The New Israeli UAV Eitan: Slightly Tiptoeing the Balance of Power With Iran?

03/16/2010

Franck Znaty
[email protected]

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has enlisted this week a new recruit within its ranks: the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Eitan, which is a domestic version of the Heron TP developed three years ago for export purpose  (it has been in particular used by French armed forces in Afghanistan). The UAV Eitan is the result of an IAF collaboration with the defense company Israel Aircraft Industries (IAA).

EITAN
Hanan Greenberg, IDF welcomes 'super-drone', February 18th, 2010 (www.ynetnews.com)

One of the largest on the market
This new UAV is described by the IAF as “major technological breakthrough”. The Eitan has a wingspan of 86 feet (26 meter) similar to that of a Boeing 737. It has a length of 79 feet (24 meters) and weighs close to 4.5 tons, which makes it one of the biggest UAV in the market. “The Eitan can stay in the air for more than 20 hours; it can carry very large cargo and fly very far, much further than any other unmanned drone in Israel” says IAF’s Lieutenant Colonel A..
Eitan’s endurance is similar to that of the US MQ-9 Reaper, the latest variant of the Predator drone, used in targeted killing missions against al Qaeda and Taliban leaders with AGM-114 Hellfire ground-to-air missiles.  This endurance capacity is the biggest one the IAF has at its disposal in its UAV fleet. The “large cargo” evoked earlier by the IAF officer is 1 ton whereas most of the Israeli drones can carry a maximum  weight of 250kg, reminds us Ynetnews.

Designed for high-altitude missions
Missions involving UAVs are taking a more prominent role within the IAF. Indeed, many operations once involving manned aircrafts are being handed over to UAVs squadrons, such as mission of intelligence gathering, escort or force protection. As indicated by Greenberg, in 2004 UAVs have registered 16,600 flight hours as this number jumped to 36,548 for the year 2009.The Eitan has already been used in missions such as during last year’s Cast Lead operation. As pointed out, by the Associated Press, the number of UAVs being purchased by the IAF is still unknown. A squadron will be especially put in place for operating the Eitan and will receive throughout the year a special training for its handling.

The Eitan will be used in high altitude along with other aircraft that will fly in lower altitude in missions involving long distance targets. According to Lieutenant Colonel Eytan, the IAF officer in charge of the Eitan project, this new aircraft “can complete a very wide range of missions, and adds specialized intelligence capabilities to the IAF. Very few UAVs in the world can reach its capabilities”. However, all these new capabilities come at a cost: “this aircraft has become much more expensive compared to its predecessors,” says another officer. “For that reason, we prepared a suitable ‘protective vest’ for it, so that it can cope with threats.”

eitan
Israel's long-range UAV 'no gamechanger', UPI, February 23rd, 2010 (www.upi.com)

A Useful Tool in the Arm-Wrestling Game with Teheran?
Despite the fact that many media and analysts describe this new Israeli capability as being able to reach and strike Iran, not everyone shares such a view and cautions that the drone “does not materially alter Israel’s ability to strike Iran.” The Stratfor analyst develops that  in order to reach Iran, the aircraft will have to fly above the Iraqi airspace and he describes this as “the most politically sensitive” route because of the American presence. To avoid this ‘unpleasant’ fact, the drone will have to contort the Arabian peninsula and fly back to Israel, and the Eitan, adds the analyst, “does not have the capability” to do so.

However, were the Israeli leaders given a green light for a preemptive strike against Iran, the Eitan, estimate some observers, would come in handy for post-attack operations, such as battle damage assessment. Such a capability could indeed be a determining element in any operations mounted against the Iranian nuclear installation.

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***Posted March 16th, 2010

Weapons Development: the Case of the Small Diameter Bomb I Block 9

03/15/2010

The 308th Armament Systems Wing at Eglin Air Force Base:
Weapons Development and the Case of the Small Diameter Bomb I Block 9

In mid-February SLD had a chance to interview Randy Brown, 308th Armament Systems Wing Director, and Lieutenant Colonel Amanda Kato, 681st Armament Systems Squadron Commander, 308th Armament Systems Wing, Air Armament Center, Air Force Materiel Command, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.  This squadron is responsible for the acquisition, production, and sustainment of the Small Diameter Bomb (Increment I) system.

The interview underscored two key elements more generally of interest to those who analyze innovation:

  • first, the wing has been infused regularly with officers who have combat experience and the programs clearly have benefited as such;
  • secondly, the SDB I Block 9 provided a rapid (18 month) process of change from contract to delivery of a significant capability to the force, which reflects an entirely different concept of operations (CONOPS) than the original SDB I program delivered.

The 308th Wing is a significant player in the evolution of U.S. and allied weapons, and the SDB I Block 9 is a major shift in the CONOPs and capability of the program, which will be introduced into the Afghanistan AOR this Spring.


SLD: Could you explain the role of the 308th Armament Systems Wing?

Randy Brown: For the 308th, we are the Acquisition Wing for all of the munitions that are purchased for the Air Force, and in some cases, with our joint programs, such as AMRAAM and other programs, which we are also purchasing for our sister services and our allies.  So we encompass everything from small munitions all the way up through the directed energy systems work.  We have a wide range of air-to-air, air-to-ground, and in some cases, some fairly significant advanced technologies that we’re working on. In addition, the 308th Armament Systems Wing develops test and training range instrumentation to support the DoD.

SLD: Does the wartime tempo affect your acquisition efforts as opposed to being a development wing?

Randy Brown: It does.  For one thing, we do have a very high deployment rate .  The Wing is heavily civilian, so we don’t have a lot of military.  But we do have, at any given time, a fairly significant number of our military members deployed, and just the fact that our officers and airmen that are assigned to us are deploying on a fairly regular basis infuses our work.  There was one week here not too long ago where we had three deployment taskings come down in one week.

So we’re fairly actively supporting the war just on that front, in addition to responding to requests such as the SDB I, which we’re going to talk about later on, Block 9.  Other things we’re doing such, as Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP) and other programs where a quick reaction capability is required, we’ll surge, move people into it, get contracts in place and go support the warfighter.

SLD:  So presumably, one aspect that helps you in your innovation and supporting the warfighter is the rotation of people on deployment in the AOR and then coming back and working in the Wing.

Randy Brown: That does help because you have first hand experience being over there, either working directly with the folks who are employing the weapon or are supporting the folks on the ground who are the beneficiaries of the weapons that we are developing and deploying.  So it does help a lot because it brings it home when you’ve lived there for six months or a year and you come back to the Wing with a different perspective than what you went over there with.

SLD: So it reduces the gap between the development of a weapon and its use.

Randy Brown: We have some of our folks that have deployed two or three times and it does help get rid of that gap between the developer and the eventual user and in our case of guys on the ground, eventual beneficiaries of what we develop.

SLD: Why don’t you discuss the fairly broad portfolio of capabilities that the Wing is involved with and is managing?

Randy Brown: We have the Direct Attack, which has some of the better-known systems, e.g. JDAM.  The Laser JDAM was a quick reaction to a request for some additional capabilities that were needed.  We have the Miniature Munitions, the SDB is in there, we’ll talk a little bit more about SDB I and then SDB increment II.

In our Air Dominance portfolio, we have the AMRAAM and other air-to-air weapons. The HARM targeting system falls within there also.  The Long-Range Attack area includes our air launched cruise missile programs with unique stealthy, precision, conventional, and electronic attack capabilities.  JASSM and JASSM-ER are in that part of the portfolio.

In addition we have MALD, which is our Miniature Air-Launched Decoy, which is a decoy system to add to the fog of war.

And then we have MALD-J which is  about to enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase and developmental test and evaluation.  The MALD-J is not only a decoy, but a jammer, so it brings both elements of deception and electronic attack into the fight.

We also have another area that we don’t talk about too much, but it’s our support to the test ranges and the training capability.  So we have things such as the sub-scale targets that we do along with the full-scale targets, the QF-4 and now the QF-16, which is in source selection.  We are developing the Common Range Integrated Instrumentation system (CRIIS), a new tri-service test instrumentation system, bringing submeter tracking accuracy, and a secure, efficient, data link to our latest generation of fighter aircraft.

We are also producing P5 for current generation aircraft to support the training community with realistic real-time simulations.  P5 operates in a joint US and  coalition environment and you’re able to know exactly what occurred on a training  mission.  You can also play back what you did during that training mission back on the ground and you can analyze it very closely. In fact, our P5 pod was very instrumental in helping solve an accident on an F-16 here not too long ago.  We were able to go back – – since the data was down linked, able to pull back that data, replay it for the Accident Investigation Board and show them exactly what had happened.

And those capabilities, because they’re not weapons, they don’t get talked about too much, but they do certainly help train and get the warfighter ready to go to war.

Another area that we work on is weapon effects.  We work with the joint community who look at the weapons’ effects, so they’re getting feedback from all the testing, they’re getting feedback from the war, and together with our weapons effects team, try to determine, “Here’s how effective this weapon is against these types of targets.”  And it helps the targeteers and the weaponeers say, “Okay, we’re going on a mission today.  This is probably the best kind of weapon to use against the targets that we’re going to go against today.”  So our folks are heavily involved in that.

Our efforts on munitions effects also helps the Air Force determine the number of additional munitions we need to buy in the future based on how many targets we think we’re going to have to go against and the effectiveness of our munitions against them.

The last area of our portfolio is our Advanced Programs.  We have things in there such as the Advanced Tactical Laser Project, which was a laser evaluation that fired for the first time a high powered laser from an airborne platform engaging a ground target.  That effort is now complete.  We also have the Active Denial System, which is a system that the Army is getting ready to take forward into the war.  In fact, it’s at Quantico now.  It’s getting ready to go over to the West Coast here fairly shortly to get a little bit more testing and then get boxed up and sent over to the AOR. So it’s going to go over there and the folks are going to use it to see if it will help them with some of the work they’re doing with either trying to disperse crowds or do some control.

So our Advanced Technologies folks really are kind of the gateway into the Wing.  They are very heavily involved with what is going on in the labs and with our planning organization, XR, and they’re our connection there.   So we also use them sometimes to shape fast track technologies, i.e., technologies that look like the’re promising and has some warfighter “game changing” capabilities, and so we’ll try to fast-track some stuff through them and get it out to the warfighter quickly.

SLD:  Just a couple of reactions: first, even though you’re an Armament Systems Wing, you’re very much part of the evolution of joint war fighting and support for the joint warfighter; and secondly, you appear to be at the heart of what could be referred to as the ground-air revolution whereby the air element is part of the solution set for ground operations, is this correct?

Randy Brown: Yes, we are.  And in fact, we’re getting even more involved now with an area we didn’t think too much about, but has come up, especially with Afghanistan. We’ve stood up a medium caliber ammo office because now, with all of the striking that’s going on, we are finding we need to do some more work and some more development in the 20 millimeter ammo area, so we are working on that.  So people sometimes think okay, you’re just doing air-to-air weapons or air-to-ground weapons.  No, we’re – – as you said — working across the spectrum of things.  Whatever is needed to support the warfighter, especially the folks on the ground right now, including literally bullets, all the way through microwaves, becomes our purview.

Small Diameter Bomb

SLD: Let’s finally focus on one of the programs that allow folks to understand your whole process of innovation and support to changes in the AOR, namely the Small Diameter Bomb Program area.  People are aware, I think, that there’s a competition for what’s going to be called SDB II, and that you helped stand up SDB I.  What many people are not aware of is that you have almost a program, namely SDB I Block 9 that already introduces significant change into the original SDB program.  Could you talk a little bit about how that requirement came to be and the differences between the classic SDB I and what Block 9 is going to look like and how that whole challenging process of innovation over the last few years has been put together?

Randy Brown: This is where I’m going to blame Amanda for success, so she’s going to step over here and talk to you.

Lieutenant Colonel Kato: Small Diameter Bomb I was developed as a long-range stand-off weapon for a different fight than the fight it’s being used in right now, different kind of CONOPs, where a stand-off would be particularly useful, namely against fixed targets. The genesis of the program was originally a Small Diameter Bomb program with two increments and it was all one big program where you would get the first capability out there first, the easier part as it were, against the fixed targets and then the part that’s challenging to everyone, is the how do you do the moving targets.  But because of procurement issues the program was split apart between SDB I and SDB II. So now we’re two fully separate program offices and we work for the same boss.

It was developed as a long-range stand-off weapon and was originally delivered to the AOR in October of 2006, first used in combat in November of 2006 and had a total of 49 combat releases through July of 2007.  All in all, there’s a lot of success with that.  It is currently fully integrated on F-15E, and  we are working on F-16s, Block 30s/40s//50s, F-22, as well as the F-35A.

SLD So the core program provided capability against fixed targets, but changing demands required a modification of the capability?

Lt. Col. Kato: They stopped using SDB I in July ’07 in the AOR for several reasons.  First of all, some of the operations weren’t in urban environments where low collateral damage mattered. In fact, some of the missions needed a bigger boom, so 500 and 2,000-lb JDAMs were better weapons of choice for the targets that they were prosecuting.  Secondly, because it’s designed as a stand-off weapon, it takes a long time to get there because the way it was developed is that it was intended to maximize its glide slope so that it could get the maximum range.

And there was the question of time to target. The pilot says, “Okay, released.”  And the guy on the ground says, “Okay, how long?”  And he says, “Four and a half minutes.”  And the guy says, “What?” In a CAS fight, that’s not good, that’s not the best option if you’re the guy on the ground having to clear air space while troops are likely in contact with the enemy for that long.

SDB 2

Lt. Col. Kato: Yes, you can see why that was not particularly optimum.  And really, that’s the genesis of the Block 9 software.  So for Block 9, it’s totally a software change.  It requires no physical changes to the weapon at all.

So we started that development effort about a year and a half ago and what it’s designed to do is to minimize the time of flight and give you that JDAM-like kind of capability in terms of getting there faster, again still with the accuracy of the current system and low collateral damage.   Also, it expands the release envelope down to 10,000 feet.  So those are the two main things that go into Block 9.

We completed all of our flight testing in January 2010.

Sldinfo: You said it was a software development that can always be challenging: how long from gestation to delivery was this process?  It probably was a pretty challenging process to modify a weapon design for quite a different CONOPs to reshape it for the CONOPs for this current AOR?

Lt. Col. Kato: It’s taken us about 18 months  We hoped it would go faster, but as you said, doing some of the additional algorithm changes to allow the weapon to get to the target faster, yet still maintain its accuracy, proved to be very challenging, to be honest.

SLD:  Now when might this potentially be introduced into the AOR?

Lt. Col. Kato: We would love to see it as soon as March.  When the final approval to field the software comes through, it will then be processed out on PCMCIA cards and they ship them out to the various field locations, and they can load it right into the weapons and bomb racks and it’s ready to go.

SLD: So that the stockpile of weapons already available in theatre just need a modification with the card that you’re putting into the bomb?

Lt. Col. Kato: You hook it up to the test set and it loads the software. It’s just the software load; there are no physical changes to the weapon or to the bomb rack.

SLD: So to summarize:  in 18 months from contract to delivery you were able to shape a new software package for the current stock of SDB weapons and shape an entirely new CONOPs?

Lt. Col. Kato: Yes: the old weapon was designed for stand-off strikes against fixed targets; the new weapon will be able to support CAS missions even in urban environments and deliver a much more rapid rate of delivery.

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*** Posted on March 16th, 2010

European Dynamics in 2010: Economics, Politics and Defense in the Reshaping of the West (Part One)

Europe is in the throes of a fundamental change.  The dynamics of change associated with the Great Recession, and the ripple effects on European societies are intersecting with a Euro crisis.  The currency crisis reflects underlying pressures and strains within global economies.  The intersection between the economic pressures with those from outside of Europe, the engagement in Afghanistan, the rising challenges of Iran, the need to guarantee Iraqi sovereignty are creating a potentially explosive brew of political pressures.  The economic and political pressures are likely to lead to significant pressures on defense procurement, which, in turn, intersect with American dynamics to create substantial pressure for a downturn in Western power projection and military capabilities.

The dynamics of change in 2010 will be explored in two parts.

  • The first part below is provided by Harald Malmgren and addresses pressures on the Euro and the Eurozone economy .
  • The second part will be provided by Robbin Laird and will examine the intersecting pressures associated with defense and potential foreign crises.

***

European Economies Under Strain in Early 2010: How Serious is the Euro crisis?

By Dr. Harald Malmgren

A growing number of hedge funds and institutional investors are betting on a further decline in the Euro relative to the dollar, with some of them questioning whether the Euro can remain a viable currency.  Early in 2010, world press and media treated the Greek financial crisis as the biggest challenge to confidence in the Euro.  After European leaders promised that a European solution would be found, by March the crisis was declared over.

greekcrisis
Greece's sovereign-debt crunch: A very European crisis, The Economist, February 4th, 2010 (www.economist.com)

The Greek Crisis: Only the Tip of the Iceberg?
Major global investors do not agree the Eurozone’s crisis is over.  Since its peak last year, the Euro fell about 10% against the US dollar.  Now, markets show a record level of contracts to “short” the Euro, betting that the Euro will fall much more. The negative perception of the Eurozone reflects a growing belief among global investors that Greece is just the first in a series of public and private debt crises among all Euro members.

Investors betting against the Euro see crippling budget deficits well into the future alongside rising unemployment, economic stagnation, and increasing chance of deflation in all of the Euro member nations.  Market pessimists believe that Euro members will be economically unable and politically unwilling to help each other because they all have huge borrowing needs and will be increasingly competing with each other in flogging their own debt.

European politicians, unwilling to open doubts about their own policies, have taken the opportunity to blame “speculators” for exacerbating the Greek crisis and undermining confidence in the debt of other Euro members.  Political leaders pledged to “ban” trading in evil credit default swaps (CDS) as if this would magically banish Euro pessimism.  The response of traders was to reduce trading in CDS and increase bets against the Euro.

Although officials in the other Eurozone countries declared they would assist Greece, it turned out to be extremely difficult to find consensus on what to do.  The only thing that could be agreed was that the Greek government would have to come up with even deeper budget deficit cuts.  Even then, signals emanated from Berlin that the German government would not agree to financial aid.  In desperation, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou declared that if the European friends of Greece could not help financially, Greece would turn to the IMF.  Unknown to the Greeks, French Finance Minister Lagarde had already advised IMF head Dominique Strauss-Kahn in January that the IMF should stay out of what was an internal Euro matter.  After Papandreou’s declaration, ECB President Trichet publicly stated that he wished to exclude the possibility of further IMF involvement with Greece.

The unsaid implication of this stance is that if Greece wants to call upon the IMF then it should first have to decide to exit from the Euro.  Underlying this hard stance was recognition that IMF intervention inside the Eurozone would bring international intervention in the internal decisions of all Euro members.  For many European governments, this would constitute yielding sovereignty to “outsiders.” From the Euro’s inception, members had long resisted yielding sovereignty to each other – much less to an outside third party.

In response to pressures for greater efforts to curb its deficit, a new Greek austerity budget was approved by the Greek parliament in March.  Euro bears concluded that deep cuts in spending and jobs combined with tax hikes would virtually assure return to recession.  The new budget assumes that Greek citizens will acquiesce, even though unions and students are mounting strikes and disruptive demonstrations aimed at blocking austerity.

What has been overlooked is that the Eurozone debt crisis extends far beyond Greece.  Whatever happens in the coming weeks, the Greek economy will deteriorate further and its borrowing needs will escalate later this year.  At the same time, borrowing needs of other Eurozone members will grow.  It is already evident that Portugal and Spain will have to issue growing debt while suffering fiscal deterioration, further downgrades, and political resistance from strikes and disruptive demonstrations.  Rating agencies have already put their debt on “negative watch” and are preparing for downgrades of yet other Euro members’ debt.  These borrowing problems will be made more challenging by huge borrowing needs of the three biggest Euro members, France, Germany, and Italy.  These three together will need to raise more than €1.2 trillion in combined new issuance and rollovers of existing shorter term debt in coming months.  As 2010 progresses, the Euro member governments collectively will have to raise ever larger capital to fund their growing deficits.  The ratio of government debt to GDP of many members will reach and even exceed 100%.

When the ECB made huge liquidity injections into the Eurozone banks from 2007 onwards, it found that banks were bringing low quality sovereign debt as collateral in exchange for Euros.  Member governments like Greece were able to float bonds in the expectation that they would be bought not only Greek banks but also by other European banks because of the ECB’s continued willingness to take any Eurozone sovereign debt as collateral.  In effect, national governments were able to spend without concern for burgeoning deficits because debt was readily financeable.  The ECB’s form of “quantitative easing” was to issue capital on the back of undisciplined fiscal policy among its members.  Now, however, the ECB is aware that it cannot go on encouraging inflated budget deficits and it has warned that next year it will stop accepting as collateral sovereign debt graded below A-.  That likely puts not only Greece but others out of the game.

Critical Flaws Underlying the Euro
Initially, the Euro was perceived by global security experts and market analysts as a “glue” that would hold Continental Euopean nations together.  Since then, it has not been recognized that there are fundamental flaws underlying the Euro – flaws which were not visible during years of strong world economic growth, but which are now appearing as large cracks in the currency’s foundation.

  • One major flaw is the Eurozone’s dependence on external demand as its primary driver of economic growth.  Growth in exports depends upon growth in growth in world trade. The head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Pascal Lamy, just announced that world trade contracted by 12 percent in 2009, a much bigger decline than previous estimates.  This decline followed an abrupt and dramatic fall in world trade which began in the fourth quarter of 2008, and which has now become the longest contraction since the Great Depression.
    Since the 1940’s, world trade grew by almost twice the rate of growth of world GDP.  Economies that had been decimated by world war, and other developing economies that wished to grow faster, were enabled to jump on to the express train of exports to accelerate domestic economic growth.  Dependence on rapidly growing external demand developed into an addiction, as domestic policies were revised to strengthen competiveness while keeping domestic costs suppressed.  Unfortunately for the Eurozone, the growth of world trade now no longer seems to be an express train running at high speed, but instead resembles a local train with frequent stops and random diversions onto sidetracks.  The rate of growth of world demand for exports has long depended on consumption in the larger, more advanced economies, and most particularly on US consumption, but consumption has slowed in the US, and it is doubtful that it will experience robust recovery any time soon.
    The composition of exports from the Eurozone, and especially from Germany, is highly concentrated in manufactured goods.  When world trade collapsed in late 2008, world demand fell far below the productive capacity of the exporting nations.  The result was worldwide industrial overcapacity.  Investment in new projects that were already under way in 2008 to increase productive capacity continued, especially in China, so that by 2010 the level of worldwide industrial overcapacity had grown.  In this context of global industrial overcapacity, the Eurozone’s overdependence on external demand is a fundamental flaw underlying the Euro which was not visible when global growth was robust.

public debts

  • Another basic flaw underlying the Euro was revealed in the failed effort to cobble together a bailout for Greece.  The member governments are still caught in the prohibition that the “Union” shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of its members, thereby excluding the possibility of dependency of “undisciplined” members on the others.
  • Another flaw in the foundation of the Euro is embodied in the agreement of the initial members of the Euro that national autonomy in both fiscal policy and in financial regulatory policy should be preserved.  They did recognize the need for a single central bank if there was to be a single currency, and they assigned monetary policy to that central bank.   However, they refused to yield sovereignty over fiscal policy to each other.  A common currency with extreme variations in fiscal policies would not be sustainable without some discipline, so they concocted the Stability and Growth Pact in which members are required to limit their budget deficits to 3 percent of their respective national GDP.  Adherence to this guideline was subject to some degree of financial manipulation to conceal the extent and timing of deficits, but as long as economic growth continued it helped to provide a practical degree of fiscal discipline — until the collapse of credit markets and the 2007 emergence of the Great Recession.  The members’ responses to the Great Recession varied widely, but the ratios of all deficits to GDP exploded.  The current average has already risen above 7%, with some countries like Greece in double digits.  In these circumstances, members have chosen to ignore the Stability and Growth Pact.  Political survival of governments took precedence over fiscal prudence, and the budget deficit discipline has broken down.
    The creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) is the latest idea to address possible mutual support of members, but German officials remind that such a fund would require a change in the treaties underlying the Eurozone, changes which would require severe sanctions on members that did not maintain budget discipline.  The troubled Euro members want financial help, but not sanctions.
  • When the Euro was introduced, the members of the new common currency also refused to agree to give up their national bank supervision and financial regulatory powers to the ECB.  The ECB can set interest rates, but it cannot examine the strength of individual banks.  The national governments do not want officials from other member governments to become privy to the circumstances of their own banks.  When the credit crunch gripped financial markets from the summer of 2007 onwards, the ECB could only respond by injecting liquidity into the Eurozone economy, without addressing the rapid deterioration in the liquidity and solvency of many Eurozone banks.  This constituted yet another flaw in the Euro’s structure.

Some might argue that a weaker Euro will help pull the Eurozone out of prolonged slump. The Euro has already fallen by 10% against the dollar.  Would further decline be beneficial?  If the world economy would resume the growth trajectory which prevailed prior to the Great Recession, then a weaker Euro would enable increased demand for exports, helping to revive economic growth among the Euro member nations.  Depreciation of the Euro would, of course, mean enabling Europe to take a larger share of world markets.

The problem in 2010 is that world trade has not yet convincingly demonstrated robust recovery from the severe contraction of the last 15 months.  Many major economies are still demonstrating symptoms of economic slump.  In a context of slower growth in world trade, and slower growth in consumption in the US, it is not clear how beneficial a further decline in the Euro would be for Eurozone exports.  It is possible that world demand would not respond to a weaker Euro, but instead, in a context of global industrial overcapacity, a weaker Euro might encourage deflation in industrial goods in world trade while increased import costs would intensify inflation pressure at home

Ultimately, the most fundamental flaw underlying the Euro is the continuing unwillingness of members to yield meaningful sovereignty to each other, or to a common Eurozone overseer.   Since its inception, the Euro has never been stress tested.  Under increasing stress now, it looks likelier to outsiders that the Euro will continue weakening and may even come apart.

HM

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*** Posted on March 16th, 2010

Copenhagen, Climategate and Cyber-Espionage: Russians, Chinese or Oil-Interests?

By D.K. Matai

cru_bldg

The Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, U.K.
(Credit photo: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/)

Just before the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change — UNFCCC — took place in Copenhagen in mid-December 2009, experts at the University of East Anglia’s world-leading Climatic Research Unit were accused of manipulating data on global warming in the “Climategate” scandal over leaked emails.
The UK government’s former chief scientist — Sir David King — has now said that a foreign intelligence agency was probably behind email hacking at the Climate Research Unit in East Anglia. Sir David said the co-ordinated hacking and the selective leaking of the unit’s emails going back 13 years bore all the hallmarks of a skilled intelligence operation from a foreign government rather than opportunist hackers. He said, “It’s the sophistication of the operation. A very clever nerd can cause a great deal of disruption and obviously make intelligence services very nervous, but a sophisticated intelligence operation is capable of yielding the sort of results we’ve seen here.”
Sir David King said more than 1,000 emails and 2,000 documents were stolen from a back-up server used by the University of East Anglia since 1996, and recent links were carefully timed to destabilize the Copenhagen climate change summit. This represents a small fraction of the total number of emails for the period from 1996 to 2009, suggesting the information leaked had been selected for the most incriminating phrases relating to possible scientific misconduct and breaches of the Freedom of Information Act.

RealClimate
The existence of the stolen emails came to light in late November 2009 when someone tried to load them onto the RealClimate Internet site run by climate scientists, including Gavin Schmidt of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Dr Schmidt said that hackers used a bonafide computer in Turkey as a proxy server but the attack could have been launched from any other computer located elsewhere in the world. He attempted to disable the hacking operation as it was taking place, but was prevented several times before finally succeeding.
The hackers had penetrated deep into the website’s database software, which required considerable skill and knowledge. An opportunistic hacker would not have had such skills, according to Dr Schmidt, including the use of remote-monitoring tools and high-level access capability.

carbonemission
U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2009, May 27th, 2009 (www.eia.doe.gov)

Russians, Chinese or Oil-Interests?
Two days after the attempted RealClimate hack, the compendium file of stolen emails appeared on a server used by a company called Tomcity operating from the Russian city of Tomsk in Siberia.
However, again, the uploading could have been done by anyone, skillfully controlling a proxy server elsewhere in the world. Experts have suggested that loading the email compendium file onto a Tomsk computer server may have been a deliberate attempt to lay a trail to the door of the Russian intelligence service, which has since denied any involvement in the hacking incident. Some expert analysts in Russia have said that China had more to gain from destabilizing the Copenhagen conference than Russia.

China has the world’s fastest rising carbon emission rates and had an obvious motive for ensuring that no binding agreement or treaty emerged from Copenhagen. However, it cannot be ruled out that powerful oil interests in the West — above all in the United States — had as much an interest, as did Beijing, in seeing Copenhagen founder.

———-

*** Posted on March 16th, 2010

Lieutenant General Dubik on the Iraq Challenge: “It Is Not About Transition” (II)

03/08/2010

In this part of the interview, Lieutenant General Dubik identifies the key principles for transition from the Iraq situation during his time in the country, stressing the fact that the focus has been more on security than on transition for the sake of transition. He suggests some key lessons learned which provide a foundation for Afghanistan and to meet the continuing challenges with regard to Iraq in 2010 and 2011. Those challenges are the subject of the final part of the interview to be published next.

[slidepress gallery=’dubik-ii-march-8′]

Credit Photos: US Armed Forces, 2009-2010

The above slide show provides highlights of the Iraq transition:

  • The first photo shows a base transfer from US to Iraqi forces.
  • The second photo shows an early morning convoy from Al Assad.
  • The third photo shows the discovery of an insurgent weapons cache.
  • The fourth photo shows Iraq police training.
  • The fifth photo shows Iraqi Army signals training.
  • The sixth photo shows support for a Provincial Reconstruction Team.
  • The final photo shows a US security team in Iraq operating in support of the elections.

***

SLD: General, if we were to summarize your views, looking back as you were about to leave Iraq and looking forward to what would happen there, what are some of the “Dubik principles” that you would take away from your time there which might be applicable moving forward?

General Dubik: First, we had this belief that it’s about transition: transition to Iraqi control, or transition to Afghan control, or transition to whatever. But it’s not about transition. It’s about providing enough security and creating security forces that can secure the country–­that will lead to transition. If you aim directly at transition you will never get there; if you aim at providing a security force that is large enough, capable enough, and confident enough to actually pull security, then you’ll transition.

SLD: We are both trained in political philosophy. So essentially what you are describing is the need to create some sense of legitimate authority and confidence that you are shaping such authority.

General Dubik: I would go to Aristotle in his ethics. He said that if you want to be happy, don’t aim at happiness or you’ll never reach it. If you want to become happy, you become virtuous and you’ll always be happy. And it’s the same thing here: don’t aim at transition; aim at providing security; aim at creating a security force that can actually provide security for the country; and then you’ll get the transition you want. We are having the same problem in Afghanistan; we have yet to commit to a security force that’s large enough to provide security for that country. That’s a different story though.

SLD: But your point is that the core principle is the same in both cases?

General Dubik: The core principle is exactly the same.

SLD: I think the difference is that Iraq is a nation, so the way you might create this sense of security is probably more regional or local in Afghanistan compared to Iraq. But the principle is the same: what is the system of legitimate government that one can create? It seems that the intellectual problem that we’re having with Afghanistan is it’s not a country, it’s not a nation in the way that we’ve just experienced with Iraq: in that sense, the Iraqi transition could actually be a bad lesson from this point of view. But the principle you’re laying down would then simply say: well, roll up our sleeves and find out.

General Dubik: And find out what works there. So what we’re going to have to do in Afghanistan – and I know that we are doing it – is to figure out how that local-to-national government relationship works in Afghanistan and create an Afghan specific solution. Don’t bring the Iraqi solution; don’t bring the American solution; don’t bring the French solution; figure out the Afghan solution. There have been periods – some extensive periods – in their history where they had a relationship that worked pretty darn well, and we ought to look at those and figure out how they worked. It’s a compartmental society and you should expect that, but the relationship of local people and tribes to the nation or to the state is an important relationship and it does work differently in different countries.

SLD: What is your next principle of transition?

General Dubik: The second one really kind of gets at what we just talked about with respect to Afghanistan, and that’s to aim at sufficiency not quality versus quantity. Of course it’s the case that you don’t want to aim just at numbers and create a force full of boneheads. But the other, equally wrongheaded approach, is taking the time to build only the highest quality force. You don’t have time to create the best possible force in the world because you’re at war and time matters when you’re at war.

So you are always in that trade space between the two extremes. One extreme is go too fast and create boneheads or push the quantity; and the other extreme is to aim only at quality but it takes forever. So you’re always in that trade space of trying to determine what’s sufficient for this country, at this time, against this enemy.

SLD: This is associated with what could be called the power of the demonstration effect: if you can create a demonstrated “success” in a city or region or province and get people to believe that you could credibly do this somewhere else, you create a sense of hope and shape a possible domino effect.

General Dubik: I think that’s what you see in Helmand Province, or at least, an attempt at that. But this idea of sufficiency is again one that is very difficult for some military people to accept, because we always want to say what’s the standard, you want me to meet the standard or not?

The issue is given this society’s state of education, literacy, technological understanding, and the enemy this society is facing, what’s sufficient to beat that enemy and how do you build a force capable of doing that as fast as you can? This is the challenge of building a security force during a fight.

So for example when we were accelerating the Iraqi Security Forces, we knew we were not going to have a complete complement of leaders. So we went to the Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters and said: okay, how many leaders does the battalion need for it to fight? Well, probably 65-70%. Okay,so that’s what we’re going to aim at, that’s sufficient for this country at this time, given this enemy.

So you’re trying to figure out what’s good enough to keep this enemy inefficient or ineffective. Another way to look at the issue of “sufficiency.” When your counter-offensive is successful, like ours was in Iraq, one of the results is that the enemy’s capability is degraded. We tried to get the enemy degraded as low as we could, so that the Iraqi Security Forces could handle them. You know, we had a tough time, and we have probably the most highly trained, best led, and technologically outfitted armed force in the world. The Iraqi Security Forces had none of that. So we had to get the enemy capability down, and the security forces’ competence and confidence up. It’s kind of an inverse relationship of capability.

SLD: I would also think that part of the process that you’re describing is to convince folks that there is a real process of Americans to leave. If the Americans are really leaving, then as an Iraqi I’m going to work with the Americans because I would like them to finally leave. So I think there’s also a cross over point to really believe that Americans are leaving.

General Dubik: There was an interesting dynamic and I would point to in March and April 2008 in Iraq as the confluence of those feelings coming to the fore. In that time period you saw Iraqi Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki start to direct his security forces semi-independently of the coalition. They conducted an operation in Basra, followed by an operation in Mosul, and followed by an operation in Sadr City.

Now, it is the case that Basra was a close run thing and they almost lost it, because they hadn’t coordinated that completely. But it was a strategic success because it was seen as Iraqis taking the initiative, fighting Shia militias, and prevailing. They were successful mostly on their own, with our support, and that success boosted their confidence to go to do a similar thing in Mosul, and they did way better in Mosul than they did in Basra. Then they went to Sadar City, did better still, then they went to Amarah, did better still.

So in this period between March and June 2008, you saw a huge increase in the confidence of the Iraqi Security Forces, in themselves, and a huge boost in the confidence of the Iraqi political leaders in their security forces, and of course a significant boost of the Iraqi citizens confidence in their own police and military.

That was a psychological turning point and was also the period that we started really in earnest to negotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). So there was confidence on both sides that the Iraqis really could secure themselves, that they have grown large enough, capable enough, confident enough now that we can in fact really negotiate something here.And they felt that they could negotiate something effective because they were not so overly dependent on the coalition forces for domestic security.

SLD: Let us go back to your basic principles.

General Dubik: Here’s one for you: dis-integrate to accelerate. In Iraq, we built the army first, and not even all of the army. We built a maneuver part first, with only a small part of its combat service support and command and control part. And the army could be built faster than part of the air force or navy. Some parts of the intelligence could be created faster than others. Mortars could be introduced faster than field artillery. And that gets to my point about disaggregate to accelerate: if you want to keep an integrated program moving forward, then that program will always move forward at the pace of the slowest element of the program.

War won’t let you take this integrated approach; time matters in war. So for example, if you’re trying to build a combat brigade, you can build the infantry component much faster than you can the artillery component or the logistics component. If you’re going to build an integrated approach, then everything will go as slowly as the slowest component.

SLD: Presumably part of your thinking was that the coalition forces were there anyway, providing certain core competencies. So you were almost thinking in a joint structure kind of motif?

General Dubik: Yes. So the thinking was, let’s accelerate as fast as we can in those areas where we can. In those that naturally lag behind because they just take longer, we will let the Iraqis rely on us. We’ll keep building those capacities but we’re not going to slow down the growth rate just to have balanced growth in the overall Iraqi national capability.

We’ll get to a balanced point sooner or later but we won’t get everybody together. I learned this building the Stryker brigades; that’s where this comes from. When we built the Stryker brigades, we could not build it in the standard integrated program approach because the family of Stryker vehicles was going to come on line at different rates: the infantry variant was going to be faster than the command and control variant, and those two variants were going to be faster than the mobile gun system, and the last was going to be the real artillery. So if we were going to wait until the entire Stryker brigade family of vehicles was ready, we still wouldn’t have one brigade fielded. So when I got the task, I disintegrated the program so we could accelerate the growth.

SLD: You talk about the Iraqis: what about the Americans? Our patience was running out. So weren’t you building confidence back in the U.S. about the process as well?

General Dubik: We knew that we had to demonstrate progress by September 2007, but we also knew that by March of 2008 we were going to have to show much more than just initial progress. That was the period that we, in our minds, realized: that’s not a long time. And so Ray [Odierno] got the counter-offensive going as fast as he could, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker got the political efforts going as fast as they could, and I got the Iraqi Security Forces accelerating so that, at the end of that time, we could demonstrate progress as a coherent whole.

SLD: This is really an important point about this interaction between Iraqi confidence in the process and the U.S. confidence: the need for cross-reinforcement.

General Dubik: But don’t confuse ends and means. I wanted to highlight that because it would have been easy for me to understand that the end of my task was to just produce the Iraqi Security Forces and get them on the street. That was the end, the goal, and purpose.

In fact accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in size, competence, and confidence was a means, not just an end in itself to borrow a Kantian term. It was a means: the requirements to grow new forces – for example, identify recruiting goals, identify leadership to fill the units, identify training centers, fill seats to go to the training centers, align the unit as it comes out of basic training with the equipment arrival at the same time so you could marry them up, train them as a unit to put them in the field – that set of activities were means to stimulate growth in the Iraqi security ministries. Our command could have done that by ourselves and produced the unit if we viewed the goal as simply building numbers of Iraqi Security Forces.

But by doing it ourselves, we wouldn’t have stimulated the Minister of Defense, Interior, and the Iraqi Joint Staff to develop the capability of doing that for themselves. So when we developed the timetable for fielding new units or improving selected capabilities, we developed it with them. When we developed the purchase plan, the timeline equipment purchase plan, we developed it with them. When we developed the budget, we developed it with them. That way, the growth of new forces and replenishment of existing forces became the means to a real end – that is a self-sustaining ministerial capacity.

SLD: You said “don’t confuse ends with means”: that gets to a broad point, but the ends and the means are concurrent with one another in many ways.

General Dubik: Yes, that’s another way you could put it, that some things are both ends and means. But it’s back to really Lawrence [of Arabia]. Don’t do for them what they should do for themselves. It certainly was the case that our headquarters could have “cranked out” this program without almost any input from the Iraqis, but that would have been wrong and counter-productive to the long-term goal.

SLD: What is your next principle?

General Dubik: The next one I’ll talk about is a little bit about how the security forces differ in function and I’ll put this under the heading that military forces and paramilitary police forces impose security, local police forces enforce security.There is a subtle but huge difference. I learned this in Haiti [in 1994/5] actually. I was given responsibility to stand up a police force in Cap Haitien, the second largest city in Haiti when I was a brigade commander. The belief at the time was we could take some guys who were policemen before intervention and put new uniforms on them send them back out on the street with minimum training. Well, we did that, and the city damn near rioted in my face. To get it right, we had to recruit not from the former police force, provide minimum training, pair the new recruits up with international police monitors (we gave them no weapons at first),get the city comfortable with their own police and how they were going to police, then introduce qualitative training over a period of a month.

SLD: So they were no longer the tools of the dictatorship?

General Dubik: Yes, right. They were enforcing the security that everybody wanted. They manifested the security that the community desired. Well when you go into a place like Iraq, the community doesn’t know what it wants yet, there is no community desire, at least there wasn’t in 2007. They were killing each other.

So you couldn’t rely on local police to enforce a security agreement that didn’t yet exist within the community, and local police were not trained, organized or equipped to impose security.

So, if you look at the growth rate in 2007, the growth rate in the Iraqi army and national police (paramilitary police) rose way faster than local police. Local police started later. When they did rise, they grew very quickly. But they grew later in sequence. Once the counter-offensive cleared the city and the initial hold was done to beat back the first counter-attack on the clearing forces.

After that was over, the conditions were right for local police. We could build local police then because a community started to emerge behind the security imposed by the clearing force – army and paramilitary police. Sure, there were a lot of missteps and things didn’t go smoothly, but progress was made.

And what you see in Afghanistan is a similar emphasis on Afghan army and Afghan civil order police as the forces necessary to do the clearing and holding – that is, to impose security. And then they’ll do local police after that – to enforce security.

SLD: What is your next principle of shaping a transition?

General Dubik: Next I’ll talk about partnership. There was no way that the Iraqi Security Forces could be created and developed without a partnership with the coalition forces. So we could get them to a certain level of base proficiency – individual skills, leadership skills, and some basic staff skills –in the Iraqi training base.

But then you had to understand that basic proficiency would be accelerated even more if they partnered with coalition forces so that on the job they would continue to learn leadership skills, coordination skills, advanced fighting skills, after action review skills, sustainment skills – all the stuff that we know our forces do very well. So MultiNational Corps – Iraq, first when commanded by then LTG Ray Odierno, then by LTG Lloyd Austin, partnered their forces with Iraqi army and police units. The Iraqis started to mirror what they saw was successful in coalition units.

SLD: So after basic training, you got them working with the allied forces, U.S. forces?

General Dubik: It was a three-phased effort. The first phase was basic training, and we reduced that from ten weeks to five, and most people thought that that’s a reduction in quality. I have a big argument about that. We took out all the “white space” and trained more days in the week and more hours in the day; we actually intensified the combat training in five weeks rather than stretch it out into ten.

From basic training we went to unit training, at which time we linked up the basic trainees with the emerging Iraqi unit leadership, the equipment that had arrived, and the embedded trainers that Ray (and later Lloyd) had identified. Those four elements came together and trained for a month, and they trained at company level and below. We didn’t focus on large-scale operations because squads, platoons, and companies win insurgencies, so we focused on small unit combat skills and a little bit of coordination. Small group tactics, that’s what wins wars – big maneuvers of brigades, we didn’t bother doing that at all.

The third phase then was that unit would go into the battlespace with this embedded trainer and link up with the coalition forces to be his partner to fight. That partnership then continued training and developing the Iraqi unit and its leaders. That way we could continue development of units fielded as we would start the cycle with another new Iraqi brigade. It was a good cycle.

Quote General Dubik

SLD: Brick by brick so to speak.

General Dubik: Brick by brick, but we cranked out one brigade per month for almost half a year. No small task.

The last item that I’ll talk about is subordination. My command was a three-star command. But in fact I subordinated my command to Ray’s (and then to Lloyd’s) and I did that because we would be better off creating units and replenishing units at the rate and pace needed for the operational plan, than by some separate unit generation plan.

So rather than have a separate developmental plan, where I would kind of salami slice things, say “this brigade goes in the south, next one goes in the middle, next one goes in the north, next one in the west, next one goes to the south, and take replacements and give 5% to every division,” we would say to Ray, who would coordinate this with the MOD and the Iraqis, “where’s the next battle going to be?”

SLD: So  if we put a thread through much of this, it is that you are trying to create a result, a result that gives confidence in a process, is this correct?

General Dubik: It’s back to the number one priority: it’s about security. That’s the thread, that’s the result we were trying to create.

SLD: You’re putting people in the game, learning how to play the game early enough: not so early that they’ll fail, but early enough to feel confident that they can win Then their mates kind of talk about that experience amongst themselves. You get a kind of contagion or you’re trying to create a contagion, is that right?

General Dubik: You are trying to create that and it’s all aimed at creating a security force that’s competent and confident in itself; about creating a security situation that is improving and creating a security force that’s large enough and good enough to secure its own country. Remember, that’s the very first point we talked about. When you do that and you line up everything aimed at that, you get to transition. Don’t aim at transition.

———-

***Posted March 8th, 2010

Dissecting the USCG Hatteras Rescue Operation

“Reverse Engineering” of USCG Operations: the Hatteras Rescue (Miracle) Case

Early January 2010, a dramatic rescue effected by the USCG was done in cooperation with the US Navy to save a man’s life at sea. This rescue involved key C4ISR assets on the new USCG MC-130Js. In a time of budgetary crisis, the USCG is still in dire need for new assets as its old ones are retired because they are just too old to operate. The new ones provide significant enhancements for operations as well. Too often when a service asks for a new asset, the need seems unclear or the impact of the new over the old is also unclear. We intend on this website to “reverse engineer” some USCG operations to provide readers with a better understanding of how the USCG achieves success, what training, manpower and assets are required to do so. We will also highlight when relevant the impact of new systems in achieving that success as well.

The impact of modernization on operations could not be clearer than in this case of rescuing a sailor at sea. Not only did the new mission systems and C4ISR assets play a central role in allowing the USCG professionals to save this man’s life, it would have been unlikely that either the effort or the joint team communication involved in the effort would have been possible.

Here the redundancy of the new mission systems allowed the crew to operate in extremely challenging conditions. The systems allowed them to locate the man miles before they would have been able to with the old systems; time was of the essence and the new systems allowed that time. And when the MC130J became mission critical with regard to fuel, they were able to hand off through the C4ISR systems, the data that they had generated to the replacement MC130J. This allowed for continuity at a crucial moment.

Lt Commander Lacer Driver and his mission systems officer, AET2 S. Lee, explained to us in an interview on February 16, 2010 at the Elizabeth City USCG Air Station how they conducted the operation. Without the tools available on the MC130J they would not have succeeded; without their skill, rapid decision-making process and professionalism under duress, no amount of equipment would have mattered. Crews (men and women) and the equipment are essential to this type of success.

The Hatteras Rescue Team
LCDR Driver and AET2 Lee (credit: SLD)


SLD: Why don’t you explain the mission on January 3rd and the challenging kind of rescue you had to do and how that operation was conducted?

Lt. CDR Driver: Yes sir: we were the search and rescue team that night for the C130J community, stationed at Elizabeth City. We had come on duty that morning at 7:45, we flew an afternoon training flight a little over 2 hours in duration, wrapped that up and we were all just calmly waiting to see if anything else would happen.

Shortly after 17:00 local time, just as the sun was setting, a call came in that a sailing vessel’s EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Deacon) signal had been detected approximately 280 miles east of Hatteras from the Outer Banks. We were told to launch to go out to see if we could find the source of that EPIRB. We did a quick weather check and weather at home station here was very benign, however we knew that a large low pressure system had moved off shore, I checked the weather and still conditions looked to be fairly manageable with winds peak gusts at 30 knots.

We quickly got airborne on our C130J and immediately upon going feet wet, I asked my MSO here to bring up our DF430 direction finding capability, and approximately 70 miles off shore or so, we began to get our first bearing point to the source of the EPIRB .This is a significant improvement from my previous experiences in the C130H community, which does not have the advanced systems we do on the C130J. Normally we would have to get much closer to a source, the beacon source in order to get any kind of a hit or composite.

SLD: And you just said you were 70 miles?

Lt. CDR Driver: We had a solid block at 70 miles off shore.

An MC-130J at the Elizabeth City Air Station (credit: USMC)
An MC-130J at the Elizabeth City Air Station (credit: SLD)

SLD: With the C130H systems how close would you have needed to be?

Lt. CDR Driver: With the H we would have to have gotten much, much closer in order to get any sort of a point at all on the EPIRB signal. I climbed to an altitude, I believe we were up at 230, we had 150 knots of wind on the tail, wind and weather conditions were more severe than forecasted, and as we descended into the area, very close now to the source of the beacon, it was evident that the weather was going to be a lot worse. Winds were sustained at 60 knots on the surface, seas were at 30-40 feet, the ceiling was solid overcast between about 800-900 feet above the water, all the way up to around 12,000-13,000 feet, solid overcast with heavy convective activity of snow squalls, we had icing conditions, sustained moderate turbulence with some severe turbulence and we knew we were going to have our hands full.

We had one disadvantage that night, that one, what some people would consider key part of our C4SR system, which was the MMR or multi mode radar, was not functioning. But the depth of the C4SR systems on the airplane made the difference. Under optimal circumstances, we would have had that MMR working, and I probably could have found that sailing vessel even though it bobbed on 30-40 foot seas, I probably could have found it that way, but that system was down.

We used the 241 nose mounted weather radar to help us avoid the worst convective activity, weather conditions that could’ve really damaged the aircraft and been pretty bad for our health and safety. We were able to use that weather radar for that purpose, but we didn’t have an MMR to help us find the target sailboat.

The good news is, Petty Officer Lee, our MSO was able to take the DF430 equipment, was able to choose lines of bearing on a easterly, westerly heading and on a north-south heading, and we were able to triangulate the source, the signal of that sailing vessel without actually finding it on our radar. So the DF430 paid huge dividends in not only acquiring the signal early, but once we got out there, it helped us pinpoint that location even though we didn’t have the benefit of our marine radar.

We found the sailing vessel, got over top of it and were able to immediately establish communications with the captain of the vessel, using his VHF-FM, VH-FM band radio channel 16, and we discovered the dire circumstances: this gentleman had been at sea for 5 days at that point, he’d gotten into terrible weather 3 days earlier, he experienced numerous knock downs, the vessel was basically de-masted, his motor was inoperative, he had a prop that was fouled and was essentially dead in the water and could not control his vessel, was getting beamed to the seas and the boat was coming apart underneath of him.

We were able to pinpoint his location with the DF430 and then other C4ISR systems like for instance the night vision goggles we wore that night, were absolutely invaluable and critical. The pilots and crew in the back wore NVG’s throughout the duration of the mission, we were able – below that overcast, solid overcast layer – to see the vessel.

When the gentleman would key his radio, his VH-FM radio and a small light would come on his radio, we could actually see that in the darkness, and we used technique where we just had him take a little hand held penlight, he happened to have a little survival pen flashlight, and he could use that to signal his location.

And in those kinds of difficult weather conditions, it was critical using those NVG’s to keep our eyes on the target. We also greatly employed our FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared Radar), the FLIR turret, the FLIR ball and camera that night, our MSO was able to keep the FLIR on the target, in fact that system is what provided this picture that you have on the website, and we could maintain much better awareness of the status of the mariner, it was very dark and with the NVG’s, we could find the vessel’s location, but we couldn’t see the fine detail of what he was doing on deck. The FLIR allowed us to know that he was actually still on deck; we didn’t need radio transmissions or we didn’t need to demand that he use his radio and potentially run down the batteries on his radio. We could see him active on his sailing vessel and we knew that he was still safe and on board. So that helped prevent unnecessary radio communication.

We were also able to determine which direction he was steering, to determine the wind and where to actually do our drops. The vessel’s aspect is very critical during these drop evolutions, that eventually we’ve found ourselves performing.

And to be able to know where port and starboard was for this captain in relation to our position and sky and the three dimensional world, it was really very helpful because we could literally say to him, turn right, look right off your starboard bow and take a look over here, you will see the airplane coming at you, and he was able to do that and we were able to correlate that in space and time using the FLIR and the aspect ratio that we got from the FLIR.

Petty Officer Lee (Missions Systems Officer): I was able to get a couple flares off of that too once we started pointing in the right direction; we talked to him on the 16, and he was able to pop off a couple flares for us.

Lt. CDR Driver: We had night vision capability both in the NVG’s that we wore on our heads: because those NVG systems were fully integrated into the cockpit design and layout of our instrumentation, there was no conflict between those systems. Also the night vision capability we had in the FLIR as I just demonstrated was pretty critical that night.

From a communications standpoint, we relied heavily on really at least 3 radio systems:

  • some were very basic: the VH-FM capability talking on channel 16 with the mariner was important
  • we also were able to utilize our Inmarsat radio, which we call the Steve phone
  • and Inmarsat communications, that allowed us to call back to Elizabeth City and talk directly to our watch center here and coordinate the follow-on assets, the launch of an additional C130J, as well as coordinate the launch of the H60, that eventually came off the USS Eisenhower and affected the hoist.

We were able to coordinate these things through that capability and that was critical. The organic HF baseline radios were critical in maintaining our radio guard and talking to RCC (Rescue Coordination Center) Norfolk and getting our tasking and keeping our chain of command informed of what was happening out there on scene. And so those communications were all pretty critical.

So you can see that even though one piece of our C4ISR system, the MMR had failed, we were able to fall back on the other redundant systems and fill that gap and perform the mission.

Quote LCDR Driver

To make a long story short, we stayed over this gentleman for approximately 4 hours, the vessel continued to get heavily damaged in the seas, and with about 30 minutes left prior to having the H60 from the Eisenhower on scene, we became fuel critical. Just as that was all coming to the head, the vessel was hit by a massive 40-foot wave which caused it to roll 360 degrees. The mariner, the captain on board was tethered with a safety line to his vessel and he managed to stay with the vessel during that complete roll, when he came back up he was extremely agitated, as you can imagine, and basically said he did not think he was going to be able to last much longer.

Because I was fuel critical, and I had reserved the rescue rafts and the rescue gear in the back for when I needed them, I quickly realized that time was now to launch them. So with the remaining fuel I had on scene, we relied heavily on the computer systems on board the HC130J to set up a rudimentary drop pattern for us. What we quickly discovered was that because the winds were so strong at 60 knots sustained with occasionally higher gusts, the computer calculated drop solutions that actually became unusable.

If you will, the course that I needed to fly was perpendicular to the wind line; the purpose being we would drop the three rafts into the ocean and the wind would cause the rafts to drift down onto the mariner and his sailing vessel. Because we were perpendicular to the wind, it required at least 45 degrees of correction in order to keep the plane flying on its required course to make the drop; I had to move 45 degrees.

My heads up display and the entire computer calculated drop data were unusable to me, so I ended up having to revert to a visual only drop maneuver. Again, the NVG’s made that possible, without them I could not have successfully done that, and we were able to perform the drop, push the 3 rafts out just as we were fuel critical, we began to climb to altitude and just before we had to depart we witnessed the rafts drifting down on the position of the sailing vessel.

We communicated two more times with the captain before his radio completely failed. The water intrusion from that roll finally caused his radio to fail, we lost all communications, but we left our final instructions with him in the blind and began to climb out to altitude.

As we were climbing out, the C130J #2 was coming straight in and we passed in flight as he arrived on scene, and I was able to use the on board communication system to pass all the pertinent mission data to the 2nd C130J that was relieving us on scene. And we basically battled those same 150-mile an hour winds back to Elizabeth City and landed with a marginal amount of fuel.

We didn’t know the rest of the story until the next day. We found out that just after climbing out and doing a handover with both the C130J that was arriving on scene and the H60 that was now only about 20 minutes out, from the USS Eisenhower, we discovered that just after we left a second 40 foot wave hit the sailing vessel. This wave completely rolled the vessel again; throwing the master off, his safety line broke so he was a person in the water at that point. He said just as he struggled to the surface to get his first breath, he looked and very close to him he saw his sailing vessel break apart and sink.

So just after we left, he went in the water, he made the statement that he really got a breath, he realized his situation was dire, he made peace with God, but he wasn’t ready to give up yet. And he said he got a few breaths, he allowed himself just a little bit of rest from the exhaustion that he was suffering, and he began to swim.

Miraculously he said he only took a few strokes swimming and bumped into an unlit object he could not see, it turned out to be the rescue raft, one of the three rescue rafts that we had dropped to him.

The raft had been blown upside down in the swells and the sea state, so he did not see the chem. light and strobe that we had attached to it, but he was able to right the raft and climbed into the raft 300 miles offshore, and probably only 15 minutes later the helicopter arrived on scene, saw him in the raft and was able to hoist him to safety out of the raft that we had dropped.

Dennis Clements Saved by the USCG And USN Rescue Efforts
Dennis Clements Saved by the USCG And USN Rescue Efforts (Credit: USCG)

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*** Posted on March 9th, 2010

Is the “Cold War” with China Becoming Serious? Placing the Cyber Conflict in a Strategic Context

03/07/2010

By D.K. Matai

Remarks at Dinner Hosted by the U.S.-China Business Council and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Ritz-Carlton HotelWashington, DC, July 28, 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Addresses the U.S.-China Business Council (July 2009)

A Growing Confrontation?
China appears to be escalating its growing confrontation with the U.S. over Washington’s announcement of a $6.4 billion defense deal with Taiwan. Under a 1979 Act of the U.S. Congress, Washington is legally obliged to help Taiwan defend itself. The Chinese defense ministry has said that the recent deal will definitely and seriously disturb relations between the two countries.

So far, in retaliation for this specific decision, China has:

  1. Imposed sanctions on U.S. companies involved in the deal with Taiwan;
  2. Suspended military exchanges because of the allegedly harmful effects of the deal on U.S.-China relations; and
  3. Stated, “It will be unavoidable that co-operation between China and U.S. over important international and regional issues will also be affected.”

This new row is not a one-time event, but rather a manifestation of an increasingly fraught relationship between Beijing and Washington, marked by a growing tone of irritation and even confrontation in public comments by Chinese leaders and officials. Moreover, this heightened irritation appears to be spreading to China’s relations with a number of other governments, in particular India and some important European nations.

Diplomats in a number of countries are commenting that statements and routine meetings with Chinese officials are characterized by increasing belligerence, suggesting an historic shift in China’s stance towards other nations. While there are a number of plausible explanations for this emerging belligerence, most disturbingly it represents a calculated necessity to escalate a cold conflict with key nations around the world in an effort to shift blame away from rising domestic economic woes on an unprecedented scale.

chart export to gdp ratio China
From: Dong He and Wenlang Zhang, How Dependent Is The Chinese Economy On Exports And In What Sense Has Its Growth Been Export-Led?, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Working Paper 14/2008, 14 October 2008

A Classic Strategy of Diversion?
The principal weakness of the Chinese economy is it’s over reliance on exports to propel domestic economic growth ( see graphic from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority). During the current recession, world demand for Chinese exports collapsed, leaving China with industrial over capacity. According to some calculations, China must cut industrial capacity in double-digit percentages to align its economy with the slower pace of world economic activity. Instead, the Chinese leadership has not only chosen to retain industrial capacity at 2007 levels but has continued adding to the established production capacity and industrial infrastructure in the last few years.

Domestic capital spending is now estimated to account for more than half of the annual rate of GDP growth. The more industrial capacity China adds and the more it builds, the more GDP figures will rise. However, many of those buildings, warehouses, and industrial plants are lying completely unoccupied or moth balled at present. Evidence suggests that within some urban centers as much as 70% of the new buildings and industrial units are completely empty. Even if world demand were to regain upward momentum, China already has production capacity far in excess of any conceivable growth in world demand for the next several years.

Unlike the economies of the U.S. and India, China has weak domestic demand. Recent statements by Chinese officials at the World Economic Forum in Davos acknowledge the need to shift attention to the need for increased domestic consumption. However, it is not possible to change the structure of the economy overnight to divert the entirety of excess industrial output to domestic consumption.

In addition, considering the lifestyle and living standards gap between Asian and Western countries, many of the products manufactured in China cannot be absorbed by the domestic economy or exported to other Asian powers like India.

China’s continued double-digit GDP growth has been maintained via an unprecedented stimulus package that represented nearly half of the country’s GDP in 2009. This amount was much larger than any stimulus package presented by the G20 countries. Clearly, this type of government intervention cannot continue without severe fallout. The impact on asset price inflation and core domestic inflation has been far from benign in the second half of 2009 with double digit percentage advances in specific economic sectors and regions of China.

As China begins applying brakes in 2010 to address its runaway train phenomena, it risks causing sharply rising unemployment while depressing its domestic property and financial markets, trapping millions of citizens and thousands of industrial groups in negative equity.

Chinese leaders may find it politically attractive to divert the attention of their citizens away from an unbalanced national economy – unwinding swiftly in 2010 and beyond – to growing pressures on China from other nations. This tactic will lay blame for the domestic mess on foreign powers and entities that are alleged to seek to interfere in domestic matters, a story that has played out many times in Chinese history.

Top Ten Concerns
Recently, the U.S. has demanded that China undertake a serious and transparent investigation into all cyberattacks on U.S. commercial and government targets. The Chinese reception to such ideas has been extremely cold and even confrontational. As a result, the U.S. has made its views on free internet access more voluble and frequent, causing further irritation in Beijing.

It is now becoming clear that China’s “cold war” with the U.S. and other powers is becoming manifest beyond the increasingly interactive segments of economic and diplomatic relations, suggesting rising tensions and potential for intractability sooner rather than later.

Among the top ten concerns are:

  1. China-Taiwan strategic balance;
  2. Cyber attacks, not only on Google but on at least 30 other U.S. companies, as well as ongoing attacks on the U.S. government and military establishment;
  3. Parallel cyber attacks on the Indian Prime Minister’s offices and other parts of the Indian security establishment, and apparent statements of concern on the part of the German and French governments in regard to cyber vulnerability;
  4. Internet censorship, suppression of freedom and activism, and human rights violations;
  5. Severe standoff at the Copenhagen Summit with regard to climate change negotiations;
  6. Tit-for-tat trade sanctions and public confrontation over demands made by the U.S. President and other foreign leaders that China alter its currency policy;
  7. Differences in approach to dealing with Iran via UN mechanisms;
  8. North Korea’s nuclear proliferation;
  9. Military presence in Pakistan; and
  10. Ongoing border disputes with India, which are taking an increasingly provocative character.

Given the complexity and concatenation of these top ten evolving concerns across multiple dimensions, there is growing risk that the “cold war” may escalate further with unanticipated consequences for financial markets, world trade, global businesses, policies of governments, and their national security agenda.

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***Posted March 7th, 2010

Cyberpoints Weekly: Writing Cyber defense into Title 10

SLD CWC

“Only the dead have seen the end of war.”
George Santayana


John Wheeler
John Wheeler

By John Wheeler
[email protected]

Writing Cyber defense into Title 10: Meeting the Challenge Head-on

The public debate is increasingly acknowledging that the military must have a distinct and essential role in cyberspace. This realization emphasizes that warfighting is distinct from other professional skill sets involved in cyberspace, namely law enforcement and intelligence. Key ideas from the history and practice of the military art will help to shape a U.S. cyber defense and warfighting capability. This capability will be necessary in order to protect the global freedom of commerce, trade, and communications.

In order to better craft a cyber defense and warfighting capability, Congress will need to expand its guidance on warfighting – contained in Title 10 of the U.S. Code – to include cyberspace. Currently, the code covers land, sea, air and space but notably omits cyberspace.

cover reference

Evolving Perspectives on the Cyber Challenge
In a recent interview, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn spoke of the importance of collaborating with other nations for the common defense, creating a vigorous defense capability, and seizing the initiative to locate attackers.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, General James Cartwright, has made the same point:

History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses significant risks: the ‘Maginot Line’ model of terminal defense will ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air, and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests. [1]

Further, the new Joint Staff statement, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,” states in bold letters: “Communications security, and specifically bandwidth protection (from both friendly interference and adversary action) is imperative.”  This bandwidth protection applies to both manned and unmanned systems.  As reported by Secrecy News, the document states that, in general, unmanned aircraft should be treated “similarly to manned systems with regard to the established doctrinal warfighting principles.”

The Need for Title 10 Inclusion
Latent in Mr. Lynn’s remarks is the policy question that is now ripe for discussion: When shall Congress incorporate cyberspace into Title 10 of the U.S. Code?

New advice and consent appointees in DOD could be forgiven for being mystified that they find the guidance for land, sea, air, and space in Title 10, but nothing on cyberspace. Many long explanations and excuses can be woven, but it is a gaping policy and statutory gap.

Notional Language for Title 10 Inclusion of Cyberspace

Title 10 of the U.S. Code is where Congress gives guidance to the Executive Branch for the efforts to organize, train, and equip forces for defense in land, sea, air, and space domains; Title 10 is where Congressional guidance for the cyberspace domain would be included.

What follows is notional language for the inclusion of cyberspace in Title 10. It is a “thought experiment” to illustrate Congressional guidance to appointed officials and the military for the tasks of organizing, training and equipping forces in the Cyber domain. The language for the space domain in Title 10 is used as a template and applied to cyberspace. Indeed, space and cyberspace share common properties of (a) being unbounded and (b) enveloping the other domains. The first section would read:

§ 2XXX. Policy regarding assured access to cyberspace:  Freedom of Cyberspace and national security cyber payloads

(a) Policy.— It is the policy of the United States for the President to undertake actions appropriate to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the United States has the capabilities necessary to successfully insert United States national security and supportive cyber payloads into cyberspace whenever such payloads are needed in cyberspace for the purpose of defending the freedom of action in and access to cyberspace by the United States and carrying out attacks in cyberspace pursuant to the defense of the United States and its interests.

(b) Included Actions.— The appropriate actions referred to in subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, providing resources and policy guidance to sustain—

(1)  the capability of delivering into cyberspace any cyber payload designated by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence as a national security cyber payload; and

(2) a robust cyberspace infrastructure and industrial base from which to base the defense of the United States in cyberspace and to mount attacks in cyberspace as needed, pursuant to the provisions of law for cyberattack.

(c) Coordination.— The Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum extent practicable, pursue the attainment of the capabilities described in subsection (a) in coordination with the Director of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence.

We are just barely wading out into the new “cyber sea,” yet we have guidance from the past in shaping appropriate responses to the other domains of defense.

For  a full draft of Title 10 Cyber Language with the Title 10 Space antecedents used for the Cyber language, click here.

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*** Posted on March 11th, 2010

References

[1]  William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, editors,” Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities”, 2009, Committee on Offensive Information

Warfare, National Research Council, page 3-1.

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