By Robbin Laird
The nature of warfare is fundamentally unchanged — it remains a contest of political will between adversaries. However, the character of how wars are fought has transformed dramatically.
In an era where conflicts can be decided before the first missile is fired or the first shot is taken, military forces worldwide are grappling with a critical challenge: how to synchronize non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains to achieve decisive advantage?
This challenge was the focus of a panel discussion at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar where senior military leaders and defence experts explored the complexities of integrating these invisible yet potentially decisive capabilities. Their insights reveal both the immense potential and significant obstacles facing modern military forces as they prepare for conflicts that may be won or lost in domains most people cannot see.
The New Reality of Warfare
“Victory in the 21st century belongs to whoever can see, decide and act faster than their opponent,” observed Admiral Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, a sentiment that encapsulates the fundamental shift in modern warfare. The speed of relevance or the ability to generate effects at the pace of contemporary conflict has become the defining characteristic of military effectiveness.∗
Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities for the Australian Defence Force, put the stakes in stark terms: “My assertion is that the use of non-kinetic effects and our ability to defend against those effects prior to and during conflict will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.”
This isn’t hyperbole; it’s a recognition that in an interconnected, technology-dependent world, the ability to disrupt, deny, or degrade an adversary’s systems without kinetic destruction may prove more decisive than traditional firepower.
The shift represents a fundamental evolution from the industrial-age concept of warfare, where victory was measured in terms of physical destruction and territorial control, to an information-age paradigm where victory may be achieved through the disruption of decision-making cycles, communication networks, and the technological systems that enable modern military operations.
Space: The Ultimate High Ground
Space has evolved from a supporting domain to a warfighting domain in its own right. Modern military operations are utterly dependent on space-based assets for communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, and precision strike capabilities. Yet this dependence creates vulnerabilities that adversaries are increasingly prepared to exploit.
“Any escalation into kinetic conflict in space risks denying access to all of our users with devastating consequences,” LTGEN Coyle warned, “not only for national security or the economy, but especially for our defence operations.” The challenge is that kinetic attacks in space create debris fields that can persist for decades, potentially denying space access to all users both for friend and foe alike.
This reality has driven military planners toward “scalable, reversible options to deter adversaries and deny them freedom of action in space.” Non-kinetic space operations, such as jamming satellite communications or temporarily blinding reconnaissance satellites, offer the ability to achieve military effects while maintaining the possibility of de-escalation.
The dual-use nature of space infrastructure complicates matters further. Unlike traditional military assets that are clearly identifiable and under military control, space capabilities increasingly rely on commercial systems and international partnerships. This creates both opportunities for resilience through diversity and challenges in command and control during crisis or conflict.
Cyberspace: The Soft Underbelly
Cyber operations represent perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of modern warfare. Popular culture often portrays cyber warfare as instantaneous or “warfare at the speed of light.” The reality, as Professor Justin Bronk noted, is quite different: “Counter military networks type cyber payloads are one of the slowest forms of warfare. You’re actually looking at between 18 months and three years, often to develop and embed a capability in an adversary Air Defence Network.”
This temporal disconnect between cyber capabilities and operational needs creates significant planning challenges. Unlike kinetic weapons that can be employed rapidly once available, cyber effects require extensive preparation, reconnaissance, and often pre-positioning of capabilities. The payload that could disable an enemy air defence system on day one of a conflict may need to be developed and embedded years in advance.
The classification requirements surrounding cyber operations further complicate their integration into broader military planning. As Bronk observed, “Does the person who’s putting together the campaign plan have the clearances to know that and the compartments to know that that capability exists, let alone the authorities to release it?” Even when cyber capabilities exist, they may not be usable due to legal, operational, or security constraints.
Moreover, cyber effects often lack the predictability of kinetic weapons. A cyber attack may work perfectly in testing but fail in operational use due to software updates, changed configurations, or simply because the target system has been replaced. This uncertainty requires military planners to build redundancy into their operations—something that conflicts with the often one-use nature of sophisticated cyber weapons.
Electromagnetic Spectrum: The Contested Commons
Electronic warfare or the contest for control of the electromagnetic spectrum sits at the intersection of traditional military operations and the new domains of cyber and space. Unlike cyber operations, which may take years to develop, or space operations, which often require complex international coordination, electronic warfare can provide immediate effects across the battlefield.
GPCAPT Steven Thornton, Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF, described the electromagnetic spectrum as fundamental to ensuring “survivability and lethality of the joint coalition force.” His former squadron operates electronic warfare aircraft that can jam enemy radars, disrupt communications, and protect friendly forces from electromagnetic attack.
However, electronic warfare faces its own unique challenges. The effectiveness of jamming depends on signal processing capabilities that are improving rapidly on both sides. As Bronk noted, “over the medium term, the effectiveness of stand-off jamming, where radar range equations are really working against you, is going to get harder and harder to have the effects that you need.”
This evolution is driving military forces toward “stand-in” electronic warfare platforms or systems that can penetrate closer to enemy territory to deliver jamming effects at shorter ranges where they remain effective. This shift parallels broader trends in military operations toward distributed, resilient systems rather than centralized, high-value platforms.
The Challenge of Synchronization
The complexity of integrating effects across these three domains cannot be overstated. Each operates on different timelines, requires different skill sets, and faces different limitations. Synchronizing them effectively requires not just technical integration but fundamental changes in military culture, education, and organizational structure.
One of the most significant barriers to effective synchronization is a basic lack of understanding across the military about what these domains can and cannot do. “There are still people out there that say to me, ‘What do you do in space and cyber? I’ve got no idea,’ and they’ve been in the defence force for decades,” General Coyle observed. “It’s a fail on all of us.”
This knowledge gap isn’t merely about technical details. It’s about fundamental operational concepts. The classification requirements that shroud many of these capabilities mean that even senior officers may lack the clearances or compartmentalized access needed to understand what options are available. As a result, non-kinetic effects are often treated as afterthoughts rather than integral components of military operations.
The solution requires systematic education reform across military institutions. Officers need to understand not just what these capabilities can do, but their limitations, timelines, and integration requirements. This education must extend beyond specialists to include all military personnel who might be involved in planning or executing operations.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of synchronization is reconciling the vastly different timelines required for different types of effects. Kinetic operations can often be planned and executed within hours or days. Electronic warfare effects can be generated immediately once platforms are in position. But cyber operations may require months or years of preparation, and space operations must account for orbital mechanics that cannot be changed at will.
This creates “the day two problem” or the challenge of maintaining effectiveness after initial operations. As Bronk explained, “It’s one thing to deny their kill chain on day one that might stop them from finding, fixing and striking your targets, but all they have to do is not fire. They’ve then seen your electronic warfare effect, or your cyber attack, your payload has been activated, whatever it is. Day two, they’ll have dug it out and they’ll have worked out a counter signal and whatever.”
The pace of adaptation in modern conflicts has accelerated dramatically. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are updating electronic warfare techniques and cyber defences at unprecedented rates, sometimes within hours of encountering new threats. Military forces must be prepared not just to deliver effects, but to sustain them through multiple cycles of adaptation and counter-adaptation.
Beyond technical challenges, effective synchronization requires overcoming deeply embedded military cultures that have evolved around kinetic operations. Traditional military planning processes, organizational structures, and even the language used to describe operations all reflect a kinetic-centric worldview.
“We traditionally just go for a kinetic action or a kinetic effect. We just don’t think about the other options and availability because people aren’t educated enough,” General Coyle noted. This isn’t simply about adding non-kinetic options to existing plans. It requires fundamental rethinking of how military operations are conceived, planned, and executed.
The classification barriers that surround many non-kinetic capabilities exacerbate this problem. Traditional military planning relies on open discussion, war-gaming, and iterative refinement of concepts. When key capabilities cannot be discussed outside of highly restricted environments, it becomes extremely difficult to integrate them effectively into broader operational concepts.
Lessons from Current Conflicts
The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East provide valuable insights into both the potential and limitations of non-kinetic effects in practice. These conflicts have served as testing grounds for new concepts and capabilities, revealing both successes and failures that inform future military planning.
The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of adapting non-kinetic capabilities at the speed of conflict. Professor Bronk noted the acceleration of iterative pace in the European theatre, where “both the Russians and the Ukrainians have to change waveforms, update mission data as more and more of the UAVs, and also conventional targets like flight control radars and target acquisition radars are digitally defined, regularly updated.”
This conflict has also revealed the limitations of traditional approaches to electronic warfare and cyber operations. Russian forces achieved significant initial success in the first days of the invasion, essentially disabling Ukraine’s air defence network for two and a half days through a combination of cyber attacks and carefully tailored electronic warfare. However, these effects proved temporary as Ukrainian forces adapted by repositioning systems, swapping components, and implementing workarounds.
The conflict has driven both sides toward more distributed, resilient approaches. Rather than relying on large, centralized systems that present attractive targets, military forces are moving toward networks of smaller, more survivable platforms. This trend has implications far beyond Ukraine, suggesting that future conflicts will require non-kinetic capabilities that can operate effectively against distributed, adaptive adversaries.
Interestingly, the lessons from Ukraine may not translate directly to other theatres. Professor Bronk observed an “interesting divergence” between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. In Europe, the focus has shifted toward distributed tactical-level systems with shorter ranges and faster refresh rates. In the Indo-Pacific, the emphasis remains on longer-range capabilities and third-party weapon handoff systems.
This difference reflects the distinct characteristics of potential conflicts in each theatre. The compressed geography and high density of systems in Europe favors distributed, short-range approaches. The vast distances and sparse basing options in the Indo-Pacific require longer-range capabilities and greater emphasis on disrupting kill chains rather than individual systems.
These differences highlight the importance of tailoring non-kinetic approaches to specific operational environments. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to synchronizing these effects across domains.
Australia’s Unique Position
Australia occupies a unique position in the global landscape of non-kinetic warfare capabilities. Unlike many allied nations, Australia operates significant airborne electronic warfare capabilities through its EA-18G Growler fleet. As Professor Bronk noted, “You’re in a much better position than almost any other medium-sized Air Force and joint force in the world, in that you have a significant integrated existing electronic warfare capability in the airborne sector.”
However, this capability advantage comes with its own challenges. The Australian Defence Force must maintain and modernize these specialized systems while simultaneously developing capabilities in space and cyber domains. This requires not just financial investment but the development of specialized human resources across multiple highly technical fields.
The human dimension of non-kinetic warfare presents particular challenges for a military the size of Australia’s. Unlike kinetic platforms where training pipelines are well-established and career paths clearly defined, the non-kinetic domains require highly specialized skills that are in great demand in the civilian sector.
The Australian Defence Force has responded to this challenge by implementing specialized pay scales for cyber warfare officers and specialists, using the aviation officer pay scale to compete with civilian opportunities. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We recognize the skills that they bring and how much they could get outside should they choose to leave.”
But compensation alone isn’t sufficient. These fields require long development times. GPCAPT Thornton noted that electronic warfare officers require “three to four years before they become highly proficient in their core trade,” with full proficiency taking up to five years. This creates a significant vulnerability: the loss of experienced personnel can have disproportionate effects on capability.
Australia’s approach to non-kinetic warfare must also grapple with questions of sovereignty and control over critical infrastructure. Much of Australia’s space-based communications and cyber infrastructure is civilian-owned and operated, creating challenges for military planning and control during crisis or conflict.
LTGEN Coyle acknowledged this challenge: “The vast majority of Australia’s space-based cyber power is civilian in nature and privately owned. How do you manage the challenge of getting that to be ready to fight tonight when you don’t control it?”
The answer lies in developing “dual-use” capabilities that combine military and civilian systems, along with robust relationships with industry partners. This approach offers both advantages in terms of resilience and access to cutting-edge technology, but requires careful management of operational security and control authorities.
The Technology Imperative
Underlying all discussions of non-kinetic effects is the recognition that military advantage increasingly depends on technological superiority. The domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare are inherently technology-intensive, requiring constant innovation and adaptation to maintain effectiveness.
One area where technology offers particular promise is in the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning to non-kinetic operations. Professor Bronk noted that while much discussion of AI in military contexts amounts to “snake oil,” there are specific applications where AI demonstrates clear benefits.
“One of the key areas where AI stuff has huge benefits that you can already demonstrate is actually in the mission data and electronic support measures data analysis, and therefore data package update cycle,” Bronk observed. The ability to rapidly process terabytes of electromagnetic spectrum data to identify new threats or changes in adversary systems could dramatically reduce the time required to update defensive and offensive capabilities.
This capability is particularly important given the acceleration of adaptation cycles in modern conflicts. Traditional human analysis methods that require days or weeks to identify and characterize new threats cannot keep pace with adversaries who may update their systems daily or even hourly.
Maintaining technological superiority in non-kinetic domains requires not just military investment but a robust industrial and research base. Unlike kinetic weapons, where production can be scaled up relatively quickly in crisis, many non-kinetic capabilities require specialized knowledge and infrastructure that cannot be rapidly expanded.
This creates strategic vulnerabilities that extend beyond immediate military capabilities. Nations that lack indigenous capabilities in these domains may find themselves dependent on allies or commercial providers whose systems may not be available during crisis or may not meet military requirements for security and reliability.
Future Implications and Requirements
The panel discussion revealed several critical areas where military forces must continue to develop capabilities and concepts for effective non-kinetic operations.
Perhaps the most important requirement is building resilience and adaptability into military systems and operations. The assumption that any particular capability will work exactly as planned is dangerous in an environment where adversaries are constantly adapting and evolving their approaches.
This requires what military planners call PACE planning or Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency options for every critical capability. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We expect to lose everything at that point in time. The reality of that is unlikely, because it’s not like you can barrage jam the entire Australian Defence Force and expect it to sustain, but we are prepared to have alternates to everything.”
Building this resilience requires not just technical redundancy but operational flexibility. Military personnel must be trained not just on primary systems but on backup methods, including potentially reverting to older technologies that may be less vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This might mean training on celestial navigation as backup to GPS, or understanding how to operate with paper maps when digital systems are compromised.
The ultimate goal of non-kinetic effects is not to replace kinetic capabilities but to enhance them through carefully synchronized operations. This requires moving beyond simple coordination to true integration, where the effects of space, cyber, and electromagnetic operations are carefully timed and orchestrated to achieve specific operational objectives.
This integration must occur at multiple levels; from tactical operations where individual platforms coordinate their effects, to strategic operations where national-level capabilities are synchronized across entire theatres of operation. Achieving this level of integration requires not just technical systems but new operational concepts, training programs, and organizational
Effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires command and control systems that can operate across multiple classification levels and integrate input from diverse sources. Traditional military command structures, designed around kinetic operations with clear lines of authority and communication, may not be adequate for the more distributed, time-sensitive nature of non-kinetic operations.
The challenge is compounded by the classification requirements that surround many of these capabilities. Command authorities must have access to information about available capabilities without compromising operational security. This may require new approaches to information sharing and decision-making that balance operational needs with security requirements.
Beyond technical and organizational challenges, effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires a fundamental cultural transformation within military organizations. This transformation must address deeply embedded assumptions about warfare, military professionalism, and operational priorities.
The military culture that has evolved around kinetic operations emphasizes visible, measurable effects. The success or failure of a kinetic strike is usually immediately apparent. Non-kinetic effects, by contrast, may be subtle, delayed, or entirely invisible to most observers.
This difference creates challenges for military leadership, training, and assessment systems that are designed around kinetic paradigms.
- How do you evaluate the effectiveness of a cyber operation that prevents an enemy from acting rather than destroying enemy capability?
- How do you train for operations where the most successful outcome may be that nothing visible happens?
These questions require new approaches to military education, training, and professional development. Military personnel must develop comfort with ambiguity, appreciation for subtle effects, and understanding of complex interdependencies that may not be immediately apparent.
The development of non-kinetic capabilities also raises questions about military professional identity and specialization. Traditional military specialties are built around platforms or functions, pilots, infantry, artillery, engineers. Non-kinetic domains require specialists who understand complex technical systems but must also integrate their capabilities with traditional military operations.
This creates challenges for career management, professional development, and military culture more broadly. How do you develop and retain specialists in highly technical fields while maintaining the broader military skills and perspectives necessary for effective integration with traditional operations?
The answer likely requires new models of military professionalism that blend technical expertise with operational understanding. This may mean longer career timelines, more extensive education requirements, and different approaches to leadership development.
Conclusion: Preparing for an Uncertain Future
The discussion of synchronizing non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains reveals both the immense potential and significant challenges facing modern military forces. These capabilities offer the possibility of achieving decisive effects without the destruction and escalation risks associated with kinetic operations. However, realizing this potential requires fundamental changes in how military forces organize, train, and operate.
The stakes could not be higher. As LTGEN Coyle observed, “If you’re zero in one domain, you’re zero in all.” In an interconnected world where military operations depend increasingly on complex technological systems, the ability to operate effectively in all domains, including the invisible domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, becomes essential for military effectiveness.
The challenge is not just developing these capabilities but learning to synchronize them effectively with each other and with traditional kinetic operations. This requires not just technical innovation but organizational transformation, cultural change, and new approaches to military education and training.
Perhaps most importantly, it requires recognition that the character of warfare has fundamentally changed. The conflicts of the future may be decided not by the side with the most firepower, but by the side that can see, understand, and act most effectively across all domains of military operation. As Sun Tzu observed, “The acme of skill is to win a war without fighting.” In an age of non-kinetic effects, this ancient wisdom has acquired new and urgent relevance.
The military forces that master the synchronization of effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains will hold decisive advantages in future conflicts. Those that fail to adapt risk finding themselves outmanoeuvred in domains they cannot see by adversaries they cannot effectively counter. The transformation is not optional. It is an imperative for military effectiveness in the 21st century.
The featured image shows the panelists from lett to right: AVM Roberton is current Director, Sir Richard Williams Foundation and was Air Commander Australia in 2017 and then the Head Force Design in VCDF Executive in 2019. Professor Bronk is Senior Research Fellow, Airpower and Technology Military Sciences, RUSI in the UK. GPCAPT Steven Thornton is the Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF. LTGEN Susan Coyle is Chief of Joint Capabilities.