The 2025 iteration of Exercise Iron Fist represents a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan military cooperation, with American Marines and Japanese forces conducting their largest bilateral amphibious training exercise in Japan’s strategically vital southwest islands region.

Running from February 19 through March 7, 2025, this exercise showcased the evolving partnership between the two nations amid growing regional security challenges.

At the heart of Iron Fist 2025 stands the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), serving as the primary American force in the exercise.

The 31st MEU holds a unique position as the Marine Corps’ only permanently forward-deployed MEU, maintaining a continuous presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Based at Camp Hansen on Okinawa, this force of approximately 2,200 Marines and sailors serves as America’s premier crisis response capability in one of the world’s most strategically important regions³.

The 31st MEU’s current ground combat element centers on Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4), built around the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. This reinforced infantry battalion brings substantial amphibious assault capabilities to the exercise, supported by Combat Logistics Battalion 31, which provides essential sustainment and logistics operations.

The integration of these elements creates a complete Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations across the diverse terrain of Japan’s southwest islands.

A notable component of the Marine participation involved aviation assets from Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. Four MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft from MAG-36 relocated to Camp Ainoura on Kyushu for the duration of the exercise. This movement represented part of a broader 2016 U.S.-Japan agreement designed to reduce training activities around Okinawa while maintaining operational readiness.

MAG-36’s participation underscored the critical role of aviation in modern amphibious operations.

The unit, which forms part of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and III Marine Expeditionary Force, specializes in providing assault support aircraft for Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.

The Osprey’s unique capabilities — combining the vertical lift of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft — make it particularly valuable for operations across the scattered islands of Japan’s southwest region.

Iron Fist 2025 emphasized practical, realistic training scenarios designed to enhance interoperability between American and Japanese forces. The exercise focused specifically on amphibious operations while working to improve the working relationship between U.S. and Japanese ground forces. Training activities spaned multiple domains, including advanced marksmanship, amphibious reconnaissance, fire and maneuver assaults, bilateral logistics coordination, medical support operations, and comprehensive fire support including mortars, artillery, and close-air support.

Recent training events have demonstrated the exercise’s hands-on approach to building partnership capabilities. Marines from BLT 2/4 have conducted live-fire exercises alongside soldiers from Japan’s 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment. These bilateral marksmanship sessions enable forces from both nations to improve their lethality and readiness while learning from each other’s techniques and procedures.

Logistics cooperation represents another crucial element of the training. U.S. Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 31 have worked directly with Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force personnel on helicopter support team operations, including complex external lift procedures.

In a significant milestone, American Marines successfully conducted the first-ever external lift of a Japanese tactical vehicle, demonstrating growing interoperability in logistics support operations.

The shift of Iron Fist from its traditional California location to Japan’s southwest islands reflects the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Until 2023, the exercise was conducted at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California before moving to its current location in response to regional security concerns.

Japan’s southwest islands have become increasingly important due to China’s territorial claims on the disputed Senkaku Islands and Beijing’s focus on conducting military exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Chinese military forces, including People’s Liberation Army Navy ships and aircraft, routinely transit through international waters and airspace around Japan’s southwest region, highlighting the strategic significance of this area.

The exercise locations themselves tell the story of this strategic focus. Training areas include multiple sites across the region: Camp Hansen and Kin Blue Beach Training Area on Okinawa, Camp Ainoura in Sasebo and Camp Takayubaru in Kumamoto on Kyushu, and the southwest island of Okinoerabu. This geographic spread allows forces to train across the diverse terrain types they might encounter in real-world operations while demonstrating allied commitment to regional security.

The exercise benefited from significant naval support, with multiple U.S. Navy vessels providing the maritime foundation for amphibious operations. The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) served as the primary platform, supported by the amphibious dock landing ship USS Rushmore (LSD-47) and amphibious transport dock USS San Diego (LPD-22). This naval component provided the Marines with realistic ship-to-shore movement capabilities essential for amphibious operations.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force contributed its own vessels, including the tank landing ship JS Kunisaki (LST-4003) and minesweepers JS Awaji (MSO-304) and JS Chichijima (MSC-605). This combined fleet provided a comprehensive maritime training environment that mirrors the complex, multi-national nature of potential real-world operations in the region.

Beyond its immediate training value, Iron Fist 2025 serves as a cornerstone of the broader U.S.-Japan security relationship. The exercise, now in its 19th iteration, has evolved from its origins as a California-based training event to become a symbol of alliance cooperation in the face of regional challenges. The annual nature of the exercise allows both forces to build institutional knowledge and develop lasting professional relationships that extend far beyond the formal training period.

The participation of Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), 1st Helicopter Brigade, and units from the Western Army alongside their American counterparts demonstrates Japan’s commitment to developing its own amphibious capabilities.

This parallel development of capabilities on both sides strengthens the overall alliance while ensuring that both nations can contribute meaningfully to regional security.

Iron Fist 2025 represented more than a training exercise — it serves as a demonstration of allied resolve and capability in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. The Marines of the 31st MEU, working alongside their Japanese counterparts, are developing the skills, relationships, and interoperability necessary to respond to future challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

As regional tensions continue to evolve, exercises like Iron Fist become increasingly important for maintaining the delicate balance of power that has ensured stability in the region for decades.

The professional relationships built during these training events, the tactical and operational lessons learned, and the demonstrated commitment to partnership serve as powerful deterrents to potential aggression while reassuring allies and partners throughout the region.

The success of Iron Fist 2025 will likely influence future iterations of the exercise and similar bilateral training events.

As both nations continue to adapt their forces to meet emerging challenges, the lessons learned from this exercise will inform military planning, force structure decisions, and alliance coordination for the evolving “fight tonight” force.

Sources:

DVIDS notes associated with the photos used in this article.

https://news.usni.org/2025/01/24/u-s-marines-japanese-forces-to-drill-in-southwestern-japan-in-iron-fist-exercise

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2025-01-27/amphibious-okinawa-japan-china-16620493.html

https://www.iiimef.marines.mil/Media-Room/News/Article/Article/4071402/iron-fist-25-strengthening-us-marine-and-japan-forces-combined-amphibious-capab/

A Tiltrotor Enterprise: From Iraq to the Future

Operation Spider Web stands as the most sophisticated drone warfare operation in modern military history, representing the culmination of Ukraine’s remarkable transformation from drone technology importer to global innovator.

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service executed a coordinated strike using 117 drones across five Russian airbases spanning 4,300 kilometers, destroying 41 aircraft worth $7 billion and demonstrating how asymmetric warfare can achieve strategic effects at unprecedented cost ratios.

This operation emerged from a three-year evolution that saw Ukraine scale from producing 1,000 drones annually to 4.5 million, develop indigenous AI-targeting systems, and create the world’s first drone-centric military doctrine.

The success reflects not just technological advancement, but a fundamental reimagining of how smaller nations can project power against conventional military superpowers.

Ukraine’s drone warfare journey began with severe limitations in early 2022.

The military possessed just 36 Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones costing $5.37 million each, effective initially against disorganized Russian forces but quickly neutralized by improved Russian air defenses.

By the summer of 2022, these expensive platforms became largely obsolete, forcing Ukraine toward a revolutionary pivot that would reshape modern warfare.

The transition occurred in three distinct phases.

• Phase One (2022) saw desperate adaptation of commercial DJI Mavic quadcopters and Chinese racing drones for military use, marking the beginning of Ukraine’s shift from conventional military procurement to entrepreneurial innovation.
• Phase Two (2023-2024) witnessed explosive scaling from 20,000 to 200,000 monthly drone production alongside development of indigenous long-range platforms like the UJ-22 Airborne.
• Phase Three (2025) achieved complete technological independence with 100% Ukrainian-made components and AI-integrated systems capable of autonomous targeting.

This evolution produced staggering results.

Ukraine transformed from 100% import dependence to 96% domestic component sourcing within three years.

Production capacity increased 4,500-fold from 2022 levels, while unit costs plummeted from millions to under $1,000 per drone.

More significantly, Ukraine created an integrated ecosystem spanning 500+ manufacturers, from major defense contractors to garage workshops, supported by comprehensive training programs that graduated over 100,000 drone operators.

Operation Spider Web required 18 months and 9 days of meticulous planning directly overseen by President Zelensky and executed by Security Service Chief Vasyl Maliuk.

The operation’s audacity lay not just in its geographic scope — spanning five time zones from Murmansk to Siberia — but in its sophisticated integration of deception, technology, and strategic patience.

Ukrainian operatives established a command center directly adjacent to an FSB regional headquarters in Russia, working undetected for months while positioning assets across the continent.

The “Trojan horse” strategy concealed 117 Ukrainian-made Osa quadcopters inside wooden cabins mounted on commercial trucks, with remotely-operated roofs that deployed the drones on command.

Unwitting Russian drivers transported these systems to positions near five strategic airbases, never knowing they carried Ukraine’s most sophisticated weapons.

The execution demonstrated unprecedented technical sophistication. Each drone carried a 3.2-kilogram payload and operated through Russian 4G/LTE mobile networks, controlled by individual operators working from Ukraine thousands of kilometers away.

AI-assisted targeting systems trained on Soviet aircraft displayed in Ukraine’s Poltava Museum enabled drones to identify vulnerable points on aircraft with 90-centimeter precision.

The system combined ArduPilot open-source autopilot software with autonomous navigation capabilities, allowing drones to complete missions even when communication links were severed.

The targeted airbases housed Russia’s most strategic assets: Tu-95MS strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles used to strike Ukrainian cities, Tu-22M3 supersonic bombers, and A-50 airborne early warning aircraft. These Soviet-era platforms, no longer in production, represented critical nodes in Russia’s nuclear triad and conventional strike capabilities.

Ukraine’s technical achievements culminating in Spider Web reflect systematic innovation across multiple domains. The Osa drone platform manufactured by First Contact represents the pinnacle of Ukrainian engineering — purpose-built for deep-strike missions with thick enclosed frames enabling transport concealment, optimized payload capacity, and 150 km/h speed capability for all-weather operations.

The breakthrough AI targeting system exemplifies Ukrainian innovation philosophy. Rather than developing expensive military-specific software, Ukrainian engineers trained artificial intelligence using museum aircraft from their own Poltava Museum of Long-Range Aviation. This approach created precise targeting algorithms capable of identifying critical components — fuel tanks, missile pylons, wing roots — while costing orders of magnitude less than traditional military systems.

Manufacturing evolution proved equally remarkable. Companies like Vyriy Drone achieved 100% localization using Ukrainian suppliers for motors, transmitters, and thermal cameras, while TAF scaled to 40,000 monthly production with $1 billion annual output. This transition from Chinese component dependence to complete domestic supply chains occurred in under three years, demonstrating  industrial mobilization under wartime conditions.

The technical infrastructure supporting Spider Web involved sophisticated command and control systems enabling multi-time zone coordination, individual operator assignments for each of 117 drones, and real-time intelligence gathering through live video feeds. The integration of commercial telecommunications networks for military command demonstrates Ukraine’s mastery of dual-use technology exploitation.

Ukraine’s drone warfare success stems from fundamental strategic innovations that challenge conventional military thinking. The creation of the world’s first Unmanned Systems Forces as a dedicated military branch institutionalized drone warfare, while maintaining contact with 90% of domestic manufacturers to enable rapid capability integration.

Doctrinal flexibility proved crucial — Ukraine abandoned hierarchical military structures in favor of decentralized “islands of forces” that encouraged rapid adaptation and innovation. This approach contrasted sharply with Russian conventional doctrine, enabling Ukrainian forces to exploit vulnerabilities through creative asymmetric approaches.

The cost-effectiveness revolution achieved through Ukrainian drone warfare cannot be overstated. Spider Web demonstrated $600-1,000 FPV drones destroying $250 million bombers, creating unsustainable exchange ratios for defenders. Ukrainian drones became responsible for 60-70% of Russian equipment destruction by 2025, accounting for 65% of destroyed Russian tanks according to NATO estimates.

International cooperation evolved from Ukraine as aid recipient to knowledge provider, with NATO members now receiving Ukrainian training on drone warfare tactics. Estonian company KrattWorks established operations in Ukraine, while Swiss microcomputer manufacturer Auterion provided $15 components enabling autonomous guidance systems at scale.

Operational security maintained over 18 months demonstrates institutional discipline rarely seen in wartime conditions. Only five people initially knew of Spider Web’s existence, with compartmentalized planning enabling complex logistics while maintaining operational surprise against sophisticated Russian intelligence services.

The path to Spider Web involved several critical turning points that enabled increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Russian electronic warfare adaptation in mid-2022 paradoxically accelerated Ukrainian innovation by forcing abandonment of GPS-dependent systems in favor of more robust alternatives like fiber-optic control and frequency-hopping communications.

Production scaling breakthroughs in 2023 enabled transition from thousands to hundreds of thousands of monthly drone production, while the AI integration decision in 2024 improved success rates from 10-20% to 70-80% through autonomous targeting capabilities. The establishment of covert networks enabling deep-penetration operations represented the final capability required for transcontinental strikes.

The strategic doctrine evolution occurred in parallel with technical development. Ukraine progressed from using drones as conventional military support systems to embracing “robots lead the fight” doctrine, eventually achieving fully unmanned operations by late 2024. This transformation reflected not just technological capability but fundamental reimagining of how warfare could be conducted.

Key technological milestones included the transition from commercial drone modification to indigenous military platform development, integration of AI-assisted targeting reducing operator training requirements, and development of swarm coordination enabling multi-platform operations across vast distances.

Operation Spider Web represents the synthesis of Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution across technological, operational, and strategic dimensions. The operation demonstrated capabilities that military analysts had considered theoretical: 4,000-kilometer operational reach, AI-guided precision targeting, continental-scale logistics, and strategic effect achievement through asymmetric means.

The operation’s strategic impact extended far beyond physical damage. By destroying approximately one-third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, Ukraine eliminated platforms responsible for cruise missile attacks on Ukrainian cities while demonstrating that geographic distance no longer provided security for strategic assets. The psychological warfare component—including deliberate disclosure of operational methods—weaponized Russian paranoia by making every truck a potential threat.

Technical maturation evident in Spider Web included seamless integration of human creativity with AI precision, autonomous navigation immune to GPS jamming, and exploitation of enemy infrastructure (mobile networks) for command and control. The operation validated Ukraine’s technological independence while demonstrating the military potential of commercial technology integration.

The strategic communication aspects proved equally sophisticated. Timing the operation on Russian Military Transport Aviation Day maximized symbolic impact, while releasing operational details created sustained psychological pressure on Russian leadership and public. This approach exemplifies Ukraine’s understanding that modern warfare encompasses information and psychological domains alongside kinetic operations.

Operation Spider Web fundamentally altered military thinking about asymmetric warfare, technological accessibility, and strategic vulnerability. The operation proved that determined adversaries can achieve strategic effects previously requiring conventional military superiority through innovation, patience, and creative application of available technology.

The democratization of precision strike capabilities demonstrated by Spider Web has implications extending far beyond the current conflict. The operation showed how commercially available components, open-source software, and human ingenuity can create capabilities rivaling those of major military powers, potentially reshaping global security calculations.

Cost-effectiveness ratios achieved through Ukrainian drone warfare — $120,000 in equipment destroying $7 billion in assets — create new models for military investment and strategic planning. Traditional assumptions about force protection, strategic depth, and defensive investment may require fundamental revision in light of these demonstrated capabilities.

The integration model developed by Ukraine — combining civilian technology, military application, artificial intelligence, and strategic communication — provides a blueprint for modern asymmetric warfare that challenges conventional military thinking. NATO recognition of Ukraine as a knowledge provider rather than aid recipient reflects this paradigm shift.

Operation Spider Web stands as the culmination of Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution, demonstrating how a nation under existential threat can leverage innovation, strategic patience, and asymmetric thinking to achieve effects that reshape the strategic balance. The operation validates Ukraine’s transformation from technology importer to global military innovator, while providing lessons that will influence military doctrine for decades to come.

The success of Spider Web proves that in an era of accessible technology and global connectivity, strategic advantage increasingly derives from innovation and adaptation rather than traditional measures of military power. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution represents not just a tactical achievement, but a fundamental reimagining of how conflicts can be fought and won in the 21st century.

The featured image was appropriately enough generated by an AI program.

By Robbin Laird

I gave one of first public presentations certainly by an outsider in Israel on the F-35 at the annual airpower conference held by the Fischer Institute in Tel Aviv on May 25, 2011.

I gave a presentation on fifth generation aircraft which highlighted how the coming of the F-35 might affect the future development of the Israeli defense force.

The advantage of discussing the F-35 with allies was simply that the aircraft would bring multi-domain combat capabilities to the force prior to that term becoming a dominant part of the current strategic discussion.

Let me say that there was not a gaggle of F-35 advocates running around the United States at the time and I took my cartload of intellectual insults etc at the time for my analysis.

Senator McCain comes to mind as a guy who never got it, but he was hardly alone.

Secretary Gates great contribution of jettisoning the rebuilding of airpower for a world of major power competition has never really been properly addressed.

One can look back to the Commander-in-Chief, President Obama,  who did not need that Cold War airplane, the F-22.

I have told the story of those who did show up and build the kind of combat airpower we desperately need in today’s multi-polar authoritarian world notably in my book on my fifth generation journey.

But let me bring back the interview I did in Israel with a former Chief of the Israeli Air Force, the full impact of his insights which we have only just seen in the Iranian operations.

Just contrast this with the Gates-Obama leadership and you can see who understood the reality of airpower in the world we live in, not the world we would like to live in.

The Key to Survival: A Perspective on the Role of Air Power in the Defense of Israel

An Interview with (Retired) General Herzl Bodinger

General Bodinger:November 2010

Question: What role has airpower played in the defense of Israel?

General Bodinger: From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel.

We have developed our Air Force at the maximum size that we can have with our resources.

The Air Force needs to cover the whole Middle East, and be able to strike any target that the government of Israel will decide is necessary for the defense of Israel.

The goal is to be able to convince adversaries that you cannot stop us, and you cannot retaliate in the same manner.

We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time.

But air superiority is not a given.

We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. T

his provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft.

Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.

Question: The new approach to take away air dominance is to augment defenses and to proliferate missiles?

General Bodinger: Yes.

The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds.  And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail.

Question: So how do you respond to this new threat environment?

General Bodinger: You can simply upgrade existing systems to deal with the new threats. There are some gaps that you can’t overcome just by making a small minor change done either by changing the tactics or simply upgrading the aircraft. There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.

Comment: Your point is that you need to introduce a different type of combat system to deal with the new threat environment.

General Bodinger: A different kind.

Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution.

And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time.

I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.

Comment: It gives you persistence.

General Bodinger: Yes, it stays there for hours, and provides information, and sometimes can attack.

But it’s a robot with the limitations of a robot. You need to shape the correct mix between manned and unmanned aircraft, which is an evolutionary process.

But you clearly need to deal with the threat from the defensive systems for both the manned and unmanned systems.

You need the ability to overcome all these threats, which are being developed against it, like the S-300 and S-400.

Question: So you need to craft effective capability to deal with the new defensive systems and missile proliferation, which threaten both manned and unmanned systems?

General Bodinger: Correct.

So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first.

The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go. Of course, with all the avionics that come with it, at first all these machines are very expensive.

But to keep buying the old aircraft simply creates targets for the new defensive systems and is a much more expensive approach. For us airpower is a spearhead force, which can be used as an icebreaker. It will open the way for the rest of the aircraft to come.

For us, this will be the F-35.

Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets.

It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target. I just want to finish this and say that the surface-to-surface missiles also are a big problem here.

Maybe other places less.

Because of the range and because of the size of the country. We don’t have strategic depth. So, we have to bear in mind that all our assets are at risks from missiles.

Whether it’s the military assets or it’s the civilian assets.

From electric power stations, airports, and refineries and factories, and airbases, the entire infrastructure can be held at risk.

Question: And your point is that offensive and defensive systems need to be available to Israel to deal with the new threat environment?

General Bodinger: Clearly you can take some points of interest, and maybe defend them better.

And if worse comes to worse, and there is such a bombardment, so the civilians, you can put to shelters and you can even evacuate for a period of time.

We don’t know what our adversaries will do.

What we’ve seen from 1991, they bombed two towns, two big cities in Israel.  Forty missiles, twenty on each.  And about one to two a day. So, it shows the ability to inflict a lot of damage. You are not simply going sit back and take strikes.

You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that.  And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure.

And the probability they will be damaged. So this time, the asset is a country.

So, it’s invaluable.

And the probability that it will be damaged is not low enough.

So we have to invest wherever we have to invest.

Even if at the end at the day, maybe we have seen the dark side of the cloud, and we’re pessimistic, one could say, and nothing happened.

No alarm and disagreements, and everything is flourishing; it’s like Europe here.

So, we hope for that, but hopes are not a plan of work.

Comment: But what we do know on the defense technology side is the defense is getting better; the missile technology is getting better. So all of that could be bundled into different threat environments that could be very, very difficult if you cannot manage the battle space.

General Bodinger: That’s why we need the new aircraft.

One would say we need better tanks; we need better everything.

But when we talk about the ranges, and the value of air power not as a partner of the ground forces, but as a lead. So, here now we are coming to the F-35.

As I look back in the development of the Israeli air force certain aircraft gave us an opportunity to make a leap forward, and the F-35 fits into that tradition.

Looking back one quality leap was provided by the Mirage, the other by the F-15.

I remind people that in the late 50’s and the beginning of the 60’s, there were arguments here in the government level and the military, and also in the Air Force whether or not we needed the Mirage.  Maybe we can take the aircraft that we have, we had all fresh stuff.  We can upgrade them.

That was the idea.

Really, many officers and pilots in the Air Force supported this. We can do with upgrades, you carry the advanced weapons, and you’re better off.

Why do we need to spend a lot of money with something, which could be a little better?

But the problem with those who cannot envision the future is that they can not understand the leap which a new platform can provide.

It’s another kind of aircraft; another kind of capability.

The Mirage was the first revolution in the early Air Force.

The second time such a thing happened, we had Phantoms, we had Sky Hawks, we converted to American machines, it was very good, but the F-15 brought a breath of fresh air.

The whole way we started to fight, we got the first aircraft that we received were in 1977, four prototypes of F-15s. We bought them from the test aircraft; they were fit to make some changes to become operational. And we got those.

This was a revolution in the Air Force.

The whole way of flying changed after the first four aircrafts came here.

Of course, when they were multiplied and then came the F-16, it became the Air Force as it is today. But the first aircraft that arrived already made the change.

And we didn’t expect that this would be the change. And so, when you ask me about the F-35, I know the qualities of the aircraft.

I know the value of low radar constriction, the fact that you have the communication network, the missiles and weapons that you can hold inside, and whatever you can reach. And I know the qualities of the aircraft, but I am sure that the minute the aircraft will actually be used; again, I know that there will be a big dramatic change.

Comment:  No one has ever flown a 360-degree aircraft with combat systems, which allow it to manage that space. We have written on the website about the cultural change associated with the new aircraft. We’ve talked to many test pilots of this aircraft.  And the notion of a 360-degree aircraft, with the kind of combat system integration, which the aircraft has, will create pressure for a culture change.

General Bodinger: You can understand it only if you experience it.  And it is very difficult to transmit it to somebody who’s never flown the aircraft.  And I’m sure that this will not be a small leap, again, it will be a dramatic change.

Comment: Similar to your F-15 kind of experience.

General Bodinger: Yes. I was lucky to put in place the first pilots in the country who flew F-15s. And I’m sure that this will be what will happen.  And I know that there will be a big development, but you cannot even imagine what it will be.  When it will come, we will know. And it will lift the whole Air Force to another level.

Comment:  I think at the heart of the issue from my point of view is sortie generation rate. Your ability to turn an aircraft around quickly to go back into combat.

General Bodinger: Now, you’re coming back to the defense against surface-to-surface missiles.  We have to retain our ability to take off. But let me go back to discuss the robots which I consider to be satellites in the atmosphere.  I think that wherever you can send a robot, instead of a person, you should prefer a robot.

Where can you do it? When the targets are static targets, the headquarters of something, any installation that you wish or asset to bring down is ideal for a robot.

That is an important for the war, strategically or tactically.

And you know where it is, and it is located there, and this is what you have to do.

And all those cases, I think it’s a waste to send a person, because you can do the punch, whatever you wish, it will go and will kill the target and come back.

And if it doesn’t come back, you send another one. So this is a robot.

All the other cases that you have need to have a human mind on the battlefield to decide, because you don’t want to kill people who are not involved, how the targets have moved to another location, you need to decide on the spot.

Or suddenly, you want to make another priority, and you have the authority to do it, because that shift in targets is necessary to success.

Comment: That’s a really crucial issue, reprioritization in a fluid environment.

General Bodinger: So then, you have to have a person on board.

Now, it could be, I’m looking at one step forward, we didn’t do it yet. You could do it in an F-35, two or three or four.  Lead a herd of those machines — the robots — and give them missions on the spot. Especially when adversaries start to become very accurate because of GPS or any other means via there missiles, we will need dominance in the decision making cycle to prevail.

We look to the F-35 to be key to that process.

And as we develop the combat capability, we may eliminate many robots; you don’t even need a UAV, why do you need a platform to carry your weapon? Launch the weapon.  Like the tomahawk, but this will be different tomahawks.

Operation Rising Lion Marks Unprecedented Use of Stealth Technology Against Iranian Targets

A recent Forbes analysis by retired Air Force General David Deptula examines how Ukraine’s innovative drone strikes are reshaping military doctrine — and exposing American weaknesses

When Ukrainian forces launched coordinated drone attacks against four Russian airbases on June 1, 2025, they weren’t just destroying enemy aircraft — they were demonstrating a revolutionary approach to modern warfare that has profound implications for U.S. military strategy.

That’s the assessment of retired Air Force General David Deptula in a comprehensive analysis published in Forbes on June 12, 2025, where he argues that Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web” represents far more than a tactical victory. Instead, it signals a fundamental shift in how smaller nations can compete against militarily superior adversaries.

Using inexpensive quadcopter drones armed with small explosive charges, Ukrainian forces successfully penetrated deep into Russian territory and damaged valuable bomber aircraft. What makes this significant, according to Deptula, isn’t just the mission’s success, but its methodology.

“Ukraine demonstrated that it is fighting smarter than the Russians,” Deptula writes, describing how the operation exemplifies “effects-based” warfare — achieving strategic objectives through innovative means rather than traditional force-on-force confrontation.

Unlike conventional counter-air operations that require coordinated strike packages of fighters, bombers, and support aircraft, Ukraine accomplished similar results using readily available commercial technology. The approach offers a template for how technologically sophisticated but numerically inferior forces can compete against larger adversaries.

But Deptula’s analysis extends beyond this single operation. He notes that small lethal drones have fundamentally altered the character of modern warfare by democratizing precision-guided munitions. Individual soldiers now have access to capabilities previously reserved for combat aircraft.

The numbers are striking: Ukrainian Army units now engage approximately 80 percent of front-line targets using portable drones, leading Deptula to suggest that artillery may be losing its traditional role as the “king of the battlefield” to unmanned systems.

Perhaps most concerning for U.S. readers is Deptula’s assessment of American vulnerabilities. The retired general, who previously served as Director of Operations for Pacific Air Forces, argues that the United States has become dangerously complacent about force protection since the Cold War’s end.

During the Cold War, he notes, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Korea maintained aircraft in hardened shelters, recognizing the risks of leaving valuable assets exposed. That mindset has largely disappeared, even as threats have evolved.

Deptula points to several warning signs: the 1999 Chinese military doctrine “Unrestricted Warfare,” which outlined asymmetric strategies to neutralize U.S. advantages; drone incidents at Virginia’s Langley Air Force Base in 2023; and the general proliferation of drone technology that makes such weapons accessible to both state and non-state actors.

The implications, according to Deptula, could be catastrophic. While the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack targeted a limited set of distant military installations, a modern equivalent using drone swarms could impact targets across the entire United States simultaneously.

“If executed across a comprehensive set of key targets, America’s ability to competently fight could be derailed at the opening of a conflict,” he warns.

Deptula’s recommendations are straightforward but expensive: prioritize force protection through hardened shelters, layered defenses, and decentralized operations. He argues that “airpower, along with every other element of military power, without assured survivability is a hollow deterrent.”

The general notes that China has already embraced this philosophy, constructing thousands of hardened aircraft shelters while the U.S. has largely ignored such defensive measures. A 2004 proposal he made to build hardened shelters on Guam was rejected due to funding constraints—a decision that looks increasingly shortsighted given current threat assessments.

For Ukraine, Deptula suggests that expanding effects-based operations beyond counter-air missions could provide the best path to victory against Russia’s numerically superior forces. Rather than engaging in prolonged attrition warfare, Ukraine should focus on identifying and striking key Russian vulnerabilities across all domains.

The strategy offers hope for other nations facing similar challenges, demonstrating that “strategic insight and operational innovation can be more decisive than numerical superiority alone.”

Deptula’s analysis serves as both a celebration of Ukrainian innovation and a stark warning about American complacency.

As drone technology continues to proliferate and adversaries study Ukraine’s tactics, the United States faces a choice: adapt to this new reality or risk having its military advantages neutralized by the very technologies it helped create.

The question isn’t whether such capabilities will be used against American forces and infrastructure, but when — and whether the United States will be prepared when that moment arrives.

General David Deptula is a retired U.S. Air Force three-star general and currently serves as Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. His full analysis is available at Forbes.com.

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