Recently, Lt General (Retired) Preziosa published two essays in European Affairs in Italian which we are including in translation after this overview of his analysis of Europe’s position in the evolving global system.
His argument rests on a fundamental proposition: the Russian-Ukrainian war represents not a regional conflict but a critical node in a systemic transformation of the Euro-Asian order. His framework reveals how Europe faces not military defeat but strategic marginalization unless it transforms economic power into coherent geopolitical purpose.
The war’s significance extends far beyond Kyiv because it operates within what Prezioa identifies as an “asymmetrical triangular system.” The United States retains military and technological dominance, China commands economic mass with global ambitions, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities despite limited economic foundations.
These three powers are interconnected through industrial chains, technological supply routes, critical raw materials, and missile postures that link the Baltic, Black Sea, and Indo-Pacific into a unified strategic space.
When Washington redirects attention toward the Pacific, European security balances shift.
When Europe fails to compensate with autonomous capacity, deterrence becomes asymmetrical.
Preziosa argues that Russia cannot defeat the entire West militarily, yet it can steadily increase European costs over time. China, meanwhile, benefits from Western preoccupation and Russian resilience without direct intervention, avoiding unilateral strengthening of American deterrent credibility.
This dynamic suggests that Ukraine’s final outcome may depend less on negotiations in Kyiv or Brussels than on implicit adjustments between Washington and Beijing regarding global competition management. Should the conflict threaten world economic or financial stability excessively, pressure for a structured freeze would intensify. driven not by European will alone but by systemic calculations among major powers.
For Europe, this presents an existential question of agency.
If the Euro-Asian order gets redefined primarily through U.S.-China competition, Europe risks becoming an object of balance rather than a subject shaping it. A Euro-Asian compromise might freeze the conflict without resolving root causes, subordinate European security to extra-European priorities, and reduce Ukraine to a variable in global stabilization.
The real choice facing Europe, Prezioa contends, is between constructing balance as an active participant or accepting balance defined elsewhere.
This challenge emerges from a historical miscalculation.
After 1989, Europe interpreted systemic imbalance as permanent suspension of geopolitical competition. American superiority made power dynamics less visible while economic integration advanced faster than strategic integration.
Security was outsourced while markets became the Union’s organizing principle.
Globalization and digital transformation expanded European societies’ awareness of international crises, yet this broadened perception failed to generate strategic capacity.
The gap between accelerated public debate and long-term decision-making contributed to internal fragmentation.
Contemporary international order has become what Preziosa calls “densified”, more compressed through energy, technological, financial, and logistical interdependencies. Localized conflicts produce systemic effects across supply chains, energy markets, and deterrence credibility.
Within this densified system, Europe’s stance remains uneven not because of irreconcilable value differences but due to divergent threat hierarchies. Poland prioritizes deterrence against Russia through geographical proximity and historical memory; Germany favors systemic stability through industrial structure and political tradition.
The structural problem lies not in this plurality, natural among sovereign states, but in insufficient cognitive convergence to translate economic weight into strategic power.
Preziosa sees the Ukrainian war as a potential evolutionary threshold where external pressure could transform into institutional consolidation, similar to how European integration historically advanced through systemic crises.
The appropriate response requires neither NATO separation nor consensus-free institutional expansion, but rather transformation of economic weight into strategic coherence through industrial resilience, integrated critical supply chains, credible deterrence capabilities, and aligned technology-security policies.
Ultimately, Preziosa emphasizes that European geopolitical position remains undefined, determined by capacity to integrate perception, power, and political purpose.
Europe cannot merely adapt to triangular dynamics among the United States, China, and Russia.
It must help shape the systemic incentives determining its stability.
Its relevance depends on transforming economic interdependence into organized power and demonstrating maturity through institutional consistency, not claiming centrality by historical tradition.
The Russian Ukrainian War and the Global Strategic System
The Russian Ukrainian war cannot be interpreted as a conflict confined to the European space, but as a critical node in a broader strategic system. The Baltic, Black Sea, and Indo-Pacific are not separate theaters, but rather interconnected compartments of a competition that concerns access, power projection, control of logistics corridors, and credibility of deterrence. What happens in Kyiv does not stay in Kyiv: it affects the global allocation of resources, the missile system, and the strategic priorities of the great powers.
The Baltic Sea is where the strength of Article 5 and the depth of European defense are measured; the Black Sea is where the territorial and maritime divide between Russia and the West is concentrated, with implications for energy and control of shipping routes; the Indo-Pacific is where the systemic competition between the United States and China is played out, directly affecting America’s ability to sustain its long-term commitment to Europe. These areas are linked by industrial and technological chains, the circulation of critical raw materials, competition in semiconductors, medium- and long-range missile postures and, above all, the global distribution of US strategic priorities. If Washington focuses its attention and capabilities on the Pacific, the European balance shifts; if Europe does not compensate with greater autonomy and industrial capacity, deterrence becomes asymmetrical. The war in Ukraine is therefore also a function of the global distribution of American priorities.
The international order is neither fully bipolar nor multipolar in the classical sense. It is an asymmetrical triangular system: the United States remains the dominant military and technological power; China is the main systemic competitor, with economic mass and global ambition; Russia is a nuclear power with significant military capabilities, but with a more limited economic base that is heavily concentrated in the energy and military sectors. In this scenario, Russia cannot realistically prevail against the entire West, but it can increase European costs over time; the United States cannot ignore European security, but considers the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority; China does not intervene directly in the conflict, but benefits from a busy West and a Russia that has not collapsed, allowing it to avoid a unilateral strengthening of American deterrent credibility.
It follows that the final outcome of the Ukrainian war may depend less on the negotiating table in Kyiv or Brussels and more on an implicit adjustment between Washington and Beijing regarding the management of global competition. If the European conflict were to become excessively destabilizing for the world economy or international financial stability, pressure for a structured freeze would increase—not only because of European will, but also because of the systemic calculations of the major powers.
For Europe, the issue is existential. If the Euro-Asian order is redefined primarily in the context of US-China competition, the risk is not direct military defeat, but strategic marginalization. A Euro-Asian compromise could, in principle, freeze the conflict without resolving its root causes, subordinate European security to extra-European priorities, and transform Ukraine into a variable of global stabilization. The real alternative for Europe is therefore not between war and peace, but between being a subject in the construction of balance or an object of a balance defined elsewhere.
This implies a structural choice: developing autonomous deterrence capabilities, industrial resilience, integration of strategic value chains, and internal political cohesion. Not to emancipate itself from NATO, but to make Europe an indispensable player in the final architecture. If the Russian-Ukrainian war is the first chapter in a redefinition of the Euro-Asian order, its conclusion will not only be a territorial agreement, but a new set of incentives among the great powers. In this context, European stability will depend not only on its relationship with Russia, but also on Europe’s position in the global strategic triangle and its ability to influence the overall configuration of systemic incentives.
Published in European Affairs in Italian on February 2, 2026
https://www.europeanaffairs.it/blog/2026/02/06/lordine-euro-asiatico-come-sistema-integrato/
From Economic Power to Strategic Coherence: Europe’s Challenge in the Global Triangular System
Europe today does not face an immediate risk of military defeat. There are no conditions for a direct confrontation that would call into question its territorial integrity. The risk is more subtle and structural, namely, failing to define its geopolitical place in the Euro-Asian order that is currently being redefined.
The war in Ukraine is not an isolated regional conflict. It is part of a systemic competition linking the Baltic, Black Sea, and Indo-Pacific regions, intertwining security, industrial supply chains, missile postures, technology, and the allocation of US strategic priorities. The central question is not only how the conflict will evolve, but what configuration of incentives will emerge from its outcome and what role Europe will be able to play in that configuration.
After 1989, Europe interpreted a systemic imbalance as a suspension of geopolitical competition. American superiority made the dynamics of power less visible, but no less real. Economic integration advanced more rapidly than strategic integration. Security was largely outsourced, while the market was consolidated as the organizing principle of the Union.
At the same time, globalization and digital transformation have profoundly changed the cognitive environment. European societies are now better informed, more connected, and more sensitive to international crises. However, this broadening of perception has not translated into greater strategic capacity. The gap between accelerated public debate and long-term political decision-making has contributed to internal fragmentation and a certain difficulty in sustaining coherent policies over time.
The contemporary international order is not ‘smaller’, but more densely packed. Energy, technological, financial, and logistical interdependencies have compressed the strategic distance between actors. In this context, localized conflicts produce systemic effects. The war in Ukraine is a prime example: a territorial conflict with global repercussions on supply chains, energy markets, financial stability, and the credibility of Western deterrence.
Within this densified system, Europe’s stance remains uneven. The European Union has significant economic clout, but has not yet fully harmonized its perception of threats. Poland, due to its geographical position and historical memory, prioritizes deterrence against Russia. Germany, due to its industrial structure and political-strategic tradition, has long favored systemic stability and economic interdependence. These are different risk hierarchies, not irreconcilable differences in values.
The structural problem does not lie in plurality, which is natural in a union of sovereign states, but in the absence of sufficient cognitive convergence. Without a shared assessment of threats and the costs of inaction, economic power does not automatically translate into strategic power. Deterrence requires capability, but also cohesion of intent.
The war in Ukraine may therefore represent an evolutionary threshold. Historically, European integration has made progress in response to systemic crises. The current phase offers a similar opportunity: to transform external pressure and perceived vulnerability into institutional and strategic consolidation.
This dynamic is part of a broader picture of competition between the United States and China. Washington increasingly identifies the Indo-Pacific as a long-term strategic priority. Beijing observes the European theater in relation to the global distribution of resources, the configuration of technological supply chains, and the credibility of American security commitments.
If the United States were to progressively reallocate capabilities to the Pacific, Europe would be called upon to assume greater responsibility for its own security balance. If China continued to strengthen its economic and technological mass without assuming direct military costs in Europe, the global balance would gradually shift. In either case, European inaction would constitute an implicit strategic choice.
The appropriate response is neither separation from NATO nor institutional expansion without political consensus. It requires the transformation of European economic weight into strategic coherence. This implies strengthening industrial resilience, protecting and integrating critical supply chains, developing credible deterrence capabilities, and aligning technology policies with security objectives.
The dimension of political leadership is fundamental. In a densified system, leadership is not measured by reactive crisis management, but by the ability to maintain strategic direction under pressure. It requires consistency, clarity of objectives, and a willingness to bear short-term costs to preserve long-term stability.
Europe’s geopolitical position is not predetermined. It will be defined by its ability to integrate perception, power, and political purpose. The continent that experienced the extreme consequences of the absence of strategic balance in the 20th century carries with it a historical responsibility: not to claim centrality by right of tradition, but to demonstrate maturity through institutional consistency and decision-making capacity.
In a denser global order characterized by triangular dynamics between the United States, China, and Russia, Europe cannot limit itself to adapting. It must help shape the systemic incentives that will determine its future stability. Its relevance will depend on its ability to transform economic interdependence into organized power and credible leadership.
Published in European Affairs in Italian on February 9, 2026