Armenia is executing a careful but decisive pivot away from Russia toward closer integration with the European Union and United States, driven by Moscow’s failure to protect Armenian interests during the Azerbaijan conflict and Russia’s broader decline as a reliable security guarantor.
The EU’s nuanced approach, offering partnership without demanding complete severance from Russia, contrasts sharply with traditional binary geopolitical choices and may prove more sustainable for Armenia’s complex regional position.
The Breaking Point: Russia’s Failure in Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia’s strategic realignment was driven by Russia’s inability or unwillingness to fulfill its security commitments during pivotal moments of conflict with Azerbaijan. In September 2022, Azerbaijan launched cross-border attacks into recognized Armenian territory.
In response, Armenia invoked Article 4 of the CSTO treaty which thereby they were expecting support from its Russian-led security alliance but instead received only diplomatic overtures without any military assistance. The chief of staff of the CSTO, Colonel Anatoly Sidorov, explicitly rejected the notion of intervention and urged Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict through political means. A CSTO mission was dispatched merely to assess the situation, which left Armenian leadership and public opinion deeply dissatisfied.
The decisive rupture in Armenian-Russian security relations came in September 2023, when Azerbaijan undertook a large-scale military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. During the operation, Russian peacekeepers which were originally deployed under the 2020 ceasefire, which President Vladimir Putin had presented as a security guarantee failed to intervene as Azerbaijani forces reclaimed control over the region.
This led to the near-total exodus of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population, over 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled to Armenia. Russian officials articulated that their peacekeepers would only use weapons if they themselves were endangered and did not act to protect the local population.
As a result, Armenia publicly acknowledged that its reliance on the Russian security umbrella was no longer viable. Prime Minister Pashinyan declared that the Armenian-Russian alliance was “insufficient to ensure Armenia’s external security” and shifted policy toward peacebuilding and independence, intensifying Armenia’s engagement with Western partners.
According to European Union officials and policy analyses, Russia’s lack of military response during Azerbaijan’s “blitzkrieg” effectively gave Azerbaijan a green light to act and contributed to Armenia’s strategic pivot away from Moscow.
Armenia’s Formal Break from CSTO
Armenia’s response has been methodical and irreversible. On February 23, 2024, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia had “frozen” its participation in the CSTO, stating “We have now in practical terms frozen our participation in this treaty” and that membership was under review.
The break became more concrete when Armenia announced in May 2024 that it had stopped making financial contributions to the CSTO, with Pashinyan declaring in June that “We will leave. We will decide when to exit…Don’t worry, we won’t return”. By December 2024, Pashinyan stated that “we already consider ourselves outside the CSTO” and “I believe we have crossed the point of no return”.
This dramatic shift reflects broader public sentiment. A 2024 poll by the International Republican Institute showed just 31% of Armenians viewed ties with Moscow positively, down from 93% in 2019. Meanwhile, a July 2024 Gallup opinion poll noted a 7% increase in support for Armenia’s membership in NATO, with 29% of respondents believing Armenia should strive for NATO membership, while support for CSTO membership decreased by 10%, with only 16.9% believing Armenia should maintain its membership.
The European Alternative: A Nuanced Approach
The European Union has crafted a sophisticated response to Armenia’s strategic reorientation, offering partnership without demanding complete rupture with Russia. In March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming that Armenia could apply for EU membership if it met the Copenhagen criteria. This was followed by concrete support: the EU announced a €270 million Resilience and Growth Plan in April 2024, boosting EU funding to Armenia by 50%.
Armenia has responded enthusiastically to European overtures. On March 26, 2025, Armenia’s parliament adopted a bill officially endorsing Armenia’s EU accession process with 64 parliamentarians voting to approve it. Public support is strong: an October 2024 poll found that 58% of Armenians were in favor of joining the European Union, while a January 2025 survey found that a majority believe Armenia will join the EU in the next ten years.
The EU’s approach includes practical benefits beyond financial support. In July 2024, the European Council approved beginning visa liberalization negotiations with Armenia, with the process expected to be finalized by June 2025 and Armenia introducing biometric passports by 2026. The EU also decided to support Armenia militarily through the European Peace Facility with €10 million to enhance the logistical capacities of the Armenian armed forces.
Economic Contradictions: The Russia Paradox
Despite political distancing, Armenia’s economic relationship with Russia has paradoxically strengthened since 2022. Trade turnover between Armenia and Russia reached a record $12 billion in 2024, with mutual trade increasing 1.6 times compared to the previous year. Armenia secured a spot among Russia’s top ten trade partners for 2024, accounting for 1.8% of Russia’s total foreign trade and ranking 8th alongside Germany.
This economic dependence reflects Armenia’s role in circumventing Western sanctions. Armenia’s GDP in 2024 is close to double what it was in 2021, rising from $13.9 billion to $27 billion, largely due to increased trade volumes and reexports to Russia worth more than $7.3 billion. Armenian media reported sharp rises in shipments of Russian gold and diamonds to Armenia and their subsequent re-export, with Armenia importing about 66 tons of gold worth $4.4 billion in the first half of 2024, almost all from Russia.
However, this economic relationship creates vulnerabilities. Russia supplies around 85% of all gas to Armenia and the country’s energy infrastructure is largely controlled by Gazprom, giving the Kremlin coercive tools against Yerevan. Additionally, cash remittances from Armenians working abroad, mostly in Russia, contribute significantly to Armenia’s GDP, making up 14% of GDP in 2018.
Limited U.S. Engagement
The United States has increased support for Armenia but with measured restraint. To date, the United States has invested approximately $3.3 billion in Armenia to support democratic reforms, economic growth and resilience, and humanitarian assistance, including $340 million since 2021. In 2024, the U.S. announced $20.6 million in new support for Armenia to bolster cyber, border, and energy security.
Military cooperation has expanded cautiously. The United States has provided $27 million in funding to support Armenia’s border security capabilities and approximately $18 million in Foreign Military Financing for armored ambulances, cyber defense operations, and training center improvements. The two countries have conducted joint Eagle Partner peacekeeping exercises in 2023 and 2024.
However, critics argue this support is insufficient. The total US-European aid package of $290 million over four years amounts to just $72.5 million annually which is one-third of what the United States gives the Central African Republic and a fraction of the $5.7 billion Armenia receives in Russian remittances.
Strategic Implications and Future Outlook
Armenia’s pivot reflects broader shifts in post-Soviet geopolitics.
With closed borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia remains geographically constrained, but the country is looking to new partners, especially India, to diversify its international relationships.
Armenia will only be able to diversify its economy more fully when the land border with Turkey, closed since 1993, reopens, though normalization efforts are proceeding slowly.
The EU’s approach of graduated integration without demanding immediate rupture with existing relationships may prove more sustainable than traditional binary choices. As Armenia’s Ambassador to the EU noted, “Armenian foreign policy is neither a turn towards the West nor a turn towards the East” which is a pragmatic acknowledgment of the country’s complex position.
Russia’s declining influence extends beyond Armenia. Recent tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan over the deaths of Azerbaijani citizens in Russian custody have created the unusual situation where both Armenia and Azerbaijan now view Moscow with suspicion, potentially reshaping the entire South Caucasus dynamic.
Armenia’s realignment represents a careful but decisive break from three decades of Russian dependence. The country’s approach which is to embrace European integration while managing continued economic ties with Russia reflects the pragmatic realities facing small nations caught between great powers.
The EU’s nuanced strategy of offering partnership without ultimatums may provide a sustainable model for other post-Soviet states seeking to diversify their relationships while avoiding the costs of complete geopolitical rupture.
The success of this transition will depend heavily on external factors: the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the stability of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, and the willingness of Western partners to provide sufficient economic alternatives to Russian dependence.
For now, Armenia has chosen a path of strategic hedging, but the momentum clearly favors deeper integration with European institutions and values.