By Robert Czulda
For Central and Eastern European states (particularly Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland) as well as Northern Europe (notably Finland), the primary and enduring threat remains. Russia, which, despite strategic setbacks, shows no intention of halting the war in Ukraine. The outbreak of conflict against Iran also affects Russia, and by extension its position and interests on NATO’s Eastern Flank.
At the outset of the war against Iran, some commentators erroneously claimed that the conflict would disadvantage Russia by cutting off its access to Iranian weapons, including drones. Indeed, Iran has supplied Russia with Shahed and Mohajer-6 drones, as well as hundreds of ballistic missiles (such as the Fateh-110), artillery shells, and small-arms ammunition, worth billions of dollars. However, it is important to note that Russia now produces Iranian-designed drones under license and does not rely on imports from Iran.
The consequences for Russia arising from the ongoing war against Iran come from a different direction. For now, they are mixed, and a full assessment of long-term impacts remains premature, as the outcome of the war is still uncertain.
In response to the U.S.-Israeli strike, Moscow’s reaction was very limited. The Kremlin condemned the strikes as an “unprovoked act of armed aggression,” yet its actual involvement was minimal. Reports primarily cite the provision of intelligence to Iran, including the locations of American ships and aircraft.
This is hardly surprising, as the two countries cooperate closely but are not formal allies. No defense clauses obligate Russia to active engagement. Russia also has other reasons to avoid direct support for Iran.
Beyond its own military limitations and the inability of its defense industry to deliver large batches of weapons to Iran, geopolitical factors play a key role: the Kremlin is reluctant to antagonize relations with Arab monarchies by directly supporting Iran, and Putin is unwilling to jeopardize his direct relations with President Trump.
On one hand, the fact that a relatively close partner (albeit not an ally) has become the target of an attack is worrisome for Russia, which has recently lost allies in Syria and Venezuela. In recent years, Russia has invested considerable time, energy, and resources into cooperation with Iran. A scenario in which these gains are lost, whether due to military action or internal developments in Iran, would be disadvantageous for the Kremlin. The Russian partner is under significant pressure while Moscow remains largely passive, sending a negative signal to all of Russia’s partners. This is especially true when considering other challenges, such as growing problems with jihadists in Mali, which has also relied on Russian support, and increasing pressure on Cuba.
On the other hand, the war against Iran presents certain opportunities, particularly if the conflict is prolonged and therefore politically and financially costly for the U.S. and its allies. The Middle East crisis diverts global attention from the war in Ukraine; recent events in Europe, right on the continent’s doorstep, have taken a backseat.
At the same time, Russia’s supporters gain an argument highlighting perceived Western hypocrisy. The West has long criticized Russia for the war in Ukraine, yet the United States has now initiated similar actions against Iran.
This dynamic is not just rhetorical. A clear example is France’s decision to withdraw the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” and its strike group from the Baltic Sea and redirect it to the eastern Mediterranean.
This development heightens anxiety in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly among the Baltic states, which are most sensitive to potential Russian actions. This scenario aligns with Russia’s interests.
Lithuania’s response illustrates this: authorities regard the risk of hostile actions from Moscow as highly serious. For instance, Asta Skaisgirytė, chief foreign policy adviser to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, openly supported the strike on Iran and stated that Lithuania would consider deploying troops to assist the U.S.
Similarly, Raimundas Vaikšnoras, commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, echoed this stance. This narrative reflects both genuine concern and efforts to maintain U.S. attention on Central and Eastern Europe.
From the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe, an American failure would be alarming. A “new Vietnam syndrome” would further reduce U.S. willingness to engage in a potential war against Russia, should Moscow attack NATO or undertake other hostile actions.
U.S. setbacks and decreased commitment to serving as Europe’s security provider would benefit Russia, which could gain influence amid worsening U.S.-Arab relations in the Persian Gulf.
Russia’s expectations extend beyond the potential erosion of Western support for Kyiv: there are also practical implications. Central and Eastern Europe is concerned about the rapid depletion of U.S. munitions. According to available estimates, in just five days of hostilities with Iran, over 800 Patriot anti-ballistic missiles were fired.
Replenishing these stocks, for U.S. troops and allied forces alike, could take years. This means that deliveries of new launchers and anti-missile systems to Central and Eastern European countries, in both peacetime and crises, could be significantly delayed, increasing their vulnerability to Russia.
Another substantial benefit for Russia could be rising profits from energy prices. Even before the Strait of Hormuz disruption, OPEC+ members, along with some non-aligned producers, decided to increase daily oil production by 206,000 barrels. Saudi Arabia has been increasing production and exports by approximately 500,000 barrels per day in recent weeks, preparing for potential U.S. strikes on OPEC+ member Iran.
This tactic failed to achieve the intended effect, as oil prices rose, reaching $100 per barrel on March 9. It matched the peak seen in 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine. In response, two days earlier, the U.S. government temporarily eased economic sanctions to allow Russian oil stranded at sea to be sold to India.
Continued instability may increase pressure to introduce further sanction relaxations or waivers. Under these conditions, the entire West could feel compelled to normalize relations with Russia.
In conclusion, the U.S.-Israel war against Iran exposes both risks and opportunities for Russia, while highlighting vulnerabilities and associated concerns in Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow’s restraint, coupled with Western distraction and strained resources, may strengthen Russia’s strategic position.