Building a Platform for Wolfpack Unmanned Surface Vessel Kill Web Operations

07/12/2022

By Robbin Laird

As the U.S. Navy shifts to a priority emphasis on distributed maritime operations, the opportunity for maritime autonomous systems to play a growing role is opened up. That is for the simple reality that as distributed modular task forces deploy, autonomous capabilities can contribute to the lethality and survivability of the force.

The kill web is a collection of sensors netted with C2, able to pass critical data to the optimal delivery system in order to rapidly achieve the Commander’s intent.  Software technologies are key parts of the way ahead to allow for switching across multiple domains to provide for a secure operational web.

Autonomous USVs can provide wolfpack deployed ISR or relay systems to enhance the reach and survivability of the fleet in its distributed operational role. They can also provide an ability to move data to other deployed task forces to provide for enhanced integrability to do so.

This is about deploying autonomous USVs in a wolfpack to operate payloads appropriate to the mission assigned to them by the commander of the modular task force. This means that the nature of the payloads onboard the USVs and their ability to work as a mission team are key attributes of how an autonomous system wolfpack can contribute to the survivability of the fleet (situational awareness) and lethality (through target acquisition support).

But the nature of the platform is important to enable such a capability. The focus on autonomous systems may be often described as platform agnostic, but clearly the platform needs to be viable for the mission sets it carries the payloads for.

So what might such a platform look like?

And how might it be built, upgraded and maintained?

I would start from the simple point that an autonomous USV is not a morphing of a manned vessel to an unmanned one.  It is not simply replicating what a manned ship looks like, but simply operated by robotics or simply being a vessel remotely piloted.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Bruce Hanson of MARTAC systems with regard to how they have built and are upgrading their platforms upon which various payloads are being operated. In the next piece, I will focus on the kinds of payloads which their platforms are already operating in the real world. The point being what MARTAC has delivered is an autonomous USV capability which navies and maritime security organizations can use to build their operational experience for enhanced defense and security capabilities now and to learn how to reshape the force going forward.

The company currently features two boats, one 12 feet in length (MANTAS) and the other 38 feet in length (DEVIL RAY). They have other sizes of boats in process, but the core point is that they have built the boats so that if one can be trained to operate one of them one can operate the others as well.

Hanson underscored that they built their boats since 2010 by building vessels of three feet in length so that they could operate several of them to test out systems and capabilities. This meant also that from the ground up they have focused on how the vessels can operate as a wolfpack. As he noted: “There is no point in simply looking at one of our boats in isolation: it is about they can operate as a wolfpack, operating in your terms within a broader fleet kill web or mesh approach.”

Hanson underscored that “the vessels talk to each other and can adjust to single platform failures or degradation.” As he put it: “They can operate as a self-healing commando team.”

The boats are built to provide a scalable fleet of USVs. And Hanson noted: “What you get with the different size vessels are differences in range and payload ranging from 18 to 16,000 pound payloads and ranges from 35 to 1000 nautical miles on vessels from 6 to 60 feet.”

The boats are built to interface with customer payloads, as the company has eschewed from the outset building their own payloads. From the beginning, they understood that customers would wish to operate their own payloads, whether that be a U.S. service preference, or for allies and partners.

The boats are catamarans. Hanson and his team hold the world speed records for catamarans and they have applied their real-world experience to building boats to operate as USVs for the maritime and security forces. The boats are built from carbon fiber and are very durable and able to operate through waves in high sea states.

The form factor of the boats is such that they can operate from standard navy RHIB launchers , and can be configured to fit into various Naval standard launch systems as well.

The company has its own core software team which builds the software to operate the vessel, the C2 and the interface with the payloads. As with all good smaller companies building a focused capability, they control the entire upgrade capabilities of their operating software systems for their boats.

The boats come standard with four independent C2 systems which allows for flexibility in operating the boats dependent on the mission sets. The boats have low / high bandwidth sat com, high bandwidth line of site, low bandwidth line of sight and 4G/5G communications capabilities. According to Hanson: “We have quite a bit of edge processing on the boat along with cyber protection systems.”

The boats have a unique dead zone capability as well. This means that boats will stop, slow down, return to base, continue or do some other response if communications are cut so that the MARTAC boats do not suffer from the “runaway” boat problem which other USVs have demonstrated in various exercises.

The control system is designed for handoffs for boat control among operators in the fleet or ashore. The system can allow coalition transfer as well which would mean that a European nation with a fleet of MARTAC boats in operation could transfer control of those boats for a period of time to a partner or ally for their mission.

The boats are built to operate together or separately dependent upon the mission requirements. But they built the boats with a nested dolls approach. This means that the 38-foot boat can launch autonomously a 12-foot boat to collaborate in the mission as well.

Nested Doll Configuration of MANTAS operating from DEVIL RAY at Autonomous Warrior 2022. Credit Photo: MARTAC

The company has a slogan which goes with their company moniker which is “Beyond Human Capability.”  What this bluntly means is that the users of the boats need to understand that these boats are not simply mimic replacements for what humans would do if operating on the boats. Rather, the boats operate differently from how a human could do so if on the boats. What this means, for example, is that the speed of the boats and the turning ratios of the boats are beyond what a human onboard could survive.

Getting navies to understand that autonomous systems are not remotely piloted is a challenge as well. Hanson tells the story of an exercise with the U.S. Navy where the MARTAC representative told the US Navy evaluator that he was going to lunch right in the middle of the live mission. The evaluator commented: “You can’t do that – who will run the boat?” “It’s Sea State 3+”The MARTAC rep said: “The boat is operating itself. See you after lunch.”  When he came back from lunch, the boat was performing as expected and the U.S. Navy evaluator said: “Your boat truly is autonomous!”

Building a robust platform from day one to be autonomous, with appropriate operational software, but allowing for flexible customer payloads is what MARTAC is focused on doing with regard to their USV boats. In the next piece, I will focused on demonstrated missions which they have been able to execute in working with the US Navy and allies.

The video below shows a clip of the MANTAS returning to the DEVIL RAY after performing an ISR mission during Autonomous Warrior 2022 (Credit MARTAC)

Featured Photo: Devil Ray operating in Jarvis Bay, Australia, during Autonomous Warrior 2022 Exercise held by the Royal Australian Navy in May 2022.

For an explanation of the nested doll concept of operations, see the following:

A Con-Ops Enabler: Scalable USVs in a Nesting Doll Approach

Also, see Chapter Four on “The Coming of Autonomous Systems” in

Defense XXI: Shaping a Way Ahead for the United States and Its Allies

And for a comprehensive examination of the shaping of the maritime kill web concept of operations:

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Finns Train with Estonian Forces

07/11/2022

Finnish troops teamed up with Estonia’s Scouts Battalion for Exercise Siil 22, a national defence exercise that tests the readiness of Estonian forces Synopsis Finnish troops are working side by side with the Estonian Army for Exercise Siil 22, a semi-annual exercise designed to test the readiness of the Estonian Defence Forces.

Named after the Estonian word for hedgehog – a small forest animal that packs a potent defence – Siil brought more than 200 Finnish infantry and engineer soldiers from the Pori Brigade to southern Estonia, where they integrated with the Estonian Scouts Battalion.

Working under an integrated command, Finnish and Estonian troops played the aggressor force, launching simulated attacks against Estonian defenders. Siil 22 saw the participation of 15,000 troops from 10 NATO Allies and partners.

A long-time NATO partner and frequent participant in NATO and Allied exercises, Finland applied for NATO membership in May 2022.

ESTONIA

05.24.2022

Natochannel

The French Army’s Titan Project: A July 2022 Update

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French army is preparing for future high intensity warfare with its Titan project, working with the DGA procurement office to devise a high capacity information network to enter service after 2040.

Titan is seen as changing the game, based on the concept of “strategy of simultaneity,” a term used by army colonel Arnaud Goujon at the May 31 conference on land weapons organized by Fondation pour la Récherche Stratégique, a think tank.

Titan is “not just about platforms,” he said, as the project aims to deliver an “extremely different capability.”

The project seeks to extend a combat cloud for ground forces, a follow-on to the army’s €10 billion ($10.4 billion) Scorpion program. That modernization drive is delivering medium armored vehicles, notably the Griffon multirole troop carrier, Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle, and Serval light multirole vehicle.

Scorpion includes a command and control network based on Atos SICS battle management system, and Thales Contact software-defined radio technology, as well as a training system in the vehicles. There will also be a vehicle to replace the VBL scout car.

Military planners and procurement officials of the Direction Générale de l’Armement are looking to deliver and manage a wider transmission of battlefield information, with greater density of data, to provide interconnection of joint military units.

Titan factors in a shift to fighting a high intensity war, moving away from a concept of operations based on troops deployed overseas for counter-insurgency, asymmetrical combat, as seen in Afghanistan and Mali.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the use of troops, armor, and artillery barrages to seize the Donbas region, eastern Ukraine, point up the significance of high intensity warfare, military analysts said.

A key feature of Titan will be to plug in a planned heavy tank and unmanned vehicles dubbed Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), a project pursued under Franco-German military and industrial cooperation.

That heavy armor in the Titan network will follow on from Scorpion’s focus on medium vehicles, although the latter includes upgrade of 200 Leclerc main battle tanks. The total Leclerc fleet is some 240 units strong, specialist magazine Defense Zone reported.

Artillery and the Tiger Mk3 attack helicopter will also be hooked into the information network, as part of the bid to boost air-land capability.

Scorpion works on collaborative combat, boosting command and control (C2), and bringing “an in-depth transformation,” Goujon said. That complex change will take years to complete, with new vehicles working in network and going on field exercises for certification. The plan is to field a Scorpion brigade in 2023 and a division in 2025.

The new fleets will change the culture and operations of the army, he said, as Scorpion vehicles will not be used the same way as the VAB troop carrier.

The Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé has been the workhorse for the army for some 45 years old, and has undergone various upgrades.

France has sent the VAB to help Ukraine, armed forces minister Sébastien Lecornu told June 27 daily Le Parisien, without giving the number of units.

That press interview confirmed a video clip that had run on social media, showing 14 VABs transported by road in Slovakia, prompting assumption they were bound for Ukraine.

In future combat there will be greater dynamic in the battlefield, Goujon said, with real time video from space satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

“The battlefield will be very exposed,” he said. There will be changes in connectivity with high bandwidth in 5G fifth-generation telecommunications for soldiers and vehicles.

Finding a budget to fund the Titan project poses a problem, with rising inflation and the high cost of technology and service support, he said. Technology will take time to mature, and unmanned systems will be more costly than manned.

Titan To Replace Kit

Titan will also renew the equipment inventory, as well as boosting the information network.

Titan will start replacing weapons at the high end of the conflict spectrum from 2040, equipment which will be worn out by 2050, said Charles Beaudouin, a retired general who led Scorpion in the army technical section. He was on the general staff when the army chief of staff launched the Titan project in 2018.

The weapons to be replaced include the Leclerc tank, VBCI infantry fighting vehicle, Patroller tactical drone, and Tiger helicopter, he said. Artillery will be succeeded by the planned Franco-German Common Indirect Fire System, while a mobile ground-to-air, low-altitude missile system will replace Mistral 3.

A next generation information and communications system using broadband, artificial intelligence and drawing on metadata in the combat theater, will replace Scorpion SICS.

Those new weapons will be fitted with advanced automation and in some cases, intelligent robotics.

“The research budget relating to Titan will be decisive because this program of programs must offer total superiority in 2050 — and for a long time after,” he said.

Technological and capability breakthroughs in Titan will allow upgrade of the Scorpion vehicles — Griffon, Jaguar, and Serval — which will be entering mid-life service, he said. Titan will also address initial gaps in Scorpion, namely defense against anti-tank missiles and drones.

“With the return of wars between nations, the nature of war is changing,” he said, “and without abandoning asymmetric combat, it is now a question of finding a full spectrum of capabilities for symmetric high intensity combat, while acknowledging any combat, symmetric or asymmetric, may have high intensity peaks.

“In this sense, we are not experiencing a return to the Cold War paradigm but a much more complex aggregate combining Afghanistan, Syria-Iraq, Ukraine, to which can be added what we do not even think of today — because war always surprises,” he said.

There will certainly be major disorders and mass migrations due to shortage of raw materials and natural resources, he said.

“What is certain is that the enemy will use the equalizing power of technology and we must imperatively regain mass — symmetry warriors inflict strong human and material attrition,” he said.

“It is not by sacrificing technology to rusticity but by developing a lower cost digital technology and in its rightful place,” he said. “This is where we expect innovation.”

Beaudouin is chairman of Coges Events, organizer of the week-long Eurosatory trade show for land and air-land weapons, which closed June 17. Coges is a unit of the Gicat trade association for land weapons.

Beaudouin was speaking in his private capacity.

Superiority In the Field

“Titan is a major project seeking to guarantee operational superiority on the ground in face of a first rank adversary,” the DGA said.

The project seeks to address the return to high intensity combat in equipment and multi domain operations, the importance of new technology – such as drones – delivering a levelling effect, and the acceleration of change or breakthroughs, the procurement office said.

The architecture and preparation of key capabilities in high intensity warfare require a “top-down” approach, the DGA said. Titan is not a program guided by physical platforms and funding, but seeks to deliver a “strengthened capability,” based on coherence of air-land forces at the high end of the conflict spectrum.

The near term aim is to consider, compare and optimise architectures for air-land forces, the office said. Titan is not an equipment program with a budget.

The main factor in Titan is the MGCS project, which will replace the Leclerc and German Leopard 2 tank, the office said.

There are technical-operational studies which will steer research and technology studies and future programs. Those studies are worth “several million euros,” the office said, without giving details.

Besides those technical-operational studies, Titan draws on MGCS architecture studies, feasibility studies on robotics, and studies backed by the European Union on future artillery, such as FIRES and E-COLORSS, respectively the Future Indirect fiRes European Solution and the European COmmon LOng Range indirect fire Support System.

The latter two EU studies are two-year design studies backed by the 2020 European Defense Industrial Development Program, each study with a budget of €3.5 million.

FIRES examines next generation 155 mm artillery ammunition and rockets based on common technology, while e-COLORSS considers improved European artillery with a 155 mm cannon and rocket launcher mounted on a hybrid truck.

Doubts On the Main Ground Combat System

It remains to be seen how Titan will proceed if the MGCS project were scaled back from its planned Franco-German industrial cooperation.

Doubts over MGCS spring from Rheinmetall reported to be seeking a place at the top table with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann on the armor project. That German struggle for the leading role on the future tank system is seen as risking the work share for the French partner, Nexter.

KMW and Nexter had expected to share the work on MGCS on a 50-50 basis, reflecting their equal stakes in the cross-border KNDS joint venture formed in 2015. The MGCS tank and unmanned systems are due to enter service in 2035.

MGCS is important for France but also for the German army, the French army chief of staff, general Pierre Schill, told parliamentarians Oct. 12.

While there were industrial issues to take into account, “the army has a strategic need to have a MGCS delivered in 2035,” he said. “Despite the difficulties that go with a cooperative project, we must pursue our studies with our German allies on the operational needs that we share.”

Belgium is the only other European nation to have ordered Scorpion vehicles, he said, but there could be development of a “Scorpion community” through interoperability with Luxembourg and Netherlands, and perhaps Germany.

Belgium has ordered Jaguar and Griffon vehicles through its Capacité Mobilisé (CaMo) program.

Eurosatory provided a showcase for the competing corporate advances on the tank front, with Rheinmetall unveiling a technology demonstrator for its KF 51 Panther, while KNDS showed an updated demonstrator of its Enhanced Main Battle Tank (E-MBT).

Pitching the two competing tank prototypes to the world market signalled MGCS might be on borrowed time, a research note said.

“We are increasingly unable to escape the conclusion that both groups increasingly expect (or hope for?) MGCS to go the same way as the parallel SCAF/FCAS combat air “cooperation”, and collapse due to a combination of national political/industrial rivalries and technological over-ambition (= cost and time),” Agency Partners, an equity research company, said in a June 21 research note titled European Defence.

The army’s success in winning funding for its modernization drive stems partly from the use of a brand name – Scorpion – after a long backstory of finishing last in the inter-service race for the military budget.

The nuclear deterrent was ring fenced in the budget, while the air force and navy won funds for big ticket items such as fighter jets, nuclear ballistic missile submarines, frigates and an aircraft carrier.

That left the army behind as poor bloody infantry when it came to securing funds, unless a catchy program name could be found. Army planners came up with Scorpion, and secured some €10 billion.

Featured Graphic: Leclerc MBT, Serval VBMR-L, JAGUAR armoured vehicles, Griffon VBMR APC Source: nexter-group.fr

Defending Gotland: BALTOPS 22

07/08/2022

As Gotland is vital to securing the Baltic Sea, Swedish troops practise rapidly reinforcing the island during BALTOPS 22, a US-led maritime exercise.

The Swedish island of Gotland hosted defence drills as part of Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 22, an annual United States-led maritime exercise.

Situated roughly 100 kilometres off the Swedish coast, Gotland has a commanding view of the Baltic Sea, which makes it strategically vital terrain for the Swedish Armed Forces.

As part of BALTOPS 22, Swedish soldiers practised the rapid reinforcement and defence of the island against a simulated enemy, played this year by the United States Marine Corps’ 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU).

Sweden is hosting this year’s exercise, which coincides with the 500th anniversary of the Swedish Navy.

BALTOPS 22 involves forces from 16 countries, with over 45 ships, more than 75 aircraft and 7,500 personnel participating. The exercise will end on 17 June 2022.

The exercise is led by the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Italy, with Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), based in Portugal, implementing command and control of the exercise.

07.06.2022

Natochannel

What the West Gets Wrong about Putin

07/07/2022

By Harald Malmgren

In 1999, Vladimir Putin suddenly sprang from bureaucratic obscurity to the office of Prime Minister. When, a few months later, Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned and Putin was voted in as President, governments around the world were taken by surprise yet again.

How could this unknown figure have amassed national voter support with so little media attention?

I had first met Putin seven years before and was not surprised by his rapid domination of the new Russia. We were introduced by Yevgeny Primakov, widely known as “Russia’s Kissinger”, who I had met in Moscow multiple times during the Cold War years when I advised Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford.

Primakov was a no-nonsense thinker and writer. He was also a special emissary for the Kremlin in conducting secret discussions with national leaders around the world.

When Yeltsin tasked his advisor Anatoly Sobchak with identifying and recruiting Russia’s best and brightest, Putin, then a local politician in his hometown of St Petersburg, was top of his list — so Primakov took Putin under his wing to tutor him in global power and security issues. Eventually, Primakov introduced Kissinger to Putin, and they became close.

That both Primakov and Kissinger took time to coach Putin on geopolitics and geosecurity was a clear demonstration that they saw in him the characteristics of a powerful leader. It also showed Putin’s capacity for listening to lengthy lessons on geopolitics — as I was soon to learn.

In 1992, I received a call from a meeting organiser at the CSIS think tank inviting me to join a US-Russia St Petersburg Commission to be chaired by Kissinger and Sobchak. The purpose would be to help the new Russian leadership in opening channels of business and banking with the West. Most of the Western members would be CEOs of major US and European companies, as well as key officials of the new Russian government. I would attend as an expert.

I was told that a “Mr Primakov” had personally asked if I could make time to participate. I could hardly refuse such a request, and I was intensely curious about the emerging Russian leadership, especially about Putin.

Arriving at the first meeting, I saw several people gathered around Kissinger and a man I was told was Putin. An official identified himself to me and said he had been asked by Primakov to introduce me to Putin. He interrupted the conversation with Kissinger to announce my arrival; Putin warmly responded that he was looking forward to chatting with me about how I see the world from inside Washington.

We spoke on several occasions between meetings, and he arranged to sit next to me at a dinner, accompanied by his interpreter. At that dinner, he asked me: “What is the single most important obstacle between your Western businessmen and my fellow Russians in starting up business connections?”

Off the top of my head, I responded: “The absence of legally defined property rights — without those there is no basis for resolving disputes.”

“Ah yes,” he said, “in your system a dispute between businesses is resolved by attorneys paid by the hour representing each side, sometimes taking the dispute to the courts which normally takes months and accumulation of hourly attorney fees.”

“In Russia,” he continued, “disputes are usually resolved by common sense. If a dispute is about very significant money or property, then the two sides would typically send representatives to a dinner. Everyone attending arriving would be armed. Facing the possibility of a bloody, fatal outcome both sides always find a mutually agreeable solution. Fear provides the catalyst for common sense.”

He used his argument in the context of disputes between sovereign nations. Solutions often require an element of fear of disproportionate responses if no deal is struck. The idea of forcing adversaries to face horrific alternatives seemed to excite him. In essence, he was describing to me the current Ukraine impasse between the US and Russia.

Putin knows Russia cannot afford a prolonged ground war with Ukraine. He also can see Biden is facing crucial midterm elections with a domestic congressional impasse, and cannot afford a major foreign crisis distraction. The two sides have no choice but to strike a deal.

On a different occasion, Putin asked me how decisions are really made in Washington, with its complex division of Presidential and Congressional powers. He said Kissinger could explain the broad parameters of a Presidential policy decision, but could not clarify how political consensus was achieved between the House, Senate, and the Executive Branch.

It was evident he had been given a deep intelligence brief on my career. He said Kissinger enjoys the public theatre of powerful people meeting in elaborate dinners or meetings with many aides ready to guide them. And he told me he had been informed that I preferred backroom meetings to shape consensus and provide room for negotiating details.

I tried to explain the elaborate process of balancing the interests of the many players in Washington, including Congress, the major agencies, and the intricate business arrangements that might be affected by any decision.

I told him of my first personal meeting with Nixon, who had said he was impressed that I had strong personal support from leaders of both major parties. However, he added, this raised worries among his staff in the White House — so he really needed to know whether I was a Republican or a Democrat. To which I replied: “Yes.”

When Nixon asked what that meant, I explained that I was not a partisan warrior, but rather a problem solver. To get a solution I would always be ready to work with key players of both parties depending upon the specific problem. This seemed to amuse Putin.

The impression of Putin that I was left with was of a man who was more intelligent than most of the politicians I had met in Washington and in other capitals around the world. I was reminded of my childhood: I grew up in a predominantly Sicilian neighbourhood, with a mafia maintaining order. No disorganised crime allowed.

Putin did seem to have the instincts of a Sicilian mafia boss: quick to reward but quick to pose mortal risk in the event of non-conformity to the family rules.

Looking back to those times of growing disarray in Russia’s leadership, I can recall the prolonged, multi-year paralysis of the Brezhnev Presidency, which was followed by the brief Presidencies of Andropov and Chernenko.

Gorbachev was not strong enough to impose his will. Yeltsin had good ideas but was easily distracted and lacked follow through. Russia was in urgent need of a strong leader — and so Putin stepped in.

As for how Putin sees himself, he did bring up several times his admiration for Peter the Great, so much so I was convinced he sees himself as his incarnation.

I have not been a guest of the Kremlin since 1988, but I am told Putin had portraits of Peter the Great hung in several important meeting rooms there — rather than portraits of himself, as would be more customary.

What this means for Biden, Nato and Ukraine is slowly becoming clear. There is more to Putin than meets the eye.

This article was first published UnHerd.com.

It is republished with the author’s permission.

 

RAAF Annual Drone Racing Tournament

The annual Air Force Drone Racing Tournament, this year hosted at RAAF Base Amberley from June 16th-19th, invited all racers within the ADF to test their skills and compete to qualify for a spot in the Australian Drone Nationals.

Civilian Drone operators from around Brisbane were invited to watch and to also display their own innovative inventions during an exhibition day on Friday the 17th of June.

The Air Force Drone Racing Team compete in both military and civilian drone racing competitions, conduct public demonstrations, and teach drone racing to cadets and schools as Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) education.

The Australian Department of Defence

July 4, 2022.

Also, see the following:

Could AI Fill the Role of Chief of Air Force?

And the following as well:

The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems

 

 

CH-53K King Stallion Lift

07/06/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron (VMX) 1 and Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 24 transport a Light Armored Vehicle 25 with a CH-53K King Stallion helicopter at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, April 27, 2022.

The CH-53K King Stallion, the Marine Corps’ newest heavy-lift helicopter, can lift up to 36,000 pounds of equipment, holds up to 30 troops, and features a computerized fly-by-wire system for semi=autonomous piloting. CLB-24 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Logistics Group, the logistics combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION NEW RIVER, NC, UNITED STATES

04.26.2022

Video by Pvt. Rowdy Vanskike 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

And in an article we published on December 8, 2020, we highlighted how different the CH-53K is from its predecessors.

To the casual observer, the Super Stallion and the King Stallion look like the same aircraft.

One of the challenges in understanding how different the CH-53K is from the CH-53E is the numbering part.

If it were called CH-55 perhaps one would get the point that these are very different air platforms, with very different capabilities.

What they have in common, by deliberate design, is a similar logistical footprint, so that they could operate similarly off of amphibious ships or other ships in the fleet for that matter.

But the CH-53 is a mechanical aircraft, which most assuredly the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is not.

In blunt terms, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is faster, carries more kit, can distribute its load to multiple locations without landing, is built as a digital aircraft from the ground up and can leverage its digitality for significant advancements in how it is maintained, how it operates in a task force, how it can be updated, and how it could work with unmanned systems or remotes.

These capabilities taken together create a very different lift platform than is the legacy CH-53E. In a strategic environment where force mobility is informing capabilities across the combat spectrum, it is hard to understate the value of a lift platform, notably one which can talk and operate digitally, in carving out new tactical capabilities with strategic impacts.

The lift side of the equation within a variety of environments can be stated succinctly. The King Stallion will lift 27,000 lbs. external payload, deliver it 110 nm to a high-hot zone, loiter, and return to the ship with fuel to spare. What that means is JLTV’s (22,600-lb.), up-armored HMMWV, and other heavier tactical cargos go to shore by air, rather than by LCAC or other slower sea lift means. For less severe ambient conditions or shorter distances than this primary mission, the 53K can carry up to 36,000 lbs.

With ever increasing lift requirements and advancing threats in the battlefield, there is no other vertical lift aircraft available that meets emerging heavy lift needs. There are a lot of platforms that can blow things up or kill people, but for heavy lift, the CH-53K is the only option.

For the Marines, this is a core enabling capability. The CH-53K is equipped with a triple external hook system, which will be a significant external operations enabler for the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The single, dual and triple external cargo hook capability allows for the transfer of three independent external loads to three separate supported units in three separate landing zones in one single sortie without having to return to a ship or other logistical hub.

The external system can be rapidly reconfigured between dual point, single point loads, and triple hook configurations in order to best support the ground scheme of maneuver.

All three external hooks can be operated independently supporting true distributed operations. For example, three infantry companies widely dispersed across the battlefield can be rapidly resupplied with fuel, ammo, water or other supplies directly at their location—during the same sortie—eliminating the requirement for the helicopter to make multiple trips or for cargo from a helicopter to be transloaded to ground vehicles for redistribution—saving ground vehicle fuel and MAGTF exposure to ground threats.

The CH-53K’s triple external hook system is a new capability for the Marine Corps and an improvement in capability and efficiency over the legacy aircraft it replaces making it a game changer for providing heavy lift in support of combat, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, notably in a distributed operational space.

The CH-53K design integrates the latest technologies to meet the USMC requirement for triple the lift of the predecessor Super Stallion while still maintaining the size and footprint to remain compatible with today’s ships and strategic air transport platforms.

The aircraft is fully marinized for shipboard operations, including automatic blade fold and design robustness to meet new and extreme requirements for salt-fog and corrosion. It is already certified for transport in C-5 (2 x 53Ks) and C-17 (1 x 53K) aircraft and also includes an integral aerial refueling probe for long range missions or self-deployment.

The work process is very different as well, because of support for palletization. This may sound like logistic geek language, but it is about speed to deliver to the force for its operating efficacy. Given that speed to operation is a key metric for supporting the strategic shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is a key enabler for the new work flow essential to combat success.

The digital piece is a foundational element and why it is probably better thought of as a CH-55. This starts with the fly-by-wire flight controls. The CH-53K is the first and only heavy lift fly-by-wire helicopter.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire is a leap in technology from legacy mechanical flight control systems and keeps safety and survivability at the core of the Kilo’s design while providing a portal to an optionally piloted capability and autonomy.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire design drastically reduces pilot workload and minimizes exposure to threats or danger, particularly during complex missions or challenging aircraft maneuvers like low light level externals in a degraded visual environment allowing the pilot to manage and lead the mission vice focusing on physically controlling the aircraft.

The fly-by-wire design further complements safety and survivability through physically separated Flight Control Computers, separated cockpit controls with an Active Inceptor System, and load limiting control laws that will extend component lives. Other cargo Helicopters originated in the late 50s/early 60s, predating the emergence of Aircraft Survivability as an engineering discipline.

Not leaving anything to chance, the overall CH-53K survivability process includes an extensive, ongoing Live Fire Test Program, which started at a component level, and culminates with a full-up aircraft test with turning rotors. The CH-53K is the only heavy lift helicopter designed from the ground up to survive in battle, reflecting a 21st century level of survivability.

In addition, the CH-53K was designed from the start in an all-digital environment, taking advantage of virtual reality tools to optimize both manufacture and support of the aircraft throughout its life cycle. Fleet Marine personnel were engaged from the beginning of the design process to ensure the aircraft was designed for supportability and reduced O&S costs–from component access, support equipment, animated work instruction and electronic publications to the system integration with Sikorsky’s fleet management tools that were originally developed to support its commercial S-92 aircraft fleet.

The S-92 has demonstrated greater than 95% availability for a fleet of over 300 aircraft which now boast near 1.5 million flight hours, in harsh North Sea and other off shore Oil & Gas environments. Use of data analytics (“big data”) has proven to save money in the commercial fleet and these same tools are already in place for the CH-53K and being proven on the CH-53E in the interim.

The CH-53K’s triple redundant fly-by-wire design improves maintainability significantly through fault Detection and isolation capability providing the ability to detect failures in actuators and other electrical and electromechanical components including hydraulic leak detection with fault isolation.

While the CH-53K is bigger and far more capable in many important ways, it’s also smaller in terms of its logistics footprint and provides a best O&S value over its entire lifetime. The CH-53K’s logistics footprint is 1/3 less by volume with a 5,000 cubic feet reduction and 1/4 less by weight with a 25, 000 reduction compared to the legacy CH-53E. That’s equivalent to the storage volume of a 2-car garage and the weight of a two up-armored HMMWVs. In the cargo world, that’s 2 standard shipping containers, which is space and available payload on a ship or less equipment to transport to an austere support base.

The design reduces the maintenance workload as well. With no mechanical rigging requirement and fewer moving parts leading to fewer failures, the CH-53K provides a significant reduction in maintenance man hours, a 35% improvement in Mean Time to Repair, and ultimately increased readiness and availability to the warfighter.

Organizational-level maintenance peculiar support equipment for the CH‑53K is based on common and CH-53E support equipment in order to reduce the new peculiar support equipment required for the CH-53K. Only 150 items of peculiar support equipment were developed to support organizational-level maintenance, which is 146 less pieces of support equipment or a 52% footprint reduction compared to the CH-53E. Additionally the CH-53K support equipment was designed to reduce and optimize equipment weight and life cycle cost while material selection and coating changes from legacy aircraft to eliminate use of hazardous materials and provide better environmental protection from corrosion.

The T408-GE-400 engine brings more capability to the CH-53K through 57% more horsepower with a smaller logistics footprint compared to the T64 it replaces in the same size package but with 63% fewer parts. The T408 supports engine on aircraft maintenance and was designed to maximize two levels of maintenance—Organizational to Depot—with all on-wing engine maintenance being performed using the common tools in flight line toolbox further reducing the logistics footprint and maintenance man hours while increasing availability and readiness of the CH-53K.

The CH-53K sets the standard and is the 1st and only true 21st Century Heavy Lift Helicopter.

To be more specific, the current heavy / upper medium lift cargo helicopters that the CH-53K replaces—legacy Chinook, CH-53 A/D/G Sea Stallion, CH-53E Super Stallion and their engines—were literally designed in the mid-20th century.

In the more than half century that has elapsed between the design of these legacy aircraft and the first flight of the CH-53K in 2015, there have been significant advancements in helicopter design and manufacturing.

The CH-53K is superior to its predecessors, not by engineering miracles, but by over a half century of steady engineering and technology progress that was designed and incorporated into the CH-53K from the ground up.

The King Stallion is a totally new helicopter that leapfrogs the CH-53E design to improve operational capability, interoperability, reliability, maintainability, survivability, and cost of ownership.

Finally, the CH-53K is nearing completion of testing and well into production. The program remains on target for a 2021 IOC and 2023 deployment that meets the USMC’s operational needs. The King Stallion is the only aircraft that meets the heavy lift requirements for the USMC, supports the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, and provides that safety, survivability, supportability and growth capability to meet the service’s needs for the many decades to come.

A good sense of how the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) intersects with the new operating environment was highlighted in interviews I did in both Pax River and Marine Corps Air Station Yuma.

In an interview earlier this summer with a senior MAWTS-1 officer, we discussed the coming of TAGRS and of the CH-53K to the Marine Corps and how these new capabilities would allow for enhanced FARP capabilities and expeditionary basing support.

In that interview with Maj Steve Bancroft, Aviation Ground Support (AGS) Department Head, MAWTS-1, MCAS Yuma, we discussed the way ahead on FARPs enabled by TAGR and CH-53Ks.

Excerpts from that interview follow:

There were a number of takeaways from that conversation which provide an understanding of the Marines are working their way ahead currently with regard to the FARP contribution to distributed operations.

The first takeaway is that when one is referring to a FARP, it is about an ability to provide a node which can refuel and rearm aircraft. But it is more than that. It is about providing capability for crew rest, resupply and repair to some extent.

The second takeaway is that the concept remains the same, but the tools to do the concept are changing. Clearly, one example is the nature of the fuel containers being used. In the land wars, the basic fuel supply was being carried by a fuel truck to the FARP location. Obviously, that is not a solution for Pacific operations.

What is being worked now at MAWTS-1 is a much mobile solution set. Currently, they are working with a system whose provenance goes back to the 1950s and is a helicopter expeditionary refueling system or HERS system. This legacy kit limits mobility as it is very heavy and requires the use of several hoses and fuel separators.

Obviously, this solution is too limiting so they are working a new solution set. They are testing a mobile refueling asset called TAGRS or a Tactical Aviation Ground Refueling system.

As one source put it: “The TAGRS and its operators are capable of being air-inserted making the asset expeditionary. It effectively eliminates the complications of embarkation and transportation of gear to the landing zone.”

The third takeaway was that even with a more mobile and agile pumping solution, there remains the basic challenge of the weight of fuel as a commodity. A gallon of gas is about 6.7 pounds and when aggregating enough fuel at a Forward Air Refueling Point or FARP, the challenge is how to get adequate supplies to a FARP for its mission to be successful.

To speed up the process, the Marines are experimenting with more disposable supply containers to provide for enhanced speed of movement among FARPs within an extended battlespace. They have used helos and KC-130Js to drop pallets of fuel as one solution to this problem.

The effort to speed up the creation and withdrawal from FARPs is a task being worked by the Marines at MAWTS-1 as well. In effect, they are working a more disciplined cycle of arrival and departure from FARPs. And the Marines are exercising ways to bring in a FARP support team in a single aircraft to further the logistical footprint and to provide for more rapid engagement and disengagement as well.

The fourth takeaway is that innovative delivery solutions can be worked going forward.

When I met with Col. Perrin at Pax River, we discussed how the CH-53K as a smart aircraft could manage airborne MULES to support resupply to a mobile base. As Col. Perrin noted in our conversation: “The USMC has done many studies of distributed operations and throughout the analyses it is clear that heavy lift is an essential piece of the ability to do such operations.”

And not just any heavy lift – but heavy lift built around a digital architecture.

Clearly, the CH-53E being more than 30 years old is not built in such a manner; but the CH-53K is. What this means is that the CH-53K “can operate and fight on the digital battlefield.”

And because the flight crew are enabled by the digital systems onboard, they can focus on the mission rather than focusing primarily on the mechanics of flying the aircraft. This will be crucial as the Marines shift to using unmanned systems more broadly than they do now. For example, it is clearly a conceivable future that CH-53Ks would be flying a heavy lift operation with unmanned “mules” accompanying them. Such manned-unmanned teaming requires a lot of digital capability and bandwidth, a capability built into the CH-53K.

If one envisages the operational environment in distributed terms, this means that various types of sea bases, ranging from large deck carriers to various types of Maritime Sealift Command ships, along with expeditionary bases, or FARPs or FOBS, will need to be connected into a combined combat force.

To establish expeditionary bases, it is crucial to be able to set them up, operate and to leave such a base rapidly or in an expeditionary manner (sorry for the pun). This will be virtually impossible to do without heavy lift, and vertical heavy lift, specifically.

Put in other terms, the new strategic environment requires new operating concepts; and in those operating concepts, the CH-53K provides significant requisite capabilities. So why not the possibility of the CH-53K flying in with a couple of MULES which carried fuel containers; or perhaps building a vehicle which could come off of the cargo area of the CH-53K and move on the operational area and be linked up with TAGRS?

As this potential development highlights, if we called it a CH-55, we would grasp which the coming of the CH-53K has a significant impact on the way ahead for mobile expeditionary basing, which is itself a key building block in the way ahead for the integrated distributed force. Or put another way, multiple basig is a key capability required for operations in the extended but contested battlespace; and the CH-55 can provide a significant capability to enable multiple basing,

 

 

 

Exercise Hedgehog 22

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. William Horton, an unmanned aircraft systems operator and the Stalker team assigned to Task Force 61/2, assembles a satellite during Exercise Hedgehog 22 near Saaremaa, Estonia, May 19, 2022.

Task Force 61/2 is participating in the Estonian-led exercise Siil 22 (Hedgehog 22 in English). Siil 22 brings together members of the Estonian Defense Force and U.S. Sailors and Marines under Task Force 61/2 to enhance

Allied interoperability and preserve security and stability in the Baltic region.

SAAREMAA, ESTONIA

05.19.2022

Video by Sgt. Dylan Chagnon U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet