The war in Ukraine is the most documented conflict in human history, and at the center of this digital chronicle sits Telegram, a messaging application that has transformed from a simple communication tool into a multifaceted instrument of warfare.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Telegram has served simultaneously as a lifeline for civilians, a command-and-control platform for military operations, a propaganda megaphone, and a recruitment tool for espionage.
Understanding Telegram’s role in this conflict reveals how modern warfare extends far beyond traditional battlefields into the digital realm where information itself becomes both weapon and shield.
The Rise of Telegram as Ukraine’s Primary Information Source
Before the invasion, Telegram was already popular in Eastern Europe, but the war catapulted it to unprecedented prominence. By 2023, an astonishing 72% of Ukrainians cited Telegram as a primary news source, representing a significant increase from 63% the previous year.1 Its rise occurred as traditional social media platforms faced restrictions and censorship, particularly in Russia, where Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter were either banned or severely limited by authorities.2
The platform’s popularity stems from its unique combination of features: end-to-end encrypted private messaging, public broadcasting channels capable of reaching millions, and minimal content moderation that allows for the rapid, unfiltered dissemination of information. For Ukrainians, Telegram became the most reliable way to receive real-time updates about air raids, safe routes, available bomb shelters, and the general security situation.
For refugees fleeing the violence, Telegram proved essential in coordinating the exodus of more than three million people. The app connected displaced Ukrainians to safe routes, humanitarian aid, and shelter information across Europe. Millions of Ukrainians living abroad used the platform to maintain connections with their homeland, desperately scanning feeds for familiar landmarks or faces that might provide news of loved ones.3
A Tool for Civilian Safety and Government Communication
Ukrainian authorities swiftly recognized Telegram as a vital pillar of wartime communications infrastructure. Throughout the country, official Telegram channels run by local governments and agencies became essential tools for disseminating urgent safety information, including real-time air-raid warnings, bomb shelter locations, security instructions, and alerts on identifying potential Russian saboteurs.4
Telegram’s two-way design uniquely empowered Ukrainian civil defense. While officials broadcast critical updates to mass audiences, citizens contributed intelligence by reporting details such as enemy troop movements, armored vehicles, and suspicious activities via dedicated Telegram bots and chat platforms. This real-time crowdsourced data proved invaluable, Ukraine’s security services credited information received through these chatbots for enabling a successful strike against Russian vehicles near Kyiv in March 2022, with officials noting that user submissions were responsible for “new trophies every day”5
This crowdsourced intelligence gathering represented a novel approach to civil defense, turning ordinary citizens into the eyes and ears of the military establishment. The democratization of intelligence collection through Telegram fundamentally altered the traditional relationship between civilians and military forces during wartime.
Intelligence Services Enter the Public Sphere
Perhaps one of the most unprecedented aspects of Telegram’s role in the war has been its adoption by Ukrainian intelligence agencies as a public-facing communication platform. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) developed a structured communication strategy on Telegram that diverges sharply from conventional intelligence practice, which typically emphasizes secrecy and limited public disclosure.
The verified Ukrainian-language Telegram channel operated by the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) accumulated more than 240,000 followers by February 2024. In-depth analysis of 2,606 messages posted from the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion up to February 2024 identified three core functions: establishing institutional legitimacy, targeting adversaries through carefully calibrated disclosures, and mobilizing domestic citizens for support and participation. The HUR’s channel delivered consistent battlefield updates, released operational footage, publicized intercepted Russian communications, announced special intelligence projects, and broadcast calls to civilians for supportive action.6
This approach transformed intelligence communication from episodic outreach into an ongoing process of public engagement. Rather than maintaining the traditional veil of secrecy, Ukrainian intelligence services used digital platforms to coordinate narrative control, reinforce their legitimacy, and enlist the public as active contributors to the intelligence mission. This represents a fundamental shift in how intelligence agencies operate during high-intensity conflicts, suggesting that transparency and public engagement can complement rather than compromise operational effectiveness.
Military Units and Frontline Documentation
Beyond government agencies, individual Ukrainian military units established their own Telegram channels to share updates, boost morale, and document their operations. Elite units like the Third Separate Assault Brigade, the 36th Separate Marine Brigade, and the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade maintained active channels showcasing training exercises, battlefield successes, and appeals for equipment donations.7
These military channels served multiple purposes. They provided transparency to Ukrainian citizens about how their armed forces were performing, helped maintain public support for the war effort, and attracted international attention and assistance. The channels also documented the war in unprecedented detail, with soldiers posting footage from helmet cameras, drones, and battlefield positions.
Military bloggers, known as “voenkory” in Russian and Ukrainian, emerged as influential voices on Telegram. These individuals, often with military experience or embedded with combat units, provided detailed tactical analysis and frontline reports that sometimes offered greater technical detail than official media sources.8 The phenomenon of voenkory represented a new category of war correspondents, semi-official voices that blurred the lines between journalism, propaganda, and military communication.
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
While Telegram served beneficial purposes for Ukraine, it also became a powerful tool for Russian propaganda and psychological warfare. The unregulated nature of the platform made it ideal for disseminating disturbing content designed to demoralize Ukrainian forces and terrorize civilians.
Russian channels regularly posted graphic footage of killed Ukrainian soldiers, often accompanied by mocking captions and propaganda narratives. One particularly notorious channel, “Arkhangel Spetsnaza,” grew to nearly 1.2 million subscribers by monetizing “exclusive” violent content. The channel offered subscription tiers costing between 5 and 10 dollars monthly, granting access to graphic videos of Russian military operations. Investigations revealed that during just two months, this channel collected approximately 30 million rubles (about $317,000) in funding, which was purportedly used to purchase drones for Russian forces.9
The psychological impact of such content extends beyond the immediate shock value. By flooding Telegram with graphic imagery and propagandistic narratives, Russian sources sought to create a sense of Ukrainian hopelessness and inevitability about Russian victory. This “war porn,” as some analysts termed it, served both to rally pro-Russian audiences and to demoralize Ukrainian supporters.10
Coordinated Disinformation Campaigns
Beyond individual channels, Russian operatives conducted sophisticated, coordinated disinformation campaigns on Telegram. Research revealed that from January 2024 to April 2025, a network of 3,634 inauthentic Telegram accounts posted more than 316,000 pro-Russian comments across channels focused on Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories.11 These comments promoted pro-Russian propaganda, anti-Ukrainian narratives, and abstract calls for peace, often carefully tailored to local conditions and current events.
This massive bot network represented Russia’s attempt to extend its occupation into digital spaces, shaping the information environment in territories under its control. The sophisticated nature of the operation with thousands of accounts posting hundreds of thousands of coordinated messages demonstrated the strategic importance Russia placed on controlling the Telegram information landscape.
The Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Kremlin-affiliated entity known for conducting online influence operations, was at the forefront of Russia’s coordinated efforts to manipulate information environments in support of state interests. In February 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner mercenary group and a close associate of President Vladimir Putin, openly acknowledged that he had founded and managed the IRA, issuing his statement via a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel. Prigozhin further explained that the agency was established to defend Russia’s information space against Western propaganda, marking a rare explicit admission of such high-level Kremlin-linked operations.12
This admission confirmed long-standing suspicions about state-coordinated manipulation of social media platforms, including Telegram.
Russian state-sponsored youth influencers also leveraged Telegram to disseminate patriotic messaging to young Russians. These influencers used social media techniques to normalize official stances on the war, creating the impression of grassroots support while actually amplifying state-approved narratives. Their efforts focused on defining “good patriots” as those who participated in memory politics, engaged in militarized activities, and supported the war effort—whether physically or virtually.13
Espionage and Recruitment
Telegram’s role extended even to espionage recruitment. For at least six months, pro-war Telegram channels actively recruited Russian-speaking residents of Europe to spy on NATO military sites and report findings through specialized bots. These channels distributed instructions on photographing military bases, purchasing local maps and guidebooks, and using local SIM cards to avoid detection.14
Recruitment messages distributed on Telegram often originating in smaller groups but rapidly amplified through wider networks have reached tens of thousands of potential recruits across Europe. European security services have documented numerous cases in which individuals were recruited via Telegram to carry out surveillance, vandalism, and arson attacks targeting military infrastructure and critical sites. Authorities in Latvia, Germany, and Poland have arrested suspects allegedly enlisted through Telegram to conduct sabotage operations in support of Russian interests, with cases including attempted arson, attacks on military facilities, and the disruption of supply lines. These incidents illustrate a pattern of decentralized, low-level operations enabled by encrypted platforms, posing new challenges to European security services.15
This weaponization of Telegram for intelligence recruitment represented a democratization of espionage. Rather than relying on traditional, labor-intensive recruitment methods, Russian intelligence services could cast a wide net through Telegram, identifying and activating sympathizers across Europe with minimal risk to handlers.
Conclusion
Telegram’s multifaceted role in the Russia-Ukraine war reveals how modern conflicts are waged simultaneously in physical and digital realms. The platform has served as a lifeline for civilians seeking safety information, a command-and-control network for military operations, a public relations tool for intelligence agencies, a documentation archive for war crimes, and a weapon of propaganda and psychological warfare.
The same technological features, encryption, broad reach, minimal moderation serve both humanitarian and malicious purposes. Ukrainian civilians use Telegram to find bomb shelters and report Russian troop movements; Russian operatives use it to spread disinformation and recruit spies. This duality encapsulates the fundamental challenge of digital communication in wartime: the tools that empower also endanger.
As conflicts increasingly extend into digital spaces, the Ukraine war offers crucial lessons about the role of social media platforms in modern warfare. The unprecedented documentation of military operations, the use of crowdsourced intelligence, the public-facing strategies of intelligence agencies, and the sophisticated disinformation campaigns all point toward a future where information warfare is as critical as kinetic warfare.
Telegram’s role in Ukraine demonstrates that winning the digital battle, controlling narratives, maintaining morale, documenting atrocities, and countering disinformation, is inseparable from success on the physical battlefield. Future conflicts will likely feature similar dynamics, with social media platforms serving as essential infrastructure for both sides. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policymakers, military planners, platform companies, and citizens navigating an increasingly complex information environment.
The transformation of social media platforms like Telegram into instruments of warfare will have lasting implications for how conflicts are fought, documented, and understood in the digital age.
1. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2025.2522222
2. https://arxiv.org/html/2501.01884v3
3. https://time.com/6158437/telegram-russia-ukraine-information-war/
4. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/russia-ukraine-war-telegram-app-7847165/
5. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-military-e-enemy-telegram-app-2022-4
7. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17868
8. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/377109559
10. https://www.uttryckmagazine.com/2025/02/27/telegram-war-fuels-itself/
11. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/digital-occupation-inside-russias-telegram-battle-in-ukraine/
14. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/01/16/we-need-eyes-and-ears
15. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-gru-nazi-sabotage-recruitment-telegram/33539661.html; https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/make-a-molotov-cocktail-how-europeans-are-recruited-through-telegram-to-commit-sabotage-arson-and-murder