In an era of intensifying major power competition, China’s diplomatic engagement with commodity-rich nations has emerged as a cornerstone of its global strategy.
The contrasting yet complementary approaches Beijing has adopted toward Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Australia under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reveal a sophisticated framework for securing access to critical raw materials while building resilient political relationships.
Both countries represent major suppliers of essential commodities to China’s economy, and both are led by center-left governments that have maintained critical stances toward certain U.S. policies while embracing China’s economic partnership model.
China’s Engagement with Brazil
China’s relationship with Brazil represents perhaps the clearest example of its commodity-rich country strategy. The economic dimensions of this partnership are staggering: China has been Brazil’s top trading partner since 2009, with bilateral trade reaching $152.8 billion in 2022 and growing to approximately $160 billion by 2024. This represents a 37-fold increase since President Lula’s first term began in 2003, demonstrating the sustained momentum of the relationship across different political cycles.
The relationship’s institutional foundation runs deep. China designated Brazil as its first official “strategic partner” in 1993, later elevating this to a “global strategic partner” in 2012. This progression reflects China’s recognition of Brazil’s significance not merely as a commodity supplier, but as a key player in shaping its increasing dominance of the BRICS organization.
The relationship reached new heights in November 2024, when China and Brazil decided to elevate their ties to a “community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.” This designation, typically reserved for China’s most important partnerships, signals Beijing’s view of Brazil as central to its vision of a multipolar world order guided by Global China.
The economic structure of this partnership reveals China’s strategic priorities. Brazil exports $91.26 billion to China, primarily soybeans and mineral products, while importing $61.5 billion in manufactured goods. This trade pattern, raw materials flowing to China in exchange for value-added products, reflects a broader pattern in China’s commodity diplomacy, though Chinese and Brazilian officials have explicitly discussed moving toward higher value-added exchanges.
China’s engagement with Brazil operates through multiple multilateral platforms including BRICS, G20, and various South-South cooperation mechanisms. This multilateral dimension serves China’s broader strategy of positioning itself as a champion of the Global South while providing Brazil with platforms to assert its own leadership ambitions. This is a key part of the Global China strategy.
Lula’s foreign policy philosophy of “active nonalignment” aligns well with China’s preference for partners who maintain strategic autonomy from U.S.-led alliances. This convergence allows China to present itself as respecting Brazil’s sovereignty while building a Global China-led world order.
China’s Approach to Australia
China’s relationship with Australia under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese presents a more complex case study in commodity diplomacy. The relationship had reached its nadir during the period from 2020-2022, when diplomatic communications were frozen and trade restrictions affected AUD 20 billion in Australian exports. However, since Albanese’s election in 2022, both countries have pursued a deliberate stabilization strategy.
The year 2024 marked a turning point, with the lifting of the final trade restrictions that formed part of Beijing’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia. Live rock lobster exports, the last commodity subject to punitive trade actions, resumed in mid-December. This gradual removal of trade barriers signals China’s willingness to compartmentalize economic and political issues when dealing with strategically important commodity suppliers.
Despite ongoing tensions over AUKUS, the Quad partnership, and Australia’s military exercises in the South China Sea, Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged that China-Australia ties had “risen from the setbacks” during Albanese’s July 2025 visit to Beijing. This language suggests a deliberate Chinese strategy to focus on economic cooperation while managing rather than eliminating security disagreements.
China’s renewed engagement with Australia occurs in a broader context of U.S.-China trade tensions. Chinese officials have expressed interest in expanding the decade-old Australia-China Free Trade Agreement and pursuing cooperation in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. China is seeking to capitalize on uncertainties in U.S. trade policy by positioning itself as a stable and reliable partner for key commodity suppliers.
The approaches to both Brazil and Australia must be understood within China’s comprehensive strategy for securing access to critical raw materials. China initiated raw materials diplomacy at the end of the 1990s, encouraging state and private companies to go global in selected targeted sectors. This strategy is based on the Belt and Road Initiative and revolves around acquisitions, stakes in mines, or the provision of infrastructure in exchange for exploitation of raw materials.¹¹
China’s success in this area is remarkable. Today, it refines 68% of the world’s nickel, 40% of copper, 59% of lithium, and 73% of cobalt. This control over processing capabilities creates dependencies that extend far beyond simple bilateral trade relationships, as many resource-rich countries lack the capacity to refine their own raw materials.
Both the Brazil and Australia cases demonstrate China’s strategic patience and adaptability. The approach allows Beijing to weather political changes in partner countries while maintaining long-term economic relationships.
This patience proved crucial during the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil and the Morrison government in Australia, both of which adopted more confrontational approaches toward China.
Both relationships feature robust institutional dialogue mechanisms designed to provide stability during periods of tension. These range from high-level strategic dialogues to sector-specific cooperation mechanisms. The institutionalization of these relationships creates predictability and continuity that survives changes in government.
China leverages multilateral platforms to strengthen bilateral relationships while advancing its broader strategic objectives. With Brazil, this occurs through BRICS, G20, and various South-South cooperation mechanisms. With Australia, China has sought to use platforms like the G20 and ASEAN-related forums to maintain engagement even during periods of bilateral tension.
The Australia case highlights the limitations of China’s commodity diplomacy when it encounters fundamental security concerns. Australia’s AUKUS commitments and alliance with the United States create ongoing friction that pure economic incentives cannot fully overcome. The Darwin Port lease controversy, where Australia is reviewing a Chinese company’s 99-year lease of a strategic port, exemplifies these tensions.
Both relationships face domestic political constraints that limit their scope. In Australia, public opinion toward China remains generally negative despite improved government-to-government relations. In Brazil, while the relationship enjoys broader support, there are concerns about over-dependence on Chinese markets and the need for greater economic diversification.
The intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition creates pressures on both Brazil and Australia to make difficult choices about their international alignments. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency adds another layer of uncertainty, as both countries must navigate between their economic interests with China and their broader strategic relationships.
China’s success in building these relationships has significant implications for global commodity markets. The combination of China’s processing capabilities and its strong relationships with key suppliers creates a form of market power that extends beyond traditional measures of economic influence.
The concentration of critical mineral processing in China, combined with its strong relationships with major suppliers like Australia and Brazil, creates potential vulnerabilities for other countries seeking to develop their own supply chains. This has prompted responses from the United States and European Union to develop alternative supply chains and reduce dependencies on Chinese processing capabilities.
China’s engagement with Brazil and Australia reveals a key element of the Global China strategy for reshaping the “rules based” order.
The Brazil relationship provides China with a comprehensive partnership that spans economic, political, and strategic dimensions. The Australia relationship demonstrates the approach’s resilience and adaptability, showing how China can rebuild relationships even after significant crises.
But as Global China meets the rethinking by the United States and Europe of their relationship with China, China’s commodity diplomacy will face increasing challenges from countries seeking to reduce their dependencies and develop alternative supply chains.
Featured image produced by an AI program and highlights the challenge from Brazil’s perspective of protecting its sovereignty against Global China, something which President Lula does not seem to be concerned with.
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