By Pasquale Preziosa
In recent months, Russia has radically transformed the way it uses drones, making these low-cost tools a pillar of its strategy.
What appeared at the beginning of the war to be a rudimentary bombing campaign, conducted with Iranian-made aircraft adapted for local use, has gradually evolved into a much more sophisticated approach, capable of integrating industrial production, technological innovations, exploitation of civilian networks, and even cross-border reconnaissance operations.
This evolution did not happen spontaneously.
It is part of a mutual adaptation between the two contenders. For some time now, Ukraine had demonstrated the effectiveness of conducting attacks deep into Russian territory, striking air bases, depots, and energy infrastructure hundreds of kilometers from the front line. Those raids, carried out with improvised but increasingly autonomous drones, had undermined Moscow’s perception of invulnerability, forcing it to disperse its defenses and recognize that relatively inexpensive systems could produce significant strategic effects.
The Russians learned their lesson and turned it into doctrine.
The production of Geran-2 drones, a local evolution of the Iranian Shahed models, was brought to industrial level and enhanced with foreign components capable of improving their accuracy and endurance. The new versions incorporate anti-jamming systems, 4G and 5G communication modules, advanced cameras, and even automation capabilities.
But the real innovation concerns integration with civilian infrastructure: Russian drones exploit domestic and foreign mobile networks, use SIM cards to ensure continuity of communication, and make them more difficult to intercept.
At the same time, tactics have changed.
Whereas in the past drones were used almost exclusively for direct attacks on energy or logistics infrastructure, today many missions are of a reconnaissance nature. The devices are sent across borders not so much to destroy targets as to measure radar response times, test NATO readiness, and identify vulnerabilities along the Alliance’s eastern borders.
The incursions into Poland and Romania have clearly demonstrated this new dimension, in which the military instrument also becomes a political message and diplomatic pressure.
Multiple objectives can be glimpsed behind this transformation.
- First and foremost is intelligence gathering: every flight is a source of data on enemy defense systems.
- Second is psychological pressure: demonstrating that no border is impervious serves to undermine confidence in NATO’s defensive capabilities.
- Third is the expansion of the operational space: not limiting oneself to the Ukrainian front, but extending the feeling of vulnerability to neighboring states as well.
- Fourth, sustainability: inexpensive drones make it possible to prolong the conflict while reducing operational costs.
- Finally, ambiguity: small aircraft can be presented as accidental errors or deviations, complicating legal and diplomatic responses by the adversary.
However, this strategy is not without risks.
Cross-border incursions can provoke unwanted escalation with NATO. The West is developing increasingly effective technological countermeasures, from enhanced radars to low-cost interceptor drones.
Furthermore, dependence on foreign components exposes Moscow to vulnerabilities in the event of tougher sanctions, while the logistical management of increasingly numerous swarms requires complex resources and coordination.
For Ukraine and its Western allies, Russia’s adaptation requires a qualitative leap in defense.
It is no longer enough to strengthen frontline protection: mobile radars must be developed, intelligence shared, the use of civilian networks regulated, suspicious SIM cards checked, and economically sustainable interception systems introduced.
Deterrence must also be rethought: it is not enough to react to attacks; the use of civilian infrastructure as a multiplier of military power must be prevented.
Russia’s drone strategy, therefore, stems from its observation of Ukraine’s deep strikes and represents a mirror adaptation of them.
However, Moscow has not limited itself to copying, as it has transformed that insight into a systemic doctrine of hybrid warfare, capable of combining mass production, technological innovation, and psychological and diplomatic pressure.
The result is a new phase of conflict, in which adaptability and resilience count more than conventional force, and in which air superiority is no longer solely that of fighter jets or missiles, but increasingly that of drones, which are redefining the boundaries of modern warfare.
From a theoretical point of view, this evolution is in line with the wars of attrition already described by Clausewitz, in which victory is not achieved by brute force but by the ability to resist longer than the enemy.
At the same time, it is part of the dynamics of asymmetric warfare, in which low-cost tools can produce disproportionate strategic effects, and hybrid warfare, where the line between military and civilian, between armed action and psychological pressure, is becoming increasingly blurred.
In this sense, drones become the emblem of a conflict that is not just a confrontation between armies, but a h r continuous adaptation of complex systems, in which technology, politics, and society are intertwined in an unstable and constantly changing balance.
This article was published on September 4, 2025 by European Affairs in Italian and is published with permission of the author.