By Robbin Laird
The Sir Richard Williams Foundation’s September 18, 2025 seminar posed a fundamental question that cuts to the heart of modern defense planning: How does a nation achieve “readiness at the speed of relevance” when the luxury of time may no longer exist?
The presentations provided sobering but actionable answers that collectively paint a picture of how 21st-century militaries must fundamentally restructure their approach to combat readiness.
The answers that emerged reveal a paradigm shift away from the comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era toward a new reality where conflicts may be decided before the first shot is fired, where industrial mobilization cannot wait for crisis to justify investment, and where readiness is no longer a destination but a continuous, dynamic condition requiring constant maintenance across multiple domains.
Answer One: Deterrence Through Demonstrated Capability, Not Future Promises
Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, Chief of Air Force, provided perhaps the most fundamental reframe of how military forces contribute to deterrence in the modern era. His insight challenges decades of defense planning focused on future capability acquisition, arguing instead that deterrence emerges from the continuous demonstration of existing capabilities.
“We contribute to deterrence directly through force generation, through raise, train, sustain, sustaining a tier one force and demonstrating that every day,” Chappell explained. This philosophy centers on what he calls the “D words” or the ability to “degrade, disrupt, destroy, defeat” showcased through regular, visible exercises that communicate credible hard power to potential adversaries.
This approach recognizes that potential adversaries make cost-benefit calculations based on demonstrated capabilities rather than promised future systems. The repeated demonstration of complex, integrated operations or what Chappell describes as having “capability and credibility that aligned minds will comprehend, communicated collectively with innovative force structures including allies and partners, delivered cumulatively over time” creates deterrent effects that pure acquisition programs cannot match.
The strategic implications are significant: military forces must be structured not just to fight when called upon, but to continuously demonstrate their readiness to fight. This requires maintaining higher peacetime operational tempos, conducting more complex training exercises, and accepting the costs of regular capability demonstrations as essential investments in deterrence.
Answer Two: Industrial Mobilization as Immediate Capability, Not Crisis Response
The seminar’s most uncomfortable truth emerged from industry leaders who shattered traditional assumptions about wartime mobilization. Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Robert Denney of Northrop Grumman delivered the starkest assessment: “Mobilization is not a switch you can flip when conflict begins. It’s a capability you build in advance.”
This insight fundamentally challenges defense planning that assumes industrial surge capacity can be activated when needed. The reality, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience and historical analysis, is that effective mobilization requires years of preparation, established supply chains, and experienced workforces that cannot be created during crisis.
Matt Jones from BAE Systems Australia reinforced this reality through historical comparison, contrasting Bill Knudsen’s successful coordination of America’s “Arsenal of Democracy” with Essington Lewis’s frustrated attempts to mobilize Australia’s industrial base before World War II. The key difference was timing: Knudsen had government backing and urgency before conflict began, while Lewis faced bureaucratic obstacles that prevented adequate preparation.
Ukraine’s transformation following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea provides the most relevant contemporary example. By beginning industrial modernization eight years before Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine had developed the capacity to sustain artillery fire, manufacture unmanned systems, and innovate at wartime speed. Crucially, Ukrainian industry had cultivated “a culture of innovating at wartime speed” where battlefield problems were prototyped in days and fielded in weeks.
The implications for Australia are stark: waiting for crisis to justify industrial investment leaves money but no time. Defense industry leaders emphasized that successful mobilization requires early government investment in industrial capabilities, acceptance of higher peacetime costs to maintain surge capacity, and systematic development of the skills and infrastructure necessary for rapid scaling.
Mike Prior from Boeing Defence Australia highlighted the practical challenges through the “reservist dilemma”. Boeing Australia employs approximately 900 active reservists representing over 30% of their workforce, concentrated in critical maintenance, modifications, and training roles. Activating these personnel for military service would immediately collapse Australia’s Wedgetail training system, creating impossible choices between civilian defense support and military mobilization.
Answer Three: The Tyranny of Compressed Timelines
Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute delivered perhaps the seminar’s most urgent warning: Australia faces a 2-5 year window for preparation, not the 5-10 year timeline commonly assumed in defense planning. This compressed timeline stems from converging factors that create windows of opportunity for potential adversaries.
American military capabilities will improve significantly by 2030 with new platforms like the B-21 bomber and advanced missiles coming online. Chinese leaders likely recognize this window of temporary advantage and may feel pressure to act before American capabilities mature. Similarly, current American political dysfunction hampers intelligence synthesis and decision-making, providing additional incentive for adversaries to act sooner rather than later.
The implications cascade through every aspect of defense planning. Traditional acquisition timelines measured in decades become irrelevant when potential conflicts may emerge within years. The comfortable assumption that warning time will allow for mobilization and preparation dissolves when adversaries can achieve fait accompli before effective responses can be mounted.
This reality demands fundamental changes in how military forces approach readiness. Air Commodore Peter Robinson, Commander Air Combat Group, emphasized that rather than planning for future capabilities or waiting for ideal conditions, forces must achieve readiness “with current assets against existing threats.” The “fight tonight” philosophy acknowledges that adversaries operate on their own timelines, not those preferred by defense planners.
The compressed timeline also affects international cooperation and alliance coordination. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve decisive results in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly while maintaining legitimacy and coordination.
Answer Four: Beyond Platform Acquisition to Whole-of-Nation Capability
The seminar’s presentations consistently emphasized that combat readiness extends far beyond military platforms to encompass what officials termed “whole-of-nation capability.” This recognition challenges traditional boundaries between military and civilian sectors, demanding integration across government, industry, and civil society.
Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities, put this in stark terms: “the use of non-kinetic effects and our ability to defend against those effects prior to and during conflict will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.” This reality requires capabilities that span space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains – areas where civilian infrastructure and expertise prove as critical as military systems.
Air Marshal Chappell outlined preliminary concepts for a National Aerospace Enterprise that recognizes Australia as “an aviation nation” with “an incredible amount of capacity and capability out there, but we are no way stitched up.” Even within the defense establishment, integration remains incomplete, making broader civilian integration even more challenging.
The challenge involves practical questions that become critical during crisis:
• Which civilian reserve personnel should be recalled to active duty versus remaining in industry roles where they contribute more effectively?
• Where should civilian aircraft land during emergencies, and which airfields should remain clear for military operations?
These decisions require coordination mechanisms that don’t currently exist.
Colonel Dave Beaumont from Defence’s National Support Division identified four pillars of Australia’s national support base: industry, workforce, social cohesion, and institutional decision-making capacity. Each pillar faces distinct challenges, but success requires integration across all four. The vast majority of Australia’s economy operates without daily consideration of defense requirements, yet these civilian industries would prove critical during extended conflict.
This whole-of-nation approach requires fundamental changes in how Australia thinks about national security. It demands civilian industries understand potential defense requirements, government agencies coordinate across traditional boundaries, and society as a whole maintains commitment to sustained defense efforts.
Answer Five: Geographic Realities Demand Forward Defense
Australia’s unique geography emerged as both advantage and constraint throughout the seminar discussions. Air Commodore Robinson’s presentation included a striking comparison: the 2,000-mile span from Perth to Cairns equals the distance from northern Finland to Greece or essentially the entire NATO front line. Yet where Europe offers dense populations, extensive infrastructure, and multiple allied nations, Australia faces vast oceanic distances with scattered island chains and limited friendly bases.
This “tyranny of distance” creates what Robinson termed the imperative for forward defense: it’s preferable to “kill the ship before it launches missiles” than to intercept those missiles after launch. This forward defense concept demands not only advanced capabilities but extensive regional partnerships and basing arrangements.
The RAAF maintains an extensive exercise program across the Indo-Pacific, from Thailand and Indonesia to Japan and the Philippines. These engagements serve multiple purposes beyond simple training: building operational familiarity with regional air forces, demonstrating Australian commitment to regional security while providing deterrent effects, and offering practical experience in operating from austere or unfamiliar bases.
Recent developments, such as taking weapons into Southeast Asia for the first time in decades during Exercise Cope West in the Philippines, represent significant policy and operational milestones. Such exercises test not only tactical procedures but also the diplomatic and logistical frameworks necessary for forward operations.
The geographic imperative also shapes capability requirements. Unlike European theaters where reinforcements might arrive within hours, the Indo-Pacific demands self-reliance and forward positioning. Australian forces must be capable of sustained operations at extended ranges with limited support infrastructure.
Answer Six: The Human Dimension as the Ultimate Constraint
Across multiple presentations, the human dimension emerged as both the greatest strength and most critical constraint in achieving combat readiness. Air Marshal Chappell noted a concerning disconnect: “Too many folks in the Air Force and too many folks in the air domain team don’t see that. They just think they’re doing their job, their bit, and aircrew and a few others are doing the air power thing.”
This observation led to his focus on building shared purpose or transforming individual jobs into a collective calling. The framework extends beyond immediate tactical readiness to encompass what Chappell describes as “healthy tension” between maintaining readiness for immediate threats while avoiding unnecessary attrition that could compromise long-term capability.
The human challenge manifests across multiple dimensions. Lieutenant General Coyle acknowledged the education gap: “There are still people out there that say to me, ‘What do you do in space and cyber? I’ve got no idea,’ and they’ve been in the defense force for decades.” This knowledge gap isn’t merely about technical details: it’s about fundamental operational concepts necessary for integrated operations across domains.
Industry faces parallel challenges. Mike Prior from Boeing noted that 30-35% of most defense industry workers have less than 18 months of experience, with over 50% of sustainment program personnel expected to have less than three years of experience by next year. This inexperience creates dangerous knowledge gaps during normal operations and could prove catastrophic during crisis mobilization.
The retention challenge proves equally critical. Lieutenant General Coyle noted that the Australian Defence Force has implemented specialized pay scales for cyber warfare officers using aviation officer pay scales to compete with civilian opportunities. However, compensation alone isn’t sufficient because these fields require development times of three to five years before personnel become fully proficient.
Air Commodore Robinson concluded by emphasizing the exceptional quality and dedication of current service members, noting “a really clear sense of purpose for the environment that we’re in, more so than I think I’ve ever seen in my career.” However, preserving this human capital through appropriate pacing of operations and training remains essential for maintaining readiness.
Answer Seven: Technology Integration at Operational Speed
The seminar revealed that technological advancement alone cannot deliver combat readiness. The critical factor is integrating technology at the speed of operational relevance. This emerged most clearly in discussions of non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.
Wing Commander (Retired) Steven Thornton, commanding No. 6 Squadron RAAF, described the electromagnetic spectrum as fundamental to ensuring “survivability and lethality of the joint coalition force.” However, Professor Bronk noted that cyber operations represent “one of the slowest forms of warfare” for counter-military network cyber payloads require “between 18 months and three years, often to develop and embed a capability in an adversary Air Defense Network.”
This temporal disconnect between cyber capabilities and operational needs creates significant planning challenges. Unlike kinetic weapons that can be employed rapidly once available, cyber effects require extensive preparation, reconnaissance, and often pre-positioning of capabilities years in advance.
The classification requirements surrounding cyber operations further complicate integration. As Professor Bronk observed, “Does the person who’s putting together the campaign plan have the clearances to know that and the compartments to know that that capability exists, let alone the authorities to release it?” Even when cyber capabilities exist, they may not be usable due to legal, operational, or security constraints.
Electronic warfare offers more immediate effects but faces its own challenges. The effectiveness of jamming depends on signal processing capabilities improving rapidly on both sides. This evolution is driving military forces toward “stand-in” electronic warfare platforms – systems that can penetrate closer to enemy territory to deliver jamming effects at shorter ranges where they remain effective.
Air Marshal Chappell’s enthusiasm for the MQ-28 Ghost Bat program exemplifies what is the goal of technology integration. Having observed live demonstrations where two aircraft operated “just like a fighter formation” with control systems simple enough to operate while inverted in an aircraft, he described the potential for transforming Australia from “a tier one small air force into a tier one medium-sized air force” without burning out human capability and capacity.
Answer Eight: Cost-Effective Solutions to Mass Threats
The emergence of low-cost drone threats has prompted significant rethinking of defense economics throughout the allied community. Professor Bronk highlighted the unsustainable mathematics: NATO forces intercepting $20,000 drones with $1.2-1.8 million missiles creates cost-exchange ratios that favor adversaries employing mass drone tactics.
Russia’s mass production of Shahed-136 drones illustrates how adversaries exploit these economic vulnerabilities. Initially costing $150,000-200,000 per unit, Russian manufacturers have driven costs down to approximately $7,000 through simplified production methods. While crude, these systems work effectively as saturation weapons designed to overwhelm defensive systems.
Ukraine’s experience provides crucial insights into cost-effective responses. Ukrainian forces have found helicopters equipped with machine guns and forward-looking infrared sensors represent one of their most cost-effective counter-drone platforms. Crews in light aircraft like Yak-52s armed with assault rifles shoot down hundreds of drones monthly, a decidedly low-tech solution to a high-tech problem.
The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) emerged as perhaps the most promising development in cost-effective air defense. At $20,000-35,000 per interceptor, APKWS breaks the unsustainable cost curve while providing genuine tactical capability. A single fighter aircraft can carry 28-49 APKWS rounds in standard rocket pods, providing sustained engagement capability against drone swarms.
For Australia, APKWS represents an opportunity to leverage existing platforms effectively. Super Hornets could serve as interceptor aircraft while F-35s provide sensor coverage, creating a layered defense network capable of engaging threats far from Australian shores. The system’s relative simplicity also makes it a candidate for domestic production.
Answer Nine: Resilience Through Distributed Operations
The concept of resilience emerged as fundamental to combat readiness, but not in traditional terms of hardening individual assets. Instead, presentations emphasized resilience through distribution, adaptability, and multiple redundant capabilities across all operational domains.
Air Marshal Chappell highlighted lessons from Ukraine and Israel, both of which have demonstrated continued air power generation despite sustained attacks on their infrastructure. Australia has been developing these capabilities through exercises like Coral Sea, where forces practiced rapid relocation, refueling, rearming, and replanning using agile basing concepts with C-17 transport aircraft supporting fast jet operations.
Lieutenant General Coyle emphasized building resilience through PACE planning or Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency options for every critical capability. “We expect to lose everything at that point in time. The reality of that is unlikely, because it’s not like you can barrage jam the entire Australian Defense Force and expect it to sustain, but we are prepared to have alternates to everything.”
This resilience requires more than technical redundancy: it demands operational flexibility. Military personnel must be trained not just on primary systems but on backup methods, including potentially reverting to older technologies that may be less vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This might mean training on celestial navigation as backup to GPS, or understanding how to operate with paper maps when digital systems are compromised.
The distributed approach extends to force structure decisions. Rather than concentrating capabilities in large, vulnerable platforms, military forces are moving toward networks of smaller, more survivable systems. This trend has implications across all domains, suggesting that future conflicts will require capabilities that can operate effectively against distributed, adaptive adversaries.
Answer Ten: The Strategic Depth of Time
Air Marshal (Retired) Mark Binskin focused on “strategic depth” as a key challenge which he characterized as not just in geography or resources, but in time itself. By accelerating the development of critical capabilities now, strengthening industrial partnerships today, and synchronizing efforts across all domains, democracies can compress the decision-making cycle that adversaries seek to exploit.
This temporal strategic depth requires departure from traditional procurement timelines and bureaucratic processes designed for a more stable world. Consider the implications for defense industrial capacity: in previous conflicts, nations could rely on their ability to mobilize and scale production during wartime. Modern warfare may not provide that luxury for the industrial base must be prepared to surge immediately.
The human dimension proves equally critical to temporal strategic depth. Military personnel cannot simply be trained for yesterday’s conflicts; they must be prepared for scenarios that may unfold with unprecedented speed and complexity. This demands not just technical proficiency, but cognitive agility – the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and make effective decisions under extreme time pressure.
Alliance structures, too, must evolve to match the speed of modern threats. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve fait accompli in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles or alliance consultation, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly to emerging crises while maintaining legitimacy and coordination.
Conclusion: A New Paradigm for an Uncertain Era
The Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar underscored that “readiness at the speed of relevance” demands nothing less than a fundamental transformation in how democratic societies approach defense. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era, extended warning times, predictable adversaries, and the luxury of perfect preparation, have dissolved in the face of new strategic realities.
The major answers that emerged from the seminar point toward a new paradigm: deterrence through demonstrated capability rather than future promises; industrial mobilization as immediate capability rather than crisis response; compressed timelines that demand immediate action rather than gradual preparation; whole-of-nation approaches that transcend traditional military boundaries; geographic realities that require forward defense; human dimensions that represent both greatest strength and critical constraint; technology integration at operational speed; cost-effective solutions to mass threats; resilience through distributed operations; and strategic depth measured in time rather than just geography.
These answers collectively paint a picture of military forces that must be continuously ready, constantly adapting, and perpetually demonstrating their capabilities. The alternative, waiting for perfect conditions or crisis justification, risks ceding the initiative to adversaries who have already embraced the speed of modern conflict.
The transformation is not optional. As the seminar made clear, in an era where the luxury of time may no longer exist, nations must choose between preparation now or improvisation later. The consequences of choosing poorly could prove as tragic as those witnessed in previous conflicts where inadequate preparation led to avoidable losses.
The question is not whether this transformation is necessary for the strategic environment has already made that choice. The question is whether Australia can implement these changes quickly enough to remain secure in an increasingly dangerous world.