By Pierre Tran
Paris – The Chinese navy was large, growing fast, and led by a complex command structure which showed an aggressive approach in operations at sea, the navy chief of staff, Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, told the Association des Journalistes de Défense (AJD) Sept. 3.
Meanwhile, the Russian navy had lost much of its access to the open seas in the West, following its invasion of Ukraine, he said.
The senior navy officer met the press club at the service headquarters at Balard, on the edge of the capital. Ship anchors were on display in the leafy courtyard of the navy building, and there were aircraft parts artfully displayed by a neighbouring building in the vast office complex of the ministry of the armed forces.
“China’s arming up is more than significant,” he said. “They have built their ships fast, with the numbers of frigates, (and) aircraft carriers.”
There was a good quality build of warships in the Chinese navy, which was making “fairly fast progress in acquiring know-how,” he said. The fleet was large, growing fast, and mostly deployed as a coastal service.
China showcased its extensive military kit Sept. 3, with a vast parade to mark the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the second world war. Chinese President Xi Jinping was flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, seen as a political signal of opposition to U.S. President Donald Trump.
Meanwhile, a summit meeting Sept. 4 of the coalition of the willing led to an offer of security guarantees on land, sea or air from 26 allies of Ukraine, in the event of a ceasefire with Russia. France and the U.K. co-led the coalition, of which some 35 nations met.
China Sails Toward Blue Water
A French assessment of Chinese naval know-how has paid close attention to the “blue water” capability of sailing aircraft carriers, particularly the catapult launch of aircraft without access to a landing strip, a complex operation, he said.
“It has to be said, they are not far off – and they are entering that (blue water) category,” he said. That could be seen at a Chinese demonstration of maritime capability in an exercise with Russian forces in the economic zone of Hawaii, he said.
The Russian and Chinese navies conducted a joint anti-submarine exercise, flying respectively IL-38 and Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters, to hunt and kill a designated “enemy” submarine in the Sea of Japan, Reuters reported Aug. 6.
That Chinese-Russian exercise came just days after Trump said he had ordered two U.S. navy nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
Vaujour said the Chinese navy has been largely a “coastal” service, and the navy was heading for “the high seas and projection.” The aim was to secure the shipping routes for the Chinese commercial fleet, he said.
What China appeared to lack for now was a high level of “integration of joint services,” namely army, air force, and navy working together, closely “coordinated,” he said. The forces appeared to lack a complex multi-domain approach, as its “highly centralized command structure” impeded greater coordination.
But the Chinese forces held many exercises, and they would boost their level of coordination soon, he said.
The significance of the Chinese navy went beyond Beijing’s ambitions to take control of Taiwan, and was set out in its 2049 Initiative, he said. This was a strategic plan on maintaining the living standard of the Chinese middle class, with pursuit of annual five pct economic growth.
Such growth required raw materials and mineral reserves in Africa, and a navy would guarantee access to the resources, he said. That pointed up the importance of the Chinese naval base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. There was a rail link there, for land transport.
China was building a fourth aircraft carrier, pointing up the navy’s role in its aim to be a world power, he said.
An Aggressive Approach
There was a notable difference between the Chinese and Western navies, he said, with the former making a “physical manoeuvre” against vessels of foreign flag. Such “aggression” could be seen in videos of Chinese naval vessels intercepting Philippine ships, he said.
That concept of operations might stem from China’s lack of naval partners, he said, in contrast to Western fleets, where commanders copy allies’ tactical moves.
The navy chief of staff told the press club when he attended a Western Pacific Naval Symposium, he met his Chinese counterparts, which included the navy political commissar, and the navy chief of staff. Those two senior naval posts – one political, the other military – prompted the question: who leads, he said.
A double command structure, replicated in each of the services, could complicate management of crises, which were already complex, he said.
French officers were invited to the Pacific symposium, as there were French naval bases in Nouméa and Papeete. The French light “surveillance” frigates Vendémiaire and Floréal were based respectively in Nouméa and Papeete, and patrolled the region.
Limited Integration
While Chinese ships sailed next to Russian vessels in the exercise near Hawaii, the admiral said, there was limited “integration” between the two navies.
That was in contrast to close operational ties between European and U.S. navies, he said, pointing up a French frigate sailing as escort for a U.S. carrier in the Persian Gulf when tension was high with Iran.
A U.S. admiral, when asked how he found working with the French navy, said it was “challenging,” Vaujour said.
Vaujour said the American admiral had said where other allies said “yes, yes” on operational requests, the French just said “no.”
The French admiral said there needed to be clear political authorization for an action, and when that was in place, the French navy was “ultra reliable” as an operational ally. The U.S. navy took an “offensive” approach, when the French service took a “defensive” attitude, he said.
Russian Navy Loses Out
On the Russian navy, it was clear Moscow has “lost a great deal at sea,” he said. The Russian service has lost the use of most of its points of naval access in the wake of the Feb. 22 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Moscow previously relied on four naval bases for access to Western seas, he said, with Murmansk up in the High North, Saint Petersburg on the Baltic Sea, Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and Tartus in Syria, on the Mediterranean, he said.
Finland and Sweden joining Nato turned the Baltic Sea into a “Nato lake” when previously it was a “Neutral lake,” he said. Russia lost access to Tartus in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and Turkey has closed down Russian access for Sevastopol, which suited the Western allies, he said.
Turkey, a Nato member, is part of the coalition of the willing, and Ankara’s mission will be to guarantee security in the Black Sea, he said. There will be need for de-mining to clear the way for commercial shipping.
The U.S. carrier Gerald R. Ford was sailing in the High North, putting pressure on Murmansk, the sole Russian access to the Atlantic, he said.
The Russian navy lost warships in the Black Sea, he said. Russian ships had to sail from Saint Petersburg, following the loss of the Tartus base, to support operations in Africa, he said. That Russian taking the long way round allowed Western allies to track the Russian ships, making Moscow more vulnerable.
On submarines, the Russian navy sailed a nuclear-powered attack boat, which the French navy tracked, working closely with allies, notably the U.S., British, and Norwegian services, he said, with a French interest in protecting its nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
Aerial Drones for the New Carrier
The French navy was working with contractors to develop an automatic landing capability for the planned new generation aircraft carrier, the admiral said.
It was fairly simple to launch drones, he said, but it was “complicated” for automatic landing.
“Today we are already working with Dassault, Naval Group, and others on automatic landing for the F5 version of the Rafale…” he said. That automatic landing was needed for future aerial drones for the new carrier, due to replace the Charles de Gaulle flagship in 2038.
Other than the catapult, there was no limit on the size of future aerial drones for the carrier, he said, other than price – “it should not cost too much.”
U.S. navy carriers had the MQ-25 drone for inflight refuelling, he said, and that uncrewed aircraft was large, weighed heavily, and was much like a plane.
The concept was for “single mission” uncrewed aircraft, with the new French carrier carrying separate drones designed for surveillance, attack, inflight refuelling, and protection, he said.
The official launch of the program for the new carrier was due this year, but there was deep political uncertainty as Prime Minister François Bayrou was expected to lose a Sept. 8 confidence vote in parliament.
There was also doubt as France suffered from problems with a budget deficit of 5.4 pct of gross domestic product, exceeding the European Union’s 3 pct limit. Spending cuts were seen to be needed, but governments have been unable to find support from a divided parliament.
Work has started on the “critical path,” of the project, with contractors Framatome and TechnicAtome working on the carrier’s nuclear propulsion, he said.
Building a carrier took some 15 years, and the complex know-how to build a carrier needed to be maintained, he said. That meant it was important to launch “fairly quickly,” he said, to “guarantee to the president this instrument of power and sovereignty, which allows France to pull its weight in the world.”
The Charles de Gaulle carrier essentially ships the naval version of the Rafale multimission fighter, Hawkeye spy plane, and NH90 helicopter. The new carrier will fly the new generation fighter (NGF), the core part of a European project for a future combat air system (FCAS), as well as the legacy aircraft.
The French navy had an 80 pct availability of its fleet of 15 first rank frigates, and 60 pct availability for the nuclear attack subs, he said, compared to 30-40 pct for Royal Navy frigates. That French high availability was due to two crews available for the warships, contractors supplying spares, and access to infrastructure.
France had naval bases among allies and overseas territories and departments, which allowed dry dock repairs and service. Russia was looking for such access to overseas bases rather than just a visit to a friendly port.
The two priorities of the French navy were lethality and information superiority, he said, with the latter drawing on electronic warfare, jamming, artificial intelligence, and collecting and processing data.