Next Generation Jammer: U.S. and Australian Co-Development

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05/26/2022

By Australian Defence Business Review

Maintenance technicians from the US Navy and Royal Australian Air Force recently completed a six-week training event on the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 next generation jammer – mid band (NGJ-MB) that is being developed cooperatively by both countries.

The event – conducted at NAS Patuxent River (PAX) near Washington DC saw the personnel conduct maintenance tasks on the new pods, including the removal and reinstallation of 60 components including arrays, pumps, and actuators. The event also allowed the technicians to verify the technical manual procedures, and to provide feedback to the project office and support team.

“It was great to have our RAAF airmen join us for this event,” said US Navy PMA-234 program manager Capt. David Rueter. “Not only was it the first time the maintainers had access to the Mid-Band pods, but also the first time they worked together as a team, and it was seamless.”

RAAF LAC Adrian Bailey added, “It’s really invaluable for us Aussies to be here now, and while we won’t get the pods for a few years, we can take [the training] back and highlight the issues now, so we’re more prepared for it. It’s very different from how we operate the ALQ-99 pods and it’s good to get a head start.

“It’s been a really good opportunity,” Bailey said. “How many times do you bring out a new weapons system and they say, ‘let’s get the maintenance guys there first to see if they can improve it.’ I haven’t heard of that too many times.”

The ALQ-249(V)1 NGJ-MB is the first of three new jammer pods being developed for the Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to replace the AN/ALQ-99 pods in US Navy and RAAF service. The next will be the AN/ALQ-249(V)2 low band (NGJ-LB) system which is currently in its Milestone-B engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase – but is reportedly delayed due to industry appeals – and then the AN/ALQ-249(V)3 high-band (NGJ-HB) system.

The NGJ-MB achieved Milestone-C production approval in June 2021, and is scheduled to enter service with the US Navy in 2023.

This article was written by Andrew McLaughlin and published by ADBR on April 14, 2022.

Featured photo: US Navy and RAAF technicians work on an NGJ pod at PAX River. (US NAVY)

Re-designing Supply Chains: The Australian Case

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Re-designing Supply Chains: The Australian Case
05/23/2022

By Gil Savage

Thanks to the Covid-19 pandemic, we’re more aware of the weaknesses of globalisation and the flaws of managing supply and demand through just-in-time practices.

The problem is clear for Australia’s policymakers, but the solution less so. Some hanker for a return to 1970s-style Australian manufacturing, forgetting it was an inefficient and highly subsidised artefact of an economic policy designed to manage unemployment. Others seek a return to globalisation, dismissing the sovereignty challenges of an increasingly complex and dangerous geopolitical world.

Neither form of extreme optimism is a sufficient risk-mitigation strategy. Whatever approach is adopted, this new insurance policy will come with a price tag that the market won’t meet.

The push to enhance Australia’s sovereign manufacturing capability, particularly in the defence arena, hasn’t yet produced the jobs or economic benefits promised. The defence industry policy statement in 2016 aimed to foster sovereign capability, but there has been virtually no increase in the ratio of defence acquisition dollars spent locally to those going overseas. Good intentions aside, we can’t and shouldn’t manufacture everything.

What should Australia manufacture and how do we decide what’s important? These decisions shouldn’t be based solely on current market forces, or on overly simplistic assessments of future returns on investment for shareholders.

Stockpiling is an oft-discussed response to supply-chain challenges. The 2020 defence force structure plan committed ‘up to $1.1 billion towards building up sovereign weapon-manufacturing capacity and between $20.3 billion and $30.4 billion towards weapon-inventory surety between 2025 and 2040’.

On the face of it, stockpiling appears to be a good idea, but it is expensive to set up, has the potential to distort markets, and risks stockpiling things that become obsolete. Commodities such as fuel have a shelf life, so stocking up when prices are low is only effective when your economy has the scale to turn over that stock. The government-led wool- and wheat-stockpile arrangements of past eras provide stark lessons of the failure of stockpiling to influence markets, manage commodity pricing and shore up supply chains.

The recent effort to map supply chains is welcome, but modern supply chains are complex and mapping takes time. The result may be an impressive infographic that attempts to simplify the picture, but then what? On what basis do we determine which parts of the supply chain are more critical than others? How do we assess the importance of one supply chain over another? Who would be brave enough to prioritise fertiliser over baby formula?

Supply-chain mapping may identify risks, but it won’t help us identify vulnerabilities to ensure resilience. This point was highlighted in the 2021 by the Productivity Commission, which noted that managing risks ‘does not mean that all disruptions identified by a firm can be avoided’ and that it also has costs.

There’s no question that our supply chains need to be resilient to withstand disruption, which in turn suggests a need to focus on the vulnerable parts of supply chains. The problem is that what makes a supply chain, or part of one, resilient can change and often what makes a supply chain vulnerable is out of our control.

Last year’s shortage of AdBlue (a diesel exhaust additive to reduce emissions made from urea) provides the perfect case study. The supply chain was ‘resilient’ up until the point that a trading partner, in this case China, made policy adjustments in response to domestic needs. The first factor was that the price of fertiliser (urea) was increasing, which was increasing the cost of food production and therefore the cost of food for Chinese consumers. The second was the need to improve Beijing’s air quality in the lead-up to the 2022 Winter Olympics.

China’s policymakers decided to have more urea available for domestic use and to make more AdBlue available for diesel vehicles in Beijing. These two decisions reduced the amount of fertiliser and AdBlue available for import into Australia. The result: a supply-chain vulnerability that we did not foresee.

This example highlights that a confluence of factors can lay the groundwork for a perfect storm that results in a supply chain becoming vulnerable. It also highlights the reactive nature of Australia’s approach to supply chains. Asking, ‘What’s the next AdBlue?’ is the wrong question. Instead, we should focus on what we can influence and what confluence of factors may render a supply chain vulnerable.

If we’re expecting to leverage northern Australia’s geostrategic position, we must appreciate that the north will need to accommodate surges in Australian and allied expeditionary forces. That will generate surges in demand for housing, water, food and fuel in addition to the air, land and sea capability that militaries rely upon.

Lifting supply-chain resilience and understanding potential vulnerabilities are essential if northern Australia is to play an effective role in our defence and security. It is a mistake to assume that we can transplant into northern Australia at a moment’s notice anything we need. Accepting that highways and rail in the north can be cut for weeks during the wet season positions it as a pseudo–developing nation and a highly ineffective geostrategic contributor.

Leveraging the north for defence and security goes beyond ensuring that infrastructure there is robust; it must have what’s expected in a modern advanced nation. Getting there will require articulation of the whole-of-community capability needed in the north and how governments, businesses and communities will collaborate to establish that capability. And it must be acknowledged that it will take time and coordinated investment to develop and sustain the workforce, build the operational capability, and establish the social infrastructure essential for the north to play its role effectively.

Policy decisions by other nations are out of our control, so let’s stop using them as an excuse for our broken supply chains and stop allowing them to shape our national positioning. We need a new definition of supply-chain vulnerability, one that emphasises the things we value as a nation so we can make the right policy decisions and achieve the best investment outcomes.

For too long, our approach to supply chains has prioritised low cost over other factors. But cheaper is not always better if it comes with an unacceptable risk. Of course, we should improve the supply chains we have, but what’s more critical is that we redesign our supply chains to meet future needs.

Gill Savage is a senior fellow with ASPI’s Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre and deputy director of ASPI’s Professional Development Centre.

Image: Department of Defence.

This article was published by ASPI on April 22, 2022.

Macron’s Strasbourg Speech: Shaping a Way Ahead for Europe in the Face of the War in Ukraine

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | 1 Comment on Macron’s Strasbourg Speech: Shaping a Way Ahead for Europe in the Face of the War in Ukraine
05/21/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – President Emmanuel Macron called May 9 in a keynote speech in the European parliament at Strasbourg, eastern France, for a broader European defense and security community, a political project made all the more pressing by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Macron called for setting up a “European political community” as a speedy alternative to Ukraine and Baltic nations applying to join the European Union, a procedure which he said would take years, more likely decades, to complete.

The perceived need for closer defense ties was heightened as Russian president Vladimir Putin attended that same day the military parade in Moscow, marking the end of the second world war in Europe in 1945.

As Macron addressed European leaders, Russian forces fought in eastern Ukraine, seeking to seize the Donbas region and securing the hold on Mariupol, a strategic harbor city that ships Ukrainian grain to the world market. Russia was holding the world to hostage with its seizing Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken said May 19.

With Macron seeking to redraw the geopolitical map for Europe, the European Commission announced May 18 a project, dubbed Defense-EU, to set up streamlined, common procurement, with a proposed cut in value added tax for buying weapons and a €500 million two-year fund to support joint orders among the 27 EU member states.
Macron’s Strasbourg speech pointed up the need to create a “European political community,” to reach out to Balkan nations, including Moldova and Georgia, eager to enter the EU single market, but remaining at the door for some time to come.

“This new European organization would allow democratic European nations that subscribe to our shared core values to find a new space for political and security cooperation, cooperation in the energy sector, in transport, investments, infrastructures, the free movement of persons and in particular of our youth,” he said.

Open Door for the U.K.

“Joining it would not prejudge future accession to the European Union necessarily, and it would not be closed to those who have left the EU,” Macron said of the European political community.

British media, including The Times and The Independent, reported the latter point referred to the U.K., the only nation which has left the EU, with Macron reported to make clear the invitation to London when he spoke in Berlin later that evening.

Macron has sought to form some kind of European military cooperation with the U.K. after Brexit, but so far there is little sign of progress. Britain and France are the two strongest military nations in Europe, but political relations between the two powers have sunk to a new low, following a series of rows, including fishing rights and control of the Channel for refugees and migrants seeking to enter the U.K.

London’s key role in Canberra’s cancellation of a multi-billion euro project for a  French shipbuilder, Naval Group, to design and build an attack submarine for the Australian navy also hurt ties between prime minister Boris Johnson and Macron.

As Macron reached out to London for a broad European alliance, the U.K. threatened to renege on the Northern Ireland protocol, a key part of a hardline Brexit agreement negotiated and signed by the government led by Johnson.

A U.K. breach of that protocol with the EU pointed up a split among European allies, critics said, sending a signal of divisive self-harm to Putin, undermining a show of closed ranks among Western allies of Ukraine.

How the U.K. responds to Macron’s call for a wider European defense coalition remains to be seen, as the pursuit and execution of a tough Brexit deal signalled London’s reluctance to engage with Europe.

Macron said in Strasbourg that Europe was not at war with Russia, there was no intent to humiliate Moscow, and it was up to Ukraine to negotiate a settlement. There was also need to address a new security environment in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

“However, we are not at war with Russia,” he said. “We are working as Europeans to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine so that peace returns to our continent.

“It is up to Ukraine alone to define the conditions for negotiations with Russia. But our duty is to stand with Ukraine to achieve the ceasefire, then build peace. We will then be there to rebuild Ukraine as Europeans, always.

“Because in the end, when peace returns to European soil, we will need to build new security balances and we will need, together, to never give in to the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge, because these have already in the past wreaked enough havoc on the roads to peace.”

A rising European concern over Putin’s attack on Ukraine could be seen with Finland and Sweden formally applying to join Nato. That application, if accepted, would extend the 30-strong military alliance to the Finnish 1,340 km common border with Russia, spelling out the significance of a treaty which pledges an attack on one is an attack on all. Macron is the present holder of the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council, which sets E.U. policy. Macron won last month a closely fought presidential election, beating a far-right candidate, and renewing a five-year term as holder of the Elysées office.

Electors go to the polls again next month to vote — or abstain – for members of parliament, and it remains to be seen whether Macron will win backing from a parliamentary majority which will support his aims to reform France.

Macron pursued a strategic autonomy for Europe in his first term, and his Strasbourg speech was seen as an ambition to widen that concept to a broader Europe, reaching out to Balkan nations which have been waiting in line to join the EU single market, all the more seen as a glittering prize in a time of open war on the continent of Europe.

EU Seeks to Boost Capability

“The Europeans need to spend together, more and better,” Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy and security chief, said on the project to boost European military capability.
The European Commission and the European Defense Agency set out May 18 their report, titled Defense Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward.

The report sets three priorities, namely refilling ammunition stockpiles, replacing Soviet-era weapons, and strengthening air and missile defense systems. It was clear those aims pointed up the depletion of stocks due to the Ukraine war.

Capabilities in the air, sea, space and cyber defense also needed to be addressed, the report said, and a defense joint procurement task force will be set up to “coordinate an EU response to very short term urgent needs, notably the refilling of stocks.”

“The call for common procurement of standard size munitions is simple,” said François Lureau of consultancy EuroFLconsult and former arms procurement chief. The €500 million budget for joint orders is small, he said, but that could mark the start of the long term aim. A waiver on VAT on weapons deals was standard practice for OCCAR, the European armaments agency.

The longer term political issue is whether there will be an EU procurement office, he said, a “European DGA” (Direction Générale de l’Armement) to place orders for weapons. There will be need for a real political determination for such an outcome.

The European Defense Agency is an EU institution for research and development projects rather than ordering weapons, he said, while OCCAR is separate from the EU.

Who Benefits – Europe or the U.S.?

While there is high level political commitment to boost European capability, there is concern on whether the budget will be spent on European or U.S. arms, whether companies on this side of the Atlantic will benefit rather than see the money flow across the ocean.

Much of European spending on weapons – more than 60 percent –  is spent outside the EU, Thierry Breton, European commissioner for internal market, said May 18. EU states would have spent more than €1.3 billion on arms if they had hit the spending target of two percent of gross domestic product since 2008.
Sceptics said on social media the bulk of European arms budgets went on the F-35 fighter jet and Patriot missiles, making European defense nothing more than a pipe dream.

Another drag on political intent are the industrial realities of tough talks on a contract for a technology demonstrator for a next generation fighter, with Dassault Aviation on the French side holding out for clear program leadership against claims for shared management by Airbus on the German side.

There is also a lack of drive on the Franco-German project for a main ground combat system, a plan to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2 heavy tanks with a system of manned and unmanned armored vehicles.

Also on the European industrial front, the Franco-Italian Navaris, a joint venture for future warships, has been seen as hit below the waterline, with partners Naval Group and Fincantieri competing against each other in the world market.

The Italian shipbuilder pitched its version of the Fremm multimission frigate to Greece, Naval News website reported July 21, 2021.

Athens opted last year for three Naval Group frigates for defense and intervention (FDI).

Thales competes with Leonardo to supply naval radars, a big ticket item on warships.

Germany Stands by France

For Germany, there is strong political will to work with France.

“There is political commitment at a very high level,” a German official said on the European new fighter project.

The fighter is the cornerstone of the European future combat air system and intended to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter.

“There are still issues to be discussed, but they are not insurmountable and (there is) strong interest to find solutions acceptable to both sides,” the German official said.

Spain is partner on the FCAS project, which competes with the British Tempest fighter project. France and Germany are due to hold a ministerial summit meeting in July.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has said Germany is committed to supporting the future combat air system, alongside ordering the F-35 fighter to carry Nato nuclear bombs.
Germany is closely coordinating with Nato and E.U. allies on arms deliveries to Ukraine, the German official said.

Scholz has abruptly reversed a previous policy of neutrality on Ukraine and agreed to send heavy weapons to the Ukrainian forces, including authorization for dispatch of the Gepard, a flakpanzer anti-aircraft vehicle built on a Leopard chassis.

Switzerland has declined to allow supply of the Oerlikon 35 mm shells for the Gepard, hitting that groundbreaking German policy switch, but Turkey is a possible alternative supplier of the ammunition, a French land weapons specialist said.

Berlin is also considering whether to green light the despatch of 100 Rheinmetall Marder infantry fighting vehicles to help the hard pressed Ukrainian army. There have also been calls to send the Leopard 2 tank to Ukraine. Germany has approved delivery of the track-mounted Panzerhaubitzen 2000 artillery to Ukraine, including training.

Macron was speaking at a special session of the European parliament in Strasbourg, marking the close of an 11-month reform project of listening to citizens’ juries, at the conference on the future of Europe.

Featured Photo:

France President Emmanuel Macron pictured at Cotroceni Palace, in Bucharest, Romania, Thursday, August 24, 2017.

Photo 98633550 / Macron © CarolRobert | Dreamstime.com

Defense Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward

Distributed Operations and Heavy-Lift: Connecting the Dots and Sustaining the Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Distributed Operations and Heavy-Lift: Connecting the Dots and Sustaining the Force
05/20/2022

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to talk with two Marine Corps officers with significant experience in working force distribution and sustainment issues with USMC heavy lift assets. With the coming of the CH-53K, the capability of the USMC to work distributed operations, from the sea, from the land, or in support of the joint force is significantly enhanced.

I met with Maj Sean Charvet and Capt Vihlen who spearhead the work of MAWTS-1 on heavy lift training and mission planning for using the unique heavy lift helicopter capability which the USMC has and is in the process of introducing the CH-53K, ramping up their capabilities as well.

The CH-53E and the CH-53K are both heavy lift helicopters unlike the Army’s Chinook series, which are medium lift helicopter. And both the E and the K are air refuellable helicopters, whereas the Chinook has some versions which are and most that are not. As one of the participants put it: “When discussing lift capacities of a helicopter, it is very dependent on environmental conditions. With the K we will see a consistent significant lift capacity at the higher end. So if you have to lift 20,000- 25,000 pounds, you might start taking things off the plane to make it lighter, which now may reduce the capability, its defensive capability, and your ability to carry troops. What the K provides is a stated capability to do heavy lift and it can do that on any given day. And that is the hardest concept for people to grasp about why the K is so significant for the USMC.”

They discussed how distance is a logistics problem. And the air refueling capability as well as the lift capacity of the K provides ways to deal with the distance problem. One way is simply the fact that it can fly further because it is air refuellable. Another way is by the load outs which the aircraft carries means it can support a wider range of basing locations and support a more widely distributed force.

This is especially important when comparing what the K can do compared to a fixed wing aircraft like the C-130J. As one participant put it, there are a limited number of airfields to which the C-130J can go. The adversary can plan in advance with regard to where the Marines might go given that logistical support requirement driven by fixed wing sustainment. With the K, there is no such limitation. Force distribution can be determined by need and impact and the K can insert and support and exit with that insertion force.

The officers made the point that the K was coming at the “right time” in terms of the focus on mobile and expeditionary basing but in terms of technological development as well. Because of the automation built into the aircraft, the crew can focus on mission management. And as a fully digital aircraft with slots for new digital capabilities, the aircraft can be part of a C2 mesh network and facilitate integration of a distributed force.

We discussed the role as well of seabases as mobile assets and how these seabases can operate as “mother ships” to insert, support and withdraw insertion forces. They made the point that a rotorcraft has a significant advantage over a small ship like the LCAC in doing so. As one participant put it: “If you can track an asset you can target it. The advantage we have in our helicopters is our capability to manage our paths to deploy and support force. We do not need to go from a fixed point to a second fixed point; we can operate with variable tracks and as the ship we launch from is moving as well. An asset like the LCAC while very valuable is not a very flexible deployment asset.”

Throughout the discussion, the officers highlighted in a variety of ways why they believed the K was coming at the right time. One aspect was that although the systems which allow automation on the K were new to heavy lift, they are not new to military or commercial aviation. That just simply had not been applied to heavy helicopter lift before.

They have both worked the fuel delivery side of USMC operations for many years. And in discussing the contribution of the K to the projected need to operate distributed bases, they emphasized that the lift capacity and flexibility of the K would be crucial to enabling effective sustained distributed force operations. This is how one participant put it: “Whether its an organic USMC or joint force asset, we can refuel multiple assets based on what a K can do, because it just carries more. It just has more capacity to carry the things that you need.”

For the Marines, the air element supports the ground combat element. So force integration is not a nice to have capability, it is a driver of the kind of training and operations which the Marines do. That particularly goes to the point of information sharing and integration between the air and ground combat elements. Working expanded and effective networks are a key part of the way ahead for the USMC, notably as it works towards greater integration with the joint force. Here the coming of the K as an all-digital aircraft can be part of the digital transformation of the USMC as it goes down the path of enhanced methods and approaches to force distribution.

Indeed, the K is coming at the right time to the USMC.

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 inspects a CH-53K King Stallion prior to its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461’s modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)

Expeditionary Basing, Force Mobility and Aviation Support Capabilities

 

 

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 take off in a CH-53K King Stallion during its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461's modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)
U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 taxi in a CH-53K King Stallion after its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461's modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)
A U.S. Marine with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 inspects a CH-53K King Stallion prior to its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461's modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)
farp

Training for Distributed STOVL Operations: WTI 2-22

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Training for Distributed STOVL Operations: WTI 2-22
05/19/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), utilize bulk fuel equipment shown to conduct a ground refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.29.2022

Photos  by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. James Copeland Jr., left, a KC-130 fixed-wing aircraft crew master from Cartersville, Georgia, and Gunnery Sgt. Timothy Leidecker, a flight engineer, both assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), prepare to airdrop supply during distributed STOVL operations (DSO), in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, near Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), secure ordnance inside a KC-130J Hercules during distributed STOVL operations (DSO), in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), offload ordnance from a KC-130J Hercules, during distributed STOVL operations (DSO), in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
U.S. Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. Timothy Leidecker, a flight engineer assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), connects a fuel hose to a KC-130J Hercules, during a ground refuel in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. James Copeland Jr., left, a KC-130 fixed-wing aircraft crew master from Cartersville, Georgia, and Lance Cpl. Elijah Findley, an F-35 fixed-wing aircraft mechanic from Brentwood, Tennessee, both assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), monitor fuel hoses during a ground refuel in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), utilize bulk fuel equipment shown to conduct a ground refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)
A U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), taxis prior to a ground refueling during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic)

How Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Would Impact NATO

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on How Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Would Impact NATO
05/18/2022

According a recently posted video by The Wall Street Journal on May 16, 2022, the subject was addressed of how the two states joining NATO would impact the organization.

We have focused for several years on how the Nordic defense dynamics are part of the reshaping od direct defense capabilities for Europe in dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

Our findings from many trips to the region can be found in our December 2020 book:

Next Step in Australian and Japanese Interoperability: KC-30 Refueling of F-2

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Next Step in Australian and Japanese Interoperability: KC-30 Refueling of F-2

In a story published by the Australian Department of Defence on April 29, 2022, the RAAF was noted as achieving a new milestone in its refueling of a Japanese fighter aircraft.

For the first time, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has conducted air-to-air refuelling flight testing with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai).

Conducted in April over three weeks, the flight test engineering program in Japan involved a RAAF KC-30A multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 aircraft of the JASDF.

Air Vice-Marshal Darren Goldie, Air Commander Australia, said the successful flight test program was a leap forward for Australia and Japan’s interoperability, and would facilitate the increasing complexity and sophistication of bilateral engagement between both nations.

“This is the first time that a RAAF aircraft has refuelled a JASDF aircraft, and will help build the special strategic partnership between Australia and Japan,” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

“The success of this program will facilitate Japan’s participation in Exercise Pitch Black 2022, which will take place in the Northern Territory this August and September.

“Working together will ensure we can continue to uphold and reinforce a secure, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.”

Over a series of flights, aircrew and engineers ensured the mechanical compatibility between these systems, and that both aircraft can be flown safely in a range of configurations and lighting conditions.

The RAAF flight test team has extensive experience with KC-30A refuelling trials in Australia, the United States and Singapore, with this most recent trial being the first time it has worked with the JASDF.

“The flight test program represents two years of close cooperation between our own Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU), and the JASDF Air Development and Test Wing (ADTW),” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

In recent years, JASDF and RAAF personnel have worked together following natural disasters in Tonga and Australia, and trained with each other during Exercise Cope North in Guam, and Exercise Bushido Guardian in Japan.

Featured photo: An air-to-air refuelling flight test between Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft from No. 33 Squadron and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF or Koku-Jieitai) Mitsubishi F-2A over Japan.

Over 4-28 April 22, a flight test engineering program was conducted in Japan between the RAAF and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai) to provide a refuelling clearance between the KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 fighter aircraft.

This marked the first air-to-air refuelling activity between Australia and Japan, and will facilitate closer and more complex engagement between both nations including JASDF participation in Exercise Pitch Black 22. The RAAF operates a fleet of seven KC-30As from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland, with each one able to carry more than 100 tonnes of fuel.

 

The AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopter

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopter
05/17/2022
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5RYsMhFwOk

The AH-1Z Viper is the Marine Corps’ primary rotor-wing ground attack aircraft.

The AH-1Z attack helicopter provides rotary wing close air support, anti-armor, armed escort, armed visual reconnaissance and fire support coordination capabilities under day night, and adverse weather conditions.

The AH-1Z Vipers is fielded in Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons, or HMLAs. Detachments from the HMLAs are deployed as part of Marine Expeditionary Units to support ship-based amphibious exercises and operations.