Euronaval Day Three: Candidates Come Aboard and Industry Builds Out the Fleet

11/06/2026
In brief

The third day of Euronaval 2026, held on November 5 at Paris Nord Villepinte, brought French presidential politics onto the show floor.

Three leading candidates used the halls to stake out positions on frigates, NATO and the drone fleet. Meanwhile, industry did the less visible work: signing supply-chain contracts, enlarging existing designs and rolling out modular platforms meant to grow with new technology.

The Candidates Talk Frigates

Édouard Philippe (Horizons), Bruno Retailleau (Les Républicains) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement national) all toured the show on Thursday.[1] L’Opinion also counted Éric Zemmour among the candidates in attendance.[2]

The number of frigates became the shorthand for each candidate’s maritime ambition. Philippe backed a fleet model of at least 18 frigates, compared with the roughly 15 first-rank frigates the Navy plans to field from 2030. He said the defense effort under way since 2017 “should not be relaxed” and that France must “massify” its conventional forces while taking “our full place in NATO” and helping build a European pillar within it.[3]

Retailleau went further, saying France would need “18 or 21” frigates. He also used the visit to revive the idea of a right-and-center primary to be held by mid-February at the latest.[1]

Le Pen said that about a hundred vessels overall is “probably not enough” for a country with the world’s second-largest maritime domain, and called for more frigates while acknowledging budget limits. She named irregular immigration around Mayotte, drug trafficking and undersea-cable surveillance as maritime priorities. She also repeated that she favors France eventually leaving NATO’s integrated command.[4] “The drone is the sailor’s best friend,” she said.[1]

Philippe used his visit to attack the NATO positions of Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon.[2]

Building the Supply Chain

The most concrete industrial news came from the Greek pavilion. Naval Group signed 10 contracts with Greek companies under its Hellenic Industrial Participation program for the FDI frigates, plus two research and development memoranda of understanding.[5]

Five contracts cover frigate construction. Salamis Shipyards will build new FDI hull blocks, METLEN will make torpedo doors in Volos, and other firms will produce electrical and propulsion control panels and composite components. The other five cover support services. The MoUs, with FEAC and SOTIRIA Technology, address undersea warfare, digital twins, signature analysis, magnetometers and seabed-warfare sensors.[5]

Naval Group CEO Pierre Éric Pommellet called the partnerships “fundamental to the success of the FDI program.” More than 75 Greek companies are now in the FDI supply chain. The second Greek frigate, Nearchos, was delivered on October 30, and the third, Formion, is due in December.[5]

A Bigger FDI

Naval Group also showed a stretched version of the FDI. An almost nine-meter section added amidships raises displacement by nearly 800 tonnes to about 5,400 tonnes, and length to nearly 131 meters.[6]

The added volume opens up options for more Exocet anti-ship missiles, additional air-defense cells, A70 launchers for naval cruise missiles, and more than 300 containerized loitering munitions. It also leaves room for drone-control equipment, special-forces support and an admiral’s staff. These are proposed configurations, not an order.[6]

This presentation builds on the day-two announcement that the DGA had ordered an increase in Aster cells on French FDIs from 16 to 32.[7]

Modular Hulls and Motherships

Fincantieri unveiled its Multi-Mission Modular Vessel, a 50-meter, 500-tonne ship built to operate with a core crew of six. It uses interchangeable 10- and 20-foot mission modules for surveillance, infrastructure protection, underwater missions and loitering munitions, and leaves open the possibility of uncrewed operation in the future.[8]

CEO Pierroberto Folgiero said that for Fincantieri, “modularity is not simply a design feature: it is a new paradigm.”[8]

The same day, Fincantieri listed the agreements it signed at the show. These included a joint venture agreement with Indonesia’s REPUBLIKORP to set up a local shipbuilding company, and a letter of intent with Denmark’s J.A. Solutions on containerized systems for reconfigurable naval units.[9]

ST Engineering gave its Multi-Role Vessel its European debut. The 150-meter, 8,000-tonne crewed mothership concept is designed to launch and coordinate uncrewed surface vessels. EDR described the concept as “manned brain, unmanned muscle.”[10]

Partnerships and Orders

Babcock and Everllence signed an MoU that would make Everllence a strategic power-and-propulsion partner for future Arrowhead 140 frigate programs, including potential Danish requirements such as the Arctic Frigate.[11] Exail announced that it had joined Babcock’s ARMOR Force autonomy ecosystem, alongside Thales, Hensoldt, Kraken and others.[12]

HGH announced a French Navy order for three SPYNEL-F panoramic infrared cameras for the Maritime Gendarmerie. This is the second phase of an experimentation program that followed trials in January.[13]

General Atomics displayed a concept for delivering its Vektrex maneuvering projectiles as submunitions from an air-launched missile.[14]

Why It Matters

Day one showed what France intends to buy.

Day two showed how European industry plans to organize to deliver it.

Day three showed that the fleet is now a campaign issue. Every major candidate who came to Villepinte argued for more frigates. They differed on NATO, not on whether France needs more naval mass.

On the industrial side, the day’s news focused on adaptability. The stretched FDI, Fincantieri’s modular vessel and ST Engineering’s mothership all aim to fit drones, loitering munitions and mission modules into hulls that can change over their service lives.

The caveat remains.

Apart from the Greek supply-chain contracts and a small sensor order, most of what appeared on November 5 consisted of concepts, MoUs and letters of intent.

The candidates’ frigate numbers are pledges, not budgets.

The real test comes after the show closes: whether the next president funds 18 or more frigates, and whether these modular designs win orders.

[1] Capital, “Euronaval : Édouard Philippe, Bruno Retailleau et Marine Le Pen jouent leur bataille navale,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/euronaval-edouard-philippe-bruno-retailleau-et-marine-le-pen-jouent-leur-bataille-navale-1531617

[2] L’Opinion, “Euronaval : Edouard Philippe attaque Marine Le Pen et Jean-Luc Mélenchon sur l’Otan,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.lopinion.fr/politique/euronaval-edouard-philippe-attaque-marine-le-pen-et-jean-luc-melenchon-sur-lotan

[3] Le Parisien, “Présidentielle 2027 : Édouard Philippe veut « massifier notre armement conventionnel », l’effort de défense ne doit pas être « relâché »,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/presidentielle-2027-edouard-philippe-veut-massifier-notre-armement-conventionnel-leffort-de-defense-ne-doit-pas-etre-relache-05-11-2026-HHHH2VXS2FG3JAZJCUVR3ZRHC4.php

[4] LCP, “À Euronaval, Marine Le Pen plaide pour davantage de frégates dans la flotte française,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://lcp.fr/actualites/a-euronaval-marine-le-pen-plaide-pour-davantage-de-fregates-dans-la-flotte-francaise

[5] NewsIT, “Euronaval 2026: Οι 10 συμβάσεις και τα 2 μνημόνια που υπέγραψε η Naval με ελληνικές εταιρείες για τις φρεγάτες FDI,” Nov. 6, 2026 (signing dated Thursday, Nov. 5), https://www.newsit.gr/ellada/euronaval-2026-oi-10-symvaseis-kai-ta-2-mnimonia-pou-ypegrapse-i-naval-me-ellinikes-etaireies-gia-tis-fregates-fdi/4815710/; see also Euro2day, “Naval Group signs 10 new contracts with Greek companies,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.euro2day.gr/en/article/2376870/naval-group-signs-10-new-contracts-with-greek-comp (which dates the signing Nov. 4)

[6] Naval News, “Naval Group Unveils a Larger, More Powerful FDI Frigate,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2026/2026/11/naval-group-unveils-a-larger-more-powerful-fdi-frigate/

[7] Zone Militaire / Opex360, “La DGA notifie à Naval Group et à MBDA un contrat pour doubler la puissance de feu des frégates de défense et d’intervention,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.opex360.com/2026/11/05/la-dga-notifie-a-naval-group-et-a-mbda-un-contrat-pour-doubler-la-puissance-de-feu-des-fregates-de-defense-et-dintervention/

[8] PortNews, “Fincantieri unveils six-crew modular naval vessel in France,” Nov. 2026, https://en.portnews.ru/news/399273/

[9] ANSA, “Fincantieri rafforza la cooperazione nella difesa navale con 5 accordi,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/blu_economy/2026/11/05/fincantieri-rafforza-la-cooperazione-nella-difesa-navale-con-5-accordi_edad1a50-c69b-4ac1-a335-36d9c0b42ca6.html

[10] European Defence Review, “Euronaval 2026 – Manned brain, unmanned muscle: ST Engineering’s MRV makes its European debut,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.edrmagazine.eu/euronaval-2026-manned-brain-unmanned-muscle-st-engineerings-mrv-makes-its-european-debut

[11] The Maritime Executive, “Everllence and Babcock Sign MoU to Support Future Arrowhead 140 Programme,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://maritime-executive.com/index.php/corporate/everllence-and-babcock-sign-mou-to-support-future-arrowhead-140-programme

[12] Exail, “Exail joins Babcock’s ARMOR Force ecosystem to advance the Hybrid Navy,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.exail.com/index.php/fr/news/exail-joins-babcocks-armor-force-ecosystem-to-advance-the-hybrid-navy

[13] HGH, “HGH secures an order for three SPYNEL-F panoramic IR cameras from the French Navy for the French Maritime Gendarmerie,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://hgh-infrared.com/fr/hgh-secures-an-order-for-three-spynel-f-panoramic-ir-cameras/

[14] Naval News, “General Atomics Concept Eyes Vektrex in Air-Launched Missile,” Nov. 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2026/2026/11/general-atomics-concept-eyes-vektrex-in-air-launched-missile/

Putin Decree Hides the Paper Trail of Russian Energy Exports as Arctic Traffic Sets Records

In brief

Russia has moved to classify the commercial records behind its energy exports at the same moment traffic on its Arctic shipping corridor is reaching new highs. The combination makes Russian oil, gas and shipping activity harder to verify just as more of it moves through northern waters.

What the Decree Covers

Presidential Decree No. 686, signed on 28 September, restricts the disclosure of specified information about Russia’s fuel and energy sector, as reported by Malte Humpert in High North News on 19 October 2026. Covered information is to be kept confidential, and its dissemination through mass media and the internet is restricted. The list includes:

  • names, quantities and prices of export cargoes
  • sellers, buyers, carriers, freight forwarders and insurers
  • payment arrangements and transport documents
  • shipping routes, transshipment points, destinations and maritime terminals
  • the timing of cargo operations

Exceptions include disclosure by companies about their own activities.

The decree does not explicitly ban AIS transmissions, satellite imagery or commercial ship-tracking services, and it does not order vessels to hide their positions. Its significance, High North News notes, is that it can cut off the commercial and administrative records analysts use to check what tracking data shows. Gaps between observed ship movements and official export records would then have to be filled through satellite imagery, AIS histories, port observations and other independent sources (High North News).

A Wider Pattern of Opacity

The decree continues a trend. Last year Rosatomflot, the administrator of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), stopped publishing daily shipping logs and NSR permit data. More vessels are sailing the route with AIS switched off. The latest examples are the Chinese heavy-lift ships Bright and Glory, carrying sanctioned equipment for Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project. A U.S. Coast Guard cyber team presenting at DEF CON 34 described “dark-fleet” tankers using multiple AIS transponders, modified firmware and interference with antenna transmissions to disguise position and identity (High North News).

Norway sits on the front line of this traffic. Its Coastal Administration estimates the shadow fleet at between 900 and 1,500 vessels, and in 2025 it recorded 251 voyages along the Norwegian coast by vessels on Norwegian and EU sanctions lists. It has warned that aging ships, inadequate insurance and manipulated identities raise the risk of accidents and complicate emergency response.

Record Year on the Northern Sea Route

Meanwhile, traffic on the route is setting records, as Splash247 reported on 20 October. Norway’s Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL) counted 104 confirmed transit voyages by 30 September, compared with 103 in all of 2025. Estimated transit cargo reached 3.7 million tonnes, up 15 percent from 3.2 million tonnes for the whole of last year, according to gCaptain. CHNL projects the season could approach 150 transits and exceed 4.5 million tonnes, although that remains provisional.

Why It Matters

Moscow is not trying to make its ships invisible; satellites and coastal sensors will still see them. What it is doing is removing the documents that tie a tanker to a cargo, a buyer, an insurer and a payment. Those records are what turn a ship sighting into evidence for sanctions enforcement.

This puts the job of verification on Western governments and independent analysts. Even the NSR record is now counted from AIS data by a Norwegian research center rather than taken from Russian logs. For Norway and its Nordic neighbors, the result is more traffic, older and poorly insured ships, and less information about what they carry, in waters where an accident or a deliberate act would test emergency response and allied maritime awareness alike. Persistent surveillance of the High North, from space-based sensors to uncrewed maritime systems, is no longer just a military requirement; it is becoming the main way to find out what is actually being shipped.

The Philadelphia Test: Allied Shipbuilding Comes Ashore

By Robbin Laird

The American debate about shipbuilding has hardened into a simple choice: build warships at home or buy them from allies abroad. That framing makes good politics. It is poor strategy. The more useful question is whether the industrial know-how of allied shipbuilders can be brought into American yards quickly enough to make a difference for the fleet.

A modest contract announced at the end of October suggests that this shift is already happening while Washington argues about something else.

A Small Contract with a Larger Meaning

Hanwha Defense USA, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, has won a $269 million contract to build a medium landing ship (LSM) for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia, with options for three more vessels. It is the company’s first U.S. Navy shipbuilding contract. The award came through a competitive process run by Tote Services, which manages vessel construction under a $2.2 billion contract supporting the planned 35-ship LSM fleet. Construction is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2027, and the program’s first vessel is expected in 2030 (The Korea Times).

Hanwha bought Philly Shipyard in 2024. “Since acquiring Philly Shipyard in 2024, Hanwha has made significant investments in its workforce and technology to pave the way to build ships for the U.S. Navy and other federal customers,” said Michael Coulter, the company’s president and CEO (The Korea Times).

On its own, one landing ship does not change the balance of naval power. What matters is the route by which the contract was won. A Korean-owned American yard competed for Navy work and won it, with American workers building the ship on American soil. No waiver was needed, and no warship is being built overseas. This is the result that both the administration and its congressional critics say they want, even though they disagree sharply about how to reach it.

The Administration’s Route: The “Finland Model”

The administration has pushed a more aggressive approach. Its FY 2027 budget rollout revealed plans to pursue foreign designs for Navy frigates and destroyers that could be built in shipyards abroad, with South Korea and Japan under consideration (USNI News).

Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought has been its most visible advocate. In June he defended building warships and auxiliary vessels in foreign facilities, arguing that overseas production should be tied to domestic investment. He pointed to the “Finland Model,” under which foreign shipbuilders produce icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard while preparing American companies to build follow-on ships, as a roadmap for future Navy programs (Inside Defense, Nick Wilson, June 24, 2026).

The approach was formalized in an August 13 presidential memorandum. It allows foreign shipbuilders that have invested in the United States to build up to two ships of designated types in their home countries. The types are surface combatants, roll-on/roll-off ships and replenishment oil tankers. To qualify, a company must have built a new U.S. shipyard or acquired ownership or a majority stake in an existing one (The Herald Business). A selected supplier would also have to transfer production technology, train an American workforce and move every later ship to U.S. construction (Ship Universe).

The ownership requirement matters for Hanwha. Because it owns Philly Shipyard, Hanwha could meet the memorandum’s condition (The Herald Business). In practice, the LSM contract makes the company’s Philadelphia investment a working shipbuilding operation rather than just a qualifying credential.

The Frigate Question

The most consequential test is the frigate. Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao has directed an assessment of surface combatants, roll-on/roll-off vessels and replenishment oilers, due November 12. The surface-combatant candidates are South Korea’s Chungnam-class frigate, the export version of Japan’s upgraded Mogami-class frigate and Türkiye’s Istanbul-class frigate (The Herald Business). No frigate winner, overseas construction contract or formal three-country competition has yet been announced (Ship Universe).

The two Pacific candidates offer different strengths. In a recent overview, CNA estimated that delivery of a Chungnam-class ship from Hyundai Heavy Industries takes roughly 18 months from procurement. Japan, for its part, is already carrying out a frigate technology-transfer plan with Australia, which has contracted for a Mogami export variant with deliveries starting in 2029 (CNA). Japan is producing Mogami frigates at roughly two a year, while South Korea can spread naval construction across several very large yards (Navy Lookout). Construction of the six Chungnam-class frigates has itself been divided among HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, SK Ocean Plant and Hanwha Ocean (The Herald Business).

The operational logic is straightforward. The Navy now sends large Arleigh Burke-class destroyers on missions a frigate could handle. As Rear Adm. Brian Metcalf put it in July, frigates “can be used in less contested waters,” and “doing so allows destroyers to perform high-intensity missions” (The Herald Business).

Congress Pushes Back

Congress has moved to limit the executive’s freedom of action, but the two chambers have drawn the line in different places.

In the House, Rep. Jared Golden (D-Maine), whose district is near Bath Iron Works, won language providing that no funds authorized under the FY 2027 defense bill may be used to contract for a battle force ship built in a foreign yard (Rep. Jared Golden). House appropriators added language barring funds for building ships in “foreign facilities” and “foreign shipyards” (USNI News).

The Senate Armed Services Committee took a more selective approach. Its bill removes the presidential waiver that allows foreign warships to be bought under an undefined “national security interest” exception. At the same time, it would let the Pentagon acquire tankers, bulk fuel vessels and roll-on/roll-off ships from yards in treaty-ally countries. As one Senate Majority official explained, these “can follow the ICE Pact model where they’ll build up to two overseas, which would be concurrent with foreign direct investment into U.S. yards for subsequent ships.” Before awarding such contracts, the Defense Secretary would have to report which yards would build the ships, how classified information would be protected and how the foreign industrial base and supply chain would be brought back to the United States. The Secretary would also have to determine that the ships would be built faster abroad, unless readiness or force posture requires otherwise (USNI News).

The final bill is not yet law (NDAA.ai).

Why Speed Is the Real Issue

The pressure behind this debate is not ideological. A Congressional Budget Office assessment released in April found that destroyers and submarines that once took five to six years to build now take nine to ten years on average (UPI). A fleet that needs to grow cannot do so on those timelines.

This is where the Philadelphia contract should be read with caution as well as interest. Construction does not begin until late 2027, and the first LSM in the program is not expected until 2030. Foreign ownership of an American yard does not, by itself, produce Korean production speed in Pennsylvania. The real test is whether the methods, management practices and supply-chain discipline of a high-volume Korean shipbuilder can be transferred to an American workforce. That will be measured in delivered hulls, not announcements.

The Shape of a Likely Compromise

Taken together, these developments suggest where U.S. policy is heading, even if the details remain contested. Combatant ships are likely to stay in American yards, as both the House language and the Senate’s removal of the presidential waiver indicate. Auxiliaries and sealift ships may start abroad under strict conditions. Allied ownership of, and investment in, American yards is what connects the two.

This is a different model from the one either side usually describes. It is not “buy foreign,” and it is not a return to a purely national industrial base. It is an alliance-based industrial strategy in which allied partners bring capital, design maturity and production experience into the American system, and American yards become sites of allied capability.

For Seoul and Tokyo, this is also a test of what kind of industrial partner each wants to be. Korea brings scale and existing ownership of a U.S. yard. Japan brings a frigate design that it is already transferring to Australia. The Navy’s assessment due November 12, and how Congress settles the final bill, will show how much room Washington is prepared to give either of them.

For now, the most concrete evidence of what an allied shipbuilding partnership can look like is not in Geoje, Nagasaki or a congressional conference room. It is on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. Whether that yard can deliver ships on time will say more about the future of American shipbuilding than the legislative debate.

Euronaval Day Two: Europe Organizes Industry for the Hybrid Fleet

11/05/2026
In brief

The second day of Euronaval 2026, held on November 4 at Paris Nord Villepinte, moved away from the ministerial announcements of the opening day.

The focus shifted to how European industry will organize itself to build the hybrid fleet: shipyards pooling corvette work, national teams forming around seabed protection, and primes setting out how they plan to move drones from trials into production.[1]

Corvette Consolidation

The most significant industrial news concerned the European Patrol Corvette (EPC). Fincantieri, Navantia and Naval Group signed the consortium agreement for the program’s second phase, EPC2, at a ceremony attended by representatives of OCCAR, the European armaments cooperation agency. EPC2 completes the preliminary and detailed design of a common Modular and Multirole Patrol Corvette and moves the program toward a production-ready platform. The program began in 2019 under PESCO, and OCCAR has coordinated it since 2022.[2]

Separately, Navantia and Fincantieri signed heads of agreement for a 50/50 joint venture. It is meant to act as prime contractor for their national EPC programs and for exports, and to run common design, purchasing and life-cycle support as a full operating company, not just a coordination office. Naval Group is reported to be studying whether to join.[3] French participation has been uncertain since earlier in the year, when reporting suggested that Paris was stepping back from the corvette project after the Italian-Spanish alliance was formed.[4]

Protecting the Seabed

On Wednesday, seven Spanish firms led by Indra (SAES, UTEK, Aragon Photonics, Iqua Robotics, FYLA and Sateliot) signed an agreement to develop SIPRIS, a sovereign system for continuous surveillance of undersea cables and critical infrastructure. The planned system combines fiber-optic anomaly detection, sonar, uncrewed surface and underwater vehicles, aerial drones, underwater optical communications and satellite coverage, with Indra’s SEADEF architecture and IndraMind AI platform tying them together. Field testing is to begin immediately.[5]

From Experiment to Production

Naval Group used the day to set out its approach to hybrid fleets. A keynote on “Naval Warfare in the Era of Hybrid Fleets” was scheduled for 11 a.m., with Aurore Neuschwander, the company’s executive vice president for drones, autonomous systems and underwater weapons, and Admiral Xavier Petit, commander of France’s submarine forces.[6]

In a companion statement, the company said a drone has to be “navalized, hardened, integrated into the platform and combat system, and fully interoperable.”

It listed four product lines (Seaquest surface drones, Seagent underwater drones, the Steeris mission system and Sealken shipboard integration) and said a 17,000-square-meter drone and underwater-weapons center will open at La Londe-les-Maures by the end of 2027.[7]

Reporting published on day two pointed in the same direction. Vice-Admiral Éric Chaperon, now naval adviser to Thales, told Euronews that navies have become “much more focused on the near future and what can be delivered immediately.”

François Watteau of the DGA called the naval drone “the sword and the shield.”[8]

Saildrone said Norway’s Umoe Mandal will build its Surveyor craft locally for Northern European customers.[9]

Defense News also reported MBDA’s Tuesday briefing on Stratus RS, a high-supersonic strike missile whose range is meant to “far, far, far” exceed Exocet’s. MBDA is still waiting for a DGA development contract.[10]

Innovation and Politics

At the Euronaval Awards ceremony on Wednesday, six exhibitors were honored: Amphitrite (Transform), Fluiidd (Sustain), Gabler Group (Engage), Astraea Marine (SEAnnovation start-up), Cosma (GICAN special prize) and Globus Metal Powders (jury special mention).[11]

French politics also came to the show floor. Presidential candidate Raphaël Glucksmann toured the halls in the afternoon to make his case on sovereignty, and other candidates were expected on Thursday.[12]

Why It Matters

Day one showed what France intends to buy.

Day two showed how European industry plans to deliver it.

The pattern is consolidation and specialization: joint ventures to cut duplication in corvettes, national teams for seabed defense, and dedicated drone production capacity.

The caveat is the same as on day one.

Most of what was signed on November 4 is a framework: heads of agreement, consortium terms, field-test plans.

These are not production contracts.

Whether France stays inside the EPC structure, and how quickly drone centers and seabed-protection systems turn into fielded capability, will show whether Euronaval 2026 marked a real industrial shift or just the next round of planning.

[1] Euronaval, “Venue and opening times,” https://www.euronaval.com/practical-informations/venue-and-opening-times/

[2] Naval News, “Fincantieri, Navantia and Naval Group sign EPC2 Consortium Agreement at Euronaval 2026,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2026/2026/11/fincantieri-navantia-and-naval-group-sign-epc2-consortium-agreement-at-euronaval-2026/

[3] Demócrata, “Navantia and Fincantieri take a new step to launch their European corvette joint venture,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.democrata.es/en/economy/navantia-and-fincantieri-take-a-new-step-to-launch-their-european-corvette-joint-venture/

[4] Zone Militaire / Opex360, “Le retrait de la France du projet de corvette européenne se précise après l’alliance entre Fincantieri et Navantia,” Feb. 26, 2026, https://www.opex360.com/2026/02/26/le-retrait-de-la-france-du-projet-de-corvette-europeenne-se-confirme-apres-lalliance-entre-fincantieri-et-navantia/

[5] AOL / Escarlata Sánchez, “Indra leads Spanish alliance to shield Europe’s underwater infrastructure,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.aol.co.uk/articles/indra-leads-spanish-alliance-shield-212907000.html

[6] Naval Group, “Euronaval 2026: Naval Group showcases its solutions to face high-intensity warfare” (press release with keynote schedule), Nov. 2, 2026, https://www.naval-group.com/sites/default/files/2026-11/20261102_PR_Naval Group showcases at Euronaval 2026 its solutions to face high-intensity warfare_VDEF.pdf

[7] Naval Group, “Naval Warfare in the Era of Hybrid Fleets,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.naval-group.com/en/naval-warfare-era-hybrid-fleets

[8] Euronews, “As maritime threats rise, France seeks to bolster Europe’s naval power,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/2026/11/04/as-maritime-threats-grow-france-pushes-to-strengthen-europes-naval-power

[9] Defense News, “Saildrone expands its European market reach with manufacturing partner in Norway,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/11/04/saildrone-expands-its-european-market-reach-with-manufacturing-partner-in-norway/

[10] Defense News, “MBDA’s high-speed strike missile to have range ‘far’ exceeding Exocet,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/11/04/mbda-high-speed-strike-missile-to-have-range-far-exceeding-exocet/

[11] Euronaval, “EURONAVAL Awards: Découvrez les lauréats 2026,” https://www.euronaval.com/fr/temps-forts/euronaval-awards/; ceremony timing from Euronaval press kit, https://www.euronaval.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/DP-Euronaval-2026-EN-191026_compressed.pdf

[12] Le Parisien, “« Ça se met lentement en route » : au salon Euronaval à Villepinte, le début de campagne présidentielle poussif de Raphaël Glucksmann,” Nov. 4, 2026, https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/ca-se-met-lentement-en-route-au-salon-euronaval-a-villepinte-le-debut-de-campagne-presidentielle-poussif-de-raphael-glucksmann-04-11-2026-DIWMTYPTYVGSBO7AB2HGEMJRPE.php; Euronews, Nov. 4, 2026 (see note 8)

Korea’s Army Plans to Guard the DMZ With Robots and Sensors, Cutting Guard Troops From 22,000 to 6,000 by 2040

In brief

The Republic of Korea Army plans to rebuild how it guards the front line, replacing soldiers on the fence with sensors, robots and drones, and cutting the guard force to about a third of its current size by 2040.

The plan was presented on 19 October 2026 at Army Headquarters in Gyeryongdae, during the National Assembly National Defense Committee’s annual audit, and reported by Oh Dong-ryong of Newspim. According to the briefing, the army will “transform the manpower-centered GOP and coastal guard systems into an AI-based, science-and-technology-enabled guard system” through structural reform and upgraded guard technologies.

A Dedicated Guard Force

The reorganization comes in two steps. First, dedicated GOP (General Outpost) guard battalions will be formed at division level. The first two stand up on 1 October 2027 in the 5th Division on the central front and the 22nd Division on the east coast. Based on how those pilots perform, the army will then create GOP guard brigades at corps level.

Today, brigades under frontline divisions split up GOP sectors and rotate onto the fence. Under the new structure, a guard brigade in each corps would take sole responsibility for frontline guarding. Units in the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) behind the GOP would stop rotating into guard duty and focus on training and combat readiness. To fill the gap, the army plans to add one new infantry battalion to each forward brigade in the FEBA area (Newspim).

Machines in Place of Manpower

The Ministry of National Defense plans to cut guard personnel in stages from about 22,000 now to about 6,000 by 2040. Surveillance will be carried by quadruped robots and reconnaissance drones; response by suicide drones, an integrated counter-drone system and fixed remote-controlled firing stations. The timeline set out at the audit is (Newspim):

  • 2028: finish upgrading the current technology-based guard system
  • 2031: convert coastal guarding to an AI-based system
  • 2033: complete an AI command-and-control system for guard operations
  • 2040: complete an “AI-based, manned-unmanned integrated” guard system, the target year of the next defense reform

The reason given is plain: the pool of available manpower is falling sharply.

Every Unit a “Smart Unit”

At the same audit, the army said every unit will become an AI-based “intelligent smart unit” by 2034 (Newspim). Personnel and logistics administration, tactical situation awareness, drone control and target processing are to be merged onto a single mobile device, alongside agentic AI tools meant to spot unusual conditions in unit operations and prevent safety accidents. Pilots at the 9th Division and supply depots were in place by 2024; the system expands to corps-level units in 2027, including one pilot each at a GOP and a guard post, before reaching brigade-level and remote units after 2029. Neither briefing gave a budget figure.

Why It Matters

This is one of the clearest cases yet of a frontline army redesigning a core mission around demographics. Korea is not adding robots to a manned line; it is planning a line that needs roughly 16,000 fewer soldiers, and freeing forward combat brigades from fence duty in the process.

The open questions are the ones that matter in a crisis: how the system performs against deception, jamming and saturation, who holds authority over remote fires along the most heavily armed border in the world, and whether funding follows the timeline. The 2027 pilots in the 5th and 22nd Divisions will be the first real test. For allied forces facing similar personnel limits, the Korean approach of using automation to take over persistent guard tasks while concentrating scarce soldiers on combat readiness is a model worth watching.

Russia’s Foreign Legion Keeps Growing: Nearly 46,000 Recruits From 151 Countries

In brief

Russia’s reliance on foreign recruits to sustain its war against Ukraine is accelerating, according to figures released by Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In the first nine months of 2026, more foreigners signed contracts with the Russian armed forces than in all of 2025.

The figures were presented by Brigadier General Dmytro Usov, secretary of the Coordination Headquarters, at the international conference “Crimea Global. Understanding Ukraine through the South,” and reported on 20 October 2026 by Oleksiy Leonov of Militarnyi. As of 1 October 2026, the “I Want to Live” project run by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence had identified 45,959 foreign nationals, from 151 countries and unrecognized territories, who signed contracts with the Russian armed forces since the full-scale invasion began.

A Steep Annual Climb

The year-by-year count shows how quickly the recruitment has grown (Militarnyi):

  • 2022: 94
  • 2023: 4,067
  • 2024: 8,877
  • 2025: 16,085
  • January–September 2026: 16,168

The Coordination Headquarters estimates that Russia is now signing about 1,800 foreigners a month. The Russian military leadership’s target for 2026 is reported as 18,500; at the current pace, the year could close at around 21,500 new foreign contract soldiers.

Where the Recruits Come From

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Belarus supply the largest numbers, though no country totals were given for them. The fastest growth is in Africa and Latin America. In the first nine months of 2026, contracts were signed by 1,449 Colombians, 699 citizens of Burundi, 530 Zimbabweans and 503 Peruvians. Ukraine has taken prisoner citizens of 59 countries who fought on Russia’s side (Militarnyi).

Recruitment methods described in the report include schemes aimed at tourists and migrant workers, promises of jobs and high pay, and, in some cases, intermediaries who take new arrivals’ passports and offer a choice between deportation, prison or a contract with the Russian army.

What Prisoners Say

A survey of captured foreigners by the “I Want to Live” project found that 46.7 percent signed to obtain Russian citizenship, 41.4 percent were recruited through enlistment offices and recruitment centers, and 28 percent did not know they would be sent to fight against Ukraine. Almost half (48.8 percent) were captured after being wounded. Notably, 79 percent said they want to return to Russia in a prisoner exchange (Militarnyi).

Why It Matters

The numbers come from Ukrainian intelligence and should be read as a count of identified contracts, not a complete or independently verified total. Even so, the trend is clear: Russia is turning a global labor market into a manpower reserve, so it can keep up its war of attrition while limiting how many of its own citizens it has to mobilize.

That has consequences well beyond Ukraine. Recruitment pipelines now reach into Latin America and Africa, drawing countries such as Colombia, Peru, Burundi and Zimbabwe into the war through their citizens, whether or not their governments want that. For Western planners, the lesson is that Russian manpower should not be judged by Russian demographics alone. Moscow’s ability to buy soldiers abroad, with money and citizenship, is part of its staying power. And the 79 percent of prisoners who want to go back to Russia suggest that for many recruits, citizenship and pay matter more than how they were drawn in.

The Fiji Decision: Bluebottles as Sovereign Assets and the Test of the Service Model

By Robbin Laird

When I interviewed Ocius founder and CEO Robert Dane on September 30, I listed the “Fiji decision” as one of the next tests of the Bluebottle program, along with the San Diego exercise, the Baltic winter trials and the opening of the company’s new operations centre (Second Line of Defense). Three weeks later, the decision arrived.

On October 21 in Lami, at the launch of Fiji’s new Integrated Maritime Security Strategy, Australian High Commissioner Peter Roberts and Fiji’s Minister for Defence and Veterans Affairs Pio Tikoduadua announced that Australia will give Fiji Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessels as permanent, sovereign assets (Fiji Sun). The decision has been made. The more interesting question is what kind of capability Fiji is actually getting.

What Was Announced

The vessels are 7.5 metres long, run on solar, wind and wave power, and can stay at sea for up to six months. They will be used to detect drug trafficking and illegal fishing (Fiji Sun). Roberts called them “a significant investment” coming off the factory line, and a key resource under Pillar 2 of the new strategy. He would not give the number, the cost or the arrival date. “We want to keep that element of surprise,” he said. Australia will also train Fijian operators, and Roberts placed the gift within Canberra’s commitment of more than A$600 million to Waqa Moana, a regional maritime surveillance effort (Fiji Sun).

Tikoduadua was clear about ownership. “It belongs to the State,” he said. The Republic of Fiji Military Forces Naval Division will manage the vessels through the Maritime Essential Services Centre, and the information they collect will be shared with other law-enforcement agencies (Fiji Sun). He presented the Bluebottles as a complement to the capability Australia has already helped build, including the Guardian-class patrol boats under the Pacific Patrol Boat Programme. “No nation can protect its oceans by itself,” he said. “We all need each other, big and small” (Islands Business).

The evidence behind the decision came from New Zealand. The Royal New Zealand Navy’s two Bluebottles, Tahi and Rua, have been operating in Fijian waters since July 2025, the first time a partner had brought an uncrewed vessel to Fiji. Tikoduadua said the trials detected more than a hundred vessels. Some had switched off their transponders, and others were fishing without licences. Some were boarded, and aerial surveillance was sent to the Yasawa and Lau waters. “These are very handy things,” he said (Fiji Sun).

Detection as a Team Sport

That last detail matters more than the hardware. A Bluebottle that spots a dark vessel has only started the job. In the New Zealand trial, detection led to boardings and to aircraft being sent out. The value came from the chain the boat fed into, not from the boat by itself.

That is the point Dane made to me about Ocius’s work with Australian Border Force in the north. He called it “a team sport” that nobody has yet learned to play properly. It is also adversarial: as the boats are repositioned, the people being hunted change how they move. He compared it to whack-a-mole, chess and sport, with positioning driven by many forms of intelligence and assets working as a network (Second Line of Defense). The Maritime Essential Services Centre, which will receive the data and pass it to other agencies, is Fiji’s version of that network. The new strategy’s emphasis on coordination between agencies (Islands Business) is what will turn detections into enforcement.

Secrecy and Deterrence

Roberts’ refusal to give numbers raises a point I want to develop. In our conversation, Dane argued that a “capability brick” of Bluebottles on station frees a commander’s ships, fuel and people for other tasks. “And if the adversary knows the pack is there, he goes somewhere else” (Second Line of Defense). That is deterrence by known presence.

The Fijian announcement adds deterrence by uncertainty. Illegal fishers and traffickers now know the boats are coming and that they are low-observable and stay out for months. They do not know how many there will be, when they will arrive or where they will be stationed. For a small navy with a very large exclusive economic zone, that uncertainty is worth something. Every vessel that turns off its transponder now has to assume it may be observed anyway. Secrecy and deterrence work together here: the existence of the capability is publicised, and its density is kept quiet.

Sovereign Asset or Service?

This is where the Fiji case tests the argument Dane and I developed. My view, which he shares, is that a Bluebottle is a robot with many moving parts, and a navy short of people should not have to maintain it alone. The New Zealand model separates the jobs: Ocius provides maintenance, turnaround, re-missioning and reprogramming from a facility in Auckland, while the navy drives the boat and runs the mission (Second Line of Defense). Dane expected Fiji to follow that pattern, with a small local facility and Fijians recovering, cleaning and servicing the boats at the ramp.

The announcement instead stresses sovereign ownership, with Australia providing operator training (Fiji Sun). The two are not necessarily in conflict. A state can own the asset and run the mission while still relying on an industrial partner for the technical layer. But the announcement does not say how maintenance, software updates and payload changes will be handled, and those arrangements will decide whether the capability lasts. Gifted patrol craft across the Pacific have shown that the hard part is sustainment, not delivery. With uncrewed systems the problem is sharper, because the platform keeps changing through software updates. The more the technology changes, the more a pure ownership model risks freezing the boat at the version that was handed over.

My test for the Fiji program is therefore not how many boats arrive. It is whether a local support arrangement appears alongside the boats, and whether the software and sensors keep improving after they are in Fijian hands.

A System That Fits the Force

There is also a human point Dane made that I found persuasive, drawing on his years working in an island medical clinic in Fiji. A Fijian sailor does not want to spend 28 days at sea on a big ship; he wants to go home to his family at night, and a system run from the shore fits that (Second Line of Defense). The Fiji deal allows that. The boats stay out for six months, and their operators stay ashore at the Maritime Essential Services Centre.

For a small navy, this is the right way round. Persistent presence comes from the uncrewed system, while the scarce crewed assets, such as the Guardian-class boats and aircraft, are kept for the boarding, the intercept and the response. That is the same division of labour I described as the mesh fleet logic in the larger Australian context: the Bluebottle takes a task off a crewed vessel and does it better, so the crewed vessel can be used where only it will do.

Why It Matters

The Fiji gift extends Australian practice in three ways.

First, it moves the Bluebottle from a trial run by a partner to a capability owned by the Pacific state itself. That is a political statement inside the Vuvale partnership as much as a technical one, and it means the regional surveillance network will increasingly be operated by island states rather than only supported by outside navies.

Second, it creates a test of the service model in its hardest setting: a small force with limited technical staff, a vast ocean area and a donor-provided platform. If Fiji can keep its Bluebottles on station and current, the model will have shown it can work far beyond the Australian Border Force.

Third, it builds a shared operating picture across Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, using the same platform and potentially the same ways of working. Dane’s operations centre is meant to run Bluebottles worldwide, and the boats already pass control across national lines in exercises (Second Line of Defense). The Pacific is where that coalition approach could become routine peacetime practice, and the experience will carry over to the harder grey-zone tasks further north.

The question I asked at the end of my Dane interview applies here as well: is the navy learning to use the system, or only buying it?

In Fiji’s case, the boats are a gift, so the purchase is not the issue.

The learning is what will count.

Euronaval Opens with Paris Pushing Drones into the Fleet

11/04/2026
In brief

The 30th Euronaval opened at Paris Nord Villepinte on November 3. Uncrewed systems were the main theme. Organizers expect 705 exhibitors, 40% more than in 2024, and the number of drone makers has tripled.[1] According to Reuters, European governments are moving quickly to strengthen their navies because they are alarmed by Russia and less sure of the United States as an ally.[2]

Opening the show, Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin said France had moved “from a logic of repair to a logic of rearmament.” She cited a draft 2027 defense budget of €63.4 billion, €6.5 billion more than in 2026, and announced new Aster and Exocet missile orders.[3] She also urged buying European, naming Greece, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands as partners.[4]

The ministry also signed a naval drone pact with industry. It is a framework for bringing the armed forces’ needs together with what industry can supply, and it is not itself a procurement. Specific orders were announced alongside it: a second deep-sea ROV from LD Travocean rated to 6,000 meters, eight Exail A18 mine-countermeasure drones, and a second, larger unmanned combat underwater vehicle from Naval Group.[5]

On the industry side, Naval Group presented SCX26, a drone-carrying warship it describes as a research concept.[6] It also showed the 37-meter Seaquest M uncrewed surface vessel, although the French Navy calls armed drones of that size “later increments.”[7] Other launches included:

  • Saab’s CB90 CX, a boat designed for uncrewed operation from the start[8]
  • BAE Systems’ Sea Tridon 40mm counter-drone gun[9]
  • a one-way attack surface drone from KNDS and SeaOwl for port and ship protection[10]

Why It Matters

France is now treating naval autonomy as something to build an industry around, not just as a set of prototypes. The pact, the mine-warfare orders and the requirement for open architectures in supplier contracts[11] all point toward a hybrid fleet.

But there is still a gap between what was shown and what has been bought. Mine-countermeasure and seabed systems are being ordered now. Armed medium drones and drone-carrying combatants remain concepts or later steps.

[1]Le marin, “Euronaval. L’édition 2026 sous le signe de l’automatisation,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/defense/euronaval-ledition-2026-sous-le-signe-de-lautomatisation-avec-une-soixantaine-de-dronistes-presents-95c277ca-d786-11f1-b736-5b9907ef0b5a

[2]Reuters via US News, “European Naval Defence Industry Meets as Threats Drive Fleet Upgrades,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-11-03/european-naval-defence-industry-meets-as-threats-drive-fleet-upgrades

[3]French Ministry of Armed Forces, “Réarmement : Catherine Vautrin appelle les industriels à se mobiliser,” Nov. 3, 2026, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/rearmement-catherine-vautrin-appelle-industriels-se-mobiliser-linnovation-production-cooperation

[4]Breaking Defense, “France investing in naval power as military ambition is ‘to be feared’,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/11/france-investing-in-naval-power-as-military-ambition-is-to-be-feared-armed-forces-minister/

[5]Defense News, “French defense minister kicks off ‘pact’ with industry in rush to field naval drones,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/11/03/french-defense-minister-kicks-off-pact-with-industry-in-rush-to-field-naval-drones/

[6]Defence Blog, “Naval Group unveils SCX26 drone-carrying warship concept,” Nov. 2026, https://defence-blog.com/naval-group-unveils-scx26-drone-carrying-warship-concept/

[7]Naval News, “Naval Group Unveils Seaquest M MUSV as French Navy Weighs Armed Surface Drones,” Nov. 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2026/2026/11/naval-group-seaquest-m-musv/

[8]Breaking Defense, “Saab unveils new speed assault boat for Swedish Navy,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/11/saab-unveils-new-speed-assault-boat-for-swedish-navy/

[9]Breaking Defense, “BAE Systems launches new Sea Tridon naval gun series,” Nov. 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/11/bae-systems-launches-new-sea-tridon-naval-gun-series/

[10]Reuters via Baird Maritime, “European navies go shopping for warships and drones as sea threats multiply,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://www.bairdmaritime.com/amp/story/security/naval/naval-ships/european-navies-go-shopping-for-warships-and-drones-as-sea-threats-multiply

[11]Shephard, “Euronaval 2026: Faster frigates, evolving contracts and drone motherships lead opening conference,” Nov. 3, 2026, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/euronaval-2026-faster-frigates-tougher-contracts-and-drone-motherships-lead-opening-conference/