Murielle Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Lessons Learned: The USMC Approach to Close Air Support in Fallujah (Part One)

Posted on January 31, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/31/2010

CAS: A CORE CONTRIBUTOR TO SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN FALLUJAH

(Reprinted courtesy of the Marine Corps Gazette. Copyright retained by the Marine Corps Gazette)

By Maj Fred H. Allison, USMCR (Ret)

Maj Allison is a former Marine F–4 radar intercept officer. He earned his doctorate in history from Texas Tech University and is currently a historian at the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

***

The USMC at Fallujah — Operation Phantom Fury (Second Battle of Fallujah): Operation Phantom Fury was a joint U.S.-Iraqi offensive in November and December 2004 (Credit: USMC)

The Challenge of Urban CAS
Urban close air support (CAS) successfully employed in Fallujah in 2004 highlights the capability of Marine Corps-style command and control (C2) of aviation. The CAS plan was built on Marine Corps C2 basics—procedural control and unity of command, which were enhanced with a common map or grid reference graphic (GRG). This maximized the fantastic capability of aviation precision weapons and targeting technology, and in the case of Fallujah, made fixed-wing CAS an appropriate option for supporting fires, underscoring the utility and need for tactical aviation (TacAir) in the Marine Corps.

The main assault into Fallujah in November 2004 (Operation PHANTOM FURY/AL FAJR) commenced when eight GBU–31s, 2,000-pound joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), dropped by Marine Fighter/Attack (All-Weather) Squadron 242 F/A–18Ds, smashed into a railroad-topped berm bordering Fallujah’s north side. The bombs created breaching lanes for Marines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines to exploit later that day. In the follow-on battle, as the Marines, soldiers, and coalition troops fought door to door throughout the city, supporting fires were perpetual, a cacophony of precisely delivered destruction. Air strikes came continuously and in harmony with other fires; most were “danger-close” and rapidly sequenced.[1] One battalion air officer remarked:

“I tell you what, for like three weeks, it felt like nothing but a continuous faucet, a continuous fire hose of airplanes. I never knew a time in November when I had a TIC [troops in contact] when I didn’t get an airplane within about a minute”.[2]

Although sporadic fighting continued for weeks after, it took about 10 days for the main resistance to be squelched in Fallujah. The high-tempo penetrating attack envisioned by Marine commanders was realized. It had been substantially facilitated by CAS.

The Fallujah operation was daunting. Any type of urban CAS qualifies as one of the most complex and demanding tasks known to modern warfare. In Fallujah the additional challenge of a counterinsurgency environment existed, thus the need to minimize collateral damage and win hearts and minds, something not achievable if a city is razed by aerial attacks under the glare of a ubiquitous media.

Also, it was a joint fight, both on the ground and in the air. Ground and aviation units from other Services and nations participated. Finally there was the blue tracking problem. There were lots of good guys fighting in Fallujah—ten battalions worth crammed into a five-kilometer square city composed of look-alike and densely packed, low-slung, brown/gray brick buildings.

‘Black Hawk Down’ Shadow
Despite these challenges, the Marines never hesitated to employ CAS in Fallujah. Indeed Marines used CAS extensively in Fallujah earlier that year in Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE or “FALLUJAH I” in April 2004. When fighting broke out, Marine Corps Cobra and Huey squadrons provided CAS. These pilots wanted nothing more than to support their ground brethren at war on Fallujah’s mean streets. They were vulnerable to ground fire, however. The downed Black Hawk in Somalia is the best illustration of why Regimental Combat Team 1’s (RCT–1’s) commander did not want them directly overhead Fallujah but rather wanted them to operate around the city’s fringes.[3]

Historically, tactical strike fighters were the blunt objects of CAS and not appropriate for an urban counterinsurgency fight. Precision ordnance, coupled with sophisticated targeting systems, changed that. Tactical jets could provide surgical CAS, and because of their speed and operating altitudes, were not vulnerable to enemy ground fire since the insurgents displayed little anti-air capability beyond small arms and rocket propelled grenades.[4]

Ironically, in an urban environment, the discreet use of big bombs, even 2,000-pound JDAMs, was appropriate. When several bad guys were holed up in a structure and artillery, tanks, or other means of fire support lacked the punch to neutralize them, a big bomb could bring the building down on top of them. On the other hand, there were times when traditional strafing worked best; low-level, high-speed passes spattering cannon fire down a street either killed or intimidated.[5]

The Marines’ own TacAir, AV–8B Harriers and F/A–18D Hornets, were yet to be deployed, so when Fallujah cooked off in April and RCT–1 needed fixed-wing CAS, their requests went to U.S. Central Command’s combined forces air component commander (CFACC), which ran the air war in Iraq. The CFACC’s air control agencies, the combat air operations center (CAOC) and air support operations center (ASOC), responded with significant air support.[6]

A Targeted Approach to “Buying Bombs”
The Marine Corps’ approach was different from that of the U.S. Air Force and its relationship with the Army. The Marines’ willingness to integrate CAS into an urban fight surprised Air National Guard F–16 pilots who noted a distinct difference between Marine and Army ground units. One of them observed, “It didn’t matter what they [Army units] were against, what was going on, what they saw, what we saw, they would never, ever clear us to drop.”[7] Another pilot put it succinctly, “The ASOC didn’t give us any work and they [Army units] weren’t buying any bombs.”[8]

The Marines were “buying bombs.” One of the Air Guard pilots contacted the Marine direct air support center (DASC) and, unlike the delays he had experienced with the Air Force/Army control system, was instead immediately given a mission. Soon the other TacAir pilots were doing the same and flying CAS missions in support of RCT–1.

The Marines were not just slinging bombs at the enemy; each strike was deemed necessary, indeed essential, as the best means to deal with the threat. Forward air controllers (FACs), air officers, and pilots took extreme care to make sure the bomb or bullets hit the designated target. Another coalition pilot supporting VIGILANT RESOLVE remarked, “Our Marines . . . put themselves much more in harm’s way than if they were out there just randomly killing. They are painstakingly careful about collateral damage.”[9]

Political leaders called off Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, probably because of the negative media coverage—the “CNN (Cable News Network) effect”—of the fighting, and RCT–1 pulled out at the end of April. But in subsequent weeks, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) brought in Marine TacAir, F/A–18D Hornets and AV–8B Harriers, basing them at Al Asad Air Base. This allowed them to be included in the planning for future operations in Fallujah.

Developing the “Keyhole CAS” ConOps
LtCol Gary Kling, call sign, “Static,” an F/A–18 pilot and the Air Officer, 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv), had the lead in planning air support for a subsequent Fallujah fight. His close associate at the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) was another F/A–18 pilot, LtCol Christopher “Moe” Mahoney. Maj Geoffrey Anthony’s DASC from Marine Air Support Squadron 3, of Col Jon Miclot’s Marine Air Control Group 38, “worked hand in glove” with Kling and his planning team. He assigned Capt Dawn Ellis to lead an air support liaison team from the DASC to Kling’s division air shop. Ellis provided the specialized C2 knowledge and experience to the planning team as well as essential connectivity and communications between the DASC and the division air office.[10]

Early on in the planning process, Kling and Mahoney met and worked on developing a concept for the operation. Kling noted that it was more than an air support issue; their task was to “integrate all the division fires, CAS, artillery, mortars” to support the ground combat element’s rapid and penetrating attack plan, one that would not only rapidly secure Fallujah but also outpace the CNN effect. Kling recalled that within Marine Corps air tactical manuals formal doctrine existed that could be applied to the problem, specifically, “from strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) and armed reconnaissance templates . . . .”[11] They chose to call it “keyhole CAS” because, as Kling explained:

The idea behind the original keyhole template in Afghanistan [Kling] had seen one employed a couple of years earlier by an STS (special tactics squadron) airman] was that you had too many planes for a very small target area and that you would push them away from the target area so that you could manage them . . . . there were relatively few troops and too many planes over a small target with limited fires assets available.
The Fallujah problem was much more complex due to ten battalions (six U.S. and four Iraqi) in a city with artillery, mortars, fixed and rotary wing aircraft and everything else a Marine division brings to the fight. This was a fires integration plan, not just a CAS plan. We kept the name ‘keyhole’ because it had reached the ‘tipping point’ with many aviators and we needed something they could envision.[12]

fallujahpic2 — Credit: Marine Aviation Command

Unity of Command: the Value of an Integrated Air C2 System
Now that they had the concept for the operation, Kling and the other planners availed themselves of RCT–1’s value-laden after-action/lessons learned reports derived from the FALLUJAH I battle. Unity of command seemed to be of utmost importance. Unity of command would allow all aviation to flow into the zone under the oversight of the Marine DASC, which would provide flexibility and efficiency. The Marines had unity of command in their area of operations (AO) in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I), or the “March to Baghdad,” and it worked extremely well.

In OIF I differences between the Marine Corps’ and U.S. Air Force’s approaches were apparent. The DASC flowed strike aircraft of all types, not just Marine, to targets in the Marine zone for quick target prosecution. In the Air Force’s centralized control system, strike control remained at the higher echelon control agencies, which meant delays in getting clearance to employ ordnance.

Additionally, the Army/Air Force system lacked the air-ground synergy implicit in the Marine Corps. This synergy came from an integrated air C2 system. Marines bring a complete C2 suite, radars, all of the equipment to the fight; furthermore, Marines conduct systematic and thorough training to integrate air with ground. On the other hand, the Army relies on the Air Force for air C2, and without dedicated training, friction results. Finally air-ground integration is Marine Corps culture and ethos that pays real dividends in a complex and dynamic combat environment. It really works.[13]

***

Notes

1. LtCol Joseph A. L’Etoile, , interview by LtCol John Way, 16 June 2005, Twentynine Palms, transcript held by the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

2. Maj John S. Payne, Maj John S. interview by LtCol John Way, 5 February 2005, Iraq, transcript held by the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

3. Col John A. Toolan, ., interview by author, 4 February 2005, Quantico; LtCol Jeffrey J.Murray, interview by Maj John Piedmont, 2 May 2004, Al Taqaddum, Iraq, digital recording and summary held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico; Maj Derek T. Montroy, interview by author, 17 February 2005, Quantico, digital recording and summary held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico. Interviews cite the danger to rotary-wing aircraft of enemy small arms and rocket propelled grenades. Murray mentions that six helicopters had been hit by enemy ground fire.

4. LtCol Gary A. Kling, , e-mail comments to draft manuscript, 18 December 2007, in author’s possession, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico; hence noted as Kling-author interview.

5. This is not to imply that “intimidation” rounds were fired. Kling asserted that “we were trying to kill someone every time the trigger was pulled,” Kling-author interview.

6. Toolan-author and Montroy-author interviews.

7. LtCol Sean Campbell, , USAF, Air National Guard (ANG), interview by author, 15 June 2005, Selfridge ANG Base, digital recordings and summaries held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

8. Maj Tom Richter, Air National Guard (ANG), interview by author, 15 June 2005, Selfridge ANG Base, digital recordings and summaries held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

9. LtCol Nate Dickman, USAF, interview by author,15 June 2005, Selfridge ANG Base, digital recording and summary held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

10. Col Jon Miclot, interview by author, 18 April 2007, Miramar, digital recording held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico; LtCol Geoffrey M. Anthony, e-mail to author, 27 May 2008, held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

11. Kling-author interview.

12. Ibid.

13. Col Marty Post, interview by author, 29 January 2004, Headquarters Marine Corps, tape recording and summary held by Marine Corps History Division, Quantico.

———-

***Posted January 31st, 2010

Eglin Air Force Base: Building Synergy for the Future

Posted on January 24, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/24/2010

SLDinfo visited Eglin Air Force Base in early January and interviewed the senior leadership with regard to various programs, capabilities and approaches to the future. The most compelling aspect of Eglin to an outsider is the confluence of two core capabilities:

The first revolves around weapons;
the second around shaping joint capabilities.

Both underscore synergy of activities.

Eglin AFB: a Broad Portfolio of Weapons From Concept to Employment

Eglin is the home to the Air Armament Center where Major General CR Davis (formerly PEO of the F-35 program) functions as both the AAC Commander as well as the USAF PEO for Weapons. Given the size of the base, and the collocation of all elements of the weapons development process on the base, Eglin possesses a formidable capability to shape an integrated weapons development process. The process emphasizes an ability to manage weapons development from concept, to deployment, to logistics support of the new weapons (See beside: first video interview with Major General Davis).

The portfolio of weapons at Eglin runs the gamut from air superiority to close combat support. Among the weapons under development or support are the following: the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) designed for destroying hardened targets with the use of conventional ordnance; the joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASSM); the miniature air-launched decoy or jammer (MALD/J); the various versions of the small diameter bomb (SDB); and advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). We will have further discussion of some of these programs in future articles.

Shaping a Road Map for the Future and Cost-Conscious Development Approach to Weapons Development

As Major General Davis underscored, “In a constrained budgetary environment and with a significant need to support the warfighter with new capabilities, our focus is on effective leveraging of capability as well as trying to shape a road map for the future.”

Major General Davis also stressed that he viewed Eglin as having a unique capability to assist the USAF in shaping an effective and cost-conscious approach to weapons development.

“We have elements of the core capabilities of the US Air Force’s future needs. There are four key elements for the future road map:

air dominance
long-range strike (next generation cruise missile)
hardened and deepened targets
and close controlled strike.

We have the key USAF programs here at Eglin and with the processes in place, we can shape a future agenda which makes sense fiscally and can effectively meet future warfighter needs.”

“Team Eglin”: A Joint Operations Focus

The other key aspect to synergy is the potential impact of the co-located facilities within Eglin on joint operations. “Team Eglin” includes facilities for AF Special Forces, the Navy Explosive Ordnance training facility (with responsibility for all the forces, including dealing with IEDs), an Army ranger facility, the 7^th Army Special Forces Group Airborne (being transferred from Fort Bragg), and small teams from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, JFCOM (joint fires integration and interoperability team) and the US Coast Guard.

As Major General Davis put it: “The synergy of being able to go from the lab to weapons production will soon be mirrored by a joint training capability. Within the confines of our ranges you can take a weapons concept and test it with at least three services, including fielding and integrated training. And you can do that with just what we have spread across Eglin AFB. (See beside: second video interview with Major General Davis).

The F-35 as a Case In Point

All of this makes Eglin the logical location to provide for the training for the joint strike fighter. An integrated training center is being built on the Eglin campus, and this training center will provide training for both pilots AND maintainers (see: upcoming SLDinfo posting on the F-35 training facility the week of January 25th).

There is a clear opportunity for the synergy of the co-location of facilities to interact with the training of F-35 pilots. As Marine Colonel Art Tomassetti, Vice Commander, 33^rd Fighter Wing (the F-35 command) underscored: “When a navy pilot wants to practice close air support, he has the possibility of supporting the Army Special Forces Group in an exercise on the base.”

In short, Eglin AFB is a dynamic place where 21^st century forces are being crafted. As Major General Davis emphasized: “There is significant potential here for synergy. The challenge is to ensure that this happens. I believe that the F-35 provides a further opportunity to enhance the synergy among the forces.”

———-

***Posted January 24th, 2010

Emerging Strategic Challenges: The Case of Arctic Co-opetition

Posted on January 23, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/23/2010

2010-06-23 By Robbin Laird
([email protected])

The Northwest Passage: A Dream To Come True?
As the Arctic becomes altered by climate change, three key elements are re-shaping global dynamics.

First, the melting Arctic is creating new transit routes so that past dreams like the Northwest Passage are becoming possible. Instead of the longer, more traditional transoceanic transit routes, east-west routes will open up through the Arctic.
Second, the melting Arctic is opening up raw materials to exploitation, notably oil and gas. At the same time, climate change has made the Artic environment very fragile, so that it is necessary to effectively and delicately manage the technical aspect of oil and gas extraction.
Third, melting ice will alter the flow of water in the region, and, more importantly, alter where fish travel. Enhanced management of the fisheries will be a core challenge for countries in the Arctic Circle.

This map shows potential routes of the Nortwest
Passage and Russia’s Northern Sea Route.
Though the Northwest Passage is currently iced over,
analysts think global warming might reduce the ice
and make passage a viable shipping route in 30 or 40 years.
Credit: Arik Hesseladahl, “Wrangling over Arctic Territorial Claims,”
Business Week (January 28, 2009)

A Five-Party Management
Five states with legal claim to the Arctic will directly manage these challenges, namely, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the United States, Canada, and Russia. The outcome of this management process will affect the core strategic interests of the entire world, including the major Asian and European powers.
The transit routes affect the conveyer belt of trade and commerce worldwide, from Asia to America to Europe, as well as the availability of oil and gas from fields closer in proximity than the Middle East.

“Scientists have come up with the first comprehensive map
of global shipping routes based on actual itineraries.
The team pieced together a year’s worth of travel itineraries
from 16,693 cargo ships using data from LLoyd’s Register Fairplay
and the Automatic Identification System,
which tracks vessels using a VHF receiver and GPS.”
Credit: http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/01/global-shipping-map/

Northern European states may be able to accrue wealth and strategic advantage for themselves. At the same time, interaction of the larger European states, such as France and Germany, with the new oil rich states will significantly affect intra-European relationships, including the future of the Euro. Denmark and Norway could well have a different view of Russian behavior in the Arctic than the Germans. Indeed, differences over the management of the relationship with Russia could become a central flashpoint in the evolution of the European Union as the Arctic opens up.
Canada’s role as an Arctic power could overshadow its other global interests. Canada has scarce dollars to invest in its defense budget, including the air and naval assets most important to managing its Arctic interests. Investments in protecting its Arctic interests could dominate the defense budget causing a decrease in spending on ground forces that are necessary to participate in global peacekeeping. Canada has real strategic interests in the Arctic, which any governing party would likely not ignore.
For the United States, the Arctic should be a central strategic issue, but currently it is not of paramount interest. Ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan take precedence. However, the continued inability of the US to fund new ships and aircraft for the US Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard remains very important when focusing on the future strategic impact of the Arctic. At present, eco-preservation of the Arctic is more prevalent than any interest in the strategic impact of new transit routes and strategic commodities. Polar bears are important, but not really pawns in global geo-politics.
Meanwhile Russia sees the Arctic as an added jewel in its crown of commodity ownership. The Russians have struggled throughout their history to translate their mineral and energy riches into sustained economic growth and development. The Arctic will once again give the Russians a chance to do this. But even without an effective investment policy, the Russians will become king makers in shaping global energy politics. Certainly, their leverage over Europe will increase.

The High North: The Testbed for New Forms of Pacific Coexistence?
Even a quick review of likely national responses underscores the co-opetition aspect of the Arctic competition. Co-opetition is a term used in business literature about the need to cooperate while competing to achieve market leadership. “In most of the modern theories of business, competition is seen as one of the key forces that keep firms lean and drive innovation”. Adam Brandenburger of the Harvard Business School and Barry Nalebuff of the Yale School of Management have challenged that emphasis. They suggest that businesses can gain advantage by means of a judicious mixture of competition and cooperation. “Cooperation with suppliers, customers and firms producing complementary or related products can lead to expansion of the market and the formation of new business relationships, perhaps even the creation of new forms of enterprise.”
The co-opetition concept seems appropriate to the Arctic engagement. To facilitate transit and exploitation of raw materials in the region, the major states involved will need to work out arrangements for joint operations. At the same time, rivalries are inevitable in a relatively undefined situation whereby boundaries can be disputed and access routes contested. Hence, posturing for advantage in a situation where cooperation is crucial seems evident.

Norway clearly sees the stakes of the Arctic competition.[1] The Norwegians are emphasizing the need for NATO to have a High North strategy and are focusing on how to most effectively protect their interests in the High North. Comments made by the Norwegian Defense Minister in the Spring of 2009 clearly illustrate Norway’s understanding of the comprehensive nature of the Arctic challenge:

“We could in the foreseeable future see the Arctic Ocean free of ice during summertime. This tells us that the global challenge of climate change needs to be addressed now through solid international cooperation and commitment. It also implies that reduced ice coverage combined with technological improvements may allow this region to become accessible to large-scale economic activity to a degree never experienced before.
So what are the security challenges in all this? First of all, there are existing and potential conflicts of interest in the area which could undermine the stability in the area. Our security policy aims to build confidence and prevent negative developments in the High North. Second, the Northern Fleet’s continued role in the Russian nuclear triad and the sheer weight of the Kola military infrastructure are of vital strategic importance to Russia. Third, the Barents Sea continues to be a training ground for military forces and a test bed for new weapon systems. Fourth, opening of new sea lines of communication will enhance the High North’s military-strategic significance. Fifth, the situation in the Arctic could be negatively affected by crises elsewhere. Russian foreign policy statements and strategy documents regularly emphasize the primary role of international law and multilateralism in international relations. This view also seems to be reflected in the new Russian Arctic strategy from 2008, where maintaining the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation is highlighted as one of four main policy aims. Russia is the only non-NATO member of the five Arctic Ocean states. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the state of High North security in the long run will be determined by the bilateral and multilateral interaction between Russia and the other states. Over the last years, Russia has shown an increased willingness to engage in political rhetoric and even use of military force. The “zero-sum” approaches in Russian security thinking are a challenge for the West. This includes the increased tendency on the part of Russia to think in terms of geopolitical spheres of influence. This political rhetoric has over the past couple of years been accompanied by the renewal of training sorties of strategic bombers across the Barents Sea into the Norwegian- and North Sea. There has also been an increase in naval exercise activity and deployments. So, Russia is sending mixed signals. We nevertheless choose to be optimistic regarding future relations in the Arctic. The reason is simply that Russia and Norway have a shared interest in maintaining the High North as an area of cooperation and absence of military confrontation. Still, we must maintain effective military forces in the north, and continue to cooperate actively with our most important Allies. This will ensure stability in the High North. Potential points of dispute exist, and the Kola military complex with its inherent activities will always be a factor in Russian-Norwegian relations.[2]

The Norwegian government put in place in September 2009 a new defense strategy to act upon these concerns. As reported by Defense News:

“We are now witnessing a gradual transformation in the global security policy landscape,” Defense Minister Grete Faremo said. “This underlines the need for a sharper focus on our interests in the High North.” Faremo said the main regional challenges are connected to the exploitation and management of resources, particularly petroleum in Arctic regions. Dubbed Capable Force, the new strategy, as outlined in a Ministry of Defense (MoD) report rolled out in September, sets out several goals, including:

Work more closely with NATO to strengthen High North regional security.
Create land-force units that can deploy rapidly.
Increase interoperability with NATO.
Spend a larger proportion of defense spending on its High North defense systems. Help NATO improve relations with Russia.
Pursue multinational acquisition partnerships to cut force modernization costs.”[3]

The Need For a 21st Century Air and Naval Integration Approach
The Norwegian view is shared among the Northern European states as they seek to shape a strategy to deal with the Arctic and their Russian neighbor.[4] States will re-enforce their maritime assets to manage their strategic interests in the Arctic. On the one hand, this will clearly require new ships able to operate in the period of transition in the Arctic. To quote Jane’s Navy International, the new Arctic situation creates simultaneously “opportunities and threats.”[5] On the other hand, new air and space assets are required to monitor activity, to provide ISR in the region, and to support actions as needed.
With a 21^st century approach to air and naval integration, it is clearly possible to combine air and surface assets into joint operations to monitor, protect, and act as required. Now with multi-mission systems such as the F-35, F-22, and Aegis, the integration of these systems carries with it simultaneous capability to perform defense, security, ISR, or strike functions.

An “F-35-Enabled Arctic Task Force” As Part of the Puzzle?
Lockheed Martin has provided a briefing that lays out how the F-35 as a “flying combat system” working with surface assets can provide for Arctic security missions for Norway. The key really is the ability to integrate an aircraft with an on-board database of intelligence and to be able to distribute this intelligence to other elements of an Arctic “task force” to protect Norwegian interest.

The slides below lay out a notional area of interest to protect from a Norwegian point of view.

These areas of interest will require Norwegian investments over the next thirty years in capabilities to shape and protect their engagement. Norway could stovepipe the acquisition of key assets with little regard to the integration of those assets, and could do so in virtual isolation from its allies. Alternatively, Norway could have significant integration among the assets it acquires with maximum interoperability with its allies, notably with its Arctic allies. In this light, the F-35 could become an important piece for solving the co-opetition puzzle.
The graphic below identifies the different operations, which could be pursued sequentially or simultaneously by an F-35 enabled Arctic “task force.” The advantage of the F-35 is that with a small number of aircraft able to integrate across the maritime and air spectrum, the “task force” could be small indeed.

In any case, nations will acquire new capabilities to deal with the ambigious Arctic future. Comments made by one Arctic expert as quoted by Jane’s Navy International (JNI) provide a good characterization of the fluidity of the evolving Arctic situation: “Arctic expert Dr Rob Huebert, associate director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, says that the main challenge until recently was getting people to take Arctic issues seriously. “Now the problem is trying to define the threat,” he says. The main concern is uncertainty, but he believes that, within this context, there are three variables: climate change, resource potential and changing geo-political reality. What makes the situation more complicated is that analysts are unable to ascertain how the three variables will interact. “Under one scenario, climate change and resource development [will make] northern resources more accessible, but when you start developing those resources, you add to climate change,” says Huebert. “The Russians are rebuilding their military capabilities through their petro dollars, and guess where their future petro dollars are coming from? The North.” He adds: “My feeling is that we’re in for a really complicated situation and if you get people doing dumb things, it can get real ugly, real fast, because it’s the interface of the politics that gets things out of control.”[6]

[1] “Guardians of the North: Norway Country Briefing,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 8, 2009).

[2] Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen, “Norway’s Security Outlook,” Ministry of Defence, May 12, 2009. Address made to the Atlantic Council of Finland on the 11^th of May.

[3] Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norwegian Strategy Targets High North,” Defense News (November 23, 2009).

[4] For example see the Stoltenberg report, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy (February 2009).

[5] “Shrinking Ice Cover Creates Opportunities and Threats,” Jane’s Navy International (January 2009).

[6] “Shrinking Ice Cover(…)”, ibid.

Towards Flexible Strategic Capability: The C5 Modernization Asset

Posted on January 12, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/12/2010

1/12/2010 An effective and flexible multi-mission capability is central to the strategic future of the United States.

As the US engages in specific military or security campaigns, undoubtedly investments will have to be made on capabilities designed for specific operations.

These specific or tailored solutions meet only a significantly limited range of problems and will be paid for to facilitate mission success. The MRAP is one example of a tailored solution made for a specific conflict. One military thinker highlights the perils of such limited investment: “After having bought 16,000 MRAPs, the Army and Marines have decided the vehicle is too large to maneuver off-road and in confined areas … so the 2010 defense bill appropriates $6.3B for new lightweight Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) – of which the Department of Defense plans to acquire 6,600.”

AMF300 — Briefing by US Transportation Commander, General Duncan McNabb, December 1st, 2009

These acquisitions are necessary to adapt to specific operations. However, politicians then confuse such expenditure with investing in an appropriate multi-mission force. It isn’t. Such expenditures are being made for relatively single purpose efforts, and come at the expense of investments in multi-purpose systems.

The United States needs to build and sustain a multi-mission force with global reach in order to remain a global power. Not necessarily a superpower in terms of being able to dictate outcomes throughout multiple areas of the world; but in terms of bringing capabilities to regional situations so that allies might meet their own objectives in conformity with perceived US strategic interests and thus remain allied to the United States. Regional engagements are always born of political compromise but for the US to influence and shape events – even if only partial – it needs to operate over the tyranny of distance. To do so requires air and naval power with a global reach.

A key element for such operations is airlift. Airlift is expensive to operate but is the single most effective element in rapidly bringing ground and air assets into play to influence events.

The C-5: a Unique capability

The US has built a mixed fleet of C-130s, C-17s, and C-5s to provide for this capability. Such a fleet requires significant tanking or air bridge capability.
The C-5 represents a unique strategic capability. In terms of load and range, the C-5 provides a significant capability to support global operations. The aircraft opens from both ends allowing more rapid exit and entry of military assets. The aircraft also carries both passengers and platforms and can transport fully equipped forces for rapid insertion operations. In other words, the C-5 provides a significant contribution both for multi-mission operations and rapid insertion ops.
The multi-mission aspect of the C-5’s capability is two-fold.

First, the C-5 provides the top end of the lift capability available to the US Air Force for strategic missions.
Second, the C-5 can provide range and lift capacity, which supports a variety of operations supporting contingency war or humanitarian operations.

The ability to bring significant insertion force capability to a strategic or tactical situation is unique in the US airlift fleet. When the US is not considering a full-scale military engagement in support of an operation but instead wishes to insert forces for a short duration, the C-5 provides a unique capability.

The C-5M is a product of the confluence of two modernization efforts.

First, the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) provides a new cockpit, including several flight safety enhancements and upgrades, which allow it to operate in modern civil space. The modernized C-5 has data links to connect with air traffic control. These links allow reduced separation of aircraft so they can operate in regulated air space. By being able to access optimized air traffic control routes, the C-5M gains fuel savings, time, and can operate at longer distance.

Second, the Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) updates 70 subsystems of the aircraft. The centerpiece of the RERP is a new General Electric engine, which is used worldwide on civil aircraft and is also found on Air Force One and KC-10 tankers. This allows access to GE’s worldwide engine system in offline locations.

C5rerp — Overall Enhancement of the C5 using COTS (Courtesy: Lockheed Martin, 2010)

In addition to the life cycle cost savings, this upgrade yields new capabilities – leveraged modernization – which allows it to shrink the tanker gap.

As already noted, the C-5M can operate in civil airspace due to the avionics upgrades, which allows it to fly more efficient routes. The range of the aircraft allows it to avoid re-fueling en route (as compared to C-130s or C-17s), which means one needs fewer tankers and less en route tanking infrastructure (notably en route air fields).

Due to the significant range and reduced air bridge requirements coupled with enhanced lift capabilities and improved reliability, the C-5M can turn around much more rapidly and depart the arrival point. As a result the C-5M can lead to significant increases in the frequency of materiel deliveries. With fewer aircraft required, fuel requirements are reduced at the austere airfield.

A Lower LCN: An Asset to Deal with Strategic Uncertainty

Additionally, the modernized C-5Ms provide significant contributions to dealing with strategic uncertainty. The US will clearly need insertion forces able to operate worldwide in very time constrained environments for humanitarian or military missions. The C-5Ms will be able to carry significant or heavy loads over long distance, which provides for either longer range for C-17 sized loads or simply bigger, bulkier, or heavier loads.

The increased reliability of the C-5M will allow the Air Force to use the C-5 on more austere runways. The C-5 has significant capability to land in austere runways; with the new systems it can be considered a core contributor to this capability. The airplane has a landing gear footprint (LCN landing classification number) lower than the C-17 and comparable with the C-130, which allows the aircraft to operate on soft semi-prepared runways.

This inherent capability allows you to go beyond how the service currently uses the aircraft. Improved reliability from modernization means the tactical use of the C-5M can be expanded. In other words, by modernizing the C-5, the C-5M will be able to reliably carry more cargo over longer distances and with less air refueling tanker dependency.

The C-5M delivers 22% more power, provides 58% faster climb rate, and 8 to 20% better fuel economy, depending upon the operational scenario. In addition, the C-5M can expand its operations into airfields with shorter runways, thereby expanding its operational utility.

The C-5 can also contribute to new requirements, such as in support of AFRICOM.

The C-5M can operate from Ramstein to cover the entire African continent in support of AFRICOM and NATO operations.

This capability allows support for humanitarian, security, or military operations throughout the entire operational area.

In short, the C-5M provides a unique national strategic capability at affordable cost and represents an opportunity for the US to strengthen its multi-mission assets. While the C-5M is useful in support of Iraq and Afghanistan, it should not be viewed as limited to support of the today’s current operations. It is an investment in today and a foundation for tomorrow.

Geared For Afghanistan: An Interview with USMC Lieutenant-Colonel Pasagian

Posted on January 11, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/11/2010

As foot soldiers are in increased demand in the harsh terrain of Afghanistan while IEDs have created new types of vulnerabilities, individual protective gear for the infantryman keeps evolving and improving to address new kinds of challenges. SLD’s Murielle Delaporte sat down with USMC Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur J. Pasagian, Program manager, Infantry Combat Equipment (ICE), to discuss such a process of adaptation with a special focus on one of the most crucial protective item today’s Marines rely on, i.e. body armor.

gear-2ndPlatoon-300 — Marine Corps photo taken in January 2009 by Lance Cpl. Geoffrey Campbell

Marines with 2nd Platoon, Company W, Task Force 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 1,
search for weapons caches in a joint effort with Iraqi police, Jan. 10. The IP coordinated cache sweep in La Hib,
northeastern Karmah, demonstrated the proficiency of Karmah’s police and resulted in hundreds of pounds of explosives,
blasting caps, pressure switches, and detonating devices being uncovered during the 13-hour search.

***

AN OVERVIEW

Today’s battlefield seems to require more of the same all across the spectrum of military equipment, i.e. more protection, more power and lethality, more mobility and agility, more stealth/silent/low heat signature, more maintainability and sustainability, more situational awareness ability… For the soldier on foot – whether Marine, Special Forces or Army -, this tends to translate into heavier and heavier loads of specialized equipment and protective device. A typical Marine combat load will include in addition to protective gear and the bare necessities (i.e. food and water) weapons, magazines, communications gear and the energy to sustain the latter. In Afghanistan, a three-day mission can require up to 150 pounds of individual loads. On the other hand, focused research and development towards lighter weight and miniaturization has lead to major improvements in this area, while the “soldier modernization” market, which emerged in the 1990’s and “generated a total $440 million in sales worldwide during 2008”, is considered very promising in the future. Some estimates anticipate a total of $6 billion to be spent between 2009 and 2015 on body armor alone for US Army soldiers and Marines.

army-training-150 — Navy Seals developped this deployable training system (credit: DID, 12/09)

New Afghan Specs: Looking for Long-Haul Sustainment
Notwithstanding the tough conditions of patrolling in thin aired high-altitude mountains (i.e. more than 10,000 feet), the accumulation and length of multiple tours of duty either in Iraq or in Afghanistan would be enough to explain the publicized increase in what is referred to as “non-deployables”, i.e. military personnel unable to be redeployed because of injuries: the total number of non-deployables has been estimated at about 20,000 with an increase of 2 to 3,000 between 2006 and 2009 and an annual injury rate of 2.2 injuries per active-duty soldier according to an article published last year in the Washington Post. Indeed, for Lieutenant-Colonel Pasagian, “heavy loads are nothing new in the USMC world and training is tailored to match the weight and fitness requirements“. Intensive strength training accross the board can help reduce injuries by up to 45%, while soldiers curriculum also tends to include basic physical therapy notions to prevent the latter (most Army active-duty combat brigades nowadays even count a physical therapist in their ranks when deployed).

Basic USMC training for units deployed to Afghanistan also tends to include the lost skills of using local animals to ensure “long-haul sustainment”, such as packing a mule : revived in the eighties when the United States were helping Afghans fighting the Soviets, the California-based Marine Corps’s Mountain Warfare Training Center is keeping the lost art alive among the next generation of warfighters.

But the main focus to enhance the latter’s mobility on the ground against an ever more agile enemy while maintaining the same level of protection and capabilities which proved successful in Iraq is to bet on technological breakthroughs and work on a joint basis whenever possible. The axis of research aiming at reducing the soldier’s individual weight and logistic footprint are numerous and include:

taking a few pounds off here and there on different items the latter must – or would like to – carry, or increasing the protection while minimizing the subsequent weight increase: it is the case for instance for the joint US Army/USMC Next Generation Combat Helmet (ECH) program, which aims at augmenting ballistic protection against fragmentation by 35% while maintaining the same weight; it is also the case of the US Army Land Warrior system, aimed at providing the soldier with situational awareness, maps, imagery, voice and text messaging capabilities, via a helmet-mounted display, which started at 17 pounds, was almost abandoned for that reason and is now back on track at 7.2 pounds a piece; it is also the case of anything which needs to be carried such as rucksacks (e.g. SOCOM Body Armor Load Carriage System or the “medium ruck” currently being designed with Afghan requirements – i.e. days of walk – in mind) or guns;
improving the design and self-sustainability of equipment: making equipment work with simple AA batteries rather than uniquely-built ones each soldier must carry with him – like the new generation of thermal sights for assault rifles and machine-guns (TWS II) which happens to also be a third lighter – is an example; developing a dual purpose undergarment aimed at protecting from the fire and the extreme cold, like the FROG, is another one (see the interview); enlarging the soles of the Marines’ boots “to ensure better stability and improve comfort” as stressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Pasagian, is another one: in this area, “the new aim is to leverage civilian advances in design and materials to build or buy new boots that are more comfortable, longer lasting, and support the efforts of troops in the field (…)” (see: US military Combat Boot Orders, DID, July 13th, 2009);
looking towards the future in a sustainable development mindset is certainly likely to kill more than two birds with one stone: whether designing new hydration systems (armoback hydration systems for instance) or searching for viable fuel cells, many industries worldwide – defense and non-defense – are actively working on finding breakthroughs in these areas. Since “70% of the tonnage required to position the US Army into battle is taken up by fuel”, fuel cells and other energy devices (such as an Australian vest generating energy from body vibrations) could indeed revolutionize the battlefield (see: Military Forces Move into Power, January 16th, 2009). So could an innovative wastewater treatment system called DAAB: developed since 2008 by the US Army and the Texas Research Institute for Environmental Studies, it should be deployed in Iraq in 2010.

Keeping these goals in mind, for Lieutenant-Colonel Pasagian, one of the most rewarding recent improvement has been made in the area of body armor with the introduction of the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) in the USMC. Follows a narrative of the above-mentioned interview.

Cpl. Brian Aldrich remains vigilant during a security patrol in support of
Operation Pathfinder, Feb. 9, in Farah province, Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. Aldrich is a fire team leader with Company I, 3rd Battalion,
8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element of Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan. SPMAGTF-A’s mission is
to conduct counterinsurgency operations, with a focus on training and
mentoring the Afghan national police (Marine Corps Photo by Lance Cpl. Monty)

***

THE INTERVIEW
GOING MODULAR ON BODY ARMOR

[SLD] What have been the major recent evolutions of the USMC infantry combat equipment?
– In regard with the Iraqi war
– In regard with the resetting from Iraq to Afghanistan
– Are there identifiable phases of evolution (depending on threat, availability, technology, etc)?

[Lt-Colonel Arthur J. Pasagian] In the past, Marines’ protection was limited to helmets and flack jackets, which resulted in fragmentation projectiles’ injuries in conflicts like the Korean war. Today the pace of development in this area has quickened, especially in the past six-seven years in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). It started in early 2000, when technological advances were made to stop small gun rounds and projectiles. Improvement has been made since then and protection against small arms in particular has been enhanced thanks to hard plates. The war in Iraq has been requiring extra-fragmentation protection and lead to the most significant advance to this day with the introduction of the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) last spring: what makes the MTV especially attractive is its complex load distribution system and multiple adjustments options for threats, but also weather conditions.
The flexibility the MTV offers allows the warfighter to tailor the appropriate level of protection to the threat whether IEDs or else via the mix of hard and soft armour. It is cold-resistant and is designed to provide a full-body level of protection.

To address flame threat, body armour has been combined with Flame Resistant (FR) technology and gear for some time: we went from using traditional FR materials/fabrics/products, such as flight suits circa 2000, to developing specific products for infantrymen: hence FROG, a 4th generation flame resistant gear in service since 2006. Worn underneath the vest, the suit is made of a mix of dissimilar material, including kevlar. The problem has been dealing with the heat generated by the extra-clothing and to find the right balance. On the other hand the mix of cold weather flame resistance has been very successful and especially appreciated in the Afghan winter and spring, thanks to a thermo-managed system that is also flame-resistant. This innovation happened to be a real breakthrough in 2008 and it was decided to field the entire force with it.
Making the vest water-resistant has been another challenge, but a crucial life-saving asset.

Master Sergeant Ilich Bello of PG16 wears the entire Flame-Resistant
Organizational Gear ensemble including the Lightweight Helmet,
goggles and Modular Tactical Vest.
(Photo by Bill Johnson-Miles, USMC, June 2009)

Lessons learned from Afghanistan are being “fed directly to the gear”: they have brought back very valuable feedback rather rapidly which contributed to improve R&D on 3rd generation plate-carriers. Higher elevation constraints have been translated into lighter plate-carriers and a better product able to manage thermostress and humidity.

Is there a “typical” USMC infantry combat equipment?
– Right now the missions are mostly land-based vs amphibious: how does one handle a potential shift in mission in terms of gear and training?
– Is there a joint approach for land gear or is USMC equipment rather different than Army’s and other services?

A “typical load” for the Marines has two major specificities: it has to be flame-resistant and it has to have body-armor (plate-carrier; MTV). Then one has to add the usual load: ammunition, batteries, water, eyewear, radios etc … The Marines’ gear is mostly identical to the Army’s or the Air Force’s: what differs though is the way it is carried.
However the amphibious characteristic of the USMC brings about a fundamental difference which is the requirement for reliable emergency release, which tends to be tested separately, but otherwise the JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System) develops capabilities on a joint basis and all services go through the same testing process. The MAGTF’s unique amphibious nature also tends to generate more focus on making the gear lighter, more agile and maneuverable, sometimes more lethal: MARSOC (Marine Special Operations Command) is in charge of developing special tailored equipment.

The main goal is a baseline for autonomy: from this point of view the plate-carrier and the MTV constitute two complementary customized solutions, resulting from the new recognition that one does need to adapt to a very dynamic environment. In the longer term, a modular system may emerge with more commonality with other services.

What have been/are the major challenges encountered?
– Weight issue debate
– theater-specific adjustments, such as hydration for instance?
– manufacturing issues (e.g. preventive withdrawal of ESAPI in February 2009; helmet bolts exemple in May 2009; enhanced quality control; etc)?

The debate about lightening the load has lead to going “back to basics” and has stressed the limits of technology: an increased survivability and mobility come at the expense of a reduction of the level of coverage with a 10 to 12 pounds diminution in overall weight. Not all Marines are fully loaded to the max, but some of them have indeed to carry up to 75 pounds of gear (coms; water; etc), including 30 pounds body armor.

As far as water is concerned, systems are getting better and better with the development of filtration kits.

Regarding manufacturing and testing, the highest quality is sought and the Marines do their own additional testing. Fielding decisions are done in government facilities and product development is usually not outsourced. A team effort exists which starts in Quantico, with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command defining the requirements for the force . In the case of the plate-carrier fielding, an urgent need requirement was determined for Afghanistan in 2008: it took only four months for the whole three-step process of requirement assessment, test standards in government labs including balistic testing (which usually last 90 days), and quality control to be accomplished, so that a surge capacity of 10,000 plate-carriers (out of 2,500) could be achieved. Such a speed process – even in the world of urgent operational needs — has rarely been heard of as far as non COTS items are concerned.

How does one keep a balance between the need for additional capabilities and agility/simplicity?
– How is it decided? Via lessons learned process or do commanders on the field have a certain latitude and autonomy on such decisions?

Available protective systems are complementary and the military decides on the field of what is appropriate depending on the mission profile: the Commander in the theater is the one choosing the options and side-plates at the Lieutenant-Colonel level. It is his choice to leave some optional gear at the base in order to tailor the load of each combatant to a unique mission. It has of course been tested beforehand and the Commander can adapt it depending on the need: an offensive mission will require more maneuverability, hence only the vest/plate carrier might be used in these scenarii, consequently lightening the overall load by some 10 to 12 pounds.

In a Distributed Operation decentralized environment characteristic of the USMC as a “sizable air-ground task force”, the decision-making process goes down to the battalion Commanders.

What are the logistics and support aspects linked to modern combat infantry gear?
– Supply for water, food, energy, other needs?
– Repair and support of specific gear?
– Evolution over the past years?
– Typical log challenges, issues, solutions and/or need for improvement?

Logistic support within Marines units have followed the same trend towards being more distributed. In order to ensure a “safety level of supplies”, the system must remain as simple as possible with issue points for reload.
The main challenge as far as body armor is concerned is the examination and the control of the plates: the latter are being x-rayed before deployment in the context of a comprehensive 18-month program. In addition total visibility asset is being pursued with the planned introduction of unique identifiers (UIDs).

Is there a different training required to match evolving equipment?
– e.g. extra-strength training or regarding higher-tech gear?

The new flexibility involved in latest generation gear – such as front commands to release slide plates – implies new reflexes to become secondary nature and new training practices which are included in the Marines’ manual. Contracts usually include new equipment training : emergency release, water kits and battery/power system are all examples of different procedures to acquire. The best trainers from this point of view are the makers of the systems themselves. That is the case for the vest, which is a rather recent adoption, since it was newly discovered in 2001: maintaining the plates properly, making sure they are good plates are all essential conditions for success.

The load bearing Modular Tactical Vest optimizes the same Outer Tactical Vest (OTV)
ballistic protection, wears more comfortably than the OTV, and enables Marines
to easily configure components of their combat load
to best meet specific mission requirements. It also includes a better quick release system.
(credit: Dedra Jones, USMC, June 2009)

CFT150 — Lance Cpl. Donald F. Marshall, a Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron Super Physical Fitness Test competitor, runs a PFT, Combat Fitness Test, a run through an obstacle course and other physical feats while wearing a flak jacket and combat utility uniform (Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, photo taken by Cpl. Kyle T. Ramirez, June 2009)

As far as the discussion over weight-caused injuries goes, the USMC has not recorded a trend of higher injury rates because of higher gear weight, since this factor and austere environment conditions have traditionally been taken into consideration in the basic training of any Marine: physical fitness has always been especially hard and part of the territory of being a Marine. A new component of Marine fitness programs is being implemented to “heighten awareness” and better match physical fitness with the operational environment. The Combat Fitness Test (CFT) is intended to keep Marines ready for the physical rigors of contemporary combat operations. The CFT has been implemented recently as part of keeping the USMC mantra “sharp mind, sharp body” going. Moments of rest are of course planned, as the Marines are riflemen first.

Weight is not a new issue and not enough data are available to draw the proper conclusions. However, all is of course being done to minimize it from lowering the carriage down to the waist, playing with various pack sizes and ensuring proper levels of hydration. Adjustments are also being made at other levels, such as boots, which are conceived to bear wider and on more rugged terrain: with a two-year durability, they tend to be more expensive, but considerably better.

From that point of view, the improved version of the MTV has lead to major changes in a very short time and looks like the right polyvalent solution regardless on where troops may be deployed.

Sgt Maj. David Bradford, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment sergeant major,
and Staff Sgt. Justin Bradley talk about security improvements,
implemented in Delaram, Farah province, Afghanistan. Bradford and Bradley are coordinating
with the Afghan national police to increase security for Delaram citizens.
Insurgents had then been targeting the area using suicide attacks and attempting
to harm civilians by planting IEDs in the bazaar area. Bradford and Bradley are part
of the Ground Combat Element for the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Afghanistan.
(Photo taken in March 2009 by Chief Warrant Officer Philippe Chasse)

source: www.marines.mil/unit/2ndmlg/Pages/news/2006/Protective%20gear%20keeps%20Marines%20safe.aspx

———-

***Posted January 11th, 2010

Our History and Lessons Learned Corner: Bagram Nightmares (Part Three)

Posted on January 10, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/10/2010

By Fred H. Allison (U.S. Marine Corps History Division)

bagrammountain — Mountains Surrounding Bagram

Harriers Sortie Rate Double the Norm
Making a globe-spanning flight from home field at Yuma, Arizona, the Marine aviators arrived on 15 October and began flying missions within 48 hours. The squadron deployed with only six aircraft, the limited ramp conditions at Bagram did not allow for a full squadron. Over the next 12 months the thirteen Nightmare pilots flew almost 3,800 combat hours in 1250 sorties, a rate that was near twice what a 16 plane Harrier squadron normally flew in a year.
Deployed as they were in the middle of a combat arena, all the flight time was “red ink” time, or combat time since the enemy was just outside the perimeter.[1] On an early combat mission, as he taxied for take-off in pre-dawn darkness, Colonel Dixon watched machine gun tracers spew into the sky off the end of the runway as local warlords settled differences.

Almost half of their missions were at night. When darkness settled, it was no-kidding dark, there was little “light-pollution” from large cities as would be the case in the U.S. From the ground it was eerie to watch operations around the field, one could hear Harriers taxiing, landing or taking off but not see them. From a pilot’s perspective, approaching the field to land at night they saw the town all lit up and in the “dark abyss” next to the town was the runway, “somewhere.”

The flying was extremely demanding. Radar to provide guidance into the field was limited and due to the enemy threat required “tactical” runway approaches, no slow, straight-ins. Afghanistan had little infrastructure to support aviation, such as navigation stations, radar facilities, maps, weather forecasting, air traffic control or other airfields where a pilot could land in an emergency or when bad weather shut down home base. When the war began in Iraq the U.S. Air Force AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft was not available for command and control. The war in Iraq also took most of the airborne tankers. This shortened missions, lightened ordnance loads and took away the safety hedge of having more airborne fuel available if unexpected conditions arose. Pilots flew constantly evaluating the situation and weighing it against their few options.

harrierpart3 — Harriers Landing by Guidry

Intelligence as the Weapon of Choice
Afghanistan previewed how the war on terror would be fought. It was a war where searching for an elusive and shadowy enemy was a central tactic and “intelligence was the primary U.S. weapon.”[2] For this fight, the Harrier proved to be of great value, mainly because Marine pilots train extensively in close air support and are genetically wired to support troops on the ground and regard it life’s greatest calling.

They also had the technology to provide superb real time intelligence information to the ground warriors: “a moving map display linked to global positioning linked to the Litening pod.” The Litening pod allowed for a magnified, precise and detailed examination of the terrain, by communicating this information to the ground troops it significantly enhanced their situational awareness. As an example, a Nightmare pilot was able to spot a man digging alongside a road at a range of 5.5 miles through the Litening pod. The pilot was able to warn the convoy of the suspicious activity.[3]

Employing ordnance was the exception. The squadron dropped 17 bombs, fired two rockets and sent almost 2,000 rounds of 25 mm down range. In most cases presence was all that was required. The Harrier is a relatively loud aircraft and its noise intimidated.

One of the special operations troops attested, the “Afghans, when they hear an airplane over head that scares the hell out of them, they won’t pull stuff when they know airplanes are overhead.” Another soldier who lived and fought out of an isolated fire base up north in the Hindu Kush mountains, where terrain is 15-20k, snow capped, beautiful and dangerous attested, “The only nights that they slept well were the nights they heard the Harriers flying overhead.”

myers — General Meyers at Bagram in 2003

Mission(s) Accomplished
Based close to the fight at Bagram and flying a fast jet, the Flying Nightmares responded quickly to air support requests. They were able to cover two vulnerability periods every 24 hours, each lasting at least 90 minutes or up to five hours if tankers were available. They flew in two-plane sections and employed “hunter-killer” tactics. The lead aircraft, the hunter, carried the Litening pod, which the pilot used to locate and designate targets for the “killer’s” ordnance. Precise delivery of ordnance when used, was critical as in a counter-insurgency collateral damage had to be minimized if they were to win hearts and minds.

The Litening pod helped locate the target and because of its infrared marker, (“finger of death”) which could be seen by pilots and the forward air controllers using night vision devices, certainty of target identification could thus be had. One U.S. Army special operations officer based at Jalabad stated that, “They did everything we asked them to do and more. They would take the time to really look for the bad guys. They would also tell us about bad guys beyond the range where we were looking. They talked us through things, we really felt that the Harriers knew what they were doing. I feel that [they] appreciate what we’re up against on the ground.” General Dan K. McNeill, USA, commander of all coalition forces in Afghanistan at the time received “constant” favorable reports on VMA-513’s performance. Two VMA-513 pilots, Major Mike Franzak and received distinguished flying crosses for providing game-changing air support for ground troops in dire situations.

In sum, the deployment of VMA-513 to Bagram proved a success and exhibited its flexibility. It deployed rapidly to an expeditionary environment, long distant from any Marine Corps logistics depot. The Flying Nightmares maintained a high operational tempo in an austere setting for an entire year. They provided valuable reconnaissance, intelligence and fire support for coalition ground forces. In so doing they validated the capability and utility of the Litening targeting pod, which has since been widely used in the war on terrorists.

It also breathed new life into the controversial Harrier itself; indeed the success of VMA-513’s Bagram deployment took the wind out of the sails of a Los Angeles Times story that attacked the Harrier’s safety record which appeared in late 2003. The Marine Corps general at the helm of Marine aviation regarded the Nightmare’s Bagram deployment as singularly important for “saving the AV-8B.” The Flying Nightmares 2002-2003 Bagram deployment pioneered the way for subsequent deployments of Harriers to Afghanistan by the Marine Corps and the Royal Air Force.

The Marine Corps likes to advertise its expeditionary nature, to be fast, austere, innovative and lethal in any clime and place. The Flying Nightmares modeled these attributes in their Bagram deployment.

[1] Called red ink time because combat flights are logged in a pilot’s log book in red ink.

[2] Don Chipman, “Air Power and the Battle for Mazar-e Sharif,” Air Power History, Spring 2006, p. 44.

[3] Dixon intvw.

———-

***Posted January 10th, 2010

Our History and Lessons Learned Corner:Bagram Nightmares (Part Two)

Posted on January 4, 2010 | by Murielle Laird

01/04/2010

: Mountains Surrounding Bagram

by Fred Allison

“Everybody wanted to go”
Although a sizeable Army and coalition force inhabited the base at Bagram, the Marines were required to build their own camp and work spaces. So, as the VMA-513 pilots trained to fly and fight out of Bagram, an advance party, commanded by 1stLt Ryan P. Flanagan, composed of Marines from Marine wing support squadrons (included MWSS-373, 374 and 474) and Marine aviation logistics squadron 13 (MALS-13) flew a month early into Bagram to build the Marine camp. These Marines had a scant two weeks to get ready. Nevertheless, there was no shortage of volunteers, “everybody wanted to go.”

The advanced party arrived in Bagram in the middle of the night, forty Marines and about five C-5s loads worth of gear. The belly of the transport was blacked out as the Air Force transport banked hard into its spiraling, tactical approach descending down into Bagram. The Marines were in full combat gear with their personal weapons “locked and loaded.” After landing they stepped out into Bagram’s blackness, it was windy and raw cold. Building a base camp, or “tent city” fit easily within the capability of Marine wing support squadrons, which had the ability to build substantial expeditionary airfields if required. Nevertheless the Bagram experience was daunting.

The next morning they saw their campsite, frames of tents stuck in the “shin deep moon dust” was all that was there, and mines. The unexploded ordnance went first then they plunged into building their camp. After a month of 16 hour days, they had erected 30 strong back tents, each a home for eight Marines, laid gravel down, set up showers and a laundry, wired the camp for electricity and communications, built bunkers and put gates up. With no internal plumbing or sewage, water had to be hauled in and after use, the “gray water” was hauled out. Later they built a chapel, recreational facilities, a sand pit for martial arts training, a weight room/gym, bouldering wall, volleyball and basketball courts, and when a donated fiberglass above-ground swimming pool showed up they put that in too.[1]

Once the squadron had moved in, it was dubbed, “Teufel Hunden” (Devil Dog). In its center was a memorial to 9-11, miniature twin towers, which listed the names of fallen Marines in Afghanistan on a concrete pentagon base with an outline of the state of Pennsylvania, carved in the cement. A flagpole was set in the middle, where daily the national banner was raised and lowered.

They rarely had interaction with Afghan civilians, although some worked on base, hauling off the gray water and doing light construction work. There was also a Friday bazaar. Afghanis traveled for hours to sell their wares at the bazaar, antique firearms, jewelry, tapestry and furs. The VMA-513 Marines continued a time honored Marine tradition of promoting goodwill with the locals, especially the children. They visited Afghan children in the hospital; some were malnourished, others were victims of mines sown during the Soviet occupation and as a result had arms or legs missing. At Christmas the Marines conducted a ‘Toys for Tots’ campaign for Afghan children in surrounding villages. Donated toys came from the U.S., enough to fill two, five-ton trucks. They distributed them in town and outlying villages.

Logistics: Looking for Simplicity and Commonality
Squadron success hinged on aircraft maintenance, they only had six jets to support a demanding flight schedule and were on a long tether for replacement parts and other maintenance support. The MWSS and MALS-13 Marines made Bagram Harrier-friendly. They built a high-power turn up ramp for engine maintenance and operated a motorized sweeper – transported from CONUS to clean Bagram’s rugged surfaces. This combined with the pilots’ caution in taxiing and landing, takeoff procedures neutralized the FOD hazard evident in that they did not lose an engine from Afghanistan FOD in the year-long deployment.[2] This was an impressive record in light of the regularity of FODs at much “cleaner” CONUS bases.

Logistics to support the Harrier squadron in Afghanistan had been a major concern. To facilitate expeditionary aircraft maintenance, VMA-513 brought a Marine Corps-developed Remote Expeditionary Support Package a mini-maintenance department pack-up, van loaded for rapid deployment that gave VMA-513 a robust maintenance capability and a large degree of self-sufficiency despite the austere setting. They received some support from Army units on base and although the parts supply line extended back to home base, Yuma, Arizona, parts arrived timely most within five days, delivered mostly by commercial carriers and U.S. Air Force transports. Important for the high aircraft availability rate was the decision to bring only one variant of AV-8B, the night attack model, instead of the ‘radar’ variant too. This allowed for simplicity and commonality for parts supply, to include cannibalizing parts if the situation demanded.[3]

Marine mechanics endured the wind, dust, cold, heat and darkness of Bagram. Steeped security requirements required that they work “lights out” at night, they wore night vision goggles and used covert lighting unless they were in the “clamshell” hangar, a rapidly erected hangar set up by the Air Force. The maintainers worked long hours, 12-hour shifts, with a day off a distinct rarity; they did not mind since there was little else to do.

Lieutenant Colonel Dixon, attested to his Marines’ role in the success of the Bagram deployment, attested that through their “internal fortitude… working 12 on and 12 off, hot weather, cold weather, rain, sleet, snow or shine. These Marines can give, and give and give and don’t ask for much in return.” Marine mechanics produced a mission capable aircraft availability rate of 83% average, for the year’s deployment; no sortie was lost for factors they had control over.

Initially the deployment was to be only six months. About the time they should have been heading home the war in Iraq started. They had been pre-warned two months earlier, around Christmas, that they would be extended for six months, doubling their deployment time. They had been counting down the days. Dixon dreaded breaking the news to his Marines. Jokingly he said, “I made everybody turn in their weapons” before announcing the change. A year in Bagram was quite an experience.”

“Operation Forgotten Freedom”
Bagram sat in the middle of hostile territory, yet there was little actual fighting, although rockets or small arms fire occasionally arced in. Complacency and boredom threatened morale. Some Marines half joking called it “Operation Forgotten Freedom”. The Air Force rotated their Bagram A-10 squadrons in and out on a regular basis; about seven different A-10 squadrons came and went while the Flying Nightmares were there. Indeed many Marines who went to Iraq and fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom I were home before the VMA-513 Marines.

Area400 — Area Surrounding Bagram Air Base

The outside threat kept them trapped on base. It was not unlike being on an aircraft carrier, but as one pilot remarked, “this carrier never pulls into port.”

After the squadron was extended Col Dixon implemented a rotational R&R program. All of his Marines had the opportunity to take a ten-day leave from Bagram. To pass the time, beyond working, which they did incessantly, the Marines PT’d. They got used to running with their M-16s. A Bagram marathon took place and documented in Runner’s World magazine. The internet, email and movies were available but, ever-innovative, flight line troops collected camel spiders, which, along with other “creepy crawlys” even cobras, inhabited the aircraft parking ramp and came out at night. Promising camel spiders were collected by Marine flight line troops to fight for the troops entertainment in the “battle dome” a plexi-glass box built by a Marine mechanic. Most important for morale, squadron leaders, and commanders up the chain of command—VMA-513 received visits from LtGen Earl Hailston, CG MarForPac and General Mike Hagee the Commandant—all stressed the significance of the deployment.

[1] VMA-513 Power Point brief, 2003, Reference Section, History Division, Quantico, VA.

[2] There was one engine damaged from “internal” FOD, a piece of the aircraft itself was ingested.

[3] Cannibalizing refers to the practice of taking a part from one aircraft and using it on another.

———-

***Posted January 4th, 2010

Our History and Lessons Learned Corner: Bagram Nightmares (Part One)

Posted on December 20, 2009 | by Murielle Laird

12/20/2009

From time to time we will run an historical piece which highlights the central focus of this website which is concepts of operations, logistics and deployed capabilities. We are beginning our “History and Lessons Learned Corner” with a piece by Fred Allison, a Marine Corps historian, on the challenges facing the USMC in operating from Bagram in the aftermath of 9/11. This piece highlights the concepts of operations and logistics challenges facing the USMC and the crucial role one piece of technology, the litening pod, played in their performance.

Fred Allison is a Historian with the U.S. Marine Corps History Division: he is a retired Marine Corps Reserve major, F-4 Radar Intercept Officer and has a PhD in military history. Allison’s article will be presented over the next three weeks and will then be followed with a piece on the challenges of providing close air support in Iraq during the Fallujah operation.

Mountains-Surrounding-Bagra — Late afternoon sun paints the mountains surrounding Bagram Air Field amber on July 26, 2008 (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Morse)

BAGRAM NIGHTMARES I

by Fred H. Allison (U.S. Marine Corps History Division)

Getting “Inside the fight”

Harrier300 — Lt. Col. Eric Schaefer, commanding officer for Marine Attack Squadron 214 "Black Sheep," Marine Aircraft Group 40, Marine Expeditionary Brigade - Afghanistan, lands at Camp Bastion for refueling. The "Black Sheep" proved they could land at a forward base, prepare for a refueling and execute (Marine Aircraft Group 40, Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto, Kandahar Airfield, AF, July 2009)

Bagram air base today is one of the world’s busiest, large, sophisticated and bustling in support of the coalition’s war against the Taliban. In the early days of what was then called the War on Terrorism, eight years ago, Bagram was the northern front, an outpost in a dangerous and hostile land. It was isolated and austere, wind-swept and foreboding. Situated on a plateau, its elevation was almost 5000 feet above sea level. Shot-up and gutted Russian MiGs were reminders that it had once been a Russian air base. Shortly after 9-11, in the earliest part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the Northern Alliance and Taliban battled for its control, literally on the base. Mortars and rockets ravaged its buildings, runway, taxiways and ramps. Once liberated, gutsy C-130 pilots began flying in and out of Bagram, bringing in troops and supplies. The decimated airport conditions however would not allow tactical jets to operate safely from Bagram.

Strike jets therefore, had to fly a long way to get overhead the Afghanistan battlefields and provide air support for coalition troops. Except for the Kyrgyz Republic to the north no nation on Afghanistan’s perimeter hosted American jets. Early in OEF U.S. Air Force bombers staged from Diego Garcia (2500 miles) or Missouri (much further) to provide air support while Navy/Marine Corps aircraft, which flew the preponderance of the OEF missions, flew from carriers 700 miles away in the Arabian Sea or from bases in Krygyzistan which were also hundreds of miles distant. With the possibility of war in Iraq looming even these limited aviation assets might not be available in the future. General T. Michael Moseley, U.S. Air Force, combined forces air component commander (CFACC) for OEF asked the Marine Corps in mid-2002, if Harriers could fly from Bagram.

The AV-8B Harrier’s vertical (or) short takeoff and landing capability meant that it did not have to have a sophisticated airfield on which to operate. Bagram was basically an Army helicopter base. Its runway had no arresting gear and unlike other tactical jets, the Harrier required none. A squadron of strike jets based in country could provide near the same air coverage as a much larger force of aircraft based hundreds of miles away. If Harriers could fly from Bagram they, like the Air Force’s A-10s which by mid-2002 were flying from Bagram, would be “inside the fight.” They could provide a quick response to calls for air support and better integrate with the troops they were supporting which themselves were headquartered at Bagram.[1]

An important aspect of Moseley’s request for Harriers was that they now had Litening targeting pods. This system, developed in Israel and co-manufactured with Northrop-Grumman, represented a generational step forward in precise weapons delivery and of great significance for Afghanistan, as it could gather intelligence data. Only Air National Guard F-16s had used them in combat, in Operation Southern Watch.[2] The Litening pod’s capability and utility was recognized by Marines and by 2001 Marine Harrier squadrons were training with Litening pods in Yuma, Arizona.

Coping with FOD, gust and threats

preplandingharrier — Maj. James Bardo, maintenance officer for Marine Attack Squadron 214 "Black Sheep," Marine Aircraft Group 40, Marine Expeditionary Brigade - Afghanistan, kneels while one of the unit's AV-8B Harriers lands at Camp Bastion July 29. The unit used the flight line to test future operations at forward operating bases and their ability to perform rapid ground refueling (Marine Aircraft Group 40, Lance Cpl. Gregory Aalto, Kandahar Airfield, AF, July 2009)

The Marine Corps, in the summer of 2002, directed Lieutenant Colonel James “Grouper” Dixon, the commanding officer of a Yuma-based Harrier squadron, VMA-513, to conduct a site survey of Bagram air base to determine its suitability for Harrier operations. Dixon and party arrived in the middle of night at Bagram, it was pitch dark, and “the darkest place” he had ever been. The next day they began the site survey. Dixon focused on the runway and ramp surfaces. They were terrible. The runway overall was crumbling, with holes in the paving, some over two feet across, six inches deep. Initial construction, by the Soviet Union, was substandard. The wooden concrete joints had rotted away and the concrete slabs were buckled and crumbling, overall a real threat to an aircraft engine that might easily ingest a chunk of debris. This is known as foreign object damage (FOD) and can cripple an aircraft as surely as an enemy bullet. True, the runway was being repaired, good for the future, but for the near term it meant that even less runway would be available. Indeed one half of the runway’s width was closed for repairs while the other half remained in its decimated state.

There were other concerns. Night operations would be required but because of the enemy threat the base would be blacked out. Harrier pilots were adept at night combat flying and practiced it regularly, but they expected to return to a base or ship that had lights to aid landing. Mines proliferated, they were visible just off the concrete, if an aircraft taxied off the paved surfaces the pilot would have to eject.

Logistics was another issue. Forward based Harriers were meant to operate as part of a Marine air-ground task force. A Bagram-based Harrier squadron would be the only Harrier squadron for thousands of miles, isolated and distanced from any Marine-specific logistics support. Bagram was at a high elevation and the thinner air would impede Harriers’ performance and reduce ordnance loads (which for the Harrier was a real problem since it did not carry a big load anyway). Vertical takeoffs and landings could not be done and carry any appreciable bomb load. The mountains and windy conditions made the air around Bagram gusty and unpredictable, again a hazard to Harriers operating at slow speed around the airfield.

Upon return to the U.S., Dixon consulted with aircraft engine experts on the FOD problem. He learned that the Harrier’s engine would not suck up a “rice krispy if it is not disturbed.” An advantage the Harrier has is that the nose gear is behind its engine intake, so it would not throw up rocks to be ingested. The FOD danger came from another aircraft’s exhaust that kicked up debris. Amended taxi and takeoff procedures and “tail pipe awareness” would minimize the FOD hazard.

Because of Bagram’s high elevation, although a vertical landing could not be used, the Harrier’s vectored thrust capability would allow short take offs and landings with a decent load of ordnance. This would also minimize the enemy ground fire threat since they would not be hovering while landing and taking off.

So, although the Harriers could operate from Bagram it was not going to be easy; the high elevation, gusty conditions, high FOD hazard, enemy threat, and minimal lighting conditions ensured that. Dixon’s squadron was young, few of his pilots or non-commissioned officers had been to war. Nevertheless, Dixon believed his squadron was up to the challenge. He reported his findings to higher command.

Storm clouds drift over the Hindu Kush Mountain Range surrounding Forward Operating Base Kalagush September 7, 2008. The steep mountains offer a breathtaking view, but can make troop movement difficult. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Morse/Released)

In August 2002 he got the word his squadron, VMA-513(-) would deploy to Afghanistan in October. He had about six weeks to get ready. Training was shaped to prepare. Night airfield operations were practiced at a blacked out Laguna Army Airfield west of Yuma. They hung external fuel tanks on their jets to simulate the diminished performance that Bagram’s high elevation would have on their jets. A squadron mechanic adapted a helicopter infrared lens light cover for use on their Harriers’ landing light. It allowed the land light to be used and seen by the pilots wearing night vision goggles, and unseen by others without NVGs. It increased visibility from 500 feet to 3,500.

Tactical training was not so problematic. They had trained at offensive air support which would be the predominate mission in Afghanistan; it’s the mother’s milk of tactical flying for Harrier pilots. An important difference though was that in Afghanistan their air strikes would be controlled by U.S. Air Force joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) instead of Marine forward air controllers (FACs). The Nightmare pilots practiced close air support missions with JTACs at the Goldwater Range at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base also in Arizona. The JTACs were enlisted men where Marine FACs were officers and aviators. Trust and reliability was built into the Marine pilot/FAC relationship, they shared backgrounds and military cultures. This streamlined communication in the challenging close air support mission of getting ordnance on targets very close to the good guys. The pre-deployment training with the JTACs served to instill confidence in the JTACs.

[1] The A-10 was able to fly from Bagram as it was a rugged jet, its engines were mounted high so the threat of its engine ingesting a chunk of concrete from the blasted and crumbling runway was reduced. It also was able to operate from shortened runways because it landed and took off at slower speeds.

[2] David P. Anderson, ANG History Office, e-mail to author, 3Aug09, author files, History Division, Quantico, VA.

———-

***Posted December 20th, 2009

CAS: A CORE CONTRIBUTOR TO SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN FALLUJAH

Eglin AFB: a Broad Portfolio of Weapons From Concept to Employment

Shaping a Road Map for the Future and Cost-Conscious Development Approach to Weapons Development

“Team Eglin”: A Joint Operations Focus

The F-35 as a Case In Point

The C-5: a Unique capability

A Lower LCN: An Asset to Deal with Strategic Uncertainty

Master Sergeant Ilich Bello of PG16 wears the entire Flame-Resistant Organizational Gear ensemble including the Lightweight Helmet, goggles and Modular Tactical Vest. (Photo by Bill Johnson-Miles, USMC, June 2009)

source: www.marines.mil/unit/2ndmlg/Pages/news/2006/Protective%20gear%20keeps%20Marines%20safe.aspx

Getting “Inside the fight”

Coping with FOD, gust and threats

Master Sergeant Ilich Bello of PG16 wears the entire Flame-Resistant
Organizational Gear ensemble including the Lightweight Helmet,
goggles and Modular Tactical Vest.
(Photo by Bill Johnson-Miles, USMC, June 2009)