Re-Shaping Tactical Capabilities

The pilot on the F-35B is really a centerpiece of what we are calling the three-dimensional warrior.  The new helmet and the interactions between the pilot and the systems on the new aircraft provide the hub for new operational capabilities.

In this interview, SLD talks with USMC aviator Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner from Headquarters Marine Corps, Aviation.  Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner is involved in shaping how the new helmet will enhance the warfighting capability of the F-35B he is part of the JSF cell at HQMC and is currently the USMC test coordinator for F-35 and has flown with prototype test helmets in the F-35 concept of operations simulators.


SLD:  You are involved with the program for the development and testing for the new helmet for the F-35B.  Could you describe how the systems on the aircraft shape a new environment within which the helmet functions as well?

Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: One of the new operational capabilities of the F-35B is its ability to sense the IR energy or the heat coming off the environment, a full 360 degrees around the aircraft.  It’s as if you are in the middle of a soccer ball : this is how I always picture it looking out through the facets.  I have these IR sensors all around me. And then the aircraft also detects more of the electromagnetic spectrum similar to a Prowler.  So, you do really have a lot more information that’s coming in or is available to be understood.

This capability shapes the classic question of how does one put information in a way that a human being can understand and act upon it? Part of the answer is the way the information is displayed which enables the pilot to be a tactical decision-maker. You gain this God’s eye perspective of the world.  So, instead of being very mechanically-driven like we are in our current aircraft, in which I have to help move the radar around to make it do it’s thing, I can pull back and allow the systems on the aircraft to do that on it’s own.

Now, that’s only part of the answer.  The next piece is the Distributed Aperture Systems (DAS), that is sensing the IR world all around me.  You have camera eyes staring at all times around you, and how do I get that information across to a person that, obviously, can only look in one direction at any given time.

So the system’s interface, the DAS imagery, gets projected on a patch on your helmet, which is an improvement or a next a step from our current helmet.  So now, I have a window into this other world and  I can look at information in the IR.  And as I turn my head I’m looking at the world surrounding me with the DAS information coming across.

[slidepress gallery=’the-f35b-pilot-distributed-aperture-systems-das-and-the-new-helmet-re-shape-tactical-capabilities’]

“As If In The Middle Of A Soccer Ball“

SLD:  So that the DAS system works closely with the helmet and it creates a new environment for the pilot to operate in.  You also were alluding to something I find interesting, which is this whole relationship between the classic tactical fighter and a specialized war battle manager, who’s on electronic warfare aircraft. In fact those specializations will be broken apart by the F-35.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: Absolutely.  The classic tactical fighter was defined by the strike package where I’m going to have aircraft that will deliver weapons; I’m going to have fighters that will either clear the way or protect them while they go in.  And then I’m going to have electronic attack aircraft to provide another level of support.  In contrast the F-35, by design, will be able to do all three of those things with either the same aircraft or the same little family of aircraft.  So, you can prioritize different roles such as : the two on the front are the fighters today, the third is going to pick up electronic attack, and the fourth is going to do the strike.  But depending on how we’re configured, we can actually flex that real time.  “Hey, looks like the fight is actually more on your side.  So, we can actually shift that focus of effort to the other aircraft.”  So, it just allows us an extremely flexible platform.

But with all that increased capability, you still have the same human beings that are flying aircraft similar to what we did 50 years ago.  Now, you just have to essentially build up those pilots a different way.  You take all the very classic training techniques; teach them how to actually fly the aircraft, teach them how to use the aircraft as a weapon and then, you’ve got to go down a different route that’s more or less teaching them to be an information manager, because this aircraft really is an information sponge.  This aircraft just creates this little information hub in the sky.  And the pilots, their job is to be effective for their primary mission, but then also decide how to get this information to other people, not just other pilots but also to the ground, because maybe they’re in a better spot to be more effective?

SLD: Tell us a little bit about the role of the helmet in facilitating what you described?

Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: The helmet in the F-35 will display fused data, and creates a picture so that, literally, when I look down through what would be the skin of the aircraft, I still get that projection of the ground underneath me.  So, if I am trying to locate a target, the current helmets will give you a little box or a symbol to highlight that target.  But as soon as the wing of the aircraft gets in the way then I would have had to move the airplane physically to clear it out of the way.  So, now I can see through the wing with this new system.

An immediate benefit is I don’t have to move my aircraft into a spot that I might not want.  For example, when we set up an orbit for intel, surveillance, reconnaissance, that ISR mission which is a lot of what we spend time doing.  There are better paths in the sky for us to just stay within a relative distance, and I want to get a really good picture, so I’m just going to set up an orbit.  But that instantly can flex with, oh, my wing might be in my own way, so you’re going to end up flying these non-optimal formations.  I’m going to move the wing out of the way so I can get a better look.  Oh, now, I’ve got to get back on profile.  That’s a lot of the work that the pilot is up to.  Now, I don’t have to do that with the DAS.

SLD:  How would you describe the changes in pilot behavior you see from this synergy of the DAS and the helmet?  Or what kinds of changes might you see?

Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: One of the other significant changes is just the way we actually can fly our formations and getting more out of the handful of aircraft in an area where we operate.  With traditional tactics, we’re going to be tied relatively close to each other, because I’m going to be checking for anybody shooting at you from the ground.  You’re going to be checking me.  So, we tend to fly together.  We don’t have to, but you take it at risk if you don’t.

But, all right, to get more aircraft over a larger area, we’re going to separate.  And you can only do that when you have very fixed-wing tolerant conditions.  I’m not going to be shot at a lot, because I’m either at a higher altitude or the threat is just not there.

With the DAS, the computer is working for me all the time looking all around, making sure that no one’s taking a shot at me.  So that instantly is going to free up the pilot and then the squadron to just spread out over more space.  And we’re not taking on risk, or adopting a different procedure, which is how we’d mitigate the risk today, because I have a system on board.  So that’s the initial basic pilot behavior change that you’ll see right away.

SLD:  Final question: one of the controversies in Afghanistan has been control of collateral damage. It seems to me that this aircraft should help in this regard in a sense that by having a closer relationship enabled between the ground and the air element, the confidence level of using weapons in close support must clearly go up?

Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: Precisely. The technology that we’ve enjoyed just in the last 10 years or so, has already improved that quite a bit.  Now, this is going to be, again, that next huge step, because we’re getting more information to the pilots, so that’s going to make that pilot feel better about it.  We’ve already started sending information down on our Legacy Aircraft.  In the F-35, you’re actually going to have more options of information to push down to those ground commanders for shared decision-making.

———-

***Posted On May 28th, 2010

This is the second of a series of four articles on the subject of conflict management written by General Jean-Patrick Gaviard. General Gaviard was Commander of Air Defense and of Air Operations (CDAOA) in Taverny from 2003 to 2005 and advisor to the French Defense Minister in 2005 and 2006. He currently works with the Paris-based French Air Force’s Center for Aerospace Strategic Studies CESA (Centre d’études stratégiques aérospatiales) and the Joint Defense Institute CID (Collège interarmées de defense); he is also an advisor to NATO’s Supreme Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, USA.

At a time when foreign military contingencies are becoming increasingly multinational and are most often held in conjunction and end with stabilization missions, General Gaviard ponders whether we should anticipate an exit strategy as soon as a crisis starts. The advantage of such planning is to find a potential solution to a conflict that could prevent military operations to turn into quagmires. Based on different types of conflicts (stabilization missions; urban guerillas; etc) and crisis situations (Afghanistan; Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah; Kosovo; etc), General Gaviard tries to see to which extent such an anticipation is concretely possible and offers various tools to get there.

This second article, which we reproduce below with General Gaviard’s authorization, was published a few months ago in the French magazine DSI. It is about the importance of Allied planning at the beginning of a multilateral intervention and on the need to define a common long-term vision regarding the future of the country, or region, in which a conflict is taking place. Otherwise, as explained by General Gaviard, there is a high risk to end up in a situation similar to the one that occasionally took place during the Kosovo war, which is to say a disagreement between allied forces regarding the best targeting strategy to put in place. This disagreement can only benefit the enemy’s (in this case Slobodan Milosevic) goal of dividing the allied forces. Such an anticipation must also be used when defining the means to put in place and the skills to be developed by the forces: the former manager of Air operations thus highlights the need to maintain the French C2 capacities (command and control) at a good level in order to preserve France’s influence in the decision making at the operational level.

***

Lessons learned in Kosovo: the need for a long-term global vision coordinated among the Allies

Q: General Gaviard, you were the Commander of the French air forces engaged in the air operation “Allied Force” which took place in Kosovo during the first half of 1999. You were also responsible to the Allied command for the national control of those forces. Therefore, you must certainly have some interesting experiences to share with our readers.

General Gaviard: First of all, I would like to tell you about the very sensitive problems inherent to target designation as we experienced it in situ. Air operations have always been monitored closely politically. The choice of targets or objectives targeting has been, since the Vietnam War, the preferred means of political leaders to exercise this control. In Kosovo, during the operation “Allied Force”, we have seen many political constraints with regard to the planned targeting. In this regard, I have two concrete examples to discuss: the first one concerns attacks on the bridges over the Danube in central Belgrade; the second one has to do with the targets on the ground of Podgorica in Montenegro, which were attributed by planners of the Operations Center to Mirage 2000D during the first mission of March 24, 1999. These two examples will allow me to give a concrete illustration of the functioning of the national chain of control, from the operational level in the theater of operations, in this case: Vicenza in Italy where I found myself in the center of command and control, to the strategic level represented by the Chief of Defence Staff and of course the French President in Paris.

• Regarding the Danube bridges in Belgrade, the sequence takes place near the end of the campaign that is to say in the month of May 1999 (the air campaign will end June 11). Operations Commander General Mike Short had proposed to attack the bridges over the Danube in the city center, that is to say in Belgrade itself, for as he said then “cut the head of the snake”. This proposal was very unpopular, especially with French President J. Chirac who knew that after the crisis and Milosevic’s departure, we would have to resume dialogue with the Serbs. Indeed, destroying the bridges over the Danube in Belgrade meant demolishing a political, cultural and economic symbol. The Danube is, in fact, as everyone here knows an umbilical cord linking many countries in Central Europe. Since unanimity rules within the Alliance and the French President had vetoed the proposal, the bridges in Belgrade were spared. Of course, President Chirac had to explain his decision to President Clinton, General Kelche had to explain it to General W. Clark then Saceur, and myself had to explain it to General M. Short. This wasn’t easy as we can imagine. It thoroughly illustrates that within a coalition, there are usually different strategic visions and therefore we should address this problem upstream at the risk of blowing that coalition. I. will come back to this point shortly.

• The other less known example is of the attack on the ground in Podgorica in Montenegro. We are at the beginning of the campaign at the end of Mars and the diplomatic discussions of Rambouillet did not yield any results. Indeed, Milosevic refuses to withdraw his troops from Kosovo despite the ultimatum given by the West. The attack is preparing. Lieutenant-colonel Girier, who commands the operation of the Mirages 2000D, finalizes the attack on the ground of Podgorica, target given by the planners of the Operations Center of Vicenza. As soon as this objective is known in Paris, we receive a red light from the Élysée. The reason why is simple: President Djukanovic then President of Montenegro had clearly separated himself from Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s “pro-war” positions. Therefore, President Djukanovic represented for the West, including France, a foothold in the region that had to be spared at all costs. An attack on the grounds of Podgorica, capital of Montenegro, hence represented at the political level, a strategic error. Consequently, President J. Chirac refused the attack of this target by the Mirages 2000D. Since my role was to monitor the use of French assets in accordance with national decisions, I rushed to General Short’s office to explain to him that “my country” wanted to switch targets. He replied bluntly: “No way! We will attack this target with or without you for one simple reason: if all the nations’ representatives constantly want to change objectives, this campaign will turn into a real rat race”. Another important point militarily is that Podgorica is only a few minutes away by flight from Almendola in Italy on the other side of the Adriatic and thus represented a strong threat looming over the platforms and combat aircrafts from the Alliance stationed in Italy. As everyone knows, an air campaign always starts with the acquisition of air superiority and in particular by the destruction of enemy aircrafts and the neutralization of platforms. In order to convince Paris of the military accuracy of this vision, I had to give a number of phone calls to the capital. During that time, Lieutenant-colonel Girier continued to prepare his mission on Podgorica. Our arguments finally convinced General Kelche, who himself managed to convince the President that we needed to attack Montenegro and the grounds of Podgorica because neutralizing this objective was absolutely necessary operationally for the safety of our own forces and the continuation of the operation.

On the night of March 24, the Mirages 2000D successfully accomplished their mission, but during the whole campaign each planned attack on the Montenegro received special attention from the Chief of staff.

What can we learn from those two examples?

• First of all, regarding planned operations, targeting will always be a permanent concern for the political powers that have a hard time controlling the tempo of an air campaign. In 1965, Lyndon Johnson designated all the targets on Vietnam without much success. It was what we nowadays call “micro management” which is mostly sterile. Things are changing, but they will still evolve under strong political constraints, especially concerning the employment of air forces and we must know how take that into consideration. Under those conditions, the national chain of command must above all be based on a strong trust among its various officials. Control of the employment of air forces differs substantially for real-time operations. Naturally, responsibilities must be delegated to the level most able to make decisions. In 2002, during operation “enduring freedom”, General Ricour was present as a national official in the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) in Saudi Arabia to ensure control of our air forces acting over Afghanistan. The Chief of staff, General Kelche instantly agreed to delegate to him the responsibility for approval of fire, in real-time, of our planes if the pilots needed a green light going beyond their specific rules of engagement. Indeed, as opposed to General Kelche in Paris, General Ricour was located in the CAOC and enjoyed a pertinent situation awareness allowing him to authorize a firing if necessary knowingly and in full compliance with the issued instructions.

• The second important point to consider in targeting regards the need within a coalition to have a “global approach” and most importantly shared by all in terms of final vision of the crisis. In the case of Allied Force, the operational plan admittedly defined a final effect in the short term regarding the evacuation of Serbian forces from Kosovo but no desired final effect or medium-term vision on the future of Kosovo. It is the absence of this long-term vision that produced strong tensions between the European visions – or at least French – and American visions, leading to misunderstandings in targeting. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to determine upstream a joint interdepartmental global approach in order to get a clear long-term overview and medium-term expected outcomes that are consistent and shared by all members of a coalition. This approach is certainly difficult to obtain in general, but is nevertheless essential. If this preliminary work is not done, the forces will inevitably find themselves in the uncomfortable position in which we found ourselves at times in Kosovo and the exacerbation of misunderstandings can lead to the explosion of the Alliance. Milosevic understood this weakness and had made then every effort to weaken and divide the coalition. It’s an important point that we must keep in mind.

Q: What did you learn about capabilities at the end of this conflict?

General Gaviard: Regarding lessons in capability, some of which may have been forgotten today, even overshadowed by ongoing operations, we must return to the two major obstacles we had to face at that time. The first one has to do with the threat of aggressive and highly mobile surface to air Serbian missiles, which created significant problems throughout the campaign. The second one is bad weather.

• The aggressive air defense artillery forced General Short to impose to his planners the integration of devices dedicated to offensive jamming in each planned raid offensive (EA6 Prowler) in order to neutralize the Serbian air defense sites and thus allow bomber raids to penetrate safely over Kosovo, and later in Serbia. Secondly, the anti-radar Harm missiles were not efficient. They were fired preventively but without tangible operational results due to the mobility of the enemy devices. This lack of European capabilities for neutralizing enemy air defenses called Sead /Dead (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense / Destruction of Enemy Air Defense) was nevertheless taken into account at the end of this conflict in the context of European work (Ecap). Since then, nothing! The Americans, for their part, do not seem to have forgotten to take into consideration this threat since they have developed stealth aircrafts such as the F22, F35, and remotely piloted vehicles such as the latest Predator “C” Avenger equipped with anti-radar capabilities as well as appropriate tactical data links. The American response to this threat is clear: stealth technology. I think it would be urgent for Europe – especially since we do not have “stealth” combat aircrafts – to put the Sead/Dead issue back on the table in face of air defense missiles that have greatly improved during that time. Some countries have incidentally chosen to be equipped with efficient air defense devices rather than more expensive superior aircrafts. The S300, for instance, is a formidable weapon in terms of ground-air defense, with a zone of defense exceeding 100 km. If one day, our forces were to face such weapons, we would be facing serious difficulties. Therefore, it seems important to me that we quickly address this issue at the European level for example.

“The advent of UASs also began at that time.
The UAS actually helped us by their persistence,in particular,
to detect targets that were beyond the fleetingness of fast aircrafts.”
(General Gaviard)

Recovery of an UAS CL 289 during the operation “Essential Harvest” in Kosovo
and in FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 2001
(Photo credit: Thierry Anne, ECPAD, Macedonia-Kosovo, July 2001)

Given the high mobility of air defense systems it was decided to establish, within the control centers, adequate structures called, at the time of Kosovo, “Flexcell”. That is to say, a cell that allowed us to collect real-time information from many sensors and directing fighter-bombers on these newly discovered targets. The advent of UASs also began at that time. The UAS actually helped us by their persistence, in particular, to detect targets that were beyond the fleetingness of fast aircrafts, and I think that from this point of view, we had started the debate well. Should we, from now on, build concepts of operations through a collaborative work between manned platforms and UAS/UCAV by means of exchange networks of images and data? This vision could come true sooner than we think.

• Second point: the bad weather. We were particularly hampered in carrying out our bombing missions during the whole month of April. Laser is a good weapon to designate targets in good weather conditions, but when the weather is bad, we need weapons that, after passing through the cloud layers arrive with a hyper-precision on the targets previously identified and localized following correct coordinates. In that context, I think AASM (“Armement Air Sol Modulaire”:“Air to ground modular weapon”) represents a viable option especially since this weapon could also, if we were able to integrate it to the network linking the sensors to the fighters / UAVs via the C2s, benefit from a possible shift in flight against moving targets. This necessary networking needed to reach a mobile air-ground site would also provide an interesting answer to the SEAD problem. Thanks to its propelled system, AASM indeed has another crucial capability to counter this threat today, namely an important “stand off”.

Q: From a politico-military point of view, what lessons did you learn at that time?

General Gaviard: Once again, I would like to raise two major points:

• The first one strictly concerns the air plans of this campaign. The strategy developed at the time and announced everywhere was too predictive and made the conflict last more than two and a half months. It is now clear that if we had acted in tandem with special forces engaged on the ground or with KLA forces (which we actually did towards the end of the operation or at least partially) to facilitate target designation, we would have gained a lot of time. Today, we are talking about desired effects. Achieving an effect requires a combination of capabilities taken within each component as part of a complete joint work. If during Allied Force the engagement of special forces had been deliberately excluded, during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, air forces were absent from the land planning. Indeed, our friends from the U.S. Army decided that they could attack alone without air support. Unfortunately, they suffered important losses for having forgotten that important principle.

• Last point: how do we gain influence within a coalition? There is in my opinion only one way: to have the capacities of a “lead nation”. I haven’t read anything in the French White Paper that sufficiently clarifies this concept. Now for a country like France which has a permanent seat on the UN and is a deterrent force, it seems important to refer to this concept, also adopted by the European Union (EU) in July. Concept implemented during the operation “Artemis” in the northeast of Congo, which is the heart of the philosophical basis of the rapid reaction forces of NATO (NRF) or the BG 1500 (Battlegroup) of the EU. But what are the criteria for determining whether a country can claim the ability to be lead-nation in a coalition? I believe that there are three criteria:

1. First of all, of course, to have forces whose volume is about 20% of the total allied forces, as long as those forces are of first rank.
2. The second one concerns projection capabilities because nowadays it is essential to project forces autonomously. In this context, the need to urgently see the A400M program lead to something becomes obvious.
3. The third capability, which is usually kept silent and that is paramount to me, relates to the centers of command and control (C2). If we want to weigh in a coalition, it is necessary to have highly trained officers who can with their expertise have influence in all structures of a C2, whether they are of intelligence, planning or control. In Kosovo, Colonel Stoesslé, for example, was the battle staff director, meaning that he was the control chief of the CAOC. We had, moreover, great officers trained at the Caspoa (“Air C2 school”) in Taverny who were inserted in all cells of the Caoc of Vicenza. This rare and recognized expertise gave us a real credibility with our friends and allies and a definite influence in support of other capabilities that we could provide to the coalition: comprehensive capabilities of the Air Force, but also of the Naval Aviation commissioned by Admiral Coldefy from the aircraft carrier Foch.

I will leave the last word to General M. Short, not always kind vis-à-vis the French political constraints, but who acknowledged the quality of our air force and who had at the end of the conflict this rare and admiring phrase for him: “You have a capable air force”.

That is what seems interesting to me to note as a witness and actor of air operations in Kosovo, only ten years ago!

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***Posted on May 21st, 2010

SLD visited U.S. Coast Guard facilities in the New Orleans area as well as attending the keel laying for the new Sentinel Class Patrol Boats at the Bollinger Yards.  Unfortunately, recent developments in the Gulf would demonstrate once again the importance of the USCG to the nation.  This sector, with other USCG sectors, is facing significant challenges from resource shortfalls. We discussed all of the various mission areas with our USCG interlocutors, but we have provided only some of the excerpts from the wide-ranging and frank interview with Captain Ed Stanton and Commander Stocklin.

Captain of the Port of New Orleans, Captain Ed Stanton is currently also commander of the unified command center, which has been set up on the outskirts of Houma, south of New Orleans to manage the oil spill response in the area: BP, the Coast Guard and state and federal agencies have indeed been gathering resources to deal with the crisis.

The Challenges Facing the New Orleans Sector:  An Interview with Captain Stanton, Sector Commander, New Orleans Sector, and Commander P. M. “Bo” Stocklin, Jr., Chief Contingency Planning and Force Readiness, New Orleans Sector

[slidepress gallery=’uscg-new-orleans’]

SLD: Could you explain the focus of your activity in the New Orleans sector?

Captain Stanton: Sectors are alike organizationally, but because of their geography, the work focus is unique to each sector. They’re all very different. For example, Miami is heavily counter-drug counter-migrant and cruise ship. New Orleans is heavily maritime safety, outer continental shelf, and river. It’s a 300– mile long port. New York is the UN, a lot of airport security, 30 congressional districts, and not as much shipping activity.

SLD: What is the major focus of Search and Rescue (SAR) in your sector?

Commander Stocklin: With regard to SAR, there’s a lot on Lake Pontchartrain. We’ve got a good location with station New Orleans to cover that. Also, we’ve got a good deal of offshore SAR where we’ve got stations in Venice and Grand Isle to respond, but their boats can only go 30 nautical miles offshore safely for a SAR response. It’s a bit more of a challenge over on this far Western side of the AOR, because our small boats from the stations don’t have very long legs, and we’re constrained with our 87 foot patrol boats.

The 87-foot boats are assets that are so handy for us, because they work so well in a variety of mission areas. We tend to overuse them quite frankly because we have to. For SAR where they’re outside of the station coverage, they’re the only thing we’ve got other than aircraft.

For doing security activities, any time it’s rough going out the mouth of the river, we have to use the cutters, because the station boats are too small to get there.

Search and rescue is an area where we work  particularly closely with a lot of our state and local partners. State wildlife fisheries, local sheriff’s departments, they really collaborate a lot with us on the search and rescue mission.

Captain Stanton: Also, SAR really for us also covers the wetlands.  We have a lot of wetlands and estuary and a lot of shallow water. Forty-ones and twenty-fives (boats) can’t go to most of the areas where we have SARs. So the air station becomes a critical piece, helicopters are especially important as are the local agencies because they have air boats.

So we rely heavily on the sheriff’s departments, fish and wildlife service, both from Louisiana wildlife—department of wildlife issues and the national fish and wildlife folks for their air boats. The NOAA surveys on this area for coastal surveys are over 100 years old. So, if there’s not a depth marked on the chart, we’re not by policy even supposed to go there. We will, if it’s critical, and no other asset is available, but a lot of this is just too shallow for our boats.

So helicopters are really important for search and rescue in this area. Two weeks ago we had a tanker offshore that lost propulsion and was loaded with crude oil. They were drifting down within four miles of one of the largest oil platforms in the Gulf, which was an access, a hub, for about 20 different pipelines : we had nothing out there. There is no way we could get there. Luckily the Gulf is full of offshore supply vessels and one put a line on it and was able to nudge it far enough, change its vector, drift just enough to get it past the platform.

So we rely on luck and other people’s resources all the time.

SLD: But luck may be useful in getting a result, but not a good planning guide.  Clearly, the new cargo and tanker ships are getting bigger and the challenges grow with them.  I see little national focus on this challenge associated with global economic growth.

Captain Stanton: You are right, the vessels are getting bigger. The activity is getting bigger, because they have to go farther into the Gulf. That’s where most of the active drilling is now. What has not been tapped yet is the natural gas resource in the Gulf because of the price. The price is depressed. So they’re not doing any exploration of production on natural gas. But when that happens, we will see the much larger Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) vessels populating the Gulf.

SLD: Maritime safety is obviously a big part of your activity here as well.  Could you describe your efforts in this area?

Commander Stocklin: Just the sheer volume is something to note here.  We have over 5,200 vessel arrivals –this is deep draft vessels every year. 93% of that is foreign flag. So that equates to a very heavy port state control workload.

Our focus is to go on board and do all the safety inspections on foreign flag vessels. In addition, we have the security workload of vetting them before hand, and we have to decide selectively who needs a security boarding. So safety and security are kind of a one, two punch for us.

In addition to the foreign flag deep drafts, we have over 2,500 domestic vessel inspections per year. That’s everything from the offshore supply boats, to barges carrying oil and hazardous material. So that’s huge.

And we also have to do facility inspections. Those are our refineries, chemical plants, anything that’s required to have a security plan by MTSA. Not only the number itself is large but we have some of the largest refineries and chemical plants in the country on this stretch of river. We approve their security plans and we have to actually do on site inspections. I think it’s at least once a year, and additionally we’re out there doing spot checks on a random basis.

SLD: Given your limited resources, the significant demand, I cannot imagine you can do anything other than a risk based approach to security management.

Captain Stanton: We try and take a risk based, strategic approach. And we work significantly with partners in the private sector as well as the local law enforcement sector as well. We look for things like cameras that can be shared on websites up and down the river in kind of a regional security network. We look for the ports themselves to buy security boats that can be used up and down the river.

SLD: Your inland waterways challenge seems complicated by the age and nature of the boats you have available to do the missions.

Captain Stanton: From the mouth of the river to Baton Rouge, I don’t believe there is a single boat ramp nor is a marina that dispenses gasoline. So our 25 foot boats are completely inappropriate for the tasks simply because they can’t go very far up the river. We use them right here in the city because they come from the Lake [Lake Pontchartrain]. It takes them an hour and a half to get from my station on the lake to the river before the security escort on a cruise ship for instance. And while they’re doing that, it’s a two-boat requirement, so there’s no SAR coverage on Lake Pontchartrain and the USCG auxiliary must step up and take over the SAR.

We try to leverage everybody because of resource constraints. We have police boats and police authority, state police, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and the sheriff’s department to help us out. We could not function effectively without them.

***

In the two videos below, Captain Stanton explains the challenges posed by the size and geographical nature of the New Orleans Sector.  He underscores that, “we are very resource strained.  We have to surge our resources all over our AOR [Area Of Responsability]; cooperation with many other organizations is vital.”

Video # 1 : The Range of the Challenge

Video # 2 : The Scarcity of Resources

*** Posted on May 7th, 2010

By Ed Timperlake
Former Commanding Officer, VMFA-321 “Hell’s Angels”

From WWII To the Jet Age : Get First “Tally” Via Speed, Range, Maneuverability… and Armor

In the opening days of US combat in World War II, extremely courageous Navy and Marine pilots went up against the Imperial Japanese Navy in inferior aircraft. For the Marines, the F2A Brewster Buffalo was woefully inadequate at the Battle of Midway and an entire Navy torpedo squadron, Torpedo-8 except for a single pilot, was killed in combat.

With the entire world in combat and nations fighting for their very existence, aircraft design teams pressed ahead with all the resources and intellectual vision they could bring to the design table. What the U.S. air forces introduced during those years was a steady introduction of type, model, and series (T/M/S) of always improving airborne killing machines.

From the F2-A Brewster Buffalo to the F-4F and F-4U to the F-6 and at wars end, the F-8 Bearcat the Navy had a series of prop driven Fighters that mastered the Japanese Zero. The Army Air Corps went from P-39 to P-38 Lighting, P-47 Thunderbolt to the P-51 Mustang with its wonderful bubble canopy to carry the fight to the heart of Germany.

Along the way emphasis was placed on pilot survivability by putting armor plates in the cockpit and having self-sealing fuel tanks. Since the entire objective was to get first “tally” and then out maneuver the enemy to kill him, the total design focus was to always improve a blend of speed, range, and maneuverability—better engines and smarter airframe designs.

Of course, while the main effort was producing enough “motors and gun sights,” industry and research lab efforts were underway to change yet again the technology of the air figh.

The P-61 “Black Widow” was an early attempt to put radar on a night fighter, and the Germans tried a rocket plane against B-17 formations. The Italians Germans, Brits and, ultimately, Americans experimented with early jet engines. The German ME-262 changed the dynamics of combat. Although, the Germans employed it in an inefficient manner in following Hitler’s call for it to be committed to an air to ground role.

The Jet Age and The Introduction of Electronic Warfare
After WWII, the jet engines started the same dynamic seen in the prop years –improved airframe system performance by improving speed, range and maneuverability. But two new dynamics were added both related to “payload”.

For a fighter in WWII, the “payload” was simple –what caliber and how many machine guns or cannons fit the design to give the pilot enough “deadly bursts” to kill several of his opponents. In the jet age, the complexities of adding airborne systems and improving the weapons carried, changed the technology vectors of design considerations and introduced two more synergistic, but relatively independent research and development paths.

Airborne radar and sensors were added to fighters and those systems helped the payload—guns and early IR fire and forget missiles became more efficient with the AIM 9 sidewinder series. But then, concurrently, independent performance was put into the payload by improving missiles and linking long-range (BVR) missile shots to radar technology. At first, radar guided missiles needed continuous guidance from the fighter but eventually even radar guided missiles became BVR self-contained “fire and forget.”

So unlike WWII research and development, where research on airframes and engines was the mantra, in the jet age there were two other huge design factors at work. The first was always questing to improve the radar systems in the fighters and, secondly, as technology allowed independent designs could improve the weapons carried. Yet again, the art of aeronautical design had to work in partnership with the science of military R&D.

Along the way survivability shifted from armor, speed, and focusing on a good canopy into the era of Electronic Warfare and now the incorporation of stealth characteristics through both design considerations, composite materials and the wonders of chemistry for paint.

Stealth is a survivability factor and is critically important because it multiplies the effectiveness of the fighter—one doesn’t add stealth but incorporates it into the very existence of the fighter. Being a multiplying factor means it is sensitive and can really drive the entire performance of the airframe and system combat performance.

So ending the 20th Century the complexities of fielding the best fighter was a much bigger challenge because of three synergistic but independent factors–basic airframe performance improvements, internal system R&D and constantly improving weapons.

The XXIst Century Man-Machine Revolution: A New Distributed Information Capability and a Potential Spiral Development Design Process
However, with the very real computer revolution moving with light speed into the 21st Century there is now a forth design dynamic at work —the man-machine interface.

With the very real capability of three dimensional sensing and being able to distribute information to other warfighers, airborne and on the ground or at sea the relationship of the individual pilot to knowledge of the bigger air battle is truly revolutionary—this is brand new and to undergo further developments.

For example one of the most important capabilities of the F-35B not yet exploited is the distributed information capability. The least experienced fighter pilot to the most experience all flying into the air battle in yet to be developed formations are all equally capable of having the same knowledge and situational awareness.

Consequently in the formation if one pilot gets inside the opponents OODA loop (observe orient decide act) all are capable of having that same joint knowledge. The revolutionary point is the enemy can splash an individual F-35B, but cannot kill the knowledge gained by all: that aspect of modern warfare is truly unique 21st Century technology brought to an air battle.

Conversely, on the offensive if one F-35B picks up an enemies airborne vulnerability such as an aircraft system or weapon frequency emission or stealth breakdown it can be sent to all. Thus, another unique aspect of F-35B 21st Century capabilities is that every Lightning II is a real time intelligence collection system. The entire engagement is also captured electronically for immediate and direct refinements to tactics and analysis at the Marine Air Weapons Training Squadron during the air battle.

Fleet wide information sharing among services and allies may be a huge factor in winning an air campaign.

Photo Credit: The F-35 Cockpit, Lockheed Martin, 2010
as published by www.airforce-technology.com

The least experienced fighter pilot to the most experience
all flying into the air battle in yet to be developed formations
are all equally capable of having the same knowledge and situational awareness.
Consequently in the formation if one pilot gets inside the opponents OODA loop (observe orient decide act),
all are capable of having that same joint knowledge.
The revolutionary point is the enemy can splash an individual F-35B,
but cannot kill the knowledge gained by all:
that aspect of modern warfare is truly unique 21st Century technology brought to an air battle.

So in WWII the Buffalo was a “grape” and the design teams worked with wartime efficiency to follow a single path to improve airframe performance. After WWII the technology vectors of improving internal systems and weapons carried were added to the mix. Finally, in this new century the concept of each pilot being a three dimensional warrior with superior knowledge will be pioneered by the USMC aviation community.

The F-35 is not designed for the early century’s concept of the knife fight; and it has the growth potential for internal changes to its systems to always incorporate the best weapons while expanding empowerment of combat pilots to have three-dimensional knowledge to elevate the fight to a new level.

In other words, the F-35 may actually be its own follow-on. Instead of the old paradigm of needing to completely build another fighter to move from the F-2A “grape” to F-4U “Whistling Death,” the Marines can just change and update the F-35B system, sensors and weapons. The Marines flying the F-35B with a pre-planned product improvement design philosophy to pull and replace or add system capabilities will in the future have total flexibility to add new sensors and improved AA missiles currently being designed.

Evolving concepts of USMC operational development is at chapter one, because recognizing and exploiting man-machine three-dimensional knowledge is truly a brave new world. Consequently, the F-35B is capable of constantly updating the next generation of U.S. fighters but not by building a new airframe but staying inside the F-35B basic airframe and adding the next generation of systems and weapons

The learning curve to improve sensors, system capability and weapons carried quickly compared to building another airframe may be a new American way of industrial surging. The American arsenal of democracy may be shifting from an industrial production line to a clean room and a computer lab as key shapers of competitive advantage.

It is a bold concept and only history will tell us if that is the best way ahead. And I haven’t even touched on the USMC combat flexibility of basing mode with V/STOL-which, as General Walsh has discussed in his interview on this website , adds an entire capability for the integrated air-ground battle.

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*** Posted on April 29th, 2010