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Secretary Gates has basically said by his actions the US has no peer competitors in Generation 5 Fighters. This assumption rests on having no threats which require the capabilities of stealth and the radar and sensor capabilities which the F-22 has now and the F-35 will have in the mid-term.
The F-22’s unique capabilities — super-cruise, stealth and sensors — have been considered by critics as an “expensive investment” which is not necessary to deal with near term problems or threats. And, de facto, these critics have lumped the F-35 and F-22 into the same capability basic. The F-35 is a potentially a very capable attack/fighter, although slipping its IOC, but it is not designed for pure Air Dominance as was the F-22.
The F-22’s “super-cruise” capability is an important contributor to air dominance, now and in the future, and makes it truly a unique air asset. It was always fun to watch the late Col. John Boyd in meetings at the Pentagon railing at individuals who never were in an air-to-air engagement. Col. Boyd was a true force of nature insisting on the best possible fighter for his beloved Air Force. He loved the F-86 bubble canopy, so one just has to look at the F-16 to see his influence.
He also was the strongest possible advocate of “cruise mach”; now called “super cruise.” He was also a firm believer of a significant measure of merit (mom) that captures a fighter’s maneuverability. That measurement of “energy maneuverability” was called P sub s and using that mom the F-22 defeats the flight envelope of the F-35 across the board.
In commenting on the Senate vote killing any further production of the F-22 past 187 Raptors, actually 186 since one was lost in a crash, President Obama’s supporting his Secretary of Defense used a very inappropriate word. The President said the F-22 was “outdated.”
The President could have used many words to declare victory. However, to state the best Fighter in the history of aviation is seen by the Commander-in -Chief as being “outdated” is really the opposite of “The Right Stuff”—it was “the wrong stuff.”
“The Right Stuff” is the greatest book ever written about US Military Pilots. The book actually evolved from a visit the author Tom Wolf made to an Aircraft Carrier on Yankee Station during the Vietnam War. He penned one of the greatest articles to come out of the Vietnam War—“The Truest Sport: Jousting with Sam and Charlie.”
A Navy F-4, Phantom Crew goes “feet dry” on a mission over North Vietnam and is bagged by a Russian surface to air missile. Often the image of a Fighter engagement is air-to-air. Tom Wolfe brings the reader into the other element—“human skeet” going up against SAMs.
Not only does the air battle depend on Air Dominance against all other Fighters but also the surface-to-air threat has to be negated. And here the US and its allies clearly have peer competitors.
“You emit you die”
Now thanks to two articles in Air Power Australia, the Air Forces of the world are being put on notice the PLA has arrived with significantly advanced SAM capability.
WGCDR Chris Mills RAAF has written “FD-2000/ HQ-9 SAM-China’s Strategic ‘Game Changer’ “ and Dr Carlo Kopp and John Wise have added a technical note “HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM Battery Radar’s” both articles paint a very important and disturbing trend of significant technological prowess by the PLA.
The PRC has a nasty history of stealing weapon systems or “buying” them and then stealing their capability using reverse engineering to exploit any military technology they think important. They then proliferate the weapon to their customers -e.g.Iran.
Remember the US Navy, Marine and Air Force Pilots flying against a third world advisory, North Vietnam, were shot down by technology developed by a peer competitor the USSR.
So if the PLA forces now have announced an advanced radar/SAM system it should be taken very seriously. During the investigations of the influence of Chinese money into the American political system in the Clinton years it became very obvious the PRC had acquired significant American military technology. The Cox/Dicks Congressional Investigation nails that point.
Consequently, it would be fair to say because of stealing from America through espionage and also open purchase from the Russians the center of knowledge about the technology of all things military may now rest in China. One can be thankful that so far that PRC quality assurance in the development of advanced weapons may still be their weakness.
However, the important points made by the Australians are to take the CHICOMs very seriously. Consequently, one must respect their analysis, especially since the PLA also believes in the military principle of Mass. Until proven other wise and technological counter measures are developed the world needs to be very concerned.
For a 21st Century Air Campaign the rule must always be —go up against American Air Forces— “you emit you die.” The Australian team has highlighted something very important.
The US has only one smart move and to use a polite euphemism “buy” or even stated more bluntly steal the PLA system and see what it is capable of accomplishing. Also a good mission for offensive “Cyber” is to get as much as possible—after all turn about is fair play.
The test will simply be by looking at the hardware and software can the US figure out how the system can be defeated. The USAF must be capable of focusing on a kill shot using a HARM, or spoofing by electronic counter measures both of which could be the F-35’s forte.
So far the USAF also hopefully has an advantage with a fighter and bomber capable of flying in a flight envelope that can’t be touched- advantage to B-2 and F-22. The F-35’s capabilities will come into play as the aircraft is introduced in numbers.
However it is important that DNI should get one, after all he was previously an Admiral defending the Pacific, and look at it. The Defense Intelligence Agency can be very capable and one hopes even with cut backs their scientists and engineers hands-on the system can resolve a lot of issues. However, with absolutely no personal knowledge of any acquisition/exploitation effort, one could hope that the US may already have the complete system.
On November 9th, Brigadier General Walsh discussed his recent experiences in Iraq (watch video abstract).
In December 2008 he became the Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing Forward and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom on November 3rd and 2nd MAW (Fwd) was deactivated on Thursday 19 November.
Brigadier General Walsh is particularly well suited to discuss the role of airpower because of his extensive background in aviation. He served in Washington with the Deputy Commandant for Aviation as the principal deputy, and in this position developed significant familiarity with the latest USMC aviation platforms, including the F35-B. He has extensive experience in dealing with the USAF and is very knowledgeable with regard to the USAF’s approach to air-battle management, so his comments on how the USMC has used aviation in Iraq, and the growing requirement for integration between air and ground elements is significant for the USAF and its relationship with the US Army as well. He was an instructor at the U.S. Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) and is a decorated Marine Corps Aviator.
A Strategic Shift In the Use of Manned Air
During General Walsh’s time in Iraq, there was a double transition underway. The first transition was the acceleration of stability operations. The second was the growing collaboration with the Iraqis in shaping their evolving capability to provide for their own internal security. This meant that the air element for the USMC had two crucial tasks:
to support US force as they began to withdraw and prepare for their exit role as Iraqi advisors;
to assist the Iraqis in shaping operations to provide for their own security.
As such, the core role of the USMC air was largely non-kinetic but with a residual kinetic role. The non-kinetic role needs to be understood as a presence and support role. The presence role was robust and significant; and General Walsh argued that the metrics for this significant airpower role are not well understood. “One can measure the effects of kinetic strike; it is more difficult to measure the effects of presence.”
Put in its simplest terms, General Walsh provided a core understanding to the strategic shift in the use of manned air in the COIN environment.
The shift is from shaping air around precision-strike to shaping air to provide collaborative presence.
– The Challenge of D.O. : the Absence of Rear Area
At the heart of the challenge is that “you are not dealing with one large formation on attack; the forces are very decentralized and very distributed. You are dealing with a very large area and with a dispersed force. You are dealing with little formations all over Anbar province, which is 250 miles by 150 miles in area. You have companies and platoons split over a large territory, which you have to support with limited assets. There is no rear area; there is no safe area.”
General Walsh went on to characterize the situation facing the COIN (Counter-Insurgency) military force. “The enemy can hit you anywhere; the enemy gets a vote is how I characterize it. We are not on the offensive; we are on the defensive. Both the enemy and we are living among the people, and the challenge is to get them on our side. If they are on our side they will give us credible information upon which we can act. But to know that level of detail you have to be distributed or dispersed.”
For the Commanding Officer, the challenge is simply the following: “How does aviation provide support in such a chaotic environment? Just as the guy on the ground is not certain of what is about to happen, so does the pilot trying to support those ground elements: all must deal with managing uncertainty.”
– Measuring the Effect of Presence
General Walsh’s answer revolved around the shift from precision strike to presence. Air presence was significant on three major levels for the USMC during this period in Iraq.
First, presence was crucial to support the Marine on the ground. This could be lift, it could be overwatch, it could be an ability to provide fire support, it could be to fly low to demonstrate to the population that the ground element had significant firepower available, it could be to deal with the disparate strikes to which the ground forces were still subject to from a dispersed enemy. “A lot of times, Marines on the ground would ask us to come down lower so that they could see us. How do you measure that effect?” General Walsh characterized this concept as “no Marine walks alone.” When a Marine is operating “outside of the wire,” the role of airpower is to provide protection and support to that Marine. He gave an example of dealing with an IED-event. “When you have a vehicle blown with an IED and have the road all of a sudden divided into two slow moving small lanes of vehicles, how do you know who is in those vehicles? How do you know what they are going to do? You can wait a long time for the clearing vehicles to show up, especially as we drew down combat posts. A request would come in: Please bring in a fighter for presence to show you are there. How do you measure that effect?”
Second, it could be re-assurance to the population. As the Iraqi leadership began to perform more functions, there was a remaining need to reassure the population that support could be provided throughout the country to the Iraqi allies. “For example, when the provincial government was to be seated in Al Anbar in June 2009, there was an Al Qaeda threat to Ramadi. The Governor asked us to fly our F-18s at 5000 feet to reassure the population and to deter any threats.”
Third, it could be presence to deter attacks from a dispersed adversary. The pop-up capability of an adversary blended into a civilian population meant that air assets were in demand to come in and to support the ground elements on an ad hoc, and on-call role. As an example of the challenge of confronting attacks in a dispersed environment challenge, General Walsh gave this example. “I was on the ground; we were stopped at a check point and the check point came under motor fire. Several vehicles in front of us were destroyed. All hell was breaking loose with mortars coming in every few seconds. We did not know where the things were coming from. We of course had no battery radar. We called in some F-18s and the minute the planes showed up the firing stopped; the enemy figured out that the F18s would know where they were with the obvious consequences. How do you measure this effect?”
– Airpower All the More Crucial for Retrograde Operations
Indeed, General Walsh underscored that as the US forces withdraw, there was demand for more – not less – airpower. This happened on several levels.
On one level, this was due to the drawdown of the number of combat posts, which supported operations in Iraq. American forces continued to work with Iraqi forces but now had to commute from distance to do their work, rather than being in close proximity to combat posts. This meant that airpower had to provide regular support to the transit of US forces working with Iraqis. “At one point we had 140 combat posts; while we were there we went from 36 to 4 combat posts; so air was relied on more frequently for convoy protection. As we drew down combat posts and associated capabilities, air was relied on for capabilities which had earlier been largely provided by the ground forces.”
On another level, this was due to the need to protect the convoys moving equipment out of Iraq. “”As you close down and do retrograde, you have to move further out in road miles and that requires air support.”
In addition, transport needs to move support elements to work with Iraqis increased demands for air transport. “We were increasingly asked to provide support for partnering operations.”
Looking for Innovative Con-Ops in a “Distributed Chaos” Environment Or The Art of “Managing Uncertainty”
– COIN: A Very Different Con-Ops Planning
General Walsh underscored that the con-ops for doing presence missions is considerably different from doing strike-oriented, offensive operations. With an offensive operation, air power can be tasked in advance, targets identified and air battle management focus is upon tempo of operations. With a presence-focus, which characterizes counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, tasking is on the fly, and not orchestrated 48-72 hours in advance.
To do the on the fly mission planning, the ground and air elements would work with common mission planning software to identify the tasks which the ground element would do on a day-to-day basis. The pilots would go airborne with a set of 4-5 taskings for the support of the ground forces, and would shift among these taskings as the ground forces would demand. The ground forces would identify in the mission software and web-based communication system what their schedule for the day was, and what their intentions for the day were. These intentions drove the taskings for the air element.
“The Marines are outside of the wire, how do we support them? We start with windows with regard to missions (i.e. Sons of Iraq payments, a security patrol known in advance, a battalion commander is going to meet the mayor, etc.). We determine the patterns of movement and look for movement clusters and then determine support in the air to support those movement clusters. Rather than carrying ordinance to cover a target, we are going airborne to support demands shaped by the most likely cluster of activities.”
– Collaborative Support and Operations: The Key Role of BFT In effect, the C4ISR focus for precision strike support for a conventional operation was being replaced by a CISR D approach, in which shared decision-making between the ground and air elements was shaped as tasks were identified and means to fulfill those needs were defined in a real-time or near-real time environment.
In addition, a push concept for air operations was adopted. In the push concept, air elements would be launched in support of the ground forces, and the selection of the taskings would be taken from the pre-planned presence support list, and adjusted as pop-up challenges emerged. Rather than the USAF approach of having air power up with weapons in place to strike on demand targets, the USMC aviators worked with the ground elements before launching to determining the range of needs likely to be required based on the ground forces intent.
A key technology highlighted by the push concept is blue force tracking. Because BFT identifies where the ground elements are located in real time AND provides a texting tool, BFT can be a crucial tool for the air element. “I can do my operations with real knowledge of where the ground elements are located to support them. It goes from being a tool to reduce fratricide in a fast moving offensive operation to becoming a key tool to allow me to do collaborative support and operations. Frankly, all of our fixed wing aircraft should have BFT on them and I hope F-35 will have as well.”The presence focus for the air element also is changing the role of the Direct Air Support Center or DASC.
Historically, the DASC functioned as an air traffic controller similar to the FAA controllers in managing air-space and providing assets against targets. In the push environment, the DASC has become a decision-making element for the operations. Which airborne elements are most relevant to the evolving on the fly needs for the ground element, understood not in precision-strike terms, but presence terms.
“The DASC has become a battle manager in an operations sense; this is a whole new concept. Historically, there were usually not enough airplanes to do the tasks. So the task for the DASC was maintaining scarce assets against targets. The DASC operated like my grandmother operating as a telephone operator connecting lines at the console. The pilot was told where to go with no situational awareness. They were directed assets. Now you have more air than you have pre-planned targets. Now you have to know what the ground teams are doing and then allocate resources against a fluid demand structure. You are operating within distributed chaos. You are functioning as an enhanced 911 operator.”
– Air-Ground Integration: A Return To Investment for the USMC The presence role which General Walsh sees as central to COIN operations is facilitated by the institutional investment which the USMC has put into air-ground integration. The USMC has pushed air ground integration down to the company level. Whereas the USAF will have a limited presence within the US Army, the USMC has significant aviator presence in the USMC ground element.
“What helps us is the number of pilots or air officers or Forward Air Controllers (FACs) integrated with the ground forces. When we have the FACs down to the company level as well as regiments and divisions. This gives us a significant number of nodes or fingers out there to integrate with the ground forces.”
General Walsh noted the difference with the USAF and the US Army. “When the 82nd Airborne replaced the USMC force, the USAF had one captain as a air liaison officer; we have 12 for every one captain that the USAF has. (…)When we have the F-35 out there, we will have a very significant flying combat system overhead which can work with this distributed command element. The processing power of the aircraft and the software on board which will allow us to support directly overhead our ground forces will be an exponential increase in capability. But this capability will be built upon the organizational investment and the habitual relationship we have between the ground and air elements.”
Also central to the USMC is having a single command element controlling the battlespace. Whereas you can centralize command, you cannot centralize control in a COIN environment, according to General Walsh. “For the air element to be effective, it must be able to provide support in a distributed control environment, and this really can only work with significant integration between the ground and air forces through facilitating on-the fly “pre-planning.”
The institutional investment has been enhanced by the use of new mission planning technologies as well. For example, the Command Post of the Future was a key tool, which the USMC used, in better integrating air and ground operations. “The CPOF is an army tool which puts in all of the plans, identifies the boundaries of the groups, provides a ground overlay, identifies battlespace ownership, Con-Ops of the operation. It provides information to shape collaboration. The commander then can determine: “OK, here is where I am going to put my Cobras, my F-18s etc”, then the ground commanders can request these assets to support ground needs.”
– Ground-Manned Air-Unmanned Air Assets: A Complementary Triade The USMC experience in Iraq, which is being transferred to Afghanistan, is re-shaping as well the way the USMC will operate in its CONUS-based air bases. The same approach to using mission planning and integration to give the base commanders a better grasp of the operation of the air assets.
General Walsh added as well that the unmanned systems are very useful in providing persistent stare for ground engagements. Yet they are limited in terms of effectiveness by simply generating data, which are not useful unless they are integrated with ground presence. “If I know there is a problem but I am far away, what use is that?”
Another problem is the distance from the operation for a UAV controller back in the United States. “For example, a ground controller for a UAS back in the US is viewing the entry into a house or area and trying to determine location of possible insurgent and trying to determine whether I place a hellfire or not on the target. So for the Marine on the ground who do you trust more, the guy making the decision back in the US or the USMC air element with whom I am directly talking and is directly overhead?”
The ability to work the Osprey with UAS will also be a significant improvement: “In Afghanistan, when the UAS tracks the bad guys, we will be able to use the Osprey to drop Marines close to the bad guys and then to prosecute. Just having data identifying a problem is not going to close the deal: having the guys on the ground get there quickly enough to make a difference will.”
General Walsh concluded by emphasizing the central role of the manned element in playing the presence role within COIN. “The ability of the ground and air elements to work together to shape presence in a COIN environment is central to re-assurance of the Marine on the ground, to the population you are trying to reassure, and to the ability to strike an adversary who can pop up without warning.”
Ed Timperlake Comments on Air Power Australia Assessments of AESA Radar Competitions
A key item which we will discuss on the website will be the evolving concepts of operations for air power working in the joint and coalition arena. An important dimension of the new fighters is the integration of sensors and radars in shaping new capabilities usable across the spectrum of warfare. We will build some basic modules over time on the impact of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars and they integration with the combat systems on systems such as the F-22 and F-35. Indeed, the F-35 is a “flying combat system” in large part to the AESA integration with the combat systems.
But the US and its allies are not alone in shaping new capabilities. Indeed, one of the fallacies of the contemporary “debate” about air power in the United States is the assumption that the US is largely in competition with itself. From time to time, we hope to highlight work of analysts who are focusing upon the competitive nature of the air operations environment.
One such analyst has been Dr. Carlo Kopp and his associates (Air Power Australia). Dr. Kopp has analyzed Russian technologies in the AESA area and has published a paper entitled “Assessing the Tikhomirov NIIP L-Band Active Electornically Steered Array” which can be found at http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-06.html. This analysis has been extended to discuss the competitive environment within which the F-35 will operate (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-140909-1.html)
***
Ed Timperlake** has provided an insightful look at these two papers and his comments follow:
Two mutually supporting papers published in Air Power Australia one by WGCDR Chris Mills and the other by Dr Carlo Kopp perfectly capture the action/reaction dynamic cycle of fighter aircraft design features.
Fighter aircraft progress in a Type/Model/Series sequence, for example the F-4 Phantom II went from F-4 A to S and then the next generation was the F-14, F-15, F/A-18 and now F-22 and soon to be introduced F-35. Concurrently, the Russians were evolving from Mig 21 to a generation of SU’s 27, 30s and as the paper points out SU-37.
The key to understanding modernization of tactical aircraft is that it is always relative and never absolute because of a reactive enemy.
However, there are moments in military history some arriving quicker than others in which a step function made a break from a continuous incremental improvement of existing weapons and defenses. I use “step” function in the sense that the jump in improvements if graphed would depart straight up in capability from a previous more smoothly progressing upward curve of capability.
There are many examples in history–Gunpowder against body armor, cannons against forts, the Monitor and the death of wooden ships, machine guns and tanks against Calvary. The invention of the submarine and airplane and perhaps the biggest military step function in history is the A-bomb– are all “step” functions.
Even with a “step” function technology breakthrough a reactive enemy eventually catches up.
In fighter aviation cycle of improvements or “step” function grew out of WWII research and experimentation– the jet engine, airborne radar and eventually AA missiles;IR-Sidewinder series, Semi-active-Sparrow series, and US current fire and forget-AARAM. These are all advances that left the WW II propeller powered fighters and the Mark-1 eyeball behind.
Over almost three decades ago thanks to Secretary Perry and DARPA “Stealth” was embraced as a defining aviation step function. Stealth became a closely protected technology and was often herald in absolute terms. To be fair, the US did establish a commanding lead but it came at a cost.
There have been many career killing debates in the US over the issue of “stealth” vs improving radar capability (mostly ground base systems). The debate has favored “stealth” and it is possible these technology debates have had a chilling effect on radar R&D. Having personally seen the results of this ongoing fight it would be fair to say it was tilted toward “stealth.
Now both authors perfectly capture with insightful and extremely well documented analysis that Russian design teams are focusing on improving airborne radar designs to defeat US “stealth” design characteristics. Both papers are cutting edge and have the possibly of being seminal works. Similar to the famous John Boyd P sub S– energy maneuverability research.
Now the issue is practical-what to do with their analysis?
Since the issue of more F-22s for the US is on life support I take heart that the papers are Australian. After the F-22 fight which made it to the Oval office to stop production at 186 there is one glimmer of hope left.
It has been reported that a Senate Committee is writing report language that will direct the USAF to set aside some R&D funding to develop an export version of the F-22. The focus is primarily on an export version to Japan but Australia has an equally pressing need.
Both authors in their respective papers show the reader why current Russian airborne radar advances are important to acknowledge. Both authors do not lecture or “tell”, they cogently and factually describe why the F-35 is not the F-22 in AA Fighter capabilities.
Once a Russian airborne radar design action/reaction cycle begins to nullify stealth designs the air to air combat equation must come back to a package of other basics. Airframe performance (range, payload, maneuverability and speed) on-board system capabilities, weapons carried and pilot training and tactics, all must come together to win the AA engagement.
One rule I usually follow is if the Russians have the technology the PLAAF (Chinese Air Force) is not far behind.
In the AA equation of kill or be killed there is one new dimension (if 20 years of research is new) which is the latest AA missile development is constantly improving “fire and forget” missiles. Today’s fighter pilot not only has to kill his adversary, but it must be done at a range the enemy can’t get off a kill shot prior to being splashed.
So once again it is back to the basics. A fighter pilot must search, acquire, identify and shoot— quicker than the opponent. Stealth gave the US a tremendous survivability advantage. However, once challenged by improving radar capability as mentioned above—the basics of technology come back in the debate;; airframe flight performance, airborne systems and weapons carried. Stealth is a survivability attribute along with other survivability multipliers–the ability of the airframe to take a hit, chaff, flares, and jamming.
I have purposely left external capabilities out of this discussion –ground and airborne search radar, IFF technology and other command and control technology that all help the fighter pilots situational awareness in the cockpit.
Both authors’ contribution has been huge. With “stealth” advantages being challenged by radar advances the F-22 v F-35 fighter comparisons come into realistic focus and every one who has any credibility must agree the F-35 is not the F-22 flying the Air Dominance mission.
Australia needs the choice to buy the F-22 along with the F-35 if they wish.
Authors note: I fully recognize the brilliant insight expressed by Andy Marshall Director Net Assessment when he wrote about “The Revolution in Military Affairs”. The future of war fighting technology is moving toward precision guided munitions with remote sensors, and information war (now known as “cyber war”). I also realize there is currently a battlefield evolution of UAVs and robotics. I focused on fighter versus fighter and the issue of “stealth” a catch all term clouding a frank assessment of the F-22 and F-35. When I hear “stealth” as a panacea making up for less relative fighter performance I think of previous historical arguments. Pre-WWII weapon system beliefs were:
The Bomber will always get through
The Battleship will rule the waves
and Subs should be used as scouts for the fleet.
Stealth is a weapon system survivability multiplier nothing more nothing less.
***
** Ed Timperlake is former CO VMFA-321, and co-author of “A Methodology for Estimating Comparative Aircrew Proficiency” (Theater Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency) and Project Manager inventing “The TASCFORM-Air Model, A technique for assessing Comparative Force Modernization in Tactical Aviation” for Director of Net Assessment, (OSD).
A new approach to maritime security which provides for layered defense of the American homeland built around maritime domain awareness is viewed as a crucial effort in the United States. To build capabilities for the new approach requires redirecting U.S. maritime capabilities away from an emphasis on overseas presence and strike to participating in extended homeland defense missions. An emphasis on security vice defense requires new tools and approaches to engaging federal entities in maritime security. At the same time, it requires engaging allies in building maritime data tools and situational awareness through such programs as the container security initiative. This is a “network-centric” approach but directed towards extended homeland defense.
