By Robbin Laird
Alan Dupont’s recent analysis published in The Australian presents a clear warning about Australia’s foreign policy trajectory. In his view, Australia is dangerously drifting toward China while simultaneously weakening its foundational alliance with the United States. This drift, he argues, threatens to leave Australia in a “national security no-man’s land” where is not fully committed to its democratic allies nor able to rely on an increasingly authoritarian China that shares few of Australia’s core values.
Dupont identifies four key factors driving this concerning trend. First, he points to the influence of “pragmatic realists” who assume China’s regional dominance is inevitable and that Australia must accommodate this reality. Second, he highlights Australia’s economic dependence on China, with trade ties seemingly trumping security considerations. Third, he notes the political calculations within the Labor Party, which has successfully courted Chinese-Australian voters while breaking traditional foreign policy bipartisanship. Finally, he identifies a strain of anti-Americanism within Labor’s left wing that views the U.S. as morally equivalent to China in its pursuit of global influence.
The consequences of this drift, according to Dupont, are already visible: Australia’s reluctance to publicly criticize China’s cyberattacks and interference operations, insufficient defense spending despite warnings about an increasingly dangerous strategic environment and a failure to recognize China’s systematic efforts to undermine democratic institutions globally while reducing its own economic vulnerabilities.
Dupont’s analysis captures several uncomfortable truths about Australia’s current strategic position. The optics he describes, namely, Prime Minister Albanese’s warm engagement with President Xi Jinping contrasted with a more cautious approach to the Trump administration, do suggest a concerning imbalance in Australia’s major power relationships.
The economic argument deserves particular scrutiny. While China is indeed Australia’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 25% of Australia’s trade, Dupont correctly notes that this figure obscures important nuances. U.S. investment in Australia dwarfs Chinese investment by a factor of more than ten to one. Moreover, China’s coercive trade measures during 2020-2021, which cost Australia an estimated $20 billion in lost exports, demonstrated the vulnerability inherent in economic dependence on an authoritarian state willing to weaponize commerce for political ends.
The security dimension is equally compelling. China’s military buildup in the South China Sea, its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan all point to a state whose interests fundamentally conflict with Australia’s vision of a stable, rules-based international order. The presence of Chinese naval vessels monitoring Australian military exercises, as Dupont notes, symbolizes this strategic competition playing out in Australia’s immediate neighborhood.
It should be noted that the Albanese government has maintained Australia’s core alliance commitments, including the AUKUS partnership and continued military cooperation with the United States. The challenge lies not in abandoning these relationships but in managing the inherent tensions between security imperatives and economic interests.
Dupont’s suggestion that Australia should emulate Europe’s approach to China offers a promising framework for moving forward. European nations, particularly Germany, have undergone a significant strategic recalibration following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The shift from viewing China as primarily an economic partner to recognizing it as a “systemic rival.” the words of German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, demonstrates how democracies can maintain economic relationships while clearly articulating their strategic concerns.
This European model suggests several principles for Australian policy:
- Strategic Clarity: Australia should be more explicit about the fundamental differences between its partnership with the United States and its economic relationship with China. These are not equivalent relationships and treating them as such creates dangerous ambiguity about Australia’s strategic orientation.
- Diversification Imperative: Just as China is actively working to reduce its dependence on Australian commodities through investments in African mining projects, Australia should systematically diversify its economic relationships to reduce vulnerability to coercion.
- Values-Based Engagement: Australia should follow Europe’s example of combining economic engagement with clear public criticism of China’s human rights abuses, military aggression, and interference in democratic processes.
What would then be the implications of the approach suggested by Dupont?
Australia would craft a comprehensive strategy that would rest on several pillars:
Military Preparedness: Australia would increase defense spending beyond the current target of 2.4% of GDP by 2033. The Trump administration’s demands for burden-sharing, while sometimes expressed crudely, reflect a legitimate expectation that allies contribute meaningfully to collective defense. A target of 3-3.5% of GDP would demonstrate serious commitment while providing Australia with greater strategic autonomy. And especially the government would commit significantly greater resources to its “fight tonight force” which is suffering as investments shift to the 2035 or 2040 force,
Economic Resilience: Australia would accelerate efforts to diversify its export markets, particularly in critical minerals and agricultural products. The recent success in developing alternative markets for products previously blocked by China during the trade war demonstrates this is achievable. Investment in value-added processing of raw materials could reduce dependence on any single market.
Technological Security: Australia would be more selective about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure and emerging technologies. The decision to cancel the Port of Darwin lease, while economically costly, sends an important signal about Australia’s commitment to protecting strategic assets.
Alliance Reinforcement: Australia would deepen its integration with democratic allies beyond the United States. The Quad partnership with India, Japan, and the U.S., along with strengthened ties with European democracies, can provide alternatives to excessive dependence on either great power.
Diplomatic Engagement: Australia can maintain diplomatic and economic relationships with China while being clear about fundamental disagreements. This requires abandoning the current approach of avoiding public criticism in favor of a more mature relationship that acknowledges areas of both cooperation and competition.
Dupont’s central insight can be put simply: Australia’s attempt to sit on the fence between the US and China is no longer sustainable. The strategic environment has fundamentally changed and Australia’s policy framework must evolve accordingly.
This does not mean abandoning economic relationships with China or adopting a confrontational posture. Rather, it requires strategic clarity about Australia’s fundamental orientation toward democratic values and institutions. As Dupont notes, quoting Thucydides: “Weak states do what they must, and strong states do as they please.” Australia’s choice is whether to build strength through alliance with like-minded democracies or to accept the constraints that come with dependence on an authoritarian great power.
Alan Dupont, “In a tougher, more dangerous world, the U.S. remains our best option.” The Australian (July 18, 2024).