By Robbin Laird
Brian Dunn’s piece at CIMSEC, “The Mother of All Cutters,” opens with a sentence that every Pacific planner should read twice. The U.S. Navy, he notes, seeks to prevail over a potential Chinese military threat before 2027, and passing through the “Davidson Window” without a war could be read as a victory of deterrence.
Then comes the sting: the reality could be that the Navy was watching the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy while China was relentlessly extending its influence and control in the South China Sea through non-military means.
That is the right problem. It is also the problem I have been writing about from the Coast Guard side for more than a decade, and it is the reason I put the Coast Guard’s own story between two covers this year in Always Ready, Persistently Under-Resourced: The Modern United States Coast Guard Story.
Dunn proposes a solution, a very large cutter built on a container-ship hull with mission modules in standard shipping containers on deck, which he calls the Mother of All Cutters, or MOAC. I want to take the proposal seriously, say where I think it is strongest, and then test it against what the Coast Guard’s long experience with capital, hulls and budgets tells us about whether it can actually be built, crewed and sustained.
The Problem Dunn Gets Right
Dunn’s diagnosis rests on a distinction that the Navy-centric debate keeps blurring. China’s advance in the South China Sea is not primarily led by the PLA Navy. It is led by the China Coast Guard and the China Maritime Militia, with the PLA Navy providing overwatch. The coast guard confronts foreign vessels in the name of “law enforcement”; the navy deters escalation from the other side. China, Dunn writes, may have as many as 1,000 fishing vessels available in the South China Sea alone, in addition to the standing component of the militia, and it has built “monster ships” with crew size, weapons and fuel capacity that dwarf U.S. Coast Guard cutters.
The method is incremental by design. Advancing slowly spreads harm out in small doses, none of which looks worthy of escalation, and framing the actions as domestic governance supplies the narrative cover. Dunn’s summary of what has failed is blunt: freedom of navigation operations, allied participation in them, information campaigns and periodic displays of military power have not stopped island-building or restrained Chinese behavior.
His conclusion is that the United States is “seemingly trapped” between risking war by answering civilian-led pressure with military power and watching its alliances fray as China advances without overt military aggression. The missing piece in the Pacific Command’s approach, he argues, is strengthening the capacity of the Philippines and other targets to exercise sovereignty with civilian regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Here the Coast Guard comes in.
The service has started to move in that direction.
Dunn points to the 2026 transfer of an “expeditionary cutter squadron” of six 154-foot fast response cutters to operate out of the Philippines and Singapore. He also cites the May 2026 patrol in which the cutter Midgett joined Philippine naval and coast guard forces near Scarborough Shoal in an activity that moved beyond presence into law enforcement, including boarding actions. That is the kind of step that sits in the space between doing nothing and doing too much, which is exactly where a white-hull service is supposed to operate.
The MOAC Concept
The ship Dunn proposes is modeled on the “modularized auxiliary cruiser” described in Military Review: a modified civilian container-ship hull carrying weapons and systems in containers mounted on deck, with a flight deck for manned and unmanned aircraft. Its job is not to fight a fleet action. It would resupply and provide overwatch for smaller cutters and patrol boats that struggle to operate far from American support infrastructure, deploy and sustain unmanned surface vessels from containerized systems, and host joint, interagency and allied law enforcement assets.
Dunn’s mission list runs from humanitarian response and safety of life at sea to protecting partners’ resources, including support for the Philippine Kadiwa initiative to escort and resupply fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. It includes outpost resupply and partner law enforcement capacity, with allied boarding teams conducting visit, board, search and seizure against what he calls privateers behind a civilian façade. At the top end is a deterrent role: as an armed service, the Coast Guard would be the first line of defense if a crisis escalated beyond water cannons.
The strategic claim is the most interesting part. A hull of that size, he argues, conveys power to allies and partners who routinely face “monster” Chinese coast guard cutters, and it would, in the words of one analyst he cites, “allow the U.S. to play on a broader spectrum” than the Navy can. His closing image is a “white hull line” in the South China Sea that holds and rolls back China’s subliminal campaign before Navy “gray hulls” must intervene.
I think that framing is right.
The Coast Guard is, as I wrote in the book, a “white fleet” committed to maritime security and management rather than war-fighting, and that gives it distinct advantages in ambiguous operational environments. A gray-hull response to a white-hull provocation hands the escalation initiative to the side that has been engineering ambiguity.
What the Coast Guard’s Own Record Says About Hulls
Where I come at the MOAC from a different angle is acquisition. The book is, in large part, a record of how the Coast Guard has bought, or failed to buy, the platforms its missions require. A proposal for a new class of very large cutter needs to be read against that record.
Start with Deepwater, which the book treats as more than a cautionary tale. At the turn of the century the service faced the simultaneous block obsolescence of nine classes of major assets within fifteen years, and it chose not to simply replace them one for one. It wrote performance specifications for the capabilities it needed across fourteen mission areas, appointed a lead systems integrator, and awarded the 2002 contract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems, a partnership of Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, with a potential value of around seventeen billion dollars over three decades. I have argued that this was the first multi-domain acquisition strategy, a security web, or what we would now call a kill web, approach, well ahead of the other services. The program was controversial, and its management problems were real. But the C4ISR integration it left behind helps explain how the HC-130J could anchor the Cape Hatteras rescue.
The MOAC is, in its logic, a Deepwater idea in a steel box: it starts from required capabilities and treats the ship as a carrier of modular systems adjusted as missions change. That is the right instinct, but the book shows it is only as good as the integration and sustainment behind it.
The second lesson is the one I developed in the chapter on how the Navy came home to the National Security Cutter. For two decades the Navy chased the Littoral Combat Ship, whose central promise was a single hull that could swap mission modules to become an anti-submarine, mine countermeasures or surface warfare ship. In practice, as the book puts it, the modules were not swapped at sea, doctrine for multi-mission employment never fully developed, and sustaining three distinct mission sets across a small hull class proved logistically unworkable.
Meanwhile the Coast Guard took the plain path: a proven hull form, mature propulsion, requirements grounded in operational reality. By late 2025 and into 2026, the Navy had pivoted to an NSC-derived frigate, FF(X). I called it a Coast Guard cutter in Navy paint, and I meant it as praise. Sound acquisition means building on what works, evolving it deliberately, producing it steadily and getting it into operators’ hands before the strategic window closes.
So a proposal built on a modular, containerized mission concept invites a fair question: how is this not the LCS lesson over again?
I think Dunn has a defensible answer, though his article does not fully make it. The LCS tried to make a small combatant do three hard warfare jobs by swapping modules. The MOAC is not a warship. It is closer to a tender, a logistics and aviation node, an enabler of other platforms, and its modules are largely containerized logistics, command, medical, unmanned-systems and boarding-team capacities rather than weapons systems that must be integrated at the combat-system level.
Dunn also cites Navy experience integrating a Medium USV into a carrier strike group using containerized systems, which suggests that the approach is more mature than the LCS module concept ever was.
The risk is mission creep: the moment the MOAC is asked to be armed enough to be a “deterrent to all but the most deliberate armed escalation,” the design starts to inherit the problems of every ship that tried to be everything.
The Resource Problem Is the Real Constraint
The title of my book is a thesis, not a slogan. The Coast Guard’s mission set has always been extraordinarily broad, and the service has never really been a priority funding agency for the government. Each administration redirects it toward a different part of that mission set without commensurate funding. I made this point about the Obama-era Pacific pivot: there was a great deal of talk and no increase in Coast Guard funding to build a Pacific fleet of national security cutters, “the platform of choice for such a role.” Strategic concepts and rhetorical commitments rarely translate into the resource investments needed to make them operational.
Dunn recognizes the moment. He notes the nearly twenty-five billion dollars of “historic investment” that then-Acting Commandant Kevin Lunday said “marks a new era for the Coast Guard.” The book tracks that money in the final chapters. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act of July 2025 gave the service nearly $25 billion, the largest single allocation in its 235-year history, including nearly $9 billion for icebreaking recapitalization. Recruiting turned a corner as well: 5,204 active-duty accessions in fiscal year 2025, the highest since 1991, after four years of missed targets that left the service about 4,800 short. Force Design 2028 is restructuring the service around people, organization, technology, and contracting and acquisitions, with a target of growing the workforce by at least 15,000 by the end of fiscal year 2028.
That is the context in which the MOAC must be judged, and it cuts both ways.
First, the opportunity.
Force Design 2028 has already set up a Robotics and Autonomous Systems program executive office, with nearly $350 million announced for remotely operated vehicles, small unmanned ground robots and short-range unmanned aircraft, and it reached initial operating capability in August 2025. A containerized mothership is a natural home for exactly those systems, and the acquisition reforms behind FD2028, which empower program executives and aim to deliver capability on schedule and on budget, are the right institutional setting for something novel.
There is also an industrial argument that Dunn does not make but that I would. A container-ship-derived hull is a commercial design. It need not compete with the National Security Cutter line, the Offshore Patrol Cutter program and the Navy’s new FF(X) for the same scarce yard slots, skilled labor and engineering attention. In the book I warned that the convergence of Navy frigate demand on the NSC production line could push out Coast Guard timelines for cutters already operating beyond their service lives. A MOAC built on a commercial hull in a commercial yard sidesteps that friction.
Second, the risk.
The same chapter in the book recalls how, as recently as 2024, the service was forced to consolidate 23 small boat stations, pause operations at six others, place three 210-foot medium endurance cutters in layup and sideline seven 87-foot patrol boats amid personnel shortages. A mothership is a crew sink. It needs a large complement, a flight deck’s worth of aviators and maintainers, boarding teams, and the supporting infrastructure that the service has historically underfunded. If the MOAC is built before the workforce recovery is durable, it could become one more expensive hull that the service cannot fully man. The book’s answer to that is not to avoid ambition but to sequence it, and to protect baseline readiness as the new capability arrives.
A Persistent Presence Problem, Not a Single-Ship Problem
There is one further point on which I would press the MOAC concept, and it comes from the book’s introduction. The Coast Guard has an “away game” that is frequently overlooked but strategically crucial. It conducts significant engagements abroad in the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Middle East, and its law enforcement authorities and diplomatic character suit it to what I call chaos management: acknowledging persistent complexity rather than waiting to restore a prior equilibrium. I also noted a structural obstacle: its home in the Department of Homeland Security makes it harder for the Pentagon to grasp its role, and the 2025 shift to calling the Pentagon the “Department of War” does not help, because it emphasizes kinetic operations over the gray-zone management that deterrence requires.
Seen this way, the question is whether one very large ship, however clever, is the right unit of persistent presence. Dunn’s own argument suggests an answer. The value of the MOAC is that it supports smaller cutters and partner vessels operating forward: the fast response cutters now assigned to the Philippines and Singapore, allied law enforcement vessels, unmanned systems. In kill web terms, it is a node, not the web. Its worth depends on the network of hulls, aircraft and unmanned craft it connects and sustains, and on the shared maritime domain awareness that lets those assets act as a coordinated whole. That is the lesson Deepwater taught about C4ISR integration, and autonomous systems make it more pressing, not less.
It also suggests a different way to sell the idea. A single ship is a target for budget-cutters and a prize for an adversary. Containerized capabilities that could be hosted on a MOAC in one season and an allied or commercial hull in the next are a capability set rather than a ship. Dunn gestures at this when he says capabilities could be added or removed as the scenario dictates. I would push it further: the containers and the integration architecture are the enduring investment; the hull can vary.
What Would Make the Line Hold
If the MOAC is to become more than an appealing concept, four things need to be in place, and all four come from the Coast Guard’s experience as recorded in the book.
The first is requirements discipline. The FF(X) lesson is that the ship should be an excellent frigate, not a platform for every interesting technology. The MOAC should be an excellent enabler and tender, with growth margin preserved for future flights rather than consumed by a wish list.
The second is schedule and production stability. One of the quiet strengths of the NSC program was its predictable build tempo: not spectacular, but consistent enough to sustain skills, suppliers and processes. A one-off mothership has no learning curve. If the service wants more than a single hull, which a persistent presence in the Pacific would require, it should plan for a repeatable build and protect it from annual budget turbulence.
The third is people. The MOAC will only deliver if the recruiting gains of 2025 hold and are converted into trained crews, and if the Pacific presence is built into the service’s force structure, not funded as a surge.
The fourth is the authority around the ship. The point of the MOAC is to enable partners to exercise sovereignty, which means the legal frameworks and allied embarkation arrangements must be negotiated in advance. The most capable hull is a liability if the partner boarding teams it carries lack the authority to act.
Time Is the Scarce Resource
In the chapter on the frigate, I quote the Australian industrialist Essington Lewis, who spent years warning his country of the coming conflict with Japan: “Time is more important than money for defence preparedness.” The Navy’s two decades with LCS and Constellation are a case study in squandering time. The People’s Liberation Army Navy, by contrast, built its Type 054A frigate steadily from 2008 and has accumulated the hulls and the operating experience that come with it.
Dunn’s article is, in effect, an argument that the Coast Guard should not repeat that error in the white-hull domain, where China already has a head start. He may be right that a ship the size of the MOAC is what is needed. Whatever one concludes about the hull, he has identified the central strategic fact: the contest in the South China Sea is being waged below the threshold at which the gray-hull Navy is meant to act, and the service whose motto is Semper Paratus is the one built for it.
What the book adds is the reminder that readiness is never granted by rhetoric. The $25 billion of recent investment, the Force Design 2028 reforms and the first signs of a recruiting recovery are the first real chance in a generation to break the pattern.
The question is whether policymakers will use it to build a white-hull line the service can actually crew, sustain and connect to its allies, or whether it will join the long list of concepts the nation endorsed and then left under-resourced. That window will not stay open for long.
