Echoes From History

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
03/05/2011

No Accident: The Newly Configured USMC Amphibious Ready Group 2016

By Ed Timperlake

03/05/2011 – “In short, simply by completing the procurement of what the USN and USMC are in the course of doing in a very short period, (F-35B, MV-22, CH-53K, LCS and LPD-17) the nation gains significant flexibility to deal with ambiguous strategic situations.”

“Gone to fight the Indians, be back when the war is over.” (Commandant of the Marines (1820-1859) Archibald Henderson)

In 1829 President Andrew “Andy” Jackson tried to incorporate the Marines into the Army. That Presidential action triggered Congress, the voice of the people to say no. In 1834 Congress passed “Act for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps.” This act of Congress kept the Marines as part of the Navy and focused on ensuring the Marine’s unique role on being ready warriors across global oceans. Commandant Henderson’s quote also captures the focus on the ethos of the Corps, which is to go to the fight. Now yet again the mission of the Marines has been challenged. However, there is no need to give credibility to the current shallow and ignorant debate because the Marines have already won that battle.

Credit: USS Kearsarge LHD Involved in Preparation for Current Libyan Operations
www.kearsarge.navy.mil


Combat tested Marine Officers mostly at the LtCol (05) and Colonel rank (0-6) are taken from their combat commands of Infantry Battalions, Aviation Squadrons and Marine Expeditionary Units to sit in cubicles and both help those in combat and also plan for the future of the Corps. Quietly away from the action these officers some of whom will return to combat often as General Officers will all give their professionally best shot in looking into future war requirements and make the very hard resource decisions. That system has worked. New amphibious ships– the LPD-17 USS San Antonio is soon to join the fleet  –the MV-22 is a war tipping aviation asset already serving in combat and is ready now. The F-35B will make the Amphib air component more modern than any large angle deck carrier with the F/A-18 and the CH-53K will enhance lift over the beach.

The Battle for the operational future of the Marine Corps has been won. Technologies have been identified that will continue to make the Marine Corps amphibious mission and combat reach the best in the world. The battle for enough resources is about to begin. Just when civilian “cubical commandos” started full cry in their pontifications about their not being a need for Marine amphibious capability— a distant verse in today’s headline echoes from history “to the shores of Tripoli.”

Currently, American’s are watching a series of unique events around the Globe especially in the Mediterranean  (a Latin translation can mean middle of the earth), all of the Middle East including Iran and also Asia especially the Peoples Republic of China is erupting. The human struggle evident and being paid in blood is the never-ending quest by individuals simply wanting the basic right of not being oppressed and exploited. How the events cascading from Tunisia, to Egypt to Libya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China will eventually play out is totally unknown. However, what is known is a Navy/Marine amphibious force is ready with a force combat tested.

Not since the early nineteenth century wars on the frontier taught a generation of West Point Officers maneuver warfare going into the Civil War has a battle hardened US military force forged in Iraq and Afghanistan been more ready for all contingencies. Those officers in cubicles at HQMC have done their job well. The current MEU off Libya has the most essential element aboard– the Marine Military Occupation Specialty 0311 “Rifleman” some of whom have lived through a decade of combat. With the basic 0311 ready to engage for the next decade, the technology coming will revolutionize that force.

Not since the early nineteenth century wars on the frontier taught a generation of West Point Officers maneuver warfare going into the Civil War has a battle hardened US military force forged in Iraq and Afghanistan been more ready for all contingencies. Those officers in cubicles at HQMC have done their job well. The current MEU off Libya has the most essential element aboard– the Marine Military Occupation Specialty 0311 “Rifleman” some of whom have lived through a decade of combat. With the basic 0311 ready to engage for the next decade, the technology coming will revolutionize that force.

It is often said in times of trouble leading up to a major conflict the question is asked,  “where are the Aircraft Carriers.” However, an additional question should always now be asked, “where are the B-2s, F-22s and tankers”—the fact that the USAF has those assets in limited supply is a national defense preparedness scandal.But my history lesson is only focusing on  “The Libyan Crisis: How the New Amphibious Ready Group Expands the President’s Options.” The current Navy/Marine team – leaving Crete to go up close to the Libyan coast ready to execute what ever is directed by the National Command authority — will only get better in the future. The entire effort by those Marine warriors in cubicles at HQ MC to identify and develop the best war fighting technologies is beginning to pay off and will “re-norm” the entire amphibious warfare capability of the U.S.

The current options for U.S. action as the events in Libya are highlighting are complex and resource heavy and have all kind of consequences. However, the future force already identified and briefed and in testing by Marine officers will “re-norm” the entire employment of ready amphibious force assets. Soon, if supported by Congress to ensure an ability to have an appropriately sized contingency, forces can be afloat in any crisis situation. This emerging range of options by the US National Command authority will be invaluable. It is up to Congress just like they have since the founding of America to give the Marines what they need-and always know however events develop around the globe the Marine/Navy team will not let America down.

“Re-Norming” Air Operations

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
01/26/2011

By Robbin Laird

01/26/2011 –

During the first quarter of 2011, we intend to publish our second book in our air power series.  The first was entitled The Three Dimensional Warrior and laid out the USMC approach to operations within which air power is the critical cement.  Unfortunately, the various attacks on the USMC acquisition plans of adding V-22s and F-35Bs to the force have largely missed the point. 

These are not simply platforms, they are at the heart of current and future MAGTF operations. 

Amazingly, critics simply focus on IOC costs and pay no attention to con-ops. 

This is a prescription for disaster.

The title of the second book could have been the future of airpower.  But today, the meaning of airpower has been clouded by the Iraqi and Afghan operations. For many, we could have the Army Air Corps, rather than a combat air force deployed on land and at sea. For many, the historic dominance established by U.S. airpower is a given, with no real “peer competitors” are in sight.  The U.S. and its allies can simply rest on their laurels, keep building traditional aircraft, and build new so-called unmanned aircraft.

For some, the U.S. does not need “exquisite systems,” although having deployed advanced systems has been the foundation for air dominance throughout the post War period.  For some, the numbers of U.S. and Allied aircraft are so dominant that the U.S. and its allies have a decade to begin a new effort to stock the force. All of these assumptions are seriously flawed.  After the initial air operations in Iraq, there was no air dominance threat.  And Afghanistan is not a contested air space, although many UAVs have been lost in Afghanistan. Supporting the ground warrior is crucial, but not the determinate missions for an air combat force.

The conditions facing 4th generation aircraft are making them exceptionally vulnerable to ground and air attacks.  The ground dimension is increasingly dominated by significant numbers of missiles (very clearly evident in the Middle East) or by significant advances in ground based air defense systems. The air dominance requirement is not determined simply by numbers of aircraft, which seems to be the bean counters measure of air dominance.  Air dominance is the sine qua non for any effective military operation worldwide.

And worldwide is the problem.  Increasingly, the numbers of aircrafts and ships available to the United States and its allies has dropped significantly over the past decade.  The USAF has reached the point where it increasingly resembles the condition of the US Coast Guard where the service can surge to a problem, but only by stripping itself of many of its available assets.  And the tanker crisis has made it evident that in situations like Korea, the ability of the U.S. to surge airpower is questionable over a sustained period of time. The historical memory of air dominance is not the practical reality in current conditions.

The U.S. has cut its airpower inventory in half over the past 15 years, and the trend downward will continue, unless there is a real commitment to manufacturing the F-35.  Unless the U.S. makes a significant commitment to building aircraft, the promise of the fifth generation aircraft will not be realized.  Commitment without construction will simply create the chimera of innovation.

The term “fifth generation aircraft” is also part of the problem facing the future of airpower.  The term suggests a linear relationship to preceding aircraft, so that one can argue that F-18s and F-16s can be upgraded and become 4.8-generation aircraft. This is simply not the case.  The fifth generation aircraft are a benchmark for a new approach to airpower, which is why we call this book the “re-norming” of air operations.

This can clearly be seen in the F-35 combat system enterprise.  The classic aircraft adds systems to the aircraft to provide new capabilities. The pilot has to manage each additive system.  The F-35 has five major combat systems, which interact with each other to provide capabilities. Functional capabilities emerge from the interaction of the systems done by the machine and are not simply correlated with a single system.  For example, jamming can be done by several systems aboard the aircraft, the machine determine which one through interaction among the systems.  And the entire system rests on a common architecture with broadband capabilities.

But if airpower leaders simply mimic the operations of older aircraft with the fifth generation aircraft, the promise of the new air operations will not be realized.  The result would be that the U.S. and its allies will simply mimic the approach of the French facing the Germans in World War II where they had superior tanks with outmoded tactics and command structures, and with the predictable result.

The new aircraft simply do not function, as do the old. We do not have to guess at this for the performance of the F-22 in the real world has already demonstrated the promise.  We have interviewed pilots of the F-22, which underscore the promise; unfortunately the F-22 has been put into a political ghetto, so the ability to leverage the capabilities of this aircraft in transforming air operations is too frequently outside the bound of political legitimacy.

Only the Russians and Chinese seem to be carefully studying the impact of the new aircraft, and in the Russian case celebrating the opportunity to generate exports for their initial entry mimicking some of the 5th generation capabilities.

The fifth generation aircraft are at the heart of a potential new air combat system enterprise.  The F-22s have been the harbinger, but for full participation the F-22 needs to be modernized with some of the essential air combat systems present on the F-35. The F-35 is a flying combat system able to operate across the spectrum of warfare.  It is the first plane, which can manage 360 space and has the combat system to manage that space.

Deployed as a force, it enables distributed air operations, an approach crucial to the survival of our pilots in the period ahead. Distributed operations are the cultural shift associated with the 5th generation aircraft, and investments in new weapons, remotely piloted aircraft and the crafting of simultaneous rather than sequential operations.

Unfortunately, the debate about 5th generation aircraft continues as if these are simply aircraft, not nodes driving significant cultural changes in operational capabilities. And they are essential tools in executing difficult missions such as missile defense as well.

The pilots whom we have interviewed are “living” this transition.  As Colonel Berke, the USMC pilot of the F-22 put it:

The joint operational role for the Raptor is significant. I’d say 80% of our funded testing since I’ve been here in the last two years in some way, shape, or form involves integration; whether it’s integration with other airplanes like F-18s, F-15s and 16s, or integration with Aegis.  Maritime Interdiction Integration is a key element of what we’re doing. Virtually all of our tests are about how to make the airplane value-added to the conventional fleet, and that’s pretty much all we’ve done recently.

And Berke underscored the new decision-making role for the combat pilot enabled by the new aircraft. But the difference between a Hornet or a Viper and the Raptor isn’t just the way you turn or which way you move the jet or what is the best way to attack a particular problem.  The difference is how you think. 

You work totally differently to garner situational awareness and make decisions; it’s all different in the F-22. With the F-22 and certainly it will be the case with the F-35, you’re operating at a level where you perform several functions of classic air battle management and that’s a whole different experience and a different kind of training.

And Berke further added: You basically receive a lot of data and you’re trying to shape that data into usable information. In the Raptor, the data is already fused into information thereby providing the situational awareness (SA).  SA is extremely high in the F-22 and obviously will be in the JSF; and it’s very easy for the pilot to process the SA. Indeed, the processing of data is the key to having high SA and the key to making smart decisions.  There’s virtually no data in the F-22 that you have to process; it’s almost all information. 

There’s a small amount, but it is presented to you clearly and it takes very little effort to process what’s going on. The fused data is so easy to absorb and it’s so easy to use. A huge amount of brain cells, a huge amount of pilot effort is necessary to do that in the Hornet. You just don’t have to do it anymore in the Raptor and the JSF. Ironically, that takes some getting used to.  The SA in a fused cockpit is so incredible that it takes time to adjust from a legacy mindset, but once you do, the payback is exponential.  The best SA I ever had in the Hornet pales in comparison to what the JSF will do for me.

F-22 pilots at Langley AFB further clarified the changes possible with the new aircraft.“Bean” Akers: I have 1,200 hours in the F-15C model, both here operationally and then flew the Raptor for three years, showed up here in Langley right before I went operational, and then was on all the first deployments, Kadina, Alaska, you name it.  So, I have done just about everything in the jet other than shoot something off the jet in anger.One of the key things you talk about is there may not be a need for an AWACS.  But there also may not be the ability for that AWACS to be there, because of the survivability challenges being posed by the threat systems that are being developed to remove them from the fight.

The enemy always has a vote. So we practice our training that there may be times where it is just us over the horizon where the AWACS is hundreds of miles behind us and he’s really not doing a whole lot for us. I’ve seen that at Red Flag where he’s trying to build a picture and his systems just can’t keep up with the mass of the enemy coming from, say, the west.  And we have to basically tell them; we’ve got the picture much better than you do.

The legacy way of fighting with the fourth generation assets relying on reach back is a critical part of the way they employ.  As we move forward with the systems and sensors that are on both the F-22 and F-35, I really don’t demand or need that requirement anymore.  Do they add to my battle space awareness?  Yes, they do.  But there are times where he is not needed and may not be available due to the threat.“Shotgun” Anthony: I’d like to dive into what Bean is talking about.  I would like to discuss the difference between the current fight and what we’re moving to with fifth generation aircraft.  And of course that doesn’t mean that Legacy aircraft, the fourth generation aircraft are not in the play.

But when it was only fourth generation aircraft, and the sensors on the 4th generation jet were structured so that they are federated solutions to different pieces of the RF spectrum.  I have an active radar that is continuously transmitting a picture off my nose. In other words, seeing what is in front of me is the focus of the classic approach. And that’s a federated system on the aircraft — an individual aircraft.  And so in order to build a coherent picture in front of our noses, we had to communicate verbally on our radio. I am painting a picture of a three-dimensional battle space with words.  And we would communicate with what we were seeing with our individual jets, because it doesn’t necessarily see the whole airspace in front of me.  We parse out sections of airspace to sanitize in front of us.  And we build a picture from close end from the nose all the way out.

And a significant cultural shift will be necessary with the new aircraft: The mission commander or the flight lead was always clamoring for sufficient information to make appropriate tactical decisions, which are really only one very thin step removed operational decisions. 

And from the operator’s perspective, it will be like the difference between stumbling around a dark room and turning the lights on. The combat situation will be instantaneously transparent.  All of those high processing time tasks that the pilot used to spend his time on with the objective of knowing what was going on so that he can then take an appropriate action — you know, point the jet in the right direction, herd the cats in the right direction – are now done by the airplane. All of those activities are now completely overcome by events. 

He doesn’t need to do them anymore; he now sees what he needs to see to make those decisions. So from an operator’s perspective, it will feel very natural.  And it will feel like you’re now able to breathe, whereas before, you were always struggling for breath.  You’re no longer at the top of Everest trying to breathe; you’re down at sea level.  You get what you need.

I think the most difficult and the most painful set of shifts will be organizational.  They will relate to the people who are now forced to relinquish operational strategic decisions to folks like us in the room.  Which has always been the case. So tactical decisions have always had operational strategic and national impact.  The difference is that organizationally, we’ll be forced to reconcile that notion, and understand that the individual who’s charged with those tactical decisions will now have the kind of information that was previously only available nearly fused but far more imperfectly fused in the CAOC. That information will now be distributed in the battlespace.

So that speaks to an entirely different — not just physical architecture, also personnel architecture, but more importantly leadership paradigm and approach to solving a problem.  You now are far more able to remove fat layers of intermediate data processing and you’re able to sic a force of very capable assets on an objective.

We’re able dynamically to adapt in the middle of that process and make appropriate decisions in support of your objective far more effectively than if you had just sent planes out on a specific task.  Go perform this task, because we back here in the building think that this collection of individuals performing these tasks will result in the amalgamative outcome that we were hoping for. Now we can send folks with the idea of an outcome we hope for.  And they now have the information to take that kind of action.  And they have the capacity to go where other assets couldn’t go previously.

The shift from the older aircraft and operational paradigm and new aircraft and the new operational paradigm can be envisaged as the network versus the honeycomb or of spears being launched against targets versus 360 degree moving decision-making systems organizing the air ground operational space.

In the classic aircraft operations of the past thirty years, the lead aircraft strike enemy targets and are organized by AWACs and the CAOC to shape the air operations combat space.  Wild weasels or F-117s would lead the attack with tactical aircraft and strategic bombers part of either the initial assault or providing follow on attack capability.  The large aircraft such as AWACs are key command elements.

This approach is increasingly suspect.

The large aircraft are targets of the adversary, the initial attack is against increasingly sophisticated air defenses or has to cope with significant numbers of missile launches. And states like China are introducing significant numbers of unmanned aircraft to complicate the air attack. The network of aircraft is targeted as a major vulnerability, with the goal of disrupting the pace and rhythm of the attack.

And the significant reductions in the numbers of aircraft mean that follow-on force attacks, so crucial in the presence of mobile targets, are undercut in their efficacy.

With the new aircraft, air operations are conceived of differently.  The F-35s operate in 360 space with systems able to see hundreds of miles away.  They could work with other multi-mission systems like Aegis to operate in a very different manner. The classic systems are used sequentially, with different capabilities shaping either a signaling function or operational capability.  In contrast, the new systems operate simultaneously.

The F-35s and Aegis, for example, are deployed.  Period.  They could be used to defend, to attack, to do kinetic or non-kinetic attack. It is really up to the national command authority. And the F-35s and F-22s will operate in honeycomb, not a network.  The planes operating as a fleet will function as separable decision makers, with joint operational missions.

An adversary can destroy parts of the honeycomb but they cannot destroy the ability of the combat air force to operate against remaining adversary forces.  The fleet is not simply a combat air arm but embodies deployed and distributed decision making capabilities. The “re-norming” of air operations will provide the foundation for building new equipment to shape enhanced capability.  If the focus remains on building the older systems, one is investing in the past not the future.

As Vince Martinez warned in a recent posting on our website: How do you create opportunities for martial advantage in the future?  Fund technological innovation on foster growth on a production level scale. If we can’t collectively see the tactical, operational and strategic advantages that the MV-22 and the JSF bring to bare because we have been trained to focus on the distracters, then maybe we should try looking at those programs from a different angle; the MV-22 and the JSF are the martial enterprise’s best incubators for the future–plain and simple.

Often, you can run across military and former military people telling jokes along the lines of “…congratulations, you just managed to kill the MV-22 Program!  What now Lieutenant?” 

Unfortunately, this joke is now more reality than satire. The greatest disappointment in this whole dilemma, however, is that we likely don’t have an answer to that very simple question that isn’t an evolutionary step backward. This is the time where leaders must lead, and those in the positions to do so need to ensure they are looking out long and far enough to be able to differentiate the forest from the trees.

An additional aspect in developing joint or coalition CONOPS for the F–35 will revolve around its interaction with other manned and unmanned assets. With regard to manned assets, a key challenge will be to work an effective connectivity battlespace with other manned aircraft, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and legacy U.S. aircraft. Here, the advantages of each platform in contributing to the air battle and to the type of flexible military force packages that 21st-century air capabilities provide will be the focus of a joint concept of operations.

In addition to the core dynamic of working with a variety of manned aircraft across the joint and coalition battlespace, the F–35 will be highly interactive with the evolution of robotic elements. UAS are not well designed for self-defense. For early entry UAS to stay alive, they need to be part of a wolf pack built around the protective functions of the manned aircraft. As air dominance and air superiority operations succeed, their significance can recede during an operation, allowing the role of unmanned aircraft to increase significantly and, over the course of the operation, supplant manned aircraft in ISR and C2 roles.

The man-machine attributes and computational capabilities of the F–35 provide a significant opportunity to evolve the robotic elements within airspace to provide for data storage, transmission, col-lection, weapon emplacement, and loitering strike elements, all of which can be directed by the manned aircraft as the centerpiece of a manned- robotic strike or situational awareness wolf pack. Rather than focusing on robotic vehicles as self-contained units with proprietary interfaces and ground stations, the F– 35 can be useful in generating common linkages and solutions to combine all into a core wolf pack capability.

In short, a number of key elements of innovation can be generated moving forward, ranging from new missiles, to new remotely piloted vehicles, and to new long range strike capabilities which can leverage the new combat aircraft’s ability to penetrate and operate in contested air space.

But to move forward, one needs to recognize that the new combat aircraft are not simply an iteration of change but a potential driver for new paradigms of combat operations, in the air, at sea and in air-ground con-ops.

The old system of sequential air operations built around legacy aircraft, AWACS, and multiple assets needs to be replaced in a timely manner by a well resourced distributed operations enterprise.

USS Freedom in the Gatun Locks of the Panama Canal

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
01/03/2011

01/02/2011 – Sailors assigned to the littoral combat ship USS Freedom watch from the flight deck as a set of gates closes within the Gatun Locks of the Panama Canal. Freedom was conducting counter-illicit trafficking operations and theater security cooperation in the U.S. 4th Fleet area of responsibility.

[slidepress gallery=’uss-freedom-in-the-gatun-locks-of-the-panama-canal’]

Credit Navy Visual News Service

3/25/10

  • The third photo shows USS Freedom in transit.

Marine Corps Operations in Afghanistan

Posted on | by Caroline Teames

01/02/2011 – In this slide show, a USMC operation to ferret out adversaries and to protect the local population is pictured.

[slidepress gallery=’marine-corps-operations-in-afghanistan’]

Credit:

Regimental Combat Team-2, 1st Marine Division Public Affairs

8/10/10

  • In the first photo,  Lance Cpl. Addison Brinks, an infantryman with Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, sights in on the enemy during a firefight, Aug. 3. Marines engaged the enemy with small arms and machine gun fire while incorporating bounding tactics to defeat the enemy.
  • In the second photo, Lance Cpl. Derek Hopkins, a mortarman with Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, carries a mortar tube while walking through a flooded field during a patrol, Aug. 3. Marines with Company K carry their mortar systems on patrols for support during firefights.
  • In the third photo, a sniper with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, shoots an insurgent during a patrol, Aug. 3. Snipers shot several insurgents inside a compound where insurgents attacked Marines with small-arms and machine guns.
  • In the final photo, Seaman Alan Davis, a corpsman with Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, runs to a safe position during a firefight in Sangin, Aug. 3. Marines used fire-and-maneuver tactics to defeat an attack by insurgents.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Posted on | by Caroline Teames

01/02/2011 – Capt. Ryan Madrid, a fighter pilot with the 157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C., launches an F-16 Fighting Falcon for a mission from Joint Base Balad, Iraq, on August 17, 2010. The 169th Fighter Wing sent F-16’s, pilots, maintenance specialists, and support personnel overseas for its first major combat operation since 2003, when the unit deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom and flew more than 400 combat missions. The 169 FW is now an “Active Associate” wing. This unique agreement with the 20 FW at Shaw AFB embeds 150 active duty airmen with the 169 FW at McEntire to forge an even stronger, more mobile force. Elements of the South Carolina Air National Guard’s 169 FW began this historic deployment in early May 2010 when airmen landed at JBB in support of OIF.

[slidepress gallery=’operation-iraqi-freedom’]

Credit: 169th Fighter Wing/Public Affairs

8/19/10

  • The second photo shows an F-16 Fighting Falcon from the 157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C., sits ready to launch on the flight line at Joint Base Balad, Iraq during sunset on August 12, 2010.
  • The third photo shows Tech. Sgt. Fred Knox (left), Senior Airman (SrA) Travis Catchings and Senior Airman Josh Steele (right), weapons loaders with the 169th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C., transfer a missile from an F-16 Fighting Falcon to its cart on August 12, 2010 while deployed to Joint Base Balad, Iraq.
  • The fourth photo shows Lt. Col. Boris Armstrong, a fighter pilot with the 157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C., prepares to launch an F-16 Fighting Falcon for a mission from Joint Base Balad, Iraq, on August 15, 2010.
  • The fifth photo shows an F-16 Fighting Falcon from the 157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, S.C., sits ready to launch on the flight line at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, during sunset on August 12, 2010.

A Multi-Mission Air Mule

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
12/22/2010

Building an Unmanned Cargo Vehicle:  The Case of the AirMule

An Interview With Rafi Yoeli

12/22/2010 – In a recent visit to Urban Aeronautics, a small Israeli company with significant experience in unmanned vehicles, Rafi Yoeli, CEO of the company outlined their basic cargo UAV offerings, built around variants of what they call the AirMule.

The AirMule is a small UAV, which can carry (dependent on the variant), 1,400 pounds or 2,500 pounds or more either for CasEvac or cargo missions.  It can also be used for special force missions carrying 4-6 people.  It is small enough to land on a truck, operate off of ships like the Littoral Combat Ship, amphibs, or can be carried by CH-53Es and CH-53Ks.  It can operate with either jet or truck fuel, which makes is a key element for operating in expeditionary conditions.

 

It might also be mentioned that the company is working on air jeeps.  As Rafi Yoeli commented: “We need that where we’re operating.  Manned, unmanned, it doesn’t matter.  We need a small vehicle that can fly in the streets and can land on any roof and that can operate from a small ship.”

Rafi Yoeli underscored their engagement with a number of interested parties on shaping the cargo UAV offering.

“We’re working now in collaboration with the Israeli Army, on basically two applications, logistics as well as casualty evacuations. On the CasEvac side, we’ve been working for three years now specifically with the Israeli medical corps.”

We’re working now in collaboration with the Israeli Army, on basically two applications, logistics as well as casualty evacuations. On the CasEvac side, we’ve been working for three years now specifically with the Israeli medical corps.

He underscored working with many other authorities as well.

There is a NATO working group (RTG-184), which was set up to explore and define safe ride standards for casevac via UAVs.  They’ve visited our facility and are well acquainted with what we’re doing.  Although Israel is not a NATO member, the IDF trauma branch has a lot of experience and know-how to contribute to the discussion.  Dr. Elon Glassberg, head of the IDF trauma branch has been a major proponent of casevac via UAV and we’ve been working very closely with him.We’re also in involved in ongoing discussions with a number of entities within the US DOD and armed forces.  The Marines, the Army and the Air Force are all involved in developing requirements for casevac and/or cargo UAVs.

The design of the AirMule is relatively simple and maintainable.

According to Rafi Yoeli:

The design is very straightforward, there is nothing to move, nothing to rotate, nothing to articulate–nothing.  This is almost solid state.  The rotors run at a constant RPM powered by a turbo shaft engine.  We’re able to lift a very hefty load, up to 1,400 pounds easily.  If we have room for a short running takeoff with the wheeled landing gear, then we can work in STOVL mode.  And in STOVL mode, our load is 2,950 pounds, this includes fuel – but fuel burn is on average no more than 350 pounds per hour. If we fill this vehicle with fuel, we have four hours at 100 knots, easily.  All this is possible due to the unique aerodynamics that we’ve spent so many years to develop.

And Yoeli then talked about the impact of carrying the AirMule on a Helo in shaping deep penetration raids or support.

“In the STOVL mode, we can actually operate forward off of helo transport. And because this vehicle gets into a CH-53 — a normal CH-53 or a CH-47– we can start counting our 300 nautical miles from some point in the desert.  So this is a very useful vehicle for everyone.

The company is developing a larger AirMule, AirMule 3.  “It’s 2.6 meters wide, by 8 meters long.  You can pack a lot of those on a small vessel.  With this compact footprint this vehicle can do 3,000 pounds for 100 nautical miles.  Which exceeds what presently the US Marine Corps wants.”

Rafi Yoeli then underscored the relevance of the vehicle to the evolving threat environment.

If you look at published data (such as the RAND Institute publication ) the situation in Lebanon is extremely difficult.  The threats are, much more challenging than what the U.S. Army has seen in Afghanistan or Iraq.  It’s getting to the point where helicopters can’t fly.

With AirMule you can fly low and fast.  You don’t need to be above the terrain at all.  You can be under the tree level with the AirMule, under the power lines.  You have enough sensors to avoid colliding with obstacles.  But that’s possible, because you don’t have an exposed rotor and your width is around six feet and you fly fast.

You’re under the threat.  Flying at any significant altitude you’re a sitting duck.  Your exposure to missiles, radar missiles, canons, and so on is enormous.  AirMule, flying low and fast can significantly reduce that exposure.  Plus, of course, you can then land at any spot.

In addition to the above-mentioned RAND Institute publication, there have been a number of published reports detailing the challenges the IAF encountered in the last Lebanon war and in Gaza.   Air support and CasEvac were seriously challenged and sometimes impossible. And of course, trucks weren’t an option.

So we see our solution is to come at the speed, anywhere between zero and 100 knots, or 120 knots.  Depending on the terrain, depending on what you want to do.  And we can really fly quite low.

Finally, Rafi Yoeli underscored how the AirMule could move together with the combat force even in the threat environment he described above.  The team on the ground at the objective can put down a transmitter determining where the AirMule should land; so human-machine interaction determines the landing spot.

Put the transmitter on the landing point and AirMule can land on that path, that’s all you, need.  Now, if there’s a tree there that got overlooked, there are sensors that are in the loop as well.

I think we tend to underestimate the efficiency of having a human in the loop who has a small transponder or even passive laser reflector, looks around, and in a second and half, does what no computer can do.  He looks around and understands what he sees.  He sees a building there, a power line there.  There are maybe two landing options but the one here is less exposed so that’s where he puts the transmitter.  This is the kind of decision that UAVs cannot yet do. Eventually maybe—and AirMule is designed to accommodate that technology when it’s available—but for now a commander’s on-the-spot judgment is the best option.

Of course, in the case of cargo delivery and CasEvac there’s always a call requesting the service and a location attached to the call.  The vehicle flies autonomously to the vicinity using GPS or INS.  The officer on the ground then defines the LZ or can turn off the transponder if conditions have changed.  If the vehicle doesn’t sense the transponder, it’s programmed to return autonomously back to its base.

The dispatch base is like a taxi station.  Our assumption is that at the brigade level or a higher level, there are a few AirMules, and they’re on standby.  They’re on standby to deliver directly to any outpost whatever they need–that’s a no brainer–and to get the wounded back.  There are criteria being developed for that,

I think we tend to underestimate the efficiency of having a human in the loop who has a small transponder or even passive laser reflector, looks around, and in a second and half, does what no computer can do.  He looks around and understands what he sees.  He sees a building there, a power line there.  There are maybe two landing options but the one here is less exposed so that’s where he puts the transmitter.  This is the kind of decision that UAVs cannot yet do. Eventually maybe—and AirMule is designed to accommodate that technology when it’s available—but for now a commander’s on-the-spot judgment is the best option.

 

Yoeli underscored another aspect of the flexibility of the AirMule.

Another nice thing with this design is that you can land on 20-25 degree slopes, which opens up entirely new options where a helicopter has no chance of landing because of the big rotor coming in contact with the slope and so on.  We can articulate the landing gear very easily land on significantly sloped terrain.

Now because this vehicle is not a big aircraft and is transportable by truck, it moves together with the brigade.  That way you can set up a depot 50 miles or 80 miles away from the front with a small unit that will receive the calls and service a vast amount of area continuously.

Finally, Yoeli underscored the scalability of their solution sets.

The design is scalable.  For now the small (1,400 lb. payload) size is our vehicle of choice but we can size up to 3,000 lbs.  It will be more expensive, but it will carry more.  We can do it.

Combat-Proven Tiger

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
12/21/2010

A Conversation with Dominique Maudet


12/21/2010 – The Tiger helicopter has been used by the French military in their Afghan engagement.  The operational role has been to work with two other helo types in providing crucial air capabilities for the French Army.  The impact of operations has highlighted the significance of evolving air-ground integration and capabilities for the French military. We will publish an interview with one of the key users of the Tiger and a man very knowledgeable about Afghan con-ops, former Chief of the COMALAT (French Army Light Aviation Command), General Patrick Tanguy soon. The Tiger has been part of that process.  The Tiger provides a highly maneuverable air asset with a gun which features rapid fire and precision in support of the ground commanders. An upgrade of the Tiger is already being tested and is in the works. Dominique Maudet of Eurocopter provided an overview of the Tiger program in a conversation in October 2010.  Dominique Maudet has been Executive Vice President for Governmental Programs for the Eurocopter Group since the end of 2006.  Prior to that he was Vice President for French Government Sales and Vice-President for Export Sales Operations from 2003-2006.



Credit : Tiger HAD Being Tested, Eurocopter, December 20th, 2010


SLD: I understand from discussions with the French military that the Tiger has been a very important part of the evolving concept of operations, a con-ops which features better integration of air-ground operations.  Could you give a sense of the Tiger operating in Afghanistan?

Dominique Maudet:  We view the Tiger in Afghanistan as a tremendous success.  The French Army has deployed three Tigers in Afghanistan since August 2009.  We support the Tiger in theater as well and the helo has been demonstrating a 90% readiness rate.  The Tiger is used in conjunction with Gazelles, Cougars and EC725 to deliver an integrated capability for the ground forces.

The French Army has deployed three Tigers in Afghanistan since August 2009.  We support the Tiger in theater as well and the helo has been demonstrating a 90% readiness rate. It is used in conjunction with Gazelles, Cougars and EC725 to deliver an integrated capability for the ground forces.

SLD: What is the state of the program and its planned evolution?

Dominique Maudet: It started as a joint Franco-German program built around a single helo configuration.  With the end of the Cold War, the French cancelled their involvement in the anti-tank configuration but the Germans continued with the anti-tank variant. The Germans focused more on a helo used in defensive missions, and the French more towards an attack role.  Both have ordered 80 copies of their versions of the Tiger. The French have ordered 40 copies of the HAP (Hélicoptère d’Appui Protection) version with 40 for a more advanced HAD (Hélicoptère d’Appui Destruction) version.  The HAD is built on the HAP but with air-to-ground missile capability and an enhanced engine which gives about 14-15% more power.  The missile is a hellfire and the engine is an upgrade of the engine built by the current engine team supporting the Tiger. [1]

SLD: So the difference between the current version and the next version is the integration with an air-to-ground missile, and then more propulsion capability?

Dominique Maudet: Exactly.  Today, out of the 40 HAP’s ordered by the French government, 26 have been already delivered, and 4 additional will be delivered before the end of this year, which means therefore that we have ¾ of the current HAPs delivered by the end of 2010.

SLD: Presumably, combat experience is feeding in some shifts in the requirements, and the desired capabilities. I would assume that air-to-ground missiles certainly would be one of them.

Dominique Maudet: Yes indeed. We will start delivering HAD from 2012 onward, for France and Spain.  Spain has joined the French HAD version, and Spain has ordered 24 HAD which come on top of the 40 French.

In the early stage of the program, before Spain joined, just after France and Germany, Australia joined the Tiger program, with quite an advanced version. The Australians have the French HAP version, including the 30 mm gun and the air-to-ground missile; the Hellfire. The Hellfire has already been integrated into the Australian Tiger. It is the air-to-ground missile currently planned to be integrated on the French HAD Tigers, while the Spanish HAP will receive the Rafael missile. The Australians have the more advanced version. The Australian Army has run several live firings of the Hellfire missiles, which have been very, very successful as well.  So, this is why for us, the HAD, at least as far as the air-to-ground capability is concerned, is not a major issue for development.  The most challenging topic for HAD will be the engine development, and schedule.

The HAD, at least as far as the air-to-ground capability is concerned, is not a major issue for development.  The most challenging topic for HAD will be the engine development, and schedule.

SLD: This is a significant evolution you are describing, which is to use this Tiger as almost a lead element in a ground battle with significant integration with the ground forces to deliver the Hellfire in a ground support role. And as C4ISR is evolving, this could provide significant integration capabilities for the ground forces as well?

Dominique Maudet: It is a distinct possibility. The full integration into a, sort of bubble, that is to say, the bubble of the battalion or the bubble of the Army moving ahead, is a question not only of radio, but it’s a matter of data links as well.  But the platform is there available for such integration.

SLD: Let us focus on the gun, which has proven so useful in Afghanistan.

Dominique Maudet: The Tiger can carry up to 450 bullets for the gun, and can shoot very quickly, more than 700 shots per minute. The concept of this gun was envisaged to be installed on the Comanche before the Comanche was cancelled.

SLD: How would compare the Tiger to the Apache?

Dominique Maudet: The Apache is bigger can carry more weapons than the Tiger.  The Tiger is more maneuverable in the battlespace. The Tiger is much lighter than the Apache, and it’s got a very strong engine, and all in all I think the Tiger is leveraging its maneuverability and agility in Afghan operations.

SLD: Finally, could you talk about your engagement with the Australians?

Dominique Maudet: We consider our relationship with the Commonwealth of Australia to be strategic in character. We won the Tiger competition against the Apache 8 years ago, and were then successful with the NH-90 MRH (Multi-Role Helicopter) competition 5 years ago against the Black Hawk. We are now working to win the next competition :the NH-90 NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) against the MH-60 Romeo.

The other thing is that we have a significant industrial footprint in Australia.  We are now one of the 2 biggest players of the industrial aerospace industry there.  In Brisbane, we have quite a big facility, which includes helicopter assembly and support, software testing and composites manufacturing.

We have a significant industrial footprint in Australia.  We are now one of the 2 biggest players of the industrial aerospace industry there.  In Brisbane, we have quite a big facility, which includes helicopter assembly and support, software testing and composites manufacturing.


[slidepress gallery=’an-update-on-the-tiger-a-conversation-with-dominique-maudet’]


The Tiger has been deployed in Operation in Afghanistan since 2009
 Credit photos 1,2,3 : Thomas Goisque, Afghanistan, 2009 (copyright: EADS)
Credit photo 4 : Eurocopter, December 2010


————

Note :

[1] The 40 Tiger HAD helicopters for France will be armed with eight Lockheed Martin Hellfire II air-to-ground missiles. Hellfire II has a semi-active laser seeker and range of over 8km. Spanish HAD will be armed with Rafael Spike-ER air-to-ground missiles, license-built by General Dynamics Santa Barbara Sistemas. In addition, HAD is armed with one Nexter (formerly Giat) 30mm cannon turret, 70mm rockets and four Mistral air-to-air missiles. HAD helicopters will also be equipped with the Sagem Strix roof-mounted sight.

Zoom On The Harvest Hawk

Posted on | by Caroline Teames
12/07/2010

12/7/2010 – Story below from : www.i-mef.usmc.mil

KC-130J Harvest Hawk takes on new role in Afghanistan

By Sergent Deanne Hurla, Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan, November 17th, 2010,

“Since 2003, KC-130Js have played a vital role in transporting coalition forces and cargo throughout Helmand and Nimroz provinces; however, the latest KC-130 to enter the area is providing a new kind of support.The KC-130J “Harvest Hawk” of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), has all the same capabilities of a KC-130J “Hercules,” but the Harvest Hawk carries four Hellfire and 10 Griffen GPS guided missiles and houses an infrared and television camera.

Its mission is to provide close air support, conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions and find improvised explosive devices. “This aircraft is not traditional – yet,” said Maj. Marc Blankenbicker, a fire control officer for the Harvest Hawk. There is only one Harvest Hawk operating in Afghanistan, and it is used to fill the gaps where coverage from other aircraft isn’t available; it operates in a role similar to that of an F/A-18, explained Blankenbicker.

Though the Harvest Hawk only began its first deployment in October, it has already had its first weapons engagement Nov. 4. “We supported [3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment] in Sangin when they were in a fire fight,” said Blankenbicker. “We shot one Hellfire missile, and the battle damage assessment was five enemy [killed in action].” Using the Harvest Hawk, VMGR-352 Marines have already found at least three IEDs near 3/5’s area of operation and in support of other coalition forces.

Missions such as these are aiding the VMGR-352 Marines to build relationships with ground forces that may be skeptical of the KC-130’s new abilities. “There wasn’t time to teach battalions what we are capable of so a lot of it has been real time, and everyone has been really receptive,” Blankenbicker said. “It’s a matter of a little bit of education and a little bit of getting to know each other.”

“When we first get [overhead], the [ground forces] ask what our capabilities are, but after having worked with them for a while, they’ve gotten used to it,” added Capt. Joel Dunivant, a Harvest Hawk aircraft commander. “From what we’ve been told, the guys really like working with us. We’re taken seriously, we’re professional and we’ve got the time to sit there and dig thoroughly into what’s going on, on the ground.”Marines and other coalition forces are all making the adjustment to having a KC-130J in the combat role, and according to the pilots, the transition is going smoothly. “On a standard day, we arrive on station and talk to the forward air controllers attached to battalions to see what is going on,” Blankenbicker said. “While we’re on hand, we use our cameras to look at villages, watch pattern of life and assess what is going on in the [area of operation] at that time. If they get into some kind of conflict with the enemy forces, then we are available to provide close air support with our weapons systems.”

Using the added capabilities, the Harvest Hawk is able to provide support to two or three ground units for up to three hours each time it flies. The aircraft is kept at a medium altitude above ground level and can work alone or in conjunction with UH-1Y Hueys and AH-1W Cobras, added Dunivant. Other than operating in a combat role, there are only slight differences between the Harvest Hawk and the Hercules. The four Hellfire missiles on the left wing, the Griffen missiles, secured on the aircraft’s ramp and the addition of the camera are what make a Hercules the Harvest Hawk. The KC-130J has provided transport and refueling capabilities throughout Regional Command (Southwest) and now provides the extra advantage of staying overhead for longer than any other aircraft operating in the region. The Harvest Hawk provides accurate and effective combat offensive capabilities to support coalition forces on the ground through surveillance and overwatch.“