By John Blaxland
There’s an understandable inclination at first blush to see the U.S. presidential election outcome as auguring difficult times ahead on the global stage.
President elect Donald Trump’s iconoclastic rhetoric on Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan, tariffs and more in the lead-up to the election, coupled with his transactional approach to business, alliances and international institutions, and of making America great again appear to be zero-sum propositions for which the world is bracing for impact.
Australia is a bit of an outlier on this, though, on a range of fronts. Public statements have invariably emphasized shared values, but it is enduring overlapping interests that will feature more prominently now.
Economically, Australian stocks are high. The biggest direct foreign investor in Australia is the United States – by a country mile. The U.S. retains a considerable trade surplus with Australia, which can be expected to act as a buffer for Trump’s tariff instincts. Thanks in part to the multi-trillion dollar super funds portfolio, the U.S. is a significant beneficiary of Australian funds investments. What’s more, Australian firms employ about 150,000 Americans and U.S. firms employ about 300,000 Australians.
Security-wise, the trusted collaboration is far more profound than most would appreciate.
Dating back multiple generations, to the dark days of the Second World War, if not to the shared crucible of war in 1918 in France, deep, trusted and trusting collaboration has seen the relationship go far beyond the ANZUS pact of 1951. That 800-plus word essay did not include a mutual defence clause, a headquarters, a commander or assigned forces. Today, though, the bilateral Australian-U.S. defence ties are surprisingly broad and deep, across the land, air, sea, logistics, intelligence, space, cyber and intelligence domains.
They are most tangibly evident in the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap, which is a unique top secret facility operated and crewed 50 percent by Australians. Successive governments, when briefed on what it offers to Australia, have become its ardent defenders, largely because of the insights on the world it offers Australian government decision-makers. That’s not going away anytime soon.
Indeed, the intelligence ties are a super-enabler for Australia, not just in hard military sense, but in terms of access to advanced technology that enables the work of policing intelligence, financial intelligence and more.
Critics of AUKUS are easy to find, and already the sense is that this scheme may have left Australia unduly exposed. Yet indicators to date suggest that, while delays and costs may blow out, the U.S. remains committed to ensuring nuclear propulsion submarines are available and operate from and around Australian waters. Initially with U.S. Navy boats and eventually with Australian-owned ones as well. Viable alternatives are not easy to find. Indeed, the submarine base at Fremantle is becoming a more consequential “suitable piece of real estate”, equivalent in significance to not only the defence of Australia and its interests (as well as those of the United States) as that of Pine Gap.
Pursuing alternative options to AUKUS Pillar I (nuclear propulsion submarines) are effectively no longer viable as they likely would cost a great deal in terms of opportunity cost and more. We can realistically expect the current and future federal governments, of either persuasion, to follow through on this scheme, capitalizing on the considerable investment made in legislative and administrative reform designed to allow greater technology sharing with Australia.
Trump insiders have consistently indicated that, in terms of the art of the deal, AUKUS remains mutually beneficial. What Trump himself thinks, admittedly, has yet to be discerned and, no doubt will be a critical determinant for the future bilateral trajectory. If he changes course, then Australia’s predicament will be considerably more acute.
The prospect of Australia’s defence being dependent on a presidential whim points to the need for Australia to muscle up on its own, including with as much American-sourced technology as can be accessed, without waiting for another white knight, or great white fleet to come to the rescue.
AUKUS Pillar II is already starting to deliver benefits to Australia and the United States, with licensed hi-tech production and manufacture options in the pipeline. The momentum is growing and has been broadly and enthusiastically welcomed by Trump insiders.
Critics may decry the turn in U.S. domestic politics arising from the Trump administration. There are a number of aspects which the Australian government likely will wrestle with, particularly concerning initiatives linked to climate change, as well as diversity, equity and inclusion. Australians offended by such moves should keep things in perspective. Australia has sought closer relations with a number of neighbours with domestic and international policies which are not particularly well received in Australia.
But that has not stopped such initiatives from being progressed.
Now, perhaps, the U.S. will be less seen as a political city on a hill, as much as it ever was. The rhetoric of shared values likely will be toned down and the rhetoric on enduring overlapping interests will now come to the fore. If American soft power wanes as a result, the implications will be widely and deeply felt.
In 2017, shortly after the last time Trump came to office, the Australian Government issued a Foreign Policy White Paper – what I call Australia’s Foreign Policy Plan B. It’s time to re-read that and think further about how we deepen and strengthen the assortment of other regional security and economic ties, to offset the prospects of an unpredictable U.S. government adding to security and stability difficulties in Australia’s neighbourhood.
This article was first published by The Guardian on 7 November 2024 and this version is published with the approval of the author.
Professor John Blaxland, Colonel (Ret’d), BA (Hons), MA, PhD, psc (RT), SFHEA, FRSN, FAIIA, MSM (USA) is Director ANU North America Liaison Office, Washington DC and Professor of International Security & Intelligence Studies in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs of Australian National University.
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