By Robbin Laird
The nature of military transformation has fundamentally changed. Where once armed forces could afford to develop new platforms over decades and then figure out how to use them, today’s security environment demands a completely different approach. This shift represents perhaps the most significant change in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare itself.
In a recent discussion with Lt General Simon Stuart, Chief of Staff of the Australian Army, the contours of this transformation became clear. The conversation revealed not just tactical adaptations to new technologies, but a philosophical reorientation of how militaries must think about capability development, acquisition, and employment in an era of rapid technological change.
Beyond Platform-Centric Thinking
“Our transformation is no longer self-referential,” Lt General Stuart explained, describing how military modernization has historically focused on platforms first, with tactics, techniques, and procedures developed afterward. Under the traditional model, a new aircraft, ship, or vehicle would be delivered, and military personnel would then spend years figuring out optimal employment methods. Doctrine would follow, eventually leading to new ways of fighting.
This sequential approach worked when technological change moved at a measured pace and adversaries faced similar constraints. But today’s reality is starkly different. The pace and scale of technological change, driven by the digital revolution and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, have compressed traditional development timelines..
The Australian Army’s response has been to adopt what Stuart calls a “threat, terrain, and technology referential” approach. Rather than being dictated to by available platforms, this methodology starts with understanding the specific threats forces will face, the terrain they’ll operate in, and the technologies available to address those challenges. Only then are platforms and systems assembled to meet operational requirements.
This represents a return to Clausewitzian fundamentals , acknowledging warfare’s enduring human nature while adapting to its ever-changing character. But the current generation faces something historically unprecedented: the character of warfare is now changing not over decades, but month by month, sometimes week by week.
The New Combined Arms Reality
The implications extend far beyond individual platform decisions to the very nature of combined arms warfare. Modern military operations increasingly involve what might be called “layered combinations” of crewed and uncrewed systems, each optimized for different aspects of the battlespace.
Stuart described a conceptual framework of multiple layers: a forward line of uncrewed ISR systems providing surveillance and reconnaissance while potentially emitting electronic signatures to confuse enemy targeting; a middle layer heavy on uncrewed systems with lighter crewed presence; and more traditional formations with heavy crewed elements supported by uncrewed capabilities.
Critically, nothing is replaced in this evolution for everything is additive. Drones don’t replace traditional platforms; they create new combinations with them. Electronic warfare doesn’t supersede kinetic capabilities; it enables them. Artificial intelligence doesn’t remove humans from decision-making; it augments human capabilities while raising fundamental questions about the appropriate level of human oversight, particularly regarding lethal force employment.
This additive approach challenges binary thinking about “man versus machine” in military affairs. The question isn’t whether humans or machines will dominate future warfare, but how to preserve human lives while leveraging uniquely human capabilities like creative thinking and moral judgment. As Stuart noted, “the answer, as it ever has been, is both.”
Innovation from the Bottom Up
Perhaps the most significant operational change is the systematic empowerment of tactical-level innovation. Historically, militaries have been hierarchical organizations where innovation flowed from senior leadership and research institutions down to operational units. Today’s environment demands reversing that flow.
The Australian Army has implemented what Stuart describes as “learn by doing” exercises, pairing soldiers directly with industry partners to solve specific mission problems. Units receive defined mission sets, perhaps defeating certain threats in specific terrain under degraded conditions, along with access to various technologies and systems. Their task is to experiment, adapt, and report back on what works, what doesn’t, and how different combinations might be more effective.
This approach taps into the creative potential of soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers at a scale military organizations haven’t attempted historically. For armies that lack mass , a description that fits most Western militaries, maximizing human potential becomes not just beneficial but essential.
The feedback loop is deliberately rapid. Units don’t spend months writing formal reports; they immediately feed lessons learned back into the system for broader application. This creates what Stuart calls “continual adaptation” or the ability to evolve tactics and procedures as quickly as threats and technologies change.
The Acquisition Imperative
These operational changes create unprecedented challenges for defence acquisition systems designed around platform-centric thinking. Traditional acquisition processes, which can take decades to field new capabilities, are fundamentally out of phase with operational requirements that change monthly.
The mismatch isn’t merely about speed, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the entire conceptual framework. Platform-centric acquisition assumes you can define requirements years in advance, design systems to meet those requirements, and then use those systems for decades. But when software can be updated rapidly and electronic warfare techniques evolve dynamically, that assumption breaks down completely.
As observed in the Ukraine conflict, code writing and counter-code writing have become central to military effectiveness. This suggests militaries may need coding capabilities at surprisingly low organizational levels, perhaps battalion level or below. The ability to rapidly modify software, adapt to enemy countermeasures, and exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities becomes as important as traditional military skills.
The implications extend beyond just adding programmers to military units. It requires rethinking the entire relationship between industry and the military. Traditional defence contractors, optimized for long development cycles and stable requirements, must now work alongside smaller, more agile technology companies that can deliver rapid iterations and continuous updates. This creates new partnership models where innovation happens through collaborative experimentation rather than formal requirements documents.
Moreover, the traditional “valley of death” between research and fielding must be eliminated. When operational environments change weekly, there’s no time for lengthy transition periods between proof-of-concept and operational deployment. Military organizations need the ability to rapidly prototype, test, and field capabilities while maintaining appropriate safety and security standards.
This reality demands what might be called “hybrid acquisition” or maintaining traditional processes for major platforms while developing entirely new mechanisms for rapidly fielding and updating software-intensive capabilities. The challenge isn’t choosing between these approaches but integrating them effectively while ensuring that rapid innovation doesn’t compromise safety, security, or interoperability.
Lessons from Ukraine
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides perhaps the clearest example of these principles in action. Ukraine’s effectiveness results not from any single capability but from the combination of Western-trained forces using Western weapons systems integrated with innovative employment of commercial and military drones, electronic warfare capabilities, and rapidly evolving software.
Crucially, Ukraine’s success demonstrates that focusing solely on new technologies while ignoring traditional capabilities misses the point entirely. Ukrainian forces need Western artillery, air defence systems, and armored vehicles to create the foundation upon which drone warfare and electronic operations could be effective. Conversely, those traditional capabilities would have been insufficient without the innovative integration of new technologies.
This integrated approach extends to something Stuart calls “adaptive reuse” or finding new applications for existing platforms. Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carriers, for example, can be converted into uncrewed or optionally crewed systems carrying various payloads: sustainment supplies, ISR equipment, electronic warfare systems, or kinetic effectors. The question becomes not whether old platforms are obsolete, but how they can be adapted to contribute to current operational requirements.
Platform Design Evolution
These operational and acquisition changes will inevitably influence future platform design. New systems must be built with modularity and adaptability as core features rather than afterthoughts. The ability to rapidly integrate new sensors, weapons, or electronic systems becomes as important as traditional performance metrics like speed or armor protection.
Consider the example of naval operations in the Red Sea, where sophisticated command and control systems were constrained by having only the weapons physically mounted on individual ships. A more adaptive approach might involve airlift platforms deploying loitering weapons that at sea operational units could employ, dramatically expanding the weapons available to commanders without requiring them to physically carry additional munitions.
This suggests platform design must anticipate not just current requirements but unknown future adaptations. Systems need built-in capacity for upgrades, modifications, and entirely new applications that designers cannot currently envision.
The Human Element
Throughout these technological and organizational changes, the human element remains central. The goal isn’t to remove humans from military operations but to leverage uniquely human capabilities while protecting human lives. This requires careful consideration of where humans remain “in the loop,” “on the loop,” or “out of the loop” for different types of decisions, particularly those involving lethal force.
The questions are both technical and ethical: What degree of confidence do we have in sensor systems? How vulnerable are they to spoofing or deception? Under what circumstances, if any, should machines make autonomous lethal decisions? These aren’t just engineering problems but fundamental questions about the nature of warfare and military responsibility.
The human dimension becomes even more complex when considering the cognitive demands of modern warfare. Operators must now manage not just traditional military tasks but increasingly complex human-machine interfaces. They must understand when to trust automated systems, when to override them, and how to maintain situational awareness in environments where information flows at unprecedented speeds.
Training paradigms must evolve accordingly. Military education can no longer focus primarily on mastering specific platforms or weapons systems. Instead, it must emphasize adaptability, systems thinking, and the ability to rapidly learn and integrate new technologies. This shift from platform-specific training to capability-focused education represents another fundamental departure from traditional military development models.
Furthermore, the psychological aspects of human-machine teaming require serious consideration. How do you maintain unit cohesion when some members are physically present while others are operating remotely? How do you build trust in automated systems while maintaining appropriate skepticism? These human factors challenges are as important as technical specifications in determining operational effectiveness.
Looking Forward
Military transformation in the digital age represents a return to first principles combined with unprecedented technological capability. Success requires understanding that platforms, while still important, are now just one element in complex systems-of-systems that must be continuously adapted to meet evolving threats.
The implications extend beyond military organizations to broader defence ecosystems. Defence industries must restructure to support continuous innovation rather than cyclical platform delivery. Military educational institutions must prepare officers for careers defined by constant adaptation rather than mastery of fixed doctrine. Political leaders must understand that defence budgets can no longer be allocated primarily based on platform acquisition schedules but must account for continuous capability development and rapid response to emerging threats.
International cooperation becomes more complex but also more critical. When capabilities evolve monthly, traditional approaches to standardization and interoperability through formal agreements and lengthy certification processes become inadequate. New models for coalition warfare must accommodate rapid capability sharing and real-time adaptation to combined operations.
The militaries that will succeed in this environment are those that can harness bottom-up innovation while maintaining strategic coherence, that can rapidly field new capabilities while maintaining existing strengths, and that can adapt continuously while preserving essential human judgment and oversight.
Perhaps most importantly, success requires cultural change within military organizations. The new paradigm demands comfort with ambiguity, willingness to experiment and potentially fail, and the intellectual humility to learn from soldiers and junior officers who may better understand emerging technologies than their superiors. This represents a profound shift from military cultures traditionally built around hierarchy, standardization, and proven doctrine.
As Lt General Stuart observed, this isn’t about choosing between humans and machines, platforms and software, or innovation and tradition. It’s about creating new combinations that leverage the strengths of each while compensating for their individual limitations. In an era where the character of warfare changes weekly, the ability to combine and recombine capabilities rapidly may be the most important military skill of all.
The transformation is already underway. The question isn’t whether militaries will adapt to this new reality, but how quickly and effectively they can do so while maintaining the human elements that make military service both effective and ethical. Those organizations that can master this balance will enjoy decisive advantages; those that cannot may find themselves perpetually behind the curve in an environment where falling behind means operational irrelevance.