Reconciling with Taliban Leaders

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01/12/2012

Dr. Richard Weitz (Credit: The Hudson Institute)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

The issue of promoting an enduring reconciliation between the Afghan government and influential members of the Taliban is the most controversial element of the peace process.

The intent is to exploit the fact that the Taliban leadership is not a cohesive group. Some Taliban leaders might accept a compromise settlement whereas others probably share to al-Qaeda’s absolutist ideology.

Karzai and Western leaders have repeatedly insisted that their reconciliation offer does not extend to al-Qaeda members, who are seen as alien foreign elements whose extremist convictions and past terrorist activities make them unacceptable negotiating partners. Although al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are united in their desire to expel Western troops from Afghanistan and reestablish a strict Islamic government in which they enjoy a monopoly of political and religious power, some Taliban leaders might accept more moderate goals.

Part IV in our Afghan series looks at the prospects of the Afghan government reconciling with the Taliban. (Image Credit: Bigstock)
Part IV in our Afghan series looks at the prospects of the Afghan government reconciling with the Taliban. (Image Credit: Bigstock)

More importantly, a Taliban government would not necessarily support Islamic insurgencies in other countries or engage in distant terrorist attacks in Western countries, whereas al-Qaeda almost certainly would pursue such tactics.

In recent years, Taliban representatives, aware of the widespread eagerness to end the country’s decades of fighting, have insisted that their political ambitions are confined to Afghanistan and that they would not aide Islamic insurgencies in other countries or assist international terrorism.

In contrast, al-Qaeda leaders continue to declare their goal to be establishing radical Islamist regimes throughout the Muslim world (which they define to encompass Spain and other territories where there once had been a Muslim majority or Islamist ruler) and waging war against a long list of foreign governments that they see as resisting this objective or describe as Muslim oppressors.

The key uncertainty is whether a Taliban government would and could prevent al-Qaeda from reestablishing bases in any region of Afghanistan under its control, exercising more restraint than before 9/11, or would allow al-Qaeda to transform Afghanistan again into a haven for global terrorist operations.

Some argue that the Taliban, eager to return to power, would want to reconcile with the international community or at least prevent the further Western military strikes that would ensue should al-Qaeda again use Afghan territory as a base for external operations. The Taliban’s leadership has released statements saying that its political objectives were confided only to Afghanistan did not intend to harm any other countries.

Yet, it is hard to imagine the Taliban actually using force to prevent their al-Qaeda allies from reestablishing a military presence in Afghanistan and employing these new base camps to organize additional terrorist attacks in other countries.

U.S. plans to retain one or more bases in Afghanistan (ironically now for the purpose of being able to conduct military operations against high-value terrorist targets in Pakistan when necessary) would also offer the Taliban an irresistible and nearby target for their assaults.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan are closely integrated at the operational level, with al-Qaeda members embedded in many important Taliban field operations. Mullah Omar, who leads the Quetta Shura Taliban, has staunchly defended al-Qaeda and developed close personal ties with the group, despite the costs to the Taliban movement. There is no indication that this position has changed despite bin Laden’s death.

Even if the Quetta Shura Taliban were to break with al-Qaeda, the terrorists would still enjoy the protection of the more radical Haqqani network, which has a major presence in eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan and enjoys the patronage of key figures within Pakistan’s national security establishment. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed in congressional testimony that Pakistan arranged for U.S. and Haqqani representatives to meet on one occasion, but the Haqqani response to the U.S. outreach was to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, allegedly with Pakistani assistance, on September 13.

Unless neutralized or included in any settlement, Haqqani members would likely collude with al-Qaeda operatives to avert a Taliban-Kabul peace agreement, which would threaten their interests in continued conflict. The Obama administration has lost hope that the Pakistani government will ever suppress the Haqqani network but has warned Islamabad that it needs to pressure the Haqqanis to join the peace process or the United States would have to destroy the group by itself, presumably with more aggressive attacks on its bases in Pakistan.

In public, Taliban representatives have also demand that all Western troops leave Afghanistan before they will even consider engaging in direct talks with the Afghan government. Karzai has sought to finesse the issue by noting that a peace agreement that ended militancy would bring about the withdrawal of all foreign military forces. The Taliban might reasonably expect them to depart in a few years in any case, without any concessions on their part.

Securing Pakistani support for any peace agreement is even more important. Pakistani officials have insisted on having a key role in any peace settlement, and have disrupted talks from which they have been excluded by arresting the senior Taliban representatives involved. The influence enjoyed by the Pakistani intelligence service within the Afghan Taliban assures them of de facto veto power over an initial agreement.

It is unclear whether the Taliban would genuinely accept Afghanistan’s current constitution, which was adopted after the Taliban lost power.

It includes a number of liberal democratic principles that many Taliban consider objectionable if not blasphemous. The Afghan peace commission has said that negotiations with the Taliban could only begin after they ended violence against civilians, severed their ties with al-Qaeda, and accepted the Afghan constitution guarantees of civil rights and liberties, including for women.

The Taliban leadership has moderated its formal position on some issues, and instructed its field commanders to do likewise in a recent field manual, but such policies seem like tactical maneuvers to reduce Afghan resistance to their return to power.

The provision guaranteeing women equal rights is a major point in dispute. Many women’s rights groups, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, oppose negotiating with the Taliban for fear of losing guaranteed schooling for girls and other rights. Human rights groups suspect that even if the Afghan government and Taliban representatives profess to respect the constitution in any future peace agreement, they will simply not fully enforce—either deliberately or due to the limited capabilities and authority of Afghan government institutions—some of its provisions in practice.

More generally, many Afghans complain they learn little about the peace process and fear they will eventually confront a settlement negotiated among Afghan and Taliban leaders imposed on them. They would like to see a less top-down, elite driven process by establishing some mechanism by which traditionally marginalized groups can express their views. Those Afghans distrustful of Pakistan and the NATO countries would also like to see the United Nations have a larger role in the peace process.

Even if Taliban leaders affirmed their willingness to talk, it would be hard to trust their intentions.

They could easily imitate the North Vietnamese strategy of professing to accept a compromise peace settlement in order to secure a foreign military withdrawal. They could then resume offensive operations against the still weak Afghan Security Forces, which have yet to demonstrate much military effectiveness. Some observers believe that the Taliban is already pursuing such a hold-till-2014 strategy.

The Pakistani Taliban has employed a variant of this stratagem in the past, ostentatiously negotiating truces with the military in order to allow their forces to rest and regroup before resuming their attacks shortly thereafter. Unlike in Pakistan, moreover, the Afghan insurgents could resume fighting with the expectation that their main adversary, the international forces, would be considerably hobbled in its response since Western publics would prevent their governments from sending their troops back to battle. Foreign governments might resume massive air strikes, but the resulting high number of civilian casualties, due partly to the absence of ground forces able to confirm the presence of noncombatants, could prove counterproductive.

The gap between the two sides has led some experts to endorse pursuing a patchwork of local settlements rather than a single national coalition government that would have to include both Karzai and his diverse opponents. These analysts believe that granting some local warlords and Taliban leaders formal or de facto control of Afghanistan’s most unstable provinces would not only recognize the reality of the limited powers of the Karzai government, but could also satisfy the many Taliban who fight mainly for money, influence, or other non-ideological reasons. The September 2010 report of the Afghan Study Group strongly endorsed the concept of promoting political decentralization within a loosely confederal Afghan state as a means of facilitating redress of local grievances: “governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.”

Yet, many considerations of principle and pragmatism suggest that such de facto political regionalization will prove difficult to achieve and sustain. Granting considerable local autonomy in Afghanistan would allow communities to give precedence to their own values, but some of these—especially in the area of women as well as ethnic and religious minority rights—will likely be at variance with the values enshrined in the national constitution and supported by the international community. It would also empower local elites to govern with considerable impunity from, for example, the central government’s counternarcotics police.

Past experience with local rule in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan also underscore the drawbacks of regional peace agreements.

The ill-fated experience with allowing a de facto Taliban government to exercise control over the southern Afghan city of Musa Qala from early 2007 to the end of that year—demonstrates that even major concessions will not moderate Taliban demands. After hard-pressed British commanders accepted the Taliban’s de facto occupation of the town, the group began to implement in Musa Qala the kinds of extremist social and political policies that had marked its rule before September 2001.

Skeptics of the durability of regional settlements also can point to the problems Pakistani authorities have experienced in attempting to negotiate durable truces with militant leaders in South Waziristan and other unstable regions along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Recurring difficulties have included differing interpretations of the agreed terms, the refusal of all insurgent groups to embrace a settlement, the opportunities the pauses in fighting have given the guerrillas to reequip and recruit, and the extremists’ reluctance to curtail insurgent use of their territory for cross-border operations into Afghanistan.

Saudi Arms Deal Fortifies US Regional Security Ties

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01/08/2012
The Saudis Face a Very Challenging Security Environment for 2012 (Credit image: Bigstock)
Dr. Richard Weitz (Credit: The Hudson Institute)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

01/08/2011 – The U.S. Government’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy requires that major sales advance U.S. national interests, are consistent with the recipient country’s legitimate security needs, and support U.S. regional security objectives. The sales to Saudi Arabia are widely supported within the U.S. government because they contribute to achieving these and other U.S. goals.

First, they enhance the Kingdom’s ability to defend itself against Iran. The new systems would strengthen the Saudi Arabian armed forces and thereby help balance and deter Iran’s growing military power. The new F-15s are an advance on the older ones. Of course, in modern defense, air assets are part of an overall defense capability and are not designed simply for air-to-air operations.

Even without Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Iranian military has been displaying a growing range of conventional capabilities, showing off new missile, naval, and air capabilities as well as expanding the Iranian ground forces. In October, U.S. law enforcement agents exposed an Iranian plot to hire a professional hit man to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in a restaurant in downtown Washington.

The Saudis Face a Very Challenging Security Environment for 2012 (Credit image: Bigstock)
The Saudis Face a Very Challenging Security Environment for 2012 (Credit image: Bigstock)

Second, the weapons—and related sales to other Persian Gulf allies of the United States—can help protect the Gulf’s vital oil exports. Even now Iranians continue to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt its vital oil exports. On December 27, Mohammad-Reza Rahimi, Iran’s first vice president, warned that, “If they [Western Powers] impose sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, then even one drop of oil cannot flow from the Strait of Hormuz.”  The following day, Iranian naval commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari stated that, “Iran has total control over the strategic waterway…Closing the Strait of Hormuz is very easy for Iranian naval forces.”  The Iranian Navy was conducting a major maritime interdiction exercise in the Persian Gulf at the time these threats were made.

 

Iranians issue such threats to underscore Tehran’s capacity to exploit Western dependence on Persian Gulf energy supplies and to threaten the health of the global economy.  Of course, such threats are seen by Arab states as also a threat to their own economic and security interests as well.

Even the most optimistic scenarios for the increased use of renewable energy still forecast continued Western dependence on Saudi Arabia’s petroleum exports for the international economy. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, is the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports.

But as the Arctic supplies come on line and as the Russian role increases, the threat to oil supply might be greater to Arab States than to the West.

Such threats raise insurance costs to commercial shippers even if their vessels were not physically attacked. The threats remind the world that Tehran might not react passively to additional sanctions. Iranians might hope that Russia and China will press the EU and Japan to avoid adopting new sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. Making threats is useful to Tehran since they can raise world oil prices and therefore generate some additional Iranian export revenue. Iranian leaders might also like to show their people how tough they are in defending Iranian interests from foreign challenges.

The United States has been seeking to enhance missile defense capabilities throughout the Persian Gulf region by placing American-run, ground-based missile defense systems in several Gulf states, by stationing specially equipped U.S. Navy missile ships in the Gulf’s waters, and by selling several types of missile defense systems to Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The systems sold to the GCC include both the low-altitude Patriot and the higher-altitude Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, which together provide a more comprehensive layered missile and air defense network than either system in isolation, especially when networked with the U.S.-operated missile-defense systems. Although imperfect, they contribute to protecting the GCC’s energy production and distribution infrastructure, including shielding the tankers conveying oil through the Gulf.

A key challenge will be to integrate air and ground or surface based missile defense assets, a core competence which the F-35 will address.

In this regard, the arms sales help regional allies contribute better to their own defense. The transferred weapons would ease the burden on the overstretched U.S. military and the overburdened American taxpayer of countering Iran. The Administration is in the process of making large arms sales to Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For example, last month the UAE agreed to a multi-billion dollar deal to purchase Lockheed Martin’s THAAD interceptors. The UAE is also purchasing 4,900 U.S. guided-bomb kits, including 600 for bunker-buster munitions.

In this context, Saudi Arabia is a key local ally for Washington given the weakness of Iraq, Iran’s traditional rival, and the limited military potential of the other Gulf states. Fortifying the Saudi Arabian military with additional weapons would help achieve Washington’s regional security goals, especially balancing Iranian ambitions and containing Iranian aggression regarding other Persian Gulf states.

U.S. arms sales to America’s allies in the Persian Gulf promote defense interoperability, both among themselves and with U.S. forces. In recent years, the United States has been selling weapons to other Gulf states concerned about a potential power vacuum in the region or about Iran’s growing strength. The F-15SAs’ communications systems will enable U.S. Saudi pilots to operate effectively together in the same airspace. The recently signed sales package includes joint training of some 5,500 Saudi personnel through 2019.

The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the other members of the GCC have been especially prolific buyers of U.S. weapons. Although the GCC presently lacks the coherence—having limited means of coordination, integration, and standardization—to contain Iran on its own, equipping all their members with U.S.-made weapons, and training them to use them, can bolster their capabilities, especially in partnership with the Pentagon. In some scenarios, U.S. troops might use some of these weapons as they rush to reinforce the region. Even for more limited engagements, having access to the data generated by Saudi Arabian missile defense radars and other sensors could prove useful for defending U.S. forces and other targets in the Gulf.

Another objective of the sales is to highlight Washington’s commitment to defend Saudi Arabia and the other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf despite the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Pentagon’s difficulties in Afghanistan.

Some Saudis worry that a pro-Iranian faction could gain political influence in Baghdad, confronting Saudi Arabia with having a pair of Shiite governments in two of the most powerful countries of the Persian Gulf aligned against it.

Even if Baghdad remains independent of Tehran’s influence, Iraq will take years to develop the military power needed to again serve as a regional balancer of Iran, even if the Iraqi government wanted to perform this role. In this context, the arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and Iraq serve as a tangible reaffirmation to the Kingdom that the U.S. security umbrella remains valid. In his briefing in the sale to reporters, Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, told reporters that, “This sale will send a strong message to countries in the region that the United States is committed to stability in the gulf and broader Middle East,”

Sustaining the United States as the Kingdom’s main foreign arms supplier is also an important goal for maintaining U.S. influence in Riyadh, which can encourage Saudi officials to continue to support policies favorable to U.S. interests, and the Middle East more generally. The F-15ASA platforms are expected to last for decades, encouraging close defense cooperation between Washington and Riyadh for a long time since Saudi Arabia will need access to U.S.-made spare parts, training, and upgrades for decades.

Several Saudi policies benefit the United States, including the Kingdom’s sponsorship of inter-faith dialogue, its domestic de-radicalization program, its restraining influence on the foreign policy of other Arab regimes, U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation against international terrorism, and Riyadh’s consistently moderate policies toward Israel.

There have been signs of tension between Washington and Riyadh in the last year over how much support to provide incumbent conservative governments in the Arab world confronted by mass uprisings. Saudi officials have been critical of Washington for not rendering greater support to pro-Western leaders of Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen. They also would like the Obama administration to exert greater pressure on the Israeli government to curtail Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the United States would like to sustain good general relations as the monarchy and other leadership posts pass from the current generation to their successors.

At least some Saudi officials have been reassured. An anonymous Saudi official told the New York Times that, “When you look at the size of this package, what does it tell you about U.S.-Saudi relations…It says it’s very strong and very solid. Any disagreements from time to time don’t affect the core relationship.”

(Editor’s Note: We will address the region’s response to the emergence of a nuclear Iran in the first issue of the Gray Swan Report to appear this month.)

The weapons sales also help recycle the petrodollars Saudi Arabia acquires from oil exports—as well as encouraging Saudi Arabia to work with American firms through offsets in developing their energy sector and other infrastructure.

A final argument in favor of the sale is that, if the United States declines to provide the Saudi government with adequate defensive weapons, then Riyadh would likely pursue other means of strengthening its security.

Most likely, Saudi officials, who have always sought multiple arms supply relationships as a hedge against a weakening of their ties with Washington, would buy the weapons from other suppliers. Saudi Arabia has already bought a number of European weapons in recent years, including multibillion-dollar contracts for the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter planes and a border security system from British-based firms, as well as some helicopters and artillery pieces from French suppliers.

The Kingdom could plausibly purchase more weapons from China, which sold Saudi Arabia some intermediate-range missiles in the 1980s. The Saudis might also buy Russian arms to provide an additional incentive to dissuade Moscow from selling more sophisticated weapons to Iran. Some of these purchases might not include the safeguards for Israel that accompany the F-15SA transaction.

It is possible, though unlikely, that the Saudi government might decide to conserve its resources and try to appease Tehran. Conversely, Riyadh might seek to acquire nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent. Whether Saudi Arabia relied on its emerging nuclear power program to manufacture weapons (which could take at least a decade without major foreign assistance) or simply bought ready-made atomic bombs from Pakistan or another country, Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would contribute to further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, a development harmful to U.S. interests.

Two general objections have been raised to the sales. First, there is some worry that the Saudi government will use the weapons in ways the United States would not like. For example, the Saudi military might be called on to suppress popular uprisings in Bahrain, in other Arab countries, or even at home. But end user agreements require that Saudi Arabia seek U.S. government approval before they transfer the weapons to another country. And the core systems at issue are designed for conventional military defense against external attack and not suitable for crowd suppression.

There was also some initial concern by pro-Israeli groups about the sales. In November 2010, more than one hundred members of Congress wrote a letter expressing their concerns about the proposed transaction. Following some initial complaints however the government of Israel and its supporters in the United States have generally not opposed the proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

One factor dampening Israeli concerns is that Saudi Arabia already possesses many of the proposed weapons systems, so the sale would not represent a major qualitative leap in Saudi military potential. Many would expand capabilities currently in limited supply, while others would complement Saudi Arabia’s existing panoply of American- and European-made weapons.

In addition, the United States has reportedly agreed not to outfit the weapons platforms provided to Saudi Arabia with the most advanced capabilities suitable for attacking Israel, such as long-range stand-off weapons. Instead, they will be equipped with the more modest armaments the United States normally sells with export versions of these warplanes. For example, the AGM-84 Harpoon Block II missile the Saudis will receive does not include the Block III data link package for in-flight retargeting.

The decision to provide the Saudis with more F-15s is itself a means to reassure Israel, since the planes are inferior to what Israel will possess but is superior to the warplanes Iran possesses. Due to various international sanctions, Iran’s military aviation wing has become very weak. Iran has instead chosen to invest in ballistic and cruise missiles with possible chemical, biological, or most likely nuclear warheads.

The United States has agreed to sell Israel even more advanced weapons to help sustain its military superiority. In particular, Lockheed Martin will provide the new U.S. F-35 stealth fighters to Israel around 2015, about the same time that Boeing supplies Saudi Arabia with the F-15SAs.

Furthermore, unlike during the 1980s and 1990s, many Israeli strategists now consider Iran, rather than the Arab countries, as presenting the greatest external threat to Israel’s security. And the new weapons the United States is providing Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf would help contain Iranians’ growing military power and regional security ambitions.

The other general set of objections relate to general unease that the Saudi monarchy might not last as long as the planes. The Arab Spring has reminded everyone of the lesson of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution – how rapidly even long-standing regimes can change. The weapons we sell today can potentially be used against us tomorrow. Some might worry that, by spending so much on weapons, the Saudi leaders are making the same mistake as the Shah in neglecting popular welfare in favor of military might.

This argument is harder to refute since the nature of regime change is complex. The relationship between military spending and popular revolutions is probably much weaker than many other types of causal links that explain revolutionary upheaval. And one hopes that Boeing and its partners will structure the sale so that the Saudis will need to continue to rely on U.S. supplies and assistance no matter who rules in Riyadh.

(Editor’s Note: We will address the region’s response to the emergence of a nuclear Iran in the first issue of the Gray Swan Report to appear this month.)

The Japanese F-35 Decision: A Building Block in A New Pacific Strategy

Posted on | by SysAdmin

01/08/2012 – by Robbin Laird

The F-35 will be a cornerstone of Japanese defense.  The Japanese know something about technology.  As a leader in technology worldwide, the Japanese decision validates the cutting edge role of the F-35.

The F-35 is the first aircraft in history which can see 360 degrees around itself more than 800 miles and has integrated combat systems to manage that combat space.  It is about a system not a platform.  The F-35 as a combat system is about the central role of maintenance, upgrading, deployment readiness, development synergies provided by common software for upgrades and development. It is a system.

The F-35A is a Key Building Block of the Pacific Honeycomb Shaping 21st Century Defense in the Pacific Photo (Credit: Lockheed Martin)The F-35A is a Key Building Block of the Pacific Honeycomb Shaping 21st Century Defense in the Pacific Photo (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

The F-35 allows re-norming of combat operations, especially appropriate to the Pacific. The fifth generation aircraft are at the heart of a potential new air combat system enterprise.  The F-22s have been the harbinger, but for full participation the F-22 needs to be modernized with some of the essential air combat systems present on the F-35. Deployed as a force, it enables distributed air operations, an approach crucial to the survival of our pilots in the period ahead. Distributed operations are the cultural shift associated with the 5th generation aircraft, and investments in new weapons, remotely piloted aircraft and the crafting of simultaneous rather than sequential operations.

The Japanese understand the opportunity to leverage the F-35 combat systems enterprise and is a key reason why the Japanese down selected the aircraft.

The classic aircraft adds systems to the aircraft to provide new capabilities. The pilot has to manage each additive system.  The F-35 has five major combat systems, which interact with each other to provide capabilities. Functional capabilities emerge from the interaction of the systems done by the machine and are not simply correlated with a single system.  For example, jamming can be done by several systems aboard the aircraft, the machine determine which one through interaction among the systems.  And the entire system rests on a common architecture with broadband capabilities. (https://sldinfo.com/renorming-air-operations/)

The Japanese understand as well the significant opportunity which integrating Aegis with F-35 provides.  The Japanese are a key Aegis partner and as such are in position to work on the integration of Aegis with F-35.

Upcoming Aegis tests will support a launch/engage-on-remote concept that links the Aegis ship to remote sensor data, increasing the coverage area and responsiveness. Once this capability is fully developed, SM-3 missiles––no longer constrained by the range of Aegis radar to detect an incoming missile––can be launched sooner and therefore fly farther to defeat the threat.

Imagine this capability linked to an F-35, which can see more than 800 miles throughout a 360-degree approach. U.S. allies are excited about the linkage prospects and the joint evolution of two highly upgradeable weapon systems.

Combining Aegis with F-35 means joining their sensors for wide-area coverage. Because of a new generation of weapons on the F-35 and the ability to operate a broad wolfpack of air and sea capabilities, the Joint Strike Fighter can perform as the directing point for combat action. With the Aegis and its new SM-3 missiles, the F-35 can leverage a sea-based missile to expand its area of strike. Together, the F-35 and Aegis significantly expand the defense of land and sea bases.

The commonality across the combat systems of the F-35’s three variants provides a notable advantage. Aegis is a pilot’s wingman, whether he or she is flying an F-35A, B, or C. Eighty percent of the F-35s in the Pacific are likely to be As, many of them coalition aircraft. Therefore, building an F-35 and Aegis global enterprise provides coverage and capability across the Pacific, which is essential for the defense of Japan.

There is a high probability that the strategic quadrangle of South Korea, Singapore, Australia and Japan will all be populated by F-35s as well Aegis’s.  This allows not only significant commonality among the allies, but provides a solid foundation for US forces to work with allies in the region and reduce the risks to US forward deployed forces.

South Korean defense can be remade by the introduction of F-35As into US forces, followed by acquisition of As and Bs by South Korea itself.  As Secretary Wynne has argued: South Korea is clearly the theater of highest utility for the emerging F-35.  With the F-22 to be the guardian of the Pacific Expanse; and perhaps even used in a partnership with the F-35, and the ROKAF forces.  This would have the highest probability of training as a ’1000 Unit Air Fleet’ and the ROKAF, equipped as they are with terrific fourth generation fighters; would yearn to be protected and supportive of this Air Battle Management System proposed and promoted for the F-35. (http://defense.aol.com/2011/11/16/a-new-strategic-moment-for-darwin-and-australia/)

One can as well see in the Korean Theater where in lieu of Aegis, Army systems can be connected via a C2 system as well as be the wingman for the F-35A’s/B’s or CV Versions.  Service identified targets that will be well within the range of tactical missiles currently fielded and/or well into their design cycle.

Singapore is postured to add F-35Bs to their inventory as well as the Aussies to add As and perhaps Bs down the line.

And the commonality of the fleet allows hubs to be built in the region supporting common operations and shape convergent capabilities. The distributed character of allied forces in the region as well as the connectivity which the F-35 allows as an interdependent flying combat system diversifies capabilities against which a core adversary would have to cope with.  Reducing concentration of forces and targets is a significance enhancer of deterrence.

And finally, the F-35 provides a key element of dealing with evolving threats as well.  As Ed Timperlake has argued:

US and allied forces will have the perfect aircraft in the F-35 to play both offensive and defense when hypersonic Cruise Missiles become a combat reality. The C4ISR-D “Z-axis” in the cockpit can lead the way in developing a Pacific  “honeycomb” ISR Grid to handle the hyper-sonic Cruise Missile threat and also go on the offensive since Chinese President Hu Jintao has just put the PLAN on combat alert.

Everything will take time to develop and if PRC goes to war at Sea today they will lose. However, time is precious for US and Allies to get the technology for a 21st Century Air/Sea Battle right.

If the F-35 did not exist with its revolutionary “Z-axis” 360 umbrella —it would have to be invented. Northern Edge validated that the US has developed a flying combat system that is world class and unique—a Fighter/Attack aircraft with EW/”tron” warfare capability with both AA and AG kinetic weapons in the bay.

https://sldinfo.com/winning-the-airsea-battle/

In short, the acquisition of the F-35 by the Japanese is an important step in re-building Pacific defense capabilities.  The F-35 is part of shaping a scalable force which can participate in executing an economy of force strategy.

Basing becomes transformed as allied and U.S. capabilities become blended into a scalable presence and engagement capability.  Presence is rooted in basing; scalability is inherently doable because of C4ISR enablement, deployed decision-making and honeycomb robustness.

The reach from Japan to South Korea to Singapore to Australia is about how allies are re-shaping their forces and working towards greater reach and capabilities.  For example, by shaping a defense strategy, which is not simply a modern variant Seitzkreig in South Korea and Japan, more mobile assets such as the F-35 allow states in the region to reach out, back and up to craft coalition capabilities.

For a look at the full strategy see

https://sldinfo.com/special-report-on-crafting-a-new-pacific-strategy/

An earlier version of this article was published on AOL Defense

http://defense.aol.com/2011/12/22/f-35-will-revolutionize-air-combat-power-in-the-pacific/

If you wish to comment on this article please go here

http://www.sldforum.com/2011/12/the-japanese-f-35-decision-a-building-block-in-a-new-pacific-strategy/

China and the North Korean Succession

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on China and the North Korean Succession
01/07/2012
The North Korean Challenge is a Looming Threat to Global Stability (Credit image: Bigstock)
Dr. Richard Weitz (Credit: The Hudson Institute)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

01/07/2011 – The international community has looked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to influence the North Korean succession process in ways that help end the protracted dispute over Pyongyang’s nuclear program and other threatening behavior.

The PRC is North Korea’s most important foreign diplomatic, economic, and security partner. Through the Six-Party Talks and other mechanisms, PRC policy makers have sought optimal outcome would be for the regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to relinquish its nuclear weapons and moderate its other foreign and defense policies in return for security assurances, economic assistance, and diplomatic acceptance by the rest of the international community.

Such a benign outcome would avoid the feared consequences of precipitous regime change—humanitarian emergencies, economic reconstruction, arms races, and military conflicts.

The Chinese have long opposed North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, if for no other reason than that its advent might induce South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan to pursue their own nuclear forces, which under some contingencies might be used against Beijing as well as Pyongyang. Some Chinese, recalling their problems with Russia and Vietnam, worry that the DPRK might even threaten to use nuclear weapons against China in some future dispute.

The North Korean Challenge is a Looming Threat to Global Stability (Credit image: Bigstock)
The North Korean Challenge is a Looming Threat to Global Stability (Credit image: Bigstock)

PRC decision makers presumably also would like to avoid the negative reaction in Washington and other capitals that would arise if it became evident that Pyongyang had retransferred materials and technologies originally provided by China to third countries. There is evidence that North Korea has exchanged technologies useful for developing WMD and ballistic missiles with Pakistan, another Chinese ally, as well as with Syria and other countries of proliferation concern.

China’s leaders also fear that these ostentatious displays of North Korea’s improving missile and nuclear capacities will further encourage the United States, Japan, Taiwan and other states to develop missile defenses that in turn will weaken the effectiveness of Beijing’s cherished ballistic missile arsenal.

China’s increasingly sophisticated missiles represent a core element of its national security strategy. It has deployed over one thousand intermediate-range missiles within distance of Taiwan to deter, and if necessary punish, Taipei from pursuing policies objectionable to Beijing.

In addition, PRC strategists see their strengthening missile capabilities as a decisive instrument in implementing China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy against the United States. The Chinese military seeks the ability to target any American military forces, including aircraft carriers, which attempt to defend Taiwan or otherwise confront Chinese forces.

As a last resort, the PRC relies on its long-range strategic ballistic missiles to deter the United States from employing its own nuclear forces against China.

Despite their irritation with the DPRK regime, most Chinese officials appear more concerned about the potential collapse of the North Korean state than about its leader’s intransigence on the nuclear and missile questions.

PRC policy makers fear that the North Korea’s disintegration could lead to several negyative consequences.

  • Induce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia;
  • Generate large refugee flows across their borders;
  • Weaken China’s influence in the Koreas by ending their unique status as interlocutors with Pyongyang;
  • Allow the U.S. military to concentrate its military potential in other theaters (e.g., Taiwan);
  • Potentially remove a buffer separating their borders from American ground forces (i.e., should the U.S. Army redeploy into northern Korea).

At worst, the DPRK’s collapse could precipitate military conflict and civil strife on the peninsula—which could spill across into Chinese territory.  PRC policy makers have therefore consistently resisted military action, severe economic sanctions, and other developments that could threaten instability on the Korean peninsula.

To prevent these adverse outcomes, PRC policy makers continue to take steps to avert state failure in North Korea and counter other possible sources of chaos on the Korean peninsula.

China still provides the DPRK with essential supplies of food, weapons, and other economic and political support. According to one estimate, North Korea receives about half its food and almost all its oil imports from China. In 2008, trade between the PRC and the DPRK reached $2.79 billion, up 41.3 percent since 2007, making China the DPRK’s most important trading partner.  Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans reside and often work in China.  PRC enterprises also own substantial investment in North Korea.

Although China provides much economic and technological aid to the DPRK, presumably some economic transactions occur due to commercial considerations that provide some benefits to the Chinese partner.  These growing economic ties with the DPRK, as well as the PRC’s security and other interests in North Korea, give many Chinese a major stake in averting additional economic sanctions, not antagonizing the DPRK leadership to such an extent that North Korea might retaliate against Chinese economic interests, and above all avoiding regime change in Pyongyang.

This desire to avoid antagonizing Pyongyang partly explains why Chinese authorities continue their controversial policy of forcefully repatriating political and religious refugees from the DPRK. Official PRC policy treats all North Koreans who enter Chinese policy without permission as economic migrants. A bilateral treaty requires Chinese authorities to repatriate them to the DPRK. Fear of antagonizing North Korean leaders, along with a natural desire to avoid thinking about unpleasant outcomes, also explains why Chinese officials have declined U.S. proposals to discuss how their two countries might respond should Kim Jong Il be replaced.  Even PRC scholars are reluctant to engage in informal or track II talks with Americans or other foreigners about how the international community might respond to state failure in the DPRK for fear that the North Koreans would learn of the talks and respond provocatively.  American policy makers worry that, without such contingency planning, Chinese, U.S., and South Korean forces could inadvertently clash if they independently intervened in the DPRK following abrupt regime change there.

To limit external threats to the DPRK, Chinese government representatives have also consistently striven to downplay concerns about the extent of North Korea’s missile program as well as its nuclear activities, including evidence of the DPRK’s involvement in the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD technologies to third parties.

They depict Pyongyang less as a nuclear-armed rogue regime than as a potential failed state and humanitarian disaster.

They also argued that the United States and other countries would need to make some concessions to Pyongyang to secure North Korea’s denuclearization, rather than expect North Korea to disarm first before discussing the provision of any possible rewards. Along with South Korea and Russia, China has resisted imposing sanctions that could inflict severe harm on the fragile North Korean economy.

From Beijing’s perspective, an enduring and comprehensive agreement within the Six-Party process would serve many interests. These include:

  • Eliminating the problems that a North Korean nuclear arsenal would present for China; decreasing the threat of U.S. military intervention in a PRC border state;
  • Securing economic and other assistance for Pyongyang that could help avert DPRK state failure on China’s doorstep;
  • Helping to reinforce perceptions of Beijing as a committed and influential regional security stakeholder.

Although Chinese policy makers are comfortable working through the Six-Party Talks, they have also regularly encouraged direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang—the approach favored by North Korea—in pursuit of this goal. They have pressed U.S. and DPRK officials to make reasonable compromises and have criticized American and North Korean policies they consider overly confrontational or provocative.

The U.S. government has had only limited success in exploiting one of Beijing’s worst nightmares regarding North Korea—that Pyongyang’s nuclear detonations and missile launches would trigger an American military response that could threaten the PRC.

Several U.S. officials warned their PRC counterparts in January 2011, most notably before and during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington, that the United States would deploy additional forces in East Asia, on both short-term exercises and long-term deployments, if North Korea continued to develop its capacity to threaten the United States.

During his trip to Beijing a few weeks before the Hu-Obama summit, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had explained that North Korea’s ability to produce nuclear weapons using its longstanding plutonium reprocessing and its newly unveiled uranium enrichment capacities, combined with continued progress in developing long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States, would soon expose Americans to the danger of nuclear missile strikes from North Korea.

The DPRK exploded nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009 launched long-range missile tests in 1998, 2006 and 2009, with each launch traveling farther than the previous one. If current trends continue, the DPRK will eventually be able to place a nuclear warhead on a functional intercontinental ballistic missile. Although the United States officially tolerates a mutual deterrence relationship with the PRC, along with Russia, such a relationship has always been excluded with North Korea. If the United States were to be vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear strike, then the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantees to its Asian allies would be called into question. South Koreans and Japanese could legitimately doubt that the U.S. officials would defend them against a DPRK attack if North Korea could destroy Los Angeles in retaliation. They could decide to acquire their own nuclear deterrent, whose use in response to an attack against them would be much more credible than that of a third party.

As Beijing well understands, a strengthening of the U.S. military alliances in East Asia would also enhance their capacity to counter China.

For example, the deployment of additional U.S. missile defenses, warships, and warplanes in the western Pacific region would also bolster the U.S. capacity to defend Taiwan and Japan from Chinese threats. Perhaps for this reason, the joint China-U.S. statement signed during Hu’s last visit to the United States expressed concern about the DPRK’s new uranium enrichment capacity, a subject the Chinese had previously avoided. But Beijing’s change of course has been limited. PRC officials have still not blamed the DPRK for the Cheonan attack, criticized the artillery barrage against Yeonpyeong Island, or demanded an end to its uranium enrichment program.

Beijing’s willingness to pressure Pyongyang to modify its policies is constrained by a fundamental consideration. PRC policy makers have found themselves cross-pressured in the case of North Korea. Although they would prefer that Pyongyang refrain from provocative actions, and would welcome a denuclearization and Korean peace agreement, they are not willing to impose substantial pressure on the DPRK regime for fear that it would collapse.

The DPRK’s sudden demise could lead to mass refugee problems, the end of a buffer state separating PRC territory from the American military, and the redirection of ROK investment flows from the PRC to North Korea, which would require a massive socioeconomic upgrading to reach ROK-levels as part of reunification.

Unlike most policy makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, PRC policy makers want to change Pyongyang’s behavior, not its regime.

Chinese officials remain more concerned about the potential collapse of the DPRK than about its government’s intransigence on the nuclear issue or other questions.

The Chinese government has accordingly been willing to take only limited steps to achieve its objectives.

These measures have included exerting some pressure (criticizing DPRK behavior and temporarily reducing economic assistance), but mostly have aimed to entice Pyongyang through economic bribes and other inducements.

Despite their frustrations with Kim Jong-Il, PRC policy makers appear to have resigned themselves to dealing with his son for now while hoping a more accommodating leadership will eventually emerge in Pyongyang. The PRC representatives flocking to Pyongyang are not trying to induce him to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons. They are seeking to ingratiate Kim Jong Un towards China for supporting him in a period of very difficult transition.

Whither the Eurozone?

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Whither the Eurozone?
01/03/2012

01/03/2012 – by Dr. Harald Malmgren

News headlines about the European Union summit on 8-9 December declared that “Eurozone leaders agree treaty changes.”  UK Prime Minister Cameron vetoed change of the EU Treaties.  So what was really agreed?

Leaders of the 17 Euro members and several other EU members agreed to pursue the possibility of incorporating into their own national laws a “fiscal union” based upon German-devised rules and penalties.  The group of nations that were ultimately successful in carrying out this task would then constitute a “core” Euro membership, with collective commitments embodied in their respective national laws, under a collective system of oversight.

How to give this the legal authority of a treaty is now being examined by the EU Commission and the Euro member governments, but for the time being there is no agreement on “treaty changes.”

The Eurozone is in the flux of significant change. Will a new treaty be part of the solution? (Credit Image: Bigstock)

Some of the leaders who agreed to continue the discussion of potential legislative changes also said they would have to “consult their parliaments,” or hold a national referendum.  Terms of the “fiscal union” were laid out in a December 7 letter from Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy to EU President VanRompuy.  This letter lays out specific terms for establishment of a fiscal union, based upon strict fiscal guidelines for national budgets, review of budgets by EU officials, and “automatic” disciplinary measures, subject to “qualified majority voting” (weighted voting according to the share of GDP of the group of countries adopting the fiscal union).  The new rules and automatic disciplines are expected to be written into national laws by each parliament.  The letter declares drafts of the legislative revisions would be reviewed by the European Court of Justice to ensure consistency of national laws with the German-devised provisions of the fiscal union.

The necessary assumption underlying the Merkel-Sarkozy letter was that the EU treaties would be amended.  Cameron’s veto prevented that.  A number of European legal firms have already privately prepared opinions for their clients that without a change in the European treaties, the European Court of Justice and the EU Commission would not have legal authority to enforce the fiscal union rules and disciplinary actions.

Much intricate legal manipulation would likely be needed to find a means for participating governments to erect an appropriate legal structure that might enable the European Court and the EU Commission to play a meaningful role.  That may take months, as the European Court and the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe will both need to consider the legal standing of whatever new fiscal union agreement is reached.

Under “qualified majority voting” Germany would be the dominant vote for or against any disciplinary action or “enforcement,” and no other group of governments could jointly enforce an action against Germany.  Politically, this will be a hard sell to many parliaments and their voters.  National spending and tax decisions approved by elected parliaments would be subject to review and revision by non-voting, non-citizens of those countries who preside over a collective decision body.  There can be no doubt that national parliaments would be ceding sovereignty to non-national, non-elected overseers who are citizens of other nations.  Ironically, President Sarkozy has publicly promised his national parliament that France would not cede any degree of sovereignty to Germany or anyone else.  The Merkel-Sarkozy letter calls for participating governments to have new treaty provisions ready by March, 2012.  It is highly unlikely that President Sarkozy could take the German outline of the fiscal union to formally request French parliamentary approval just before French national elections on 22 April and 6 May, 2012.  Moreover, there can be much doubt whether the French parliament would approve substantial ceding of sovereignty to non-French officials who are not subject to French elections, particularly if such a new entity was German-dominated.

As the German rules and disciplines work through various parliaments, and citizens of participating nations express opposition to them, it is highly likely that elaborate negotiations of the specific language will have to take place among two dozen nations.  Some of the participants are likely to drop out, some early and some later in the process.  This process of forming a fiscal union will likely take many months, and by the end of the process perhaps only a few may remain.

It is even possible that only Germany will remain.  Some German politicians believe that it would be desirable for the entire process to result in a much smaller “core” Euro membership, most likely without the “southern neighbors” and without the Scandinavians, who will likely choose a different path.  Many German politicians would be happy if the Italian parliament was unable to agree.

It must also be recognized that a number of senior German politicians privately remain hopeful that all the others will fall away, so that Germany can be left alone to seek a new destiny – with greater attention to Russia, China and the rest of Asia and the Middle East.  This idea of “delinkage from the West” has already become part of German security planning, with deep cuts in military spending and manpower, and gradual disengagement with NATO.

In all of this work on fiscal union the issues of growth and of sovereign debt were not addressed.  Markets have remained hopeful that the ECB might eventually take on the role of lender of last resort and buy substantial quantities of Spanish and Italian debt – with the French hoping for purchases of French sovereign debt too.

The Bundesbank continues to say that ECB bond buying or the issuance of collective Eurobonds would be illegal under present treaties.  The German Constitutional Court would likely support this Bundesbank opinion if the ECB were to lean towards mass bond purchasing.  Until the fiscal union is determined to be a treaty, the ECB is legally unlikely to be allowed by courts to take bold bond purchasing that would constitute financial transfers among EU or Euro members.

Thus, an objective assessment would be that the summit leaders simply kicked the can further down the road, only this time in expectation that some members will not be able to remain in the Euro club.  If a new core Euroland emerges, it will be a more   German-dominated core that faces East, to future economic expansion with Russia and Asia, with less reliance on the political and economic dynamics of Southern and Western Europe – allowing detachment from the Atlantic security umbrella which Germany and some others likely feel is too costly to maintain and no longer needed.

Coast Guard Stakes Its Future on National Security Cutters

Posted on | by SysAdmin
(Credit: National Defense)

01/03/2012 – by Dr. Scott Truver

The focal point of U.S. Coast Guard acquisition reform and recapitalization remains the National Security Cutter.

The NSC is one of the Coast Guard’s major contributions to the nation’s fleet. As such, the Navy may want to look at the Legend-class cutters as a cost-effective means to carry out “lower end,” yet critical roles and missions, and as a complement to its Littoral Combat Ships.

Unlike the 45-plus knot Littoral Combat Ship, the NSC has been optimized for higher speeds and significant endurance. Compared to the Hamilton-class 378s they are replacing, the 418-foot NSC design provides better seakeeping and higher sustained transit speeds of 28 knots, or 30-plus knots sprint speed; greater endurance and range with maximum 90-day patrols and 12,000 nautical miles at 12 knots; an improved ability to launch and recover small boats, helicopters and drones; and advanced secure command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) and ability to handle sensitive information.

(Credit: National Defense)
(Credit: National Defense)

That said, budgets will remain squeaky-tight for years, if not longer, and dynamics completely out of the Coast Guard’s control could derail even the best of plans.

The first three cutters were procured through the Deepwater Integrated Coast Guard Systems consortium under cost-plus incentive-fee contracts. NSC numbers four and five are being procured through Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Miss., under fixed-price incentive-firm contracts.

As of late 2011, the total costs of the NSC ships were: $591 million for the Bertholf, which included design costs; $432 million for the Waesche; $467 million for Stratton; and $480 million for Hamilton. The Coast Guard in September signed a contract for a fifth unnamed ship for $482 million. Three of the cutters — Bertholf, Waesche and Stratton — were sailing by the end of November. Plans call for the remaining three NSCs to be delivered by 2019.

The Office of Management and Budget has approved a capital investment plan for the next five years that shows numbers six, seven and eight in the program.

“I’m optimistic that we will get it done,” Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp Jr. noted in a National Defense interview. “We need to get it done and I’m committed to getting those eight ships built.”

Shipyard innovations and learning-curve efficiencies contributed to the $180 million reduction in the cost of the second ship compared to the lead cutter. Costs increased for Stratton and Hamilton, however, which was largely the result of structural enhancements to improve fatigue life, for which Bertholf and Waesche will be retrofitted in the future. And, a 3-year delay between the third and fourth NSCs also contributed to an increase in costs for Hamilton.

The $482 million contract the Coast Guard signed for the fifth national security cutter is only $2 million more than Hamilton cost.

The first two NSCs were found to be remarkably “clean” during their builders’ and acceptance trials, thus reducing the need for expensive “fix-its.” Although the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) identified some problems, it concluded that Bertholf is a “unique and very capable platform with great potential for future service.”

More important, the service and shipyard capitalized on lessons learned from Bertholf during construction of Waesche and in November 2009 took delivery of a cutter that had a significantly higher level of quality and completeness than the lead ship. INSURV reported Waesche is a “very clean and capable platform” that met or exceeded all readiness expectations.

“We continue to build on lessons learned and made significant improvements to the Stratton, including hull-strengthening, construction process efficiencies, enhanced functionality and improved sequencing,” Mike Duthu, NSC program manager at Ingalls Shipbuilding division, said in an interview. “There is an intense focus on achieving lessons learned, and we constantly ask ourselves: How can we do this better and more efficiently? This process involved all divisions of the yard and every functional department — operations, engineering, planning and material experts.”

As a result, Stratton was delivered in September with 31 percent fewer INSURV-noted discrepancies than Waesche.

One of the most notable process improvements has been the significant reduction in the number of “grand blocks” — multiple units stacked together in large assembly halls away from the waterfront — used to put together the ship’s hull. Entire sections of the NSC are built and outfitted on shore, out of the weather, and then lifted into place, allowing for earlier outfitting completion and testing, and resulting in a significant reduction in wait times. Time is money.

“We used 32 grand block lifts to assemble Bertholf and 29 lifts for Waesche, but needed only 14 to assemble Stratton,” Duthu said. “This enabled more sub-assembly work in each grand block in a controlled environment and led to fewer construction hours compared to the process for Bertholf.”

Also, the design has remained remarkably stable since the reviews of 2002-2004. “The shipyard benefitted from mission/requirements stability,” Duthu said. “There was not much ‘churn’ in requirements, although the post-9/11 environment did see some new requirements.”

Those included collective protection system for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection and the sensitive information facility in Bertholf and the following ships. Concerns about hull strength drove a design change in the third NSC, he said.

“That’s a good thing from the yard’s perspective, as we can take advantage of the efficiencies associated with a stable design,” Duthu said.

Acquisition stability is also critical, as it allows the yard to get closer to a “heel-to-toe” production schedule — ideally a new ship award every year. That wasn’t the case for the first three ships, but the contract for the fourth came with an option for number five, Duthu noted.

The Coast Guard’s acquisition practice of awarding one cutter every several years works against achieving efficiencies from serial production and materials buys. It is unlikely the program will have a multi-year procurement for the final three cutters, which would require congressional authorization. But, if the program is expanded beyond eight ships, for other U.S. and foreign customers, that might be a cost-saving option to consider.

“We’d be able to leverage everything — stable workload, stable funding and a stable product funded at consistent and constant intervals — to wring even more efficiencies out of the program,” Duthu offered. “But without such stability, it’s unlikely that the cost can come down much more than it already has.”

The cutters’ roots are in the ill-fated and now-defunct Integrated Deepwater Systems program, which included three classes of cutters and other boats, new manned patrol aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, and leading-edge off-the-shelf C4ISR systems.

As early as 2001, Deepwater had come under increasing scrutiny and criticism from Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general, and sundry official and unofficial observers. Among other challenges, the GAO identified serious management, funding, cost, schedule, design and technical shortcomings in several Deepwater “asset classes.” A new July report noted the program “continues to exceed the cost and schedule baselines approved … in 2007.”

The upshot of these challenges was the dismissal of the Integrated Coast Guard Systems lead systems integrator, a joint venture of Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Now, a revamped Coast Guard acquisition directorate oversees the $25 billion program, which still looks to recapitalize the Coast Guard for the 21st century.

“We have instituted acquisition reforms now that I think serve as a model for other organizations across government,” Papp testified in March before the House Homeland Security committee’s transportation and infrastructure subcommittee.

“There is a sense of urgency to get on with recapitalizing the Coast Guard,” Capt. Peter Oittinen, the Legend-class program manager in the service’s acquisition directorate, said in an interview. “The eight NSCs are replacing the 12 increasingly obsolescent and costly-to-maintain 378-foot Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters that have been in service since the 1960s.”

“Eight NSCs might not be enough,” said Capt. Kelly Hatfield, commanding officer of the cutter Waesche.

There are indications that the service would gladly accept another two or three or more NSCs, should the resources be available, particularly if other components of the service-wide recapitalization program do not materialize.

The NSCs are also ideal for the growing maritime security/constabulary tasks under the National Fleet Policy calling for Navy and Coast Guard forces to partner. There are direct commonalities with the Freedom and Independence classes of Littoral Combat Ships and even the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) guided-missile destroyers.

“The NSCs were designed and engineered with two competing attributes,” Hatfield noted. “They are multi-mission ships that have long endurance but can go fast.”

Posted with the permission of National Defense (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/January/Pages/CoastGuardStakesItsFutureonNationalSecurityCutters.aspx)

For our special report on the National Security Cutters see https://sldinfo.com/national-security-cutter-special-report/.

The Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor: Where Manufacturing is Not a Dirty Word

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor: Where Manufacturing is Not a Dirty Word
(Credit: Gulf Coast Reporter's League)

01/03/2012 – by George Talbot

Any region that wants jobs with good wages and a secure future is eager for a piece of the $219 billion U.S. aerospace industry. It’s such an appealing prospect that a group of competing states in the Southeast actually joined forces to back EADS’ bid to create a multi-million-dollar aircraft assembly plant in Mobile, Ala.

The rivals in Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana knew the impact would go well beyond the Mobile area and would create thousands of spinoff jobs. They saw it as a watershed event, like Mercedes-Benz’s decision in 1993 to establish a manufacturing plant in Alabama – ushering in a new era of automotive production across the South.

(Credit: Gulf Coast Reporter's League)

EADS lost the bid to build Air Force tankers in early 2011, dealing a setback to the region. But the competition brought a spotlight on the significant and widespread aerospace activities in the South.

A few highlights:

  • Lockheed Martin builds F-22 Raptors and C-130J transports in Marietta, Ga.
  • Boeing is building 787 commercial jets in Charletson, S.C.
  • Northrop Grumman is building Fire Scout UAVs and fuselages for the RQ-4 Global Hawk in Moss Point, Miss.
  • Airbus established an engineering center in Mobile, Ala., where about 200 aerospace engineers perform design work on a variety of commercial aircraft.

Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida all can lay claim to significant aerospace activities. There’s the massive aerospace cluster around Redstone Arsenal and the Marshall Space Fight Center in Huntsville, Ala., one of the largest in the nation. There’s the growing aviation region around the Golden Triangle of east-central Mississippi, Florida’s Space Coast, and the multi-state aerospace corridor along the Interstate 10, just to name a few.

It’s that I-10 corridor that’s the focus of the first report produced by The Gulf Coast Reporters’ League, an independent team of journalists, in part because it’s the one aerospace cluster in the region that includes a piece of all four states. The Florida state line is less than 144 miles from the Louisiana state line.

The Gulf Coast Reporters’ League has published an 88-page report, “Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor 2011-2012,” to provide the public, economic development officials and politicians with a better understanding of the considerable capabilities of the region, not only in aerospace, but in other science, technology, engineering and math fields.

The comprehensive report has six parts: foreign investments; space activities; RDT&E applied technology; unmanned systems/robotics; military aviation; and education/workforce.

The Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor is an urbanized region with multiple contiguous metropolitan areas that includes the largest city in Louisiana, second largest in Mississippi and third largest in Alabama. It’s something of a microcosm of the aerospace activities found in all four states.

The report isn’t just a catalogue of what’s in the 12-county/parish corridors, but attempts to put those activities into context, to see how it all fits together. The Gulf Coast Reporters’ League shared their executive summary with SLD.

Strong Military Presence

The reporting team found the region has a heavy concentration of military bases and Coast Guard activities, with three of the bases among the most valuable in the United States in terms of replacement value. Most of the bases are involved in some aspect of aviation. The bases occupy more than 700,000 acres along the Gulf Coast, with aviation activities ranging from pilot training to aerial weapons development. This huge military complex trains tens of thousands of students each year, who earn wings or learn technical skills, including cyber security training.

Military activities bring billions each year into the region through payroll, contracting and other activities. Some 3,400 companies in 12 Gulf Coast counties and parishes were awarded $47 billion in Department of Defense contracts between 2000 and 2010.

The region is part of an exclusive club that has a National Aeronautics and Space Administration presence. One of the 10 NASA centers is located in the region, and a NASA manufacturing center is 40 miles away. The region could benefit from NASA’s push to move more of its activities to the private sector.

Target Industry

Aerospace is a target industry for Alabama, Mississippi and Florida, and Louisiana.  The region has targeted advanced manufacturing. Local economic development groups have also targeted aerospace, and state and local leaders have joined in regional alliances to pursue the aerospace industry.

Six commercial airports and multiple non-commercial, long-runway airports, allowing easy access to the western, central and eastern portions of the corridor, serve the region. Many of the commercial airports include military aviation activities, and some of the non-commercial airports play key roles in military and non-military aviation activities.

Major U.S. aerospace and defense companies have operations in the Gulf Coast region, including many with multiple sites. Foreign aerospace and defense companies and non-aerospace companies also have a sizeable footprint in the region. China’s AVIC is the newest entrant in the region.

R and D Highlighted

There are 16 universities, several with “very high” research activity, that operate or have interests in the I-10 region. Organizations operated by those universities include the National Science Foundation Engineering Research Center, Raspet Flight Laboratory, Polymer Research Institute, High-Performance Materials Institute, Center for Advanced Power Systems, National Center for Advanced Manufacturing, and Research and Engineering Education Facility. One community college, Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College, is among the top associate degree producers in STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) programs in the United States.

There are multiple technology transfer offices and business incubators across the region. A new group, the Gulf Coast Patent Association, was formed in 2010 to focus on intellectual property issues.

Research and development activities in the region involve federal, state and corporate players. One base alone spends more in research and development each year than many of the nation’s most prestigious universities.

Aerospace activities include many in growth sectors, including unmanned aerial systems, propulsion systems, advanced materials and geospatial technologies. One university activity focuses on micro air vehicles that use nano-sensors. In addition to unmanned aerial systems, at least three federal operations are involved in some aspect of unmanned underwater vehicles.

Two areas in South Mississippi are authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration to fly unmanned aerial vehicles. Unmanned systems are also flown at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., in military air space.

Aerospace and technology parks have been established or are developing across the region, including a 3,900-acre park at Stennis Space Center, Miss. In addition, NASA hopes to turn more than 800 acres around New Orleans’ Michoud Assembly Facility into an advanced manufacturing park. Michoud is home to the National Center for Advanced Manufacturing.

Brookley Aeroplex in Mobile, Ala., has been focusing on aerospace activities for years. It has been a finalist three times for major aircraft plants. It was chosen by one foreign company, but economic problems in that country forced the cancellation of the project. It was also a finalist for a Boeing plant, and was chosen by EADS to build tankers. That project died when the Air Force awarded the contract to Boeing, but Airbus continues to examine Brookley as a site for commercial aircraft production. Another site in nearby Hancock County, Miss. has twice been a finalist for aircraft production plants.

Shaping an Educated Workforce

States and local areas have workforce programs to train blue- and white-collar workers for the aerospace and related industries. Many of the programs are company specific. Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida are right-to-work states.

According to a study, the Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin MSA in Florida has the third highest concentration of aerospace engineers in the nation behind Huntsville, Ala., and Melbourne, Fla.

High schools in the region have programs targeting aerospace, advanced materials and geospatial career fields. A career academy in Northwest Florida allows students to engage in real-world projects in science and math to achieve high school and college credit and industry-recognized certification. It’s become a national model.

Expanding the Footprint

The reporters found that the Gulf Coast region’s aerospace activities are deep and widespread, and cover a large assortment of fields. The region along the Interstate 10 corridor has built its aviation infrastructure over the past 100 years, and owes much of its growth to military and space flight endeavors of the federal government.

Today the Gulf Coast’s aerospace footprint includes federal and commercial space activities, aerial weapons development, unmanned aircraft production, aircraft parts and avionics manufacturing, military aviation activities, and research and development that includes three detachments from two highly-regarded military research laboratories.

Three of four states with a piece of the I-10 aerospace corridor have targeted aerospace, a lucrative market in the United States, with sales expected to top $219 billion in 2011. It involves everything from Earth-bound flights to voyages into deep space. The fourth state, Louisiana, has targeted advanced manufacturing, aerospace and non-aerospace alike.

Local economic development professionals along the Gulf Coast have also targeted the industry, and have formed cross-border alliances to pursue aviation. One reason for cooperation is the recognition that a large aerospace activity in any part of the I-10 region is likely to have a spillover impact on nearby areas.

The cooperation is in part because aerospace pay is generally higher than other industries, and has room for workers ranging from skilled blue-collar production-line workers to white-collar engineers. Aerospace also relies on several complementary industries, like advanced materials and sensor technologies.

The federal aerospace activities, both NASA and the military, have poured billions into the Gulf Coast. Personnel at the mix of bases, aviation and non-aviation, receive better-than-average paychecks, and the facilities spend billions buying services locally, from construction work to defense equipment. In 2010 alone, contractors in the 12 counties/parishes were awarded 6,225 contracts totaling $3.97 billion.

The federal military and space activity led to another, lesser-known pillar of the Gulf Coast aerospace corridor: research, development, test and evaluation. The region has a piece of the nation’s $397.6 billion research and development enterprise, with federal, university and private companies all involved. Florida’s Eglin Air Force Base alone spends more on research each year than many of the nation’s foremost universities. There are also aerospace-related research and applied technology activities, notably advanced materials and remote sensing/geospatial technologies.

To protect the lucrative activities, local officials make it a priority to protect their bases and the NASA facilities from encroachment. While it’s clear that one reason is the value of the bases to the economy, another factor may be the pro-military population itself. Counties and parishes in the region have a higher proportion of veterans than the nation as a whole.

With a population that’s decidedly pro-military and political leaders who support the military, the region has gained more than it’s lost from base closings. Every branch of the military, active duty and reserve, is represented, as is the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Coast Guard.

The Balance Sheet

Looking beyond aerospace, the business-friendly region offers tax breaks and other incentives to new and established businesses alike. They promote their generally lower cost of living and lower cost of doing business. While there are unions, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi are all right-to-work states, considered by some to be a major plus.

Those factors may be partly responsible for the influx of foreign-owned companies, aerospace and otherwise, looking to establish a foothold in the United States marketplace. Indeed, while much of the country frets over jobs moving off shore, the Gulf Coast has been a beneficiary of what some call “in-sourcing.”

The Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor isn’t the largest in the nation or the Southeast. But its broad range of activities, multiple seaports and airports, road and rail systems allow easy access from within the United States and abroad, and may provide it with a competitive advantage.

But no area is perfect, and that’s the case with the Gulf Coat region. There remain issues with insurance as a result of the hurricanes that have hit the region. And educational attainment has been a concern for years. Federal data, admittedly dated, shows the number of high school graduates and degree-holders as a proportion of the population to be below the national average.

But caution must be taken in viewing those countywide figures. The numbers go up when individual cities are considered. Pensacola, for example, has a higher proportion of high school graduates in the population and a significantly higher number of people with college degrees, 32.4 percent compared to the nation’s 24.4 percent. Mobile, Ala., too, has higher numbers than the national average. Individual schools also have singled themselves out for their academic achievements.

And while the military has been and will continue to be a pillar of the region’s economy, at least one public official sees that as both good and bad. Florida State Sen. Don Gaetz, R-Niceville, is concerned that there’s too much reliance on tourism and the military in his part of Florida. He and others want to see more diversity, through attracting a range of high-tech and mid-tech industries that can take advantage of the trained workforce.

The Gulf Coast Reporters’ League believes that the tools exist in the Gulf Coast Corridor to grow the aerospace industry. It’s just a matter of understanding how to leverage them, and working together in a manner that will benefit the entire region.

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Want to learn more about the aerospace activities in the Gulf Coast I-10 Region? The Gulf Coast Reporters’ League, an independent team of journalists, took on the issue in an 88-page book. You can download the free PDF of the full book at gulfcoastaerospacecorridor.com/gulfcoastaerospacecorridorbook.html. (29.15 MB file, available as full booklet or by chapter)

To purchase a print edition of the book, visit lulu.com and place the number “10757864″ or “Gulf Coast Aerospace Corridor 2011-2012″ in the “find” space. Copies are available individually or in multiples, with a choice of shipping methods.

Beyond Putinism

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Beyond Putinism
12/23/2011
At present, most Russians still probably want the regime-led reform rather than regime change. (Credit Image: Bigstock)
Dr. Richard Weitz (Credit: The Hudson Institute)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

12/14/2011 – Recent Russian elections have identified several weaknesses in Russia’s political system, but not the means solve them. Russia is experiencing its own unexpected Arab Spring, though the system should survive and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is likely to return to the presidency next year. But the Putin system that has defined Russian politics is likely to end within the next decade since its vulnerabilities cannot be addressed by the modest reforms that the leading members of the regime can support.

Even the official tallies show that a majority of Russians voted against the ruling United Russia Party in the December 4 elections. They lost substantial support among the middle class, nationalist intelligentsia, and nouveau riche, who previously rallied behind Putin as the man who saved Russia from the disorders and weaknesses of the 1990s. Moscow and other big cities saw a surge in votes for the Communists, while the liberals gained support in certain important areas, including reportedly the Russian Embassy here in Washington, which has some of the smartest diplomats and policy analysts in town. According to other sources, not a single sailor in two Russian nuclear submarines in the Arctic cast their ballot for United Russia, underlying discontent in the military despite Putin’s pledge to boost military spending.

At present, most Russians still probably want the regime-led reform rather than regime change. (Credit Image: Bigstock)
At present, most Russians still probably want the regime-led reform rather than regime change. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

Putin’s electorate now consists primarily of the poor, uneducated, and the North Caucasus, where the local satraps secure Central Asian like majorities of 90+% percent in return for the lavish funding they receive from the Kremlin fearful that ceasing such payments, as the Russian nationalists now demand, will see them lose control over the region to the Islamists.

There is considerable evidence that much voting fraud occurred during, before, and after December 4 and that the cheating overwhelmingly favored the ruling party, United Russia (now called the “party of crooks and thieves” by critics who accuse it of stealing votes like it steals money from the people). which unlike in previous elections was running scared.

Thanks to the modern communications technology, amateur election observers were able to make videos of blatant ballot stuffing and other electoral crimes and then post them on the Internet. In addition, Russian and foreign monitors were denied access to the polling places and the leading Russian monitoring organization, Golos, came under sustained cyber attack on voting day.

But many of the distortions occurred before voting day. President Dmitry Medvedev has long attacked the “legal nihilism” underpinning corruption and the lack of the rule of law in Russia. This phenomenon has been very evident in Russian politics even during his four years in office, and especially in recent months.

For example, the Ministry of Justice refused to register for the ballot of nine of the political parties most hostile to the regime, such as Boris Nemtsov’s People’s Freedom Party. The head of the electoral commission was a blatant partisan of United Russia. And provincial and local officials instructed public employees to back Kremlin-approved candidates.

Some of the ruling party’s backers might have artificially boosted the Russian Communist Party’s totals since Putin would like nothing better than to depict this upcoming March’s presidential race as a contest between him and perennial second-place finisher Gennady Zyuganov, who has led the Party since Russia’s independence two decades ago. Meanwhile, perennial Liberal Democratic Party (sic) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky can siphon some votes away from more radical anti-Kremlin nationalists like popular firebrand Alexei Navalny, a lawyer who has moved from denouncing Russian bureaucrats for financial fraud to denouncing the ruling party for electoral fraud.

In any case, the electoral laws cushioned the magnitude of Putin’s setback. The United Russia captured a majority of the Duma seats after the votes of the parties that failed to pass the  seven percent threshold (in itself an unusually high barrier for a proportional representation system) needed to receive seats in parliament. These votes were then distributed to those whose initial totals indicated they exceeded that hurdle. In the new Duma, United Russia will have 238 seats (a loss of 77 seats). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation will have 92 seats, the leftist A Just Russia will have 64 seats, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will hold 56 seats.

The Kremlin, as it has done for the past 20 years, can bribe and otherwise secure legislative support from Just Russia, the Liberal Democrats, and other pliant political parties and ambitious or covetous faction members by applying the numerous administrative resources at his disposal. The president can and also does simply make decisions by decree or by bypassing the Duma, whose members constantly complain they know little about the activities of such key institutions as the armed forces and the security services.

At present, most Russians still probably want the regime-led reform rather than regime change. Civil society may be more active than in recent years, and the protests have attracted an unexpectedly large number of participants and have been surprisingly geographically dispersed. Putin’s aura of invincibility has cracked (not good for his tough guy image) and may yet shatter, but the regime’s opponents lack a single leader, party or even core idea around which to rally. They naturally find it easier to unite against what they oppose but will need a more positive agenda to make further progress. For now, the opposition is just as divided as the elite, with the communists, nationalists, and liberals setting aside their differences for the moment but probably not for long, especially after the regime starts inciting them against each other.

Still, the Arab Spring illustrates how resisting reforms and denying people opportunities to express peaceful even political opposition can lead to mass social protests that demand a change of regime rather than merely its policies. Perceptions of widespread electoral fraud have led to colored revolutions in several other former Soviet republics. The cases of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate that authoritarian regimes are vulnerable when electoral fraud, political manipulation, and economic corruption grow so extensive that they undermine the regime’s legitimacy.

Despite some high-profile reform initiatives during the last few years under President Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s quasi-authoritarian political system has continued, though power is now awkwardly shared between Medvedev and (mostly) Putin rather than concentrated solely in the office of the presidency. This problem will be solved when Putin, who faces a strong opposition candidate or party, returns to the presidency in a few months and consolidates political power in his person.

Even so, the larger problem is that system still lacks a means of allocating and transferring political power that is widely seen as legitimate. The practice of Putin’s exchanging jobs as he desires and changing key personnel without popular consultation breeds popular alienation cynicism, and occasionally anger. In addition, it reinforces the problem that Russia’s political institutions, with the exception of the presidency, are undeveloped and therefore unable to establish an effective system of political checks and balances.

Under Putin and Medvedev, the prime minister and the president have dominated decision making, coerced the legislature into serving as a highly compliant body under the overwhelming control of pro-Kremlin parties, and reigned in the autonomy of Russia’s regions, media, corporations, and other key political and economic actors. Pro-Kremlin political parties, receiving substantial Kremlin support, dominate the political landscape, while other political movements—nationalists, communists, and liberals—have been marginalized.

The government pursues modest economic and political liberalization to mitigate pressures for more comprehensive political and economic reforms. The political authorities tolerate groups that have non-political agendas and mobilize to address specific problems, but repress groups, by manipulation when possible, but with force if necessary, that seek to overturn the existing political system through mass action.

Media controls are scaled, with the most extensive government controls applied to the most widely used communication sources, such as television. The Internet, specialized journals, and other lesser used media are often manipulated rather than controlled. The government hires pro-regime writers and bloggers to communicate its messages. Russian officials are aware that excessive Internet controls can inhibit economic growth by denying business and public decision-makers access to important information. Restrictions on political expression deny the authorities a feedback mechanism for identifying and correcting flawed policies. Nonetheless, the ability of people to discredit the fairness of the ballot so easily by posting embarrassing videos will surely tempt the Kremlin’s team to try to restrict its use more extensively in the future.

Even so, many of the protesters are motivated most by this feeling of disempowerment, that their votes do not matter, and by a loss of dignity, a sense that they do not matter to those who rule in their name. The protesters want their leaders to listen to them. But even if they are heard, the structural constraints of Russia’s current political and economic system will make it difficult for the regime to meet the protesters’ demands.