The European Missile Defense Decision: impact on Con Ops and industrial ripple effect

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09/21/2009

In late September, the President announced the termination of the plans to place missile interceptors in Central Europe. In so doing, Secretary Gates and President Obama indicated that they were replacing the old plan with a new one (for an interesting comment on this decision see Colin Clark on DOD Buzz).

According to the Administration they are pushing a two-part plan. The first part to be completed by 2011 entails the deployment of SM-3 missiles on Aegis ships able to protect “areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe,” according to Gates. The second part which is to become operational around 2015 will “involve putting upgraded SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors,” Gates adds in his piece in The New York Times of Sept 20th.

The decision will certainly lead to significant strategic debate. For sldinfo.com the core questions for consideration are the industrial and concepts of operations issues. This decision raises a number of them, which have not been discussed. The press has simply interpreted this as a win for Lockheed Martin and Raytheon and a loss for Boeing. But this interpretation avoids, rather than engages the fundamental questions facing industry and the services.

THE SLDINFO.COM CHECK LIST
Issues Key Task to Watch
Cost and Budget for Shift in Policy Termination Costs; Impact on CONUS-based defense systems and costs;
Budget for Aegis and SM-3 Programs Shipbuilding numbers; Aegis program upgrades; SM-3 Budget; Integration Costs and Efforts
If Plus-up to SM-3 and radar systems ashore…. Need to see the program, the systems integration approach, the test plan, and the budget
New concepts of operations for use of sea-based missile defense for collective defense Shaping Collaborative Con-ops and Transparent Decision Making to Deter Iran
Basing of the new SM-3 land based missile defense package Watch diplomatic activity to handle the end of the old and signing up of new land-based missile partners
Impact on Multi-Mission Systems Aegis pulled from the carrier task forces or new Aegis BMD dedicated assts as picket ships for the Mediterranean Iranian deterrence mission?
Impact on Macro Missile Defense Policy Linkage of new systems in the Middle East with space-based and air-breathing sensors and systems; programs and budgets?
Link of Defense with Offense Shaping of collaborative con-ops of defense and offensive assets in deterrence of Iran; declaratory and operational indicators of deployed capability and planning to reassure allies in the region

The first core question is the cost and budget for this shift. When one shifts from an old approach to a new one, the near term cost goes up not down. The program in Central Europe has to be terminated and termination costs paid. The program in Central Europe was tied to technology being used elsewhere in the missile defense system –notably Alaska – and the costs of these assets will go up as the overall demand goes down.

The second core question is the budget and commitment to the Aegis missile defense program. If the idea is simply to redeploy existing assets, with no significant budget commitment to building new assets, then the area where this capability has already been deployed –Asia—will face more risk.

The third core question is that if this decision will lead to more money for Aegis destroyers and Aegis systems, then the plan to add capability needs to be clearly seen in Navy budgets or missile defense general accounts. And how will this build occur, with what timeline, with what contractual vehicles and how rapidly the timeline? And the decision to deploy new SM-3s ashore will make sense only if the radars guiding intercept are appropriate to such a mission, and these are what exactly?

The fourth core question involves managing the concepts of operations. Gates tells us that “we” will be making assessment decisions of risks and deployment of systems. This places a premium on disclosure of the collaborative concepts of operations and decision-making approaches that would give any of our European and Middle Eastern partner’s confidence in the process of providing for timely defense. And placing Aegis ships for BMD purposes off of Mediterranean shores as virtual ‘picket ships’ raises questions about the overall concept of operations for the USN.

The fifth core question is who is going to want new “land-based” SM3 missiles after what has happened with the old decision being overturned by the Administration. If this leads as Sec Gates has indicated to simply ground basing of Aegis and SM-3, this has never been done before. We will need a site, and agreement with Nations about this siting.This decision resembles the Skybolt decision where a new Administration decided unilaterally to change the weapons to implement a US defense strategy. The “we” becomes a key question open to scrutiny and to shaping collaborative approaches.

The sixth core question is the impact of this decision on the multi-mission systems being developed by the US. The USN has been concerned for some time with Aegis BMD leading to a reduction of Aegis assets working in carrier task forces. Does this mean than we will see a significant downturn in the number of carrier task forces and with it the number of aircraft carriers?

The seventh core question is the impact of the decision on the overall approach to missile defense. What will be the relationship to the approach here, to the future of military space, the networking of land-based assets with sea-based assets in delivering capability?

The final question is the con-ops of defense with offense. The US leadership terminated F-22 and has been reluctant to deploy F-22 to the region. But the relationship to how you use the new multi-mission strike assets with defensive assets is at the heart of the integrated con-ops central to a 21st century approach. So how will the Administration combine deployed assets in the Middle East for comprehensive defense, which means what is the concept of operations to defend against Iran, which draws upon both defensive and offensive assets?

In other words, there remains much to be planned, funded and executed before the change in plans can effectively be executed.

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***Posted September 21st, 2009

The USMC and Crafting the Seabase Enterprise

Posted on | by SysAdmin
09/18/2009

The USMC has become more of a land army as a consequence of the Iraq War. General Conway, the USMC Commandant, is worried the Corps is losing its expeditionary focus. Marine officers who have joined the USMC during the Iraq period are very likely NEVER to have been aboard ship. According to Conway, “They have been to Iraq two or three times in most instances but, in some cases, now are leaving us never having stepped aboard a ship.”

But the essence of the USMC is to be a flexible, expeditionary force. Indeed, in their operations in Afghanistan and Iraq they have conducted flexible operations built around their aviation capabilities. Indeed, in a famous moment in the initial Afghanistan operation, the USMC operated from ships to move deep inland to operate against the Taliban. Task Force 58 was in essence a seabasing operation as the USMC leadership sees it, and an example of what the USMC needs to be prepared and supported to do in the years ahead. Task Force 58’s (TF-58) combat operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 covered 450 nm to establish Camp “Rhino” and then operated over 750 nm to Kabul. “On 25 November TF 58 opened a second front in the south by commencing the longest ship-to-objective maneuver in history, moving 400 miles inland to seize the desert airstrip south of Kandahar. Renamed “Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino,” it supported the introduction of additional joint forces as well as the isolation and the eventual seizure of Kandahar, the last political and military stronghold of the Taliban regime. Supported and sustained from a sea base 450 miles away, FOB Rhino facilitated the projection of combat power several hundred miles further inland.”[1]

Figure 1 General Amos, The Competition for Access and Influence "Seabasing" presented at the 12th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Panama City, Florida, 2007
Figure 1 General Amos, The Competition for Access and Influence "Seabasing" presented at the 12th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Panama City, Florida, 2007

The flexibility of operations essential to the USMC was underscored by the release of the USMC’s Combat Development Command at Quantico’s evolution of the concept of the “Strategic Corporal.” The “Strategic Corporal” was invented by former USMC Commandant General Krulak and referred to the flexible training and capability of the individual marine operating in variety of organizational settings, notably the “three block war.” In the October 2007 release of the Combat Development Command, the “Strategic Corporal” became associated with the evolution of the seabase. Here the concept of the role of the “Strategic Corporal” is that of the USMC unit of operations from battalion on up able to operate flexibly from the sea many miles inland to influence events. Here the USMC is seen as able to operate in peacekeeping, stability, and low-to-high intensity operations with integrated equipment packages able to operate from the sea or redeployed on the shore or deep inland able to influence events. The notable point is the modular sea-base approach is seen as integral to the operation of the new USMC equipment, notably the Osprey and the F-35 in the years ahead. Flexibility, expeditionary, integrated operations and sea-basing are seen as closely integrated in evolving USMC doctrine and operations.

In a discussion with Jim Strock, Director, Sebasing Integration Division of the Capabilities Development Directorate of the USMC Combat Development Command  the basic USMC approach was outlined.

Characteristics of Seabasing Key Attributes of the Seabasing Enterprise
National capability for force projection No secure beach or host nation required
Exploits sea as maneuver space 365 days a year No “iron mountain” ashore to protect
Maximizes the effects of forward presence Assembles troops and equipment at sea
Reduces dependence on vulnerable land bases, “steps lightly” on allies and partners Selectively offloadable for different missions
Increased options for the President Sustainment and reconstitution of fighting from the sea
Crafting of an enterprise which can cover the spectrum of political-military missions on a global basis Deployed and sustained force afloat able to influence events ashore with ground forces engaged ashore
Enabler of joint and coalition operations in area denial and anti-access environments Sea strike becomes a deployed joint force, not simply an aerospace strike force

The first and most compelling point made by Strock was that seabasing should be understand in a modular way. No two seabases will be alike. A mix of capabilities will be blended to allow the forces operating off of the seabase to influence events ashore. Modular mix and match will allow the seabased force to provide the flexibility necessary to operate in a variety of settings and for a variety of missions. The seabase is flexible and scalable. But without a sufficient robust mix of capabilities and without “sea shield,” the seabase will not be effective.

What's in the Joint Seabase?

“Viewing the Sea Base as a capability, it can be formed by a one ship, a small group of ships, or a larger, more diverse force. No two seabases will ever be the same. The platforms shown on this graphic are all components that will play a role in the “system of systems” of the seabase enterprise. At the center of the Seabase will be the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future). The Carrier Strike Group is built around an aircraft carrier, while an Expeditionary Strike Group provides the synergy of surface combatants with a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked on Amphibious Warfare Ships. Various connectors will provide both intra-theater and inter-theater lift of aircraft, personnel, and equipment. The Combat Logistics Force ships provide sustainment, and Coalition Forces provide unique capabilities to the Sea Base that will be critical to our success.”

Seabasing is not about logistics support to forces put ashore. It is about logistics embedded in the sustainment of forces able to deploy from the seabase deep inland. It is about sustainment and engagement as two arms of deployed capability. Seabased forces maneuver directly to the objective rather than first establishing a presence on shore.

At heart, the seabase by combining its initial logistics support and providing a base for continuing operations with a possibility of sustained replenishment can operate effectively from the moment it arrives on station. By combining sustainment and deployable forces, the seabase embodies a force able to influence events ashore across a wide range of contingencies. The flexibility of the seabase concept, Strock, maintains will be essential to U.S. and allied strategy in the years ahead, as access denial becomes more telling and the need to insert force rapidly or selectively becomes more important in shaping counter-terrorism or humanitarian missions. Insertion forces will become strategically important as the U.S. rethinks the desirability of deploying large land armies to do stability operations as a core motif of U.S. operations.

Also important to the USMC is getting the seabase approach in place and operating effectively as it brings online its new expeditionary equipment. The F-35, the Osprey and the expeditionary fighting vehicle all will provide greater range, lethality, and C4ISR capabilities to a deployed force. And the USMC will be able to operate its evolving doctrine of decentralized and reconfigurable forces (distributed operations) with the new equipment connecting the deployed elements. And with reachback to the seabase, the force can operate with sustainment in place.

Seabasing allows the USMC to focus on operations right away rather than primarily focusing on managing the offloading of equipment to port and shore facilities. Strack underscored that in current operations it is necessary to offload inventory ashore, then organize the inventory, then marry the supplies to the equipment, then assemble to equipment and only then begin operations. This not only takes time, but enhances significantly the vulnerability of an embarqued force. With the growing capabilities of adversaries to target fixed facilities ashore, the need to operate rapidly against those capabilities and to operate from various vectors of operations connected by the seabased forces networks and protected by sea-based defenses is growing. The seabase may provide the only viable insertion of ground force option in many future contingencies.

For operations beyond the initial insertion, the seabase will need to be replenished. And here a new vehicle (the Vehicle Transfer System of VTS) is being developed to provide offloading capability from replenishment ships and capable of transferring assets among elements of the seabase. And indeed, R and D efforts are underway to enhance the capability for replenishment and transfer of assets to provide for greater sustainability and, therefore, operational capability for the seabase. The seabasing concept of the USMC places sustainment on strategic par with the forces able to be deployed. Twining of sustainment and operational capability is a core aspect of the evolving concept of the seabase.

Vehicle Transfer System

Some of the key technologies which must be developed to enable the seabased enterprise are: skin to skin transfer of cargo and related operations, automated cargo handling systems that will permit selective offload of cargo, cranes that can lift more and operate in higher sea states, and the ability to interface and offload rolling stock and cargo with other ships and connectors.

Joint Seabasing Experimentation

Although seabasing is a core U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps approach, the U.S. Army is becoming an increasingly important partner in the evolution of the seabase. In Iraq and Afghanistan the US Army and USMC have increasingly cooperated in shaping common capabilities, e.g, the procurement of the Shadow UAV by the USMC and sharing of operational approaches with the US Army. The US Army has become a partner with the USMC in shaping joint R and D with regard to vessel requirements and is sharing the acquisition of some elements of the seabase. US Army thinking was underscored in a recent US Army presentation on the seabase at the annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference in October 2007.[2]

Figure 2 From BG Martz Brief to Expeditionary Warfare Conference (2007)
Figure 2 From BG Martz Brief to Expeditionary Warfare Conference (2007)

In effect, what the Army is advocating is reshaping their logistics ship support from offloading equipment to a mixed fleet which could support operations from the seabase for a period of time before an offloading operation is embarqued.

Figure 3 The JHSV is being developed with the Army working through Navy program office (PMS 325). The JHSV is a 35-45 knot ship that will provide intra-theater life of equipment and personnel.
Figure 3 The JHSV is being developed with the Army working through Navy program office (PMS 325). The JHSV is a 35-45 knot ship that will provide intra-theater life of equipment and personnel.

Although the USN and USMC both support the seabase concept, there is a difference. Due as much to the shipbuilding challenges as much as anything else, the USMC emphasizes amphibious assault and forceable entry. The USN tends to emphasize replenishment and resupply of forces which have moved ashore.

Clearly, the USMC would like a significant increase in the commitment in the shipbuilding budget to ships appropriate to the seabasing enterprise.[3] Here additional amphibious vehicles, transfer vehicles, replenishment ships and other assets are required to achieve the promise of seabasing. Strock indicates that about 7% of the shipbuilding budget goes to the amphibious fleet. He would like to see this increased.

One might observe that the seabasing enterprise could become more significant to future Administrations. The current shipbuilding crisis is shaped by what Defense News’s Chris Cavas calls a radical commitment to building many new ships at once for the surface navy.[4] It is a hugely risky venture designed to build a strike fleet. In contrast, the seabase enterprise makes the combined ground, air and naval team (USMC and US Army) the naval strike force. The difference here is significant: is naval strike largely about missile and related strikes from a carrier task force or is it about influencing events ashore from a seabased enterprise? Indeed, one could see the U.S. Navy being recast as a littoral endurance force able to employ a seabased enterprise, provide for maritime security and provide global presence seeking to influence events in the littorals as the core US elements.

If the seabasing enterprise is to be realized, there clearly will have to be a sustained strategic and financial commitment.  The challenge is that the Obama Administration is reviewing the entire gamut of amphibious operations.  And support for sea-basing might be construed as part and parcel of any cuts to the amphibious fleet.  This would be unfortunate given the flexibility which the fleet provides and the utility of insertion forces globally and across the spectrum of operations.  As the Administration considers the role of “hybrid warfare,” sea basing could prove an indispensable tool for flexible global operations.  And the USMC is emphasizing the role of sea basing within what the USN is calling its global fleet station strategy.  And the commitment to the F35 carries with it the opportunity to consider the role of the F-35B to a future sea-basing strategy.

The Obama Administration through the QDR process is very likely to change elements of what underlies the seabasing capability.  Notably, with regard to the logistics ship which will  underlie the capability.  The Mobile Landing Platform of MLP is a centerpiece to the capability.  But it appears that the Administration will not build a new ship for this capability, instead opting for an existing hull form.  So the shift might be from the MLP to a MLP-like capability.  The jury is out on weather the Administration supports a core capability; but the need is not.

An earlier version of this article was published in Military Logistics International in February/March 2008 and was authored by Murielle Delaporte and Robbin Laird.

[1] Grace V. Jean, “More Amphibious Ships are Needed, Marines Contend,” National Defense (February 2008)

[2] Chris Cavas, “US Navy Gambles on High Technology,” Defense News (February 4, 2008).

[3] BG Joseph E. Martz, Director, Concepts Development and Experimentation Army Capabilities Integration Center, A Campaign Quality, Expeditionary Army for 21st Century Full Spectrum Operations (October 23, 2007).

[4] Naval Operations Concept 2006, p. 28.

———-

***Posted September 18th, 2009

Shaping the Con-ops of Ground Robotics: Robotics Rodeo at Fort Hood

Posted on | by SysAdmin

One of the more interesting dynamics of change in concepts of operations in the years ahead will be the relationship between robotic systems and ground, air and sea operations. An excellent illustration of the thinking about operational scenarios within which ground robotic vehicles might be used in the years ahead is the “robotics rodeo” sponsored by the US Army.

According to TARDEC:

The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) and Fort Hood III Corps want you to demonstrate your innovative and new unmanned ground systems technologies to the U.S. Army user and research and development communities at the Robotics Rodeo at Fort Hood, TX, Aug. 31 to Sept. 4, 2009.

The Robotics Rodeo demonstration is not a competition or sole source justification but, rather, a market research event to see if your technology will potentially benefit Army robotics programs. The Robotics Rodeo has two opportunities for you to demonstrate your technology in either, or both, the Extravaganza and Robotic Technology Observation, Demonstration and Discussion (RTOD2) demonstrations.

Mission Statement:

III Corps and TARDEC hosts a Robotics Rodeo from 31AUG-04SEP09 on Fort Hood to motivate the robotics industry, educate Soldiers, developers, and key decision makers, and observe the current state of robotic technologies in order to encourage the development of autonomous systems supporting warfighter operational needs.

Objective:

A combination of task-based open events and freestyle demonstration for market research, not source selection. This will be an opportunity for all the robotics industry with products at or above TRL 6 to demonstrate them in a military operating environment.

Robotics Rodeo Presentation [pdf, 3.4MB]

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***Posted September 18th, 2009

The Evolving U.S. Military Space Paradigm: Lynchpin for a Global C4ISRD Enterprise

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Evolving U.S. Military Space Paradigm: Lynchpin for a Global C4ISRD Enterprise
Delta II Launch
Delta II Launch. Photo credits: Boeing Co.

The more than 40 year history of US military space has entered a new phase. The US military space system was built as a unique overlay for the US intelligence community and the US military to provide for strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union. It has evolved over time into a global enabler for the transformation of the US military into a truly global force. It is now the lynchpin for what is emerging as a global C4ISRD enterprise enabling the global security and defense capabilities of the United States.

What began as a unique military “high ground” has become one of the four key nodes of the evolving C4ISR system. Space, air, naval, and ground platforms are becoming interconnected in a system to provide digital content for the US military. This digital content encompasses communications and sensor systems distributed over space, air, naval and ground platforms. The core platforms were historically built separately and “stovepiped.” Now the strategic requirement is to shape interoperability across the enterprise whereby synergy, leverage and redundancy are the goals. Synergy comes from the ability to operate throughout the various domains; leverage is generated by the ability to have a synergistic system whereby the unique competence of each element of the US forces can use digital tools to provide for their mission sets. Redundancy is increasingly crucial to the survivability and sustainability of US forces. The changing strategic context for US military space (notably, the emergence of China) places a premium on redundancy of space assets, and assets across the C4ISRD enterprise.

The Evolution of US Military Space: A Pragmatic Approach to the Future

The US has more than 40 years experience in the use of military space. This experience forms a unique asset guiding further evolution of the US military space paradigm. Each phase of development has left behind its core structures, capabilities and systems based upon which the overall structure of US military space has been further developed. No architecture guided the construction of the system; key elements were put in place similar to geophysical eras and then the next era emerged in interaction with the past.

The core US space system was built with the Soviet Union in mind. The closed nature of Soviet society and the shooting down of the U-2 led to a priority focus on overhead reconnaissance as the initial core space requirement. With nuclear deterrence as a core and continuing mission, the US focused on space for early warning of Soviet launches, communications and data links among dispersed naval and air assets to ensure secure second strike, and an ability for the national command authority (NCA) to be able to conduct war even under the stress of nuclear exchange.

This baseline reconnaissance and communications capability was hierarchical organized to provide for NCA control. The intelligence community’s focus on hierarchical support has only been modified in recent years as the focus has shifted to support for deployed warfighters.

The introduction of what became known as GPS was part of the counter-Soviet effort. It was originally designed to provide for linkage among U.S. forces to augment deterrence. But over the 30 year history of the program GPS has evolved more rapidly and innovatively than any other US military space program. It has been the thread of continuity from the counter-Soviet days to the current emphasis on a global C4ISR enterprise.

The next major shift in the US military space program was built around the Reagan initiatives to provide for missile defense. Star Wars was an ambitious program which sought to connect a system together to defeat ballistic missiles and to provide for strategic defense. The emphasis on data management and new command and control mechanisms within the project became part of the more decentralized focus of the current military space system.

The Clinton Administration added two new impulses to the US military space system.

First, the Clinton Administration sought to create a new partnership with the private sector. And the Administration’s policies coincided with the rise of a significant commercial space sector, most notably in communications but increasingly in earth observation as well. The current military space system has been significantly refocused with the availability of significant commercial communications towards providing for ISR data to the warfighter.

Second, the Clinton Administration began the post-Soviet era effort to recapitalize the historically inherited space constellations. A persistent problem since the mid-1990s has been the need to replace aging single purpose constellations with more flexible multi-purpose constellations. The Space-based infrared system (SBIRS) was a key example of how the Administration sought to replace many satellites (notably defense warning satellites) with a new multi-purpose constellation which could provide data for many military purposes. The program has had many problems of getting untracked and has proven very difficult to execute technologically. And the negative experience of SBIRS among other programs has led to a simplification of current space acquisition efforts.

The post-Clinton efforts have focused upon the transformation of space. Here the Bush Administration sought radical changes in space constellations whereby much of the data and communications activity necessary for C4ISR would be put onto space-based platforms. Both space-based radar and TCS or the transformational communications system (based on laser communications) has proven more advanced in concept than in technological feasibility.

At the same time, several years of significant warfighting experience in Afghanistan and Iraq have completely transformed the warfighting approach of American forces whereby the role of the air-breathing assets and changes in the ground forces have augmented the role of non-space systems within the C4ISR global enterprise.

The Obama Administration has not yet shaped its approach to civil or military space. But what is clear is that programs have been cancelled such as TSAT, and civil space programs will be significantly re-shaped. The key question will then be how the Administration deals with its space assets and how it shapes an explicit or de facto architecture for C4ISRD assets. What is likely is a significant downturn in spending for specifically military space assets, with a concurrent demand to get what is funded right in terms of delivering capability to the warfighter,

In short, US military space assets are no longer unique, sui-generis tools for the intelligence community in assessing a peer competitor. They are now embedded in the overall evolution of US military forces and reconfiguring of how the US will execute its role in the global system. From being unique to embedded assets now means that space is part of a global digital enterprise, which the US military uses to deploy and sustain force, and in which space and air-breathing systems can alternate dependent upon the mission and geo-physical location of operations.

The Nature of the C4ISRD Enterprise

The “crucible of war” has reshaped the role of military space and with it forged a new paradigm. Rather than advancing a purely proprietary military space sector, now the emphasis is upon space’s crucial role in enabling a global C4ISR enterprise.

The military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored a new approach to the use of C2 and ISR by the military. These operations have relied on air-breathing and ground-based platforms to provide significant C2 and ISR. The USMC is relying on what they call “non-traditional” ISR for their operations. The USMC means by this “on-demand” ISR by ground and sea-based decision makers to shape outcomes, which they determine are realistic and close to the operational environment. Air-breathing platforms, whether manned or unmanned, are increasingly central to these ISR and C2 operations. And the USMC and US Army have worked closely to share data across ground-based systems as well.

C4iISRD
C4iISRD

With the dramatic enhancement of the role of C2 and ISR generated by the ground-air partnership, the role of space is changed. Space becomes a significant layer within the communications and data spheres, not itself the repository of the network. Space systems become relay elements, coordinating nodes, and participants in a collaborative system, not the dominant layer shaping the network. This means that the U.S. military can shift from building complete military communications and ISR networks in space to leveraging the evolution of air-breathing and ground systems as well as global commercial systems as well in shaping its future military space system.

Also, the operations associated with the “overseas contingency operations” (to use the Obama Administration’s language) have underscored the changing nature of the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic systems. For example, now the US Air Force’s primary operational missions are largely non-kinetic within which kinetic strike is a core capability to be exercised only as appropriate to the mission. The classic role of military space has been to provide C4ISR for kinetic strike against moving or static tactical or strategic targets. With the “overseas contingency operations”, there are fewer targets and significantly more events that need to be shaped on the ground or at sea. Data and communications need to be provided close to the point of decision-making, not stored in Washington data vaults. As such, the military and security players in the global security enterprise are relying more on a collaborative and “on demand” networks than on the data provided from distant GEO satellites.

For joint and coalition operations which empower “overseas contingency operations,” communications and data need to be capable from the outset to be shared. This means that a premium is placed from the outset on shared capabilities, not proprietary data provided by U.S. military systems, which then is laundered through a tortured intelligence sharing process with allies. By then events are beyond the relevance of the data provided. Proprietary U.S. military systems are at the core of shaping kinetic capabilities for the joint U.S. force; they are not at the heart of the shared data and communications capability central to the shared operations.

This means that relying on shared systems with allies and the commercial sector is becoming more important for the U.S. military space system. On the one hand, data can be purchased from partners and allies. On the other hand, relying on commercial networks and systems to provide for capabilities is increasingly important.

Another way to understand the current functioning of the US military space system is to analyze the context within which reliance on space is highest and those contexts in which reliance on the unique space systems is significantly reduced. Heavy reliance on space systems is crucial for short burst high intensity insertion of forces. Here the air arm of the US military relies on space to provide for kinetic strike support and air integration to provide for maximal offensive military impact. As the duration of operations increases, the size of the deployed joint force goes up and the intensity of operations drops, space becomes an embedded element within others to provide for the communications and ISR support necessary for continued operations.

Moving Forward

The first key development shaping the next decade of U.S. military space efforts will be responding to the growth of the middle-layer of the C4ISR geo-physical architecture. Namely with the emergence of the F-35, a true revolution in ISR capabilities will be available to US and allied forces. The F35 has significantly greater processing power than current aircraft and has an open-chip architecture. With this level of processing power available, the F35 will be capable of simultaneous multi-mission operations, rather than current combat aircraft’s approach to sequentional multi-tasking. Additionally, unmanned aircraft developments are exploding with a significant diversification of high-mid-low altitude C2 and ISR capabilities. Additional introduction of dirigibles and other assets will contribute as well to an expanded mid-layer role in the C4ISR or C4ISR D (shared decision-making) enterprise.

The second key development will be the need to deal with space competitors by putting some capabilities deeper into space and by diversifying the ability to move digital content around the C4ISR enterprise. Here a new approach to GEO-satellites is to be envisaged. As Former Secretary of the USAF Wynne underscored:

“I have wanted to get away from ‘BattleStar Gallactica’ combination satellites into a streamlined set of distributed functionality. I have seen resources wasted after pasting up a satellite with disparate payloads to save incremental launch costs; and watched as the cost of integration, and the software to manage the various payloads ate up the proposed savings and schedule leading to calls for cancellation, and a fall off in reliability in the eyes of a patient customer. Now there may be an opportunity. Over the past several years, with DARPA support, the opportunity for Formation Flying, or as some put it proximity operations has been tried and found to be workable. In the same period a lot of work has been done to perfect Wireless, broadband communication, which allows for local area networks among the formation. I see this as laying the foundation for distributed operations in space. This concept is not new, but what is new is the near term capability for achievement. But there is more, and that is the recent refueling mission that DARPA has demonstrated. This can profoundly alter design requirements for satellites, and if there is distributed functionality, it then allows for modular replacement; and continuation of the remaining elements in orbit, refueled. Then, as we have seen with the GPS ground station changeout, a broad plan for updating/upgrading can be systematically applied.

“Long life for deep space remains an issue; and NASA and DARPA continue to seek solutions; but for the Air Force; the above described engineering breakthroughs need to be fully exploited. We need to have a steady and achievable schedule for modernization of the constellations. Given the current state of space; and the now realized vulnerability; distributed functionality leads right into Operationally Responsive Space. Frankly, smaller and distributed satellites are both easier to protect, and easier to replace. The communication across space is already a proven commodity; though the concept of distributed Local Area Networks and Downlinks provides redundancy, and robustness.”

The third key is to leverage current constellations and new systems to more effectively reshape the C4ISR paradigm. In other words, working through how the evolution of space systems can reshape the C4ISR paradigm, which in turn allows that paradigm to reshape space requirements.

In short, the pragmatic evolution of US military space has put it at the heart of the further evolution of the US military. It has gone from being a specialized “high frontier”to becoming one which finds its identity from serving the evolution of the C4ISR enterprise. And that enterprise includes dynamic interaction from the ground, sea and air sides of the equation. Indeed, the next decade, spending on the ground systems is likely to take prominence as the holy grail of interoperability is pursued.

Conclusion

In short, the US uses military space in a number of ways to facilitate a global C4ISR enterprise.

First, it enables a global strike and reconnaissance force. Uniquely able to operate with global reach and in support of high intensity operations, military space assets allow the US Navy and US Air Force to operate with force packages beyond normal operating range.

Second, the communications part of military space operates the most secure elements for worldwide operations. Security is an essential part of any kinetic operations. But for non-kinetic operations, the US relies on significant commercial satellite capabilities. And learning to make the two work together is a key part of the global communications effort.

Third, US military assets provide unique ISR assets with global reach, global refresh and provide for global connectivity. But increasingly these assets are simply part of an overall ISR effort within which air breathing assets provide the bulk of ISR data. The ground processing side of the effort is receiving increasing attention to provide for as much interoperability of data, which can be transferred throughout the enterprise. As a result of significant changes in the ISR data approach, the US is thinking about a transition to GEO satellites as transmission and data relay elements and less as the originators of sensor data.

———-

***Posted September 18th, 2009

The AEGIS Global Enterprise: Crafting a Global Defensive Capability

Posted on | by SysAdmin
Aegis Missile Launch
Aegis Missile Launch

Missile defense is a global effort. It requires the global deployment of U.S. forces and the capability to connect those forces with those of its allies. Joint and coalition concepts of operations are being shaped to ensure decision makers with the options of providing defense for allied deployed forces and the homelands of the U.S. and allies. As a global enterprise, missile defense will always be a work in progress ensuring that evolutions in sensor technologies are joined with defensive missiles in a joint and combined command and control system.

The U.S. Navy’s Aegis program is an important contributor to shaping the foundation for such a global system. Through initially foreign military sales programs in Japan and eventually cooperative commercial defense programs, Aegis has become part of the allied fleet. Today five allied navies have purchased or deployed the Aegis combat system: Japan, Spain, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Australia.

An additional collaborative aspect of the Aegis program has been the central role of Spain and its industry in introducing a frigate-sized Aegis ship to the world’s fleets. The Spanish frigate series, in turn, has shaped Norwegian and Australian options. Aegis has truly become a global enterprise.

While not all of these ships are tested to be BMD capable, the sensors on the Aegis system of all of these navies can play a role in a global sensor grid important to shaping missile defense capabilities worldwide. And when one adds the consideration that the coming deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to the U.S. fleet and to U.S. and allied air forces will add significant sensor capabilities to the U.S. Navy as well as to allied forces (all of the current Aegis navies are potential candidates for the F-35). There is a significant 21st century opportunity to shape an integrated air-sea sensor net for the deployed fleets which provides, in turn, a growing capability to shape missile defense forces and protective cover for global presence forces.

Not surprisingly, the first acquirer of Aegis, the Japanese, have taken the lead in shaping missile defense capabilities for their fleet. The Japanese are outfitting four Japanese destroyers with the Aegis BMD weapon system. The Kongo was the first Japanese destroyer to intercept successfully a ballistic missile with its Aegis BMD Weapon System in a December 2007 test. The Japanese are working closely with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in enhancing their capabilities for missile tracking and, with the introduction of the Aegis BMD system, are deploying capabilities to turn missile tracking into an ability to defeat incoming missiles.

Two of the other Aegis navies have agreements in place, which will enhance their ability to provide for missile defense. The Spanish frigate Mendez Nunez (F-104) participated in Flight Test Standard Missile-12 by providing tracking data which involved a successful intercept. This flight mission was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis BMD equipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS Decatur (DDG 73), using the operationally certified Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6) and the Standard Missile–3 (SM-3) Block IA missile successfully intercepted the target during its midcourse phase of flight.

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense presentation
Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense presentation

Australia signed a MDA framework MOU on July 7, 2004, which enables a working relationship to shape a role for the new Australian aegis fleet. As the Australian MOD noted about the MOU: “The Memorandum of Understanding will enable Defence to gain access to, review, and evaluate the various layered defensive systems in the US missile defence program, and decide which are appropriate areas of participation for Australia. Areas of potential interest for Australia include: Expanding our long-standing cooperation in ballistic missile early warning; science and technology. Research, development, testing and evaluation of missile defence systems; cooperation in areas such as ship- and ground-based sensors and handling data from sensors; and opportunities for Australian industry.”

“Our new Air Warfare Destroyers will be equipped with radars capable not only of detecting aircraft and anti-ship missiles, but also ballistic missiles. This information could comprise part of the missile defence network to provide early warning of an impending attack.”

The South Koreans are building three Aegis ships and the new KDX-III destroyers will able to contribute to allied monitoring capability against missile threats in Asia. The South Korean government has expressed a clear interest in se-based terminal defenses built around the Aegis system.

Other allied navies have developed and deployed advanced defense systems for their frigates as well. And several of these allies are working with the U.S. to shape a collaborative network to share data for missile warning and as capabilities are built to shape a data grid for missile warning, the potential is then created for shaping a defensive system using such data. The British Royal Navy is working with the US Navy to shape a collaborative framework for operations between the US fleet and the new UK Type 45 destroyers to enable the Type 45 to participate in joint missile defense. The British PAMS system and the Sampson radar are the systems being uses to work interoperability with Aegis.

The Dutch have engaged in a program to upgrade their frigates to enhance missile- tracking capabilities. And they participated in FTM-11 by providing target tracking along with the USS Hopper for the USS Lake Erie’s interceptor test. The Dutch use the APAR system as the basis for missile tracking, and seek to have the APAR become interoperable with Aegis.

The Germans also use the APAR system. And as interoperability of the APAR with Aegis is enhanced, the German navy will be able to share missile-tracking data more effectively with other allies.

In short, the Aegis system will play a central role both for the United States and its Aegis partners in shaping a global missile defense capability at sea. Other allies who have developed and deployed other air defense and combat systems are working with the United States to find ways to enhance the interoperability between Aegis and other allied systems. And with President Obama’s cancellation of a land-based missile defense system in Europe and a shift on emphasis to the enhanced role of missile defense at sea, the role of the Aegis global enterprise is heightened in U.S. policy.

The goal is to craft a fast response data system, which allows allies to jointly track missiles. And based on such a data system forge command and control links which facilitate joint and coalition missile defense capabilities. Given the flexibility of a sea-based force, this can permit the U.S. and its allies to deploy capabilities to dynamic threat areas in tomorrow’s world, rather than building against today’s threats alone.

As the recent assessment of the Joint Forces Command underscored, “the battle for access” in the global commons will become increasingly difficult as adversaries acquire advanced missiles and other area denial weapons. “There is also a rising danger with the increase and longer range missiles that presence forces could be the first target of an enemy’s action in their exposed positions.” It is very likely that deployed sea-based defenses will be an important element in allowing U.S. and allied “presence forces” to operate effectively.

In other words, the Aegis global enterprise lays a foundation for a global capability in sea-based missile defense. And this capability, in turn, becomes increasingly central to the freedom of action necessary for the global operation of U.S. forces and its coalition partners.

———-

***Posted September 18th, 2009

The Case for New Programs in a Period of Defense Transition: The Naval UCAS Case

Posted on | by SysAdmin
09/17/2009

9/17/09: The United States and its allies are in the midst of a significant financial downturn with serious consequences for defense acquisition. The “contingency operation” in Afghanistan and the “withdrawal” from Iraq both generate severe budgetary pressures and emphasize force acquisition priorities most appropriate to those operations. And the “withdrawal” from Iraq will cost billions of dollars in moving kit, training and equipping Iraqis, destroying kit and depoting kit used in Iraq. The Iraq “withdrawal business” will come at the expense of new kit in production or development.

Secretary Gates announced in early April his intention to turn this budgetary dilemma into a strategic reset in favor of counter-insurgency forces and equipment. Most notably, the Department plans to add civilian and military personnel with the attendant costs of such personnel and their clearly negative impact on funds available for procurement. He argued against the acquisition of “exquisite” equipment (such as the F-22 and some missile defense systems”) in favor of 80% solutions. In such an environment, it will be extremely difficult to launch new programs or to promote programs in development, which have not entered full production. Indeed, Washington is awash with “defense reformers” who want stable prices and cost effective solutions for defense problems, not matter how complex the challenge. Such a stance will inevitably lead to a bias against new or developmental programs. By definition, one can know the cost of a tank in production; one cannot fully price its replacement.

The Power Projection Transition

The United States faces a special dilemma in this regard because its power projection forces are unique in the West; and, indeed, U.S. allies have grown accustomed to U.S. naval and air superiority. This assumption may no longer be warranted as defenses become strengthened against offensive air operations, mobile systems being put in place by states such as Iran (which although not “peer competitors” will have access to peer weapons), and the U.S. Navy wishes to operate away from the Blue Water in more dangerous proximity to land in “enduring littoral operations” or simply littoral operations of long dwell and duration which expose the fleet to a growing multiplicity of threats.

Indeed one can argue that the Obama Administration will require power projection forces to be re-enforced not weakened during its tenure. Power projection forces are crucial to the Iraq withdrawal mission (in deterring Iran, and in protecting forces leaving, moving or staying in Iraq), to the Afghanistan mission (which requires distributed military forces which are connected by air assets), by a significant increased demand for tanking and lift for both missions, and, of course, all the other global missions which require U.S. power projection forces.

The Obama Administration Faces the Future

Indeed, one can argue that the most significant element of U.S. force structure which needs to be renewed and acquired over time are multi-mission power projection forces. These forces have been used continuously and flexibly throughout the post-cold war period and, in a variety of contingencies and situations, where shaping new capability on the fly has proven central to success.

But, if U.S. power projection is reverse the downward trend of the last two Administrations, the Obama Administration will need to seek a new approach to a joint and coalition multi-mission power projection force. Such a force would be built to deal with new challenges, not simply to prepare for major wars in the “Global War on Terror” or major confrontations with “peer competitors.”

The proximate drivers for a change in the power projection approach will be several:

  • The termination of the F-22 program and the decision-context within which the program is terminated;
  • The priority placed on the F-35 as a joint and coalition platform;
  • The network enablement of the F-35 as the enabler for 21st century power projection forces:
  • Growing capabilities to network the man-machine force structure inherent in the new manned aircraft and the blending of more effective relationships between data among the manned and robotic elements to create greater C4ISR D structures, with C4ISR D being understood as better integrated tools to provide for enhanced decision making;
  • Moving ahead with a next generation re-fuelable tanker to support modern aerospace forces, manned and unmanned;
  • Central priority on the Iraq drawdown and the Afghanistan concept of operation and strategy for U.S. and allied engagement;
  • The impact of the financial crisis and public policy responses to that crisis on the acquisition of power projection forces;
  • The emergence of crises that require power projection forces;
  • The ability of the US Air Force and Navy to work together to shape tailored concepts of operations which allow greater network synergy, ISR coverage, support for ground and insertion forces, and for joint or single-service led strike operations;
  • The priority placed on dealing with enhanced defenses among state actors opposing U.S. interests; the simple point is that defenses are getting harder to penetrate and re-working U.S. capabilities will require nothing less than a new 21st century concept of air operations.

These are simply some of the key drivers of change. To the extent to which the drawdown in Iraq is seen to require attention to integrated power projection forces both to protect U.S. forces leaving Iraq and to deal with regional rivals to U.S. influence in the newly independent Iraq, a priority could emerge upon a revamped power projection force. But the focus could well be upon some variant of the F-35 model, namely a joint and coalition platform which enables an engagement of either a national joint or coalition force.

And the new projection force should be viewed as multi-mission in character. The conventional wisdom about power projection is that is primarily characterized by a significant strike role. Absent “peer” competitors, the strike role is diminished and with it the need for a significant strike force. Secretary Gates has made this point many times and, if continued for the duration of the Obama Administration, U.S. capabilities will degrade further.

Enhanced US Air Force and US Naval Synergy

An effective approach to a strategic re-set for the United States does not start where Gates has focused the effort, namely, on the priority of stability operations or counter-insurgency forces. Rather, it starts by a more effective integration of U.S. power projection forces and continued commitment to multi-mission forces. This means seeking where possible synergies in the concepts of operations between the US Air Force and the US Navy, and to promote programs which allow such synergy to be enhanced.

In other words, there is a strategic requirement and opportunity to provide for much better integration between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy in promoting connectivity, synergy and capability to leverage its forces. Both face significant shortfalls; working more effectively they can enhance the nations capability to project power, provide presence and work with friends and allies.

This can be done in a number of immediate ways. The joint acquisition of Global Hawk and the joint deployments on Guam provide an opportunity to develop more effective joint ISR concepts of operations and data sharing. The joint acquisition of the F-35 provides a further opportunity to develop a 21st century concept of air operations which draws on the strengths of the 5th generation aircraft to provide for a new approach to maritime and air integration. The integration of Aegis systems with the F-35 provides another opportunity to link the Air Force and USN into more effective littoral presence and strike missions.

The USN will launch a new carrier and would be an excellent idea to link this new carrier with new con-ops for the USN as an anchor for global security. The point of an aviation carrier is that it carries air assets and by working closely with other US air elements and promoting capability to work with allies, a carrier becomes part of a global security solution, not just dedicated to blue water operations.

The new carrier will carry a new Hawkeye system, F-35 and can become the mother ship for a new UCAS system. As General Davis, the former PEO for F-35, noted in a recent interview for this article, “What becomes important is to understand how our new systems are working much more effectively with regard to interoperability and leveraging one another. We need for focus on the emergence of battle management networks encompassing carriers, F/A-18s, Hawkeyes, UAVs, F-35s and Marines on the beach.” With these systems able to work interoperability with other air and strike elements, broader recognition of the value of the continued carrier efforts might be generated.

The Naval UCAS as Significant Enhancer of Power Projection

The new UCAS system is an example of the type of new program, which ought to be supported in the period of defense transition in front of the United States. It is currently in a vulnerable funding state. The demonstration program has been funded but in the current environment can a new program such as UCAS survive?

The program brings a number of key enhancements to the table, and these contributions suggest a template for the types of new programs, which should be supported even in a constrained fiscal environment.

First, it extends the strike range of an already funded core capability, namely, the carrier task force. Tactical aircraft have limited range; the UCAS has much greater range and reach. This makes it valuable in and of itself, but extending the reach of the new tactical aviation asset to be deployed to the fleet, namely the F-35, enhances its value. The sensor and communication capabilities of the F-35 are significant, but the reach of the aircraft remains within tactical ranges; the UCAS has forward strategic strike reach as well as ISR and communications reach-back to the tactical assets. The UCAS can spearhead the entire sensor and strike grid put up by the carrier task force.

Second, the UCAS will be the first unmanned system developed in the wake of the deployment of the new F-35. The F-35 as a “flying combat system” should be a generator of change in the unmanned fleet. The development and then deployment of the UCAS will be integrally interconnected with the F-35, and as such can take advantage of commonality in sensors and communications with the new manned aircraft. Shaping a common concept of operations between the F-35 and the UCAS can provide an important stimulus for change for the US Air Force as well.

Third, it is highly likely that the US Air Force new bomber program will be shifted to the right in funding priorities. This provides a significant opportunity for the US Air Force to learn from the US Navy’s experience in deploying the UCAS with the F-35 to shape a possible unmanned successor for the manned bomber. A template could be shaped by the Navy, which could provide important lessons learned in shaping the US Air Force’s strategy to work the future of its unmanned programs with manned aircraft.

Fourth, the company building the UCAS demonstrator, Northrop Grumman, can draw on significant lessons learned in their other unmanned programs, such as Global Hawk, and on their core contributions in sensors and communications to the F-35 to provide a realistic development to production program for the new UCAS aircraft.

In other words, the program evidences a number of key qualities, which makes it worthy of finding even in a stringent environment. It leverages significant capabilities already paid for and deployed. It leverages new capabilities coming into the fleet. It provides a way to enhance synergy between both power projection forces. It provides a learning curve, which the US Air Force can use in shaping its future development and acquisition approach.

A Significant Enhancer of Multi-Mission Capability

Another discriminator for the UCAS is that it provides a core multi-mission capability for the joint and coalition force structure. It should not be understood as a stand-alone platform, which is of value only in the most extreme warfighting conditions. It is NOT a specialized asset, rather it is a multi-mission asset useful across the spectrum of conflict and in the diverse concepts of operations which the U.S. Navy, and the joint and coalition forces are likely engage in against the most likely threats of the next two decades.

The UCAS will be a significant asset in the formation of the new concepts of operations for distribution aerospace forces. Among the forward deployed stealth assets, a significant sharing of ISR, C2 and strike functions will be shared, and communicated to other assets in supporting roles. The UCAS with its distinctive stealth capabilities will become an important node in the new air operations network which can be used in command and control functions, as a forward air controller identifying targets for either stealth or legacy aircraft, as strike platforms leading an attack or supporting an attack by providing more weapons on targets needed by the manned stealth aircraft.

The UCAS will an important contributor to fighting the hybrid wars facing America and its allies. With the diffusion of advanced technologies, both commercial and military, U.S. and allied militaries cannot count on a clearly defined spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity of operations; Low intensity can become mid-intensity rapidly. You do not want to bring a knife to a gunfight, especially when you are not certain of who is defining the nature of the conflict or its tactical or strategic reach. This is especially true in the era of cyberwarfare as well, whereby the length and breadth of the battlespace is unknown until engagement. A modular UCAS brings a diversity of capabilities to the battlespace, ranging from command and control support, situational awareness, providing crucial links in a distributed electronic or cyber war attack, initial strike weapons, additional support strike weapons. In addition, these capabilities are launched from an alternative airfield at sea with a different set of trajectories than land-based facilities, which further enhance the capability of the joint or coalition force.

The UCAS also can provide an important tool in support of insertion forces. The USMC focuses on the need for a new approach to sea basing. As the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the USMC augment their Special Forces capabilities, and in the case of the U.S. Air Force and USMC the Osprey is seen as a key tool for rapid force insertion, the UCAS can provide a crucial support element for rapidly inserted ground-air forces. The introduction of a stealthy UAV provides the top cover for the insertion of Special Forces for raiding or counter-terrorism operations. Insertion forces by definition can be rapidly withdrawn as well. The U.S. after long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan might well consider the advantage of rapidly inserted forces to deal with the suppression of local threats creating global consequences.

The USMC for certain, and several allies as well will deploy the F-35B. And perhaps the U.S. Air Force as it reconsiders its position within the re-set of power projection forces might acquire this aircraft as well. The STOVL aircraft has many advantages for concepts of operations, including deploying ashore on rugged “airfields” and operating from support structures at sea or on the air. Dependent upon the amount of time ashore and where operating the USMC has developed an effective plan for support of the dispersed force ashore. The advantage of “airfields” not known ahead of actual deployment is significant; a UCAS as providing for early and continuing ISR or defensive support for forward deployed STOVL airfields is compelling.

And finally, the UCAS can provide a significant contribution to an “enduring littoral presence” mission for the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy has struggled to define its littoral mission. When the service operated “from the sea” construct, the littoral were simply space through which strike and sea control was exercised. In the world of today and the next decades, engagement in the littorals for relatively long duration is a crucial mission. As the U.S. Navy considers acquisition of the littoral combat ship (LCS), the question of how to sustain the operation of these ships or how to combine them with other littoral assets such as an engaged USMC will become significant. The UCAS will provide a significant airborne asset to support the LCS in its initial engagement and provide sustained support as desired.

Conclusion

The UCAS should be seen as a multi-mission asset, not a specialized asset. The threats facing the U.S. and its allies are hybrid in character. As such, multi-mission capabilities need to be deployed for ANY tailored mission. Indeed, the experience since the end of the Cold War has demonstrated how little predictability either strategists or policymakers have provided in their forecasts for the future. What has happened is that the U.S. military has used virtually every weapon or capability in its kit to craft unique responses to every situation which policymakers have demanded of the U.S. military. As a result, it would prudent for U.S. policymakers to ensure that a multi-mission power projection force be supported and developed in the years ahead. Indeed, OSD has initiated an effort to enhance air and seapower capabilities. As they sort through new approaches to sea and air power collaboration enhancing the unmanned and manned synergies should be a significant element of the effort.

An earlier version was published in RUSI Defence Systems (Summer 2009).

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***Posted September 17th, 2009

Manufacturing for Sustainability: The F-35 Case

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9/17/09 A key argument for buying newer platforms compared to older ones is the savings built into a new platform over the operational and logistics costs of the older platform. In the commercial airplane business, both Boeing and Airbus design and build their newest platforms with significant enhancements in sustainability in mind. According to one senior official at Airbus, “We have a design committee which reviews recommendations with regard to sustainment and logistics support from commercial customers to determine the most desirable enhancements we might then build into the new aircraft (the A350). We then determine priorities and feasibility’s with regard to the design approach and manufacturing process to shape the new build aircraft.”

This is true as well for military aircraft. The F-35 has been designed in part in ways to mimic a commercial manufacturing process and the development, design and manufacturing approach for the F-35 have been built around enhanced sustainability for the new aircraft. Indeed, the F-35 team has focused on ways to ensure that the build and sustainment process have has much inherent overlap as possible.

In an August 2009 interview, with Bob Fiorentini, former head of F-35 production, and now VP for Global Strategic Sourcing, a number of key aspects of the approach to design, development and manufacturing for sustainability were identified and discussed in an interview conducted in late August 2009.

According to Fiorentini, the focus of the program from the beginning of the design of the aircraft has been upon affordability, both in terms of initial cost and sustainment.  The designs of the aircraft and notably the tooling for both production and sustainment have been built with a keen focus on logistics considerations.  Fiorentini underscored that “historically, legacy aircraft have been built and then sustained in the field.  These processes have operated virtually independently of one another.  And learning which has occurred in the process of building the aircraft has not been passed on directly for the post-build or sustainment process.  In this program, the relationship has been changed to allow significant interaction between production and sustainment approaches.”

A core element of the approach has been upon designing and building tools for both manufacturing and sustainment.  Fiorentini underscored that “we are designing and building dual use tools versus build and then sustainment tools.”

In other words, many of the tools used in the build of the aircraft will be deployed to the filed.  This leads to cost containment for the tool building companies who get a much longer run because they are producing for both production and sustainment processes.  This also leads according to Fiorentini “to much earlier maturity for tools used in sustainment than has been the case in legacy programs.”

Fiorentini provided several examples of the build for sustainment approach for the F-35 program.

The first example is the integrated power plate or IPP, which is used to support the integrated suite of applications, which provide electrical power, temperature control and engine start systems.  “On legacy aircraft all of these systems are separate and require separate maintenance efforts.  On the F-35, the IPP uses the same tools and maintenance process.”  The result is a significant reduction of time needed to maintain the aircraft.   The tools used to build the aircraft and to sustain it are identical and are seen in the accompanying photos.

Integrated Power Plate

A second example is what the F-35 program team calls the EHAS or the electrohysdrostatic actuation system.  The EHAS is a “revolutionary step in the control of aircraft surfaces.  Hydraulic systems for the F35 are not centralized.  EHAS allows each unit on the surface to control itself.”  Fiorentini adds that this “significantly reduces the risk of catastrophic failure.  And the EHAS systems reduces the amount of maintenance for the aircraft by eliminating a number of components in the airframe such as hydraulic tubing, hose lines goring through the airframe.”

The EHAS reduces the overall weight of the aircraft and by simplifying the aircraft simplifies the maintenance tasks as well.  And as with other systems in the F-35, the EHAS tools for the build of the aircraft is the same as the tools, which will be used to sustain the aircraft.  The EHAS tooling is seen in the accompanying photo.

EHAS tooling

Another example of how design change shapes sustainment capabilities is the operation of the F-35 canopy.  The canopy tilts from the back, which allows the ejection seat to be removed and serviced.  In legacy aircraft, the canopy has to be removed to take out the ejection seat.  By designing the canopy this way, the time for servicing the ejection seat is significantly reduced.  And the tools used for seat alignment are the same for both production and maintenance.  The ejection seat tool is seen in the accompanying photos.

Ejection seat tool

ejection seat tool

A fourth example is how the engine trailer is used for the F-35.  The engine trailer looks like a modified truck with four large wheels on it.  The engine is installed on the aircraft or pulled off by the engine trailer.  This allows maintenance to be facilitated by use of the fitted trailer “truck.”  And the engine trailer used in production is the same as the one being used in test and then run stations. Fiorentini noted that “not only is training going on as the engine trailers are used in the production process but suggestions for both line workers and maintainers (who are on the lines as well) are inputing suggestions.  This facilitates and early maintenance learning curve prior to deployment.”  The engine trailer is seen in the accompanying photo.

Engine trailer

There are additional examples throughout but the point is clear: in the design and production of the F-35 future sustainment has been built in wherever possible.  And design features like the reduction of panels, which need to be removed to do repairs, reduce downtime.  “Many of the components of the airplane which in legacy aircraft required panel removal are now built into the weapons and landing gear bays where no panel disassembly is required for most commonly serviced parts of the aircraft.”

The maintainers for the F-35 use a ruggedized laptop to do initial systems checks.  In legacy aircraft, very specialized equipment proprietary to the manufacturer has to be used.  And again, the same procedures used in the factory are those used in the field for final test out for flight.

And Fiorentini emphasized that the build to maintain has enhanced significantly the reliability on the flight line.  “We use one data base throughout the design and maintenance process.  This guarantees consistency and will provide important metrics for sustainment.  And the use of the same design tools to design for production and sustainment tooling ensures compatibility throughout.”

Interview conducted August 2009 by Robbin Laird.

———-

***Posted September 17th, 2009

The Acquisition Challenge: Re-Shaping US Forces in a Constrained Fiscal Environment

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Acquisition Challenge: Re-Shaping US Forces in a Constrained Fiscal Environment
C-5M in Flight
C-5M in Flight

As the Obama Administration shapes the acquisition approach of the Department of Defense for the years to come, hard choices will be taken. And these choices will have significant impact both in implementing strategy and in shaping strategy for years to come.

Among the key drivers will be Afghanistan, Iraq and the operation and shape of power projection forces. First, how the Afghan strategy is re-cast and how US forces are equipped and the concept of operations of those forces in concert with those of allies will shape US capabilities for years to come. Second, the drawdown in Iraq, the re-deployment of the significant stash of equipment in Iraq to Iraq forces, within the region or returned to US forces in the United States or abroad will also have a shaping function on US and allied capabilities in the region. And, finally, how the Administration approaches the re-shaping of US expeditionary and power projection forces will have a fundamental impact on the US posture. The power projection forces shape how the US approaches allies, allies deal with the United States and will shape the calculations of adversaries with regard to the real military capability of the United States in global affairs.

Acquisition is inextricably intertwined with military capability. In the ongoing debate about acquisition processes and of the proper balance between industry, civilians and the military, what is often forgotten is that acquisition is about buying things. Too often the lawyer mentality of those shaping the process enforce the notion that process is more important than outcome. The critical question is the ability to buy the right equipment, at the right time, with the right effect and with core capabilities to sustain that equipment worldwide.

The press of financial limitations further complicates the challenge. Those limitations include: a crisis in financial resources, costly “overseas contingency operations,” a growth in numbers of military personnel reducing the resources available for equipment buys and sustainment, a shift in domestic priorities away from those represented by the Department of Defense, growing competition in global markets to sell US equipment, and the lingering impact of cacophony in US export policies which in the case of the satellite market have virtually eliminated US suppliers from the global competition.

At the heart of the challenge will be how to leverage austerity. The current strategic review process owes the country more than simply justifications for cancelling programs and supporting counter-insurgency operations. It owes the country some foundational principles for launching a new architecture and new programs to support U.S. and allied power projection forces providing for security and military needs.

One of these principles could be “leveraged” modernization whereby well-established platforms are leveraged to provide for new capabilities and to seek to connect these legacy platforms into new “connected battlespace capabilities.” One example is the USMC “Harvest Hawk” program. The USMC is using its KC-130Js to craft a roll-on, roll-off ISR platform. The USMC is looking to do the same with its Osprey’s. The program will yield an operational aircraft in less than a year.

Another example is the approach, which could be taken to the airlift fleet. Clearly lift is crucial for the future of US joint operations. There are clear limits to the amount of capital available for the acquisition of new lift aircraft; and as well there is significant uncertainly with regard to the future disposition of US kit to be carried by the lift fleet. When FCS was clearly in place, one could project with some certainty the nature of the future lift fleet. Such certainty is now gone.

And the tanker fleet was already supposed to be in the process of recapitalization. So the lift fleet needs to be modernized in the context of limitations for several years ahead on the numbers and capabilities of the tanker fleet. The new tanker fleet was designed to provide a refuelable tanker and such a fleet would allow new aircraft to operate at greater distance from the battlespace and for the tanking fleet to be able to be aloft for significantly great time and with much greater efficiency.

The USAF approach to C-5 modernization provides a solution to the lift and tanker shortfall problems. Here is a unique program that combines improved reliability, enhanced operational capability, fully capitalizes on an aircraft’s service life, while demonstrating good stewardship of the national treasury. According to a 2008 USAF estimate (which is the current program of record), for the mixed C-5 fleet (52 C-5Ms plus 59 AMP C-5As) there will be a reduction of operation costs by $15 billion and a Reduced Total Ownership Cost of $8.9 Billion.

The upgrade program for the C-5 consists of two elements.

The Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) provides a new cockpit including several flight safety enhancements and upgrades which allow it to operate in modern civil space. The modernized C-5 has appropriate data links to connect with air traffic control. These links allow reduced separation of aircraft to operate in regulated air space. By being able access optimized air traffic control routes, the C-5M gains fuel savings, time and can operate at longer distance.

The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) updates 70 subsystems of the aircraft. The centerpiece of the RERP is a new General Electric Engine, which is used worldwide on civil aircraft and is found as well on Air Force One.. This allows access to GE worldwide engine system in offline locations.

This upgrade program not only virtually pays for itself through life cycle cost savings but yields new capabilities – leveraged modernization – which provides capabilities able to attenuate the tanker gap. As already noted, the C-5M is able to operate in civil airspace due to the avionics upgrades, which allows it to fly more efficient routes. The range of the aircraft allows it to avoid (or significantly reduce) re-fueling enroute (as compared to C-130s or C-17s), which means less tankers and less need to rely on enroute tanking infrastructure (notably enroute air fields).

And the modernized C-5Ms provide significant contributions to dealing with strategic uncertainty as well. The US will clearly need insertion forces to be able to operate worldwide in very time constrained environments whether for humanitarian or military missions. The C-5Ms will be able to carry significantly heavier loads over longer distance to more locations than ever before.

And the increased reliability of the C-5M will allow the USAF to use the C-5 in more austere runways than it currently feels comfortable to operate. The C-5 has significant capability to land in austere runways; with the new systems it can be considered a core contributor to this capability. The airplane has a landing gear footprint (LCN landing classification number) lower than C17 and comparable with the C130, which allows the aircraft to operate on soft semi prepared runways. This inherent capability allows you to go beyond how the USAF uses the aircraft. With more reliability from modernization, the tactical use of the C-5M can be expanded.

In other words, by modernizing the C-5, the C-5M will be able to carry more cargo, over longer distances, and with less air refueling tanker dependency. The C-5M delivers 22% more power, provides 58% faster climb rate and 8-20% better fuel economy, dependent upon the operational scenario. And the C-5M can expand its operations into airfields with shorter runways, thereby expanding its operational utility.

And the timelines of C-5 modernization and tanker shortfalls cross each other. The C-5 modernization program can be completed about 2015, which allows the tanker program to become launched and starting to deliver aircraft, which will enable the remainder of the lift fleet to operate more effectively. The C-5M can provide the broader reach without the tanker input; which then C-130s and C-17s can participate more effectively in a renovated tanker-enabled fleet.

In short, austerity requires innovation. Leverage current assets where possible to gain further capability combined with the re-capitalization of the power projection forces will provide mid to long-term solutions in a constrained environment. Obviously, finding the balance between the two will be the art of policy and the crux of policy choices. But programs like “Harvest Hawk” and C-5 modernization make sense as part of the solution.

The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) updates 70 subsystems of the aircraft. The centerpiece of the RERP is a new General Electric Engine, which is used worldwide on civil aircraft and is found as well on Air Force One and KC-10 tankers. This allows access to GE worldwide engine system in offline locations.

This upgrade program not only virtually pays for itself through life cycle cost savings but yields new capabilities – leveraged modernization – which provides capabilities able to attenuate the tanker gap. As already noted, the C-5M is able to operate in civil airspace due to the avionics upgrades, which allows it to fly more efficient routes. The range of the aircraft allows it to avoid re-fueling in route (as compared to C-130s or C-17s), which means less tankers and less need to rely on in route tanking infrastructure (notably in route air fields).

And the modernized C-5Ms provide significant contributions to dealing with strategic uncertainty as well. The US will clearly need insertion forces to be able to operate worldwide in very time constrained environments whether for humanitarian or military missions. The C5Ms will be able to carry significant or heavy loads over long distance, which provides for either longer range for C-17 sized loads or simply bigger, bulkier or heavier loads.

And the increased reliability of the C5-M will allow the USAF to use the C-5 in more austere runways than it currently feels comfortable to operate. The C-5 has significant capability to land in austere runways; with the new systems it can be considered a core contributor to this capability. The airplane has a landing gear footprint (LCN landing classification number) lower than C17 and comparable with the C130, which allows the aircraft to operate on soft semi prepared runways. This inherent capability allows you to go beyond how the USAF uses the aircraft. With more reliability from modernization, the tactical use of the C-5M can be expanded.

In other words, by modernizing the C-5, the C-5M will be able to carry more cargo, over longer distances, and with less air refueling tanker dependency. The C-5M delivers 22% more power, provides 58% faster climb rate and 8-20% better fuel economy, dependent upon the operational scenario. And the C-5M can expand its operations into airfields with shorter runways, thereby expanding its operational utility.

And the timelines of C-5 modernization and tanker shortfalls cross each other. The C-5 modernization program can be completed about 2015, which allows the tanker program to become launched and starting to deliver aircraft, which will enable the remainder of the lift fleet to operate more effectively. The C-5M can provide the broader reach without the tanker input; which then C-130s and C-17s can participate more effectively in a renovated tanker-enabled fleet. (for a treatment of the C5 versus C17 acquisition issue see the piece by Loren Thompson http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/c-5-versus-c-17-an-assessment-of-airlift-options?a=1&c=1171. In short, austerity requires innovation. Leverage current assets where possible to gain further capability combined with the re-capitalization of the power projection forces will provide mid to long-term solutions in a constrained environment. Obviously, finding the balance between the two will be the art of policy and the crux of policy choices. But programs like “Harvest Hawk” and C-5 modernization make sense as part of the solution.

An earlier version of this piece appeared on DOD Buzz (Buying Smart When Money is Tight).

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***Posted September 17th, 2009