Complementing Air Support?

12/10/2010

Tanks In Afghanistan: Supplementing or Augmenting Air Power Via Direct Fire Support

By Murielle Delaporte
**@sl*****.com



Leopard 2 (www.forces.gc.ca)


12/09/2010 – M1A1 Abrams vs Leopard 2A6M?
If the Canadians and the Danes regularly use their tanks in the Afghan theatre – respectively since 2006 and  2007 — the U.S. military leadership has always been reticent to imitate its allies out of fear to replay the scenario of the Soviet intervention in the eighties in the minds of the Afghan population. The Canadians were the very first ISAF members to deploy seventeen Leopards 1C2, which they had to replace because of increasingly high maintenance costs and the looming risks of lacking spares by 2012. They therefore deployed as early as 2007 twenty Leopards 2A6M. The Danes have been using fifteen Leopards 2A5DK since 2007.

Repeated tactical successes of the German-made Leopard seem to have demonstrated the key role of the tank in operations: sixteen tanks M1A1 thus will supplement the arsenal of the Marines and will be deployed in the Helmand Province in the spring of 2011. Such an initiative seems intended less as an “escalation” than a mean to replace the Canadian tanks,  on which American forces have been regularly relying for support (it was the case no later than last month during the offensive of Panjwaii). Canadian armed forces must indeed leave Afghanistan in July 2011, leaving behind only a thousand advisers [1]. If figures are correct and add up, the overall number of tanks within the Coalition in Afghanistan would in actual fact go down from thirty five to thirty one as of this summer.

Such an initiative seems intended less as an “escalation” than a mean to replace the Canadian tanks,  on which American forces have been regularly relying for support (it was the case no later than last month during the offensive of Panjwaii). Canadian armed forces must indeed leave Afghanistan in July 2011.


Direct Fire Support Wanted
Among the advantages of the tank recognized in Afghan ground operations:

•     An undeniable deterrence capability without needing a large number of tanks

•     A reconnaissance capability (allowing in particular to check the presence of civilians in hostile territory, thus reducing losses within the population)

•     An ability to provide close proximity and rapid fire support other than relying solely on air support (thus less potential collateral damage also)

•     An extremely effective protection against IEDs (although extra-armor is no silver bullet in that matter)

•     An auxiliary logistics support particularly appreciated by light infantry units (such as the paratroopers)

Among the disadvantages are the questions of reduced mobility compared to light armored vehicles (in terms of terrain, but however not in terms of threats) and the logistic challenge to bring them over the theater. [2]  The First Abrams was actually delivered by C-17 (which can carry one M1A1 versus two for the C-5) on November 26th to Camp Bastion.



Arrival of the first Canadian Leopard 2A6M CAN in Afghanistan in 2007
Credit: www.army.forces.gc.ca


“The ponies want to gallop” [1]
With regard to Canada, the outdatedness of C2 had encouraged the government to borrow twenty net generation tanks – the Leopards 2– considered definitely more powerful and deployed as of August 2007.As Adjudant Bruce Rose, from the Royal Candaian Dragoons noted at the time:

« With the Leopard 1 C2, we had to push the engine to its limits to engage, but with the Leopards 2’s  1500 horse power, one has to hold on the poneys who want to gallup. » [3]

In addition, better protection against IEDs, better shooting capability and air conditioning (the lack of which had been compensated by special suits in the C2s).

The agreement between Canada and Germany lead in 2009 to two outsourcing contracts regarding maintenance with the German firm Krauss Maffei-Wegmann in 2009:

The loan of 20 Leopard 2 tanks by Germany plans their return to their country of origin at the time of the end of the agreement. To satisfy this requirement, Canada will convert 20 tanks Leopard 2A6 bought of the Netherlands to the German standards and will turn them over as replacement. Since the tanks must go back to Germany by September 2012, a deal was concluded with Krauss Maffei-Wegmann, the manufacturer of the material, at the end of July 2009 to restore the tanks. (…) the prolongation of the Afghan mission from 2009 to 2011, announced in March 2008, created the need for currently carrying out the rotation of the 20 tanks Leopard 2A6 in service in the theater.

The 20 tanks were useful under the difficult conditions of Afghanistan during the two last years, and it is planned to withdraw them from operations in 2010 to repair them and give them back. A contract was allocated to the manufacturer of the material, Krauss Maffei-Wegmann in Germany, to carry out urgent work of  repairing and upgrading. This urgent contract, evaluated at 86.9 million dollars (CAN), was granted to Krauss Maffei-Wegmann in June 2009. [4]

 

June 2009

A contract is allocated to Krauss Maffei-Wegmann, the manufacturer, for repair, check up and the upgrade of 20 tanks Leopard 2A4 to be deployed in Afghanistan in September 2010.

July 2009

A contract is allocated to Krauss Maffei-Wegmann, the manufacturer, for the conversion of 20 tanks bought from the Netherlands back to German standards,in order to give them to Germany as replacement.







————-

Footnotes

[1] http://www.crisisgroup.org

[2] https://sldinfo.com/?p=3903

[3] http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-fra.asp?id=2253

[4] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/2/pro-pro/Tank-fra.asp


References

In English:

•   www.cdfai.org

•   www.defenseindustrydaily.com

•   www.nationalpost.com

•   www.armytimes.com

•   www.leaderpost.com

•   www.aviationweek.com

•   www.militaryphotos.net

•   www.casr.ca


In French:

•   www.marketwire.com

•   www.army.forces.gc.ca

•  www.forces.gc.ca

•   www.rfi.fr

•   www.armyrecognition.com


In Danish:


Related SLD Articles

Putting Afghanistan in the Rear View Mirror

12/06/2010

Rethinking “Contingency” Operations

By Heather Penney

12/6/2010 – With the deluge of media and congressional attention on the budget, deficit, and national debt, it is surprising that the connection between our current/future economic predicament and OEF/OIF has been conspicuously absent from the debate. According to the CRS, costs for OEF/OIF/GWOT since 9/11 have totaled $1.121 Trillion dollars, not including the 2011 request. 94% of these costs are attributed to DoD. Those are sunk costs.

Source : Belasco Amy, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,
Congressional Research Report, September 2, 2010, page 3 
(www.fas.org)

What about the future? The 2011 request for Iraq is $51B, and OEF is $120B. The 2011 costs – one year of operations –generate 170% the “efficiency savings” the Department is seeking over the next five years through cutting service capabilities. CRS estimates that if we still have 60,000 troops in the region by 2015, the bill over the next decade will be approximately $588B. This doesn’t include the non-discretionary entitlements from wounded warriors and increased end strength that are inevitable. Now that we are sending (at least) one company of tanks to Afghanistan and 2014 is the new target date, this higher estimate is quite probable if not conservative.

So why isn’t our occupation of Iraq and more significantly, Afghanistan, on the table when it comes to the budget debates? What are our real strategic objectives and essential national interests in “stabilizing” these regions? And does the cost (both in budget dollars and in indirect impact to our economy, deficit, and debt) required to “win Afghanistan” satisfy existential necessities? That is, are we in a situation where we cannot afford not to win Afghanistan? Quite the contrary – in fact, we are in a situation where we can’t afford to stay.While it is not in our interest to have escalation of conflict expand throughout the region, we need not occupy to contain Afghanistan. It is unlikely that “winning” Afghanistan is reasonably possible nor would it be enduring.

Are we in a situation where we cannot afford not to win Afghanistan? Quite the contrary – in fact, we are in a situation where we can’t afford to stay. While it is not in our interest to have escalation of conflict expand throughout the region, we need not occupy to contain Afghanistan. It is unlikely that “winning” Afghanistan is reasonably possible nor would it be enduring.

Furthermore, the opportunity cost of not drawing our forces down is too great. We are pouring our treasury at Afghanistan and Iraq and deepening our debt which makes us more vulnerable to aspiring global players using their economies. Our primary policy objective there should be to accelerate the transition of security to Afghanistan with minimal investment and presence. The state need not be perfect, completely stable, or mirror U.S. democracy. We are losing the cost imposition equation and have neglected our interests in other parts of the globe because we are mired in an occupation.

Source : Belasco Amy, The Cost of Iraq... (ibid), page 10
(www.fas.org)

Iraq and Afghanistan are conflicts of choice. Contrary to the rhetoric going in, neither regime posed existential threats. Even Al Qaida is not an existential threat. If we want to hunt terrorists, then we should go hunt terrorists (ala El Dorado Canyon or more recently, Yemen). Hold terrorist strongholds, camps, and leadership at risk 24/7 irrespective of boundaries or borders.

But violent regime change and occupation are not a smart use of force (nor is it smart foreign policy), and a “secure and stable” Afghanistan is not the solution to exterminating Islamic extremism. We must focus on basic, foundational capabilities as real budgets decrease. We cannot afford to dilute our dollars on mission-creep in near-sighted efforts to be relevant to the short-term. It may be counter-intuitive, but we need to invest in those critical things that are difficult, take a long time to do, and are expensive: high-tech asymmetric capabilities and operational mission-sets that require significant training, proficiency, and expertise.

It may be counter-intuitive, but we need to invest in those critical things that are difficult, take a long time to do, and are expensive: high-tech asymmetric capabilities and operational mission-sets that require significant training, proficiency, and expertise.

We can do things that are easy and cheap anytime – and on a quick turn. Investing our DoD dollars in service specific, unique, and existential capabilities allow us to address global challenges and avoid the losing end of strategic surprise. What are those things that really are existential in nature, and what are those capabilities we need to secure our allies, balance power, and maintain our status as a superpower?

Hanging our allies out to dry because we are unwilling to fund a US military strong enough to be the dominant/sponsoring partner fractures alliances, creates regional arms races, invites global instability, and opens opportunities for aspiring powers – and leaves us no ability to shape, influence, deter, or balance regional dynamics.

It makes no sense for the American public to throw money at expeditionary adventures to secure someone else’s failing nation when we aren’t willing to invest in a military that is capable of protecting and advocating the critical interests of the United States.

The ANA: How Autonomous?

12/01/2010

Will The Afghan National Army (ANA) Be Able to Sustain Itself Once Western Troops Depart?

By Olivier Azpitarte
**@sl*****.com

Olivier is a former Foreign Legion officer and a Paris-based multimedia reporter: he is part of the SLD team since June 2010 as a reporter. Below are his findings based on one of his trips to Afghanistan.

11/30/2010 – Since the announcement by the French former Minister of Defence Hervé Morin about the start of withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan in 2011, the issue of the evaluation of Afghan security forces is more relevant than ever. Foremost among the concerns are the maintenance, logistics and troop support. Will these native troops be able to sustain themselves after the withdrawal of Western troops? On the occasion of a one-week stay in July 2010 in the main base of the Afghan National Army near Kabul, we had the opportunity to see several battalions in training and operation. Here is our report.

Outsourcing Maintenance
The Pol-e-Sharki camp is located on the outskirts of Kabul on the Jalalabad road. Dozens of Afghan battalions – the “kandaks” in Dari – are permanently stationed there. North on the Shamali plain, hundreds of peeled hectares extend in the foothills of the Koh-e-Safi massif: the place called Deh Sabz is the main field of the “kandak factory”. This summer, the pace of production is a battalion (around 700 men) every fortnight. Units cross and follow each other, to quickly instruct the future mass army of the Karzai government. They no longer carry the Kalashnikov assault rifle, as it was still the case across the country in 2008, but the M16, and as handgun, a Beretta. The troops ride in brand new Ford Ranger pick-ups or “reconditioned” U.S. Humweees: sand painting has been replaced by a coarse camouflage, the most important being not to be confused with the insurgents. Across the country, American troops remain the preferred targets of rebel bombs. All these vehicles, we are told, are maintained and repaired by a civilian company. Western and Afghan employees would be working within this sector of outsourced maintenance. On the shooting target range, they wear with discipline sand-colored American boots, pixilated fatigues, Kevlar helmets and modern body armor. With some individual adjustments: one prefers leather sandals, and another has the kevlar helmet backwards. “It allows me to place my rifle better,” he says. His instructors bow to the cardboard he shows in support: everything is right on target. So be it.

On the shooting target range, they wear with discipline sand-colored American boots, pixilated fatigues, Kevlar helmets and modern body armor. With some individual adjustments: one prefers leather sandals, and another has the kevlar helmet backwards. “It allows me to place my rifle better,” he says. His instructors bow to the cardboard he shows in support: everything is right on target. So be it.

Unpaid soldiers
At the rear of a Ford Ranger, four recently incorporated Afghans are tossed towards an area where they are supposed to show up in response to a fictitious ambush. That is their initial instruction, which must come to an end within weeks. One of them, aged 18, shares with spontaneity. “I have not received pay for the past two months,” he says, half-amused, half annoyed. Laying on the ground moments later, under orders from an instructor who tries to make a good impression, the soldier shouts: “Bam bam bam bam bam bam bam … I would have liked to shoot, but we do not have blank ammunition for the exercise “ Is he still in good spirits anyway? He does not answer yes or no, a grunt escapes his mouth. However, his determination to fight at gunpoint is firm: “I’m not afraid to go into battle, I am even eager to be there,” he says with an attitude steeped in masculinity. A tradition in Afghanistan.

Little arrangements regarding jerrycans…
Starting at dawn towards the valley of Tagab. A logistics company of the Afghan army (a “coy”) leaves to supply kitchen wood to two Afghan outposts. Their food supply, unlike the Western troops, is local. And their method of cooking, traditional: from large pots on the fire. In the convoy, Ford Ranger pick-ups and Humwees armed in a respectable way surround gleaming trucks with a payload of 7 tons and bearing the International brand. There are also three French armored vehicles: on board, armed militaries of the “Train” (i.e. the French Army logisticians) on a mentoring mission with their Afghan counterparts for a period of six months. Journey without mishap until the first battle station, situated on parallel 42: the “hornet’s nest” controlled by supporters of the Tagab Valley begins at this point, but no incidents to report. Lieutenant Jérémie [the French army requires that the civilian press keeps the anonymity of its members in Afghanistan, NDLA] still displays astonishment. This officer of the 2nd material Regiment is the chief of the convoy’s French elements. He receives a message sent trough his interpreter: the Afghan part of the convoy, he learns, has restarted without his knowledge towards the second position on the parallel 51, further north, and in the heart of the insurgent area. The Afghan convoy commander estimated that the risks of being attacked were lowered significantly by not being accompanied by French armored vehicles. His calculation paid off: not even one harassing fire punctuated his one and a half round trip. On the position of latitude 42, the French find time a bit long. The mood is philosophical: “After all, they are at home, it is their country, we’re just guests”, a French logistician interjects. Another one is more upset: “When they need us, they know where to find us, but beyond that, they do not even bother to be courteous.” This sentencing was a little tough but did not take long to prove true: the French Lieutenant just received a second message through his interpreter that makes his blood boil. He gathers his ten men on the field and addresses them in an unfussy style: “The Mouchkil [the problem, NDLA] today is what? The Mouchkil is that they are almost dry on some vehicles. In one of them, they have less than a quarter tank. It means that we will go to Kabul on the way back and we will run out of fuel. So, as usual, we will give them a jerrycan. I’m sorry but that’s the way it is.” According to their own smart calculations, the Afghan logisticians manage to systematically be given fuel by the French under duress: unless they remain stranded and fear a possible roadside bombing, the options are scarce. That’s worth an explanation between French and Afghan command. We observe the scene from a distance: the Afghani tempers, smiles effectively and the “case” is resolved. The return convoy starts off, rolls a bit, and 60 kilometers from Kabul, stops. Cans are unloaded from the French tanks by Afghanis. Chief Warrant Officer Yves, a noncommissioned officer of the 515th regiment of the train, looks on, perplexed. He comments: “For them, everything that can be set aside is worth taking. It is even common for a tanker of the Afghan army to never reach its destination. The crew disappears for two weeks, and then returns to the kandak, where it is immediately reinstated, after one of their secret arrangements, as if nothing had happened.” It must be said that fuel is a very sought after good, because the difficult supply makes it very expensive. Corruption, which is so often the subject of debate at the political level, sometimes undermining the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Karzaï administration, thus also affects, not surprisingly, the army ranks … “It is morally reprehensible,” moderates the Sergeant-Chef Hervé of the 515th Regiment of the Train,” but humanly understandable: the price of fuel on the black market in Kabul is very high.” Certainly.

“Time to fill their pockets”
Back in Paris. We meet Johan Freckhaus, a French expert on Afghan issues. A former Massoud comrade, a former team member of the presidential campaign of the candidate Abdullah [1], he prefers to blame large scale political mistakes rather than individuals. “Corruption in Afghanistan is not based on a group of bad people that we could identify and replace. What a good excuse: we would do an admirable job unfortunately marred by a shameless native administration! The truth is that the centralized and authoritarian system that we have put in place [at the loya jirga – traditional constituent assembly – in 2003, NDLA] with the help of an emigrant, urban and progressive Afghan elite, is unsuited to the fundamentally rural, conservative and religious country. This system has no chance of survival and, by using force to impose itself, it only creates rejection, as indeed before him Prince Daoud’s “republic” in the ’70s and the Communists’ “democracy” in the 80’s. The more resentment, the less hope and the more Afghans are in the moment, in search of quick profits. Today, there are foreigners and money; it’s time to fill their pockets for the future of the family, the future education of the children, even exile if the Taliban was to be back soon!

“The truth is that the centralized and authoritarian system that we have put in place [at the loya jirga – traditional constituent assembly – in 2003, NDLA] with the help of an emigrant, urban and progressive Afghan elite, is unsuited to the fundamentally rural, conservative and religious country. This system has no chance of survival and, by using force to impose itself, it only creates rejection, as indeed before him Prince Daoud’s “republic” in the ’70s and the Communists’ “democracy” in the 80’s. The more resentment, the less hope and the more Afghans are in the moment, in search of quick profits. Today, there are foreigners and money; it’s time to fill their pockets for the future of the family, the future education of the children, even exile if the Taliban was to be back soon!

“The strategy of ‘always more’: an illusion”
Beyond the feelings collected during this report, the issue raised by Johan Freckhaus about the Afghan army is more fundamental: “There is indeed an insurgency in Afghanistan because  you have 30 000 or 40 000 rebel fighters – according to allied military intelligence – backed by millions of Afghan civilians, in growing numbers, who feed them, house them, transport them, protect them, give them information and so on. These civilians are doing it foremost to drive foreign troops out of the country and in rejection of the system we are trying to impose, but do not want the return to power of the mullahs either. Withdrawing our troops is therefore the right strategy to effectively drive a wedge between the rebels and their supporters. This famous momentum, this magic moment where the power relationship can be reversed, will come from fair and complete withdrawal of foreign forces, because then the fate of the country will return to its population. Then the Afghan security forces, as they exist today, would very well be capable, with the help of villagers, of chasing away those rebels on motorcycles mainly armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers, whose most lethal know-how is simply to trigger explosives remotely. The strategy of “always more” prevalent until today for the Afghan security forces is a dangerous illusion: more troops, more money, more power to the central government, all of this is counter-productive, it fuels the insurgency! We are building oversized security forces in Afghanistan that the country is far from being able to afford. We imagine a police state, supported from abroad, which would subject the population to the decisions of Kabul. We imagine building in a few years, for one of the poorest countries in the world, an army that could successfully maintain in power a hyper-centralized system. This is not sustainable.” Let’s remember, for the record, that the Afghan government, which now has 140, 000 military and 109, 000 police officers, aims at a 240,000 military and 240,000 police officers force [2]. And that is for a country of about 20 million inhabitants. In comparison, France, for a population three times larger, has fewer than 170,000 military personnel (ground and air) and 265 000 gendarmes and police officers.

For the record, that the Afghan government, which now has 140, 000 military and 109, 000 police officers, aims at a 240,000 military and 240,000 police officers force [2]. And that is for a country of about 20 million inhabitants.

Exiting the conflict “from the top”
Organizational and strategy matters are also emerging: shouldn’t the Afghan army enhance its defense functions rather than the control of areas by a mass infantry? Focus on heavy melee and support weapons, such as tanks, artillery, engineering, and its vital functions such as maintenance, logistics and supporting the troops, rather than recruiting legions of brave men left and right? In addition to the French military logisticians mentors belonging to the “Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams” that we followed, several thousand of troops, French and from other nations under the NATO banner, already participate in the Epidote mission, within “Embedded Training Teams” in educating and mentoring in the logistics, artillery, cavalry and engineers fields. An action plan from the U.S. military has set up an effective system of payment for the Afghan army in 2010 although, as we leaned through our story, progress still needs to be made. No partnership initiative has yet emerged internally, to our knowledge, in the areas of maintenance. Those practical considerations are essential but certainly not sufficient for exiting the conflict “from the top”. The geostrategic explorations still deserve to be discussed elsewhere [3].

No partnership initiative has yet emerged internally, to our knowledge, in the areas of maintenance.

———-

Footnotes & references

[1]  Present in the second round of Afghan presidential elections in 2009, before withdrawing his candidacy due to suspicions of electoral fraud.

[2] http://fr.rian.ru/world/20101003/187552455.html

[3] Johan Freckhaus wanted to add about this matter during our interview: “Our mistake is that of stubbornness. We’d do better to finally propose a more relevant, decentralized and distributed political system, and to give up the poison of “strategic partnership” to return to the historical neutrality – which has always been the stability of Afghanistan – rather than wanting to create over time a “new man” who would adapt to what we wish for his country, who would obey the President “in all that he will order” provided that that President is favorable to us. Finally, we only give the Afghans a choice to be with us or against us. And unfortunately, we must note that they are increasingly likely to be on the side of our enemies.”

Waging the Future Fight

11/23/2010

Budget Decisions and the Future of the Martial Enterprise

By Vince Martinez

Budget Freeze: the F-22 Raptor has been one of the first victims
Credit photo: www.flightgear.org


11/23/2010 – Decisions, Dollars and the Future
It is no surprise that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the MV-22 Osprey are in the sights of many within the Department of Defense (DoD) as looming budget cuts make their way to the forefront.  As big ticket programs, with relatively high price tags, it is easy to make budget decisions when all you choose to be concerned about is the impact on the bottom line.  Unfortunately, this type of conventional wisdom often leads to decisions against investment in truly innovative and operationally significant technologies because of high risk, and instead chooses to emphasize fiscal prudence by ascribing to an investment strategy that propagates more affordable, and often less capable solutions in order to save money.  To add insult to injury, we have collectively used up our operational resources and are now willfully putting them away wet.  We have been reluctant to spend the money necessary to keep our operational resources ready for war, and now we have transitioned to a point where we are even more reluctant to replace the aging gear—even if the current systems are operating well past their projected service life with no visible replacements on the horizon.

We have been reluctant to spend the money necessary to keep our operational resources ready for war, and now we have transitioned to a point where we are even more reluctant to replace the aging gear—even if the current systems are operating well past their projected service life with no visible replacements on the horizon.

Unfortunately, most of these programmatic decisions are not the byproduct of what actually happens on the battlefield.  These pitched fights are waged, won or lost in the boardrooms of major Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), in the confines of service specific strategy sessions, are the direct results of sanitized budget drills, fall prey to political banter and are even driven by investment decisions on Wall Street.  Most decision makers who influence these outcomes are often far removed from the operational landscape where the technologies ultimately manifest, and through no fault of their own, have been trained to view their battlespace in a completely different light than the warfighters they are meant to support.  While many will point out that this is far from a new insight, it can at least be surmised that we are now–once again–in a place in history where these decisions can and will dramatically impact our ability to fight and win the next war, and can dramatically impact our ability to posture our country for future success.  Those who are in key positions across the military enterprise have to be cognizant of the impacts of their decisions, and despite their relative safety from the threat of harm often experienced by the armed service members they are meant to represent and support, they must also ensure they do not approach these types of decisions lightly because the stakes are extremely high.


Production and Manufacturing Decline and the Martial Enterprise
There are significant differences between the technological landscape of today and that which was experienced in generations past.  For the United States in particular, much of its production capacity has been outsourced to countries around the globe.  As a direct result, the U.S. has managed to erode generations of knowledge and experience in fabrication, machining, smelting and manufacturing of precious metals and large-scale production; just to name a few.  Critics would argue that trade restrictions surrounding the purchase of military equipment have preserved our wartime capacity, but reality shows that the number of manufacturing and production facilities in the U.S., along with the vast expanse of manufacturing and production expertise that comprised the work force, has declined significantly over the last 30 years.  Critics will also point toward the fact that many of our manufacturing jobs have given way to more productive, hi-tech methods that better help us to satisfy the demands of our consumer based economy, and would even argue that bottom line gains have been made relative to manpower required to support a higher level of production.  All logical, defendable arguments from a statistical perspective, but any battlefield commander will tell you, it is often the things that you can not see that should make you worry the most.

There are other impacts that often prove difficult to see when simply looking at the number of widgets one can produce for a given cost on a spreadsheet.  For the military industrial complex, as an example, every large OEM has a long list of vendors who serve as sub-contractors in support of large Federal contracts.  Many of these businesses fall into the small business category, and often do not have the luxuries of large-scale production capacity, hi-tech machinery or even a stable workforce to run them.  With the cumbersome DoD acquisitions process, it is often exceedingly difficult for small companies to set aside the time and effort necessary to comply with all of the mandates and compliance issues necessary to acquire federal contracts.  These companies often have to rely on the larger OEMs to provide that contracting and acquisitions expertise to actually gain work, and programs like the JSF and the MV-22 provide opportunities for small business not only to keep the doors open and provide jobs, but more importantly,  also allows smaller companies to participate in the development and fielding of new, cutting edge technologies.  The numbers of available sub-vendors, sadly, is dwindling by the day due to not only the impacts of a constricting Federal budget, but also the slowdown on the commercial side of the production machine.  As a result, many of these companies are being forced to close their doors.  This hurts everyone—large, small and Federal.  And again, to add insult to injury, we have also created an environment where generations of Americans have turned away from careers in the trades as a direct result of the inconsistency of work and the lack of opportunity.

The numbers of available sub-vendors, sadly, is dwindling by the day due to not only the impacts of a constricting Federal budget, but also the slowdown on the commercial side of the production machine.  As a result, many of these companies are being forced to close their doors.

The key to maintaining the advantage in martial endeavors has always been innovation.  There are also exponential benefits to the U.S. economy by fostering the development of a knowledgeable, agile and experienced workforce through the martial enterprise.  As companies are now seeking technological expertise and the bottom line advantages of an overseas workforce, we also are seeing a corresponding decrease in our ability to sustain those who wish to pursue the same opportunities in the United States.  The martial enterprise is one of the last vestiges of a once deep bench of innovation, research and production machines that were directly responsible for winning World War II and the Cold War, and also fueled the growth of the commercial sector in robust, post-war eras.  This niche of the U.S. economy not only produces technologies that provide martial advantages, but also incubates some of the best opportunities for young and old Americans alike to cultivate careers that develop and harvest ideas and technologies that are worthy of competition on a worldwide scale.  The JSF and the MV-22 have changed entire technological paradigms, as an example, and are the result of aggressive innovation and investment on both the government and industry side of the fence.  Based on the latest budgetary decisions surrounding those platforms, however, it is clear much of that has been lost in an overwhelmingly distracting argument about what the paperwork or the balance sheets call for.  It is precisely these types of technological advances, however, that can and should serve as a catalyst for future development in the technological arena—martial and otherwise.  Keeping these programs alive and well is as important to the U.S. economy as it is for military advantage, and it also serves to incentivize industry to continue to invest their own developmental dollars into new and innovative technologies that can be eventually be produced on a strategic scale.

Here come the trees…
As anyone can attest, the number of innovators out there in the U.S. market that can actually produce an F-22 Raptor, a JSF or an MV-22 are sparse.  We have choked off innovation and the cultivation of business in the defense sector because of an archaic acquisitions approach that flourishes on regimented and predictable thought, cumbersome processes and procedures, and a funding strategy that views industry profit as a negative term.  Without a system that rewards and funds innovation, the military industry will continue to be the landscape of giants who have the overhead and the depth to weather the fiscal drought.  We will also guarantee a limited depth chart in terms of who is available to turn to in order to solve emerging issues.  In the end, we only have ourselves to blame for setting the stage for some of the most innovative technologies ever fielded to go by the wayside, along with all the secondary and tertiary benefits that come along with it.  How do you increase the readiness and reliability of an airplane?  Innovation.  How do you solve interoperability issues with other platforms?  Innovation.  How do you create opportunities for martial advantage in the future?  Fund technological innovation on foster growth on a production level scale.  If we can’t collectively see the tactical, operational and strategic advantages of the MV-22 and the JSF because we have been trained to focus on the distracters, then maybe we should try looking at those programs from a different angle; the MV-22 and the JSF are the martial enterprise’s best incubators for the future–plain and simple.

Without a system that rewards and funds innovation, the military industry will continue to be the landscape of giants who have the overhead and the depth to weather the fiscal drought.

Often, you run across military and former military people telling jokes along the lines of “…congratulations, you just managed to kill the MV-22 Program!  What now Lieutenant?”  Unfortunately, this is now more reality than satire.  The greatest disappointment, however, is that we likely don’t have an answer to that very simple question that isn’t an evolutionary step backward.  This is the time where leaders must lead.  Those in the positions to do so must ensure they are bold enough to look out long and far enough to be able to differentiate the forest from the trees.

Altering the Course of a War With LAA

09/24/2010

Light Attack Aircraft Can Alter the Course of a War

By Ed Timperlake

Credit : Super Tucano Landing, Embraer, 2010

September 24th, 2010 – The world has taken notice of an important and successful military attack in a nasty war raging in Colombia, South America. The event has a lesson for the American Military especially in Afghanistan.

Recently, Colombia has killed a key FARC leader with a strike task force. As reported by AFP on September 24th, 2010:

The military said that 72 warplanes, including 30 helicopters, low-flying Super Tucano attack planes and Israeli-built Kfir jets, were involved in the attack, dubbed “Operation Sodom.” Also killed were three senior rebel leaders, including a member of the FARC directorate, a regional military commander, and the head of the group’s urban militias, according to the military.

Second Line of Defense is fortunate to have recently interviewed Colonel William Buckey USMCR (ret), now Vice-President of North America for Embraer, the maker of the Super Tucano, as well as the Embraer Brazilian leadership team. These interviews will appear soon on SLD. Willam Buckey’s interview is important because his last assignment before retiring was serving as the senior Marine Aviator building out Kandahar for the President’s surging of troops into combat. He and his NATO Team were nominated for the prestigious Collier Trophy for their efforts, and the airfield at Kandahar is now the largest and busiest single runway operation in the world. Colonel Buckey has provided his insights into the combat need for a light attack aircraft and recent events in South America have just shown that the combat effectiveness of such an approach can alter events for winning in a very dramatic way.

As the French news report about a successful operation to schwack some very bad individuals, it shows the Super Tucano has yet again demonstrated its world class reputation as an extremely capable combat tested light attack aircraft. In the U.S. Military, three very capable American combat Generals know of the Super Tucano: General Mattis, General McCrystal, and General Petraeus. All have to be “platform agnostic” in support of the concept of operations in a program called Imminent Fury II. All three men are warriors who want fielded capability to help win in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Congress delayed or permanently ended IF II and that is not good.

  • General Mattis then Commanding Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) testified about a special forces effort called operation Imminent Fury II. The Department of Defense supported the effort and sent a request to Congress to act. The entire action from testinomy to request took just a month, which is relative light speed. But nothing occured. Then a letter was made public in the Washington Times by Bill Gertz that showed General McCrystal solidly behind the rapid fielding of Imminent Fury II. General Petraeus in the chain-of-command as then CG Central Command forwarded the letter to the Chairman. But nothing happened.
  • It turns out that, unlike the recent combat success in Colombia, Imminent Fury II was stopped by Congressional Action. An immediate request for a combat program was not approved by Congress because IF II was going to use the Super Tucano. The ST is in direct competition with the attempt by the Hawker Beech to convert their T-6 Texan trainer into a combat aircraft–the AT-6. The T-6 Texan trainer (the basis for the proposed AT-6) is manufactured in Kansas by Hawker Beach a Canadian-owned firm currently in dire financial straits. There have been reports that, in order to stave off disaster, management has been considering moving some production lines to Mexico.
  • It now appears, looking at the Congressional reporting, that stoping IF II was part of a bigger effort to give time, so a combat version of the T-6 could be developed and tested. Unfortunately the Afghan War goes on and time is short. Congress has earmarked millions to try and get the T-6 Texan, a US Air Force trainer aircraft, up to combat standards ahead of a pending fly-off competition for equipping the emerging Afghan National Army Air Corps. This fly off will be a competitive test of ready-to-fly, non-developmental tactical light attack planes that are currently available. The “AT-6B” version of the trainer is not yet ready. The non-combat certified AT-6B’s competitor is Brazil’s Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, the FARC killer that has been operational for several years. including several combat missions schwacking FARC guerillas in the dead of night.

Colonel Buckey and Embraer have a good story to tell to appear soon on our website.

The A400M: Capabilities and Concepts of Operations

07/15/2010

When Second Line of Defense visited Spain in May 2010 for the Trade Media briefings given by Military Airbus, there was an opportunity to visit the A400M final assembly line and to see the 4th A400M under construction which can be seen in the slide show below.  In addition Peter Scoffham gave a tour of the aircraft highlighting some of the design features of the aircraft.  In a futher discussion with Scoffham, it was clear that the capabilities of the aircraft would have implications for concepts of operations.  To follow up on the initial conversation, an interview was conducted in early July focusing on the relationship between design features of the aircraft and approaches to operations.

Peter Scoffham enjoyed a full career as a pilot in the Royal Air Force flying Vulcan bombers, Victor air-to-air refuelling tankers and VC10K tanker/transports.  He has carried out numerous operational missions in conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Atlantic, the Balkans and the Middle East, and has completed overseas tours in Cyprus, Canada and Belgium.  While in Belgium he served as the NATO Branch Chief in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) with the primary responsibility for coordinating the international force deployments for both the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo operations in the mid-to-late1990s.

On leaving the RAF in August 2003, he joined Airbus Military in Toulouse as the Military Advisor for the A400M Airlifter programme.  He is now Vice President Defence Capability Marketing for Airbus Military with the responsibility of marketing Airbus Military’s comprehensive product range of military airlifters and aerial refuelling tankers. 

***

 

Building the 4th A400M, Sevilla, Spain, May 2010

SLD: As you gave us a tour, talk to me a little bit about the engines.  You were talking about the staggering of the engines and the performance characteristics of the engines, which seems to me allows a lot of flexibility in the performance of this aircraft for the kinds of missions we’re talking about.

Peter Scoffham: People  ask me: why did we go for a turbo prop rather than a turbo fan?  And of course, the  simple answer is that today’s  turbo prop technology now allows an extremely powerful engine to be built, enabling  equivalent high cruise altitudes  and almost equivalenthigh cruise speeds as turbo fan airlifters.  The powerplant technology now enables not only equivalent speeds to  those of turbo jets but also retains  all the tactical advantages that turboprops bring over jets.

For example, we all know that  engine performance suffers whenoperating at high airfield elevations  and at high temperatures.  But jets suffer more than props.  The other thing is, the most dangerous flight part or part of the flight profile for an aircraft is actually when it’s close to the ground, below say 5,000 feet because of MANPADs or man portable air defenses whether they be  shoulder-held  missile systems or small-arms fire.

Even though turbo jets like the C17 can descend extremely rapidly from high level, actually, there’s not much threat up there, but what a turbo fan or jet can’t do is plummet below 5,000 feet, because they accelerate too quickly, not having sufficient drag, so they can’t slow down sufficiently for a  tactical landing.

Whereas  aircraft like the C130 and A400M with  large propellers can indeed do a rapid  descent and you will have seen that at air shows, – a very impressive tactical  descent, flair and touchdown from turbo prop aircraft.  So in sum, the A400M powerplants bring the advantages of high speed and high altitude plus the tactical advantages of turbo prop engines.

SLD: And so the point on that is that the rapid rate of descent below 5,000 gives the pilot and the operational team a lot of flexibility to develop tactics for operations in the battle space?

Peter Scoffham: Absolutely.  And although it still has to be tested through flight test, we are anticipating that the A400M in the final stages of descent below 5,000 feet, can have up to a 14 degree  approach path which compares to something like 11.5 degree approach for a C-130 and about six, maybe six and a half for a C17.

So you can see that in terms of a tactical descent, either getting down to low level quickly or  possibly  landing in a hostile forward operating area, , those turboprop engines  give a lot of survivability to the aircraft.

SLD:    And that characteristic takes us back to the point we really started with which is that 10 years ago,  air forces had a very different expectation of how they intended to use their airlifters than they do now.  Now you expect them to be at the center of the battle space, and we no longer  think of it as essentially  a bus going from A to B; these tactical characteristics become far, far more significant as part of the integrated force in the battle space.

Peter Scoffham: Especially in hostile environments where forces such as those of the US and UK are operating, because there’s a growing desire to deliver heavy equipment directly to the point of effect or the point of need.  This is where we are actually  putting armored vehicles directly into the forward area where, the vehicles roll off the aircraft ramp, and if necessary, ready to open fire immediately.  Whereas maybe 10 years ago, when we were still very much into the hub-and-spoke mentality of the 60s, 70s, and 80s, clearly that would not have been likely.

SLD: You were showing during the tour the undercarriage design and the landing flexibility of that design in addition to the benefits it brings in  airdropping.  As I remember it, you were looking at the numbers of wheels and also the design of the undercarriage which allows an interesting capability of the aircraft to be able to airdrop without really worrying about the cargo being sucked back behind the aircraft. Could you comment on this?

Peter Scoffham: There are two parts to this question.  So let us consider  the actual landing bit first, and then we’ll talk about the airdrop afterwards.  The ability to land on rough unprepared and soft airstrips was a fundamental  European requirement, and  it gives tremendous utility for delivering heavy equipment to the “point- of-effect” or the “point- of- need”.  The European Air Forces wanted  a rapid response capability for a global presence or reach, but because the European nations couldn’t necessarily afford to have many types of airplanes with all the different characteristics of large, medium and small, they needed one aircraft to do all.

So, the then “Future Large Aircraft” as it was called in the 1990s, now the A400M, had to have at least as good as a tactical performance as the aircraft it was replacing, in this case, C130 Hercules and C160 Transals.

And in particular  able to land on at least as soft as or indeed even softer surfaces than , those airplanes it was going to replace. We can achieve this because the A400M has 12 wheels, and it’s just simply the effect of increasing the aircraft’s footprint.  The equivalent would be, shall we say, walking on a snowshoe on the snow, rather than just sinking in.

And one of other thing a small but  nonetheless an important design feature, is that the nose wheels on the A400M, have been deliberately made slightly larger than traditional nose wheels so that on very soft surfaces they do not  “dig in”.

SLD: Now to the question of the airdrop characteristics that the design of the aircraft allows?

Peter Scoffham:  The main problem with any  aircraft with a ramp is that the airflow  behind the ramp tends to get sucked in, and if you were  dropping paratroopers simultaneously, there’s a risk that they would collide with each other some  100 meters or 100 yards behind the aircraft.

So one of the things the designers had to do was to try to  smooth out that airflow around the back of the airplane –    and you’ll have seen how on many other airplanes there are strakes, wing  fences, vortex generators and all sorts of other  aerodynamic gizmos to try and overcome this problem.

But even with these aerodynamic gizmos, some airplanes have not been able to overcome the  problem, and therefore have no option but to go for  paratroops jumping alternatively from  side doors,  This means that the paratroops land over a much greater area which of course is not ideal. Accordingly, and to overcome this problem, the A400M wheel wells or wheel bays were designed specifically to have an aerodynamic shape resulting in a clean or lamina flow behind the aircraft – which in turn allowed paratroops to jump simultaneously without fear of colliding in the slipstream.

But there are other advantages to having these larger but aerodynamic wheel bays.  First, apart from cleaning up the air  around the back of the airplane, in that these larger wheel bays enable a step to be incorporated into their design so that the paratroops can now exit the aircraft more easily.

And secondly, by increasing the size of the wheel bays both forwards and backwards   there are now  two large spaces  which can be used to accommodate systems which normally clutter up the inside of a freight bay.  Accordingly,   the freight bay is now clean or at least cleaner, which maximizes  the available cargo space.

SLD:    This allows you if you want to insert a special forces package, you could have a combination of actual special forces guys and kit dropped simultaneously from a small number of aircraft, which would be a huge advantage.

Peter Scoffham:  There are two points here.  The first thing is if we’re talking special forces and packages, the ramp on  current in-service tactical airlifters, has a limiting load of about one metric tonne, although this reduces to about half-a-tonne if it is to be dropped from the ramp.But the advantage of the A400M is that its  ramp  can carry a six metric tonne payload  and  for airdropping as a part of a package a  payload of four and a half  metric tonnes can be dropped .

So in terms of a special forces insertion with a concurrent drop of equipment, you now have a situation where paratroops   can jump at the same time out the side doors and  a metric four and half tonne load can be dropped from  the ramp.  This, of course, gives them tremendous flexibility.  And just while we’re talking Special Forces, there was a requirement for the high-altitude delivery of Special Forces.  As an example of this civil airliners cruise at about 34-35,000 feet.  But, the A400M is designed to fly one mile higher, at 40,000 feet, then open the ramp, and enable special forces to jump with all of their specialist kit .  At the moment, there is no other aircraft capable of doing that.

SLD: Your aircraft seems to me to be well designed for the new operational scenarios in which forces expect the airlifter to be part of the operational battlespace.

Peter Scoffham: Absolutely. Whereas in the past, as you and I well know, we always say you develop kit to fight the last war, and the next war is never the same.– well, pleasingly, the A400M is not only able to meet today’s requirements but it is versatile and flexible enough to meet evolving requirements and hence it will be ideal for  future operations as well.

SLD: One of the things I was struck with when we were watching the video of the testing of the aircraft was the testing involving engine stalling.  And what impressed me about that was inherent basic stability of the aircraft. This has a tremendous potential for allowing a customer to put on the aircraft things that I can jettison out of the back that allows me to get very innovative over the next 40 years. 

Whether they be cruise missiles, whether they be UAVs or various robotic elements, it seems to me that the basic aircraft given the inherent stability of the aircraft and the size of the aircraft, and the ability to operate in a battle space, it gives a customer, a lot of flexibility in how to use this over the next 40 years.

Peter Scoffham:   I’ve flown large airplanes for most of my life, and we often say flying a large airplane is  like aiming a wet sponge, it doesn’t react like a fighter!, So it was  interestingly yesterday, when we had a presentation by our chief test pilot and he specifically mentioned the A400M’s aerodynamic stability.

One of the videos we saw was the A400M  flying in formation.  And it was absolutely astonishing how steady the airplanes in formation were,  – re-affirmed by  the chief test pilot who said he was astonished how on the first flight information,  the aircraft performed so well.

During a flight test programme my understanding is the first  couple of hundred hours or so on any test program is  all to do with validating aerodynamic performance.  And something which has been so pleasing about the test program to date  is that the aerodynamic design  of the A400M  has been verified.   So  aerodynamically, the A400M really is proving to be a great success already.

Now, moving onto possible A400M’s variants.  The big advantage of any big airplane like this, of course, is that it can have many, many functional roles.  And if you think of the Hercules over the last 50 or 60 years, the number of variants of Hercules shows how such an aircraft  can be modified .  But at  the moment, – and I am sure you’ll  understand this -, we are totally and utterly focused on meeting the European launch contract

But there is actually no reason why when that launch contract has been largely satisfied, we cannot concentrate on maximizing the undoubted flexibility of this airplane, along the lines that you stated.

SLD: The basic aircraft will be in operation for many years, and given its inherent flexibility, represents a key element for 21st century air capability.

Peter Scoffham: I would not only agree with you, I would reinforce it by saying that if you consider that airplanes built in the 1960s are still flying today some  40 years or even 50 years on, then considering the use today of modern materials, linked to  modern maintenance techniques, then there is no reason why the A400M should not be around for  60, 70 or even 80 years from now.  And when you consider the potentially long life of the A400M  and the potential flexibility for it to undertake many, many variants, this aircraft  is a tremendously good investment for nations.

SLD: You were talking a little bit earlier about the aid  missions.  Talk to me a little bit about the capability of the aircraft to allow you to work in a more flexible environment so that you could operate eight missions in a variety of spectrums.  Because at the end of the day what’s often not realized is aid is going to areas that have had devastation by definition.  And that means that you don’t have optimal airfields, optimal landing conditions. 

Peter Scoffham: Absolutely.  Now, obviously as military men, our primary focus is on military operations.  But if we  were to  look at it from a political point of view, or maybe from the point-of-view of the benefit it could bring to  society ,  the A400M is attractive to nations because More and

more emphasis is now being put onto nation’s ability to play its part on the international world stage of civil assistance.  Sometimes we call those civic missions.  And the classic example of that, just as you say, is providing aid to the devastated areas caused by earthquakes, typhoons, flooding or  other natural disasters.

The key here actually parallels the A400M’s support of forward operations for military forces.   in the past, people think of aid to a disaster area as being supplying blankets, food and bottled water.  Actually,  the Tsunami of December of 2004 made us all realize , that if buildings are collapsing on people, like the earthquakes in Pakistan, like in Haiti a few months ago, or indeed in like Sumatra of late last year. What you need in the first few hours of any rescue mission is very heavy engineering equipment to lift that masonry off the  people who are trapped beneath.  And you’ve got to do it very quickly; you’re talking about 24 or maybe 36 hours maximum, to get that heavy engineering equipment to the point of disaster.  And that means you can’t send it by boat, you can’t send it by train, and you can’t even really send it by  very large aircraft, because they need the facilities of well-equipped large airfields which are often a considerable distance from the disaster area..

So, the big advantage of an aircraft like the A400M, is that you can now deliver that big, heavy engineering equipment, directly to the devastated area  and  you’ll give those people who are trapped in that 24-hour window- of- opportunity a much, much greater chance of survival.

———–

*** Posted on July 15th, 2010

An Update on the Distributed Aperture System

07/06/2010
No more dogfigth: with DAS, the missiles do the turning, not the aircraft (credit: Electro Optical..., ibid, slide 6)

SLD talked with Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems’ Mark Rossi about the Distributed Aperture System (DAS) on the F-35, which together with the helmet provides 360-degree situational awareness for the F-35 pilot. Mark has served as the Director of the AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EO DAS) for the F-35 platform, having management responsibility for the product development and production of the EO DAS hardware and software.  He joined Northrop Grumman in 1984 and has held numerous positions of increasing responsibility in Technical Subcontract Management, Business Development and Program Management.

***

SLD: The Distributed Aperture System (DAS) is one of the reasons why the development of the F-35 is about the next 30 years of military aviation, not the past 30 years. Yet folks have not really wrapped their heads around what DAS is or can and will do for the warfighter.

Mark Rossi: The biggest problem facing DAS is the fact that it is a complete unknown to most people, but as they become more familiar with its value, they begin to realize just how revolutionary this system will be for the warfighter. DAS changes the game. If you consider radars for instance, the utility radar brings to the fight has been fundamental to the mission of our armed forces for decades.

Practically everything since WWII has been equipped with radar; and our radars just keep getting better and more capable.  The technology is evolving with the advances in electronics.  We just keep building on prior capability. The capability DAS brings to the fight however is new – and will change the way the game is played significantly.

No more dogfigth: with DAS, the missiles do the turning, not the aircraft (credit: Electro Optical..., ibid, slide 6)
With DAS 360-degree spherical situational awareness capability, there is no need to dogfigth: the missiles do the turning, not the aircraft (credit: Pete Bartos, Electro Optical DAS Media Briefing, Slide 6, Northrop Grumman, 2010)

The services have never experienced anything like the unprecedented capability provided by DAS. While pilots who have witnessed demonstrations of our capability are typically wowed by our imagery and performance metrics, few have any real idea of the magnitude of the capability they are actually receiving with the DAS system. The key discriminator that DAS brings to JSF is full, 360-degree spherical situational awareness. We create this bubble around the airplane where we see everything of interest, all the time, simultaneously. Spherical situational awareness will significantly change the game.

SLD: Is this a man-machine interface we’re talking about?

Mark Rossi: Yes, but we make it easy for him. From a situational awareness point of view, the pilot does absolutely nothing. We are monitoring the world around him all the time and then differentiating and reporting things that occur in that global scene that are important to the pilot. It’s only when we determine that something important has occurred that he’ll even know anything’s going on – except, of course, for day/night imagery that is presented to him continually on his Helmet Mounted display and on his panoramic cockpit display.

SLD: DAS provides 360-degree spherical situational awareness for the individual pilot on the F-35, but is there any reason that we couldn’t take that fused data and share it?

Mark Rossi: There’s no reason we couldn’t share DAS data short of any limitations of the current data links in the aircraft.

SLD: But the point is that you’re standing up a basic capability on the first production aircraft and there’s the opportunity to take this capability, which is unprecedented, and figure out new ways to share data and new ways to battle manage.  In other words, you’re investing in the future by buying this capability.

Mark Rossi: Absolutely.  There is no telling how the services will want to use or potentially enhance DAS functionality in the future – on or off-board a single JSF – as the users become more familiar with the capability DAS has to offer.

SLD: So the point—focusing on the individual aircraft now and the pilot managing the aircraft—this allows him to have capabilities to see 360 degrees and understand the threat envelope around him so that the pilot can declutter the battlespace and focus on the most important priorities.

Mark Rossi: We declutter it for him automatically. We classify the world into things that the pilot would care about such as air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles as well as airborne objects like aircraft within range and only present to him only those things that he should focus on.

SLD: Why is the DAS so misunderstood or underestimated?

Mark Rossi: First of all, the users don’t really understand what DAS is going to do for them.  They have no real point of reference. Again this capability is revolutionary. But more importantly, many currently fielded missile warning systems are fraught with error producing high false alarm rates. The reliability and accuracy of the DAS ensures a whole new level of trust and confidence in the capability we provide to the warfighter.

The reliability and accuracy of the DAS ensures a whole new level of trust and confidence in the capability we provide to the warfighter.

SLD: How does the new helmet for the F-35 interact with the DAS?

Mark Rossi: The DAS provides 360-degree NavFLIR (Navigation Forward Looking Infrared) capability that is projected on the helmet display.  FLIR is an archaic term because FLIR stands for forward looking infrared. We’re not forward looking; we’re everywhere looking. But it’s a term that people are familiar with so we stick with it. So if you think about it, all the information is already being collected as part of the situational awareness and missile warning modes. We simply determine the line of sight of the pilot based on his head position and process the raw image data for enhanced display on the HMD.

He can basically see anywhere he turns his head—even if he is looking right through the floor of the plane because we see everything in 360-degree spherical space!  We also provide a separate video feed to the Panoramic Cockpit Display that displays a pilot-selected line of sight, at his discretion. All of this functionality replaces bulky night vision goggles that are significantly challenged in urban lighting situations. When we have demonstrated our NavFLIR capability to Navy pilots, they tend to be awestruck at the possibility of even seeing the horizon clearly, let alone seeing the carrier and its wake.  DAS is going to revolutionize night landings on aircraft carriers.

DAS is going to revolutionize night landings on aircraft carriers.

SLD: You mentioned fusion. The fact that this data is fused… can you tell me a little bit about what advantage that brings?

Mark Rossi: The fusion that we do at our level is relative to the integration of the six sensors installed throughout the aircraft. It’s fused into a singular unit that does not lose track of things across sector or camera boundaries, and provides seamless imagery between sensors regardless of line of sight.

Being able to stitch the seams to the point that we don’t lose a track across a boundary in inertial space is critical to meeting our performance requirements.

[slidepress gallery=’das-update-july-2010′]

SLD: You’re providing technologies, tools that really allow the pilot to act very differently, function very differently.

Mark Rossi: This kind of technology will not be foreign to the next generation of fighter pilots. They will expect it, because the young kids who are going to be flying these airplanes will have grown up playing virtual reality-based video games. DAS will fit very well with their expectations for 5th generation capability. DAS can also potentially expand the operational envelope of the JSF mission.

Since the numbers of aircraft are great, one can only begin to imagine the possibilities for non-traditional uses of the kind of data DAS provides. Ground activity for instance, which is currently suppressed because it is not of interest to our current mission, could be exploited with simple algorithm enhancements. The potential uses for DAS are only limited by our ability to imagine them!

———–

*** Posted on July 7th, 2010

Memorial Day Remembrance: Fighting The Right COIN With XXIst Century Tools

05/29/2010

By John Wheeler
cy*********@sl*****.com

John Wheeler, USMA 66, served in Vietnam 1969-70 and in four tours in the Pentagon for four Presidents. He prepared the first Joint Munitions Effectiveness tables for nuclear and biological weapons which undergirded National Security Decision Memorandum 35 to forego US use of Biological weapons. He served as Special Assistant to the 21st Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne, with work focused on Cyber Warfighting and Precision Strike. He chaired the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, which built the Vietnam Wall in DC, and was first Chairman and CEO of Mothers Against Drunk Driving. He is Chairman of the new American Warfighters Fund, a charity which addresses key unmet needs of America’s active duty personnel, veterans and their families.

The airstrike restriction increases the vulnerability of the warfighters
and therefore may enhance the rate of US KIA and WIA in Afghanistan.”
Photo Credit: http://5west.files.wordpress.com

New COIN Vs Old COIN: Reducing Collateral Damage AND Allied losses

COIN (COunter INsurgency) is the order of the day in Afghanistan. COIN provides a set of techniques appropriate to operations in close proximity to civilian populations when combating insurgents. Unfortunately, an older interpretation of COIN prior to the air-ground revolution is being applied strategically in Afghanistan. With the fielding of systems which allow for 360 degree situational awareness, Rover, and time tested (over the last decade) air-ground communications and release systems, the ground combatant commander now has actually tools for survival and effectiveness unknown in previous wars.

As we remember the Fallen on Memorial Day, we should be concerned lest adopting older COIN rules, where the ground troops are in equivalence with the insurgents, add needless US and allied casualties. With the tool sets which have evolved over the past decade, we should pursue greater air-ground integration in support of COIN, not pursue a ground operation per se.

The current interpretation of US defense counterinsurgency means organizing US defense heavily around support of “boots on the ground” in Vietnam-like war. It is a slow-paced mode of operations, personnel-intensive, expensive in personnel costs, and centered on nation building. The aim is to address mortal threats such as terrorist fission detonations in American cities by “winning hearts and minds.”

It features a return to the “fair fight” battles of the XXth century, with two sides slugging it out with high casualties. The mantra since 2006 has been that focus on anything other than the older interpretation of counterinsurgency is “Next-War-Itis” and has confused providing new integrative air-ground assets, such as F-35, with being functional equivalents to UAVs or to adding legacy aircraft buys.

In contrast, effective XXIst century operations focus on new tools, such as fifth generation aircraft and power projection assets such as the Osprey, or weapons ensuring a reduction of collateral damage and civilian casualties, such as the STB I Block 9. One wants to re-load to shape the “Unfair Fight,” with full and combined leveraging of American and allied technology and innovation:

  • strategic and tactical cyber warfighting
  • fifth generation (and sixth in view)
  • speedy acquisition of the tankers, key to a global reach
  • cyberlinks for “Reachback,” in which only minimum numbers of expensive personnel are in layers of overseas headquarters
  • hyper-precise non-nuclear strike
  • modern tankers replacing 50-year old—literally duct-taped—aircraft to renew the American “Air Bridge” across the world.

US Airstrike protects US and allied troops, and it finds, deters and kills enemy combatants. The Restriction on Airstrike notionally cuts back US Airstrike in order to reduce civilian casualties. General Stanley McChrystal ordered the restriction in June 2009, because he believes the level of innocent civilian casualties caused by some airstrikes to be a significant factor in causing disaffection toward the US by non-combatant Afghan citizens.

What General McChrystal has done is move in the direction of an “Army Can Go It All Alone” posture. It reverts to the XXth century Army position of the “Fair Fight”, where fairly evenly matched opponents ground forces slug it out with heavy WIA (Wounded In Action) and KIA (Killed In Action).

It equates COIN with such an approach; in reality, XXIst COIN is empowered by new tools and techniques of “360 spherical situational awareness” and air-ground integration. The USMC has pioneered these methods; now the US Army and Air Force working together can resonate with such an approach appropriate to their own integrative operations.

It is crucial not to pursue an interpretation of COIN that is XXth century in character, reminiscent of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In the XXIst century, all that changed, and the combined US forces achieved Total Battlespace Dominance, reducing ground casualties and friendly fire incidents greatly; it also intimidates the foe from massing and from moving by day; instead, they must hide in caves and move in tiny groups at night, resorting to suicide missions.

Credit: http://www.newzaroundus.com

Untying Our Hands
The supposed reason for the restriction, i.e. that CivCas (civilian casualties) is a significant factor impeding support of a majority of true noncombatant Afghanis, is not based upon systematic factual investigation that has been compiled and presented to Congress and the public. On the other hand, on can already highlight three major flaws intrinsic to such a restriction:

  • The airstrike restriction increases the vulnerability of the warfighters and therefore may enhance the rate of US KIA and WIA in Afghanistan: because fewer enemy combatants are killed as they move to engage US troops and because the constant pressure from airstrike has been weakened, more and more enemy combatants roam free during day and night: this leads almost certainly to even more US KIA and WIA.
  • The Restriction micromanages young officers and non-commissioned officers in the fight—the best-trained and equipped soldiers in history: micromanagement and “looking over the shoulder” hampers initiative, depresses US troop morale, and increases the delay in responding to battle situations – a delay, which can turn out in certain situations to be fatal as everyone knows.
  • While such a path may make sense from a political point of view to keep the coalition unified, it also tends to confuse some of the U.S. military allies, as to what kind of war one is supposed to fight.

As we remember the war dead on Memorial Day we should consider the question of why we are pursuing a COIN approach, which inevitably increases US and allied casualties. Why limit ourselves to 1950’s styles of COIN, when we have evolved tools which allow for the use of airpower in close proximity operations, save American and allied lives, and reduce collateral damage?

As a Vietnam veteran remembering this Memorial Day, I just do not get it: why fight with one hand behind our backs for the purported reasons of winning “the hearts and minds” of the Taliban?

Credit: http://imagineaworldof.blogspot.com

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***Posted on May 29th, 2010