Australia Works Regional Defense Infrastructure

02/23/2022

By Australian Defence Business Review

Australia will spend $580 million to upgrade ports in Papua New Guinea, enhancing some of the country’s out-dated infrastructure, providing useful facilities for use by Australian and allied warships, and – perhaps most importantly – warding off investment by China.

Under an agreement signed by Prime Minister Scott Morrison and PNG PM James Marape in mid-January, Australia will provide a series of loans and grants for work on a number of priority ports, all in PNG’s north and on islands.

Through this investment, the Lae Tidal Basin will be PNG’s largest port with an enhanced capability to handle container traffic from Southeast Asia, and possibly becoming a regional hub for exports to the Pacific.

Works will also be undertaken at Kimbe on the north coast of New Britain, Lorengau on Manus Island, Kavieng in New Ireland, Vanimo in West Sepik, and Wewak in East Sepik (see map below).

Australia is already assisting PNG to renovate the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island for use by PNG’s patrol boats, and also by Australia and the U.S. Though nominally intended for PNG’s Guardian class patrol boats, it could accommodate larger vessels.

China has already demonstrated an interest in boosting ties with PNG, in mid-2020 signing a $200 million deal with the PNG government to export seafood directly to the Chinese mainland and to develop the local fishing industry. At the time, China’s ambassador to PNG talked up a potential free trade agreement.

Under its massive Belt and Road Initiative launched a decade ago, China’s CCP has supported developing nations through investment in their infrastructure projects. But it has been accused of using this investment as ‘debt trap diplomacy’ by saddling small nations with infrastructure debts they can’t readily repay, for which China has sought concessions in return.

Announcing the ports deal, Mr Morrison made no mention of China, instead saying it was about enabling and supporting the sovereignty, independence, and self-sufficiency of PNG. “Infrastructure strengthens economies, creating the conditions for long-term jobs growth,” he said. “Bigger ports mean greater access to global trade opportunities.”

This article was written by Max Blenkin and published by ADBR on January 27, 2022.

The featured photo is of the port of Lae.

A European Update: Germany to Acquire F-35s?

02/22/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Germany has yet to decide on whether to buy the F-35 fighter jet, but a decision will be made later this year, a senior German parliamentarian said Feb. 21.

“There’s no decision yet, but we will decide this year,” the parliamentarian told reporters, here. “There is a clear urgency.”

A replacement of the “obsolete” Tornado fighter jet flown by the German air force set the timing and need for a potential order for the F-35, which was certified to carry U.S.-built nuclear bombs, part of the Nato deterrence, the parliamentarian said.

An order for the F-35 could be made alongside purchase of Eurofighter jets for conventional operations, particularly electronic intelligence, the parliamentarian said.

Asked why an order for the Rafale was not possible, the parliamentarian said the French fighter lacked certification for U.S. nuclear bombs, ruling out that aircraft. It was interesting to note that when the Tornado was built in the 1970s, there was no problem for a European fighter to be certified to carry U.S. nuclear weapons, the parliamentarian added.

On French concerns on an order for the F-35 cutting the German budget for the Future Combat Air System, the parliamentarian said that would depend on the number of F-35s to be bought.

Airbus builds the German Eurofighter Typhoon, while Lockheed Martin is prime contractor for the F-35. Airbus signed Nov. 11 2020, a German contract for 38 Eurofighters under a project dubbed Quadriga.

Britain, Germany, and Italy ordered the swing-wing Tornado in the 1970s, and those partner nations – plus Spain – are backers for the Eurofighter Typhoon. France dropped out early in the Eurofighter project to pursue its Rafale program.

There was a more general problem with European defense projects, the parliamentarian said, pointing to differences in French and German timetables for maritime patrol aircraft.

There were some in Paris who criticised Berlin’s order for a fleet of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, seen as effectively ditching the project for a maritime airborne warfare system (MAWS), and pulling out of an MK3 upgrade to the Tiger attack helicopter.

The German coalition, led by the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), has said there would be a review of government policy, seen as opening the door to procurement of the F-35. The coalition partners are the  environmentalist Green party and pro-business Free Democrats.

That policy review by the government led by the Social Democrat chancellor, Olaf Scholz, marked a change in direction from a previous coalition led by the Christian Democrats, with the then chancellor Angela Merkel at the helm. The Social Democrats had been the junior partner, until the elections last September reversed that balance of political power.

The previous center-right administration had ruled out the Lockheed Martin F-35 and considered the Boeing F/A-18 or Eurofighter as replacement for the Tornado, due to be withdrawn around 2030.

The previous government’s opposition to the F-35 could be seen in the removal in 2018 of the German air chief of staff, who had expressed preference for the F-35.

In France, the prospect of a German order for the F-35 has sparked concern, as that was seen as cutting funds for the FCAS, which has a new generation fighter at the heart of the program. France, Germany and Spain back the FCAS, with Dassault as the prime contractor on the new fighter. The French family-controlled company is in dispute with the German Airbus unit over intellectual property rights and leadership of key program elements.

A Russian-Generated European Crisis

Putin formally said Feb. 21 Donetsk and Luhansk, the two disputed territories in the Donbas region, eastern Ukraine, were republics and independent from Kyiv, sparking sharp denunciations in the West and in the U.N.

Shortly after Putin’s recognizing those two Russian-controlled separatist areas across the border in Ukraine, Moscow sent in troops and armor in as “peacekeepers.”

“There is a Russian crisis, not Ukraine crisis,” the parliamentarian said the day before the effective annexation, with Russian president Vladimir Putin taking a “revisionist” approach.

That approach consists of Putin seeking to reshape the status quo in Eastern Europe, where nation states have aligned with Nato and their Western European allies, after having been held under direct control by the Soviet Union.

A key East European partner for France was Poland, the parliamentarian said, with a relaunch of the Weimar Triangle, which brings France, Germany and Poland into close cooperation.

The Baltic nations – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are also key actors in the Russia crisis, taking a highly negative view of Moscow.

The threat from Putin extended beyond Ukraine, the parliamentarian said, raising a “real challenge for Europe,” such as cyber attacks. European governments were poorly prepared and there was a need for enhancing resilience.

Sanctions Against Russia

The U.K. has drawn up a list of sanctions against Russian companies with shares trading in the London financial center, the City, and Russian oligarchs with large property holdings.

London is reported to be a money-laundering capital, with wealthy Russians facing allegations of corruption or those close to the Kremlin holding £1.5 billion ($2 billion) in U.K. property, The Times, a British daily, reported Feb. 18, drawing on a report by Transparency International, a campaign group.

In the House of Commons, a senior member of parliament and former BBC journalist, Benjamin Bradshaw, asked defense minister Ben Wallace, why under the current prime minister not a single Unexplained Wealth Order had been issued, not a single Russian national holding a golden visa had been named, and “why does he think we have been so slow at tackling Russian dirty money in London.”

The UK passed in 2002 the Proceeds of Crime Act, which included unexplained wealth orders, which allowed the seizing of property without having to prove crimes had been committed, relying on civil standards of proof rather than criminal law.

Britain adopted in 2008 golden visas, which speeded up applications to be a UK resident for those who had £2 million. Some 2,500 such visas have been issued to Russians, out of a total of more than 12,000 golden visas, daily The Guardian reported Feb 20.

The British parliament’s joint intelligence and security committee said in 2020 that the golden visa scheme “was welcoming oligarchs with open arms,” and remained open after the alleged poisoning by two Russian GRU agents in 2018 of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian  intelligence officer, and his daughter Yulia, in Salisbury, southern England.

Featured graphic: Photo 237245721 © Kontakt5956 | Dreamstime.com

Exercise Cutlass Express 2022

02/20/2022

In a press release published on February 6, 2022, the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa announced the launch of Exercise Cutlass Express 2022.

DJIBOUTI – Maritime forces from East Africa, West Indian Ocean nations, Europe, North America, and several international organizations began the multinational maritime exercise Cutlass Express 2022 (CE22) with an opening ceremony held at the Coast Guard Training Center in Djibouti, Feb. 6, 2022.

CE 22, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet (NAVEUR-NAVAF/C6F), assesses and improves combined maritime law enforcement capacity, promote national and regional security in East Africa, and increases interoperability between the U.S., African nations, and international partners. CE22 will be linked with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise (IMX), eliminating regional seams and increasing U.S. global capabilities and interoperability.

“The valuable operational experience gained during Cutlass Express contributes to participating countries’ ability to suppress and counter illegal activities, including piracy, arms trafficking, human smuggling, and drug trafficking,” said Jonathan Pratt, U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti. “Our participation together over the next 12 days is key to help us strengthen our relationships and recommit to the principles that guide this partnership—adherence to rule of law and the capacity to disrupt illicit maritime activity.

This year’s exercise leverages the recently adopted Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which 14 nations are signatories, as a framework for exercising information sharing practices and enforcing marine rule of law. The participating nations will be testing their ability to detect or disrupt illicit trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, as well as search and rescue situations.

The exercise will improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), information sharing between Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs), maritime interdiction, adherence to the rule of law, and counter-proliferation interdiction capabilities in order to disrupt illicit maritime activity and strengthen safety and security in East Africa.

The exercise begins with an in-port training period followed by at-sea scenarios and concludes with a senior leadership symposium. The underway portion of the exercise tests the ship’s abilities to conduct maritime interdiction operations (MIO) by boarding teams against simulated suspect vessels, detecting illicit activity, and follow-on evidence collection procedures.

The valuable operational experience gained during Cutlass Express contributes to participating countries ability to suppress and counter illegal activities, including piracy, arms trafficking, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal trade in wildlife.

CE 22 is one of three U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet -facilitated regional exercises undertaken to provide African forces and international partners with collaborative opportunities on comprehensive maritime security concerns.

Exercises like Cutlass Express in East Africa/Western Indian Ocean, Obangame Express in the Gulf of Guinea, and Phoenix Express in the Mediterranean fall under the international collaborative maritime capacity-building program Africa Partnership Station (APS) as part of a phased approach to building enduring relationships and combined capacity to ensure the safety and security of the regional maritime environment.

“International Maritime Exercise 2022 and Cutlass Express 2022 will play a critical role in the ongoing development of regional cooperation in support of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and improving information sharing and maritime domain awareness among the 12 participating nations,” said Capt. Cannon Neslen, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, Maritime Partnership Program, U.S. Navy Reserve Detachment 118.

Participating nations in Cutlass Express 2022 include Comoros, Djibouti, Georgia, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, United Kingdom, and United States. Interpol, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are also participating in the exercise.

U.S. Africa Command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is one of 11 U.S. Department of Defense combatant commands, each with a geographic or functional mission that provides command and control of military forces in peace and war. AFRICOM employs the broad-reaching diplomacy, development, and defense approach to foster interagency efforts and help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism in Africa.

“Coming together to coordinate our capabilities throughout the maritime domain not only breeds regional security and stability,” said Capt. David Family, Commanding Officer, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. “It gives us a chance to deepen our partnerships and cultivate new ones moving forward.”

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners in order to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

The North Carolina-Based Marines Participate in Cold Response 2022

02/18/2022

By Robbin Laird

During a visit to 2nd Marine Air Wing last summer, I met with Marine Air Group 26.

During that visit we discussed the transition from the land wars, which included the need for more focus on the Northern Flank of NATO.

Certainly, the current European crisis has underscored the importance of such an effort.

This is what I wrote after my meeting with the MAG-26 team:

During my recent visit, I had a chance to discuss the way ahead for combat assault support with three members of MAG-26. Maj. Mazzola is MAG-26 Operations Officer. Maj. Kevin O’Malley is assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (VMM-263), an operational MV-22 squadron, and Maj. Tom Gruber is a member of VMM-365. We focused on the challenges of transition from the Middle East land wars as well as the work on shaping a new way ahead for the assault force.

Up front, the shift was described by one participant as “A total paradigm change.”

2nd MAW Marines will perhaps lessen expeditionary operations in Mesopotamia and increase engagements in the North Atlantic area operations.

In fact, the Marine Corps has already made gains towards this goal.

Since 2018, focus on specific challenges such as cold weather training and exercises have increased at a pace not witnessed since the Cold War.

Case in point, one interviewee noted that in March 2022, they would once again train with the Norwegians in the Cold Response—one of the largest Norwegian and Coalition exercise since the Cold War.

This is how that exercise is described by one source:

“About 40,000 soldiers will participate in Norway’s Cold Response 2022 exercise next year, planned to take place in the Ofoten area with the country’s navy and air force as the main players in the war game. “There is a significantly increased interest among our allies for the north and the Arctic,” said General Eirik Kristoffersen, head of the Norwegian Armed Forces in a phone interview with the Barents Observer. In times of growing distrust between Russia and Europe, Norway seeks to build its security in partnership with NATO allies and Nordic neighbors.

“That includes more joint military training up north. Now, the Armed Forces are revealing more details about next year’s planned large-scale winter exercise.

“As it seems today, we will have about 40,000 soldiers in exercise Cold Response,” Kristoffersen said. “It will be the largest military exercise inside the Arctic Circle in Norway since the 1980s,” the general added.

“Cold Response 2022 will train reinforcement of northern Norway, and the main action will be by navy and air force capacities in the Ofoten area. The region is near to the Army’s northern brigade and training areas where U.S., British and Dutch soldiers frequently drill in Arctic warfare.

“Ofoten is also home to Evenes airport where Norway’s new fleet of P8 Poseidon maritime surveillance planes will be based together with NATO’s two northernmost Quick Reaction Alert F-35s fighter jets on standby to meet Russian military planes flying near Norwegian air space. For NATO and the Nordic countries’ defense partnership, Ofoten is of core strategic importance in case of a larger global conflict involving Russia in the North-Atlantic. The area is about 600 kilometers from the Kola Peninsula where the Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines are based.”

As the Marine Corps conducts force design, they must figure out how to supply that force.

For example, when operating in the Mediterranean, the Ospreys can fly to several support facilities.

This will not be the case when operating in an environment like the North Atlantic.

This means working the logistical support challenge with the Navy to provide for afloat support and to work on pre-positioning of supplies and work the arc from North America to the Baltics.

How will the supply chain to support North Atlantic operations be shaped going forward?

Clearly, the renewed focus on naval integration is part of the answer.

This will be a function of how the Navy reworks its own logistical support; this will be a function of how ashore support is built out in the region (the arc from North Carolina to the Baltics) and how the amphibious fleet is reshaped.

Clearly, the coming of maritime autonomous systems can be part of evolving support solution sets.

As one participant put it: “Perhaps the supply shortfall can be mitigated by logistical movers. Having unmanned aircraft or unmanned surface vessels will undoubtedly be able to contribute going forward.”

There is clearly a shortage of amphibious shipping both in terms of combat ships and connectors for the North Atlantic mission against a peer competitor.

We did not discuss the broader challenge which can be referred as shaping a new family of systems to deliver the amphibious warfare capability to the extended littoral engagement in the North Atlantic, but this is a key challenge which must be met going forward.

Another aspect being worked is how to integrate the ARG-MEU in wider fleet operations.

The Marines and the Navy are working exercises in the North Atlantic to find ways to do so, and the recent BALTOPS-50 did provide some insight with regard to this.

And the evolving relationship between 2nd Expeditionary Strike Group and II MEB will clearly focus on this challenge.

An aspect of the way ahead for the ARG-MEU is its participation in fleet defense and shaping ways the amphibious force can better defend itself afloat.

The F-35 has already demonstrated in the Pacific that it can contribute significantly in this role and with the F-35 coming to 2nd MAW’s operational force, it can play a similar role in the Atlantic.

But given the nature of the arc from North Carolina to the Baltics, allied F-35s will play a key role in all of this, as has already been demonstrated in BALTOPS-50 with the role of Norwegian F-35s.

The participants indicate that indeed they are engaged in discussions with the Navy about how to better integrate capabilities for the extended littoral operational fight.

As one participant highlighted: “As the Navy focuses on integration of their fleet operations, they want to be able to use all of the assets available to them.

“And that is why the MEU is now part of the discussion.”

One key question which is a shaping function moving ahead was posed by one participant this way: “How does the Air Combat Element (ACE) participate effectively in defense of the amphibious force?”

Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Lt. Gen. Mark Wise, is noted as saying that “the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force must be agile, mobile, and survivable. That means looking to, and building upon, current warfighting philosophy and our way of doing business.

“This vision is built around distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced based operations: DMO, LOCE, and EABO.

“The Marine Corps will not abandon, but rather will refine and improve upon, these concepts for operational design for a littoral fight.”

Now they are engaged in the exercise, and in the article are some early photos from their engagement.

For my look at the USMC transformation path, see my new book, published last week:

While the Ukrainian Crisis Simmers: The Launch of Brilliant Jump 2022 and Cold Response 2002

Even though the focus is upon Ukraine, the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO are deeply affected by the crisis.

The Belarus takeover by Moscow and the virtual permanent deployment of Russian force there with the Kaliningrad enclave not far way poses a direct threat to the Nordics, the Balts and Poland which makes up the 21st century version of the NATO’s Northern Flanks or better put as the defense arc from the Nordics through to Poland.

In a recent article posted on the website Eye on the Arctic, Thomas Nilsen underscored what the Russians are about in the Northern waters. The Russians have issued a Notice to Airmen or NOTAM with regard to an area of high risk to civilians.

The Bear Gap is a military term for the strategically important waters from the North Cape, via the Bear Island and north to Svalbard. It is here the Barents Sea meets the deeper Norwegian Sea, and by that access to the North Atlantic.

In a conflict scenario, keeping control of the Bear Gap would be important for the Russian Northern Fleet to protect its strategic missile submarines in the eastern Barents Sea from NATO forces.

The Russian NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) is aimed at alerting civilian aviation to stay away as military missiles shootings will take place. The alert does not specify which missiles might come. However, the Northern Fleet’s largest warship “Pyotr Velikiy” sailed out from Severomorsk this weekend to the Barents Sea. The nuclear-powered battle cruiser is armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, among other weapons.

There are also other multi-purpose submarines and surface navy ships in the area that are armed with cruise missiles. Launching cruise missiles from east of the Varanger fjord against potential targets in the western Barents Sea is a scenario Russia’s Northern Fleet also drilled last February. However, last year’s NOTAM-alert near Bear Island covered a much smaller area.

At the same time, Norway is hosting a large NATO exercise.

This is how the Norwegian Ministry of Defense highlighted the exercise in a January 26, 2022 press release:

Exercise Cold Response 2022 (CR22) is a national Norwegian exercise.

The Cold Response exercise series are held every other year, with invited international participants.

The exercise was notified according to the Vienna Document 2011 § 61 on the 12th of November 2021, as well as in November 2020 – as the exercise could be over 40 000 personnel.

Cold Response 22 is the largest planned exercise conducted within NATO in 2022.

A significant part of exercise Cold Response 22 will take place in international waters adjacent to Norwegian territory with a large maritime and air presence. The Field Training Exercise will take place between 23 March‐ 30 March. A total force of 35 000 personnel from 25 nations are taking part in the exercise. Due to the pandemic, there are ongoing changes, so this number might change until the start of the exercise.

The Officer in charge of the Exercise is the Chief of the Norwegian Joint HQ in Bodø.

The objective of CR 22 is to exercise reinforcement of Norway in order to enhance the readiness of the participating forces and demonstrate Alliance and Partner cohesion under challenging climatic and topographic conditions.

Scenario

  • The scenario of the exercise is artificial and will mainly provide a framework to portray the road to crisis with peer adversary in all domains (North vs South forces).
  • Depicted on this map, you can see the planned phases for the exercise. Phase1 – is starting with naval operations in the Atlantic in order to gain access,
  • Phase 2 – constitutes of Air heavy operations in order to enable landing.
  • Phase 3 – Is the amphibious landing and land battle in order to restore national integrity.
  • There will be two exercise areas, one in the north and one in the south, marked in green.
  • Important to notice is that a significant part of exercise Cold
    Response 22 will take place in international waters with large
    maritime and air presence, and not on land.
  • At the moment it is foreseen a participation of approximately 16000 forces on land, these numbers might change before the start of the exercise due to the pandemic and necessary precautions in this regard.

Command and control.
There are two operational commands in the exercise.

  • Norwegian Joint Headquarter (NJHQ) – is the Exercise HQ and
    will command the North forces.
  • NATO Joint Force Command Brunsum (JFCBS) will lead the
    South forces

During the exercise, the participating forces will be deployed to different locations as depicted on the map. The largest participating states in the exercise are Norway, the USA, France, and the United Kingdom.

  • Norway is committed to the Vienna Document obligations. We are strong supporters of confidence and security building measures. With reference to Chapter V (§47) of the Vienna Document 2011 we will invite all OSCE participating states to an observation of the exercise. The observation will take place from 23. till 30 March 2022. Should the number of forces drop below observation threshold, Norway will conduct the observation on a voluntary basis.
  • The observation will cover both the northern and southern exercise area, all brigades and most of their subunits will be visited. Invitation will be sent out in early February.
  • It is important for Norway to inform early and comprehensively about large military exercises to avoid potential for military tensions and misperceptions. Larger changes to this exercise will be notified accordingly the coming weeks. This to keep participating states who would like to plan a Vienna Document inspection and/or participate in the observation of CR 22, up to date on the developments in the planning.
  • (In November this year (2022) we will notify the next Cold Response exercise, which will be conducted in 2024.)
  • (We appreciate the Vienna Documents provisions regarding early notifications and observations as one of the Vienna Documents many measures to foster transparency, trust, and confidence.)
  • (Press and public will also receive information on the exercise. This will be done through the local authorities on site, but also through official webpages, press releases and other media outreaches.)

Thomas Nilsen in a January 13, 2022 article notes:

Preparation for the long-time planned exercise is already well underway and is not directly linked to the current standoff between NATO and Moscow over Russia’s massive military buildup of troops at Ukraine’s border. However, a conflict in eastern Europe could spill over to the Arctic as the Kola Peninsula is home to some of Russia’s most powerful weapon systems, including hypersonic cruise missiles and the naval component of the strategic nuclear triad.

On December 24, President Vladimir Putin said his military forces successfully fired a simultaneous salvo of the Tsirkon hypersonic missile. The weapon is now ready for deployment with the Northern Fleet on both frigates and the 4th generation multi-purpose submarines of the Yasen-class.

Launched from the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, the Tsirkon missiles could reach targets in the Norwegian Sea in about 10 to 15 minutes if Moscow in a war conflict chose to activate its Bastion defense concept aimed at denying NATO forces control of the Norwegian and Greenland seas.

And in a February 11, 2022 NATO press release the exercises Brilliant Jump 2022 and Cold Response 2022 are highlighted:

On Monday, 28 February 2022, in Norway, NATO will launch one of its main exercises of the year, involving naval, air and land forces from across the Alliance. Under the command of NATO’s Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS), the long-planned Exercise BRILLIANT JUMP 2022 (BRJU 22) will demonstrate the readiness and mobility of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This rapid deployment will also enhance the interoperability of Allies and Partners.

Approximately 2,500 troops, mainly drawn from four NATO nations (France, Italy, Poland and Spain) will participate on the land. These forces will be supported by 10 warships from eight NATO nations (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway and The United Kingdom) with some 750 sailors operating off the coast of Norway and by air assets drawn from NATO member states.

This year, exercise BRILLIANT JUMP will lead directly into the bi-annual Norwegian-led exercise COLD RESPONSE 2022 (CR 22), which runs from 14 March to 1 April 2022. CR 22 is a defensive exercise under a NATO Article 5 scenario. The aim is to train the reinforcement of allies/partners under challenging climatic conditions, enhancing the readiness and capabilities of the participating forces. Up to 35,000 troops from some 28 nations will participate, including non-NATO partner nations, Finland and Sweden.

Norway and allies are committed to transparency and risk reduction. For that reason, Norway announced this long-planned exercise two years in advance in accordance with requirements of the Vienna Document. The Vienna Document obliges all host nations to notify the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of major military exercises. For that reason, Norway has invited all OSCE member states – including Russia to send observers to Exercise COLD RESPONSE.

Both exercises are strictly defensive in character; all allies are committed to openness and transparency in full compliance with international obligations.

An Update on Arquus: February 2022

02/17/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Arquus, a French builder of light and medium armored vehicles, has set a high priority on winning export deals in 2022, after the COVID pandemic slashed foreign orders last year, executive chairman Emmanuel Levacher said Feb. 16.

Foreign deals accounted for some 10 percent of orders last year, with domestic contracts making up 90 percent, he told the annual news conference.

“2021 was a difficult year for orders,” he said, with foreign orders failing to hit targets.

On the domestic front, France was expected to launch in March or April a competition for some 9,400 army trucks, worth some €3 billion ($3.4 billion), which was expected to attract fierce foreign competition.

Arquus has partnered with Soframe, a unit of the Lohr company, to pitch in that tender, which will include fuel trucks.

Arquus, a unit of Swedish truck maker Volvo, won orders worth some €68 million from overseas clients, Levacher said. Most of those foreign orders came from five or six nations in the Middle East and Africa.

The COVID crisis hit export orders as there were restrictions on overseas travel and sparse attendance of trade shows, notably DSEI in London and IDEX in Abu Dhabi, he said. Meanwhile, there was strong foreign competition, particularly from Turkey, which “pushed its geopolitical advantage.”

The return of trade shows, including the French Eurosatory land weapons exhibition, was expected to help business.

Europe as Target Market

Arquus was now focusing on export deals in Europe, where markets were more open and accessible, he said, and was seeking to cut dependence on the Middle East and Africa. The company was pitching its Sherpa four-wheel drive light armored vehicle in a competition in Romania and was competing in a Greek competition for military trucks. There were also tenders in Estonia and Sweden.

Sales to European forces were also seen to be more acceptable in public opinion, as there were allegations of human rights abuse in some Middle Eastern nations.

More generally, there was something of a “schizophrenia” in the European Union, which is setting up its European Defense Fund (EDF) in the pursuit of greater sovereignty and autonomy, while the EU was also considering a formal adoption of social responsibility concerns on the arms industry in Europe, Levacher said.

Such a recognition of social responsibility was “extremely dangerous,” as that would deter banks and investors from making funds available for arms companies.

As part of its European drive, Arquus was among 18 companies from some 10 partner nations taking part in two EDF research projects, dubbed FAMOUS 1 and 2, he said.

That acronym refers to the European Future Highly Mobile Augmented Armored Systems project, backed by a budget of €9.92 million, of which €9 million was from the EU, Forces Operation Blog (FOB) reported.

Upgrades and Services

Arquus saw a prospective boost in business from foreign client nations upgrading and servicing their fleet of armored vehicles, with Kuwait setting up a local workshop, while Qatar was conducting a retrofit of the six-wheel drive Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé (VAB) armored personnel carrier.

Qatar, which has a fleet of some 300 VABs, had initially considered upgrading 170, and had decided to fit out 120 units in the Ultima kit.

Operators of the VAB, such as Cyprus and Morocco, were seen as prospective clients for an Ultima upgrade, which included a remote-controlled machine gun turret, Slate anti-sniper acoustic system, anti-mine protection for the soldiers’ seats, and updated driver’s dashboard.

Arquus saw a boost in domestic orders, sealing deals worth €275 million last year, mainly from the Scorpion army modernization program and service support.

Sales from overseas clients accounted for some 25 percent of 2021 revenue, with the balance  from France, Levacher said. The aim was a 50:50 balance of foreign and domestic sales.

Overall sales last year rose six percent, “not great,” he said, and followed a 10 percent revenue fall in 2020. “Profit was not great” last year, he said, and rose in “the single figures.”

The sales forecast for 2022, 2023 and 2024 was “moderate growth,” and the target remained hitting €1 billion by 2030, he said.

There was an “uncertain environment,” with political uncertainty due to the election, he said, Covid effects hitting client nations, and tension on the domestic supply chain, particularly in the auto industry. There was controversy on arms exports, and geopolitical uncertainty in the sub-Saharan Sahel region, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

French Tenders

There was “great satisfaction” with the French market last year, due to execution of the Scorpion program, which consists mainly of the Griffon troop carrier and Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle.

In the outlook for domestic orders, the French Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office was expected to launch in March or April a competition for a fleet of army trucks, in a deal worth some €3 billion.

Deliveries would run for 15 years, with first shipment in 2024. That program, replacing a  Renault Trucks fleet, would include four- and eight-wheel drive vehicles, and a fuel truck. The air force and navy would receive a few trucks, with the army as the main operator.

The Dutch company DAF, Mercedes of Germany, Italian manufacturer Iveco, and Rheinmetall Man of Germany were expected to enter that tender.

In other French tenders, a competition was expected this year for some 40 robots to detect mines, to replace the fleet of Buffalo anti-mine vehicles, an industry source said. The requirement was for a remote controlled robot of three to five tons, to be towed behind the Griffon troop carrier, which can hit a high speed of 70 km/hour. That budget will be less than €100 million, with a first delivery in 2024. French state-owned Nexter and Milrem, an Estonian robotics specialist, were expected to pitch rival products.

Technology explored in the EU-backed FAMOUS study will feed into a French project, dubbed Véhicule Blindé d’Aide à l’Engagement (VBAE). Belgium has said it was ready to work with France on the VBAE, which will replace a French scout car, the Véhicule Blindé Léger (VBL).

The French requirement for VBAE was for 1,900-2,500 units, weighing less than eight tons, with a first delivery in 2027.

Emmanuel Levacher

President and CEO of ARQUUS since June 2015.

Born: 1962.

Principal work experience: During his rich career, with inter alia 30 years in the automobile industry (Renault Trucks, Renault, Volvo), Emmanuel has held multiple operational and strategic functions in contact with markets on the five continents. He has also built a solid experience with French and foreign governments, state authorities and public and diplomatic institutions.

Education: Master in Political Science, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris, France. Master in Business administration (finance), Ecole de Management, Lyon, France. American Language Program Columbia University, New-York, USA. CEDEP Operational Management Program, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.

 

France and the Ukraine Crisis, 2022

02/16/2022

by Pierre Tran

Paris – President Emmanuel Macron’s Feb. 7, 2022 flight to Moscow could be seen as the doves’ diplomatic attempt to defuse the crisis over Ukraine, a counterbalance to the hawks dispatching troops and weapons to warn off Russian forces massed on the border with its neighbor.

Macron spent five hours in talks behind Kremlin closed doors with Russian president Vladimir Putin, with the French head of state flying the next day to Kyiv to meet Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy, and then on to Berlin to see German chancellor Olaf Schulz.

The French aim was to “de-escalate” the crisis rising from Russia gathering some 130,000 troops and armor on the border with Ukraine, previously part of the former Soviet Union.

Moscow may have denied any plan to invade Ukraine, but there is deep concern Moscow will order a military move, such as seen in 2014 by seizing the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas region, eastern Ukraine.

Macron had assumed the role of peace broker, carrying the badge of French political leader, as he may hold the six-month rotating presidency of the council of the European Union, but he knew he had no mandate to speak for the 27-strong EU. And France may be a NATO member, but Paris also had no remit to speak for the transatlantic alliance.

Macron had actively taken up the role of the nation’s top diplomat, spending precious political time in search of a peaceful solution to a perceived Russian threat on an East European nation. France is due to go to the polls in April, and Macron has yet to declare candidacy in the election for the five-year tenancy of the Elysée president’s office.

That diplomatic whirlwind may well have been a French drive, but it may also be seen as part of Macron’s wider mission of boosting the role of Europe in world politics, his pursuit of the concept of European strategic autonomy, including a military capability, separate from NATO and Washington.

Among the points Macron and Putin agreed at the Moscow summit was resumption of talks over the territorial dispute in Donbas under the 2015 Minsk agreement. Officials from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia met Feb. 10, but the four members of the Normandy format came away with little to show for resolving the low-level conflict in the region.

Macron also discussed a new security order for Europe at the Moscow summit, as Russia has demanded a roll back of the NATO membership and missiles deployed around Russia. France has urged grave caution but has not advised French nationals to leave Ukraine, pointing up a distinct approach from at least 30 other nations, which afternoon daily Le Monde reported Feb. 14  have told nationals to leave the country.

Paris insists on an independent verification of threat, a cornerstone of its pursuit of strategic autonomy. France has its own intelligence gathering means on land, sea, air and in space, and will have access to intelligence gathered and shared by NATO partners.  That independent approach could be seen in the decision by the then President Jacques Chirac to stay out of the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, a decision which bruised relations between Paris and Washington for years.

After the Moscow meeting, the Russian spokesman disputed media reports that Putin had assured Macron that there would be no further military moves around Ukraine.

Russian intelligence agencies reportedly have a common practice of recording events, perhaps prompting the question whether there is a recording of that high-level exchange of views, perhaps resolving who said what and when.

Reinforcing Eastern European NATO States

The UK defense minister sparked controversy after the Sunday Times reported Feb. 13 that Ben Wallace said there was a “whiff of Munich in the air.” British authorities sought to play down that remark, which implied Russia might play the role of Adolph Hitler, the BBC reported the following day.

NATO was undergoing brain death, Macron told The Economist in 2019. But the crisis seems to have sparked something of a cerebral recovery, with NATO members rallying around to show support for Ukraine, which seeks to join the military alliance.

A first batch of U.S. airborne troops landed Feb.4 in Germany, part of a 2,000-strong deployment to Poland and Romania, with 1,000 soldiers moving from Germany to Romania.

The UK was sending 350 Royal Marines to Poland, adding to the 100 army engineers already there, helping to strengthen the border with Belarus.

Germany was sending 350 more soldiers to Lithuania, reinforcing the some 600 German troops already there and accounting for around half the battle group.

Russia has drawn a red line against NATO ever accepting Ukraine as a member, and it remains to be seen whether the alliance will accept Kyiv’s application, which would pledge  collective defense in the event of an attack.  Russia has demanded a NATOretreat from its borders, with weapons and troops pulled out of former Soviet bloc states which joined the Atlantic alliance after 1997. Moscow has also called for the NATO withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe, and recognition and autonomy of the Donbas region.

Russia has issued Russian passports to Ukrainians in the region, underlining its territorial claim.

U.S. president Joe Biden has clearly said there would not be armed conflict with Russia, which would spell another world war. The Western partners, including the European Union, have pledged to take severe economic sanctions if there were a Russian invasion.

Europe vs Putin

After the Kyiv meeting, Macron flew to Berlin, allowing a late working dinner with Scholz and the Polish president, Andrzej Duda, bringing together the three leaders of the Weimar Triangle, the cooperative group of France, Germany and Poland.  “Our common goal is to avoid a war in Europe,” Scholz said.

Scholz was just back from meeting Biden in Washington for talks. Before Macron flew to Moscow, he twice called Biden, and called Duda, UK prime minister Boris Johnson, Putin, Scholz, Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, and Zelenskiy, clearing the ground for the meeting with Putin, The Economist said on social media.

That was a departure from Macron’s previous meetings with Putin, notably in 2019 at the Brégançon medieval fort, the French official holiday retreat on a Mediterranean island, and in 2017 at the Versailles palace, west of the capital. The Elysée reportedly did not brief Western allies before those meetings.

“These more than five hours of talks make us realise how different the Putin of today was to the Putin of three years ago,” said a French source briefed on the Moscow talks, Reuters reported. The Russian leader spent most of the time “rewriting history from 1997 on.”

Putin told the BBC that he had been forced to moonlight as a taxi driver in the 1990s as he earned so little after the collapse of the USSR.

“Sometimes I had to earn extra money,” Putin said. “I mean, earn extra money by car, as a private driver. It’s unpleasant to talk about to be honest, but unfortunately that was the case.”

Putin’s remarks were in the BBC documentary film, Russia, Latest History, which aired Dec. 12 2021.

Putin worked for the KGB intelligence service and resigned after the 1991 coup against president Mikhail Gorbachev, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin went on to work with Anatoly Sobchak, mayor of St Petersburg.

Putin reportedly used the familiar French “tu” rather than the more formal “vous” form of address when he saw Macron at the meeting. Macron had declined to agree to give a Russian request for a DNA sample for a Covid test, which meant the meeting was held at a long table, sparking many visual jokes on social media.

A View from Latvia

The Latvian deputy prime minister and defense minister, Artis Pabriks, told Feb. 7 the German Marshall Fund of the United States, that while the US informed Latvia and the other Baltic states on US negotiations and plans with Moscow, it was not clear the Latvian government had been informed of  Macron’s “talking points” before he flew to Moscow.

Macron made a call Feb. 5 to Latvian prime minister Krisjanis Karins, before the meeting with Putin, the list from The Economist on social media shows.

Are those who are negotiating with Putin “representing the West or are they mediators between the West and Moscow?” Pabriks said, adding that Russia’s demands extended beyond Ukraine, and Moscow was seeking expansion against the West, Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

Pabriks evoked the then UK prime minister Neville Chamberlain and the 1938 Munich agreement – and referred to the film Munich: The Edge of War which recently started showing on Netflix. Macron should have flown to Kyiv first and discussed the “concessions” before going to Moscow, Pabriks said.

Franco-Russian Ties

France has strong links with Russia. That can be seen in the then leader of the Free French forces, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, sending French pilots to fly alongside the Russians on the Eastern Front in the Second World War.

Those French air force pilots formed a squadron, dubbed Normandie-Niemen, flew Yakovlev Yak 1 fighter planes 1943-45, and supported Russian troops in the battle of Kursk. Moscow  awarded the French squadron the distinction of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The present Normandie-Niemen squadron flies Rafale fighter jets from Mont-de-Marsan air base, southwest France.

In 2011, the then president, Nicolas Sarkozy, backed a controversial sale worth €1.2 billion ($1.4 billion) of two Mistral class helicopter carriers to the Russian navy, with options for two more.

The Baltic nations, the U.S., Ukraine, and other central European allies criticized that deal, which stood to boost Russian force projection.

Sarkozy’s successor, François Hollande, cancelled the Mistral carrier deal in 2015 and repaid Russia €948 million, comprising €893 million for building the two warships and €55 million for adapting Russian equipment for fitting on the vessels.

The French authorities declined to pay the French shipbuilder, Naval Group, an estimated €200 million payment for building the two warships, Vladivostok and Sevastopol, which were later sold to Egypt.

Featured Photo: Flags of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. Normandy Format meeting on eastern Ukraine. Credit: Bigstock

See also the following:

President Macron and Defense: En Même Temps

Ukraine Crisis 2022: A Polish Perspective

02/14/2022

By Robert Czulda

Despite numerous alarmist tones, average Ukrainians do not panic – shops are open and people gather at restaurants and pubs.

Ukrainian security expert Yevgeniya Gaber, whom I interviewed recently for the Polish media, said that there are no signs of any chaos and the Ukrainian intelligence community did not consider an invasion as an imminent threat.

While American, British and Canadian diplomats were ordered to leave Ukraine, Polish embassy and consulates work as usual – there is no evacuation at all. Poland, who is among few countries supplying the Ukrainian Armed Forces with defensive arms, firmly stands by Ukraine’s side.

Is an invasion imminent?

First of all, it must be underscored, that Russia has already invaded a sovereign territory of Ukraine – parts of this country have been under Moscow’s occupation since 2014. An open invasion is not Putin’s ultimate goal – army is a tool of foreign policy and thus by gathering tens of thousands of soldiers at the borders of Ukraine, the Kremlin primarily wants to achieve political goals.

There are many indications to argue that that some of them will be achieved without firing a single bullet. An often erroneous explanation is that the current crisis is Moscow’s attempt to undermine Ukrainian bid for NATO and the European Union, but no one can seriously conclude that Kiev was on any path to a full membership in these organizations.

Putin’s primary and personal goal is to stay in power, and a “sieged fortress syndrome” is a simple yet effective way to unite poor and frustrated citizens around their leader.

The Kremlin was unable to build a thriving economy in the country, but was very successful in creating an image of NATO as a hostile, aggressive organization preparing to attack Russia, which is, of course, an absurd narrative. Moscow has been pursuing an anti-Western narrative for years.

Ultimately it has borne fruits. According to Moscow-based Levada Center, 82% of Russian citizens believe that Russia has enemies. For 70% it is the United States, while in 2011 only 33% shared such opinion.

In a geostrategic dimension, Moscow’s goal is to ultimately destroy international rules, which were created after the Cold War.

After the aggression on Ukraine in 2014 Russian commentator Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine and Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, explained a Russian approach: “after the end of the Cold War, we got tangled up in some misunderstandings. Supposedly everyone knew who won, what is the new world order, but no one defined it formally. New rules were not written in any international documents, acts or agreements. Now Russia tried to set new rules, because those that have been in force until now have not been beneficial to Russia”.

Now many experts and some officials – French President Emmanuel Macros has been among them for the last couple of years – claim that Russia must be included in a new European security system.

However, it is impossible to reach a solid agreement with Putin’s Russia without significant concessions. Moscow’s demands are as long as absurd – the Kremlin expects the West to fully abandon Ukraine (all foreign advisors and arms delivered to Kiev are to be withdrawn, NATO has to stop any military exercises with Ukraine, which would be forced to become a neutral country).

Moreover, Russia expects NATO to halt its enlargement. In return, Russia offers nothing. Moscow has been playing on dividing the West and weakening Central and Eastern Europe, which it still considered by the Kremlin as a Russian sphere of influence. Russia does not want to conquer this part of Europe militarily, but is ready to use non-military yet still hostile instruments to achieve subordination, which would be ultimately recognized by the West.

An open war or even a limited armed conflict would be a massive disaster, but that does not mean that we should yield to the thug.

If the West – both NATO and the United States – want to preserve its position – it must draw a red line. Of course, Ukraine is not in NATO and it will not be defended by NATO troops, but the Ukrainians know that. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – the most vulnerable NATO member states – are a different story. Their security is also a security of the whole transatlantic security system. The failure of their defense would mean the end of NATO as a security provider and the United States as a superpower and protector.

Russia has already achieved an important goal.

What many Western analysts fail to notice is the fact that during the current crisis, Russia has completely absorbed Belarus, which no longer exists as a separate state. Security apparatus and armed forces have been closely integrated and Belarus has lost its defense and political independence.

Polish security expert Andrzej Wilk put it bluntly: “Belarusian military and its defense industry are parts of Russian system.”

Now, the whole was accomplished – Russia deployed its troops in Belarus, which will remain there after the current crisis is over. Moreover, Russia moved a potential frontline with NATO several hundred kilometers to the West. A length of NATO’s border with the Russian Federation was expanded too.

Secondly, when the current crisis is over, Moscow will finally open the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will increase European dependence on Russian natural gas. As soon as the NS2 is operational, Ukraine will lose its transit role and Russia might invade it without any fear that a secure flow of its gas to Western Europe is threatened.

Do not be fooled – Nord Stream 2 will be opened sooner or later and definitely will not be cancelled – the pipeline has already been built and both Moscow and Berlin are waiting for the best moment to make it running. Russian aggressive behavior will be ultimately rewarded.

Featured photo: Robert Czulda moderating a panel on air power modernization at the Defence 24 Conference on September 27, 2021. Image Credit: J.Sabak

Also, see the following:

Seam Warfare and Polish Defense

Looking Back and Looking Forward: The Case of Ukraine

Looking Back and Looking Forward: The Case of Ukraine

Shaping a Way Ahead for Polish Defense: The Perspective of Robert Czulda