SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

Crafting Cyber Operations: A Terms of Reference for Facing 21st Century Challenges

Posted on January 11, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/11/2010

As the Wall Street Journal put it, “web is new front among cold war foes.” In this article, the author, Siobha Gorman, noted that :

“Alleged attacks on Google Inc. from China redraw the battle lines between the U.S. and its former Cold War adversaries, who are now squaring off on a new front: cyberspace. In the new cyber war, the targets are U.S. companies as much as embassies or spy services, because corporations hold giant repositories of sensitive information and can be easier to crack. Companies are responding in kind, often launching their own intelligence operations to counter the spies.”

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This is John’s first contribution to sldinfo.com: he will provide regular insights into how to shape effective con-ops in the cyber domain. John has a wide range of combat and government experience. He is a West Point graduate with warfighting experience in Vietnam. He has significant private sector experience, as well as holding various positions in government, including being Secretary, US Securities and Exchange Commission. His most recent position as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force included principal tasks, among which were standing up Cyberspace Forces and placing Precision Strike technology and Real Time Streaming Video targeting links into the hands of groundfighters in combat.

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Cyberspace is emerging in the consciousness of defense planners, the Congress and the public as a new operational domain, like Air, Surface Sea, Undersea, Space, and Land. US Government-wide, it is a process of fits and starts, just as in the case of the emergence of the Air and Undersea Domains in the early 20th Century. As the agencies of the United States Government frame and respond to the issues regarding Cyberspace, a complex process is underway.
It is possible to list the main factors that assist in following and interpreting developments in Cyberspace. The cyber defense debate is a confusing one. This “terms of reference” overview provides a way to understand the major dynamics at play and to provide a way to navigate the policy debates for 2010. The TOR is organized around five main principles and then a list of defining factors that aid the tracking and interpretation of Cyberspace developments. The conclusion is a Notional Mission Statement for USCYBERCOM, in order to focus comment and discussion. A full Reference list follows, as a set of key documents and statements.

Facing a New “Cyber Sea” and uncharted “Cyber waters”

The Five Principles
In overview, US policymakers stand in shoes similar to those of the pioneer leaders of the 1920’s and 30’s in the air and undersea domains. Five verities apply in Cyberspace, as in any domain.

Principle 1
The ultimate national aim is Freedom of Cyberspace, just as in Freedom of the Seas, Freedom of the Air Domain, and Freedom of Movement in Space and within national borders on Land. This means Freedom of Ideas and of Commerce in Cyberspace.
This is based on the US Constitution, going to the “Common Defense” purpose in the Preamble and in the provisions in Article I and Article II for protecting freedom of the sea lanes – an unbounded domain similar to Cyberspace. The application of the Constitutional guidance to the Air Domain followed naturally, and so also to Cyberspace. Cyberspace is a “commons” in the full sense of the word, to be kept open and defended.
The History of US response to war threats is that the US can dominate any domain of war. In the case of Cyberspace, it was the USA that pioneered the precursors to the Internet and to earliest operations in Cyberspace. SAGE, “Semi-Automatic Ground Environment” – was built to shift command and control around nuclear targets that have been destroyed by fission or fusion attack.

The SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) System, was designed and built in the 1950s to defend against the threat of Soviet bombers attacking the continental United States (see: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=06drBN8nlWg)

Principle 2: In Cyberspace each of the nine Principles of War fully applies: Mass, Offensive, Simplicity, Surprise, Maneuver, Objective, Unity of Command, Security and Economy of Force.
A key action and a measure of success will be to develop, test and prove in combat a conop or conops for successfully applying each Principle.
For national defense, the professional skills of Law Enforcement, Warfighting, and Intelligence all come to bear. Since deterrence, defense, and offense in war are decisive in any domain, full awareness and consideration of the Principles of War is a key to planning and understanding. General James Cartwright USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke on the Principle of the Offensive: History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses significant risks: the “Maginot Line” model of terminal defense will ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air, and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests.
Principle 3: In Cyberspace Operations require a balance of Warfighting, Law Enforcement and Intelligence effort.
In the Air, Sea and Land Domains, Law Enforcement and Warfighting are the active protections, and Intelligence carries out its core function of data-gathering and warning. In Cyberspace, due to the history of the evolution of Cyberspace doctrine from the communications and electronic surveillance fields, there has been a heavy Intelligence participation in operations.
Since Law Enforcement, Warfighting and Intelligence each involve differing professional skill sets, a balance of the three functions is vital. Where Intelligence action in Cyberspace overlaps with Warfighting and Law Enforcement, the staff and resources burden on Intelligence can be eased by shifting the Cyber functions more toward Warfighting and Law Enforcement, so that the Intelligence Community can focus most efficiently on burgeoning terrorist-tracking threats.
Principle 4: Humility is in Order: 2010 is an early stage in Cyber Warfare Evolution.
There is much we cannot know, so that it is premature to make determinations about whether or not the U.S. can dominate or deter in Cyberspace. So to speak, all nations are wading still close to shore into the new “Cyber Sea.” Nevertheless, the Mission of the U.S. Warfighter remains, by doctrine, to deter, and, if needed, fight and win swiftly with minimum casualties and cost in Cyberspace: an “Unfair Fight.” Drawn-out, “fair-fight” wars remain traps.
Principle 5: Privacy Concerns are Manageable.
The immutable requirement of the Constitution is to Provide for the Common Defense, under Article I and II. In the current political world citizen privacy is a concern that delays Cyberspace development. The mechanisms of the Constitution provide resolution, as in the case of the Air and Sea Domains, with citizen information and private sector information gathered in controlling flights and sea passage, and, from Article III, use of a special FISA court to protect citizens. Similar solutions are feasible in Cyberspace.

illustration-wheeler300 — A Semantic Web Application for the Air Tasking Order, 2005 (credit:http://stinet.dtic.mil/ cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463762&Location= U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Wanted: A Leap of Imagination to Deter a Possible “Cyber Pearl Harbor”

The Defining Factors
Listed below are fourteen distinct defining factors susceptible to help monitor Cyberspace developments and evolution.

Potential Foes are advanced in the domain.
They are already menacing the world and U.S. interests, as did Nazi and Japanese aircraft and submarines in the 1930’s.
The Taxonomy is new but vital, because it shapes thought and action.
XXth Century nomenclature drawing on terms like “network operations” is being displaced by taxonomy based on terms such as “cyberwar” and “cyber operations.”
A Leap of Imagination is needed to envision main war in the domain.
Learning Takes Time and Pain.
Years and combat will transpire before the full force of Cyber Deterrence and Warfighting are well mastered, just as it took main war to reveal the full force of the air and undersea warfights. There is an “American Way of War” that is ingrained in US culture, and it tends to involve delays and then unfortunate disasters along the road of learning, such as First Bull Run, the Little Big Horn, Pearl Harbor and the Trade Towers.
Turf Battles Can Ensnare Progress.
This is part of the “American Way of War”, where legal, statutory and treaty concerns can ensnare planning and forward motion. This is the natural political process in government, and Cyberspace policy and budgeting is no exception.
Recruiting, Training, Equipping are Telltale Indicators.
Recruiting and commissioning in each of the Armed Services and Government wide is a key factor to watch and track. Congressional guidance is incomplete in the Cyberspace Organize, Train and Recruit functions. Increasingly, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees will have jurisdiction, in adjustment from the prior regime where the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence have by default administered much of Cyberspace policy.
Placing Cyberspace in Title 10, USC. Title 10 guidance on Cyberspace would correct a gaping lack in the statutory predicate for organizing, training and equipping in for Cyberwar. USCYBERCOM is untethered without this guidance.
New Cyber Weaponry Abounds.
Cyber technology is proliferating and needs testing, for example, software packages, links to aircraft, spacecraft, and sea vessels, and troops on the ground.
The Domains are Interdependent.
Coordinated and integrated deterrence, defense and attack among U.S. Warfighters in the U.S. military services and with Law Enforcement needs doctrine and practical experience.
Defense Retrenchment is Under Way.
There is a political spirit of retrenchment in defense spending, including efforts for a “nonaggression” treaty in Cyberspace, notwithstanding foreign peer buildup — a situation similar to the United Kingdom exactly a century ago when young Churchill grasped the undersea domain and the vulnerability of battleships. Defense atrophy may be an impending risk.
First Responders and the Commercial Structure are Vital Partners.
They work in the cyber domain just as they do in the air domain, creating a need for coordination, command and control that includes them.
Savage Major Attack is Possible.
Some planners foresee savage surprise attack as possible or even probable, a “Pearl Harbor” such as fission detonations in DC and NYC, including an Electromagnetic Pulse from the groundburst, or a separate airburst, that would disrupt or erase local Cyberspace.
Melding “old” cultures with “new” is a Challenge.
As aviators with infantry, so cyber warfighting with traditional intelligence and infantry cultures.
The extensive private sector experience with mergers and acquisitions and the long travail of melding differing cultures speaks to the difficulties inherent in combining Warfighter, Law Enforcement and Intelligence professionals to operate in Cyberspace.
December 2005 Was the Modern Turning Point in Cyber Evolution.
Since 1995 and some years before, personnel in all Services and the Intelligence agencies saw the emerging vulnerability of web sites to interruption and the risks of internet penetration. By 2000 defense planners saw the emerging idea of a new domain in the mass of evolving communications via computers and data links.
The turning point was the action of the US Air Force in December, 2005 designating the Mission of fighting and winning in Cyberspace as a formal part of the US Air Force Mission Statement. This marked the first formal elevation of the term “Cyberspace” to name the Domain, and it sharply elevated national awareness of the Domain. For example, between November 2005 and February 2006 the number of Google Hits on the term, “Cyberspace” increased more than tenfold. The action of a warfighting service to name the Domain and set the Warfighting Mission in the Domain spurred the defense community, coalesced awareness of each Military Service’s programs in the Domain, opened Defense-Wide and Government Wide Debate on Cyberspace vulnerabilities and opportunities, and led to a 73% increase in funding government wide for Cyberspace activity from 2004 to 2009, to at least $7 Billion per year.
The Russian use of Cyber Preparatory Fires in 2007 in Estonia and 2008 in Georgia and the increasing and huge predations of US intellectual property and defense information by suspected Chinese agents accelerated US Government concern, action, and funding. Privacy activists mobilized, creating drag on the pace of standing up a robust Cyber Warfighting capability.
As a matter of Taxonomy, US Government Cyber activity as a whole became termed “Cyber Security”, and the Department of Homeland Security was given US Government lead for Cyber Security. The dynamics of US Government action in Cyberspace remain fluid and continue to evolve, as with the Air and Undersea Domains in the 1920’s and 1930’s.
The Mission Statement for USCYBERCOM is a Key Indicator.
A Presidential Order or SECDEF Order and perhaps in time a Statute will presumably set the Mission. Per SECDEF’s June 23 Cyber Command Standup Memo:
Cyberspace and its associated technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to the United States and are vital to our Nation’s security, and, by extension, to all aspects of Military operations.
Yet our increasing dependency on cyberspace, alongside a growing array of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, adds a new element of risk to our national security. [emphasis added:] To address this risk effectively and to secure freedom of action in cyberspace, the Department of Defense requires a command that possesses the required technical capability and remains focused on the integration of cyberspace operations. Further this command must be capable of synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil authorities and international partners.
The Mission statement not only defines core tasks and objectives; it can inspire the Cyber Command and build morale. A watered-down or obtuse mission statement telegraphs weakness and ill-resolve to potential foes and fails to inspire and mobilize focused action. The Commander will want as strong, inspirational and empowering a Mission Statement as is prudently possible.

federalIT — Federal IT Spending Portfolio for FY09 (credit: http://download.101com.com/pub/gcn/ newspics/AgencyIT-ITsecurity-spending09.pdf)

While some observers believe that Cyber-based deterrence in Cyberspace is not possible, that view is inconsistent with freedom of action and maximum risk reduction; similarly, some observers believe that U.S. dominance in Cyberspace is neither possible nor desirable. That view is at best premature given that Cyber Warfighting is in an infant stage, with much to be learned in coming years.

In sum, then, a Notional Mission Statement follows from the Constitutional duty of providing for the Common Defense:

“The mission of USCYBERCOM is to preserve American Freedom of Cyberspace by deterring and defeating foreign cyber assault on the United States, her allies, and citizens and by aiding law enforcement, first responders and allies.”

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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES: KEY REFERENCES LIST

1. Keith B. Alexander, “Warfighting in Cyberspace”, 2007. Strong vectoring for the Cyber Warfight. Article has primarily Warfighter, not Intelligence, perspective (http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,143898,00.html).

2. Harry Summers, “On Strategy”, 1982. A superb statement of the Principles of War illustrated through a recent fight – Vietnam — still fresh in memory, so that the Principles are well illustrated and couched in terms applicable to Cyberwar and War in any domain. (http://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Critical-Analysis-Vietnam-War/dp/0891415637/ ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1263242130&sr=8-1).

3. William Gibson, “Neuromancer”, 1984. Shortly after authoring a short story in which he coined the term, “Cyberspace”, Gibson wrote this novel. It is a must-read for the drill of stretching the imagination to grasp the Cyberspace Domain. The novel has proved to be prescient in foretelling real-world developments. Admittedly a bit racy on the storytelling side. U.S. Gen X, Y and Z Cyber Adepts list it as must-read, and are right to do so. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuromancer).

4. Orson Scott Card, “Ender’s Game”, 1985. This is adroit fiction that assists in the intellectual stretching to imagine the Cyberspace Domain. U.S. Gen X, Y and Z Cyber Adepts list it as must-read, and are right to do so (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ender’s_Game).

5. Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, “Estimate of the Situation”, 1997 (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/pub1_97/Appenf.html).

6. United States Armed Forces Order of Battle, 2008. Useful for envisioning the OB (Order of Battle) for Cyberspace Warfighting (http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/9059/usaob.html).

7. Joint Fire Support Support Operations, 1989 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-20-30/Ch3.htm).

8. “A Semantic Web Application for the Air Tasking Order”, 2005. A think-piece that assists in formulating a notional Cyber Tasking Order (http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463762&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf).

9. Edward M. Cook, “Selected Principles of War as They Apply to Counterdrug Operations”. The Principles of War apply in substantial degree to Law Enforcement. Warfighters deter, seek out, fix, and destroy the foe; Law Enforcers deter, and seek out, fix and bring the lawbreaker to justice (http://www.stormingmedia.us/39/3960/A396073.html).

10. Anthony McIvor, Ed. “Rethinking the Principles of War”, 2007. This work features the fresh thinking of twenty-nine leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines. Chapter 28 by Michael Warner, “Intelligence Transformation Past and Future” is valuable reading in applying the Principles of War to Cyberspace (http://www.amazon.com/Rethinking-Principles-War-Anthony-Ivor/dp/1591144817).

11. William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, editors,“Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities”, 2009, Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council. Current and comprehensive assessment of the Cyberspace Domain as it is currently understood (http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651).

12. Nicholas A. Lambert, “Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution”, 1999. Strong similarities from 1909 to USA of 2009 – insufficient funding for defense, exhaustion of the Treasury, a kind of Anesthesia of Pacifism, apparently eroded Will to Deter and Fight; emergence of new war domains: air and undersea; Churchill grapples with the effort to envision the new domains in actual full battle in peer war (http://www.amazon.com/Fishers-Revolution-Studies-Maritime-History/dp/1570034923).

13. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets”, 2009. Foreign Affairs Magazine. Points to the need to lift the veil of mystery from Cyberspace, move Cyber Warfighting into the military domain, and focus US strike on long range capabilities (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65150/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/the-pentagons-wasting-assets).

14. James E. Cartwright, Statement in Ref 11, above re Cyberwar, page 3-1: “History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses significant risks: the “Maginot Line” model of terminal defense will ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air, and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests.”

15. SECDEF Order June 23, 2009, “Establishment of a Subordinate Unfied U.S. Cyber Command Under U.S. Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations.” (http://fcw.com/articles/2009/06/24/dod-launches-cyber-command.aspx).

16. Data and Charts on US Government-wide IT Spending (http://download.101com.com/pub/gcn/newspics/AgencyIT-ITsecurity-spending09.pdf; http://gcn.com/articles/2008/02/07/spending-for-it-security-gains-ground-in-09-budget.aspx); Informative 2005 Article by Michael Freeman, Scott Dynes, and Adam Golodner of Dartmouth (http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/119.pdf).

17. Cost of predations on US Military Cyberspace (http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/04/09/235591/cyber-defence-for-us-military-costs-16m-a-month.htm); thorough exposition on Cyber Threat and Statement by STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton about the scope of the threat (http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php).

18. The power of Taxonomy (e.g. 21^st Century “Cyber Operations” vs 20^th Century “Network Operations” (http://www.amazon.com/Language-Thought-Action-S-I-Hayakawa/dp/0156482401/)

In the analysis below by John Wheeler, the author sorts out the nature of the cyber challenge and provides a clear focus to shaping a cyber doctrine for the United States. John Wheeler provides indeed a very helpful overview to a very confusing and conflictual problem: what is the nature of the cyber security challenge and what concepts of operations do the US and allied governments need to shape to effectively meet the latter?

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***Posted January 11th, 2010

DARPA To Review Impact Of Globalization On U.S. Industry

Posted on January 10, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/10/2010

By Richard McCormack
(Manufacturing News)

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is exploring how it can once again become a driving force in the U.S. economy. Under new leadership, the agency has announced plans to host an “Industry Summit” that will explore “globalization and its impact on U.S. industry.”

The event will be hosted by DARPA director Regina Dugan on January 26 and 27, 2010, and will include chief executives from U.S. industry who will “gather with the director, deputy director, office directors and program managers for an open and interactive dialogue to discuss how globalization is impacting U.S. industry, and consequently, our country’s national security.”

DARPA will keep the meeting intimate by hosting two one-day summits on the topic. “Each summit will have an identical agenda,” says the agency. Registration will be on a first-come basis and is limited to those who hold positions such as CEO, COO and CTO. “Cutting-edge technological advances and radical innovations do not happen in a vacuum,” says DARPA. “They require strong partnerships, an open exchange of ideas and intense collaboration.”

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To sign up, go to: https://www.signup4.net/Public/ap.aspx?EID=DARP12E&OID=50. The conference coordinator is Barbara Smith ([email protected]), 703-276-2237).

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***Posted January 10th, 2010

Speaking from Experience: Ken Miller on FFP Contracts

Posted on January 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/09/2010

Challenges Facing Widespread Use of Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) Contracts in the Defense Sector

A Way to Shape Acquisition Reform
The Obama Administration seeks to apply firm-fixed price contracting in a number of sectors, including defense. Indeed, it appears that the Administration equates the use of this contract vehicle with the ability to shape acquisition reform.(e.g. see the use of firm fixed price contracting under the stimulus bill or in defense contracting).
Recently, the Wall Street Journal published a cautionary note on the widespread application of such an approach in large-scale programs subject to significant development challenges and approaches (see Dan Michaels and August Cole , WSJ, December 14, 2009 ).
The authors note that Now the Obama administration wants to use fixed-price deals as one tool to permanently shake up defense contracting and cut its cost of military systems. In August, the Pentagon awarded an Army truck contract worth billions of dollars to Oshkosh Corp. on a fixed-price basis. BAE, whose subsidiary had held the contract for 17 years, and another bidder, Navistar International Corp., lodged protests with Government Accountability Office to challenge the Army’s pick. Oshkosh’s lower pricing is an issue with the losing companies.
They add a cautionary note from a senior Boeing official:
Boeing Chief Financial Officer James Bell said recently that the company was taking its concerns to the Air Force. “Fixed price development is a tough contract,” he told a conference. “It is very, very difficult.”

Pre-conditions (for Success) to Fixed Price Contracting
This month I would like to share some of my views on the critical factors that should be used in fixed price contracting.
Among the most significant in shaping a successful fixed price contract are the following:

Relatively straightforward or simple technical problem
Experienced program team
Very good program management tools
Mature technologies
Follow-on production

These key factors allow us to then ask the core question: Do we have those factors in place when we decide to use fixed priced contracts in today’s environment?
Under current congressional pressure, the use of FFP contracts is considered the contract type of choice to use for our major development and procurement programs. I would like to share some of my past experiences (more like scars) in this area and what I have learned as the factors to use in selection of contract type.

First, however a basic understanding of classical contract types will be useful. Specifically types of contracts fall into two broad categories, fixed price and cost reimbursable. The WSJ article outlined the key approaches used in contacting which are identified in the following graphic:

graphicKM1-350 — Michaels and Cole, "Defense Contractors Resist Fixed-Price Jobs," WSJ (December 14, 2009)

FFPs are designed for procurements and developments where the work is clearly understood and the risk to develop and deliver is low. Cost reimbursable type contracts are used with more complex and less defined /developed program content and the risk is considered to be much higher. These types of contracts normally include provisions for risk sharing between the government and the contractor.
The theory is that in a fixed price environment the cost risk is on the contractor and in a cost reimbursable environment the cost risk is on the Government. The perception is that fixed price contracts are guarantees of performance for a fixed price while cost reimbursable contracts are open ended – both performance and funding-wise.
This simplistic view has, in the past, driven us to impose fixed price contracts on work scopes for which they just weren’t appropriate in the mistaken belief that the Government’s risk had been bounded by the fixed price. Some current acquisition strategies try to use contract types as the singular tool for contractor behavior management. From my experience, such a strategy has some serious flaws. We have learned from the past that a “perfect” contract does not exist and contract type alone does not afford successful program execution.
Rather, a combination of many factors is required to pull off successful contract performance. The primary tenets I advocate for successful program execution include a clear understanding of the requirement, good communications/transparency, superior program management tools (near real time earned value insight, risk management process,) and motivated /experienced workers to pull it off.

graphic2KM — A recent GAO study of navy shipbuilding practices underscored that lack of clarity drives risk and hence cost

The practice of using fixed price contracts as the best way to control contractor performance behavior is again in vogue. I think this practice requires further consideration and a review of our past performance in this area before elevating this approach to a core principle for successful acquisition reform. Program success and successful contractor performance is more complex than selecting a type of contract.

It requires developing a solid acquisition strategy. This starts with the foundation of a sound risk assessment including, clear understanding of the technology involved. Contract type should be selected based upon the above plus other considerations including management factors such as management team experience, robust real time tracking systems (for cost and schedule), solid system engineering planning — all of these factors play in developing a sound acquisition strategy.

So one should do a lot of homework to ensure that contract type matches your risk, skill and likely bidders’ past performance. One hat does not fit all and one type contract does not fit all major development programs. Matching the appropriate type of contract to the procurement is an art form that is at the foundation of successful acquisition practices and reform.

Lessons Learned from the A-6E and A-6F programs
The past is often a good predictor of the future so we may learn valuable lessons from it, if we are vigilant. As a young government employee working in several program offices in the late 80’s I got firsthand experience on the complexity of using FFP contracts for development programs. At that time I was the deputy program manager of the A-6 / EA-6 program office and had the opportunity to try my hand at managing fixed priced development efforts.

Two of the programs we had in this situation were the A-6F Program and the A-6E Re-wing Program. The recurring headache in these FFP environments was distinguishing between ‘in scopeand out of scope’ efforts. ‘In scope’ effort was straightforward, it was something that was considered to be a baseline requirement of the fixed price contract. The challenge was to demonstrate that the requirement was (or wasn’t) was included in the priced contract baseline and no cost or schedule impact would be allowedfor performance of the effort. This type of issue often occurred in areas of specific specification compliance.
In other words, the contractor might argue that a specific performance level was specification compliance for a particular technical parameter. We had very experienced engineers and contracts folks who were able to conduct an analysis to affirm or rebut the contractor’s assertion The contractor also had a skilled workforce to hold up their end of the dialogue. A single technical requirements oversight by the government resulting in an ‘out of scope’ determination could cause serious cost increases. If a needed technical requirement found to be ‘out of scope’ of the fixed price contract, we would have to develop changed requirements, get it priced out, secure funding and add it to the contract.
This was not an easy process; rather, it required both complex and timeliness to execute. This process was further complicated by the fact that virtually all of the program’s funding was already tied up in the firm, fixed price of the contract.
If you had a hundred or so of these types of changes (not uncommon on a complex weapon system development) program, you had a second full time job. We should always keep in mind that developing complex weapon systems is not easy. Some design iteration is always required. To say “no changes allowed” is just not realistic. I saw some of my peers have similar challenges on the F-14D, P-7, and A-12 to name a few of the fixed priced development programs that ended up being canceled. With many billions spent in development we only got a few flying prototype aircraft and a few parts and a bunch of paper and some lawsuits.

The difference between then and now is that I believe we had more program dollars in those days and a more experienced work force. Most of our engineers, contracts officers and managers had broad experience from working on multiple programs over the course of their careers.

I hope that we can be informed from our past experiences as we develop future program acquisition strategies. We must also consider matching the procurement approach with people and tools that can lead to successful program execution. Using the right contract type with the right management tools and with the right people trained to execute the contract on both the government and contractor sides is essential to successful contracting. Blindly following a fixed-price contract mantra will not get you there. Fixed-price contracting is not pixie dust.

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***Posted January 9th, 2010

General Hawley on: Why Weapons Systems Cost So Much – the 101 Version (Part Two)

Posted on January 5, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/05/2010

By Richard E. Hawley, General (Ret), USAF

General Hawley served as the Commander, Air Combat Command and Commander US Air Forces in Europe. Additionally he was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.

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PART TWO

This is not an easy question to answer. There are three broad categories of cost – development, procurement and sustainment; each of which is driven by a different set of factors. While development and procurement costs attract the most attention from the media and from Congress, they account for just 40% of total weapons system cost. Operating these systems over their 20 to 40+ years of service accounts for 60% of life cycle costs, and can best be constrained through investments in reliability and maintainability during development. Unfortunately, our intense focus on the cost to develop and procure weapons systems often discourages such investments.

Development Cost Drivers
The operational environment, anticipated threats and concept of employment are the primary drivers of development cost. Designing systems to operate in demanding environments, e.g., at sea, in mountainous terrain, desert conditions or extreme heat or cold adds complexity and hence cost. Our forecast of adversary capabilities against which a weapon system will operate at the mid-point of its life cycle also determines the need for complexity and hence cost. Systems intended for operation within secure airspace such as Predator and Reaper, or against modest adversary defenses are far less complex than those meant to operate within a high threat environment, e.g., F-35 or N-UCAS. Finally, concepts of employment are important drivers of development cost. Systems meant to launch standoff weapons will cost less than those designed to penetrate advanced air defenses, as will those that can depend on off board sensors rather than conduct autonomous operations. Of course standoff platforms require relatively costly standoff weapons and off board sensors don’t come free either. That’s why it is important to consider the cost to accomplish a mission, not just the cost of a weapon or weapons system.

Acquisition strategy is another important driver of development cost and the most important variable those strategies must control is time in development. Developing a major weapon system involves the creation of an army of engineers, and the longer those armies exist the more they will cost. Time really is money, and that’s why controlling schedule should have as high a priority as satisfying operational requirements. The F-15, F-16 and F-18 were all developed in less than seven years with minimal cost overruns, but only because they relied on mature technologies and the operational users accepted tradeoffs in performance to maintain schedule. Schedule risk is multiplied when advanced technologies must be developed within a major acquisition program, as opposed to using technology demonstrations or prototypes. Fly by wire technologies first deployed in the F-16 were developed in the lab and demonstrated in an F-4 technology demonstration project. Unfortunately, it is often hard to find support for such projects within DoD or the Congress.

Testing new weapons systems is a very expensive process and often amounts to 20% or more of total development cost. Unfortunately, there is no incentive for the government’s independent test organizations to control those costs. In fact, in an era when new weapon programs and major modifications are few in number, the incentive is to prolong testing so the test infrastructure and engineering talent can be sustained. It is the programs that pay these costs.

A fourth driver of development cost is funding stability. Program plans usually assume a funding profile that resembles the classic bell curve; modest funding in the early years ramping up rapidly as the army of engineers is assembled, then tapering off as subsystem developments are completed. When DoD or the Congress cut funding to pay other bills, program managers must re-plan and reflow a very complex and interdependent set of activities. That process consumes engineering man hours that could have been spent keeping the program on schedule. Experience shows that an arbitrary cut of $100 million adds about $400 million to development costs because that army of engineers must be sustained for several months longer than planned.

Finally, requirements creep is the enemy of cost control. If program managers cannot freeze the requirements baseline, or fail to do so if so empowered, program plans suffer from constant disruption. The result is similar to unstable funding, with schedules slipping to the right and costs increasing. The key to cost control is strong program management, with well trained and experienced program managers operating in an environment in which they are empowered to make all key programmatic decisions and are held accountable for the results they produce (see graphic below).

Production Cost Drivers
The cost to produce weapons systems is a function of size, density of advanced technology content, the number of systems that DoD buys and the rate at which those systems are produced. It is often said that we buy aircraft by the pound, and within any class of weapons system, that remains the most reliable predictor of production cost. The first production unit of a 50,000 pound fighter aircraft will cost roughly twice that of a 25,000 pound fighter. The same holds true for ships, submarines and tanks.

Across classes of weapons systems the primary driver of cost per pound is the density of technological content. Satellites contain the most advanced technology per pound of any class of weapons system yet developed, so the cost of a two ton satellite often rivals that of a 900 ton submarine.

Industry can sell laptop computers at a profit for less than $1,000 because they sell millions of them. Unfortunately, weapons systems will never benefit from those economies of scale. Nevertheless, the number of systems produced does have a significant effect on average unit production cost. The tenth unit of any weapons system will cost substantially less than the first due to a phenomenon called the “learning curve”. As workers gain experience and processes are refined, production costs decline. Suppliers who expect to sell hundreds or thousands of a component can accept a much smaller profit margin than if they sell a handful or a few dozen. Efficiencies possible from automated production processes often don’t yield a return on investment unless production runs are quite large. There are many other ways in which production costs are driven down as quantities increase.

Production rates are the other important driver of unit production costs. Very low rates make it impractical to invest in many automated processes, so there is a threshold below which costs may increase rapidly. Industry builds tooling and facilities to support the government’s planned rate of production, so when those plans are changed costs will rise. Lower rates leave capacity idle, while higher rates can introduce inefficiencies in the production process. Either way, costs rise. Unlike quantity, where the more we buy the lower the cost, there is an optimum rate of production.

As with development, erratic production funding will drive production costs up. It generates workforce turbulence and results in sub-optimum use of tooling and facilities. Labor agreements can even generate a ripple effect, where production cuts in one program can generate cost increases in another. How can this happen? Labor agreements typically give production workers “bumping rights” so a worker displaced from a program where rates have been reduced can “bump” a worker with less tenure from another program. The result is learning curve regression and an increase in the penalty paid by the government for its inaccurate production forecast. Multi-year contracts are a tried and true way to stabilize funding. They enable contractors to buy materials in economic quantities, schedule the workforce and facilities efficiently, and reduce costs associated with preparing annual proposals. Savings over annual procurements are typically in the range of 5-10%.

Finally, small investments in engineering for producibility during development can pay significant dividends during production. Seemingly small design issues, like leaving inadequate clearance for a mechanic to torque a nut, can drive significant cost increases.

Sustainment Cost Drivers
Sustainment is where the real money is. Typically 60% of total life cycle costs. The drivers are manpower, modernization to keep the system viable, component repair and replacement, and consumables. The best, if not the only way to control these costs is to invest in cost of ownership reduction during development.

The Navy’s DD(X) destroyer program made investments during development to reduce the crew complement by 70% from earlier destroyers. If realized, the savings would exceed $18B over the life of a 32 ship fleet. (GAO-03-520 June 9, 2003)

In the mid 1970s the Air Force opted for the single engine F-16 over a two engine alternative primarily to reduce life cycle costs associated with engine replacement and fuel consumption.

F22-200 — F-22 Deployed (US Air Forces Central Public Affairs, December 2009)

The F-22 program was one of the first to establish hard requirements for reliability and maintainability, and substantial investments were made during development to drive maintenance man hours per flying hour below 12.

Three different approaches on three different programs; but all illustrate good ways to control the cost to operate and maintain our weapon systems. Each required an upfront investment in an environment where every dollar of development cost is subjected to continuous and intense scrutiny, and in which little credit is given for promised future savings.

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***Posted January 5th, 2010

Featured Video: Firefight in Waterpur Valley, Afghanistana

Posted on January 4, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/04/2010

U.S. Army Platoon firefight at Qatar Kala, Kunar province in Afghanistan with anti-Afghan forces. Scenes include the platoon firing towards the mountains where the fire was coming from and a helicopter arriving and then taking off.

Credit: 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, 11/3/09
Video Location: Kunar province, Afghanistan

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***Posted January 4th, 2010

Business as Usual in Bangladesh: The Global Armed Robbery Hotspot

Posted on January 4, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

: A Guide to MaRisk: Risk Intelligence’s online threat monitoring solution, MaRisk, uses zoomable maps with multiple icons for more enhanced threat classification. Please refer to the reference chart for MaRisk icons in order to better utilize the accompanied maps.

The World Third “Hottest” Hotspot
Bangladesh is the third highest-ranking country for incidents in international piracy and insurgency statistics. Despite being tucked away at the bottom of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh and its primary port, Chittagong, remain a piracy hotspot. Even with a reduction in armed robberies two years ago, the five-year trend reveals that it is business as usual in Bangladesh.

The international community appears to have overlooked that piracy is only an umbrella term for a wide array of tactics and organizations. Piracy and its domestic cousin, armed robbery, come in many shapes and forms: The operating environment and coastal stability are key in determining what the most logical and realistic tactic will be for the greatest return in revenue for robbers and pirates.

Be it the highly profitable hijacking industry off the Horn of Africa, luring ships to bunker fuel illegally and then rob them in the Singapore Stairs, inside kidnap and ransom jobs in the Malacca Straits, to the highly successful robberies off the Anambas Islands, the concept of piracy should truly be regarded as an ‘umbrella’ term.

The international community and media also appear to be able to focus only on one form of piracy at a time. Prior to 2007, the focus was exclusively on the Malacca Strait. Since then, the shift in focus appears to solely be on the Horn of Africa. ‘Secondary’ high-risk zones, areas that the media neglect include the national waters of Peru, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Therefore, the world’s third “hottest” hotspot Bangladesh, despite Bangladesh is a poor and volatile country and Chittagong port at a glance, seems like a hectic mess of chaos. Despite sinking within the mangroves as the rising sea levels and monsoons approach, Chittagong is one of the most important South Asian ports. The port area itself accommodates a population of 2.2 million inhabitants and in 2007, the medium sized port hosted 2,000 vessels carrying 28 million tons of cargo. Containerized cargo totaled nearly one million twenty-foot equivalents (TEUs). The Chittagong area is home to a large number of manufacturing and telecommunication companies that use the port city as their South Asian hub. Crime in Chittagong often entails activity within the port area ranging from armed robbery, cargo theft, smuggling, to fraud. Large-scale organized crime syndicates typically conduct these activities and have done so for many years. Kidnap and ransom has also increased, namely in the western mangroves of Bangladesh, where criminal groups are targeting fishermen.

Within the past year, there have been nineteen incidents occurring on vessels berthed or anchored in the Chittagong area. Although one robbery has occurred while berthed in the river, the bulk are occurring at anchorage, namely in the renowned Anchorage B. This location is vulnerable due to its isolation out in the bay and is particularly exposed due to poor law enforcement responses and the high concentration of small vessel traffic such as fishing boats, making it easier for the attackers to conceal themselves both before and after the incident. Approximately half of Chittagong incidents occur in Anchorage B, while the remainder have occurred at anchorages closer to the port.

In the failed incidents, the robbers aborted their attempts at the first sign of resistance, while in other cases, determined robbers in multiple boats and often armed, board the vessel and rob it by taking a crew member ‘hostage.’ This suggests that the groups operating around Chittagong port are diverse and range from sophisticated organized crime groups to more opportunistic fishermen. On 28 September, the bulk carrier D.D. VIGILANT was boarded at Anchorage B by eight suspects in a wooden fishing boat at night. The previous night in nearly the exact same location, the tanker KIRANA QUARTYA was boarded and robbed by the exact same number of suspects stealing ships stores. This suggests that there is syndication in some of the maritime robberies in the port area, however, their tactical level of violence and crew resistance threshold levels differ.

Armed robbery related violence spiked on 15 April 2006 when ‘Alauddin Bahini,’ the leader of the largest syndicate in Chittagong, was gunned down in a firefight in the outer anchorages. Since then the vacuum has been filled by smaller yet equally effective groups with respect to targeting ships. Currently the more violent forms of armed robbery in Bangladesh are occurring in the western waters and up in the Sundarbans. The robbers are known as Dacoits who live in small camps within the mangroves resembling the insurgency-like lifestyle of Niger Delta militants living within the bushes and creeks. Although reported incidents only include the targeting of fisherman, three different gangs reportedly kidnapped 72 for ransom on 14 September 2009. The primary holding area for kidnapped fishermen is the Kochikhal area, where fishing vessels have also reported being boarded and robbed. On 3 October, Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) claimed to have disrupted Dacoit operations in a counter piracy operation near Nil Dumur. The RAB apprehended the alleged leader, Amjad Hossain, and confiscated eight rifles and ammunition.

Incidents along the Bangali Rivier have increased where fishermen and a passenger vessel were reportedly involved. Earlier this year on 17 May, a fishing boat was attacked by heavily armed robbers and on 29 August, a passenger boat was attacked in the seasonal lake Goradigha Haor by approximately 17 armed robbers. A firefight with the marine police ensued before the robbers discarded their weapons and escaped by hiding in Boalia village. Fortunately the more violent attacks have yet to occur against shipping.

bangladesh200 — MaRisk Map of Bangladesh highlighting kidnap and ransom activities in Sundarbans

However, with 19 incidents occurring in the last year, Bangladesh remains a MaRisk hotspot and is the ideal example for armed robbery-style attacks against predominantly anchored vessels within national waters.

Prevention and Deterrence as Keys to Anti-piracy, if not Anti-robbery Policy
Vessels and their companies can prepare themselves to avoid being the target of an armed robbery in the Chittagong area. The proper implementation of anti-piracy measures can reduce the likelihood of a boarding, however, there are examples of vessels neglecting even the simplest measures and therefore succumbing to attacks.

One such vessel is the Panama flagged SERASIH managed by a Singapore company. The vessel was boarded and robbed on 22 September and again on 13 October. In both cases the vessel was robbed out at Anchorage B at nearly the same time of day (21:00-22:00 Local Time). In both cases the robbers easily boarded the vessel and captured a crewmember, threatening him with a knife and stealing ship’s stores before escaping. During the 22 September incident, the suspects were not detected until the very end of the robbery indicating that anti-piracy measures and crew readiness were poorly planned and ineffective. The subsequent robbery of the vessel exactly three weeks later indicates that little was learned and no additional security measures were implemented after the first incident.

MaRisk Map of Bangladesh highlighting kidnap and ransom activities in Sundarbans — MaRisk Map of Chittagong incidents within past year. Anchorage B incidents constitute a large number of the attempted and actual armed robberies.

Vessels calling on Chittagong and when at anchor particularly out in Anchorage B and A are to implement rigid anti-piracy measures. Incidents at both anchorages (B & A) occur at night and involved lightly armed suspects boarding the vessels from one to two boats. Increased lighting, doubled duty watches, and reinforced forecastle and ship’s store doors are all simple measures in preventing attacks. On 3 October, a bulk carrier successfully deterred an attack at Anchorage A with doubled deck patrols and by securing barbed wire on the sides of the ship.

Another example was the successful prevention of a robbery on the Pakistani flagged CHITRAL, a general cargo ship managed by the Pakistani National Shipping Company. The vessel’s crew managed to spot the suspects whilst attempting to board via the anchor chain and raised the alarm whereby the heavy and alert crew presence forced them to flee. Given that thus far the level of violence deployed against a foreign merchant ship has been low, implementing anti-piracy measures and learning from other incidents can help deter incidents in the future.

It is difficult to assess whether Bangladesh will subside or increase in piracy incidents within the next quarter. There appears to be no link with economic circumstances and the global recession. In the past, even when Chittagong port experienced one of its periodical strikes causing significant backlog, robberies did not intensify despite the increase in targets in the outer anchorages. Seasonal weather patterns have little effect on incident trends as well since there is seldom a concentration against merchant ships in a specific annual quarter. However, in the Sundarbans, the syndicates appear to be most active in correlation with the fishing season from August to March.

Armed robbery in Bangladesh has always succeeded due to the poor capabilities of the Bangladeshi maritime enforcement agencies and has generally flourished in both the syndicated and opportunistic realms. Although nineteen incidents in the Chittagong area are significantly high in proportion to other global risk areas, the level of violence within attacks on merchant ships has yet to escalate. It is possible that some of the syndicates operating out of the Sundarbans may relocate to the Chittagong area, however, it seems unlikely given the desire to specifically target local fishing boats and kidnap their crews.

Nevertheless, there are plenty of opportunistic robbers as well as better-organized syndicates operating in the Chittagong area, which will likely continue to warrant continued robberies in the port area. It may not be a dramatic hijacking, but Bangladesh does require due recognition because it is the global hot spot for armed robberies in national waters.

***

Karsten von Hoesslin is a Senior Analyst and Editor of Strategic Insights with Risk Intelligence and examines piracy, organized crime, and insurgency issues. He holds a Masters in Strategic Studies and is a PhD Candidate.

From Strategic Insights. No. 19 (October 2009), Published by Risk Intelligence, Vedbaek Stationsvej 18, 2950 Vedbaek, Denmark

(Tel: +45 70 26 62 30/ Fax: +45 70 26 62 40)

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***Posted January 3rd, 2010

Afghan Ops and the Logs Bite of the DOD Apple

Posted on January 3, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/03/2010

A Surge in Cost Per Troop
The President has committed to a major new phase of the Afghan campaign. Although called a “surge,” it is much more of an expansion of the engagement. And with that expansion comes a significant demand for new resources to deal with the most neglected part of operations to the outsider, logistics and sustainment costs.

Afghanistan is not Iraq to quote General Petraeus. This is true in multiple ways, but no more so than in terms of operations and logistics. The geography and terrain in Afghanistan require what the USMC calls “distributed operations,” and with what the USMC calls “expeditionary logistics .” And such logistics require SIGNIFICANT use of air assets to connect deployed forces, and with those air assets significant energy and basing costs.

The cost for deployed soldier in Afghanistan will be multiples higher than for the deployed soldier in Iraq. Dependent on which analyst is doing the assessment, the number ranges from 2 to 4 times higher (see graphic below from CSBA Report, page 2).

Security Measures On the Move
Not only are direct costs significant, security considerations are as well. There are limited major airfields out of which to operate; these airfields provide targets for the use of bio or chemical weapons to disable those airfields. And providing security for goods in transit via the land routes is a major challenge as well (see briefing slides below from USCENTCOM presentation on the New Silk Road, pages 19 and 25).

New-Silk-Road_Page_25

The Logistic Costs of Withdrawal and Recap
The “surge” carries with it a “withdrawal” imperative. This means that ramping up forces in country entails the very significant logistics costs of withdrawal as well. If we know anything from the experience of the current withdrawal from Iraq, logistics, even in the best of circumstances, costs tens of billions of dollars to execute for the withdrawal.

Of course, the “surge” is not just American. Allied engagement is inextricably intertwined with the Obama Administration allied policy. Logistics sustainment and supply in extreme environments and over significant distances will have to be performed for the coalition forces. And these efforts will operate from the same staging areas, whether air or ground basing.

Another cost to consider will be the ramp up of pressure to recapitalize the air infrastructure, which provides for the warfighter. Here the costs for modernizing C5s, adding C130s and C17s, the acceleration of the A400M, the rebuilding of the US tanker fleet, the entry of the new A330 allied tankers (UK and Australian tankers will arrive significantly before any new US tankers which are yet to be contracted, let alone procured) must be considered. The significant increase in air dropping required for Afghan operational support will require modernization of the fleet doing the air dropping.

tankerbridge400

A Geopolitical Price to Pay
There will be significant geopolitical costs to logistics supply as well. The US and its allies will use land routes over Russian territory and are discussing the same with the Chinese. Some Americans have protested the proposed French sale of the Mistral ship to the Russians, but such activities might become more normal as costs are extracted by the Russians for support for the Afghan engagement. What we know about Russians is that their support is never free.

There has been a virtual war on contractors inside the beltway, which have provided for logistics support. This war will have to be ended and peace declared. Contracting support for the war will go up not down.

The variability of energy prices and currency fluctuations, generally, will be significant factors shaping the cost of operations as well. The general global economic dynamic will have a direct impact on the cost of the commodities used in the operation.

Rotorcraft investments are crucial to engage in this operation. The efforts to provide for enhanced improvements by NATO through collaborative maintenance of helos operating in Afghanistan is significant. Yet the acquisition of new birds will be necessary to support the effort and with these aircraft defense measures might well need to be funded as well.

Land-Locked or Dead-Locked Engagement ?
It is clear that simply to list the logistics imperatives underscores the high costs for the engagement. And if these costs are not paid for through significant defense supplementals, there will be a rapid contraction of the defense investment accounts. And these contractions will come at the expense of the global power projection capabilities already at risk in the department’s funding. The US could see a further shift from global presence to land-locked engagement.

These expenditures will be joined with the very significant costs of the Iraq withdrawal. This withdrawal will take at least two years.

So the challenge will be to provide logistics support for Iraq withdrawal, while the US and its allies are doing a significant ramp up and, if successful, followed by a ramp down in Afghanistan. If you want to follow the money in the US defense budget, you better look at logistics and its consequences for Afghanistan and Iraq. We are likely to see the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics department of the Pentagon become the Logistics, Acquisition support and Technology department and if they are not carefully the name will become LATE.

***

An earlier version of this piece appeared in DOD Buzz on December 11th, 2009.

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***Posted January 2nd, 2010

Preparing for Withdrawal from Iraq

Posted on December 28, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/28/2009

One of the major budgetary challenges for 2010 and 2011 will be providing for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the training and support for Iraqi security forces. These costs will be variable, notably they depend upon events and are subject to ruptures in the process. These costs include infrastructure construction, clean-up of bases and weapons, turnover or transfer of weapons to the Iraqis, some of which will be done through Foreign Military Sales, and, of course, training and partnering with Iraqi forces can slow down significantly the full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. And if there are significant events in the region affecting Iraq, the US could well be held hostage to developments and will have to fund and support forces in the region.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) captures some of these costs in its regular reports, but given that this SIGIR has been set up as a watchdog for fraud, waste and abuse of funds, its reports will only capture some of the costs (http://www.sigir.mil/). Even so, the costs are in the tens of billions of dollars in the view of SIGIR.

And Congressional Budget Office estimates, which have focused more directly on the costs of withdrawing US forces, underestimate the costs of the transition from US surge and presence to partnering and support (http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10523/10-07-TierneyTroopWithdrawal.pdf)

What this slide show features are some of the varied activities involved in the Iraq transition.

[slidepress gallery=’withdrawal-from-iraq’]

The first photo shows Sgt. 1st Class Antonio Jurilla, Port of Entry Transition Team operations assessing operational readiness of border police located at the Al Sheeb PoE in southern Maysan province. The PoETT is attached to 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division and spearheads the “advise and assist” mission along the Iraq-Iran border (credit Multi-National Division-South 12/16/09).

The second photo shows U.S. soldiers, assigned to 1434th Engineer Company, with members of the Iraqi Army, hoisting a truss with a crane, at 4th Brigade, 2nd Battalion Infantry Division’s Joint Operation Center, Forward Operating Base Constitution, Baghdad, Iraq, Dec. 15. Together the U.S. Soldiers and members of the Iraqi Army work to build a 40×60 division level Tactical Operation Center. (credit Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq).

The third photo shows efforts to build the Iraqi Navy. The Coalition Naval Advisory Training Team here has been mentoring and training units of the Iraqi Navy and Marines for more than three years.Comprised of nearly 150 active and reserve Sailors and Marines, the International Transition and Advisory Mission combines United States and United Kingdom trainers to help guide the development of the Iraqi Navy.This partnership continues to enhance the Iraqi Navy’s ability to provide protection of its territorial waters, oil platforms and maritime infrastructure. (credit US Naval Forces Central Command).

The fourth photo shows U.S. Blackhawks landing at Umm Qasr’s landing strip on Nov. 15 with UK troops and equipment as part of the Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission with their U.S. allies. Over 75 UK service members will be training the Iraqi navy alongside their U.S. allies as part of the mission that runs through 2011. (credit 203rd Public Affairs Detachment).

The fifth photo shows 4 Iraqi T6-A training aircraft conducting a flyby at the ground-breaking ceremony of the new air traffic control tower in Tikrit, Iraq. (credit Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq Public Affairs, 12/17/09).

The sixth photo shows n Iraqi air force King Air 350 sits on the airfield at Al Muthana Air Base, Iraq, May 8. The airplane is assigned to the Iraqi air force’s King Air Squadron 87 and boasts the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities necessary for the detection and deterrence of insurgent activity. (credit US Air Force).

Photo 7 shows Staff Sgt. Joshua Roden advising his Iraqi counterpart during combat operations over Iraq May 8. They are flying aboard an RC-12 assigned to the Iraqi air force’s King Air Squadron 87. The airplane boasts the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities necessary for the detection and deterrence of insurgent activity. Sergeant Roden is a mission sensor operations instructor, assigned to the Combined Air Forces Training Team. (credit US Air Force).

Photo 8 shows U.S. Air Force instructors assigned to the 721st Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron here along with their Iraqi students prepare to lift off in a Mi-17 helicopter on a mission using night vision goggles Oct. 7, 2009. U.S. Air Force instructor pilots assigned to the 721st AEAS train, advise and assist Iraqi helicopter pilots around the clock, helping the Iraqis develop their own air force. (credit U.S. Air Forces Central, Baghdad Media Outreach Team, 10/7/09).

Photo 9 shows Spc. Richard Muniz, a personal security detachment gunner for 15th Sustainment Brigade, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), watching the area during a mission to the Al Qayyarah water pump, in Al Qayyarah, Iraq, Dec. 1. (credit 15th Sustainment Brigade).

Photo 10 shows 1083rd Transportation Company Heavy Equipment Transport trailers sit loaded with 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, tanks, ready to be moved. (Credit 15th Sustainment Brigade, 12/10/09).

Photo 11 shows Col. Larry Phelps, 15th Sustainment Brigade, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), commander looking at the machinery in the pump house on the Tigris River at Al Qayyarah, Dec. 1, as his body guard, Staff Sgt. Stuart Gimble, a Washington, D.C., native and 15th’s personal security detachment platoon sergeant, watches from above. (credit 15th Sustainment Brigade).

Photo 12 shows shipping containers being loaded during preparation for a convoy logistics patrol, near Al Hillah province, Iraq, Dec. 13, 2009. The convoy brings supplies and equipment for U.S. Soldiers stationed at Stackhouse. (credit Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq).

Photo 13 shows U.S. Soldiers patrolling throughout the Ur area, north of Baghdad, during a presence patrol, Dec. 15. Although the unit is equipped with Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1A1 Abrams tanks, Soldiers used their feet to travel the streets during their most recent presence patrol.

According to Capt. John Ulsamer, commander of Company A, foot patrols are less intimidating, and the unit gets better cooperation from the local populace. Trekking through muddy streets, surrounded by local children, the Soldiers made contact with several townspeople, conducted impromptu vehicle searches and handed out flyers to children.The flyers informed children of the risks of carrying around toy guns and running around military convoys. 1st Lt. Nicholas Ramos, a platoon leader with Company A, said the safety of the children is just as important as ensuring the village’s overall security.”We just want [the Iraqi people] to know we are still here for them,” said Ramos, a Nokesville, Va., native who has been part of these patrols for over six months.The search was driven by a cache that exploded on the grounds of a school while the students were burning trash. School officials requested that the IA clear other schools in the area to ensure insurgents hadn’t hidden any additional caches. (credit Multi-National Division Baghdad).

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***Posted December 28th, 2009