SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

From PBL to U.S. Government Directed Logistics

Posted on February 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/15/2010

Insourcing or the End of PBL?
The Obama Administration has focused on reform of acquisition practices across the public sector and the President has gone out of his way to target the private sector as a source of “outsourcing gone awry.” The President has hence called for greater responsibility in government oversight of the acquisition process as well as doing more of its own work to “save” money.

Ironically, a key part of this effort is the ending of performance-based logistics begun in the Clinton Presidency, as U.S. allies either further embrace or further innovate in having the private sector heavily engaged in both the management of and execution of logistics in order not only to achieve substantial savings and productivity gains, but also optimize their supply chain.

The Administration will “insource wherever possible to ‘save money’.” The “insourcing” phenomena is really about hiring public servants and reducing the role of private industry. What is not clear is how this saves money.

Indeed, interviews with a number of firms in the U.S. underscored that the U.S. government is in effect hiring back its former personnel which had retired and gone to the private sector and is paying them a premium to do so.

A senior USAF officer in charge of a major USAF facility told sldinfo that “our facility was always dependent upon the use of contractors. Now we have to replace those contractors and do so at cost increases of nearly double of what we were paying the private sector. The result is a reduction of output of the weapons development facility.”

The Value of Comparative Metrics
Performance-based logistics has become a target with the pursuit of such principles. The GAO has in several reports reviewing PBL underscored that the “cost savings from PBL have not been demonstrated. They are not auditable.” The GAO point is well taken and as a senior OSD official involved in sustainment and logistics told sldinfo, “we need to improve our efforts to understand and demonstrate cost savings from working with the private sector.

Yet one should note that the GAO does not audit the depot system, which does 50% or more of the U.S. logistics and sustainment efforts. Indeed, without auditing the depots, it is impossible to claim that there are cost savings in the offing by pushing more government work to the depots instead of having the private sector involved through a PBL or similar effort.

What is striking is how often assertions of future savings are simply not challenged.

A key case in point is the recent USAF decision to jettison the PBL system for the F-22. The PBL for F-22 has clearly demonstrated that the private sector delivered improved performance and availability of the aircraft.

In the case of the F-22, the irony is that in 2008 the USAF gave the PBL team the PBL system level PBL of the year award. Key success factors cited in the award were warfighter support, public-private partnerships, ownership costs reduction and sustainment system engineering teamwork. Another key discriminator cited in the award was ability to respond to changing ops tempos and warfighter needs.

Notably, as the F-22 fleet size has been caped and inevitably will go down in numbers for missions, one would think that USAF data indicated that a 15% improvement in Mission Capable rates and repair time reduced by 20% would count for more rather than for less in the period ahead.

Apparently not. According to Debra Tune, deputy assistant Air Force secretary for logistics, the government will save “billions of dollars” from bringing the work in-house. Although a good case of populist procurement rhetoric, what is not clear is what savings the USAF is referring to. There may be upfront reductions in expenditures in FY 2010 or 2011 but it is difficult to see how hiring new personnel or hiring back retired personnel saves money.

Even more to the point, under PBL, metrics for the payment of services by the private sector- and, even more important, management of the parts ordering chain – have clearly been established. A key advantage of PBL has been that the private sector delivers an outcome, and does so by buying parts in line with its determination of the flow of parts necessary to achieve a result [1].

The government does not. The government buys on annual budgetary cycles and based on bureaucratic estimates of parts required on an annual basis. Delivering to mission readiness is a metric one can understand; it’s more difficult to understand how the government now will save money from its own management of the supply chain.

Because the missing ingredient in the Administration’s treatment of “insourcing” and the end of PBL is simply that it will now have to manage the supply chain. For programs in production, prime contractors are the vortex of managing a difficult supply chafing process. The advantage of the PBL approach is simply that the contractor is in a position to maintain the supply chain with an eye to production and sustainment. Unless, the Administration has in mind going back to an Arsenal system, it is difficult to see how it will effectively do this.

But it is precisely what the USAF leadership is promising to do with the new tanker and the F35. Debra Tune added in an Inside the Air Force interview, “We consider support integration (CLS) role to be a core competency of the Air Force. We are moving back toward government product support integration.” [2]

A C-17 Loaded (Photo Credit: www.theaviationzone.com)

Managing the Private Engineering Base
Another challenge facing the Administration will now be to manage the private engineering base supporting the sustainment process. The impulse towards PBL was driven by the inability of the government and the private sector to provide full transparency between the warfighter needs and the development and production engineers in the private sector. As a former senior acquisition official told sldinfo: “PBL allows the engineering talent in the private sector to be fully engaged in sustainment and modernization of systems. By putting the private sector in a leading role in shaping metrics for performance, the engineers were then in a position to shape more effective upgrade and modernization strategies.”

The new “government directed sustainment approach” then is reshaping the concept of how to acquire new products, and presumably ownership of the engineering process for modernization. Whereas the F-35 has had a clear approach to building a PBL sustainment system, now the USAF on its own has suggested it will not follow this approach.

The USAF will “back-fit” the new “approach” to existing PBL contracts, such as the C-17. It is difficult to find a sustainment approach more successful in readiness and performance metrics than the C-17, but Debra Tune tells us that “change” is necessary here as well. It will be interesting to see whether Boeing’s international approach to sustainment of the aircraft will follow the new USAF direction, or whether global clients, such as in the UK will want the “older” tested PBL model.

In the logistics domain, the gap between U.S. practices and those of its allies are likely to widen in the period ahead. Getting rid of PBL is significantly easier than actually delivering effective government-led sustainment efforts. The proof will be in the pudding.

***

References:

[1] See for instance: http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/performance-based-logistics-perspective.pdf

[2] Inside the Air Force, “Air Force to Manage Logistics for KC-X Tanker, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”, January 29, 2010

———-

***Posted February 15th, 2010

Looming Gaps: The “Haiti” Rescue Effort in 2012

Posted on February 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Towards a rescue capability gap?

The Waesche Crossing the Panama Canal — The The new cutter, the Waesche, comes through the Panama Canal in early February (credit: USMG; 02/2010)

The military impact of equipment shortfalls and delayed modernization efforts is sometimes difficult to measure. When a crisis like Haiti happens, the U.S. military responds and is able to work with allies across the region, obscuring the shortfalls’ true effect.

For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has played a crucial role throughout the crisis. It was first on the scene and has remained active throughout. At the same time, the inability to modernize the cutter fleet in a timely fashion has created a looming critical shortfall in capability. During the crisis, the USCG had to bring a venerable cutter, USCGC Hamilton, from the Pacific via the Panama Canal to play a crucial role. By 2012, this ship will be decommissioned and unable to support a similar crisis in the future.

The Coast Guard’s recent plans to replace the Hamilton with one of its sister ships, the Dallas, was abandoned when the President’s FY-2011 Budget Request announced that both these vessels would be decommissioned. The Budget Request, just released, determined that both vessels were more than 40 years old and too expensive to maintain. A replacement for the Hamilton has yet to be identified.

Originally, twelve of these highly capable cutters were built. Plans call for their replacement by eight National Security Cutters. To date, only two of these new vessels have been built and one is currently under construction. Funding is being sought for the next two.

The national policy seems to be “throw out the old and bring in the new very slowly.” The policymakers are needlessly accepting the capability gap and recklessly hoping that no Haiti-type crisis occurs.

From a capabilities standpoint, the differences between the old and the new cutter are significant. The old cutter is limited in performance, command and control, and how assets on board can be deployed. The new cutter is a fully functional command ship with significant connectivity with U.S. and allied law enforcement and military authorities. While the older cutter can carry only an H-65 helicopter, the new cutter will carry the re-furbished H-60s, which are significantly larger and more capable. The new cutters can also carry unmanned aerial vehicles, which will be useful in crises like Haiti.

Simply put, if you want the U.S. military to continue doing the magnificent job it performed in Haiti, you have to pay for the infrastructure, which includes the highly trained and experienced crews and sustained logistics support. The infrastructure is built by buying real systems. More briefing slides on future capabilities, numerous IG and GAO reports, and dozens of Congressional Hearings may amuse folks inside the Beltway. However, they deliver no real world capability, which the first line responders need. The second line of defense is provided by manufacturing and acquiring platforms and systems. Without the second line there is no first line. A rescue capability gap is certain without recapitalizing the infrastructure.

***

NB: In the accompanying video, the Hamilton is pictured coming from the Pacific through the Panama Canal to participate in the Haiti rescue.

———-

***Posted February 15th, 2010

General Bansard on Logistics and Sustainment in France (Part Two)

Posted on February 14, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/14/2010

Logistics on the Front Line

A few months ago, SLD sat down with General Jean-Pierre Bansard, in charge at the time of Logistics Organization within the MoD Chief of Staff, in order to gain a better understanding of the evolution of French support and logistics in light of the many undergoing reforms and the mutation of the battlefield.

This is the second of a three-part series previously published in French as a single article in ”Soutien Logistique Défense” in October 2009.

4. [SLD] What lessons can be drawn from the measures already implemented, such as improved Full In Service Support (MCO for “maintien en condition opérationnelle“ in French), increasing outsourcing, or existing restructuring, e.g. the creation of the CSFA (Commandement du soutien des forces aériennes, i.e. Air Assets Support Command) and the SIAé (Service Industriel de l’Aéronautique, i.e. Aeronautics Industrial Support Service)? Are these measures compatible with the upcoming new reforms?

[General Bansard] Despite the fact that the numerous audits, which were done in the framework of the RGPP about the support units, were conducted by outside experts, such a process managed to take into account the studies and reviews launched prior to the RGPP. Indeed, the adaptation and rationalization efforts have been a constant concern within the armed forces’ support units and many of the leads followed by the RGPP audit teams are in the wake of the work achieved in the past years by the armed services and the support services.

As a result, the ongoing reforms are for the most part fully compatible and consistent with the evolutions already underway. In fact, the RGPP can be considered as the main catalyst for speeding up the pace of reforms already engaged and for launching reforms considered at the time, but not yet fully on track.

bansard2-pic1-bdd — The Defense Base Concept: 11 prototype bases (www.defense.gouv.fr)

Nearly all of the forty or so ongoing reform projects taking place within the ministry of defense have a functional nature, as they all aim at rationalizing and optimizing the support functions.On the other hand, the creation of defense bases is by nature organizational. The goal is to put support capabilities in common on a territorial and joint basis, since all MoD structures physically located near the defense base are to be supported by the “Defense Base Support Group” (GSBdD or “Groupement de Soutien de la Base de Défense” in French), which brings together all common management and support means.
The creation of defense bases can therefore be described as a transverse cross-cutting reform and the coherence of the overall process of reform must be assessed within such a context, which is not an easy task.

This new organization directly impacts in particular on the deployable support assets. Indeed, when deployable units are located on a defense base, they share their support capabilities within the GSBdB on a joint basis, but when these units have to be sent on an operational mission, these capabilities need to be rendered to them in full: this is for instance true as far as the treasurers are concerned, who will now be one per GSBdD as opposed to one per regiment, but such an evolution concerns all military support functions. To build our capability model, the basis has always been a theoretical ternary rotation cycle for military personnel (“one on the ground, one returning from it, and one getting ready to go”); in reality, the ratio tends to be more 3.5, nay even 4 to 1, in order to face unavailability, training imperatives and other hazards. The “mutualization” of support capabilities is to lead to their actual reduction, which means that, as a result, the GSBdD is not always in a position to provide all the necessary deployable capabilities on its own. This generates therefore a support capabilities maneuver on a joint level, either via a system of rotation among the defense bases, or via the resort to reserves, but also most certainly, via the hiring of temporary staff, such as veterans.

6. Does the economic crisis have any tangible impact on the current developments (either positive such as speeding up certain aspects of the reform, or negative such as the shrinking of the supply base)?

It is a bit too soon to comment on the effects of the crisis. Indeed, one must refrain from confusing the “noise” (i.e. the short-term analysis of the signs) and the trend. Military planners always work on a ten-year period (the outlook of the White Paper is 2020), the military program law is based on six-year time-frame, and even budgetary forecasts are now three-year based. It would therefore be rather risky to try to extrapolate on the past months trends over the long run.

Military logisticians must display self-control, calm and levelheadedness. They must be able to take a step back from current events and put them into perspective, because logistics systems are by nature endowed with inertia: they must be driven like oil tankers rather than race trimarans. If logisticians were to base their actions on the immediate interpretation of daily events, military logistics would become about as reliable as the stock exchange market.

Reading scholarly and well-documented reports on the current economic crisis, I cannot help but remembering similar reports written when the oil prices ranged over 140 dollar a barrel and which recommended I urgently put in place financial dispositions in order to face an unavoidable rise over 200 dollar a barrel. My instinct was to wait and I am glad I did, since today I get other well-documented reports, coming from the same organizations, which explain how to manage the cost of oil supposed to remain under 40 dollar a barrel for a while.

So, as far as the impact of the economic crisis on the MoD’s reform is concerned, the only thing one can say for now is that the higher credit rates for business make any form of public-private partnership (PPP for “Partenariat Public-Privé ” in France, PFI for “Public Finance Initiative” in the UK) more challenging, and that the shrinking of the industrial base does not facilitate the defense conversion process underway to accompany the suppression of MoD’s jobs. It would be however a bit presumptuous to translate such a statement into the longer term, given, among other heavy trends, the demographic factor: baby-boomers (such as myself) will indeed soon – and massively – pave the way for younger generations, especially in small and medium-size enterprises.

The NH90 (http://www.airforce-technology.com)

7. What is your feeling about the impact of the new generation of equipment on support and logistics?

The least one can say is that this question is complex and is subject to many controversies. As I am nearing the end of a long career of logistician, I have been in a position to attend the early phase of many military programs now in production (Leclerc, Tigre, NH90, VBCI and to a lesser extent Rafale). For each of these programs, I can assure you that the reduction of MCO costs has always been part of the military specificities. No matter how amusing it may seem today, the MCO costs reductions were indeed emphasized in the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) assessment as a major argument to speed up the renewal of the fleet.

We are in fine witnessing an explosion in overall MCO costs per hour of service or per flight hour. One may therefore wonder about the assessments done at the time regarding support in the context of the process of integrated logistics support, which primarily benefited these equipments. There are of course multiple reasons behind this, and one should refrain from hazardous comparisons. One flight hour of Tiger and Rafale delivers an operational performance far superior to a flight hour of Gazelle or Mirage 2000. The same observation is valid for the VBCI compared to the VAB or the NH90 compared to the Puma.

One must however acknowledge that the weight of the MCO in the TOC of modern arm systems is constantly growing, whereas the forecast twenty years ago predicted a substantial reduction. Are the causes linked to the tendency, classic in many military programs to over-commit, or does this signal a much deeper phenomenon? Probably a bit of both.

In my view, the frantic technological race is definitely part of the determining factors lying behind the MCO costs’ evolution, especially because of the frustrating cortege of obsolescence it generates and the costly updates which go with it. However, the search for technological excellence is consusbtantial with operational performance, which is not only indispensable when facing the enemy, but also when it comes to competition in regard to arms export – which one cannot do without.

Nonetheless, the current geostrategic context seems to favor a diversification of the fleet, in which could co-exist high-tech equipment providing a high level of performance fitting the most demanding deployments on the one hand, a more rustic fleet with more limited capabilities, but sufficient for easier operations, on the other hand. It is certainly a path worth exploring, knowing that there is a gap between the theory and the implementation: like haute cuisine, it is all a matter of mixing and matching the right ingredients in the right proportions.

Is France heading towards a reform of the acquisition process, which would allow an end-to-end approach to military programs, while integrating support and logistics requirements from the outset of their conception?

The answer is an unequivocal YES. However, it is a bit of a practical joke, since this question has been on the table for more than 20 years (if not more), and the answer has systematically been yes. But in spite of that, we still have not found the magical potion, which will perform miracles, such as a free-ride…

The Chief of staff and the MoD’s Acquisition service (known as DGA in France, for “Délegation Générale de l’Armement“) work nevertheless tirelessly and hand-in-hand on the establishment of Integrated Program Teams (EDPI, for “équipes de programme intégrées“). These EDPIs would follow up a program throughout its life-cycle (from its conception till its retirement) and would include, besides the program’s director and the Chief program officer, a third official in charge of MCO. In the past, the responsibilities of the program’s director and the Chief program officer would split once the equipment would become operational. Nowadays, the trend is to associate a tripartite entity systematically including a support and logistics expert (MCO, maintenance and integrated logistics) to the conduct of a program throughout its life-cycle.

The implementation of these new EDPIs is going to be experimented on about ten programs, selected so that they represent an accurate sample and help validate the concept, while contributing to the definition of the best processes.

Of course, if there is an area where experimentation needs to be conducted without taboo nor prejudice, it is when dealing with the role of industries as far as MCO is concerned. Many leaps ahead have been achieved, but there is still a long way to go on a path filled with obstacles – a path one needs to walk upon with circumspection and pragmatism without being too dogmatic or simplistic. For genuine partnerships between the armed forces and industries to emerge and last, it is crucial to build them on the basis of a win-win relationship and a climate of mutual trust, which will require time, and most probably some evolution in our contracting modes.

———-

***Posted February 14th, 2010

D.K. Matai on: China’s Cold Cyberwar

Posted on February 13, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/13/2010

Our colleague and regular contributor D. K. Matai starts a series on cyber security issues which complements John Wheeler’s contributions to SLDinfo on the same subject. John Wheeler is shaping proposed Title X language for constructing a legal framework for the engagement of U.S. forces in dealing with the cyber domain as it does with the ground, land, air and space domains.

***

China’s Cold Cyberwar: Rise of 5th-Dimension Red Army and Economic Pearl Harbor?

China’s digital attacks: a turning point in cyberwarfare
The recent China-based cyber attacks on more than thirty Silicon Valley companies, including Google, are the beginning of a new stage in the evolution of cyber warfare. The attacks targeted and stole source code and user information from the companies’ servers. Based on the sophistication and scope of the attacks, security experts have concluded that state-sponsored actors were likely involved. Despite all the handshakes, we are in the midst of a Cold Cyberwar.

Cyber Warfare
The China digital attacks represent a turning point in cyber conflict for the following reasons.

First, these are the largest and most sophisticated cyberattacks to have targeted specific corporations in many years.
Second, the attacks had the most visible goals of controlling information flows in and out of China.
Third, the attackers wanted to acquire core intellectual property and digital identities of foreign competitors.

As a result of the incidents, Google claims it will no longer censor its search results in China and it may withdraw from the country altogether.

Economic Pearl Harbor?
A hither-to unknown security hole in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) was exploited during the attacks. Recognized in mid-January, Microsoft is working on a patch. It has warned that versions 6, 7, and 8 of the web-browser are affected by the vulnerability.

In response, the German and French governments have advised their agencies to stop using IE. They have further warned their citizens of their continuing vulnerability when using Microsoft’s web browser.

Hidden deeper in Berlin and Paris is the growing awareness that Beijing has been able to acquire critical parts of source code of IE and much of the underlying platform and proprietary software.

Designing a Counter-Cyberattack Strategy
China’s Cyber Army
For the first time in 2007, a U.S. military report into the future of geo-political relations with China suggested that the Chinese government was developing a cyber warfare division for use in possible future conflicts.

The report, entitled “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” suggested that, in addition to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ground force, navy, air force, and rocket arms, the Chinese government was putting together a team to deal with “electronic and online arenas.”

“People’s Liberation Army authors often cite the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed an ‘information blockade,’” the report says. “China is pursuing this ability by improving information and operational security, developing electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities, denial-of-service and deception… China’s concept of an ‘information blockade’ likely extends beyond the strictly military realm to include other elements of state power.”

The same U.S. defense report suggested that China is developing teams to attack, defend, and exploit computer networks with a separate section handling electronic countermeasures. It cited logistics systems and satellite communications as possible targets and claims that exercises have been held in cooperation with other PLA wings since 2005.

Indeed, the cyber warfare programs of China and the U.S. share one objective: to access and render inoperable the command and control systems of adversaries, whether earth- or space-based.

But the potential of cyber warfare goes far beyond infiltration into the communications systems of a potential adversary. Looking back to the height of the Cold War, nuclear missile technology and weaponry were focused on physical destruction of the infrastructure of adversaries. Psychological deterrence was one objective. The other was to decimate potential adversaries’ economies should war become unavoidable.

Increasingly, the advanced economies of the world have become dependent on the worldwide web for managing banking, finance, telecommunications, energy flows, power grids, transportation and delivery systems, industrial processes, inventory management, emergency services, remote diagnostic medical assistance, etc.

Solutions for The Cyber Warfare Paradigm Shift
The Pandora’s box of full-scale cyber war is open now. As in all wars, our collective national defenses must excel enemy aggression. We will therefore need to understand the following.

First, defense has always been about securing trade routes and markets. Considering several trillion dollars of trade is routed digitally, a counter-attack will require electronic weapons that can disable attacking systems from various parts of the world. This counter-attack will ultimately need the support of governments. These forces will save businesses a lot of lost time and money in dealing with rogue, politically motivated, electronic attacks from radical and criminal groups scattered across the world and within nation(s).

Second, mobilization of resources including new investment will become necessary on interoperable, knowledge management and analysis systems.

Third, investment in more local human intelligence across the globe will be essential. The expertise of the very few available people who are proficient in digital technologies would need to be utilized to train the counter-attack-forces through the establishment of national centre(s) of excellence for digital defense.

Fourth, nothing significant can be achieved without this cohesive sharing capability being made available to the future counter-attack-forces, who would be able to ensure reliability, availability, maintainability, and scalability of business systems in the event of protracted hacker attacks.

We must ultimately hope that the pace of dissemination of real time information throughout the world will outpace the determination of a few governments and their proxies to disrupt our way of life.

———–

***Posted February 13th, 2010

Lessons Learned: The USMC Approach to Close Air Support in Fallujah (Part Three)

Posted on February 11, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/11/2010

CAS: A CORE CONTRIBUTOR TO SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN FALLUJAH

(Reprinted courtesy of the Marine Corps Gazette. Copyright retained by the Marine Corps Gazette)

By Maj Fred H. Allison, USMCR (Ret)

Maj Allison is a former Marine F–4 radar intercept officer. He earned his doctorate in history from Texas Tech University and is currently a historian at the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

***

: Operation Phantom Fury (Second Battle of Fallujah): Operation Phantom Fury was a joint U.S.-Iraqi offensive in November and December 2004 (Credit: USMC)

Paying attention to commonality
RCT–1’s Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE after-action report underscored the great utility of a common map or GRG. Kling and his team enhanced RCT–1’s FALLUJAH I GRG, made it useable for day and night operations, provided different scale maps for different users as appropriate, and made detailed sector maps. Commonality of place names was manifestly important to ensure that supporting fires were expeditious and accurate. It was posted on the 1st MarDiv website for all to access, and Kling and his team of airspace planners made a “round robin theater tour” to ready rooms throughout, including aboard the USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67), to brief the GRG and keyhole CAS plan. Capt Ellis highlighted the GRG’s importance to pilots: “If you don’t have this in your cockpit . . . if you can’t talk to this, go home; we’ll send you home.”[22]

Finally, the CAS plan for FALLUJAH II relied on Marine Corps-style procedural control. It allowed for routing a lot of aircraft into a tightly confined space, in a compressed time. Procedural control is in variance with Air Force positive control or radar control. Procedural control is less restrictive on pilots.

As a 3d MAW staff officer described it, procedural control is:

. . . like on a highway you can put two cars doing 80 miles an hour and put them three feet apart with a line down the center, and as long as they know not to cross the line [they will be safe], but if I had to do that by radar I’d have to put a huge space between them. So [with] procedural control you can actually saturate the area more with aircraft, so long as everybody goes by the procedures . . . that’s not doctrine to the Air Force . . . they look at it as a loss of control.[23]

Type II CAS—prosecution of a target when neither the pilot nor the FAC sees the target but both have digital imagery or coordinates that can ensure that the right target is hit—was used predominately. This was appropriate for Fallujah because the strike fighters operating above 9,000 feet certainly were not going to get eyeballs onto targets in the brown slur of Fallujah’s architecture, while FACs on the ground often had their views of the targets blocked by buildings, or they had to keep their heads down because of enemy fire. Deep air support, in effect, was being supplied at close range.

Targets were discovered or identified by pilots, FACs, and JTACs. Information was exchanged, as the same imagery was often shared between one and another. Once positive identification was made, clearance to attack was passed to the pilot by a FAC or JTAC. Although no one really had eyes-on, the target could be very close, even across the street. A vertically delivered bomb could collapse the building with little danger of fratricide because the building would contain the blast.[24] Buildings next to other buildings that had been struck by bombs still stood; their windows had not even been blown out. A few pock marks evidenced a blast that had destroyed a building only ten meters away. Insurgent hideouts also were mini arsenals. By collapsing the building, insurgents were killed and arsenals destroyed and therefore not available for leakers to use later.[25]

marine aviation — credit: Marine Aviation Command

AC130U — An AC-130U Spooky Gunship shooting flares as countermeasure against heat-seeking missiles (Credit: USAF, Florida, 2008 as shown at: http://en.wikipedia.org)

Relying on the whole gamut of air assets
Airstrikes did not stop at night. Air officers and FACs, leveraging UAS-gained intelligence prepped the battlefield for the next day, taking down buildings known to harbor insurgents or arms caches. The ever popular, and omnipresent, Air Force AC–130U droned overhead, its optics and sensors surveying and reconnoitering the urban battlefield, exchanging information with FACs and air officers on the ground. Its sensors could pick up body heat, and when they did, insurgents were quickly ushered into Allah’s waiting arms. It was music to the Marines’ ears at night, “. . . background music for everyone. He would lull everyone to sleep with the ‘giant potato gun.’ The Marines loved it.”[26]

The accuracy of the air-delivered fires was phenomenal. Minarets attached to mosques, obviously prime insurgent observation points and snipers’ posts, were often targeted. A laser Maverick, guided bomb unit, or laser-guided bomb could “roll the thing open like a can,” and leave the mosque itself virtually undamaged.[27] Strafing at times too was appropriate and could have an awesome impact. One Marine commander noted how Harriers and Hornets were brought down to 3,000 feet and made a strafing pass. “It had an awesome impact,” he asserted.[28]

The keyhole CAS plan allowed virtually the entire arsenal of coalition air assets to be brought to bear—not only strike fighters and attack helicopters of all Services, but also electronic warfare aircraft, Navy and Marine EA–6Bs, which remained adjacent to the city and employed electronic magic to impair the enemy’s communications system. The Navy’s big submarine-chasing P–3s, now equipped with a full suite of electronics, provided enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and C2 assets. Rotary-wing aircraft operating on Fallujah’s fringes at times used laser energy from fixed-wing fighters above to guide their Hellfire missiles to targets within the city. Attack helicopters also escorted casualty evacuation flights and land convoys around the city. That’s what Marine AH–1W Cobras were doing on 11 November 2004 when two of them were shot down within minutes of each other at two different locations, one west of Fallujah and the other north, pointing out that the rotary-wing CAS birds were in a real down-and-dirty gunfight with the insurgents.

It also serves to remind us that airspace for the high-flying TacAir indeed had a permissive environment in Operation AL FAJR; the enemy fired nothing that threatened their sanctuary. If the enemy had employed weapons that could range them, the CAS plan and its implementation would have been entirely different. But the enemy did not, and the value of TacAir, tied with precision weaponery and targeting, was made obvious, and in the case of FALLUJAH II, it was predominately Marine TacAir. Although Air Force, Army, and Navy aircraft flew numerous strikes, in the final tally, at least 80 percent of the CAS strikes in November in Fallujah were delivered by 3d MAW aircraft, precisely and expeditiously. Approximately 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and missiles, and 93,000 machinegun or cannon rounds were sent down range by aircraft—in concert with over 6,000 artillery rounds and almost 9,000 mortar rounds fired.[29] There were no fratricides.

This blitzkrieg of supporting fires no doubt caused the deaths of many of the estimated 2,000 insurgents who had chosen to stay and fight. The city was not reduced to rubble. True insurgent strongholds went down, but minor damage was inflicted compared to other cities that have endured an intense urban fight supported by aviation.[30] Civilians, the vast majority of whom had vacated the city thanks to a focused information operations program, returned in time to vote in large numbers in the election held on 30 January 2005.

***

Footnotes:

22. Ellis interview; Kling-author interview.

23. Col Ken Lee, interview by author and David Anderson, 15 June 2007, Headquarters Marine Corps, transcript held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

24. LtCol John M. Butterworth, , interview by LtCol John Way, 4 February 2005, Iraq, transcript held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

25. Kling-Way interview.

26. Maj David P. Smay, and Maj David E. Straub, interview by author, 17 May 2007, Patuxent River, MD, transcript held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico; Capt William Vaughn interview by by Maj Joe Winslow, 7 January 2005, Iraq, transcript held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

27. Smay and Straub interview.view.

28. Toolan interview.

29. 3d MAW MicroSoft PowerPoint briefing dated 18 January 2006, information held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

30. Jonathan Keiler,“Who Won the Battle of Fallujah,” Proceedings, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, January 2005, pp. 60–61.

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***Posted February 11th, 2010

Game Changers: Reframing The Climate Change Debate (Part Two)

Posted on February 10, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/10/2010

New Solar Minimum Ushers In Extreme Cold Climate?

By D.K. Matai

Judith Lean, Cycles and trends in solar irradiance and climate, 12/22/09 (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com)

The longer the sun remains quiet, the higher the chances of a prolonged series of cold winters and shorter summers. This is the quietest sun we have seen in almost a century.

The current solar cycle, which began in 1996, was expected to reach a minimum and transition to a new solar cycle in January 2007, post 11 years. It did not, although we have crossed 13+ years and are still counting in January 2010. We are experiencing a historically deep solar minimum!

For those who study the sun, the length of the solar cycle, lasting an average of 11 years, has proven to be the best historical indicator of short-term climate. At the end of these solar cycles, sunspot activity first declines, and then picks up markedly, typically indicating the beginning of a new cycle.

However, the slow return to the next phase of the solar cycle at present may portend a general decline in solar activity. 2008 was a sunspot “bear market” and 2009 was no better according to NASA. There were no sunspots observed on 78% of the days in 2008. To find a year with more blank suns, we have to go all the way back to 1913. Sunspots for 2009 dropped even lower: there were no sunspots on 90% of the days by April.

Solar Irradiance Cycle: Economic Consequences

The Dalton Minimum was a period in history with very low solar activity characterized by prolonged cold conditions between 1796 and 1824. This began with a solar cycle that lasted for 13.6 years, not dissimilar to the present elongated solar cycle. That cycle was then followed by two very inactive solar cycles.

During this time period, there were reports of wide-scale crop failures and food shortages. If similar conditions occur after this present, ongoing, deep solar minimum, and there is a large drop in temperature due to an inactive sun, the world could see further stress on the food supply. Areas that had become available for growing food during the recent short period of warming may become too cold again to grow food over the next two cycles, i.e., two to three decades.

Low Solar Activity

: Courtesy: J. Jokipii, University of Arizona (http://helios.gsfc.nasa.gov) – In the image above, it’s easy to see why the neutral current sheet is often called the “ballerina skirt”. The Parker spiral is indicated by the arrows. The magnetic field is primarily directed outward from the Sun in one of its hemispheres, and inward in the other. This causes opposite magnetic field directions in the Parker spiral. The thin layer between the different field directions is described as the neutral current sheet. Since this dividing line between the outward and inward field directions is not exactly on the solar equator, the rotation of the Sun causes the current sheet to become “wavy”, and this waviness is carried out into interplanetary space by the solar wind. In addition, every eleven years the entire magnetic field of the Sun “flips” — the north magnetic pole of the Sun becomes the south, and vice versa. The flip takes place at solar maximum.

The American Geophysical Union’s journal “Eos” published a paper in late 2009 suggesting that the levels of magnetic activity associated with recent sunspots indicates the sun might be returning to a state of low activity, similar to that of the historic Maunder Minimum between 1645 and 1715, when sunspots became exceedingly rare. During that period, called the Little Ice Age, Europe and North America were subject to bitterly cold winters and very short summers.

Observations of this period suggest that the solar cycle essentially stopped during this time, as very few sunspots were recorded during that time. Global mean temperatures responded accordingly dropping by 0.4°C. The effect was rather pronounced in the Northern Hemisphere, and felt as particularly harsh during the chilly white winters.

The last solar cycle drew to a minimum as expected, leaving the sun with very few sunspots for the past few years. However, what is surprising is the slow pace at which the next solar cycle is starting. That delay set the stage for the Eos paper, which notes that the few sunspots that have been visible are associated with extremely weak changes in solar magnetism. In some models of solar dynamics, this indicates that we are heading for a period similar to the Maunder Minimum, at least as far as the sun is concerned.

Assuming this model is right, can we expect another Little Ice Age, wiping out any impact of the greenhouse gases that have been pumped into the atmosphere?

Solar Cycle Climate Connection

The association between longer solar cycles and cooler climate was first demonstrated in 1991 by two Danish researchers, Egil Friis-Christensen, the director of the Danish Space Centre in Copenhagen, and Knud Lassen, a solar scientist at the Centre, in a paper published in Science. If we compare the global average temperature changes estimated for the Maunder Minimum, -0.4°C, with those that have occurred since the middle of the 20th century, which are about +0.4 to +0.5°C, they even out.

However, Australian geologist David Archibald has found that for every one-year increase in solar cycle length, there is a 0.5°C decline in surface air temperature during the following cycle. The present solar cycle will be 13+ years in length and, using the Archibald relationship, there would likely be a 1.0-1.5°C decline in temperature over the next solar cycle. This possible temperature decrease may not sound like much, but it is thrice as large as the increase in average global temperature during the 20th Century. It is also worth comparing that figure with the warming expected by the end of the 21st century, which the IPCC estimates at over 2°C.

All these numbers indicate that a return to Maunder-Minimum-like conditions could first take us back to very ‘cool cycle’ conditions last experienced between 1880 and 1915, which would be a significant change. Beyond that, a more drastic cooling, similar to that during the Maunder Minimum, could plunge the Earth into another Little Ice Age, but only time will tell us if that is likely.

Henrik Svensmark is the director of the Centre for Sun-Climate Research at the Danish Space Research Institute (DSRI). He studies the effects of cosmic rays on cloud formation. He has suggested that changes in the solar magnetic field associated with sunspots can also have an indirect affect on the climate. These changes influence the number of cosmic rays that reach the earth’s atmosphere — weaker solar magnetic fields mean that more cosmic rays hit the Earth. The cosmic rays form ions in the lower atmosphere that seed clouds, which cool the planet by reflecting sunlight back out, thereby exaggerating the cooling effects of much lower solar activity.

Conclusion: A Buying-Time Opportunity?

The current data is consistent with a decline in the sun’s magnetic field activity, which could potentially end in a sunspot-free period. It is uncertain whether the solar irradiance will rebound soon into a more-or-less normal solar cycle –- or whether it might remain at a low level for decades, analogous to the Maunder Minimum, a period of few sunspots that may have been a principal cause of the Little Ice Age.

This directly affects humanity because sunspot numbers act as a proxy for the amount of radiation sent out by the sun, which can have a significant influence on the Earth’s climate.

According to the climate change establishment, the sun is only one of a large number of factors that influence the climate, and the changes in solar radiance caused by sunspots are asserted by them to have a smaller impact on the climate than that caused by our ever-increasing levels of greenhouse gases.

Nonetheless, even a relatively small cooling effect caused by reduced solar activity, may buy humanity valuable time in coming to grips with greenhouse gases we are pumping into the atmosphere, at least when it comes to Earth’s average temperature increase.

Ocean acidification and long-term damage to the environment are not addressed via the possibility of much reduced solar activity.

Key Question: For how many years must the planet cool, and how cold must it get, before we are able to say that the planet is no longer warming?

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***Posted February 10th, 2010

General Bansard on the Evolution of Logistics and Sustainment in France (Part One)

Posted on February 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/08/2010

: General Jean-Pierre Bansard

LOGISTICS ON THE FRONT LINE (I)

This is the first of a three-part series previously published in French as a single article in “Soutien Logistique Défense” in October 2009.

***

1. [SLD] Could you highlight the main points, both qualitative and quantitative, regarding the current massive logistics reform within the French armed forces?

[General JP Bansard] The reform of the French armed forces, which is now taking place is at least as thorough as the professionalization reform initiated in 1996. This reform is twofold as it results from the convergence of two distinct reviews: on the one hand it stems from the White Paper on defense and security and on the other hand from the General Review of Public Policies (known as “RGPP” in French).
The White Paper was meant to adapt the format and structure of the armed forces to the evolution of the geostrategic environment, whereas the RGPP aimed to rationalize the entire support functions within the Ministry of Defense. Because logistics is part of both the operational and the support missions, it stands at the very heart of the current reforms.

2. What results are you expecting from this reform in terms of budget savings, operational efficiency and under which expected timeline?

WEEK16-FEB2-JPB-PIC2 — ECPAD, French MoD, 1992

The main objective of the current reform is to achieve savings in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) in order to redirect investment towards procurement and increase the modernization of our military capabilities.
Reforms will be carried out during the 2009-1014 Program Law. Over the course of this period, 54,000 jobs will be removed, for the most part from the support units (around 72%). At the end more than 4 billion Euros are expected as far as savings in O&M are concerned, including the costs induced by the reform process itself (such as for instance job loss compensations). We must however deduct 1.4 billion Euros in procurement, mainly because of infrastructure costs which are estimated to be worth 1.3 billion Euros (these figures are detailed in the February 2009 National Assembly report by Mr. Cazeneuve and Mr. Cornut-Gentille). Beyond 2014, the recurring savings in O&M should reach 1.5 billion Euros a year.

3. What is the impact of the new strategic outlook mapped out by President Sarkozy and its government (reduced presence in Africa; stronger commitment in Afghanistan; new base in the UAE; reintegration in NATO) on logistics?

– How can we, for instance, compensate for the diminution of our traditional logistics support bases in Africa?

The French White Paper does plan for a restructuring of our military presence in Africa. However, decisions will only be made once the agreements binding us with African hosting nations will have been reviewed on a case-by-case basis. It is therefore a bit premature to accurately describe the logistics organization we shall adopt in the future. It is, in any case, already certain that we shall continue to be granted permission to several access points, which may prove necessary in case of a required force projection. Indeed, we are currently working on the establishment of a new permanent base in the United Arab Emirates, which will complement our setting in a region of strategic importance. The reduction of our pre-positioned forces has been rendered possible by two major factors:

the enhancement of our ability to anticipate crises thanks to new upcoming “knowledge and anticipation” capabilities;
the reactivity of our intervention forces, which need to be able to depend on the appropriate projection means in order to deploy in specific timelines.

Our pre-positioning at sea, via in particular our projection and command ship (what we refer to, in French, as BPC, for Bâtiments de projection et de commandement) is indeed quasi permanent. We must also be in a position to be able to rely on rapid strategic and tactical power projection means: from this point of view, the A400M is crucial, especially as far as deployments on the African continent are concerned, since the C17 cannot easily be deployed in this type of terrain.

– Has the Afghan experience been changing our traditional modus operandi as far as support and logistics are concerned?

Afghanistan is currently the operational area, which shows itself to be the most challenging for logisticians. This theater of operation is especially tough as far as geography is concerned, with enclaves only connected via rare and difficult lines of communication, which are considered especially dangerous because of hostile activity (mines, traps, ambushes…).
We already faced similar situations in ex-Yugoslavia – with a somewhat lower threat level though – as well as on African theaters. Of course, this type of theater – in which frontlines are non-existent, where, as a result, it is hard to identify any front or rear areas, and where the location of the forces to be sustained are divided by zones of insecurity – represents a permanent challenge for the logisticians, who must ensure the constant delivery of crucial supplies to the troops.
We had to draw the right conclusions via our traditional lessons learned process at three levels:

regarding the equipment, especially as far as new protection requirements are concerned (armoring of the cabins of logistics vehicles; reconfiguration of our light armored vehicles – VAB for Véhicules de l’avant-blindé – and enhanced anti-IED protection);
regarding the modes of transportation, which asked for a more frequent use of air-mobility and air-transport;
and, finally, on processes, which required a close cooperation between logistic operations and tactical operations and a perfect coordination of overall maneuvers.

Indeed, the existence of a compartmentalized theater and the absence of distinct front and rear areas are placing the logisticians on the frontline, an observation already made during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. Adjustments had therefore to be made concerning the logisticians’ training, which has become more military, in order to better adapt to the new environment. In this type of theaters, the logisticians’ missions are totally integrated with those of the warfighters (escort mechanics, roads’ opening, equipment protection; etc…). Air assets are also mobilized to the benefit of logistics: air transport of course, but also fighter aircrafts at times, mostly for reconnaissance missions as well as close air support when attacked.

WEEK16-FEB-2-JPG-PIC-3-400 — ECPAD, French MoD, Chad, 2008

– Will more projection capabilities be required?

In terms of projection capabilities, the White Paper’s new operational contract takes into account the increase in warning time which is expected from improved crisis anticipation.
This in turn should allow us to recover part of the military support capabilities which are deployed in stabilized, or soon-to-be stabilized, theaters, and re-deploy them in a new theater where they will be better used.
At the same time and in order to facilitate such a redistribution of support capabilities, we have been implementing since 2006 the addition of new assets through outsourcing and the use of local manpower on stabilized theaters. This concept, called CAPES France, is similar to the one put in place in the United States (LOGCAP), in Canada (CANCAP), in the United Kingdom (CONDO-CONLOG) and within NATO. The first conclusion, after three years of joint experimentation in ex-Yugoslavia and in Chad, mostly in strategic transport (by sea, air and ground) and the support of the warfighter, is that important savings were made in ex-Yugoslavia. In Africa, where the local work force has always been directly employed by the armed forces, the CAPES outsourcing experience proved to be less conclusive at first sight: such an observation needs however to be balanced out by the fact that the tasking requested from the contractors tends to be more demanding than back home, which makes it hard to compare. Outsourcing in Afghanistan seems more problematic because of the high threat level which is constant, except for a few rare secured areas. For example, convoys coming from Pakistan move along in risky conditions: it is the case for military convoys, but even more so for civilian truck drivers who enjoy no protection.

– Are new types of complementarities within the EU and NATO being considered?

Whether in NATO or the EU, there is no doubt that logistics capabilities are among the toughest to assemble in the context of a multinational operation surge.
NATO has developed relevant concepts and processes to build up logistics multinational capabilities. However, one should stress that no single country hurries to play the role of logistics expert or leading nation (“nation cadre” in French). This stems from multiple reasons, among which is the negative ratio between the heavy costs embedded in the mobilization of the necessary capabilities and the low political visibility of logistics compared to combat.
France does however participate actively in these multinational initiatives, by taking on an important role in logistics (i.e. France’s role as the leading nation in the framework of the European force deployed for Darfur).
The solution certainly lies in the amendment of funding regulations in order to make the supply of support capabilities more attractive. In the meantime, outsourcing is often the way out of stalemates, at least for theaters and operations for which this kind of solution can be considered. Another major advantage of outsourcing is that it also allows to solve potential interoperability issues, which can often be extremely problematic when logistics support missions have to be implemented.

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***Posted February 8th, 2010

Maritime Security in Europe: The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative as Part of the Puzzle

Posted on February 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

By Harry Syringas (Sldinfo research staff)
[email protected]

According to the Assembly of the Western European Union’s assessment on the risks and threats of the maritime situation in Europe, among the maritime nations of the European Union, coastal regions account for over 40% of Europe’s GDP while roughly 90 % of the EU’s foreign trade and over 40% of the internal trade travels by water. Europe is a continent where maritime transportation is crucial and directly involves countries from the North to the South of Europe. Maritime security is indeed increasingly important in the scheme of things for European governments. The challenges of dealing with piracy, to protect against environmental challenges, to prepare to deal with Arctic challenges, and to provide for the security of the global conveyer belt of goods are among the priorities. Growing interest has not lead yet to crafting a system of sharing data and information to shape common policies, procedures and concepts of operations. But there are attempts to shape more effective efforts to build such a foundation for a coordinated approach.

An example of growing interest in shared collaboration for maritime security is the Adriatic-Ionian initiative (AII).

W17-adriaticpic — Source: www.defendory.gr (Defendory International, issue 3, October 2006, published by DBDC)

Origins of the AII

Part of the Mediterranean Sea is the Adriatic – Ionian basin, an area between Italy and Greece, reaching also the coasts of Albania, Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro. The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) was initiated by Italy. Practically, this is a follow-on activity (in military sense) of the Ancona Declaration – Conference on Development and Security in the Adriatic and Ionian, held in Ancona in May 2000. This initiative is a forum which joins naval components from Italy, Greece, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an aim to promote cooperation, joint training and conduct of exercises and exchange of experiences between the Adriatic and Ionian Sea navies.

The Italian and Greek Navies are in charge of developing a naval project for the navies of the seven member states with a view to facilitating surveillance of the Adriatic-Ionian region. In June 2009, the initiative was consolidated by the creation of a permanent Secretariat.

A Broad Agenda

The AII follows the outline of the Stability Pact, even if some of the participants are not members of the EU. In the framework of the Table on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development a document called the Adriatic Action Plan (AAP) 2020 was adopted at the environmental ministers’ meeting in June 2003 in Zadar, Croatia.
The AII is also a step for its non EU members, all at different stages of accession, closer to the standards of the European institutions as they get the chance to exchange experiences and participate in common projects with three EU full members (Italy, Greece and Slovenia).

The Council is chaired on a rotating basis by the eight member countries. Foreign Ministers of the member states form the decision-making body of the AII and the agenda is set up by the meetings of the National Coordinators. Its parliamentary dimension is “sealed” by the annual meeting held by each presidency and joined by national parliamentarians. Moreover, during each presidency, meetings with the Heads of the Naval Forces are being organized in order to discuss recent updates and issues concerning the Initiative as well as exercises in which all fleets take part; for instance, in March 2009, in Athens, the Greek Head of the Naval Forces, invited his counterparts from Italy, Albania, Montenegro and Croatia to confer and exchange ideas on the exercise ADRION – CAX 2009.

Speaking of an initiative bearing the name of two seas – some consider it to be one – the navies of the countries involved play a main part and are being primarily used for civilian purposes. The agenda includes combating illegal activities, environmental protection, sustainable energy, tourism, maritime transport, education and inter-university cooperation. However, the first pillar of this initiative relates to security and the fight against crime in the region. In times of peace, the Army’s task is to prevent a conflict before it occurs. Illegal trafficking and migration is very high on the list of activities. So are environmental issues and access to energy sources. In relation to the latter, three projects are covering the environmental aspect of the AII. The projects initially link three North Adriatic AII member states that are more advanced institutionally; other states have agreed to join and follow the projects in their extended phases or to learn from them in following years: navies of the countries around the Adriatic-Ionian basin are hence being used in a constructive way.

***

See for additional information:

Adriatic Sea Partnership: http://asp.rec.org/
Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration: www.mvpei.hr
Italian Ministry of Defence, Army Navy: www.marina.difesa.it
Secretariat for Adriatic Area: www.seadriatic.net
Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mfa.gr
Assembly of the Western European Union: www.assembly-weu.org

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***Posted February 8th, 2010