Munitions Systems Specialists with the 332d Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron build MK-84 Conical Bombs in a Munitions Storage Area at an undisclosed location, Southwest Asia, Oct. 28, 2022.
Munitions Systems Specialists are responsible for: providing small arms to Security Forces, demolitions explosives to Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and bombs and missiles to fighter aircraft.
10.28.2022
Video by Tech. Sgt. James Bentley
332d Air Expeditionary Wing
By Pierre Tran
Paris – A project for a future combat air system (FCAS) backed by France, Germany, and Spain has sparked close interest elsewhere in Europe, the French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, said Jan. 23.
“There are other European nations knocking at the door,” he told the Association des Journalistes de Défense, a press club, when asked about the FCAS project.
A next generation fighter jet is a key part of FCAS, with Dassault Aviation working as prime contractor, and Airbus Defence and Space as industrial partner. Other core FCAS elements include remote carrier drones and a combat cloud for extended network communications.
The next day, the minister told parliamentarians there could be “good news soon on FCAS,” as other countries “see the program is advancing and want to join,” OpexNews, a specialist newsletter, said on social media.
A spokesman for the minister declined to give further details. Dassault declined comment.
Le Monde ran Jan. 20 an interview with Lecornu, who told the afternoon daily that European nations had shown interest in FCAS, and the project was on the agenda for the Franco-German summit and joint cabinet meeting held Jan. 22, here.
Britain was clearly the highest value potential partner for France, a defense analyst said.
The “real question” is whether the U.K. teamed up with France on FCAS, with other nations ranking on lower standing, the analyst said.
“Dassault would dream of that,” the analyst said. The U.K. had capability that made it the natural partner for France, although the industrial restructuring would be difficult.
The FCAS fighter demonstrator might well be built and flown, but the real question was what happened afterwards – whether the FCAS program will be launched, the analyst said.
The demonstrator will cost relatively little, but the real cost will fall in the following years, running into 10s of billions.
“Of course,” a second analyst said when asked if the U.K. would be a good FCAS partner, pointing to a 1996 fighter project pitched by BAE Systems and Dassault.
The two companies announced plans to work together to build a replacement for the Mirage 2000 and Tornado fighters, but their respective governments went separate ways, leading to the Rafale and Typhoon.
Meanwhile, Britain, Italy, and Japan announced last month their partnership in the global combat air programme (GCAP), opening the way for British companies in the U.K. Tempest project to work with Japanese firms in the F-X fighter program.
“Like minded countries” can buy into GCAP or collaborate on wider capabilities, boosting the export outlook for the fighter, the U.K. government said Dec. 9.
That agreement between London and Tokyo on a new fighter opened up a new area of cooperation, as the two countries have worked together over 10 years on military technology, including missiles, the second analyst said.
Spain joined FCAS after Macron and the then German chancellor, Angela Merkel, launched the project in July 2017 in a bid to boost European strategic autonomy.
There appeared to be a thawing of relations between Paris and London, following the distinctly frosty Brexit departure from the European Union.
A long awaited Anglo-French summit is due to be held March 10, with French president Emmanuel Macron inviting U.K. prime minister Rishi Sunak to come to France. Defense and security are on the agenda.
However, the French commander in chief said in a Jan. 20 keynote speech at the Mont de Marsan airbase, he was also seeking to deepen “structural partnerships” with Germany, Italy, and Spain. France has just signed a cooperation treaty with Spain, renewing defense ties which dated back to the 1980s, he said.
Britain and France are signatories of the 2010 Lancaster House treaty, intended to boost military and industrial cooperation.
One of the projects under that agreement was a project for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed future combat air system – demonstration program, but London cancelled that some time after the 2016 vote for Brexit.
Lecornu’s parliamentary remarks sparked discussion on social media on which countries might join the FCAS project, with Sweden seen as prime suspect.
Saab was the Swedish industrial partner on the demonstrator for a French unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed Neuron, led by Dassault. Other industrial partners were the Spanish Airbus unit, Greek company HAI, Italian firm Leonardo, and Swiss company Ruag.
Sweden has also been a partner on the British Tempest fighter project, but Swedish interest appears to have faded.
Sweden could be a partner with France on submarines, the first analyst said.
In FCAS, there is both a “mutual” cooperative approach between France and Germany in phase 1B, and a more “national” aspect in phase 2, when production gets under way, a senior defense official said. The French air force and Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office are drawing up technical requirements, as phase 1B gets under way.
Work is ramping up on phase 1B, which includes architecture studies for the demonstrator for the fighter, drones and the cloud, an industry executive said. The planned phase 2 includes development and in the later stage, production of the fighter demonstrator.
The fighter demonstrator is expected to fly 2028/2029, a couple of years later than intended, delayed by tough talks on the phase 1B contract.
At the Franco-German summit, Airbus DS displayed a life-sized model of a concept for a remote carrier drone.
The director of the Airbus FCAS program, Bruno Fichefeux, presented the model to Macron and chancellor Olaf Scholz.
That drone model was presented at the 2019 Paris air show.
The total budget for FCAS phases 1B and 2 is close to €8 billion ($8.7 billion), split between France, Germany, and Spain, comprising €3.2 billion for phase 1B, running some three and a half years, with the balance for phase 2, which is under option.
France and Germany said Jan. 23 in a joint statement in English they would pursue cooperation in capabilities, namely “to complete the major NGWS (next generation weapon system) and MGCS (main ground combat system) capability programmes.
“To continue joint efforts, on a bilateral basis and within the E.U., to support the development of a sovereign and innovative European DTIB (defence technology industrial base), with a special focus on the space domain.”
The summit marked the 60th anniversary of the Franco-German Elysée cooperation treaty.
Featured Graphic: Photo 95578213 © Ruletkka | Dreamstime.com
1st Cavalry Division participated in Project Convergence 2022, an experiment offering opportunities to access future warfighting strategies, including how the All-Service and Multinational Force can work together to detect and defeat threats Sep. 29 through Nov. 9 at Fort Irwin, California.
FORT IRWIN
11.09.2022
Video by Sgt. Brayton Daniel
Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Public Affairs
By Robbin Laird
Of the four Nordic countries, Sweden faces the longest journey towards a new regional defense approach — but also has an opportunity to undergo significant, smart transformation for a modern era that sees it finally join the NATO alliance.
It has the longest journey due to its unique and long tradition of neutrality in European defense, and its subsequent historical experience in navigating political blocs in Europe. It has a significant chance for innovation because it can rebuild its defense forces within a wider context and perspective while relying heavily on domestic defense companies that the country has not yet tapped to its full benefit.
The legacy of Swedish neutrality was seen in the Swedish experience in World War II. In John Gilmour’s insightful book, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin, he concluded about the Swedish approach: “Sweden prudently looked after its own interests and spurned the tutelage of the self-interested and evidently untrustworthy combatants. The responsibility for Sweden rested in Stockholm and nowhere else.”[1]
What has changed is that Stockholm now sees its own interests as being best served by enlightened participation and leadership in the two key alliances shaping modern Europe, the European Union and NATO. It is by accident of timing, but perhaps a sign from history, that Sweden will take over presidency of the European Union in 2023 — the same year that should see them formally entering NATO.
Sweden faces a double challenge. How can it lead an effort for a significant strategic rethink about the defense of the region and Europe as a whole? And can it do so by being bold in thinking through what this really means in terms of a redesigned force structure?
Following the end of the cold war, Sweden let its forces draw down to very low levels. As Stefan Hedlund noted in a 2019 article about Swedish defense: “The end of the Cold War brought severe downsizing. Funding for defense dropped to merely one percent of GDP in 2018, the lowest level of all the Nordic countries excluding Iceland. The rationale for these cuts was derived from abandoning the traditional doctrine of territorial defense. Armed invasion was no longer viewed as a credible threat.
“Although Sweden continued making significant military contributions to international peacekeeping, its ability to defend its territory has seriously degraded. Sweden’s elaborate system of hardened defenses, once erected to protect the very long coastline, was demolished. Air force bases with hardened bunkers were closed. The navy lost its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The ground forces were slashed, with artillery and air defense units almost entirely eradicated.”[2]
Despite that historical slowdown, Sweden began its rethink in defense posture and structure in the wake of the initial Ukraine crisis in 2014. And it was clear that the Swedish leadership woke up to the fact that being neutral does not mean that can avoid being dragged into any conflict between Russia and other European states, given the nature of the new combat systems, and the Russians lowering the nuclear threshold in their declaratory strategy and force acquisition. Neutrality may be nice — but not if your society is nullified by military action going through the region.
Notably, since 2014, Sweden has had an increasingly robust international/partner-engaged strategy tied to the NATO members, even prior to its formal membership application earlier this year. For example, in 2017, the Swedes held the exercise Aurora 17, which was the largest Swedish military exercise in more than 20 years and was clearly intended as an exercise of Swedish defense capabilities against a larger, more sophisticated opponent. France, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Germany, and the United States — all NATO members — joined Finland in participating in the exercise.
The Aurora 17 exercise involved triggering a revival of Sweden’s approach to total defense, and involved around 40 Swedish agencies other than their Ministry of Defense. And in the runup to applying for NATO membership, a key element has been an emphasis on evolving their total defense or whole of nation approach, including the return of conscription. The total defense concept includes cyber defense, mobilization enhanced approaches, and working how reinforcements might operate from Swedish territory.
There are several areas of innovation which Sweden will be key player in going forward in a more integrated approach to Nordic defense.
The first will clearly be operations with Norway and Finland in the High North, working as well with non-Nordic allies. Notably, during recommendations by the Swedish Armed Forces Supreme Commander Gen. Michael Bydén on Nov. 1, among them was to enhance Swedish presence in the High North and find innovate ways to support force operations with allies in the region.
One of his recommendations underlay any serious Swedish defense rethink: “Developing a Nordic dimension is especially important because the conditions in Northern Europe require joint and coordinated defense concepts. Sweden must accept a special regional responsibility since NATO’s defense concept is based on regionally existing capabilities. The Swedish Armed Forces stipulate that the Nordic countries belong to the same operational area and are led by the same command structure (Joint Forces Command.)”[3]
A second area of focus is clearly force mobility. Simply having a ground force that operates as a hedgehog on its own territory is not enough – how will the ground forces operate with allies in forward defense of the region, notably the Baltics?
A third is to change how the Air Force and Navy work together. The Air Force has historically provided the air defense for a small naval force. As the Air Force and Navy operate at greater distance, how will the combat air and combat ships be outfitted differently, or platforms developed differently in the future? (Here Saab’s participation in the UK led Project Tempest could lead not only to changes in the Swedish Air Force but in allies as well.)
The Swedish Navy has been focused on operating in the Swedish archipelago, forward leaning operations in the Baltic Sea and along on their west coast focused on control of the inlets/outlets to the Baltics Sea. As it is built out to play a broader role in providing strategic depth to the region, the Navy will share more maritime defense interests with Denmark and Norway and could look to collaborate in their approaches to shipbuilding.
And as the Baltic Sea sees greater cooperation among the NATO allies who would now surround the area (Finland, Sweden, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, and Denmark), how will they work together to deal with the Russians operating from the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad? How will Sweden approach maritime and defense and security in this contested sea bordering Russia and directly confronting Russian maritime interests in the North Atlantic? Here the potential cross-national cooperation on joint ISR and command and control could lead to significant innovation involving maritime unmanned systems, both USVs and UUVs, plus even more significantly working ways for the two types of maritime unmanned systems to work together.
There’s a lot to consider, and Sweden must do so while balancing the need for careful thought with speed. If managed correctly, Sweden can draw on its unique location and strengths to help shape a broader kill web defense and security structure with its allies in the region. Finding ways to innovative in connecting land, air and maritime assets in a cross border, and cross cutting force able to operate from security operations to high-end ones could bring significant innovation to the region, while also demonstrating the kind of multi-domain innovation that could serve as a model for other NATO states.[4]
[1] John Gilmour. Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The Swedish experience in the Second World War (Societies at War) (Kindle Locations 5989-5991). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.
[2] Stefan Hedlund, “Sweden Rebuilds its Military Force, Maybe,” October 30, 2019, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/sweden-military/.
[3] https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/swedens-chief-defense-wants-strengthen-military-presence-northern-sweden
[4] For an examination of how to understand the nature and promise of a kill web force, see Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century, 2022.
This article was first published by Breaking Defense on January 5, 2023.
Featured Image: Credit: Dreamstime.
A Royal Australian Air Force C-17A Globemaster has airdropped supplies with a combined weight of 10,470kg to Bunger Hills in Antarctica on 15 December 2022.
The stores airdropped include water tanks, dome tents, trestle tables and aluminium planks, ensures the Australian Antarctic Program is able to begin preparations for a two year science campaign at the Denman Glacier.
As part of Operation Southern Discovery, the Australian Defence Force supports the Australian Antarctic Division by delivering large scale, heavy scientific and operational equipment that is oversized and/or time critical, including providing emergency support to the Australian Antarctic Program.
The Whole-of-Government Australian Antarctic Program came into effect on 1 July 2016 and is run by the Australian Antarctic Division.
For the first time, Naval Medical Forces Pacific (NMFP) supported exercise Keen Sword at Camp Foster in Okinawa, Japan, Nov. 17, 2022.
NMFP personnel setup an expeditionary medical facility and established a Medical Headquarters to conduct training in support of Keen Sword 23.
OKINAWA, JAPAN
11.17.2022
Video by Staff Sgt. Matthew Wisher AFN Okinawa
By Robbin Laird
The CMV-22B has been bought by the U.S. Navy as a replacement for the C-2A Greyhound aircraft to provide for the carrier on-board delivery mission for the large deck carrier fleet. The numbers of the aircraft ordered for this mission are 48 and are sized to provide for the mission projected for peacetime conditions and derived from the Defense Strategic Guidance 2012.
Currently, the CMV-22B is being used following the same concepts of operations which the C-2A Greyhound executed.
The C-2A is a fixed wing aircraft operating from runways and landing on a carrier in point-to-point operations. But the CMV-22B is an Osprey: it does not need runways to take-off from is not constrained to runway enabled point-to-point operations.
This reminds me of the impact of the Osprey on the USMC and its at sea operations. The legacy ARG-MEU operated within a 200-mile geographical box due to the range and speed of the helicopters operating from the amphibious ships. With the Osprey’s speed and range, the ARG-MEU over time became the amphibious task force. Something similar is very possible for the Navy as the fleet commanders consider a shift from thinking of the CMV-22B as a C-2A replacement and recognize it as a fleet asset.
Such a shift was suggested during my visit to the CMV-22B “reveal ceremony” in Amarillo, Texas held on February 6, 2020. There I met CAPT (ret.) Sean McDermott who currently is a commercial airline pilot who served in the US Navy for 26 years. He was involved with the C-2 during the majority of his career, starting as a Greyhound pilot and eventually commanding one of the Navy’s two fleet logistics squadrons. In the final years of his service, McDermott was involved in working through options for the Navy as they considered C-2 replacements, with an eventual Osprey selection.
This is what McDermott projected: “With the C-2 we did one thing – Carrier On-board Delivery. With the Osprey, Combatant Commanders already know the multi-mission capability of the V-22 and will be tempted to utilize them for a variety of other missions. This is not something that would happen with a C-2. Carrier leadership will eventually struggle to fence off their logistics assets from outside tasking.”
In other words, there is an anticipated operational demand that fleet commanders will want to leverage fully the new versatile capabilities of the Osprey. McDermott noted that with the new platform being introduced to carrier aviation, it will be possible to leverage it to shape a greater range of capabilities for the COD asset. He noted that as the Marines began to get comfortable with the MV-22, they shaped the unique Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF), which has become a highly demanded asset. He argued that such innovation was certainly possible for the Navy as it worked with its new COD aircraft.
Now the CMV-22B has come to the aircraft carrier.
The first two deployments have been to the USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) and to the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72). Clearly, with initial deployments the key focus is upon ensuring that the basic COD mission is executed and the CMV-22B is integrated into carrier deck operations. Any thought beyond that needs to be secondary to ensuring that the core mission is executed.
But when assured of that, leveraging the capabilities of the Osprey needs to be considered especially in light of the Navy itself changing the con-ops of the fleet and the role of the carrier in terms of those changing con-ops.
In my co-authored book with Ed Timperlake on the Navy and changing con-ops, we had one chapter which precisely addressed re-imaging the role of the large deck carrier. We noted in that chapter:
“A good sense of how the large-deck carrier and its operations are being reworked and reimagined was discussed with a senior U.S. Navy officer we talked to in 2020 about the way ahead for the large-deck carrier. That officer underscored that “The carrier strike group battlespace has gone from being where the engagements occur to a situation in which the carrier strike group itself becomes a piece on the larger chessboard, which will, from a Navy perspective, be managed at the numbered fleet level. Because of the sensor and communications technologies and the weapons evolution, the chessboard is bigger, and the large deck carrier is feeding into the interactive kill webs through which we operate on that chessboard. The numbered fleet becomes the command-and-control node, which is why we are seeing the numbered fleets standing up in maritime operations centers that we did not have before. The size of the chessboard is enlarging significantly, with kill webs, that can stretch for thousands of miles, when you add in things like Triton or satellites.”
“The officer then added that “The Navy’s focus on distributed maritime operations is part of a broader joint coalition warfare approach built around a distributed but integrated force. It entails working with very flexible modular task forces, which can reachback to other combat capabilities to deliver strike and defense capabilities over much wider distances than where they are operating geographically. We see the large deck carrier and its partnered assets as moving beyond a focus simply on its proximate operating area to supporting a larger region, to be understood in terms of the size of the numbered fleet.”[1]
In other words, the very opportunity to leverage the unique capabilities of the Osprey suggested by McDermott are enablers for the shift in Navy con-ops underway and in which the carrier is not the center of the naval fleet but an enabler for maritime based joint and coalition operations,
How then should the CMV-22B’s role be envisaged in light of the dynamics of change in the re-craft of the maritime-based role in joint and coalition based multi-domain operations?
Recently, I have had a chance to meet with Captain Sam Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing in North Island. Just the name of the wing should give one an idea that creativity in thinking about the Osprey was envisaged. Captain Bryant’s mission statement for the Wing is: [to] “Man, Train, & Equip all USN VRM Squadrons to provide flexible and agile tilt-rotor options to Fleet Commanders wherever our nation requires us to operate.”
We started by focusing on the initial deployments and events during those deployments which already demonstrated the difference an Osprey makes expanding capabilities for the core mission from COD to providing enhanced logistical support.
According to Captain Bryant: “Our deployments to Vinson and Lincoln focused on our peacetime concepts of operations. We did a good job and produced good outcomes with the initial deployments. We already have demonstrated our ability to operate 1000 mile plus missions over water on a regular basis. This is certainly necessary given the distances the carriers need to operate in the Indo-PACOM AOR. And that fact that we can operate at night was a key factor in thinking about enhanced operations for these two carriers.”
He provided examples of missions performed during those two deployments that the CMV-22B could do and a C2-A could not.
The first was a medevac mission. Here a sailor had suffered a stroke, and a catapult launch could have proved fatal. Via the CMV-22B they flew the sailor directly to the medical support facility ashore long range at airplane speeds, but were able to land directly there in helicopter mode. The medical support facility was not served by a runway so a fixed wing aircraft would not be able to land directly there.
The second involved a repair to a non-functioning catapult aboard the Lincoln. The CMV-22B was able to get the support element needed directly ashore landing helicopter mode and quickly returning. The particular support facility was not served by a fixed wing airfield so it would have taken more time to obtain the support necessary for the repair if using a C2-A. Time is safety; time is lethality; time is survivability. The CMV-2B is uniquely suited to meet the “golden mile” of shore-to-ship logistics support, and “golden hour” of medevac support.
Captain Bryant reported that the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Paparo, was pleased with the initial deployments, but feels that the Osprey can do much more in its role in evolving fleet concepts of operations.
The aircraft provides an important support for, but more than that, stimulant for the shift in con-ops whereby the Navy focus on distributed operations which itself is in an experimental development and growth phase and intersects with the USAF’s approach to agile combat employment.
In other words, the reshaping of joint and coalition operations is underway which focuses upon distributed task forces which can deliver enhanced lethality and survivability.
Bryant highlighted that the CMV-22B compared to a legacy Osprey has much more capability. The Osprey is a path-breaking aircraft which breaks the rotorcraft’s limits on range and speed. But Bryant noted about the CMV-22B even when compared with the MV-22: “We have better range. We have much better avionics. We have better communications which allows to connect with the strike groups more securely. We are better suited for long-range navigation operations, and the flexibility required to support a high-end fight in the Pacific.
A con-ops to support the fleet approach instantly raises questions about the numbers of CMV-22Bs the Navy needs.
One aspect is the question of how many aircraft the Navy needs to do even the COD mission. When the Marines were asked during the initial process of evaluating the Osprey for the COD mission, they recommended four aircraft and team of 100 to 110 people to operate and support the aircraft. The Navy is currently using three. So that is the first point at which to raise the numbers question.
A second aspect of the demand for increased numbers of aircraft is to look at distributed ops for the fleet and to realize that the aircraft is a web support asset not a point-to-point load carrying asset. The fleet demand could be high and demand will rapidly outstrip supply when it comes to these aircraft.
The Osprey is a very flexible aircraft which makes it a high demand aircraft. As more fleet elements want to tap into the asset, the aircraft could see pressure on its availability and readiness. This was what I saw already when working with MARFORCPAC Commander Lt. General Robling when the USMC Ospreys were placed in a high demand setting with the shortfall in KC-130s in theater in the 2014-15 time frame.
The need to move weapons around the kill web in a contested environment will make the Osprey a prioritized fleet weapons carrier. The ability of the Osprey through role on roll off capability to play the role of an ISR/C2 quarterback which can play a key role in information logistics could see demand spike along these lines. Notably with the coming of maritime autonomous systems generating task force ISR in key locations the ability of the Osprey to move that data to the point of attack or defense could prove to be a critical capability for the fleet as well.
The shift from simply being COD to becoming part of the dynamic development of maritime kill web con-ops can be seen in the growing relationship between the command with NAWDC. When I went to NAWDC in 2000, I asked where the CMV-22B fit in. The answer was not clear. But now the NAWDC team is working closely with the CMV-22B command to work answers to that question.
Captain Bryant concluded by emphasizing that there might be a need to build a 21st century version of the Cold War approach the Navy once used. They had intra-theater support squadrons with several types of aircraft to support the movement of maritime forces. Now with distributed forces over significant distances, how might the Navy and the joint force do a 21st century version of such a theater support capability?
Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing
Captain Sam Bryant, a native of Ithaca, NY, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1997, where he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in English. CAPT Bryant completed his graduate education at The Naval Postgraduate School Monterrey, CA, where he earned an Executive Master’s in business administration (EMBA). Following his initial carrier qualification aboard the USS HARRY S TRUMAN (CVN-75), He was designated a Naval Aviator in December of 1999.
Captain Bryant’s operational sea duty assignments included The Rawhides of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40 (VRC-40), The Providers of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron Det 5 (VRC-30 Det 5 FDNF). He later returned to The Rawhides (VRC-40) for his department head tour, and to the Providers (VRC-30) for his Commanding Officer tour in San Diego, CA.
Captain Bryant’s shore assignments included T-45 advanced jet instructor duty with VT-22 in Kingsville, TX, Executive Assistant to Commander, NORTHCOM-Joint Task Force Civil Support (CJTF-CS), and Executive Officer of Fleet Replacement Squadron 120 (VAW-120 FRS). For his post-command staff tour, he reported for Pentagon duty at OPNAV N98 “The Ranch”, as the CMV-22B/C-2A Requirements Officer. Following Pentagon duty, CAPT Bryant returned to the cockpit to complete his MV-22B Osprey transition, and reported as the first Commanding Officer of the Naval Aviation Training Support Group New River, NC (NATSG). He then reported to Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing (VRM WING), San Diego for his major command tour as the CMV-22B Osprey Type-Wing Commodore.
Captain Bryant’s personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (3), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (3), and Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (4), and various campaign and service ribbons. He has accumulated over 3,500 flight hours and 350 carrier arrested landings, in six different type-model-series (TMS) aircraft, including the C-2A, T-45, and the MV-22B Osprey.
Featured Photo: Captain Bryant the day of the interview at North Island, January 4, 2023.
[1] Robbin Laird, Robbin and Edward Timperlake, Edward. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (pp. 181-182). Kindle Edition.
Also, see the following:
U.S. Navy Interior Communications Electrician 1st Class Nathan Cobb, technical services manager, Hidenori Uchiyama, lead technician, with Armed Forces Network Iwakuni, and U.S. Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal technicians assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni react to a simulated missile strike event during Exercise Active Shield at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, Nov. 15, 2022.
Exercise Active Shield is a bilateral exercise conducted annually with the Japan Self-Defense Force to better prepare the air station’s incident response procedures during base defense operations.
YAMAGUCHI, JAPAN
11.15.2022
Video by Sgt. Devin Andrews Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni