all international experts and main actors from defence and security sectors and will offer the opportunity to meet them all in Paris from 14 to 18 June 2010.
In accordance with its decade traditions, Eurosatory adapts to the needs of armed and security forces in a world where threats and operational skills are changing. The 2010 Exhibition will respond to these trends in several ways.
For example, as a consequence of harsh ongoing conflicts, armed forces are particularly concerned to offer soldiers the best forward medical support, since the first few minutes are so critical for the survival of a wounded soldier in action. In 2010, Eurosatory will become more deeply involved in this domain through the development of an “Operational medicine” cluster. This cluster will bring together companies in the domain presenting their innovative products, as well as the armed forces health services presenting their equipment and know-how.
As in 2008 Eurosatory will feature a technology cluster on the theme of UVS, an area of key importance for modern armed forces. Today, thousands of UAS are deployed in conflict zones. They are also widely employed for security and civil activities. In 2010, for the first time, the international “UVS Forum” will be embedded in the exhibition and located for five days besidetechnology clusters. It will include an arena for live demonstrations of UGV rides and light UAV flights. This fast-growing cluster will become a meeting point for companies in the sector presenting the latest innovations.
Last but not least example of a response to changing threats, Eurosatory opens widely to Homeland Defence. More than 300 exhibitors declare fully or partly dealing with security equipment. A dedicated cluster will be devoted to HLD-HLS and the Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris, a military firemen corps, will demonstrate its skills as well as the French Gendarmerie Nationale, which will stage high-tech exhibit. An extended special area is also devoted to the European Defence and Security Meetings® (EDSM), especially dealing with Homeland Defence and Security concerns.
In line with such features is the general growing trend in dual capability illustrated by products, equipment and technologies displayed by exhibitors.
While maintaining the first place in classical land and airland warfare armament, vehicles, weapon systems and equipment, Eurosatory will reflect the significant changes that are taking place in global perceptions of what constitute national security, a statement more and more asserting a growing convergence which is now called the “Defence and Security continuum”.
Eurosatory is also the business week for gaining access to world markets especially for SMEs through the Eurosatory One-to-one Business Meetings® (4900 meetings in 2008) and the business strategy consulting. 79% of exhibitors are internationally ranked SMEs and micro enterprises from 52 countries. The exceptional exhibitor (70%) and visitor (50%) loyalty rates confirm Eurosatory as the world reference in its domain and an efficient business accelerator. A fact which is not extraneous to a significant presence of high qualified first time exhibitors.
As a consequence, the exhibition is a guarantee of high level meetings between all industry exhibitors and visitors: primes, suppliers, subcontractors, research and development, laboratories, institutes and service companies as well as meetings with all customers of defence and security equipment and services. Due to this opportunity, Eurosatory holds a strong appeal for decision-makers and buyers, official delegations (520 VIPs in 2008 in 117 delegations from 73 countries), experts and influencers (Eurosatory Guests) from 30 countries, professional users (4500 representatives from the armed and security forces of 86 countries and international bodies (UN, NATO, EU).
Because Eurosatory is also a showcase for innovations and future technologies, it is the prime place for attending world technology launches. Stressed by international media and visitors, the exhibition can such a way distinguishes itself with the number of physically present equipment and weapon systems (more than 1500 displayed on 138 600 m2), live indoor and outdoor demonstrations and a large number of improved technology clusters: individual soldier equipment, embedded electronics, CBRN detection and protection assets, day and night vision, operational medicine, unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, training and simulation.
Finally, Eurosatory is imposing itself as the forum to prepare tomorrow’s defence and security. Because using high technology equipment doesn’t make sense without having considered tactical or strategic environment, the 2010 exhibition will stage a large series of conferences and seminars throughout the week on targeted subjects in several areas.
The first one will be an international Land Operations Forum, sponsored by GICAT (the French Defence Manufacturers Association) and the French Ministry of Defence. It will comprise 6 conferences confronting doctrine, technology solutions and lessons learned from operations, where international experts will debate on dedicated military topics.
On the broader canvas, think tanks from many countries will gather in an “International Think Tank Village” holding conferences and workshops on Defence policies and strategy.
A two-day International Operational Medicine Conference, held by DCSSA, the French armed forces joint medical service, will stage a session on “Forward Combat Medical Support”, with a panel of German, French, UK and US medical experts and an other on “Forward Surgical Support” including presentation of equipment in use by French Army, US Army and US Marine Corps. Several other countries have announced their participation.
The Training & Simulation cluster will present the latest challenges of the domain in two conferences and a series of expert workshops.
As previously mentioned, Eurosatory will be the venue for the UVS Forum Annual Conference held by UVS International. Of course, all technology clusters will hold a strong series of conferences and workshops where exhibitors will present their latest products and skills in advanced technology.
All these international events will bring in one place defence experts and actors from around the world offering industry, politicians, the armed forces, researchers and the media an opportunity to reflect on tomorrow’s defence.
All exhibition events and products launches will be relayed by media. The press centre will meet over 660 journalists from all five continents representing almost 330 media organisations with a strong international impact.
Visitors will take advantage of the completely renewed Eurosatory website (www.eurosatory.com) to register in advance and to find out detailed information. Different tools will be available in the weeks before the event, enabling visitors to prepare for their visit through the comprehensive in-line exhibitor catalogue and to arrange pre-scheduled appointments.
The 2008 session counted 52,414 visitors from 131 countries. Eurosatory 2010 is a required visit for meeting and interacting with all defence players. It means that Eurosatory allows all political-military decision-makers, industry players and professionals to obtain, in a single place within five days, all the information they need and to find solutions to all their equipment requirements.
Accordingly, it is also a MUST for all armed and security forces members, military and civil service, to update professional knowledge, to evaluate and compare, to see and test in live, to recognize trends, to meet counterparts and to debate doctrine and concepts.
Moreover, Eurosatory can be named the Presidents’ exhibition as more than 50% of exhibitors companies are headed by their Chaiman or CEO.
For all these reasons, Eurosatory is definitely the place to be in June 2010.
The Euro crisis associated with the May, 2010 Greek bailout is more fundamental than closing a one-time hemorrhage of debt imbalances. Politics within the Eurozone national governments are putting severe stresses on the cohesiveness of Continental Europe. Germany wants the rest of Europe to sign up to a crash diet to cut deeply into the accumulated fat of social spending and retirement excesses. Germany’s neighbors want Germany to fund the health spas which the rest of Europe believes is needed to meet German demands. People in the streets of Europe are rebelling against their own governments’ efforts to impose spending cuts and tax increases, and now they are starting to question the benefits of being aligned with a stingy Germany. For different reasons, the idea of leaving the Euro and returning to national autonomy has come back to life, not only in Greece but also in Spain, Italy, France and even Germany. The historical forces of fragmentation are once again at work.
The process of putting Humpty Dumpty together again would require nothing short from a significant advance beyond the Maastricht Agreements, which put the Euro together in the late 20th Century. That bargain, which put the new Europe together, lived in a permissive financial and political environment of the 1990s. That environment vaporized as the Great Recession gripped the world from 2007 onwards, posing huge financial and political challenges to Europe, to the trans-Atlantic relationship and to the global competition.
The first consequence will be diminished power of Brussels over the nation states which constitute the European Union. The Germans insist on becoming a “more normal power” and want to protect their financial stability against outsourcing economic equality within Europe through the mediation of Brussels and its various funds. The more prudent “nationalistic” course in Bonn will most likely be re-enforced by a deeper relationship with London. The British have been skeptical of the Euro and the creation of a common currency without a common budgetary process from the outset. They have been proven right to do so. Now a new government has come to power, which must deal with the growing fiscal deficit of London precisely at a time when Berlin is seeking partners in a more prudent fiscal management approach for Europe as a whole.
The second consequence of the crisis is to highlight the growing tension between the costs of the social welfare system in Europe and the need for a new growth model. The current social welfare system in Europe was funded by substantial domestic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and by export growth in subsequent decades. The sustained growth momentum of recent years has now been called into question by aging of the European population and a dramatic slowdown in world demand for what Europe wants to sell. Having grown addicted to reliance on external demand, Europe allowed domestic consumption to take a back seat to boosting exports. World trade fell into a deep, sustained decline in 2008, for the first time since the Great Depression, and even now shows little sign of recovery to pre-2008 rates of growth. As growth slowed, national governments chose to run bigger and bigger deficits to keep up social spending, increasing borrowing by selling debt not only to their own banks but to other banks throughout the land of the Euro. Debt has piled onto debt, and now the Eurozone leaders have devised a financial “shock and awe” response which adds yet more debt, in a vain effort to convince world investors that the Euro and the European Union can survive. This has left Europe with a very slow or even negative growth economy. Leaders in Europe now need to address what the growth model for the next thirty years will be. It cannot be defined by what it is not – namely a polluting and sweatshop environment. Although the service sector is important, a return to manufacturing and ensuring access to commodities to generate growth remain fundamental. There may be a “green manufacturing revolution” in prospect but it won’t happen by itself with economic investments, incentives and a hard working workforce. Growing debt cannot be ignored, because it is increasingly difficult to find lenders to lend to the member governments simply to keep spending going without prospect of resumption of robust economic growth.
The third consequence will be to accelerate the global competition for capital. The “good” debt rating countries will compete with other members of the European community, the United States, China and other major contributors to global economic growth. Capital is getting more costly; and Europe is in direct competition with the United States for many of the same sources of capital. If the European economy stagnates or falls back into recession, there will be flight of capital to the safest alternatives. Investors will seek to preserve capital by parking in the most liquid world markets, where assets bought one week could, if needed, be sold the next week without significant losses. The most liquid markets for parking are the US, and to a lesser extent, the UK and Japan. Already, in the spring of 2010, we can see collapsing confidence in European leadership in the form of accelerating selloff of the Euro with capital flight to the dollar.
The fourth consequence is that the rising cost of capital and the cost of the social welfare system will put downward pressure on public expenditures. All public expenditures whether defense, non-defense, medical or whatever will be under pressure from the challenge to manage the Euro and its underlying debt structure.
The Euro crisis provides a foundation from which several strand of new European development might well emerge.
First, the French-German bargain that built Europe will be under growing strain as the end to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) looms in 2013. Since the birth of the EEC, the CAP was the critical mechanism which provided funding of the Euroean Commission and transfer payments from industrial centers to the peasants and farmers in rural Europe. Germany’s transfer payments to its neighbors were the crucial adhesive which bound together not only the nations but the peoples of what eventually became the European Union and the Eurozone.
Earlier in this decade EU leaders decided the time had come to undertake major structural reforms in the CAP. The Germans especially wanted to end their role as paymasters for farmers and peasants in neighboring countries. When Poland sought to join the EU, the Germans saw the prospect of ever growing and never ending transfer payments to that potentially gigantic agricultural producer. An historic meeting between French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder took place in which the Germans pushed for a phase out of the CAP. Chirac, whose personal political base was rural French farming, refused immediate reform, but the two leaders agreed that major changes could begin in 2013 – after Chirac’s time as President. We are now approaching 2013, and many Germans are looking forward to becoming a “normal” nation, without obligations to send Euros from Germany to its neighbors to support their rural voters. If the CAP were to come to an end, or be drastically curtailed, one consequence would be a major reduction in the flow of cash which now supports the European Commission and its various programs. This political adhesive among EU members would become less effective, and open new domestic political stresses within several of the German neighbors.
Second, the German dependence upon European trade and economic relationships is growing less as its dependence on Russia and Asia grows. The ties between Berlin and Moscow will grow stronger as the Germans deal with need to have reliable and cost effective energy and commodities to keep their manufacturing sector vibrant. This is especially true as the Chinese build their global commodities base in areas where the Germans would not be able to contest the growing significance of Chinese ties. As for the Franco-German alliance, the French elite have started to question the value to France of close links to an increasingly assertive Germany. The financial crisis of the Euro countries in the spring of 2010 was marked by German bullying of France’s leadership and the public subordination of Paris to Berlin. Impending diminution of German support of rural France adds additional heavy political strain.
Third, Northern Europe, notably Norway and Denmark, will have access to the Arctic and its commodities over the years ahead. The opportunity to build economic wealth and ties in the North will increase in importance over loyalty to Brussels and the management of the flow of expenditures between Northern and Southern European which Brussels currently manages.
The need to shape a new economic growth model and the re-structuring of Europe along the lines suggested will also reshape European security and defense. On the one hand, there will be less public sector money available to provide for defense. This would certainly suggest that engagements in lands not seen as directly connected to strategic interests – Afghanistan certainly comes to mind – will be jettisoned.
On the other hand, growing strategic threats from states like Iran, and the need to ensure infrastructure security and to ensure the flow of commodities and goods may well drive European states to reconsider their commitments to security and investments in air and naval assets essential to the global flow of goods and services.
Reconfiguration of European interests will happen against the backdrop of an America which will be competing with Europe for capital, and reducing its ability to defend the global commons, to use a current US phrase. A significant drawdown of US power projection capabilities and growing commitment to land forces will challenge European states to consider how best to ensure for own security. On the other side of the Atlantic, current assumptions in Washington that security ties with Europe remain essentially intact will likely be tested as European ability to maintain the role of a player in world security recedes.
Constantine Pappas is starting a series on the development of the UAV environment in the Department of Defense as a new regular SLD contributor.
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This is the first of a series of anecdotal vignettes of the development of the UAV (now called UAS) environment in the Department of Defense. Subsequent articles will deal with:
Pioneer: How The Program Survived A 27% Readiness Factor
Small drones: A Fractionated Market That Enabled Innovation with No Adult Supervision
Predator: A Success Story in Creating a Market
Global Hawk: Managing Risk/Reward
Many recent attitudes reflect the first flight of an unmanned vehicle in 1783. As Jim Winchester writes in The Timeline of Aviation:
“An unmanned test balloon flew from Paris north to Gonesse, a village now situated between Charles de Gaulle and Le Bourget airports. There it suffered the indignity of being attack and destroyed by bewildered peasants.”
A fate suffered by many recent UAV projects…
This series addresses the difficulties of introducing a Disruptive Technology in the Defense community and to provide lessons learned for program managers, operators and decision makers. Wikipedia states that: “Disruptive Technology and Disruptive Innovation are terms used in business and technology literature to describe innovations that improve a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, typically by being lower priced or designed for a different set of consumers. Disruptive technologies are particularly threatening to the leaders of an existing market, because they are competition coming from an unexpected direction.”
The perspectives presented in these articles range broadly across four decades of success and failure with this disruptive technology.
[slidepress gallery=’qh50-slideshow’]
Credits: The photos of Destroyer, Short Final and Snoopy are U.S. Navy; the ones of the Night Panther and Armed QH-50 are DARPA; and the one of Jeep Control station is Gyrodyne.
Navy’s First Fleet-Fielded UAV System: Successful Operations, Failure In Management
Why does a program that performs 400 percent better than its Technical Development Plan requires, has been fielded on over 100 ships, delivered under schedule and under budget, and performs with a weapons systems effectiveness factor that is 12 percent higher than its nearest competitor get terminated?
Users and Buyers Have Different Goals
With the Cold War in full hue and cry and a dramatic Soviet submarine building program presenting a major threat, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) was a primary strategic factor for the US Navy in the 1950s and 1960s. The Air Force was held in abeyance from ASW by congressional edict, preserving ASW as the Navy’s unique mission.
Within the Navy, the aviation and surface platform barons and their communities were locked in mortal combat for ascendency in the ASW mission role. While the US submarine community was focused on the “silent service” role, the backroom intelligence relationships with the aviation community were very strong. The aviators were effective in collecting Soviet sub signatures for use by the “silent service.” These intelligence community relationships created a strong interwoven link between subs and aviation.
The surface community “black shoes” viewed ASW as one of their three prime warfare missions, the other two mission areas being Anti-Air Warfare and Anti-Surface Warfare. The competition between the communities was fierce. It reflected competition in a zero-sum game where careers, promotions, personalities, and egos were involved in a winner-loser environment.
Admiral Arleigh (“31 Knot”) Burke, a surface sailor, served from 1955-1961 as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and became the protagonist for the Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) to fill the need for a surface ship with a long-range ASW weapons delivery capability. Burke was willing to take high risks like DASH in order to restore the surface Navy’s position within the Navy’s air, sub, and surface hierarchy and he had the personal clout to push through the changes that he felt the Navy needed – a four star change-agent.
During the late 1950s, the Marine Corps established a competition for a one-man helicopter for troop operations in a nuclear environment. The coaxial Rotocycle, developed by the Gyrodyne Company of Long Island, NY, won the competition. Admiral Burke observed the competition and saw the machine as the perfect vehicle to extend the range of surface ship weapons delivery beyond that of the Rocket Assisted Torpedo (RAT) and the follow-on Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC).
At Burke’s insistence, the Navy initiated the DASH program with Gyrodyne, owned by Peter J. Papadakis, a flamboyant Greek immigrant.
Since DASH was a flying machine, the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER, now NAVAIR) assumed the responsibility for buying, fielding, and supporting the air vehicles that would be flying off destroyers in support of the surface community missions. BUAER designated the QH-50 DASH as a “naval aircraft,” a decision that would prove to be the death knell for the program.
The Naval Ship Systems Command (now NAVSEA) was responsible for implementing the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program. Eventually, over 100 ships were outfitted with DASH as an operational mission system in competition with the naval aviation community. This was the first time that the aviation and the surface ship community had interaction on a joint program other than aircraft carriers. The cultures and vocabularies were different and how they viewed their mission areas were in direct competition.
This would not be the last time unmanned systems would be in this situation.
FRAM Destroyer Operating DASH (credit: U.S. Navy)
What Was the DASH System
The QH-50 air vehicle used the Boeing T50-BO-8, and, later, the T50-BO-12 heavy fuel gas turbine engines. The T-50-BO engines were also used in mine sweeping boats with the designation of LM-XX. Two QH-50 air vehicles were carried aboard a FRAM destroyer and secured in the hangar. Each vehicle could be rolled out and spotted for flight operations. The deck handling equipment was designed to ensure positive control of the QH-50 during all deck movement and could be rigged and un-rigged in about three minutes by the QH-50 detachment personnel. The actual time to launch from secured for sea in the hangar to lift off was about seven minutes. The hangar was alsoused for performing all organizational maintenance.
In addition to the hangar, the ship had an installed Ground Control System (GCS) in a separate small equipment room, generally located on the main deck below the hangar spaces. Full redundancy was provided by a “mix and match” dual transmitter, dual antenna, and dual coder/decoder GCS capability. The primary control station for the entire system was on the flight deck under the control of the DASH Officer, the officer-in-charge of a detachment. There was a secondary control station in CIC where the ship’s CIC Officer could control the air vehicle at extended ranges by using plots of the submarine target and the UAV on the NC-2 plotter. A separate storeroom used only for the DASH parts completed the ship facilities required to support the UAV system.
The QH-50 was a very benign air vehicle for payload integration. Since the QH-50 was designed to carry two torpedoes (each weighed 450 lbs) side by side and to release one at a time, the air vehicle was relatively insensitive to lateral shifts of the center of gravity (CG). The digital control system had several spare switch functions and with three hard points on the airframe, and up to 21 KVA of airborne power available, it was possible to interface many packages with the QH-50. The simple engine interface and the over-capacity transmission enabled the system to have a significant built-in load carrying capability of about 1,100 lbs without a great deal of concern for CG position.
Using heavy fuel (JP-5), DASH could remain airborne for about 1.75 hours carrying two MK-44 or one MK-46 torpedo out to a convergence zone range of about 30 miles. The range was limited by the radar return from the drone. While a DME transponder capability was available, BUAER declined to invest in the $2,500 per unit and many QH-50 were lost due to loss of radar tracking as it flew over the radar horizon. The operating altitude of the DASH was limited electronically to 1,000 feet because that height was thought sufficient for torpedo deployment.
Dash On Short Final (credit: U.S. Navy)
“Using heavy fuel (JP-5), DASH could remain airborne for about 1.75 hours
carrying two MK-44 or one MK-46 torpedo out to a convergence zone range of about 30 miles.”
The 5 hour endurance, shown in this table, was attained through the use of saddle tanks for special mission purposes.
DASH Physical and Performance Characteristics
The normal complement for the DASH was a five person detachment consisting of an Ensign or LT(jg) with no prior aviation experience and a skilled enlisted crew of two aviation machinists and two avionics technicians. The ship provided two nono-rated plane handlers. The detachments were formed out of VU-3 and VC-6 personnel for PAC and LANT units, respectively. The DASH personnel normally had no ship duties under way and could spend their entire time on maintenance and preparation for flight.
The personnel situation deteriorated over time. Instead of highly trained enlisted aviation ratings, the DASH detachments were made up of lower skilled ratings, which became reflected in the performance and readiness of the system.
Training was performed through the existing Navy infrastructure. Flight training for the DASH officer consisted of about 8-12 hours of actual flight time and about 6-8 weeks of classroom instruction for both the officers and enlisted personnel.
DASH Experiences Barriers to a Disruptive Technology – Perception Becomes Reality
With Admiral Burke planning to retire and Admiral George Anderson, a Naval Aviator, taking his place as CNO, the seven year development period initially planned for the DASH was truncated to three and the DASH was placed into the Fleet in 1963, essentially using the fleet as a development and test organization.
Surface ship Commanding Officers did not like DASH. Because DASH had been designated a naval aircraft, any time a DASH was lost, a full OPNAV investigation was held to determine the reasons. The surface ship Commanding Officers were forced to hold these special hearings when a DASH was lost and to file OPNAV reports. Since the surface navy tended to eat their young, several CO’s careers were derailed by having letters of censure placed in their file because a DASH crashed. In short, flying DASH was risky to careers.
Hence, the situation was one where the users of DASH, the surface ship drivers, would not use the system due to this high risk. The aviation community that provided support for the DASH would not permit DASH to fly when manned aircraft were operating, and the naval aviation acquisition community was actively campaigning to kill DASH so Light Airborne Multi-Purpose Systems (LAMPS) could fly.
The key used by opponents of the DASH was the number of DASH losses. If the loss rate In this area, the surface and aviation communities were in harmony. The surface community knew that a manned helo would belong to a squadron and the ship‘s CO need only continue the ships normal routine. If anything happened, it would be the squadron CO’s responsibility. Hence no career risks.
Key facilitators involved in the anti-DASH campaign were the prime contractors. In addition to the normal advertising blitz, lobbying congressional support, the contractors discovered that their Naval Reserve officers on their staffs could be put to good use for the program when these individuals were on active duty. The active duty reserve officers were known to copy brochures and submit them to various professional naval publications as stories of value to the sailors. Bad news travels well and the DASH blemishes were continually exposed.
In 1966 the steady drumbeat of criticism, mainly from the Navy itself, forced the Secretary of Defense to defund the program in the 1967 budget. However, the DASH program had sufficient resources to continue for many years, in fact until 1971 when the program was directed to stop and the 750 DASH billets were redirected to the emerging LAMPS program.
Reality Does Not Mean the DASH Will Be Saved – Dead Man Walking
The Navy’s Technical Development Plan called for a mean time between loss (MTBL) of 1 loss for every 24 hours of flight time. The actual Fleet MTBL was 100 flight hours (LANTFLT) and 117 flight hours (PACFLT). Several unique US operations had a MTBL of 425 hours and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force had an MTBF of 650+hours.
Goodness had nothing to offer in the way of saving a disruptive technology. There were many bright lights for DASH in the fleet. These were the 20% that do the 80% of the lifting. The table below summarizes some of the higher standards of fleet performance, contrary to the drumbeat of antipathy.
DASH Fleet Performance
SNOOPY Payload Illustrates Ease of Integration (Credit: U.S. Navy)
Worthy of note is the comment regarding transit to YANKEE station and SNOOPY flight hours conducted in 1968. SNOOPY was an interesting non-program. While most of the Navy knew of DASH as the torpedo delivery system, fewer knew that Project Snoopy had been initiated to provide reconnaissance and gunfire support spotting capability in Vietnam. Six SNOOPY video packages were made up that were completely bolt-on self-contained systems to be carried on one of the three stores stationed on the QH-50. These packages provided omni-directional real time video data to the ship or to any station with a video receiver capability. On certain missions, once the QH-50 had lifted off and was inbound to the target, control of the QH-50 was passed to a manned helo that was equipped with a portable QH-50 control system. The manned helo extended the effective range of the QH-50 well beyond the normal shipboard maximum control range of 50 miles and was a first for UAV-manned aircraft interface. What made this feasible was the simplicity of interfacing the airborne DASH electronics.
The figure below provides a conceptual view of the project.
SNOOPY Con Ops
Nuclear monitoring for Project GREELEY was another capability. The project worked so well that DOE requested transfer of QH-50 from the Navy. The Navy declined.
Meanwhile, DARPA’s Dick Cesaro initiated the Night Gazelle and the Night Panther projects. Both of these projects were highly successful. These and several other projects were so far ahead of anything else in the DoD pantheon of favorite projects that eventually Dick was invited to leave DARPA. While the Egyptian Goose and similar projects (with new names) are now still operational, DASH died. Night Panther was the DARPA Weapons Demonstration program using the QH-50 Platform.
Night Panther .50 Cal Depleted Uranium Fleschette Gun (credit: DARPA)
The stability of the QH-50 in flight offered an outstanding opportunity for DARPA to extend the state of the art in controls and weapons delivery platforms. Consequently, DARPA launched the QH-50 NITE GAZELLE program to outfit the QH-50 as a weapons platform. When carrying weapons that required aiming, a large U-Mount platform provided the extreme stability required for precise weapon aiming. A good example of one of the more sophisticated projects is the QH-50 with a 5-hour endurance carrying a DU .50 caliber gun with a LLLTV and a contrast tracker (shown in the picture on the left).
The three stores station, the payload weight carrying capacity, and the use of Practice Multiple Bomb Racks (PMBR’s) gave the system a high degree of weapons utilization flexibility as shown in the photograph below.
Armed Q-50 : Weaponeering DASH (credit: DARPA)
The various capabilities of the QH-50, its operating experience and ability to be upgraded had no influence on the final decision to terminate the program. Worthy of note is that more than 30 years after termination of the program, the QH-50 was being flown by the Navy and the Army for T&E purposes.
It is important to examine why the program was rejected by the various communities regardless of the “goodness” of the program.
Barriers to Disruptive Technology and Lessons Learned
Let’s examine some of the barriers and lessons learned.
Jack Pappas was the Officer in Charge of the Navy’s first deployed DASH Unmanned Vehicle detachment in the Navy from 1962 to 1965 aboard USS James E. Kyes (DD-787). Since then, he has been an Assistant Branch Head at the Navy Research Laboratory, worked in the intelligence community, was in charge of Director Navy Business Development and Director of Strategic Planning for a Fortune 100 software company, managed a radar research center at the University of Pennsylvania, became an SES Chief Engineer of a Navy R&D Center, ran companies, did international business development for a Fortune 100 company and founded several start-up companies. Jack, a Naval Academy graduate, is a strategy and business development practitioner, performing tasks as diverse as cherry picking the Bulgarian military-industrial complex for investors in Lichtenstein to arranging $1 million USD financing for a large dog kennel. His consulting practice is headquartered in Lexington Park, MD. He is active in community pro bono work and divides his spare time between Maryland and West Virginia, commuting in his airplane.
Credit: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org
