In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
Littoral operations for US and allied navies have largely focused on warfighting as the defining element. For a “blue water” fleet like the US Navy, the littorals are the areas passed through in shaping the battle on the air and land in confronting adversaries. The goal is to destroy enemy assets and to shape a decisive military outcome in the adversaries area of strategic control or interest.
For allied navies, littoral operations have not had the same meaning, in terms of linking those operations to deeper strike floating blue water assets. But they too have been defined by the military capabilities of the littoral fleet to defeat enemy assets operating close to their territory and to be able to defeat land-based air-breathing assets launched from their territory, which could deny allied forces ability to operate in the littorals.
No one would deny the centrality of these missions or capabilities. If either a blue-water force or a littoral force is unable to manage threats to their ability to operate, they clearly will be unable to provide credible capabilities to operate against adversaries or enemies in the littorals.
But, increasingly, the nature of 21st century operations operates in more ambiguous situations. Indeed, one could argue that decision-makers send naval forces into the littorals to control an area of tactical or strategic space, more to influence events within that space than to seek to generate military action against land forces or to start a war.
The insertion of force is generally initiated to deal with security threats and challenges within an area of tactical or strategic interest. The initial operation is generated by the need to provide for security in an unstable area, or to influence events, which could get out of hand. The initial force may be limited in character and circumscribed by very specific rules of engagement.
The task then for the littoral force is to operate in an area of variable size in the littorals for a variable period of time, but capable of enduring within the littoral space to shape events and to manage crises.
To do so, the maritime littoral forces carry with them capabilities to link to C4ISR assets, either solely organic or characterized by significant reachback to national or allied forces. Enduring littoral presence requires a significant capability for scalability. The initial littoral insertion force needs enough autonomy in terms of sustainment, defense, and C4ISR to be able to operate effectively. But if the evolution of the situation demands its over time-enhanced capabilities can be provided to the littoral force by reaching back to sea-based or land-based national or allied assets.
Certainly counter-piracy and sea-lanes of communication missions are core examples of the enduring littoral presence mission. In the wake of World War II and the Cold War, the USN has defined sea lines of communications or SLOC missions as largely blue-water missions requiring an ability to defeat blue water navies and related assets denying the ability of the US, and allied and partners to operate freely at sea.
But the reality is that in a world of significant commercial shipping, almost all of it not under US control, SLOC control begins with an ability to work with the commercial sector. It continues with an ability to work with local coast guards and law enforcement agencies. And this requires a C4ISR capability to work between military vessels and commercial and law enforcement agencies of foreign partners.
As the enduring littoral maritime presence mission becomes more effectively prioritized, naval capabilities will be re-crafted.
To take the American example, among the key elements, which the US will need to bring more effectively into, play is the following:
The initial insertion force might well be a US Coast Guard force using the new National Security Cutter or LCSs acquired as the so-called OPC (offshore patrol cutter). These assets will have organic ISR attached to their operations and be hopefully optimized by a C4ISR system which can work with the commercial and law enforcement sectors.
New USN LCS vassals able to work in joint operations with the USCG could join these assets. Or, alternatively, the USN will deploy LCS or destroyers initially and again, will need to have organic assets for C4ISR able to deal with the appropriate security threat, namely an ability to work with commercial and law enforcement sectors in shaping a response.
Whether USCG or USN assets, there is a need to link up to air-breathing and space-based assets and to reachback to land or sea-based military assets. This will be crucial to shape scalability options and hence shape a crisis management “escalation” ladder.
To work effectively, the ships, including LCS will need to link with USAF and USN and USMC aviation assets. As the F-35 and Ospreys are introduced in numbers, an ability to integrate with their C4ISR capabilities will be important in shaping enduring maritime presence capabilities.
It is in this sense that the significant role of USMC amphibious ships should be understood. Far from being relevant only when the US has a forced entry option, small “floating” force augmentation assets at sea could provide significant reachback and scalability contributions to a littoral force.
If such deployed assets do not suffice to deal with the problem, further reacback to significant USAF or USN assets would be called for. The point is that in the evolution of the most likely 21st century missions, the insertion force will be small and its mission circumscribed. The management capability which one wants to have in shaping crisis management in the littorals is reachback, connectivity, and scalability. But this is exactly the opposite of how the USN is currently postured.
Nonetheless, changes are underway which could shape such an approach.
First, the USN has signed agreements with the USMC and the US Coast Guard to have a joint operational concept.
Second, the decline of the numbers of USN assets has led the navy leadership to prioritize a new maritime strategy, which features working with other navies. Associated with the new strategy is a priority on the operation of global fleet stations at which the USN creates at sea bases able to work in deployed areas of need and opportunity.
Third, the USN and perhaps USCG will procure the LCS, which calls out for an effective operating concept.
Fourth, the USMC and USN are introducing the F-35, which is a “flying combat system” whose ability to link to other assets as a force multiplier makes it a natural candidate to work with the LCS or other littoral assets.
Fifth, the F-35 will be a global coalition asset, which allows for sharing of effective approaches generated for US forces to work with allies in joint con-ops for enduring littoral presence missions.
Sixth, the USMC is introducing the Osprey onto its ships and as such the Osprey with its speed and range could contribute force-multiplying capabilities to the initial forces inserted into littoral operations.
Seventh, the QDR review provides an opportunity to focus on the USMC amphibious ships in ways beyond repeating Inchon.
Eighth, the UAV revolution provides a significant opportunity to shape options for initial littoral forces to carry organic ISR, and provides opportunities to use longer-range UAV support, such as the N-UCAS in support of littoral missions.
Ninth, the connectivity opportunities inherent in moving beyond proprietary solutions for communication open up a significant opportunity to move the militaries into the world of connectivity to commercial and law enforcement communities operating in the littorals.
And finally, the need to re-shape military space provides opportunities as well to use commercial assets more effectively in operating with the commercial, allied, and law enforcement communities.
In short, the shift from littoral warfare to enduring littoral maritime presence can see a significant change in how maritime forces integrate with air-breathing and C4ISR asset; and in ways military forces work with the commercial, coast guard and law enforcement sectors.
The U.S. Navy can position itself as a key element for the Obama Administration as it seeks new opportunities for global cooperation. The Administration has underscored their desire “to build partnership capacity” and to “enhance enduring relationships” among core allies.
The USN has a unique global presence and works every day with international commercial, law enforcement and military partners and allies. The current chief of naval operations (CNO) and his predecessor have underscored the growing significance of the global maritime partnership; what should be made clear is that, on an even larger stage, the Navy and its global relationships can provide an important element of reshaping the US global alliances for the 21st century. It is not a question of simply adjusting to change; it is the opportunity to embrace it and to accelerate global changes necessary for the recrafting of American power for the 21st century.
As the Obama Administration shapes its polices, the USN leadership can seize a number of opportunities to remind the nation of the importance of the Navy and its global partnerships.
First, as the U.S. scales back its operations in Iraq and moves attention elsewhere, important considerations emerge of re-building the power projection and presence forces. Here the opportunity rests to provide for much better integration between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy in promoting connectivity, synergy and capability to leverage its forces. Both face significant shortfalls; working more effectively they can enhance the nations ability to project power, provide presence and work with friends and allies.
This can be done in a number of immediate ways. The joint acquisition of the Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle and joint deployments on Guam provide an opportunity to develop more effective joint ISR concepts of operations and data sharing. The joint acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter provides a further opportunity to develop a 21st century concept of air operations which draws on the strengths of the 5th generation aircraft to provide for a new approach to maritime and air integration. The integration of Aegis systems with the F-35 provides another opportunity to link the Air Force and USN into more effective littoral presence and strike missions.
According to General Charles Davis, former Program Executive Officer for the F-35 program, the “5th generation aircraft provides an ideal opportunity for the joint forces to enhance their true jointness. And with the global partnerships associated with the F-35 provides a seamless transition from a joint to a collaborative force.”
The standing up of U.S. Africa Command provides another opportunity for the USN to enhance recognition of its significance to global security missions. The rampant piracy in the waters off Somalia requires naval presence and maritime domain collaboration. Russians, Europeans, NATO, Indians, Malaysians and others have put force into the region to deal with the piracy problem. The USN can provide real leadership for a global coalition seeking to tame the piracy problem. According to a senior OSD official, “I think the USN as well as the USAF are really the core elements for AFRICOM’s future operations.” And as former Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne noted in a major address in Paris in 2008, “The distances in Africa require the use of air power, and air and naval collaboration will be an important anchor for AFRICOM.”
Among the most important international programs for the USN in the 21st century are Aegis and F-35. Efforts to enhance their integration are a natural path to enhance U.S. global coalitions. Many Aegis partners are current or prospective F-35 participants; finding ways to link the two will be an important enhancer for partners. For example, given Norwegian concerns about Northern European energy security, including the Arctic, there is interest in enhanced Link 16 connectivity between Aegis systems and the F-35.
To the extent to which allies work integration of F-35 with Aegis, they create extended “littoral bubbles” into which the USN and USAF can plug their systems to, in turn, extend the capabilities of the allied “littoral bubbles.” As a senior Japanese official noted in a conversation with sldinfo.com, “By linking Aegis with our air systems, we can extend our perimeter security. And if we can extend our ISR reach we can better work with the stretched US Pacific fleet.”
USMC Harrier Training off of British Warship
The Navy’s most visible asset is the aircraft carrier, and the time is ripe to provide new concepts of operations to enhance this most complex – and expensive – of weapons systems to become an anchor for global security. By working closely with other U.S. air elements and promoting an increased capability to work with allies, the carrier should become more a part of a global security solution not necessarily keyed to blue-water operations. The introduction of several significant assets, including the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, UAVs, UCASs and the F-35, provide a unique opportunity to modify and enhance the role of carrier-based aviation.
As General Davis has argued, “What becomes important is to understand how our new systems are working much more effectively with regard to interoperability and leveraging one another. We need for focus on the emergence of battle management networks encompassing carriers, F/A-18s, Hawkeyes, UAVs, F-35s and Marines on the beach.” With these systems able to work interoperability with other air and strike elements, broader recognition of the value of the continued carrier efforts might be generated.
The U.S. Marine Corps, by its expeditionary nature, is a key focal point for the integration of air, ground and maritime forces into the joint force structure. The air components enable strike and C4ISR capabilities to facilitate rapid advance against adversaries on the battlefield or to operate in a distributed manner to change the very character of the battlefield or of military operations. Air also is an enabler for operations from the seabase, which figures prominently in USMC and USN thinking for the years ahead (and is discussed elsewhere on this website).
Lieutenant General George Trautman, Deputy Commandant for Aviation of the Marine Corps has underscored the central role of the new air platforms in further enabling the USMC to play a synergy function. “As we transition from current operations, our new platforms simply extend our capabilities to play an integrated role. Our new systems – Osprey and F-35 – will play a forcing function, which allows adapting our Marine Air-Ground Task Force con-ops. And these con-ops are, we believe, central to 21st century military operations.”
The new air platforms fit into the overall air-to-ground approach taken by the USMC. The MV-22 Osprey will provide unique capabilities and allow the “ground” forces to engage in envelopment operations that Napoleon could only have dreamed about. As a further demonstration of the expanding capabilities brought by the Osprey, the Marines have flowen their Ospreys off British warships (photos posted elsewhere on this website). The F-35B in the hands of the Marine Corps will be a “first generation flying combat system” which will enable air-ground communication and ISR exchanges unprecedented in military history. The pilot will be a full member of the ground team; the ground commanders will have ears and eyes able to operate in a wide swath of three-dimensional space.
Shaping a bipartisan consensus in the United States to allow the Navy and its sister maritime partnership agencies to work on a global basis will be increasingly important as the United States faces challenges in the global production system. Just-in-time and just-enough manufacturing systems and the provision of commodities for the functioning of the U.S. economy depend in large part in the unfettered and efficient movement of goods at sea. Crafting greater understanding of the need for defense and security capabilities working with allies and partners to provide for that free movement of goods and commodities is essential. In this regard, the tri-service maritime strategy recognizes that globalization increases the need to prevent strategic disruption from environmental disasters, piracy, terrorism or competitors seeking advantages from the inherent vulnerabilities of the global “conveyer belt” of maritime trade.
The world may be “flat” because of globalization, but we may want not to be “flattened” by globalization. Virtually all globalization models ignore the defense and security element. Without security for air, ground and maritime transit, there is no globalization. And, without secure cyberspace, there is no effective transfer of information and data in the World Wide Web. There simply is no guarantee of freedom of commerce, information, currency and security of persons, data and goods and services. The new approach to a global maritime partnership is, in part, an effort to provide for such a security guarantee.
There is a clear need to enhance the Navy’s role as well in maritime security. This combines well with an expanded enduring littoral mission for the USN. As the USN adds Littoral Combat Ships and enhances its ability to work with commercial partners and global navies, the service can expand as well its ability to operate on an ongoing basis in the world’s littorals. Being able to contribute to anti-piracy efforts, protection of commercial shipping against terrorist threats, expanding the capability to manage and to participate in global ISR networks designed to share data for crisis management, all of these activities, in turn, allows the USN to expand the legitimacy of and its actual role in littoral operations. By so doing, development of the LCS in operating with the world’s coast guards also will become a central task.
In short, with the advent of the Obama Administration, there are opportunities to re-focus, innovate and move forward in enhancing joint and coalition capabilities. It is imperative to leverage the advent of new technologies and systems, which allow the US and its allies to craft a more effective global security enterprise.
The USMC has been wargaming its approach to logistics as it seeks to improve its expeditionary capability. For the USMC, shaping an effective approach to expeditionary logistics is seen as central to core capabilities. During one such exercise, Mobile Provider 08, which was held at Camp Johnson, near Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, the USMC shared its findings with regard to the ongoing challenges and approaches to shaping expeditionary logistics. The game will become an annual event to test conceptual development against operational experience to the benefit of both. Indeed, the USMC is completing the 2009 game in September and SLDinfo.com will report on the results of this game when those results become available. As one participant characterized the wargamet: “It is historic to have this level of participation from core elements of the logistics command element of the Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).”
MP 08 was a five-day, operational-level, two-sided wargame that involved simulation and the use of LogMod bridging technologies (discussed in the companion piece on LogMod) for command and control (C2) and execution of Logistics Chain Management (LCM) functions. In the words of the organizers, “MP 08 is to examine innovative operational, and technological approaches to expeditionary logistics support to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in maneuver, with particular emphasis on the role and impact of field-level supply, maintenance, and distribution.” According to one of the organizers of the event, “The aviation command element has their core level planning event; the ground combat element has its core level training exercise; this war game is equivalent for the logistics command element of the MAGTF.”
Representatives from the first, second and third Marine Expeditionary Force (MEFs), the logistics integration division, USMC systems command, USMC logistics command, USMC special operations command as well as from USMC aviation and ground elements were involved in the war game.
The more than 90 participants were broken down into four cells representing units and/or staffs within:
MEF Command Element, Marine Air Wing (MAW) and Supporting Establishment;
Marine Logistics Group (MLG) and General Support Combat Logistics Regiment (GS CLR);
Direct Support (DS) CLR and Regimental Combat Team (RCT) as the primary maneuver unit within the Ground Combat Element (GCE); and
DS Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB).
The setting was also significant. Last year’s event was staged at Quantico. The gamet was played in the new USMC Tactical Decision Center (TDC). The TDC was established in the summer of 2007 in order to train students and operating force Marines in a wide spectrum of simulated command post exercises. The TDC orientation book identifies the focus of the TDC as follows:
Development of the TDC was based upon a concept that leverages recently demonstrated successes of the Logistics Common Operating Picture (LCOP) process in OIF, as well as, the core requirements for establishing a CLOC in any LCE organization. The TDC operates using currently recognized “bridge systems”, as specified by MARADMIN 444/05, until GCSS-MC is fielded. These systems include Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), Warehouse to Warfighter (W2W), Transportation Capacity Planning Tool (TCPT), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracker (FBCB2/BFT), and Common Logistics Command and Control System (CLC2S). Additionally, students will have access to other current systems and databases, such as the, Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS), Marine Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT), and Logistics Automated Information System 7.1 (LOG AIS 7.1). The TDC will also allow students to execute RFID procedures as performed in the Combat Logistics Area (CLA) and will utilize a convoy operations simulation system to allow students to simulate convoy operations simultaneously with CLOC operations. The TDC is also capable of functioning as a higher headquarters CLOC in support of Field Training Exercises (FTX), such as the Logistics Officer (LOC) FEX. All of these operations, performed together, will provide students with a realistic and challenging environment for learning.
The game had five major objectives:
C2 relationships and actions required to conduct expeditionary logistics operations, specifically exploring the interaction between C2 and logistics chain management (LCM);
Determine MAGTF in the maneuver impact on ground supply chain and maintenance operations;
Affirm alignment of field maintenance capability functions among organic units in the maneuver;
Evaluate expeditionary LCM concepts, specifically, to delineate field-level logistics roles, responsibilities, and capabilities;
Exercise responsiveness of MAGTF distribution in the maneuver.
USMC Log 'Bridge' Technology Solutions
The exercise relied on using several of the USMC bridging technologies being introduced prior to full-scale introduction of the fully modernized approach. The major bridging technologies are the Battle Command Sustainment and Support System, the Transportation Capability Planning Tool and the Common Logistics Command and Control System. These tools were used to try to more effectively connect the expeditionary forces with their supply and logistics systems.
The USMC is focusing in the modernization effort, not on a land operation like Iraq, but on expeditionary operations. As one Marine put it, “You can build a Wall Mart in Iraq to supply troops. In the field, you live or die by timely supply with no Wall Mart Credit Card in hand to solve the problem.”
At the center of the conceptual rethink is developing pull logistics, rather than just-in-time logistics. The Marines simply do not believe that just-in-time logistics works, and push logistics is simply inefficient. The forces need to pre-position support packages which can be used by the deploying forces. The goal is to shape predictive support packages for the most likely maintenance events. Obviously, there can never be 100% predictive behavior but the goal is to determine what can be predicted so that supply lines and communication capabilities are more effectively utilized.
The game drew upon three key supporting concepts. The first was inventory positioning. “Inventory Positioning (IP) is focused on positioning maintenance support capabilities based on readiness based sparing and virtual kitting at critical nodes on the battlefield.” The second was the use of Tactical Maintenance Time Windows (TMTW). “TMTW identifies the tactical maintenance time (TMT) available under expeditionary maneuver conditions at the supported unit….” The final element was Maintenance Event Management (MEM). “MEM is the process of managing deadlining maintenance event frequency. Maintenance event code is identified for a repair action, e.g., brake repair. The (event) is associated to: a bill of materials for parts, i.e. VK; tools needed for the repair; level of maintenance expertise; number of mechanics needed; echelon of repair/level of maintenance; level of repair facility/ evacuation criteria and; number of hours needed to complete the repair. Tracking maintenance event failure rates by frequency and battlefield occurrence will provide more efficient maintenance capability planning and IP.
By enhancing pre-supply of predictive elements, the forces can maximize their ability to use communications and command elements to focus on supplying critical supplies. The USMC is keenly aware of the limits on bandwidth available to the expeditionary warrior and seeks to craft an approach, which is realistic in terms of bandwidth and effective in reach to the expeditionary forces.
The goal of this effort is to focus on shaping capability, not moving bits around the table of a logistics board. As the USCM analysts put it: “In terms of maintenance, the only parts or group of parts that matter to the MAGTF Commander are the ones that provide him a capability.”
The USMC conceptual approach refers to the predictive events as “virtual kitting.” And the task is then to management the “virtual kits” to improve pull logistics and an ability to pre-supply for the most frequently recurring events. The objective is to push capabilities, not parts. And the challenge is to overcome the classic approach to logistics, which is a pull approach with its inherent limitations and dysfuntionalities.
Pushing Capabilities Not PartsIndependent vs. Dependent DemandMaintenance Event Management Through Virtual KittingI MEF HMMWV Maintenance Events
Instead of simply having depot based supplies or believing in the mythology of just- in-time logistics, the USMC is seeking to develop a middle way. By basing their efforts on assessments of past logistics behavior and by building models of that behavior, planning can focus on putting replacement assets forward to the extent predictable from past behavior. The other advantage of this approach according the Marines is that you have greater slack in the system to deal with unpredictable events, many of which could prove critical to success of deploying expeditionary forces. The goal is to enhance the capacity to surge to unexpected events whilst maximizing predictable support events. Events are defined simply as frequently occurring situations which are defined in terms of packages of parts and equipment, rather simply single piece inventory assessments. The more success you have with this system, the more one can identify anomalies and determine to what extent these are predicable as well.
The basic approach rests on crafting a “Virtual Kitting” approach which is defined as:
A group of National Stock Numbered (NSN)’s (parts) associated to a particular Preventive Maintenance (PM) or Corrective Maintenance (CM) event;
NSN’s are managed and delivered collectively as a “kit” but are not boxed together;
The “virtual kit” stockage level is forecasted however the stockage levels for the associated NSN’s are calculated as dependent demands.
The USMC analysts then describe the resulting management task for “virtual kitting” as follows:
“Viirtual Kits” will be loaded to the Supported Activities Supply System Management Unit (SMU) General Account General Account Balance File (GABF);
“Virtual kits” will be locally assigned and tracked via requirement code on the GABF;
The NSNs associated with each kit will be compared to current asset posture daily to ensure that every NSN for every kit is available for immediate issue.
The goal of the “virtual kitting” effort is to decrease independent demand and to increase dependent demand.
An example cited in briefings during the wargame was that of providing for supplies for a HUMVEE. By tracking a 60 day cycle of maintenance, the most likely events were identified needs support. Then the repair tasks could be conceptualized as maintenance events, and parts clustered and pushed forward to support the predictable problems likely to happen tasking the supply chain.
During the game three key themes were especially predominant. These themes, in turn, will provide important inputs into the further evolution of the USMC LogMod effort.
The first key theme was on the C2 dimension. The effectiveness of an integrated logistics chain in the maneuver was viewed as highly dependent upon practice C2. “The war game emphasized that an integrated logistics chain provided the ability for the CLB to have visibility into the readiness posture of the RCT allowed for validation of CSS requests from the supported unit and enhanced push logistics when applicable. ”
The second theme or conclusion which emerged was that maintenance-event based planning enables more effective logistics execution. “Inventory positioning was identified as contributing to reduce repair cycle times; however, the concept requires validation. A recommendation was made to conduct a modeling and simulation study to validate the concept and accurately assess its potential for future implementation.”
The third key thematic was the role of distribution as the lynchpin of the integration of supply and maintenance. “Distribution was the most often discussed issue during MP 08 as it was identified as a critical enabler of ground supply chain and maintenance operations for a MAGTF in the maneuver. The war game validated the placement, roles and responsibilities of distribution elements outlined in MDDP, particularly the placement of the DLC’s within the CLB. Additionally, the war game evaluated the use of RFID at maintenance collection points and for reverse logistics support of damaged equipment and secondary reparables (SECREP). Issues regarding command relationships between movement agencies did arise during the war game, such as the relationship between the MMDC and the DLCs. It was recommended that MAGTF Distribution Doctrine be developed to support MAGTF Deployment and Distribution Policy to implement to formalize Marine Corps distribution doctrine.”
In short, the organizers of the event were very pleased with the level and quality of participation in the war game. Indeed, discussions with participants indicated significant buy-in to the new approach but continued concerns with effectively implementing “push” logistics. While no one doubted the advantage of the approach, there was much discussion of how extensively this could be done and how effectively. According to one of the organizers, it is hoped that they can bring the advanced logistics operational course graduates into future games. This would allow for a better dialogue between planners and executors.
An earlier version of this article appeared in Military Logistics International in the summer of 2008.
The USMC’s Log MOD-2007-2 War Game was held in Quantico in September 2007. The game was held over five days. Whereas the first game (October 2006) focused on participating in shaping the reform approach, this war game was dedicated to kicking the tires and test driving the concepts. Eighty-five professionals participated in the Wargame, most with significant recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The first game helped develop the reform approach. The second game confronted the approach with a range of real world problems and identified core challenges, which the approach will have to overcome to become viable.
The game was a remarkable effort to sort out the tensions in transitioning to a more effective approach to battlefield logistics support. Three core themes came up throughout the games. The first was the tension between the approaches which embedded logistics support on the battlefield and the nascent IT systems which can empower such an approach. The second is the tension between the current operations in Iraq, which are in place logistics for a “second land army,” and the real requirements for the USMC of expeditionary logistics for an engaged distributed force. The third is the tension between lessons learned from past operations and the needs for a sea-based force which the USMC sees as core to its expeditionary future. What logistics reforms fit the future, rather than the past? What realistic capabilities will be deployed with regard to IT? And how much trust can be put in the new system so that hoarding and stockpiling can be overcome as legacy logistics realities?
Simulation: a relatively new tool for USMC logisticians
War gaming and simulation are relatively new tools being used by the United States Marine Corps as a whole. According to U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Donald Bohanner, the command has been working on their development since 1995 – when the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) was actually established -, but “the push for Marine Corps simulations occurred in 2001 with a research project initiated by the technology division at Training and Education Command to investigate technologies to create a Deployable Virtual Training Environment for Marines”[1]. The advantages over – or in complement to – live-fire training are financial, but can be measured in terms of time-saving, risks and preparedness. The Marine Corps Wargaming Division, based in Quantico, is in charge of the program and part of the MCWL.
Wargaming Division Organization
Game One, Present at the Creation
From October 30th to November 3rd 2006 USMC logistics professionals gathered for the first time to participate in the inaugural Log Mod war game. The main objective of the 2006 game was to first “define the roles, responsibilities and relationships of the various Logistics Operations Center (LOC) staffs” and “to generate a draft policy and doctrine”[2]. With the transformation of the traditional Force Service Support Group (FSSG) into the Marine Logistics Group (MLG)[3], LogMod has been seeking- and War Gaming has been one of the tools allowing to do so – “to establish habitual relationships and a single point of entry for requests between the supported and supporting commands within the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force ] to ensure tactical logistics functions are executed and fulfilled effectively”[4].
Initiated right after the reorganization of the MLG, the first game was aimed at examining the LOG C2 (logistics command and control) in order to define the missions of the various structures just created. It was to assess the responsibilities and resources necessary to implement the overall vision of what was referred to by a participant in this year’s war game as a “holistic approach to logistics”. The difficulty has been to shift from a decades-old vertical chain of command to a structure in which all the traditional functional directions – maintenance, transportation, supply, engineering, C2, medical/dental – are integrated within each CLB (Combat Logistics Battalion), which requires a complete overhaul at the regiment level. In the words of one of the officers in charge of Log Mod 2007-2, Major Vincent Applewhite, “the CLB structure was adopted to maintain a permanent logistics C2 structure built around a core transportation capability. The CLB maintains a habitual support relationship with an Infantry Regiment. Based on this standing structure, CLB, it can be rapidly “tasked organized” to meet mission requirements. The core CLB is approximately 330 Marines and may be augmented up to 800+”[5].
From the Force Service Support Group…
LCE Realignment FSSG to MLG
… To the Marine Logistics Group[6]
Marine Logistics Group
Game Two: Playing Out and Evaluating the Approach
The second war game, which occurred mid-September 2007, was also done in Quantico and implemented by the MCWL. There was broad participation by representatives of the Marine Corps (such as Marine Aviation), as well as of other services and agencies (such as GSA – General Services Administration – and Marine Corps Installations) and outside contractors supporting the program administratively (i.e. Booz Allen and Hamilton, CTC and EG&G).
Log Mod 2007-2 continued the process started during the first Log Mod game (described by a participant as a “wish list for officers”). The goal as described by one of the organizer, Mike Resnick, was to “make the changes across the Corps”, while fine-tuning the process down to the RCT (Regiment Combat Team) level in order to better provide support to the infantry[7].
According to the organizers:
“The purpose of Log Mod 07-2 is to examine logistics support request procedures and the roles, functions, and activities of the Logistics Combat Element and the supporting establishment while supporting a Ground Combat Element conducting maneuver in the MEF battlespace. Log Mod 07-2 will examine the feasibility and practicality of changes in capabilities, staffing, process and technology as recommended by: the Field Maintenance Capability Alignment (FMCA) workshops, MARCORLOGCOM SECREP management concept of operations, Realignment of Supply Spiral I process action teams, and the MAGTF Distribution Conference and policy.”[8]
Log Mod 2007 was designed to test a number of core reform initiativesin terms of their impact on the “affected units”. The players used the same matrix during the various game moves, and formed the basis of reaching conclusions about the challenges of implementing the reform.
Testing four key aspects of the Log Mod process
The game tested four key elements of the matrix in terms of the challenges facing the reform process. The first was the challenge of realigning the supply chain. The second was the realignment of maintenance and where maintenance would be best performed. The third was a key aspect of the realignment of supply, namely secondary repairs. There was especially spirited discussion on this point during the game. The final challenge was the logistics distribution throughout the MAGTF, or where optimally to organize the distribution network in terms of responsibilities.
Source: Mike Resnick, Logistics Modernization Initiative Update, September 2007.
RoS (Realignment of Supply) Spiral I
Ros Spiral I is the first phase of the Realignment of Supply initiative and the first listed initiative on the matrix. The responsibility for order management is transferred from the supported unit to the supporting unit, while one supporting unit per MAGTF is to be in charge of both inventory and procurement. One focus of the game was to assess the feasibility of such a shift in responsibilities, as well as assessing the necessary resources to make it effective. Four “capabilities” were explored: inventory positioning; removal of order management functions from supported units; centralization of order fulfillment and capacity management (inventory, procurement) responsibilities in one supporting unit for each MAGTF; migration of inventory management and inventory warehousing functions for some classes of supplies.
RoM (Realignment of Maintenance)/FMCA (Field Maintenance Capability Alignment)
A key aspect of the new MCMP (Marine Corps Maintenance Policy) is the reduction from traditional five echelons of maintenance (EOM) three levels of maintenance (LOM): operator/crew, field and sustainment.
Source: Mike Resnick, Logistics…, ibid.
The players of the game assessed the impact of the RoM Field Maintenance Capability Alignment (FMCA) regarding the migration of the ground SECREP (Secondary Reparable) repair capability from the supported unit to the supporting unit or LCE (Logistics Combat Eleent).[9] Seven capacities were addressed in the matrix: migration of the capability for repair of ground common comm/elecSECREPs (line replaceable units) from the supported unit to the LCE; shared responsibilities for engineer Field LOM tasks between the LCE and and ground combat element (GCE), specifically component repair, evacuation and end item recovery/evacuation missions; realignment of all field LOM support repair tasks for AAV, LAV (light armored vehicles) and tank-unique systems within the GCE units; migration of all Field LOM component and parts replacement tasks for artillery equipment to GCE units; shared responsibilities for component repair, evacuation and end item recovery/evacuation missions between the LCE and GCE units; migration of selected maintenance support tasks such as annual small arms gauging tasks, replacement of small arms barrels and replacement of optics components and parts from the LCE to the organic unit; alignment of electro/optical repair special tools for Field LOM units with only 2nd EOM kits.
RoM / MARCORLOGMOD SecRep (Secondary Reparable) Management
SECREP is a process improvement effort under the RoM (realignment of supply) initiative and has been another central concept of operation around which the war game was designed. Here too the idea is to provide a single point of contact to integrate and improve the process of management of secondary reparables, as well as improving tracking and visibility of the assets. Four capacities were in this case examined carefully, as detailed in the matrix: implementation of recommended LOGCOM Concept of Support for SECREP management; MCLC (Marine Corps Logistics Command) ability to coordinate and track SECREP asset postures to support cross-leveling opportunities across the Marine Corps; MCLC ability to coordinate and track configuration of SECREP assets repaired within the MAGTF and rebuilt at Sustainment level maintenance activities; MCLC ability to coordinate and track evacuation of SECREPs from forward deployed locations.
SecRep Diagram 07
MAGTF DISTRO
With the MAGTF Distribution concept, a single distribution officer becomes the single point of contact to coordinate the whole distribution process, while having the authority to “task transportation assets throughout the MAGTF as the overall Distribution Capacity Manager”[10]. In this case, four capacities were also examined by the game: establish a distribution officer as the single point of contact to integrate, coordinate, and supervise distribution processes; MDDOC (MAGTF Deployment and Distribution Operations Center) authorized to oversee and task transportation assets across the MAGTF as the overall Distribution Capacity Manager (DCM); Configuration of the MDDOC and MMDC (MAGTF Materiel Distribution Center) tables of organization and equipment per the MDDP; MMDC conducts throughput operations.
Source: Mike Resnick, Logistics…, ibid
A seminar-style War Game
The LogMod 07-2 War Game Operations Order describes the conduct of the simulation as a “seminar-style War Game based on a single Marine Logistics Group (MLG) scenario designed to examine logistics support request procedures (…)”[11], as opposed to a “box game”. The game was to evaluate the “procedures, roles and functions rather than the players’ performance”. The players communicated via email (Email CPX game) and kept track of all their exchanges for further analysis at the end of each day (outbriefs).
The game was divided into five moves and based on a scenario called “Barbary Sword”: the goal of the operation was to free an allied country from a foreign invasion; in twelve days, the shift was from “MEF in the defense to MEF in the offense”, and included a sea-based logistics exercise. Stage 1 was “Assembly”; Stage 2 was “Movement to Attack Positions”; Stage 3 was “Defeat 1st Echelon”; Stage 4 was “Defeat 2nd Echelon”; and Stage 5 was “Restore the International Boundary”[12]. The players – divided in four cells – were to review the impact of each move on the major aspects of each initiative and draw conclusions about the feasibility of the reform at the end of the five day-war game. To do so, each organization (and for the final questionnaire, each single player) had in particular to answer the following question: “What were the impacts of the Log Mod Concepts on your organization’s ability to execute your mission in this move?” During each move, the players had to respond to new developments and deal with bottlenecks, or what was referred to as MESLs, for Master Scenario Events List. Overall, the game included seventy MSELs.
Who’s got the mission? Who’s got the asset?
Concretely, some of the questions raised and addressed during the game were:
Where will maintenance be performed on the battlefield?
Where will inventory be positioned on the battlefield?
Where will distribution be performed on the battlefield?
Where will MAGTF go for transportation?[13]
How does each segment affect each other? How would they be best integrated? How to bring resources to the theater in the most efficient way? Is more maintenance needed? More equipment? More personnel? More capacity to support it? Who can fix the fastest? How to act quickly? What are the consequences? All these challengeswere raised very early in the game to make sure that potential gaps in the policies being drafted were to be addressed[14].
The war game allowed to assess the pros and cons of each Log Mod initiative and generated multiple debates and recommendations to address some the issues at stake. Here is an attempt to sum up some of the conclusions made at the end of these five days of discussions for each initiative.
RoM/FMCA
In the case of maintenance – which used to take place at the rear -, the question posed during these five days of simulation was to find out at which level it would be best performed. New recommendations were integrated in this war game and one of the conclusions was that “maintenance can be embedded at the CLB level”.
RoS: centralized order management
The same question was posed as far as supply was concerned: should inventories be spread across the battlefield or is it better to have an “avenue to go back to”. In this case, the IT enablers allowing the process were not yet fully available. The trend is to “move away from stockpiling to positioning.” To do so will require decentralization in order management across the board with centralization at the CLB level and in the execution of the orders. Among the conclusions made the last day, the risk of the CLB becoming a bottleneck was stressed. The physical burden of warehousing and the loss of flexibility it implies was highlighted.
A recommendation made by one of the cells was that the MLG should be the center of excellence for centralized order management. However, Log Mod demonstrated the feasibility of reducing the RCT log footprint, as well as eliminating double orders at the RCT level.
MAGTF Distro
Log Mod War Game 07-2 was also an opportunity to examine the distribution pipelines and to determine better ways to perform this function. The goal is to bring “just the right stuff”, but no more, so the force remains “light, lean and fast”. From this point of view, the Marines have an advantage over the Army in the sense that they never were able to carry a lot with them (just because they would often be sea-based) and the sense among the officials in charge of the War Game was that “if the Marines cannot do that, nobody does”. One of the major changes – besides, and parallel to, the integration of various services within the MAGTF – is the existence of liaison officers embedded in units and able to go back and forth the pipeline. This is a major advantage in getting rid of the “iron mountain” mentality. At the end of the war game, there was a consensus that the MAGTF Distro process did succeed in adapting to a decentralized battlefield and in increasing asset visibility, but that the augmentation in requirements was not matched by an augmentation in personnel. A recommendation was made about the potential use of reserve forces.
SecRep Management
The new SecRep management process was perceived by participants as improving the accountability factor, but that there was an increase in cost and footprint, as well as increased demand. This could however be solved, according to a participant, via a more tailored approach of SecRep allowances. The need for standardization was also stressed. The shift in the control of assets was discussed in terms of pros and cons: the advantages were that there was a “continuity of Ops when the MEF was deployed” and that it provided a “stable training platform for Active duty personnel”; on the other hand, the MEF was losing control of assets, budget and process[15].
Another question raised during some of the final outbriefs was the ability to test a piece of equipment just fixed at the battalion level. The answer was that more than often it is fixed without having to be tested (either it starts again right again or it does not), but that testing can be performed as long as the battalion is not on the move. One of the participants recast this question as follows: would it make sense to develop new equipment which would precisely allow a repair done on the move?
The Key Challenges to Be Addressed
Improving asset visibility
A recurrent theme during the five days of war gaming in Quantico was summed up by one of the participants with these two very simple core-questions: “Who’s got the mission? Who’s got the asset?” The most frequent complaint has been to first clarify who was doing what (especially in terms of prioritization of assets), and secondly how reliable the new process was. Indeed, the questions of trust and accountability are at the very basis of the success of logistics reform as a whole. Past experiences have often been rooted in the fact that whoever owned some assets would tend to hold on to them by fear of not being properly supplied on time. An interesting discussion took place during one of the outbrief sessions about whether or not to institutionalize a practice developed in Iraq, which has been consisting in carrying a small percentage of equipment in excess capacity (about 5%; 10% in the case of trucks). The balance between autonomy (with the extra-weight involved) and trust in the system is obviously a difficult one to achieve and one the Marines have been struggling with. In the case of this exercise and according to one of the players, “based upon lessons learned during OIF, forward in-store capacity was included during the planning stages of the operation to provide a ready source of combat replacement equipment”. This concept of “forward in-store capacity” is resembles mobile pre-positioning and is intended to facilitate force replenishment.
The problem lies however in the fact that it is not so maneuverable (back to the footprint issue) and therefore needs to be calibrated in regard with future sustainment requirements. That is indeed the main change compared to the past, when pre-positioned logistics were in place. Another question raised was the fact that “ if lots of people were to carry SecReps, how do you get then back to be fixed and then sent back?” The current situation is that the repair tends to be done on the battlefield and the advantage of a small excess ad hoc capacity is precisely to be able “to fix on-site as opposed to fill out the pipe of supply”. The consensus is that it is better to repair as opposed to replace, especially given the problem of transportation likely to occur in wartime (e.g. “no truck to be found in Bagdad”). However, if this may be true for trucks and tanks, the “center for excellence to fix SecRep” is not necessarily at the battalion level. This raises issues not only in terms of transportation, but also as far as how much staff one needs at each level and what kind of qualifications are required.
Adapting training
Marines now involved in expeditionary warfare need to be more flexible, more autonomous and more qualified. The Marines have an advantage over other services as its training traditionally has been less specialized and strived to maintain the same level of quality across the board. As Major Applewhite pointed out, “the Marine Corps’ policy of “quality spread” to assign officers across all occupational fields thus ensuring and equal distribution of high caliber officers in the MAGTF’s Aviation, Ground, and Logistics Combat Elements. Moreover, all Marine Officers are MAGTF Officers trained to understand all elements of the MAGTF, including their employment and support requirements. The resulting synergy combined with our expeditionary culture produces Marine Officers capable excelling across the full logistics spectrum.”
But for the logistics community, the current modernization pushes the process even further (as one participant put it: “training is cross-leveled across the enterprise”). The purpose of the Log Mod 2007-2 was precisely to identify which additional skills would be necessary to achieve better results, especially at the regiment level, while assessing “the complexities associated with task organized logistics in direct support of Regimental and Battalion sized maneuver forces and challenge of developing and maintaining the logistics skill sets needed to manage and lead those logistics organizations”[16]. The need to “re-train in a deployed environment” was stressed: one of the major difficulties encountered is indeed for the logisticians to adapt “on the fly” to mission-oriented assignments, hence training needs to emphasize flexibility and responsiveness. One participant noted that the good news was that the “training was actually rather easy as long as one can do it at the unit level”.
Staying focused on Expeditionary warfare
Dealing with conflicting requirements
One of the major challenges for the US Marine Corps is to remain focused on its primary mission, i.e. expeditionary warfare as the war in Iraq has been pulling it in the exact opposite direction. The Marine footprint in Iraq has been much heavier and longer-term than initially planned. The risks of drifting towards a “second land army” posture has been stressed by the USMC Commandant himself who recently proposed to deploy the USMC as the lead US force in Afghanistan, leaving Iraq to the Army as the lead force.. The USMC leadership is deeply concerned with losing their expeditionary focus. This is true in terms of training (neglecting some aspects such as sea-based operations for instance), equipment and logistics structure and organization. What appeared clearly during this war game is that the dilemma for the logistician is to constantly base his/her decision on a “balance between the best solution and the better one”[17].
Operating in an increasingly joint environment: “keeping the MAGTF prospective”
More integration, more jointnessare required in the new battlefield environment. This war game demonstrated this at at least three levels:
Within the MAGTF between the RCTs and the CLBs, the relationships worked well, but the connections with the logisticians in charge of repair needed to be developed further;
Within the MAGTF between the ground and the aviation: as BGeneralReist pointed out, MAGTFDistro solved many problems, because the Navy and the USMC work together. This war game was including Aviation and the good news is that the procedures such as SecRep were done in a very similar way and very efficiently. This was considered an extra step achieved towards better MAGTF integration;
Within the MAGTF between the operational and the logisticians: one of the conclusions made the last day was indeed the fact that more discussion was needed “between the MEF and the Log Mod folks”.
Bridging technological gaps or transitions
A key challenge facing logistics reform is the disjunction between new approaches and shifts of authority and the fielding of the IT technology, which empowers the transition. The whole concept underlying Log Mod relies on a new C2 architecture (which should be available within a two-year framework): “Technological enhancement, spearheaded by the Global Combat Support System Marine Corps that provides a single program and point of entry to access critical logistics data, will have the most impact on logistics modernization initiatives. Combined with state-of-the-art command and control systems with increased bandwith, Marines across the battlefield will benefit from real-time logistics status updates”[18].
During the game, the participants engaged in observing an exercise off site where the new Oracle system was being tested. Reactions were solicited from the game participants concerning what they saw and would like to see in the IT reform effort, notably with regard to metrics.
Conclusion: The War Game and the Challenge of Reform
If many Marines concluded that they were not “ready for prime time yet”, Log Mod 2007-2 did help however to identify the potential gaps in the system and “choke points in the Log Order of Battle”, which means that, from this point of view, the goal of the exercise had been attained.
One of the primary advantages of logistics War Gaming has been, from the point of view of many of the players involved, to bring together a large group of logistics professionals, who never had a chance till last year to meet in person and work directly together. Some institutional walls are hence starting to vanish, as the structures are being collapsed into more functional entities. Indeed, in his introductory remarks, the officer in charge of the event, Brigadier General David G. Reist, strongly emphasized the importance of teamwork and how such an exercise contributed to do so by bringing multiple perspectives to the table: “We are all looking at the same Rubik’s cube: we are just looking at different sides of it.”
War Gaming is also the only process allowing to put together not only the elements of the restructuring of the Marine logistic community (and maybe in the future, of the logistic community as a whole, i.e. Army included), but also the lessons learned from the current operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The level of combat experience among participants was indeed quite impressive and brought a sense of urgency in the way issues were addressed and solutions proposed. One of the recommendations made at the end of the exercise was to go even further next time by maybe increasing the links with the operational side and by moving from a seminar-style game to a “game with screen”[19].
If for some of the participants, the overall conceptual picture is still in flux, LogMod 2007-2 was unanimously acknowledged as a step in the right direction and helped identify the difficulties and challenges ahead. By bringing a large group of Marine’s together with recent combat experience, the right focus was evident throughout the game: “where do we bring Log Mod to support the needs on the battlefield?”
An earlier version of this article was published in Military Logistics International (November/December 2007) and written by Murielle Delaporte and Robbin Laird.
[1] The Marines Corps has been using as a result games such as Virtual Battlefield System One and Close Combat for training purpose. See: U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Donald Bohanner, “Simulations Prepare Marine Corps for War”, Department of Defense Transformation, 2 December 2004.
[3] An MLG is typically composed of 8,000 Marines and includes – “for support in Garrison or deployed” – 116 Refuelers, 300 Medium Lift Vehicles (MTVRs), 28 Rough Terrain Cargo Handlers, 120 Fork Lifts, 60 Mobile Cranes, 75 Maintenance shelters, 34 Bull dozers, 40 Road Graders, 80 Dump Trucks, and 82 ROWPU. (Source: Marine Logistics Group (MLG) Reorganization, briefing slides, Logistics Modernization.)
[4] LtCol. Manning, Deputy Director, LogMod Transition Task Force, as quoted in: First LogMod…, ibid, p.1.
[5] Major Vincent Applewhite functioned as the Deputy Director/Controller of the game. He is also the representative of the game sponsor (i.e. DC, I&L (LP).
[6] Marine Logistics Group (MLG) Reorganization,ibid.
[7] Interview with Mike Resnick and Major Vince Applewhite, Quantico, September 19th, 2007.
[8] Logistics Modernization Initiative War game 2007-2 (LOG MOD 07-2) Information Paper, USMC, June 2007.
[9] Realignment of Maintenance (ROM)/Field Maintenance Capability Alignment (FMCA), USMC, game “read ahead”.
[10] Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Distribution, USMC, game “read ahead”.
[11] Logistics Modernization 2007-2 War Game Operations Order, game “read ahead”, 7 September 2007.
[12] LogMod War Game O7-2, Executive Outbrief, 20 september 2007.
[13] Marine Logistics Group (MLG) Reorganization, ibid.
[14] Interview with Major Applewhite and Mike Resnick, ibid.
[15] SECREP Management, Cell A brief, September 2007.
[19] War Game Outbriefs, USMC, Septembre 21st, 2007: “Cell A” concluded in its LogMod Initiative assessment that there is a “Need to utilize tools available to conduct wargaming (SIM centers; CLC2S, BCS3)”.
The United States Coast Guard and Navy are pursuing the creation of a national fleet to craft a common approach and develop interoperable capabilities to provide for maritime security. If this were to become a reality, what would be required and what would be entailed to make it work?
The crafting of the national fleet is not a static concept, nor just building and maintaining hardware and software. Rather, it is a dynamic process of creating capabilities and capacities for a common maritime security policy and approach illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 1: The National Fleet is a Process of Capacity Building
By blending physical assets through connectivity tools and networks, and coupling them with doctrine and a maritime security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), national fleet capabilities emerge. Fashioning those capabilities and combining them with commercial and global maritime state partnerships enhance the capability of the national fleet. It is a dynamic and fluid process whereby the USCG and the USN learn to work together in the global maritime commons to create greater maritime security capability through global alliances and partnerships.
It is an inherently international effort, which is grounded in more effective domestic collaboration and cooperation. As such, the national fleet will always be a work in progress, the effectiveness of which is measured by the ability to generate greater capacity to provide for global maritime security.
The USCG and USN: Shaping Mission Sets
Shaping approaches to share the core competencies of the two services is a key consideration in crafting the national fleet. For the national fleet to be more than a bumper sticker, crafting agreements, doctrine and working relationships between the two services will be essential. And this effort will flounder if the core competencies of the two services are not respected and built upon in shaping synergy, rather than competitive redundancy (for a discussion of how to shape a collaborative maritime security regime with respect to the Pacific, see special report one).
National Security Cutter
The USCG is at heart a maritime security, safety, and stewardship agency, which routinely operates with full authority in both the law-enforcement and military domains, sometimes simultaneously. It is a respected partner for other nations in applying the rule of law to the global maritime commons and it leads international efforts to enhance maritime security and safety. The USN is a military force, which is being transformed into a global networked maritime capability able to provide for layered defense of the United States and its global interests and friends.
The overlap between the two services is managing the security and defense issues associated with global maritime security and maritime security operations. The USCG is trained to enforce the law, provide security, rescue the endangered, facilitate commerce, protect the environment, and the like; the USN is trained to attack and defend against adversaries and to support combat forces. As the USN migrates towards more engagement in maritime security and reshapes its force structure to do so, the close collaboration with the USCG becomes more significant in shaping an effective global maritime security capability.
At the heart of the challenge of working together will be the global “rules of the game.” Allies and competitors alike see the USN as a military force; they see the USCG as a civilian law enforcement, security, and environmental response force. This perception is based on fundamental reality and reinforced by the core competencies of the two services.
The challenge now is to work the blended domain: that of layered maritime security to protect the US homeland, to engage trading partners in shaping collaborative maritime security regimes, and to participate with global partners in dealing with maritime threats close to the source or wherever identified in the maritime domain. The engagement of the commercial sector, state and local governments, along with foreign navies and coast guards will undoubtedly steer the working relationship of the USCG and USN as well.
Key Elements in Operationalizing the National Fleet
Beyond the broader effort to work through how the core competencies of the two services can be connected in an effective contribution to global maritime security, operationalizing the national fleet combines a range of core tasks central to the evolution of the two services.
These core tasks are three-fold: shaping common doctrine for shared tasks, combining where possible synergies in shipbuilding and acquiring other platforms to provide for greater numbers of physical assets, and through connectivity and networking creating a C4ISR common space for action. By providing for these tasks, an increased capability for and capacity to provide for maritime security will be created. And to provide for effective global maritime security is an overarching strategic task of growing significance to both services. An emphasis on security versus defense requires new tools and approaches to engaging federal entities in maritime security. At the same time, it requires engaging allies in building maritime data tools and situational awareness through such programs as the container security initiative. This is a “network-centric” approach but directed towards extended homeland defense and global maritime security. Coalitions at home and abroad shape the effort.
At the heart of the creation of a national fleet is the challenge of shaping doctrine for the execution of a maritime security strategy. As the USN and USCG recapitalize their physical assets, commonality in acquisition should be pursued wherever possible. The intention is to ensure that each service’s ships and boats have as much common hardware and software as possible to increase compatibility. The Coast Guard’s new National Security Cutter, for example, has a gun deck similar to one used on Navy combatants. Sensor suites and communications systems on new ships and boats will be the same. Indeed the USCG could acquire the LCS along with the USN to provide for enhanced platform synergy.
The crafting of greater synergy in making acquisition decisions is a crucial part of implementing a new national fleet policy. By building more interoperability from the ground up the ability to ebb and flow in support will be enhanced.
A core need for the national fleet capacity will be to craft as much common C4ISR space as possible. Indeed, the then Admiral Mullen CNO’s approach to the “1,000-ship Navy,” which is a core complement to the national fleet, saw C4ISR commonality as a vital requirement. This has been continued under his successor.
Global maritime awareness and the ability to communicate within the maritime domain are crucial to building the global maritime security enterprise. Similarly, since at least 1997 the USCG has been emphasizing maritime domain awareness a key activity to enhance maritime security. The MDA program encompasses comprehensive integration of federal, state, local, and private sectors. Uniquely positioned as both a military and law-enforcement service, the Coast Guard can bridge the gap between the DHS first responders and the US Navy, with its forward-deployed assets operating in open ocean reaches.
In other words, shaping a national fleet will be a key test of the Obama Administration’s commitment to shape a global policy to provide for security of the “global commons.”
The military budget under President Obama and Secretary Gates is dominated by the twin themes of Afghanistan and austerity. The focus on Afghanistan is shaping the strategic perspective for the Administration’s military strategy and austerity is re-shaping the defense portfolios. The power projection forces so dependent upon proprietary military space assets are being significantly re-drawn, less by strategic design than by strategic re-focus.
The impact of the Administration’s decisions and approaches are significant for military space, and is leading to either outright termination of programs, re-shaping programs or putting programs on budgetary diets. The impact is to re-shape military space significantly. This re-shaping is further accelerated by the continued priority placed on the intelligence community’s “black” assets, which may or may not serve well operational deployed power projection forces.
The challenge is how to leverage austerity and the new priorities to re-craft military space. The “strategic pause” being enforced by such actions can provide an opportunity to look at “gapfillers” and “near-term” fixes as key elements for shaping a new space approach which, in turn, can lay the foundation for the launch of new programs on the other side of the Afghan operation. Indeed, the impact of the current strategic review process owes the country more than simply justifications for cancelling programs and supporting counter-insurgency operations. It owes the country some foundational principles for launching a new architecture and new programs to support U.S. and allied power projection forces providing for security and military needs.
Leveraging austerity would start by re-considering the role of the commercial space sector and the changing nature of national security missions. The commercial space sector is viewed by the military space acquisition process as largely a “gapfiller” or “final resort” to provide the data unable to be provided by the preferred proprietary U.S. military systems. Nonetheless, commercial systems will be used more in the next few years due to program terminations and shortfalls in the military space sector.
But a reverse in logic is required. US military space programs should be built with significant commercial space assumed as a core acquisition priority for the US security and military services. The US military space architecture should now be built with a commercial space foundation in place from which unique capabilities would then be defined and prioritized in US military-unique acquisitions. A complete reversal in logic is required: rather than “gapfilling” with commercial systems US military systems would become the unique providers of capabilities UNABLE to be provided by the commercial sector.
Commercial developments make this possible. Notably, hosted payloads provide a significant infrastructure opportunity for the US military to put on commercial satellite buses communications and other assets, which can be launched on a regular commercial launch rhythm. Hosted payloads can provide both test beds for new technologies and augmented capabilities for communications, missile warning and space situational awareness. Commercial operators can field these systems faster (less than three years) and cheaper than dedicated military systems. And such systems can be launched from secure NATO launch range son more than twelve commercial satellites going to GEO each year (from the Cape and French Guiana).
And the change in the focus of US strategy calls for increased use of commercial systems, which can be shared with allies and partners. The purchase of shared assets to support security and law enforcement operations is of increasing significance to the types of operations, which Obama espouses. Whether performing counter-piracy operations, working in joint counter-narcotics operations, whether dealing with environmental threats or challenges, or sharing arms control data, all of this can only happen with the sharing of timely communications and data provided by satellites or other C4ISR systems.
By relying on commercial systems, the ability to share is built in as common decisions can be made about encryption standards for the shared data. If this is not done, the US is left with the very unsatisfactory situation of making case-by-case decisions to share unique proprietary data provided by US military and intelligence satellites. One does not build effective military space architecture on an ad-hoc basis of sharing with allies and partners when you have asserted that working with allies and partners is now the core reality of your strategy.
The new military space architecture would then start by two principles. First, robust acquisition of commercial satellite services would define what the military needs to acquire uniquely. Second, commercial systems would be used widely to allow the kind of sharing required for security and law enforcement operations in which the US will engage in the 21st century.
Additional principles could be added to shaping the new architecture.
The third principle would be to determine what the air-breathing assets already acquired and being acquired provide to the C4ISR architecture of which military space is a key component. The commitment to the F-35 means that a significant ISR capability will be fielded over the next 10-15 years which when joined by unmanned vehicle systems will revolutionize operational ISR. With the addition of stratospheric air vehicles, a significant change in what is required from space can be anticipated.
The fourth principle would be to determine the nature of collaborative space operations with friends and allies. How will US unique systems complement and contribute to the ability to do coalition operations and shape effective global security operations? This means that the US needs to build into the core of its own activities an ability to shape and work with allies in crafting shared and joint collaboration. Notably, the emergence of the European Galileo system at precisely a time when the US is worried about GPS shortfalls suggests that a joint effort would make sense. Collaboration is not the last act of desperation; rather it should become a foundational principle of procurement and operations
The fifth principle would be to determine the unique systems which military space would need to provide in light of the first three principles. With a clear definition of what functionalities are unique, rather than what platforms are unique, commitments could be made for the relatively small number of unique assets, which the US military must own and operate. This would be especially true for a combined naval and air power projection force. The long-range strike and reconnaissance missions which the naval and air forces perform clearly need to be supported by unique US military assets. But rather than defining the architecture largely on the basis of this principle it needs to be the crowing definer of requirements.
Cybersecurity challenges and the threats from some powers who are developing abilities to disrupt US-specific military systems simply re-enforce the advantages of a multi-layered architecture encompassing commercial, air-breathing, allied, and US military systems. The US cannot afford to build a proprietary Pentagon-funded layered and diverse architecture which deal with cybersecurity threats all by itself. A diversified architecture in which commercial and allied elements are part of the foundation makes the task of disruption much harder and certainly for states not terribly desirable politically.
In short, new military space architecture could be built by leveraging austerity. An opportunity exists for the US to move beyond proprietary procurement to a new approach in which unique systems are defined in a new-layered architecture, not as the sine qua non for the Pentagon.
A version of this article appeared in Space News (July 27, 2009).
The world may be flat because of globalization, but we may want not to be flattened. The trouble with analyses like Freedman’s is there is a God called “Globalization” hidden away in the bowels of the earth, which creates automatic effects and benefits for something called the “global economy.” Nations disappear; power is the hidden hand of 18th century philosophes and somehow the system works for the greater good.
The difficulty with such an understanding is that it ignores the core role, which the United States and Western Europe have played in guaranteeing global economic, military and political security. The democratic system has not been perfect, and is clearly in transition, but stability has been anchored by core nation states. What is not clear is that with the rise of Asia, and the growing salience of the commodity states, what system will replace the Western system. And indeed, the terrorist threats to the Western system are designed, in part, to try to block the evolution of the Western system into a genuinely global system of prosperity and security on anything akin to the Western model.
Rethinking Globalization Models
National bargains are a key part of the global transition. Nationalism has not gone away, just visit China during the Olympics if you need to be reminded how bumpy the “flat” world is in reality.
Virtually all globalization models ignore the security element. Without security for air, ground, and maritime transit, there is no globalization. Without secure cyberspace, there is no effective transfer of information and data in the world wide web. And the world wide web was built by the American military for national purposes – C2 survival in times of nuclear attack. The WWW was built to secure communications, not to make the world flat.
There simply is no guarantee of freedom of commerce, information, currency and security of persons, data and goods and services. The United States and European nations have been at the heart of creating such guarantees for national purposes. Leaders in the post-WW II environment have seen it as essential to guarantee these freedoms against Soviet threats. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the erosion of Communism in China, the goals of Western leaders have been extended outside of the West.
We stand at a transition whereby the challenges of continued guarantees of security will need to be provided by new stakeholders in the Western system as that system transmutes into a global one. The core challenge is to find ways to provide for the public good of global security without shutting down the very openness, which makes globalization work.
Inevitability of the Security Challenge
Macro-economists tend to view defense and security as drains on productive resources. Yet productivity in a nascent global system rests on security and defense. Indeed, the line between defense and security capabilities is being blurred by modern states as their interests reach way beyond traditional national boundaries and traditional measures of national power.
And a global system in which the flow of data, currency, goods and services flow world-wide through mechanisms like just-in time production is increasingly vulnerable to disruptions. Indeed, strategic disruptions are built into the global system. The need to manage such disruptions (to plan for, to provide for, to shape decision-making and implementations tools for) is a growing public good. Yet one can look in vain for much significant strategic thinking or investment in ways to cope with strategic disruption.
And the decentralization of the global economy and global information grid is enhancing the ability of small groups and even individuals to engage in activities, which can significantly disrupt the global system. While one might criticize the terms, which the Bush Administration used to characterize the problem (the Global War on Terrorism), it is clear that the growing capability of small groups bent on disrupting the world system and seeking to divert it to their advantage is a real threat, no matter how you label them.
Meeting the Challenge
Risks need to be dealt with and managed as a normal task in coping with globalization. Clearly, it is impossible to build a completely risk-free global infrastructure. But what is troubling is how little investment is being put in place to at least deal with crisis contingencies, or to provide, a “surge” capability to provide for short-term amelioration for the shut down of ports, airports, train lines, or protect against what the Gartner Group calls the danger of a “digital” Pearl Harbor.
The first task is to build into our decision-making systems capability to plan for and expect strategic disruption. Herman Kahn, the famous nuclear strategist, called for “thinking the unthinkable.” Kahn was one of the first nuclear strategists and crafted the study of how to conduct nuclear war if such a horrific problem emerged. If Kahn were still alive today he would write a new book about strategic disruption as “thinking the unthinkable.”
The second task is as important as the first. Assuming we could craft decision- making systems which could plan for strategic disruption, how would we get today’s fractious societies to even want to think about such pain. Pain avoidance is the goal of modern democratic society, unless it is self-inflicted in seeking higher metaphysical states. But before we reach such a state we might find our way of life significantly threatened by small groups possessing weapons of mass destruction seeking to send us via an alternative pathway to reaching the next life.
How will we implement decisions in a timely and effective manner? What tool sets do we need for effective implementation? How can we train and prepare Western publics for the unexpected? From watching soap operas to preparing for the reality of strategic disruption is a crucial transition necessary to guarantee tomorrow’s democratic societies.
Building an Effective Tool Kit
In other words, Western decision-making systems need to craft effective tool kits to deal with risk management. We need security and military tools robust and flexible enough to aid in prevention and response to strategic disruption.
Among the tools necessary are redundant and hardened communications systems, interoperable communications and information systems, ability for key public and private institutions to share data and to communicate in crises, and an ability to train for crisis.
We should learn to be at least as effective as terrorist groups in using decentralized structures. Decentralized structures are probably optimal in maximizing survivability and the ability to be flexible enough, rather than presenting rich target sets associated with vulnerable networks.
Crisis leadership rooted in decentralized structures would provide not only an effective tool in dealing with actual strategic disruption, it might well deter groups from random strategic disruption attempts.
As we have modernized our militaries, we are seeking to decentralize operations and secure the networks of information and decision-making, which allows for effective operations. As we seek to secure our social, economic and information infrastructures, some of the same principles apply. Instead of running from our efforts at military modernization, we should embrace the best lessons learned.
Conclusion: Crafting a Risk Management Posture
In preparing for strategic disruption, we seek to find the right mix of response capabilities. We need to be able to combine proactive, active and reactive elements in our decision-making and implementation capabilities.
We need to blend three core elements. First, we need to have robust and redundant communication and information systems. Second, we need to have resilient organizations capable of absorbing shocks. And, third, we need to have alternatives, certainly in crisis periods, to single-source dependencies.
In short, the strategic challenge is to craft, forge and reinforce decision-making systems with several key competencies:
Right mix of centralization and decentralization in execution;
Fail-safe procedures;
Shape a sufficient cadre of well-trained first responders;
And generate a significant and meaningful number of exercises and simulations to frame effective procedures for the unexpected.
Strategic disruption is not a surprise in a globalized environment; it is a given. Effective risk management policy will be the result of policy, not simply the outcome of chance. Coping with chance can be used to shape effective policy, but only after the fact. It is better to plan for the unexpected because it isn’t.
With a significant shortfall in spending for new power projection platforms, the U.S. faces a core challenge of how to most effectively build forces for the years ahead. At the heart of this opportunity will be to shape joint con-ops for the US Air Force and Navy and to ensure more effective networking among Air Force and Naval systems as well as to shape more effective collaborative C4ISR systems with allies.
Solutions for a Dominant, Responsive Force
At the heart of this opportunity is to leverage new programs in play to ensure that they work effectively together. The cancellation of the future combat system means that the original concept surrounding the program whereby the network would enable the platforms will shift to ensuring that the ground network works effectively with the air systems in play. The air-ground revolution, which was launched by the Iraq invasion, has continued with the surge and with the transfer of forces to Afghanistan. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles to shape ground force options and decision and links like the Rover video system which has connected manned aircraft to ground decision-makers has rapidly expanded in the Iraq and Afghan operations.
Now the question is why not take the termination of FCS to shape an opportunity for greater collaboration between the air and ground systems. This will be especially significant as the F-35 enters into service. The F-35 is a “flying combat system” which will significantly enhance the capabilities of the air and ground forces to work together in shaping collaborative con-ops and to share decision-making. Leveraging this new platform as the U.S. reshapes connectivity between the air and ground systems is a significant opportunity for innovation and change.
The USMC can serve as an important catalyst to shape the new relationship between USN and US Air Force assets and the US Army. The USMC adopted Shadow as its common UAV with the Army. In so doing, the USMC and Army have worked through a number of common solutions to the use of data coming from the Shadow to support ground operations. This working relationship can be expanded to shape an important relationship between the USMC F-35 and the US Army. And because the systems on the USMC’s F-35 are virtually identical to those of the USN and US Air Force, an important template would be put in place to re-shape air-ground connectivity as the US Army modernizes and the F-35 is introduced as the common air element across three services.
There are already some elements for shaping such commonality in the connectivity revolution, which needs to take place in order to reshape joint operations. For example, DARPA has sponsored a Rockwell Collins program called Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT), which can be used now to more effectively integrate air and ground operations. TTNT is a capable waveform built around an “open system approach.” The technology enables networking between airborne platforms, weapons, and ground forces, and as an internet protocol or IP system operates in ways similar to what is available commercially with systems like Blackberry or iPhone. But unlike such commercial systems, TTNT provides a highly secure structure and long range of operation up to 300 miles for line of sight operations and connections to beyond line of sight operations. In addition, the system is scalable and survivable complimenting existing legacy communications systems.
Navy program officials associated with the Unmanned Combat Air System have recently underscored the cost savings associated with an open architecture system such as TTNT. These officials underscored the significant advantages to having a scalable system like TTNT. As reported by Defense Daily, Glen Colby, the IPT leader for the system, commented: “if you design for scalability…then you pull the old one out, put the new one in, and it doesn’t really matter if it’s the same exact model or not because the design for scalability ensures that you can plug the new one in and you get better capability at less cost. ßIf you don’t design for scalability and you are asking this vendor to give you the exact same model, it’s very costly, because in the commercial world nobody builds [that part] anymore. It’s very important to understand what scalability is because inherent scalability allows you to design in flexibility. In fact, scalability is one of the things that allows you to rapidly update your system.”
And connecting some of the new air assets will provide significant gains in strategic capability as well. Notably, the Osprey with a range and speed which allows ground forces to operate over an entire theater of operation such as Iraq can provide a key piece of the puzzle in making unmanned aerial vehicles a much more effective instrument. Currently, if a UAV discovers a target of interest, which requires prosecution by ground forces and is not appropriate for an air strike, by the time current rotorcraft get the target it is almost certainly gone. And indeed one Osprey is the operational equivalent of three CH-46s and one-to two forward operating bases. With systems that connect the Osprey effectively with UAVs, the ability of the USMC, Special Forces and the US Army to operate rapidly against targets discovered by the UAV would be significantly enhanced.
Another significant area where connectivity creates strategic capability revolves around the Aegis and the F-35. Among the most important international programs for the USN in the 21st century are Aegis and F-35. Efforts to enhance their integration are a natural path to enhance U.S. global coalitions. Many Aegis partners are current or prospective F-35 participants; finding ways to link the two will be an important enhancer for partners. For example, given Norwegian concerns about Northern European energy security, including the Arctic, there is interest in enhanced Link 16 connectivity between Aegis systems and the F-35.
To the extent to which allies work integration of F-35 with Aegis, they create extended “littoral bubbles” into which the USN and USAF can plug their systems to, in turn, extend the capabilities of the allied “littoral bubbles.”
In short, in an environment of financial scarcity directing confronting the connectivity challenge is central to ensure that the U.S. and its allies will indeed deploy significant capability in the future. Otherwise, as the platform shredding process generated by financial stringencies unfolds, we will simply have fewer and fewer tools to deal with our global military and security challenges.
