By Robbin Laird
On August 31, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Narendra Modi told Vladimir Putin, “We must move away from endless war towards an end to the war.” He described a peaceful resolution of all issues as the call of humanity and said that this is India’s message.
Eleven days later Modi was hosting Putin in New Delhi. It was the first time since 2022 that Putin had traveled abroad to attend a BRICS summit. At their Friday meeting the two leaders spoke of raising bilateral trade from about $65 billion to $100 billion by 2030, reviewed defense cooperation, and discussed an annual India-Russia summit around the end of the year.
It would be easy to read these two encounters as contradictory, or to pick one and call it the real India. Both are the real India. The public appeal for peace and the hospitality in Delhi are two sides of a hedging strategy. India is holding as many options open as it can while its largest neighbor and rival, China, grows stronger, and while a war launched by Putin reshapes the world around it.
This article places that hedge inside the argument of my book, The Global War in Ukraine. The book argues that Putin’s war has narrowed Russia’s future at home and its reach abroad, and that its greatest beneficiary has been China. India is the most consequential test of that argument in the Global South. Its behavior confirms the narrowing of Russian reach, but it complicates the story in two ways. India is not decoupling from Russia; it is restructuring the relationship. And India has its own reasons to keep Russia from becoming wholly dependent on Beijing, which slows the very decline its hedging reflects.
What the war did to Russia
The book makes three claims about Russia.
The first is domestic. The war economy has become less a means of territorial conquest than a mechanism for concentrating control. The security services and the military-industrial complex are its principal beneficiaries, and by late 2025 defense and security absorbed roughly two-fifths of federal spending. Inflation, a 17 per cent key rate, labor shortages and a widening deficit were squeezing the civilian economy, and thousands of scientists had left. That creates a trap. Ending the war would unravel the power structure built around it, while continuing it consumes the base that structure stands on.
The second is Russia’s global position. The war has contracted Russian influence from the Baltic to Central Asia and the Caucasus, ended Germany’s energy relationship with Moscow, and produced a united and militarized NATO with Finland and Sweden inside it.
The third is subordination to China. The yuan has displaced the dollar in Russia’s foreign-currency trading, Chinese refiners have extracted discounts of 10 to 19 per cent on Russian crude, and Beijing has become the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels. Russia has become a price-taker in its most important export markets.
India fits into this picture as the largest Global South customer for Russian energy and arms. Its choices decide whether Russia’s pivot to Asia is a partnership of options or a dependence on two buyers, and every marginal Indian decision shifts Moscow’s bargaining position toward Beijing.
Stock and flow
The most useful distinction in Indian defense trade is between flow and stock. SIPRI measures flow, meaning deliveries in a five-year window. Russia’s share of Indian arms imports fell from 70 per cent in 2011-15 to 51 per cent in 2016-20 and 40 per cent in 2021-25. France now supplies about 29 per cent and Israel about 15 per cent.
Two cautions apply. The decline predates the war, since 2019-23 was already the first five-year period since 1960-64 in which Russia supplied less than half of India’s arms imports. And the decline has stalled at the margin, because Russia’s share was 36 per cent in 2020-24, so the latest window shows a slight uptick.
The book measures stock, the installed base. About 90 per cent of the Indian Army’s equipment is of Russian origin, along with roughly 70 per cent of the Air Force’s combat aircraft. The Su-30MKI alone equips 14 of the IAF’s 30 squadrons, and the Navy’s only operational carrier flies Russian MiG-29Ks. Flows can change within a few years, while stocks take decades. Delhi treats the dependence as a “bridge” to be managed down over a decade or more, because an abrupt break would hurt the readiness of units facing the Chinese army on the Line of Actual Control before it hurt Russian operations in Ukraine. So “India is reducing exposure” and “India remains deeply exposed” are both true, at different levels.
The arms portfolio
The clearest recent signal is the Su-57. There was no signed deal to abandon. India left the fifth-generation co-development program back in 2018, and this summer it declined a fresh offer. Moscow had offered the Su-57E with licensed domestic production and technology transfer, and New Delhi turned it down, leaving Algeria as the only publicly identified export customer. Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh said India had no plans to acquire a new version of the Sukhois and was actively considering upgrading the existing fleet. The position hardened over the year, from an open question in March to a categorical rejection by late July. The likelier drivers are cost, capability and the indigenous AMCA, along with the Rafale. The IAF is reportedly close to a deal for 114 Rafales, 94 of them built locally.
The alternative to buying new is the “Super Sukhoi” upgrade. The IAF plans to bring about 75 per cent of its Su-30MKI fleet, more than 200 of roughly 272 aircraft, to the new standard. The upgrade centers on the Indian-made Virupaksha AESA radar and new mission computers, with a first prototype expected around 2028-29. Much of this is indigenous, but the airframe and engines are Russian in origin. The AL-31FP engines are built under license by HAL, and Russia has offered the more powerful AL-41. India is still evaluating its options. The result is Indian sensors and weapons on a Russian airframe. Moscow’s role shrinks from prime supplier to limited partner.
The December 2025 Putin-Modi summit formalized that shift. The joint statement said the defense partnership was being reoriented toward joint research and development and the production of advanced platforms. I described this in the book as Russia’s move from India’s dominant armory to an embedded defense-industrial partner, with joint manufacture of spares and components for Russian-origin equipment inside India. Russia keeps a stake in the Indian arsenal but earns less per platform and holds less leverage.
Yet the pattern is not one-directional. In late March the Defence Acquisition Council cleared about $25 billion of proposals, including five additional S-400 systems and a Tunguska contract with Rosoboronexport. That came despite the S-400 delivery delays I document in the book. India buys Russian where nothing else fits, in layered air defense, and goes elsewhere or indigenous where alternatives exist.
Oil: hedging on supply, not sentiment
Before the war Russian crude was about 2 per cent of India’s supply. Steep discounts from April 2022 transformed the trade, and Russia became India’s largest source. In 2025-26 Russia supplied about 30.3 per cent of India’s crude imports, worth $40.8 billion.
The 2026 pattern has less to do with Ukraine than with the Gulf. The Iran war began with US-Israeli strikes on February 28. In February, cargoes from within the Strait of Hormuz accounted for 53 per cent of India’s crude imports. Russia’s share of Indian crude reached a record 51 per cent in July, as disruptions to Middle Eastern supplies increased refiners’ reliance on Russian oil. One tracker put the July share higher, and another counted Russian crude at 18.7 per cent of India’s imports in February against nearly 50 per cent in July, as Middle East imports fell by 63 per cent.
Then came the reversal. Russian imports fell 26.3 per cent in August as Chinese refiners outbid Indian buyers. That report is from an aggregator, but it is consistent with other coverage. In the first two weeks of September, imports were about 30 per cent below the August average, which experts attributed to attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, with Iraq emerging as a key alternative. Pressure from Washington adds a third force, and its history this year shows the hedge at work. On February 2 President Trump announced a deal cutting US tariffs on Indian goods from 50 to 18 per cent, and said that Modi had agreed to stop buying Russian oil. The joint statement did not mention Russian oil, and the Indian government has neither confirmed nor denied the pledge, saying that its purchases are guided by national interest. An executive order provides that a 25 per cent tariff would return if India resumes such purchases, and Indian refiners avoided Russian cargoes for March and April delivery. The Iran war began less than a month later. I have not found reporting that Washington has reimposed the duty, although pressure for tariffs of up to 100 per cent on buyers of Russian energy is growing.
None of these forces is about Putin or the war’s morality. Indian refiners treat Russian crude as one grade in a portfolio, taking more when the Gulf is disrupted and less when supply is scarce, costly or politically penalized. That is hedging rather than alignment.
For Russia, the picture matches what the book describes. Chinese refiners winning cargoes with the advantage of the Northern Sea Route show China’s power as a price-setter. India is the alternative outlet that keeps that power in check. My inference is that every barrel India buys reduces Russia’s dependence on Beijing, and every barrel India forgoes increases it.
The domestic trap and Indian choices
India’s decisions touch the domestic logic of the Russian war economy at three points.
The first is revenue. India and China are the biggest buyers of Russian oil, which is seen as helping Moscow replenish its budget. The book argues that the war economy is sustained by centralizing resources and pressing the civilian economy, so export revenue matters most when everything else is squeezed.
The second is the defense industry. It is both the main beneficiary of the war economy and, as the book shows, degraded by sanctions and by the demands of the war. A lost Indian fighter order narrows its export outlets and increases its reliance on state budgets. That is my inference, not a finding from the book.
The third is legitimacy. Because of the ICC warrant, Putin’s personal diplomacy is largely confined to forums such as the SCO and BRICS. The warrant was not enforced during his Indian visit in December 2025, and India bears the reputational cost of hosting him. For Putin, a Delhi summit with Xi and a bilateral with Modi is worth more than any trade target, because it shows a country of 1.4 billion still receiving him.
India also benefits from the peace track. US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Putin in Moscow this month with a proposal to end the war. Modi’s message from Bishkek costs him little and keeps him positioned as an interlocutor if talks advance. And the book’s paradox applies here as well: peace may be harder for Putin than war, because ending it could unravel the structure he has built around it. India’s hedging horizon runs past any ceasefire.
The third party: China
The book’s central claim is that Putin’s war has strengthened China at Russia’s expense, and India’s hedge has to be read against that. India and Russia are the two continental powers Beijing is working to reshape. India’s strategy has two aims that pull against each other. It wants to reduce its own dependence on a Russia that is weaker and more reliant on China, and it wants to keep Russia as a “residual pole” in Asia so that Moscow does not fall entirely into Beijing’s orbit.
That tension explains the pattern. India buys S-400s because nothing else fills that layer, and it refuses the Su-57 because a new fifth-generation dependence would be deeper and riskier. It keeps buying Russian oil, which supports Russian bargaining power against China.
There is also a Chinese track. Modi and Xi were expected to hold talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, in a meeting that could help consolidate a diplomatic thaw after the 2020 border tensions. India is hedging against China with Japan and the West, while also engaging Beijing directly. The question I pose at the end of the India chapter remains open: how will India fare if a Chinese-centered order takes shape in which both Russia and India are junior players?
Japan and the wider hedge
The Indo-Pacific track is visible in the exercise Veer Guardian 26. It runs from September 9 to 21 at Jodhpur, with three Japanese F-2 fighters and 110 personnel, and it is the first time Japan has sent fighter jets to India. Japan’s defense minister visited in August, and the two countries signed a maritime security arrangement that month. Chinese state media portrayed the deployment as an attempt to strengthen coordination against Beijing. A retired Indian air marshal cautioned against reading it only through a China lens, since India drills with many partners, while acknowledging that such events make Beijing wary.
Japan is also deeply involved in Ukraine’s war, as the book documents. It signed a security agreement with Kyiv in June 2024 and, in April 2025, agreed to share high-resolution satellite radar imagery with Ukraine. Tokyo has also sanctioned entities in China, India, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan over alleged support for Russia’s war. So India is deepening military ties with a country that backs Ukraine and has penalized Indian firms over Russia. This is compartmentalization. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar’s formula, quoted in the book, lists engaging America, managing China, cultivating Europe, reassuring Russia and bringing Japan into play. Russia sits in the “reassuring” slot, which is not the language of alliance.
What would change the reading
Six developments would show whether this is a durable shift or a tactical mix.
- The Rafale signing. A deal for 114 aircraft, mostly built in India, would confirm the Su-57 refusal as part of a coherent fighter strategy.
- S-400 delivery and follow-through. Timely delivery of the additional systems would suggest that Russian air defense remains a sustained priority. Further slippage would strengthen the case for alternatives.
- The Super Sukhoi engine choice. Selecting the AL-41 would deepen Russian lineage in the fleet. An indigenous or non-Russian option would mark a real break.
- Russian crude once the Gulf normalizes. If the share stays well below the July peak when supply recovers, the shift is strategic. If it rebounds, this year’s swings were driven by supply and price.
- The US tariff track. Reimposition of the 25 per cent duty under the February executive order, or legislation allowing tariffs of up to 100 per cent on buyers of Russian energy, would force a choice India has so far been able to defer.
- The year-end summit and any ceasefire. A visit by Modi to Russia, or a settlement that eases sanctions, would test whether India’s hedge stays a hedge.
Conclusion
Modi’s words at Bishkek and his welcome for Putin in New Delhi belong to the same strategy. India is reducing Russian dependence in new arms purchases, keeping the installed Russian base alive with Indian sensors and weapons, buying Russian oil when supply and price make sense, and building ties with Japan, France, the United States and, cautiously, China.
The Indian case supports the book’s argument about Russia’s shrinking reach. Russia has lost the prime-supplier role in Indian defense, watches Chinese refiners outbid its oldest large customer, and depends on a few forums where leaders will receive it. It also shows how uneven the decline is. Russia remains embedded in India’s arsenal, is a larger energy supplier than before the war, and benefits from India’s wish to keep it from becoming Beijing’s junior partner.
India is not leaving Russia. It is managing a partner that has been weakened by its own war and increasingly by China, while making sure it never depends on any single power again.
Bibliography
All online sources accessed September 18, 2026. Sources marked † are aggregators, forum reposts or exam-preparation sites and should be checked against primary reporting before publication.
Bishkek SCO summit and the December 2025 Putin-Modi summit
RBC-Ukraine. “Modi meets Putin and calls for end to war.” September 2026. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/modi-calls-on-putin-to-end-endless-war-1788193125.html
Outlook India. “‘Every Single Day Spent In War Pushes Humanity Back’: PM Modi Tells Putin At SCO Summit.” September 2026. https://www.outlookindia.com/international/every-single-day-spent-in-war-pushes-humanity-back-modi-tells-putin-at-sco-summit
The Conversation. “Xi, Putin and Modi looking in different directions as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation marks 25th anniversary.” September 2026. https://theconversation.com/xi-putin-and-modi-looking-in-different-directions-as-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-marks-25th-anniversary-291058
Al Jazeera. “Putin pledges ‘uninterrupted’ fuel shipment to India amid US sanctions.” December 5, 2025. https://aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/5/putin-modi-kick-off-india-summit-as-trade-us-sanctions-loom-large
The New Delhi BRICS summit, September 2026
Business Standard. “Modi, Putin discuss $100 bn trade target, defence ties at Brics Summit.” September 11, 2026. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/modi-putin-discuss-100-bn-trade-target-defence-ties-at-brics-summit-126091101235_1.html
Reuters, via Global Banking & Finance. “Modi, Putin Discuss Trade and Defence Ties Ahead of BRICS Summit.” September 2026. https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/modi-putin-hold-talks-new-delhi-trade-defence/
NPR (Associated Press). “BRICS leaders meet in India as wars and US tensions test the bloc.” September 12, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/09/12/g-s1-143054/brics-leaders-meet-in-india
Al Jazeera. “BRICS meets in India: What’s on the agenda, why it matters.” September 12, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/12/brics-meets-in-india-whats-on-the-agenda-why-it-matters
CNBC. “Xi, Putin and Modi meet at BRICS summit amid Trump pressure.” September 12, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/12/brics-summit-xi-putin-modi-trump.html
Arms trade: SIPRI data and procurement decisions
SIPRI. “Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars” (press release). March 9, 2026. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-arms-flows-jump-nearly-10-cent-european-demand-soars
SIPRI. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025” (fact sheet). March 2026. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
ThePrint. “India remains 2nd largest arms buyer, Russia’s share in imports drops, France & Israel gain—SIPRI.” March 9, 2026. https://theprint.in/defence/india-remains-2nd-largest-arms-buyer-russias-share-in-imports-drops-france-israel-gain-sipri/2874000/
† SPMI IAS Academy. “India: World’s 2nd Largest Arms Importer – SIPRI.” April 1, 2026. https://spmiasacademy.com/currentaffairs/2nd-largest-arms-importer-india/
Tribune India. “Tensions with China, Pak driving India’s arms imports shift towards Western suppliers: SIPRI.” March 2025. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/tensions-with-china-pak-driving-indias-arms-imports-shift-towards-western-suppliers-sipri
Deccan Herald. “India again tops global arms imports, Russia main supplier: SIPRI.” March 11, 2024. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/india-again-tops-global-arms-imports-russia-main-supplier-sipri-2931533
India’s World. “India’s Arms Imports: Shift in Structure, Scale Remains.” April 8, 2026. https://indiasworld.in/indias-arms-imports-shift-in-structure-scale-remains/
The Su-57 decision and the Super Sukhoi upgrade
The National Interest (David Axe). “Why India Rejected Russia’s Advanced Su-57 Fighter Jet.” Republished May 1, 2026. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/why-india-rejected-russias-advanced-su-57-fighter-jet-196067
Kyiv Post. “India Rejects Russia’s Su-57E Fighter Jet Offer, Bets on Domestically Produced AMCA, 260 Su-MKIs.” August 4, 2026. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/81720
Eurasian Times. “Su-57 For IAF: India Rules Out New Sukhoi Fighter Jets, To Prioritize Su-30 MKI Upgrades.” July 2026. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/su-57-for-iaf-india-rules-out-new-sukhoi-fighter-jets-to-prioritize-su-30-mki-upgrades/
Defence Security Asia. “India Slams the Door on Russia’s Su-57 Stealth Fighter as Defence Secretary Confirms ‘No New Sukhois’.” August 1, 2026. https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/india-rejects-russia-su57-stealth-fighter-super-sukhoi-rafale-mrfa-amca/
† Defence News India (forum repost). “India to Transform 75% of Su-30MKI Fleet into Super Sukhoi, Targeting 80% Indigenisation.” October 2025. https://defence.in/threads/india-to-transform-75-of-su-30mki-fleet-into-super-sukhoi-targeting-80-indigenisation-with-next-gen-combat-capabilities.15734/
† Defence News India (forum repost). “Russia to Support India’s Su-30MKI Super Sukhoi Upgrade Program with Flight Control Integration and Certification Assistance.” July 2026. https://defence.in/threads/russia-to-support-indias-su-30mki-super-sukhoi-upgrade-program-with-flight-control-integration-and-certification-assistance.18165/
The Defense News. “Russia Offers AL-41 Engine Upgrade for IAF Su-30MKI Fleet in Super Sukhoi Modernisation Push.” 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/news-details/Russia-Offers-AL-41-Engine-Upgrade-for-IAF-Su-30MKI-Fleet-in-Super-Sukhoi-Modernisation-Push/
Tribune India. “Russia offers Sukhoi-57 engine for India’s Sukhoi-30MKI upgrade.” https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/russia-offers-sukhoi-57-engine-for-indias-sukhoi-30mki-upgrade
Energy
ThePrint. “Russian crude never left India’s import mix. It made up 1/3rd of oil imports from 2024 to 2026.” March 9, 2026. https://theprint.in/economy/russian-crude-never-left-indias-import-mix-it-made-up-1-3rd-of-oil-imports-from-2024-to-2026/2874224/
Vortexa. “India likely to maintain Russian oil purchases.” March 3, 2026. https://www.vortexa.com/insights/india-maintain-russian-oil-imports
ThePrint. “India’s Russian crude imports set to fall in September amid tighter supply, Iraq a key alternative.” September 14, 2026. https://theprint.in/economy/indias-russian-crude-imports-set-to-fall-in-september-amid-tighter-supply-iraq-a-key-alternative/3042166/
† EcoNiti. “India’s Russian oil imports fall 26% in August as China outbids.” September 3, 2026. https://www.econiti.org/daily-news/2026-09-03/2026-09-03-india-russia-oil-imports-fall-august-venezuela/
† APAC Media. “India-Russia Crude Oil Imports Worth $40.8 Billion Face Trump’s 100% Tariff Threat.” September 16, 2026. https://apacnewsnetwork.com/2026/09/india-russia-crude-oil-imports-trump-100-percent-tariff-threat/
The U.S. tariff deal and Russian oil, 2026
CNBC. “Trump says U.S. and India reached trade deal, will lower tariffs immediately.” February 2, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/02/trump-india-trade-deal-tariffs.html
The Wire. “MEA Will Give Information on Russian Oil Purchase, US Deal Won’t Hurt Indian Farmers, Says Piyush Goyal.” February 7, 2026. https://m.thewire.in/article/agriculture/mea-will-give-information-on-russian-oil-purchase-us-deal-wont-hurt-indian-farmers-says-piyush-goyal
Reuters (Nidhi Verma), via Yahoo News. “Indian refiners avoid Russian oil in push for US trade deal.” February 8, 2026. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/indian-refiners-avoid-russian-oil-045706762.html
Chatham House. “Despite reset in India–US relations, New Delhi retains commitment to strategic hedging.” February 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/despite-reset-india-us-relations-new-delhi-retains-commitment-strategic-hedging
The National. “Trump’s new tariff threat risks cutting off Asia’s Russian oil lifeline as Gulf supply falls.” September 18, 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/09/18/india-china-us-tariffs-russian-oil-lindsey-graham-act/
Japan and the Indo-Pacific
The Hill (opinion). “Japan joins India in military exercises to counter China.” September 2026. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/6090561-japan-india-veer-guardian-jets/
South China Morning Post. “What Japan’s coming fighter jet deployment to India means for China.” August 29, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3365697/what-japans-coming-fighter-jet-deployment-india-means-china
Indian Defence News. “Japanese Fighter Jets To Join India in Veer Guardian 2026 Amid Rising China Tensions.” September 2026. https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2026/09/japanese-fighter-jets-to-join-india-in.html
Vision Times. “Japan Sends Fighter Jets to India as Tokyo and New Delhi Eye China.” September 4, 2026. https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/09/04/japan-sends-fighter-jets-to-india-as-tokyo-and-new-delhi-eye-china.html
Al Jazeera. “Japan sanctions China-based firms accused of supporting war in Ukraine.” June 21, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/6/21/japan-sanctions-china-based-firms-accused-of-supporting-war-in-ukraine