By Robbin Laird
The Australian Army’s professional development site, The Cove, has published a primer on “techcraft”: the ability to understand, integrate, employ and adapt technology in a tactical setting, joined to traditional fieldcraft and tactical judgement. The article draws on the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned and the British Army’s Centre for Army Leadership, and it lands in the right place. Techcraft does not replace fieldcraft. It does not turn every soldier into an engineer. And it has to include the ability to fight when the technology fails.
I think the primer is right, and I think it can be pushed further. Two books of my books, one published this year and one next, Lessons from the Drone Wars and Australian Defence 2026, approach the same problem from different directions: one from the Ukrainian battlefield, the other from Australia’s own force design choices. Read together, they suggest that techcraft is not mainly a question of individual soldier skill. It is a property of an institution, and the institution either produces it or it does not.
What the primer gets right
The primer makes three claims worth underlining.
First, issuing new equipment is no longer enough. Soldiers must understand a system, employ it, adapt it, and recognize its limits. That is the center of the Ukrainian experience. In Lessons from the Drone Wars I described Ukraine as a warfare laboratory in which commercial technology, volunteer innovation networks and rapid fielding cycles compressed the time from idea to employment to weeks or even days. The soldier at the edge was not a passive recipient of equipment. He or she was the source of the next iteration.
Second, techcraft includes operating when systems are degraded or denied. The primer is explicit on this, and it is the right emphasis. Electronic warfare is the forcing function of the entire drone war. In the book’s sixth principle, electronic warfare drives all other innovation: systems that cannot operate in GPS-denied, heavily jammed environments become tactically irrelevant, and the contest between jamming and counter-jamming pushes frequency-hopping, fiber-optic control and autonomous guidance forward. Russian forces field trench-level electronic warfare, in some cases carried by individual soldiers, and Ukrainian forces answer with their own layered counter-measures. A section that understands why its drone link has failed, and what to do next, has techcraft. A section that only knows which button to press does not.
Third, the primer cautions that technology alone does not deliver decisive advantage; effectiveness depends on the people and organizations employing it. This matches the argument in the Drone Wars book that the conflict is evolutionary rather than revolutionary: drones do not make old arms irrelevant, they force forces to rethink how they combine firepower, sensing, maneuver and industry.
Fieldcraft and techcraft are one skill in Ukraine
The primer uses the example of a soldier operating a small uncrewed aircraft: the soldier must understand observation, concealment, terrain and enemy capabilities, not only the controls. Ukraine shows how far that integration goes. Permanent aerial surveillance has created gray zones some twenty-five kilometers deep in which movement becomes difficult. Fieldcraft, in that environment, is largely about the signature a unit emits and the sensor picture it faces, which is a technical problem. Signature management, dispersal, deception and drone employment have fused into one discipline.
That is why the primer’s phrase “as much about adaptability and problem-solving as pure technological proficiency” deserves emphasis. The Ukrainian examples the book documents are about adaptation under pressure: platoon-level units calling in fires, retasking drones and moving data across the front in minutes using commercial communications and improvised digital tools. The result was not a perfect network-centric architecture. It was a jury-rigged, resilient system that could absorb damage and still function. The soldiers who built and used it were doing what the primer describes. The CALL example of modifying antenna configurations to extend a robot’s operating range belongs to the same family.
Training has changed, and that changes the argument
One part of the Ukrainian record bears directly on the primer’s question about what level of technological understanding should be expected of all soldiers. The Drone Wars book records that operator training requirements have compressed dramatically, with flight training reduced from hours to minutes through simulator programs using commercial gaming equipment. The implication I drew in the book was strategic: this democratization of operator training changes force structure and personnel requirements.
For the Army, the practical reading is that basic system operation is becoming the easy part. What is scarce, and what takes years to build, is judgment: where to employ a system, when not to, how to read its failure, and how to fit it into the fight. That is the part the primer calls techcraft, and it cannot be taught from a simulator alone. It comes from use, mistakes and shared lessons.
The British “tri-lingual” idea meets the cost-exchange ratio
The primer notes the British Army’s argument that leaders should be tri-lingual, fluent in tactics, technology and money. The third language deserves more attention than it usually gets.
The first of the seven principles in Lessons from the Drone Wars is that cost-exchange ratios have become the new logic of warfare. A $400-500 first-person-view drone can destroy a multimillion-dollar target, and a $20,000 drone can draw a missile costing many times more. A commander who cannot reason about those ratios cannot reason about what to commit, what to protect and what to accept as expendable. But the same chapter warns that the principle is domain specific. Cheap mass works on land because ranges are short and payloads modest. It does not transfer unchanged to the air domain, where Collaborative Combat Aircraft must carry high-end sensors and datalinks, or to the maritime domain, where saltwater, sea state and endurance impose their own costs. Money literacy, in other words, is not just an acquisition skill. It is part of tactical judgment, and it has to be learned within a domain’s physics.
Techcraft is an institutional property
The primer’s strongest recommendation is cultural: leaders should create environments where experimentation, subordinate initiative and managed risk are encouraged. I would go further. The record in both books says that soldier skill without institutional design will not survive contact with a bureaucracy.
Consider what the Ukrainian experience shows. Ukraine’s adaptation was not only a matter of talented individuals. It rested on a distributed ecosystem, hundreds of manufacturers from major contractors to garage workshops, working directly with frontline units and bypassing traditional hierarchies. Speed of adaptation, the second principle in the book, depends on direct cooperation between warfighters and manufacturers. The Russian comparison is instructive: Russia became a sophisticated drone and electronic warfare practitioner at the tactical level, but its centralized doctrine and cumbersome decision chains left it reacting one cycle behind Ukrainian innovation.
Australia has its own versions of the loop. In Australian Defence 2026 I describe the Ghost Shark program, built around continuous upgrades driven by feedback from Navy operators. As David Goodrich of Anduril Australia put it, “We do not design based on anything other than operational experience.” I describe the same feedback loop in the Ocius Bluebottle program, where a sustained operations contract has served as a continuous link between the builder and the users of the data, and mission endurance has grown from roughly thirty days to well over one hundred. The operators are not passive recipients of a finished product. They are the driving force behind what the system becomes.
The lesson for the Army is the one I drew for the Navy’s Maritime Autonomous Systems Unit: the unit that operates the systems must also own the concepts. Doctrine written by people who have never operated the systems will fail on contact. If the Army wants techcraft at section and platoon level, then section and platoon-level users need a structured channel into how the Army thinks about, buys and sustains these systems. The primer’s fourth discussion question asks how a unit can make room for small-scale experimentation while managing safety, security and training requirements. The answer cannot be left to individual commanders’ goodwill. It needs to be a designed feature of the force.
The belief gap and the five-year problem
There is a historical reason to start now. In the chapter on Australia’s hull-gap decade, I made the point that new platforms take roughly five years after entry into service before operators understand how to use them, and close to ten years before they are fully integrated into the wider force. The F-35 took close to two decades for air forces and their political masters to internalize what its advantages meant for operations. The obstacle was what I call the belief gap: the difficulty of accepting what one has never seen. It was overcome only when operators, planners and commanders began to treat the new capability as the starting point rather than one option among many, and that took years of flying, exercising, experimenting and making mistakes. It could not be short-circuited by better briefing slides.
The same logic applies to uncrewed and autonomous systems across the Army. Techcraft cannot be built after the systems arrive in volume. It has to be built on the systems already available, which is why I argued that the maritime autonomous systems already in production are not precursors to some later capability. They are the instruments through which the learning can begin today. The Army’s equivalent is to put current uncrewed aircraft, ground vehicles and electronic warfare tools in soldiers’ hands now, accept imperfect results, and capture what is learned.
Know what the system is, and what it is not
The primer asks soldiers to recognize limitations. One of the most important limitations is conceptual. In the Drone Wars book, and in the foreword by Wing Commander Keirin Joyce, there is a warning about the misuse of language: current systems are routinely called autonomous when most operate at levels two and three of a five-level scale, where they perform delegated tasks under human supervision. Level five, fully independent decision-making, is a long way off. Calling an automated system autonomous creates unrealistic expectations and diverts attention from what the system can actually do.
A soldier with techcraft knows the difference. He or she knows when a system needs supervision, what happens when its link is cut, and what the operator must still decide. This is also where the book’s fourth principle, human-machine teaming, comes in: the machine is strong at execution, navigation, target recognition and precision, and the human contributes context, creative problem-solving and ethical oversight. The soldier is the part of the kill web that supplies judgment.
Beyond the uniformed force
The primer frames techcraft as a professional responsibility for Army members. The Australian case suggests a wider frame. In the Camel Train concept, Joyce pointed to roughly thirty thousand licensed drone operators in Australia, certified under CASA standards: commercial operators, agricultural technicians, surveying professionals and hobbyists. In a period of competition or mobilization, that community is an operational reserve of a kind that has not existed before. Many of the logistics, passive intelligence-collection and decoy missions a Camel Train fleet would fly do not require a uniformed pilot, so uniformed personnel can be concentrated on tasks needing military authority and judgment. Joyce called this a fifth-generation workforce concept.
If techcraft is the ability to employ technology within a military context, then part of Australia’s advantage may lie in how well the Army connects its own soldiers’ techcraft to a civilian population that already has technical skill. The Ukrainian record points the same way: the boundary between the defense industry and the civilian economy blurred, and that gave Ukraine an ability to regenerate combat power that surprised many observers. For a middle power with a small force, reserve traditions and industry ties are part of the techcraft story.
Techcraft across the alliance
Finally, techcraft will be developed jointly. The Australian Army’s littoral pivot is bound up with the U.S. Marine Corps, and in the chapters on co-invention I describe Marine Rotational Force-Darwin as a shared laboratory where concepts are tested under the real geographic and logistical constraints of northern Australia rather than the simplified conditions of a training range. The Matilda 1 landing vessel is an instrumented experiment, designed to measure cargo throughput, fuel consumption, crew requirements, maintenance burden and beach availability, and U.S. Marines and Australian soldiers first embarked on it together in July 2026. Mixed crews developing the operating concept from the outset is techcraft built the right way: soldiers learning a system by using it, with the data feeding both nations’ decisions.
The Cove’s primer notes that techcraft matters because Army is optimizing for littoral maneuver, where dispersed operations and contested communications place increasing demands on soldiers and commanders. I agree, and I would add the point I made in the Army chapter of Australian Defence 2026: the Army’s role in a littoral kill web depends on sensing, sustainment and resilience, and each of those depends on soldiers who can operate and repair technology under pressure.
Questions for the Australian Army
The primer closes with discussion questions. Here are four more, drawn from the two books.
- Who in the Army owns the concepts for the uncrewed and autonomous systems it is fielding? Are they the people who operate them?
- How quickly can a lesson learned by one section reach the people designing the next iteration of the system, and the people writing doctrine?
- What is the Army’s plan for the five-year learning period that follows any new capability, and can part of that period be spent before the capability arrives in volume?
- How will the Army draw on Australia’s civilian technical workforce, and what does techcraft mean for reservists who already work with these systems in their civilian jobs?
Techcraft is a useful word because it names something armies have been improvising for some time. The Ukrainian war shows that the soldiers with the most techcraft are those embedded in organizations built to learn from them. The Australian task is to build that kind of organization before it is needed, not after.
Sources
- The Cove, Techcraft: The Emerging Skillset of the Modern Soldier, November 11, 2026
- Robbin Laird, Lessons from the Drone Wars: Maritime Autonomous Systems and Maritime Operations (Second Line of Defense, 2026), including Part One, Part Two (“The Seven Principles of Modern Drone Warfare”) and the foreword by Keirin Joyce
- Robbin Laird, Australian Defence 2026: Shaping a Middle Power Defence Strategy, including chapters 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10
