By Robbin Laird
The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era are dissolving. For Australia, this transformation presents both unprecedented challenges and opportunities to reshape its role as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia is moving from alliance dependence toward more strategic independence while deepening operational integration with trusted partners.
The traditional model of alliance partnership, where Australia provided bases and political support in exchange for American security guarantees, is proving inadequate for contemporary challenges. There is a growing recognition within Australian strategic circles, as noted in a conversation with a senior strategic analyst recently with me, that “we can’t rule out the possibility that we might actually have to conduct some operations, major operations, to deter and demonstrate capability to deter even China, but also cause enormous damage to the baddies if the United States decides it’s going to sit on its hands.”
This stark assessment reflects a broader realization that has been developing across multiple Australian governments: the reliability of any single patron, even the United States, cannot be taken for granted in an era of domestic political volatility and competing global priorities. The experiences of Ukraine and Israel, where American support came with significant operational constraints and political interference, have reinforced Australian concerns about maintaining decision-making autonomy in potential conflicts.
It is clear that Australia needs to ramp up its own capabilities, which work with regional allies and support the broader American forces as well. But its own capabilities is the rub – which ones are central to shape a more independent posture and how to build, operate and pay for such capabilities?
In other words, the strategic dynamics have outpaced current budgets and policies.
Australia’s strategic independence cannot be built on traditional military thinking focused on capital ships and large platforms alone. With a population of 25 million and constrained defense budgets, Australia must invest in one Australian analyst called “high-leverage capabilities”. systems that can “stop even a major aggressor in its tracks” through technological sophistication rather than numerical superiority.
The recently announced $1.7 billion investment in Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicles exemplifies this approach. Unlike traditional submarine programs that deliver small numbers of expensive platforms over decades, the Ghost Shark program is designed for rapid scaling and continuous technological evolution. The difference between deploying 15 Ghost Shark systems versus 180 represents a qualitative shift in deterrent capability that potential adversaries must factor into their planning.
This modular, rapidly deployable approach extends beyond underwater systems. The goal of a diversified more independent capability is to create multiple, simultaneous threats that complicate adversary decision-making while avoiding the catastrophic loss scenarios associated with traditional platform-centric strategies.
The technological sophistication of these systems often reflects joint development with the United States, but their operational deployment and tactical employment will be determined by Australian strategic requirements. This represents a fundamental shift from technology transfer to collaborative development, where Australian operational insights shape system capabilities from the design phase.
Strategic independence requires more than advanced weapons systems. It demands industrial capacity to sustain those systems independently of vulnerable supply chains. The Ghost Shark program’s emphasis on domestic battery production illustrates this broader requirement. As defense analysts have noted, producing sophisticated autonomous systems while importing all critical components from potentially hostile nations represents a fundamental strategic vulnerability.
The concept of “embedded logistics” offers a framework for addressing these challenges while serving broader alliance interests. Rather than relying on expensive, vulnerable supply lines stretching from Hawaii to forward deployment areas, the United States could dramatically reduce Pacific logistics costs by supporting Australian industrial capacity development. This approach could reduce American logistics costs signifcantly while providing Australia with the industrial foundation for sustained military operations.
This industrial development serves multiple strategic purposes. It reduces Australian dependence on any single supplier, including traditional allies whose domestic politics might disrupt supply relationships. It provides the foundation for supporting regional partners who lack sophisticated defense industries. Most importantly, it enables Australia to maintain military operations during the extended periods when great power politics might limit access to traditional suppliers.
Strategic independence does not mean strategic isolation. Australia’s future security depends on deepening operational integration with trusted partners while maintaining decision-making autonomy. Recent developments in military-to-military cooperation illustrate how this balance might be achieved.
The level of operational integration already achieved between Australian and American forces extends far beyond traditional alliance cooperation. As one Australian strageic analyst noted in a conversation with me, current systems integration means “if you’ve got a sensor saying, here’s a PLA task group here, what’s the best asset for actually striking that in 15 minutes time, if it’s an Australian F-35 flight… it’s a joint thing.” This represents genuine operational integration where tactical decisions are made based on capability and positioning rather than national boundaries.
Similar integration is developing with other regional partners. Australia’s expanding training relationships, from long-standing arrangements with Singapore to new partnerships with Germany, reflect a diversification strategy that reduces dependence on any single relationship while building interoperability across multiple partnerships. The recent German request to conduct pilot training in Australia, driven by recognition of Australian operational excellence, illustrates how capability development can create strategic options.
The key insight from these developments is that operational integration can coexist with strategic independence when partners maintain genuine capabilities rather than depending solely on a dominant ally’s systems. Australia’s ability to contribute meaningfully to integrated operations depends on having independent capabilities to contribute, not just political willingness to follow American leadership.
Australia’s evolving strategic role extends beyond self-defense to regional leadership through capability sharing and operational cooperation. The expanding relationship with the Philippines illustrates this potential. Australia’s new treaty arrangements and joint exercises with Manila represent more than bilateral cooperation for they demonstrate how middle powers can create alternative security networks that complement rather than compete with traditional alliance structures.
The autonomous systems focus provides a particular opportunity for regional leadership. Maritime autonomous systems offer an ideal platform for sharing operational information and coordinating responses to gray-zone activities without requiring the massive infrastructure investments associated with traditional military cooperation. Australia could position itself to serve as a regional hub for autonomous systems development and deployment.
This regional role serves broader strategic purposes by creating multiple decision-making centers that complicate adversary planning. Rather than focusing solely on potential American responses to regional aggression, potential adversaries must account for Australian capabilities, Philippine responses, Japanese actions, and other variables that cannot be controlled through bilateral pressure on Washington.
The Pacific Island fingerprinting campaigns by Chinese forces illustrate the importance of this distributed response capability. Australia’s ability to respond independently to such provocations, without requiring American approval or support, provides options for graduated responses that might be impossible within traditional alliance frameworks where every action requires extensive coordination.
The challenge lies in maintaining operational cooperation while political relationships fluctuate. The Trump administration’s demand for 3.5% GDP defense spending from Australia, while politically problematic, reflects genuine recognition that increased ally capability serves American strategic interests. However, increased capability necessarily means increased autonomy in employment decisions.
The solution requires reframing alliance cooperation from patron-client relationships toward genuine strategic partnerships. This means American acceptance that capable allies will make independent decisions about capability employment, while Australian recognition that strategic independence requires genuine capability development rather than political posturing.
Australia’s strategic independence must address economic as well as military vulnerabilities. The Chinese economic coercion playbook, demonstrated globally over the past decade, requires capabilities for economic as well as military resistance. This connects strategic independence to broader questions of industrial policy and economic diversification.
Strategic independence requires economic policies that support both military capability development and resistance to economic coercion. The embedded logistics concept serves both purposes by creating industrial capacity that supports military requirements while reducing dependence on potentially hostile suppliers.
This economic dimension extends to regional leadership opportunities. Australia’s capacity to provide alternative economic relationships for Pacific Island nations and regional partners creates strategic options that complement military capabilities. The combination of economic alternatives and security partnerships provides a more robust foundation for regional influence than either element alone.
Australia’s approach to strategic independence through high-leverage capabilities would offer lessons for other middle powers facing similar challenges. The emphasis on rapidly deployable, modular systems that can be scaled quickly provides an alternative to traditional platform-centric approaches that require decades for development and massive resource commitments.
The technological sophistication required for this approach demands genuine innovation rather than license production of foreign designs. Australia’s success with autonomous systems development reflects investment in domestic technological capacity rather than simple technology transfer arrangements. This model requires patient investment in research and development capabilities but provides the foundation for genuine strategic autonomy.
The deterrent effect of these capabilities depends not only on their technical performance but on adversary uncertainty about their capabilities and employment concepts. The psychological impact of facing an unknown number of sophisticated autonomous systems operating in contested waters may exceed their direct military effect.
This uncertainty principle applies more broadly to strategic independence. Adversaries who could previously predict Australian responses based on American decision-making patterns now face genuine uncertainty about Australian capabilities and intentions. This uncertainty serves deterrent purposes regardless of the specific capabilities involved.
Australia’s de facto movement toward more strategic independence represents neither abandonment of alliance relationships nor pursuit of complete autonomy. Instead, it reflects adaptation to a strategic environment where traditional security guarantees are no longer sufficient for national survival. The goal is developing sufficient independent capability to deter aggression while maintaining the partnerships necessary for broader regional stability.
This transition requires sustained political commitment to capability development, industrial investment, and regional engagement. It demands American acceptance that genuine partners exercise genuine autonomy in strategic decision-making. Most importantly, it requires recognition that strategic independence and alliance partnership can reinforce rather than contradict each other when properly structured.
The stakes extend beyond Australian security to the broader question of whether democratic middle powers can maintain autonomy in an era of great power competition. Australia’s success or failure in developing genuine strategic independence while maintaining productive partnerships will influence similar efforts across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
The comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era offered the illusion of permanent security through alliance dependence. The emerging strategic environment demands the reality of security through capability and partnership. Australia’s challenge is managing this transition successfully while contributing to broader regional stability. This transition is not only possible but essential for long-term security in an increasingly contested world.