According to a news release on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website, the Finnish government has released its latest defence white paper.

At its meeting on 9 September 2021, the Government approved the Defence Report to be submitted to Parliament.

The Report and its implementation ensure that Finland’s defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment. The Report and its implementation will extend until the end of decade.

Finland’s defence environment remains tense and difficult to predict. In addition to the land, sea and air domains, cyber and information environments and space are highlighted. The importance of the neighbouring Arctic regions is growing.

The defence administration prepares to counter broad-spectrum influencing, together with other actors, as part of the evolving national comprehensive security model. Interagency cooperation must be further developed in the fields of cyber defence, strategic communication and information defence. Threats to the cyber operating environment and related national development needs will be assessed in more detail in a new study. 

The Defence Report will reorganize the force structure of the Defence Forces wartime units. In the future, wartime troops will be divided into operative and local troops.  The number of local troops will be increased from 2025 by transforming the majority of the regional troops into local troops. At the same time, the range of duties of local troops will expand and the standards will rise. The importance of cooperation between authorities and the role of reservists will be emphasised.

The cost savings obligations directed at the Defence Forces during previous years and the currently available resources make it challenging to maintain activities and readiness on the current level. This also restricts preparations for a crisis or warfare of long duration.

The maintenance of readiness, training of conscripts and the development of new capabilities require a gradual increase in the number of personnel in the Defence Forces by 500 person-years by the end of the 2020s.

Close international defence cooperation strengthens Finland’s defence capability. Finland must have the ability to work together with key partners, based on a separate decision, in all security situations affecting Finland, including during a crisis.

While the President and the Ministerial Committee guided the preparation of the Government’s Defence Report, it was prepared as in a cross-governmental cooperation and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group was consulted. This is the second Government Defence Report; the previous one was completed on 16 February 2017.

In the white paper, the nature of the Russian threat was underscored and highlighted as follows:

Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland’s neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces, and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations.

The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role.

Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and maintained the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. In the spring of 2021 Russia concentrated a large number of military forces in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. Its activities, for example, in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that the threshold for threatening to use or using military force to try and reach a political goal has lowered.

During the last few years, Russia has positioned some of its most technologically advanced weapons systems and increasingly more capable forces close to Finland. It regularly conducts joint service exercises, and its ability to project military force in a swift and surprising manner has improved. Long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, enable Russia to extends its military capabilities beyond its borders, and restrict the freedom of action of other actors.

Russia conducts exercises and operates actively outside its territory, which could escalate tensions. Furthermore, it has strengthened its strategic nuclear deterrent, and hardened its nuclear rhetoric.

If you wish to see a similar view in Europe, one can go to Poland where the deep concern with the border operations of Belarus are highlighted as well as part of a broader Russian strategy.

The report was published in full on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website.

Or it can be read in e-book form below:

Finland is a key player in the strengthening of Nordic defence cooperation and provides a signifiant example of a state and people focused on resilience as a key element of defense capability.

The Australians are clearly looking at ways to enhance resilience as well as Poland in Europe. The return of Norway to a “total defence concept” goes down the same lines.

As the post-pandemic recovery process takes hold, what place will secure supply chains play in the way ahead for the European Union states?

As we wrote in our book on the Return of Direct Defense in Europe:

The Finns are shaping a way ahead for themselves, with their neighbors and are a key stakeholder in shaping a new approach to Nordic and Northern European defense. This is a long way from “Finlandization.”

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/10/enhanced-nordic-operational-cooperation-september-2021-declaration-of-intent/

By Robbin Laird

My colleague John Blackburn has focused for some time on the importance of the Australian defence forces becoming more sustainable from Australian sources. He then broadened his look at resilience to the energy and then maritime sectors. This was PRIOR to the pandemic.

With our societies facing a major challenge in re-launching after the pandemic, the question of resilience, and secure supply chains is now a key part of any effective or successful project for the recovery of the liberal democratic societies.

Recently, I have interviewed Blackburn on the launch of a new study which focuses on the challenges facing Australia in shaping a resilient society. And I will publish that interview in the near future.

Notably, this week the final report of the project is being released.

According to the team which generated the report:

“In early 2020, the International Institute for Economic Research – Australia (IIER-A), in partnership with Global Access Partners (GAP), embarked on an 18-month long project to consider Australia’s resilience in the face of a changing world. Over 250 people participated in 40 activities which included Taskforce meetings, workshops focused on specific issues, and the GAP Summit on National Resilience.

“This politically independent effort involved participants from all sectors, including retired Federal and State politicians and the heads of major peak bodies.

“This report presents an integrated view of the National Resilience Project’s nine component studies.”

The executive summary of the report highlights the findings of the report and follows:

The COVID-19 pandemic was a dual shock to our health and economic systems. The ongoing widespread lockdowns, the troubled vaccination rollout, interstate rivalries and social dislocation exposed vulnerabilities in many systems that underpin our society.

In 2021 Australians are faced with concurrent, and in some cases existential, challenges. These include climate change and the urgent need to reduce emissions, growing global and regional security risks, a global pandemic which will have persistent societal and economic impacts, a global energy transformation where we are lagging the developed world, and a global market model that has resulted in reduced resilience, as evidenced in the face of recent crises.

Our National Resilience Project posed three fundamental questions to our workshop participants: What is a resilient society? Are we resilient enough? Can we make ourselves more resilient? We postulated three key attributes of a resilient society: shared awareness and shared goals; teamwork and collaboration; and the ability to prepare and mobilise in the face of a crisis.

The Project has highlighted our lack of resilience in all three areas. Faced with a crisis that it had not prepared for; the Federal Government closed the nation down and then applauded its’ brilliance in preventing outbreaks of the scale seen overseas.

However, 18 months later we remain closed to the outside world, reactive, and crisis managing the present whilst failing to prepare for the significant health and economic challenges we will face in the next few years. We are not unique; the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a global lack of resilience because of a collective failure of preparedness and mobilisation.

We observe that there is a lack of shared awareness and shared goals in Australia and limited honesty and directness from some Australian politicians about our future challenges. This situation is exacerbated by our Federation’s political systems which has not been able to address our risks and vulnerabilities in a coherent, systemic manner.

Political reactions are often too little, too late, and too short-sighted. A complicating factor is that our Federation structure may have been fit for purpose a century ago, but it cannot deal with the constellation of challenges we face today.

Unfortunately, the prevalence of political spin in lieu of substance over the past decade has also dulled our senses to the point of complacency. Neither side of politics is blameless in this respect. Social cohesion enables and derives from social activity, especially collaborative and supportive activity built on a foundation of trust.

Strong, trusting social bonds that survive and thrive in the face of differences of opinions, beliefs, life circumstances and living conditions are crucial for a society or community to be ‘resilient’, especially when confronted by sudden change or catastrophic threats or events. Federal, state and territory governments need to cooperate on a comprehensive, evidence-based national resilience framework to assess current capabilities and future threats and set national, state, territory, and local policy objectives as part of an overall resilience strategy.

Whilst the formation of the National Cabinet in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with hope and optimism, that soon faded when the behaviour of Federal and some State leaders regressed into self-interest and power plays, compounded by the partisan elements in the media.

As Australia attempts to move on from the COVID-19 pandemic our immediate national challenges are ones of response and recovery. However, we must also prepare for future challenges.

A sovereign nation must buttress, rather than outsource, its self-reliance, and while State, Territory and Federal Governments have taken measures to protect and restore the economy in the wake of COVID-19, a broader long-term vision for domestic manufacturing and trusted supply chains would prepare the ground for a more sustainable recovery, and better prepare the nation for the future.

We are likely to see more compounding disasters on a national scale with far-reaching consequences. We need to be better prepared for these disasters. A nationally coordinated and, where appropriate, standardised, and interoperable disaster preparedness and mobilisation system needs to be developed. Business-as-usual, or more correctly businessas-was, is not an option.

Whilst this is a grim assessment there is some cause for cautious optimism. The actions we need to take are not beyond our ability to design and implement.

We have considerable expertise and resources in this country.

To address some of our resilience deficiencies, we are recommending the creation of an independent National Resilience Institute. The Institute could contribute to a deeper, apolitical, examination of the issues raised in this report.

The aim is to help inform the public policy debate, to improved shared awareness, and to offer ideas on how to improve our national preparedness.

The report can be found in PDF at the following two websites:

Global Access Partners and the Institute for Integrated Economic Research-Australia.

The report can be read in e-book form below:

By Robbin Laird

Warsaw

I am in Warsaw and have just attended the two-day conference held by Defence 24.

According to the organization: “Defence24 Group, the publisher of Defence24.pl portal, is organizing a third edition of Defence24 DAY & SOFEAST conference, focused on the major issues in the areas of defence, security and defence industry.

“This year, Defence24 DAY will take place in a two-day formula, combined with SOFEAST, a scientific conference dedicated to the Special Operations Forces as well as combat medicine.

“Defence24 Day is the leading defence and security sector conference, focused on the major issues of the sectors both in Poland and around the world.

“The event is a place where decision makers, senior administration & Armed Forces officials, defence industry representatives and experts may debate and share their experience.

“It is planned that Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Paweł Soloch, the Head of National Security Bureau as well as numerous senior Polish Armed Forces commanders will take place in the conference.”

The agenda for the conference can be found on the Defence 24 website.

I will be reporting on the presentations and discussions which I attended at the conference as well as providing in depth interviews from Polish defence experts with regard to the challenges being faced by Poland and shaping a way ahead for Poland within the overall transition in direct defense in Europe.

In our book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21^st Century Authoritarian Challenge, Murielle Delaporte and I focused on how the current phase of defense in Europe drew upon Cold War history but was very different in many ways as well. Notably, there is a broader challenge posed by both modern Russia and China in which shaping new joint defense capabilities across the European operational landscape needs to be combined with new approaches to security to deal with new infrastructure threats.

That clearly was the perspective provided by participants in the conference.

After 2014, Poland along with other states serious about defense, such as the Nordic states, shifted their focus from out-of-area forces, to reworking how to defend their own national territory against the authoritarian states and their challenges.

And in so doing, for the Poles, as a key state on the Eastern flank of Europe facing the unincorporated states in Europe, both Belarus and Ukraine, and the Putin driven Russian state revival, how to do so is an ongoing work in progress.

The conference provided a number of insights with regard to the agenda for the Poles in shaping a way ahead. I would note that Poland is certainly focused on the challenges of enhanced national security, akin to the concerns I have discussed while in Finland and in the Nordic region, and increasingly in Australia as well,

There is a core concern with dealing with what have been called hybrid threats, namely, the authoritarians working wedges within a society and within that society’s broader alliances by creating asymmetrical threats.

For Poland currently, the Belarusian use of migrants to breach the Polish border on their way into Europe more generally is such a case. This challenge was extensively discussed at the conference, and the Polish response in part has been to mobilize the territorial forces to provide a new brigade to support border security.

This has led to broader European concerns about how to secure European borders, with Poland receiving both criticism and support from a wider European community.

And the wider community aspect is a key one both discussed at the conference and in my interviews.

The Poles clearly see a Russian direct threat to them and to Europe. And they are closer to de Gaulle’s vision of Europe, one of nations cooperating on common interests than to the views of today’s European Commission which sees the way ahead as creating a single set of rules for the entire European community. Here Poland is on collision course with the Commission.

At the same time, there is growing concern among nations who believe that Russia and China pose direct threats to Europe and see the need for enhanced cooperation among like-minded states. Certainly, there is scope for enhanced cooperation with the Nordic states who have deepened their own cooperation as well.

There were references as well about the United States and the dramatic Biden Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan and the AUKUS announcements. And the elephant in the room clearly is what the Biden Administration is going concretely to do going forward with regard to defense, both globally and in Europe.

The Polish government has raised its defence budget and is considering additional capabilities for its operational approach to direct defense. The challenge will be to build a more integrated joint force going forward and one which can work effectively with allies.

How will the territorial force be shaped going forward? How will it intersect with more mobile capabilities, such as with its F-35 force?

In a period of time in which the allies of Poland are reworking their own defense templates, it is fair to say that there is no model for Poland to apply to its own direct defense which is congruent with what allies are doing themselves.

The Nordics for example, are reworking how to shape a more integrated territorial defense but one in which air and missile power can expand the perimeter for their defense. The F-35 consortia is a key part of reworking how Europeans will deliver multi-domain capabilities to drive greater force integration, and Poland buying the F-35 will be able to participate in this ongoing development.

The United States is facing a significant change from its preoccupation on the land wars in the Middle East to shaping a new 21^st century force, kill web enabled, and crafted to provide for force distribution and integration.

But this is a work in progress, one which I have focused on for a number of years with my colleagues.   

How does Poland then intersect with ongoing American and European allied warfighting developments, which are driving significant changes in the templates which will deliver relevant force capabilities against adversary forces, which themselves are undergoing fundamental change?

A notable challenge for Poland is how to both defend its national territory and to operate in its perimeter with mobile forces.

The opportunity to integrate more effectively with its Nordic partners and operate in the defense of the Nordic states is not a task for Abrams tanks.

How best to shape a realistic mobile force which can both operate in the perimeters and aid in the territorial defense?

This applies as well to working with the states in the Black Sea region and when necessary, in the Polish perspective being able to participate in the defense of Ukraine.

The challenge can be simply put: (1) Poland needs to combine credible territorial national defense, but (2) with an ability to participate with allies in breaking down the anti-access area denial approach of the Russians and (3) with credible mobile forces which can move to the point of attack by the Russians on the seams which they hope to open up by hybrid or direct warfare needs. The seam warfare piece of what is often called hybrid warfare is something I discussed recently with MARFORPAC in the Pacific.

In short, Poland is in the front lines of European defense.

How they work their own defense is a key part of the broader allied approach and will drive it as well.

When you are the front lines you tend to take the threat more seriously than when you are not, and that is one of the challenges clearly facing the vision of those like President Macron who champions “European Sovereignty” yet pursues his own vision of Russia in Europe.

Featured Photo: The panel held at the end of day one of the conference on “Technology Development in the Defence Sector: Key Success Factors for R and D and Technology Transfers.” Credit: Second Line of Defense