The maneuvers in the war in Ukraine in the Fall of 2025 show several dynamics at once. The Russians are using attacks on civilian targets to undercut the will of the Ukrainian people to fight. But Putin has a significantly constricting economy and the threat of the Russian people becoming tired of the war as they did in Afghanistan. The Ukrainians are ramping up their attacks on Russian military and civilian infrastructure to erode the support for the war in Russia by bringing it home to the Russian people.
Meanwhile, Europe is stepping up its support for Ukraine and Russian drone attacks on NATO territory may well led to NATO air patrols over Western Ukraine. President Trump has expressed his frustration with Putin after having given him an off ramp to end the conflict but now may well support extended activities by the Ukrainians to recover more of their territory.
It is clearly a war entering a key phase. As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth autumn, the conflict has reached a critical inflection point. The fighting that began with Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 has evolved into a complex, multi-dimensional struggle that now directly threatens to draw NATO into its first military confrontation with Russia since the alliance’s founding. The dynamics unfolding in Fall 2025 reveal a war that is simultaneously grinding forward on the battlefield while escalating dangerously in the diplomatic and strategic spheres.
Despite more than three and a half years of fighting, Russia continues to make territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, though at a pace that belies the enormous costs Moscow has incurred. According to data compiled by the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces gained approximately 226 square miles of Ukrainian territory in the four-week period from August 19 to September 16, 2025. While this represents a slight decrease from the previous four-week period, the trend since the beginning of 2025 shows an average monthly Russian gain of 169 square miles.1
These territorial advances, concentrated primarily in the Donetsk region, tell only part of the story. Russian forces have captured numerous villages and towns, including areas near strategically important cities like Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Kupiansk. The advance has been characterized by intense artillery bombardment, massive use of drones, and grinding infantry assaults that consume enormous amounts of military equipment and personnel.
The human cost of these gains has been staggering. According to an April 2025 estimate by then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Cavoli, Russia has suffered more than 790,000 killed or injured, with an additional 50,000 missing.2 Ukrainian casualties, while lower, are also severe, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy estimating 400,000 killed or injured and 35,000 missing as of January 2025.3 These figures represent a catastrophic loss of life that continues to mount with each passing month.
The material losses are equally devastating. Russia has lost over 22,000 tanks and armored vehicles according to open-source intelligence tracking, while Ukraine has lost nearly 10,000. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in May 2025 that Russia has lost at least 10,000 ground combat vehicles since the war’s start, including more than 3,000 tanks, as well as nearly 250 aircraft and helicopters and more than 10 naval vessels.4
Both Russia and Ukraine have intensified attacks on civilian and military infrastructure throughout 2025, each attempting to erode the other side’s capacity and will to continue fighting. This mutual targeting of infrastructure represents a deliberate strategy by both sides to bring the consequences of war home to their opponent’s population.
Russia has maintained its intense campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since late 2022, inflicting severe damage on the sector. By the end of 2024, Ukraine’s available electricity generating capacity had reportedly shrunk from a prewar total of 56 gigawatts to about 9 gigawatts, with 64 percent of its 25 gigawatts of generation capacity either destroyed or located in territories under Russian occupation. As of September 2024, Russia’s strikes had eliminated 80 percent of Ukraine’s thermal capacity, making the country dependent on the three remaining Soviet-era nuclear power plants for roughly two-thirds of its power supply.5
The danger extends to nuclear facilities themselves. In October 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant had been without offsite power for six days after recent attacks near the site.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed grave concerns about the situation, as the lack of power is needed to cool nuclear reactors and prevent a potential meltdown. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy warned that Russia’s actions around the Zaporizhzhia plant represent “a threat to everyone,” noting that “no terrorist in the world has ever dared to do with a nuclear power plant what Russia is doing now.”6
Ukrainian drone strikes have targeted Russian oil refining capacity and military infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, particularly intensifying in August and September 2025. Analysis from The Moscow Times, BBC, Kyivindependent, and Reuters confirm that these attacks have temporarily shut down substantial portions of Russia’s refining capacity.
Specifically, Reuters and the Kommersant business daily, as cited by The Moscow Times, confirm that drone strikes reduced Russia’s oil refining capacity by about 16–17 percent—equivalent to shutting down approximately 1.1 million barrels per day—during this period. The BBC and the analytics group Ciala provide additional context, noting that up to 38% of refining capacity was offline at peak interruption, but the figure directly attributable to drone strikes for late August and September is about one-quarter (roughly 16–17%) of the country’s total capacity. This has caused gasoline shortages, rationing, and even temporary closures at hundreds of filling stations across Russia.7
These attacks have had tangible effects on Russian-occupied territories. In Crimea, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014, fuel shortages resulting from Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries forced authorities to freeze fuel prices and impose petrol rationing, limiting motorists to purchasing 30 liters of fuel at a time.8
The attacks on civilian areas continue as well. A massive Russian attack on September 28, 2025, lasting more than 12 hours, unleashed close to 600 drones and dozens of missiles across seven Ukrainian regions, killing at least four people and injuring more than 70 others. In the Sumy region, a Russian drone attack killed a family of four, including two young children.9
While Russia continues its military operations, it faces mounting economic difficulties that threaten the sustainability of its war effort. Russia’s economy is experiencing what one analysis described as “a slow train wreck,” suffering from high inflation, prohibitive interest rates, a growing budget deficit, labor shortages, and unsustainable military spending.10
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in October 2025 ordering the conscription of 135,000 men for military service, with Russian men aged 18 to 30 to be drafted between October 1 and December 31. This ongoing need for conscription highlights both the enormous personnel losses Russia has sustained and the difficulty of maintaining force levels necessary to sustain offensive operations.
The economic strain extends beyond military expenditures. Russia has had to develop increasingly complex sanctions evasion networks, partnering with countries like India, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and using shell companies in unexpected locations.
Despite these economic pressures, it remains unclear whether domestic discontent in Russia has reached levels that would threaten Putin’s grip on power. The Kremlin has maintained strict control over information and dissent, making it difficult to assess the true state of public opinion regarding the war.
Perhaps the most significant development in Fall 2025 has been President Donald Trump’s dramatic rhetorical shift on Ukraine policy. After months of pressuring Ukraine to accept territorial concessions and suggesting that Kyiv would need to cede land to Russia to achieve peace, Trump reversed course in late September 2025.
On September 23, following a meeting with President Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Trump posted on Truth Social that he believed “Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” He added that with “time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option.”11
The policy shift came after what Trump described as getting to “know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation” and seeing the “Economic trouble it is causing Russia.” Trump also expressed support for NATO countries shooting down Russian aircraft that violate their airspace, though he said U.S. support would “depend” on the circumstances.
The most dangerous development in Fall 2025 has been a dramatic escalation in Russian violations of NATO airspace, creating the potential for direct military confrontation between the alliance and Russia. These incidents have reached an unprecedented scale and put NATO members on edge about Russian intentions.
The most significant incident occurred on September 10, 2025, when approximately 20 Russian drones violated Polish airspace during a Russian attack on Ukraine. Some drones were shot down by NATO jets, while others crashed on their own. This marked the first direct military engagement between NATO and Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The operation involved Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, Italian AWACS aircraft, NATO Multi Role Tanker Transport, and German Patriot systems.12
Less than two weeks later, on September 19, three armed Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violated Estonian airspace, remaining there for over 10 minutes. This prompted Estonia to invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which allows members to request consultations when they believe their territorial integrity or security is threatened. NATO’s response was swift, with Allied aircraft scrambled to intercept and escort the Russian jets from Estonian airspace.13
Additional violations have been reported across NATO’s eastern flank. Norway announced that Russia had violated its airspace three times in 2025 alone—twice over the sea near Vardø in Norway’s far northeast, and once over an uninhabited area in the northeastern county of Finnmark. Romania and Latvia also reported single Russian drone violations of their airspace during September.14
The NATO response has been firm in rhetoric but reveals significant internal divisions about how to handle future incidents. Following the Estonian incident, NATO issued a strong statement condemning Russia’s “dangerous violation” and warning that “Russia should be in no doubt: NATO and Allies will employ, in accordance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend ourselves and deter all threats from all directions.”
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte backed Trump’s comments about shooting down Russian aircraft that violate NATO airspace, stating that suspect aircraft would be shot down depending on threat assessments. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk took an even harder line, vowing to strike any intruders “without discussion,” while Czech President Petr Pavel stated that “we must respond appropriately, including possibly shooting down Russian aircraft.”
However, significant divisions exist within the alliance. During an emergency North Atlantic Council meeting called by Estonia, representatives from Poland, the Baltic states, and other eastern European countries wanted the joint statement to make clear that additional violations, including by manned aircraft, would be met with force. Germany and some other members urged more restraint, concerned about escalation risks.15
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich acknowledged the complexity of the situation, noting that shooting down unmanned drones carries different risks than engaging manned aircraft. “Shooting down manned aircraft like fighter jets clearly carries a higher risk of escalation if there’s an engagement that kills someone on either side,” Grynkewich explained. He acknowledged that different NATO nations have varying expectations about when and how NATO assets should intervene, with some countries like Poland wanting “a very broad application” while “other nations make different judgments.”16
The incidents have raised fundamental questions about Russian motives. Some experts believe Russia is probing NATO’s defenses to identify weak points and exploit fissures in the alliance’s response. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur suggested that Russia may be trying to force NATO to divert air defense resources from Ukraine to defending its own territory: “Maybe their calculation was that now the European countries have to send something additionally to Estonia regarding the air defense assets, and that means they cannot send it to Ukraine.”17
The NATO airspace violations have revived discussions about “closing the skies” over Ukraine, a proposal that was rejected early in the war due to fears of direct NATO-Russia confrontation. While NATO air patrols over Ukrainian territory have not been implemented, the concept is receiving renewed attention as Russian airspace provocations continue.
Some proposals involve creating what has been termed an “Integrated Air and Missile Protection Zone” over western and central Ukraine. Defense analyst Margaryta Vdovychenko has argued that such a zone would not only restore stability and enable economic recovery, but also allow Ukraine’s Air Force to focus on defending the eastern front. She estimates that implementing this would require around 120 modern fighter jets, backed by early warning aircraft, tankers, and robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.18
Poland is moving to amend its law on overseas military deployments to allow Polish forces to shoot down Russian drones over Ukraine without prior approval from NATO or the EU. The Polish Ministry of Defense introduced the draft legislation in June 2025, aiming to restore rapid and independent response powers that had been restricted by a law passed in 2022. That earlier law required obtaining prior consent from NATO, the EU, and the host country for Polish military operations abroad; this change had been criticized for limiting Poland’s ability to act against airborne threats like Russian drones near its border. The new, expedited bill seeks to remove these restrictions, permitting Poland’s military to engage Russian unmanned aerial vehicles over Ukrainian airspace without international approval.19
European nations have increased their support for Ukraine throughout 2025, though responses remain uneven across the continent. Germany has pursued significant rearmament efforts. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius described Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to NATO,” pledging that Germany is ready to protect the Baltic region and will respond to Russian threats in a united and responsible manner.20
Lithuania’s Defense Minister Dovile Sakaliene stated that Russia’s recent airspace violations showed that NATO must move from “air policing missions” to “genuine air defence.” The Danish government announced that production of solid rocket fuel for the Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo missile would start in Denmark from December 1, 2025. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Kyiv in early 2025 and announced £4.5 billion in aid, including 150 artillery barrels made in the UK and 15 additional Gravehawk air defense systems.21
European leaders are actively advancing plans to use frozen Russian assets held in European banks to support Ukraine, including at a recent summit in Copenhagen where both the proposal for a €140 billion loan (approximately $165 billion) backed by these assets and the concept of a “drone wall” were debated.
At the summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and leaders from Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and other nations voiced support for employing immobilized Russian central bank assets as collateral for the loan, which Ukraine would only repay if Russia fulfills its reparation obligations. The idea was first floated by von der Leyen and quickly gained traction as U.S. aid for Ukraine waned, putting increased financial responsibility on European states. Several leaders, including the Belgian Prime Minister, noted the need for legal clarity and risk-sharing among EU states, given many of these assets are held in Belgium.
The summit, dubbed the “drone wall” meeting, provided the first opportunity for EU leaders to formally debate the plan to use frozen Russian assets to fund the €140 billion ($165 billion) loan for military and economic support to Ukraine, alongside new defense initiatives like the drone wall and Eastern Flank Watch to counter Russia. The proposal received broad support, with leaders agreeing to further develop legal and financial frameworks before a final decision at a follow-up summit in three weeks.22
Nonetheless, Hungary and Slovakia refused to endorse European Union plans to phase out Russian gas deliveries by 2027-2028, particularly concerning the Turkish supply route, citing risks to their national energy security and economic interests. Both governments publicly criticized Brussels’ push, arguing such measures would increase energy costs and undermine their ability to guarantee stable supplies.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban held a phone call with President Donald Trump in September 2025 specifically addressing Central European energy security. Orbán explained to Trump that Hungary’s energy supply cannot be guaranteed without Russian gas and oil. Trump acknowledged this concern during or after the call, even as he pressed Hungary and other NATO allies to stop purchasing Russian energy to weaken Russia’s war economy.
Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and cabinet minister Gergely Gulyás confirmed the content of the call and Hungary’s position publicly, making energy security and Russian supplies central to the discussion. These events followed EU legislative proposals that could allow phasing out Russian pipeline gas through Turkey by 2028, which Hungary and Slovakia oppose.23
The dynamics unfolding in Fall 2025 reveal a war that has entered what can best be described as an “escalatory stalemate with heightened NATO-Russia tensions.” This phase is characterized by several simultaneous and potentially contradictory trends:
• Continued Russian territorial advances: Despite enormous costs, Russia maintains the operational initiative on the ground in eastern Ukraine, making slow but steady gains that gradually erode Ukraine’s defensive positions.
• Intensifying infrastructure warfare: Both sides are escalating attacks on civilian and military infrastructure, attempting to break the other’s will to continue fighting by bringing the war home to their opponent’s population.
• Economic pressure mounting: Russia faces significant economic difficulties that threaten the long-term sustainability of its war effort, though whether these pressures will translate into meaningful constraints on Russian military operations remains unclear.
• Shifting U.S. policy rhetoric: Trump’s dramatic change in tone regarding Ukraine’s ability to win represents a potential inflection point, though whether this rhetorical shift will translate into substantive policy changes and sustained support remains highly uncertain.
• Unprecedented NATO-Russia tensions: Russian airspace violations have created the most dangerous direct confrontation between NATO and Russia since the Cold War, with significant potential for miscalculation or escalation.
• European commitment deepening but divided: While European support for Ukraine has increased, significant divisions remain within Europe about how far to go in supporting Ukraine and how to respond to Russian provocations.
• Nuclear risks persisting: The situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and Russia’s general approach to targeting infrastructure create ongoing risks of nuclear accident, even absent intentional use of nuclear weapons.
This combination of factors creates a critical inflection point. a moment when the conflict could move in dramatically different directions depending on decisions made by key actors. The war is neither frozen into a stable stalemate nor rapidly moving toward resolution. Instead, it exists in a dangerous state where both breakthrough and catastrophic escalation remain possible, sometimes simultaneously.
As Fall 2025 progresses into winter, the trajectory of the war remains highly uncertain. Several key questions will likely determine how the conflict evolves:
• Will Trump’s rhetorical shift translate into sustained policy? If the United States increases support for Ukraine beyond rhetoric, it could significantly alter the battlefield dynamics. Conversely, if Trump’s position proves fleeting or European allies are left to shoulder most of the burden, the effect may be limited.
• Can Ukraine sustain its defense? Ukraine’s ability to maintain sufficient force levels is increasingly debated among analysts, driven by high casualties, declining morale, desertion trends, and recruitment difficulties. These factors have contributed to urgent discussions about the future sustainability of the country’s defense,
• Will Russian economic pressures force strategic recalculation? If Russia’s economic difficulties become severe enough to threaten domestic stability or military sustainment, Moscow might be forced to seek a negotiated settlement. However, Putin has shown little indication of such willingness thus far.
• How will NATO navigate the airspace violation challenge? The alliance’s response to continued Russian provocations will test its cohesion and could either deter further Russian aggression or lead to dangerous escalation if miscalculation occurs.
• Can Europe sustain and increase its support? With the United States potentially reducing its role, Europe’s willingness and ability to fill the gap will be crucial. This includes not just military aid but also potential security guarantees for Ukraine and possible deployment of European forces.
The Kremlin has stated it is ready for peace negotiations, but Russia’s position has not changed: Ukraine must withdraw from the four regions Russia annexed in 2022, end its desire to join NATO, and accept strict limits on its armed forces. This remains unacceptable to Ukraine and its Western supporters, leaving the diplomatic path as blocked as ever.
The war in Ukraine as it stands in Fall 2025 represents perhaps the most dangerous moment since the initial invasion. The combination of ongoing military pressure, escalating infrastructure attacks, heightened NATO-Russia tensions, shifting U.S. policy, and mounting but uncertain economic pressures creates a highly volatile situation.
The international community faces difficult choices. Too little support for Ukraine risks emboldening Russian aggression and potentially inviting further attacks on European security. Too much support, particularly if it involves direct NATO military involvement in Ukrainian airspace, risks triggering a broader conflict between nuclear-armed powers.
What is clear is that the war has reached a critical juncture. The decisions made in the coming months by leaders in Washington, European capitals, Kyiv, and Moscow will likely determine not just the outcome of this conflict, but the broader security architecture of Europe.
2. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf
4. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/05/18/7512753/
5. https://euideas.eui.eu/the-evolving-rationale-behind-russian-attacks-on-ukraines-energy-infrastructure; https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/the-electricity-front-of-russias-war-against-ukraine/; https://kyivindependent.com/russia-destroys-all-thermal-power-plants-nearly-all-hydroelectric-capacity-in-ukraine-ahead-of-winter-zelensky-says/
6. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166016; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-now-without-offsite-power-six-days-grossi-2025-09-29/
7. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czx020k4056o; https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/26/ukrainian-drones-hit-major-oil-refinery-in-southern-russia-for-second-time-in-a-month-a90634; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/61252
8. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/30/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-1314
9. https://www.newsweek.com/nato-scrambles-fighter-jets-russia-12-hour-barrage-ukraine-10793973
12. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_237559.htm
13. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_237721.htm
14. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russian-forays-nato-airspace-causing-alarm-happening-125954596; https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/25/politics/nato-divided-repeated-russian-incursions-response
15. https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/25/politics/nato-divided-repeated-russian-incursions-response
16. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/24/alexus-grynkewich-top-nato-commander-in-europe-russia-has-always-tried-to-maneuver-for-advantage-over-the-alliance_6745696_4.html; https://www.koha.net/en/bote/nato-ja-e-ndare-per-reagimin-ndaj-rusise
17. https://news.err.ee/1609807077/defense-minister-nato-was-ready-to-use-force-if-needed-after-russian-airspace-violation; https://kyivindependent.com/nato-was-ready-to-use-of-force-if-needed-tallinn-says/
18. https://kyivindependent.com/calls-to-close-ukraines-skies-return-as-russia-tests-nato-borders/
19. https://reopen.media/en-gb/articles/poland-to-let-forces-target-russian-drones-over-ukraine; https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/09/25/poland-wants-to-shoot-down-targets-over-ukraine-without-nato-and-eu-approval/
21. https://www.baltictimes.com/air_defense_should_be_a_nato_priority_this_fall_-_lithuanian_minister/; https://caliber.az/en/post/ukrainian-company-to-launch-solid-rocket-fuel-production-in-denmark; https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/3949352-britain-to-send-150-artillery-barrels-new-mobile-air-defense-system-to-ukraine.html
22. https://apnews.com/article/europe-ukraine-russia-assets-frozen-loans-plan-91929d8b2263ace7ea452157f19a6222; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/01/world/europe/russia-frozen-assets-ukraine-loan.html; https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/belgium-says-eu-leaders-must-share-risk-use-frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-2025-10-02/
23. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/slovakia-rejects-eu-plan-phase-out-russian-gas-by-end-2027-2025-05-07/; https://www.euinsider.eu/news/hungary-and-slovakia-withhold-support-as-eu-proposes-ban-on-russian-gas-and-oil-by-2027