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With the current focus on finding ways for the USMC to better support the joint force, a key opportunity might be overlooked.
How might the joint and coalition force reshape themselves to be capable of either doing or leveraging mobile basing?
The Marines with their triad of the Osprey-F-35-CH-53K operating off of sea bases can provide a significant launch point for the USAF, the US Navy and the US Army to learn how to weave multi-domain air-sea-land integration into a force leveraging mobile basing.
This is critical no matter where one finds oneself on the spectrum of warfare.
For the limited wars we are engaged in with the 21st century authoritarian powers, it is crucial to be present at the point of interest.
It is necessary as well to be persistent in your presence with reachback to other capabilities to ensure escalation control.
Mobile basing with kill web reach is a key element for escalation control and a key enabler for distributed integrated operations when needed to provide for a force able to enhance its survivability.
With the Osprey-F35-CH-53K triad and a reimagining of how to use and develop the amphibious task force capabilities, the joint and coalition force can evolve much more effectively in the near to mid term.
It is crucial to deliver integrated rather than dissipated combat capability which can be generated by so called-disruptive change rather than leveraging real capabilities at hand and expanding the strategic imagination of how to use such capabilities.
It is crucial to leverage what the U.S. forces already have at hand.
There is a strategic opportunity to expand significantly how to think about mobile basing within the evolution of the joint and coalition force,.
The next round of articles on mobile basing will focus on how to do this.
For the first round of articles on mobile basing which provide the foundation for the next round of analysis on this key subject, see the following:
The featured image highlights my forthcoming book on USMC transformation.
A key element of the presentations and discussions at the 1 December 2021 Williams Foundation seminar on building out sovereign capabilities was how Defence could best position itself to nurture, leverage and work with the evolving Australia space industrial eco-systsem.
AIRCDRE Terry van Haren (Retd.), former air attaché to the United States, provided a very clear focus on how he thought the ADF can best leverage an Australian space enterprise.
His focus was upon the emergence of “new” space which he had observed in the United States and the significant opportunities which such a strategic shift in the space business provided for Australia.
In his briefing, he presented a slide which nicely captured much of his argument:
As he put it at the seminar: There is a significant opportunity for Australia with the emergence of new space. At the delivery level, there are now a lot of options now available as a service launch, as a service, for example. Data has become a service; software has become a service. It means that government now could be a customer, and they can move with the speed of the industry. You don’t need to lock yourself in. You can change who you are using as new systems develop and emerge from new space. Sorry to the old primes here, you’re in the other column.
“But I think you probably need to actually adapt to this new space of environment as well.”
The major presentation at the seminar which provided answers to shaping a way ahead for defence with regard to the space sector was provided by Professor Tanya Monro, the Chief Defence Scientist (seen presenting at the seminar as featured photo for this article).
Notably, Defence is investing in space to improve the resilience and self-reliance of Defence’s space capabilities. Space has been recognized by the government as a Defence Sovereign Industry Capability Priority (SICP) in its own right.
She argued along the lines of van Haren that space is being disrupted by rapid technological change with the emergence of ‘New Space.’
This development has lowered the barriers to entry for all, including Australia companies.
The Government goal is to substantially increase our national space economy. And they are doing so in part by supporting a broader policy for Innovation, science and technology (IS&T) and seeing this effort as providing enablers for building a robust national space economy.
She argued that Defence space IS&T is a key Defence enabler for building a sovereign Defence space capability. “We are seeking to help create a sovereign industrial capability to provide increased space capability for Australia. To do that, we need to partner with great minds across our nation.”
She highlighted the importance of the defence innovation hub which can provided a way ahead for mission-directed research. And in the space domain by partnering with the national space sector can “deliver impacts through streamlined, agile and secure innovation pathways for our future space capabilities.”
In her presentation, she highlighted how she saw the way ahead with regard to Defence IS and To programs in the space domain area.
She noted that the “Defence Innovation Hub undertakes collaborative innovation activities with the potential to enhance Defence capabilities, including for space.” In other words, the re-set of how defence is looking to tap into Australian industry to generate greater defence capability is to be leveraged to provide for specific space capabilities, rather than the other way around.
She underscored the importance of the “Defence Rapid Prototyping Initiative (RPI) aims to increase use of innovative technologies to solve critical Defence problems with a Defence Capability Assurance Fund (CAF) to be introduced in the middle of the decade.”
In this effort, she highlighted the STaR Shots approach.
This is how the DS and T web page describes this approach:
“STaR Shots will be established to focus strategic research and drive the development of leap-ahead Defence capabilities. This strategy introduces a new concept – STaR Shots – that will concentrate strategic research efforts on a smaller number of bigger, specific and challenging problems of the scale and impact of JORN. An ambitious schedule will be set, with the aim of demonstrating leap-ahead capability within 10 years.
‘STaR Shots will be challenging, inspirational and aspirational, and will generate competitive capability best achieved through Australian investment. They will align with Defence strategic guidance, address future Force Structure priorities and be sponsored by at least one Defence 3-star leader. Crucially, they will have clearly defined transition pathways to take innovative ideas out of the laboratory and deliver real impact into the hands of the warfighter.
“STaR Shots will focus the strategic research investment program but with an increase in scale and intensity that will be supported by investment from other innovation initiatives and partner co-investment.
“The initial eight STaR Shots will be established to collectively support Defence’s ability to prevail in contested environments. Aligning with capability needs across each of the warfighting domains, they will enable Defence to get to the fight, shape how the ADF operates and generate new military effects.
“STaR Shots will be supported though investment in modelling and simulation, wargaming, prototyping, experimentation and trials. They will culminate in technology demonstrations during ADF exercises.
“The STaR Shots are deliberately ambitious and reflect Defence’s enduring commitment to invest in science and technology. As our strategic context evolves, new STaR Shots could be established to ensure that leap-ahead capabilities which align with Defence’s needs continue to be delivered.”[1]
The particular space-focused Star Shot program within the overall effort is to focus on “resilient multi-mission space.” The DS and T web page identifies this effort as follows:
“Providing resilient space-based services direct to the warfighter to enable the Australian Defence Force to prevail in increasingly contested operating environments.
“Context:
“Space-based systems play a vital role in all ADF and coalition operations, wherever they occur around the world. From providing precise location information and situational understanding of the operating environment to enabling personnel and platforms to stay connected, assured access to satellite services and the freedom to operate in space are critical to the ADF’s ability to protect and defend Australia’s national interests.
“Space is now a warfighting domain. Some countries are developing anti-satellite systems and denial-of-service measures that threaten space-based capabilities. Satellites and space systems used by Defence are becoming more vulnerable as the space domain changes from a benign environment into one that is increasingly congested and contested, where adversaries seek to limit the military advantage provided by space.
“An agile and potent future force will rely on assured access to resilient and responsive space services. Seamless interoperability with coalition partners will also be necessary to support diverse missions across multiple locations around the globe.
“Opportunities:
Advanced space-based surveillance capabilities to provide comprehensive situational awareness for superior decision-making.
Secure and resilient communications delivered from space for a highly networked force.
Resilient satellite services providing accurate position and timing information to enable precision effects in contested environments.
Advanced space domain awareness and control for sovereign space operations.
Autonomous space systems and processing capabilities to dynamically reconfigure and deliver space cloud services at speed and scale direct to the warfighter.
Space systems hardened against anti-satellite and denial-of-service measures.”[2]
Professor Monro provided a slide in her presentation which captured some of the key elements of the space-focuses STaR shot effort:
There is also a very helpful video which was released on 3 May 2020 which highlights key elements of this effort as well.
According to the narrator of that video, the heart of the effort is to shape a small satellite network that can deliver various data to ADF warfighters operating worldwide.
The focus is to leverage the innovations in LEO systems to be able to do so. Communications, imagery, position, navigation, and timing capabilities are envisaged for the ADF user. To do this, a focus is upon developing and testing new technologies and capabilities with SmartSat CR and to work small satellite integration.
In the interview which she did with the Williams Foundation she summarized how she saw the target goals and the way ahead:
“I don’t think it’s ever reasonable to expect that Australia will have a purely sovereign space capability, but we certainly need a much more sovereign one than we have now. We’re very dependent on access to foreign space assets. I don’t think Australia will ever have a purely independent sovereign space capability.
“And I don’t think we need one, but I do think we need a much more sovereign space capability than we have now. We need to know that when push comes a shove, we can rely on space assets to support our nation and its protection of its own interests, that our ADF can rely on having access to space when needed.
“We need to build very significant Australian sovereign industry capability to support that. And I think that that helps us be a better international partner. What we absolutely must do is work with our allies to make really clear where Australia has niche advantage, so that we can create opportunities for our companies to export to the world in those areas and that we can buy other complimentary areas of capability and technology from allies.
“For me, a future Australian sovereign space capability means assured access to the things we need when we need them under pressure. But it doesn’t mean every space asset that we use is sovereign. Defence has a range of innovation programs that are designed to help foster, support, and invest in new space technologies and capabilities.
“This includes the Defence Innovation Hub, which can accept great ideas from industry and really pull them up the technology readiness levels to the point where they could be demonstrated and tested in a defence context and then pulled through to acquisition programs.
“And it’s really exciting to see how many of these projects are now maturing to the point where they are serious acquisition prospects, and indeed a number are pulling through into capability. We also have things like The Next Generation Technologies Fund which can take earlier staged ideas to get them to the point where we could put them through that innovation pipeline.
“There are increasingly a range of different ways that companies, big and small can interact with defence. I think what we’re increasingly focusing on over the next couple of years is getting engaged with industry earlier. Hearing your good ideas and working out how we can reduce the barriers for you to be able to develop new technologies in a defence context.”
A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker with the 927th Air Refueling Wing, Florida refuels a U.S. Air Force F-35 Lighting II with the 33rd Fighter Wing, Florida.
Sovereign Australian space requires an Australian industrial space eco-system to be shaped and enhanced.
How might this be done?
Crafting, shaping, and building out an Australian space industry able to provide for sovereign capabilities for the Australian government decision makers is based on the enhanced opportunities in commercial space.
Nick Leake, head of satellite and space systems Optus, provided a comprehensive look back at the company’s experience in the space business. Optus is one of the largest telecommunications companies in Australia. It has operated satellites as part of its business since 1985. Currently, the company operates 10 satellites with Optus 10 being the latest of their satellites.
As noted by the company: “In 2003, Optus successfully launched the world’s largest hybrid commercial and military communications satellite Optus C1, together with the Australian Defence Forces. Optus C1 is the Australian hotbird with twenty four commercial Ku-band transponders operating in beams covering Australia, New Zealand, the nearby offshore islands, Papua New Guinea, Hawaii and South East Asia. Optus C1 carries subscription TV services and Aurora Free-to-Air radio and television services to remote areas in Australia.”[1]
All of this means that Leake spoke from the standpoint of several years of operating experience as an Australian firm with real-world experience in working a commercial telecoms satellite fleet. His discussion focused on the challenges of operating a satellite network in the growing presence of space junk and in the face of powers that believed they had the right through ASAT systems to place deliberate “junk” to disrupt or destroy a perceived adversary’s satellites.
Nick Leake addressing the Williams Foundation Space seminar, December 1,. 2021.
Leake underscored a number of key points about the interaction between commercial space and the need for government to focus on maintain some kind of order for space operations.
“We are looking towards the future. We are looking for some cohesion within Australia with Defence and the Australian Space Agency to develop tools to give us better safety in operating our geostationary spacecraft.
“The C1 spacecraft is 18 years old. We operate that satellite in what they call inclined orbit. So we operate spacecraft at 36,000 kilometers in a 70-kilometer box. We fly it in a figure of eight because it has the pull of the earth, pull of the moon, pull of the sun, so it is never static. We try to keep it in this box, pointing at earth and if you don’t have a spectrum filing, you’ve got nowhere to put your spacecraft. It’s incredibly important that you keep your spacecraft, at your orbital slots and that you maintain those spacecrafts.
“If you move a spacecraft away, you’ve got three years to put that spacecraft back to keep your finding in use, so it’s called bringing into use. That’s an important part of a commercial operator, but it’s even more important for our Defence forces that they maintain their orbital filings across the orbital arcs that they want to use their spacecraft.”
The impact of evolving commercial space for defence and security operations could not be more clear than in the domain of ISR.
In his presentation to the seminar, AIRCDRE Richard Keir (Retd.) Strategic Advisor for National Security and Intelligence to Geospatial Intelligence Pty. Ltd, provided a targeted presentation on how the ISR demands for the civil, security and military sectors can benefit from commercial geospatial efforts.
There are a number of conclusions one can draw from the emergence of a robust commercial space enabling ISR Market.
Notably, since 2002, the commercial space-based earth observation market has become very dynamic and global. Essentially, Australia is involved in this market and there are clear opportunities for the Australian government to get better value out of this market for it national security requirements. In effect, commercial imagery and data from that imagery can be used along with classified sources and methods and thereby enhance the scope and quality of the data collected.
By taking advantage of the growing number of commercial satellite capabilities and constellations, the Australian government can enable a whole of government strategy in defence and security. Because commercial space based ISR data and information is unclassified, it can form a solid foundation for information sharing with a wider array of allies and partners than highly classified imagery. This can prove very useful in terms of crisis management and escalation control, notably as information war is a core reality today.
For example. in discussions I had during my past visits with the Maritime Border Command, it is very clear that such capabilities fit right into their evolving approach to working from maritime domain awareness shared with partners and allies.
AIRCDRE Richard Keir (Retd.) speaking at the Williams Foundation space seminar December 1, 2021.
The Maritime Domain Awareness dynamic is an arena where shared information s crucial for both whole of government and working with partners and allies. In the recently released White Paper which Keir referenced in his presentation which his company just released, the nature of the MDA market for commercial space is explained in the following terms:
“MDA is enhanced by space-based Earth observation as it has unique capabilities to image large swathes of the ocean and complex littoral environments using a mix of EO, IR and SAR imaging sensors – fused with AIS – and increasingly assisted by RF sensors. The latter assistance provided by RF sensors is especially useful in cases where a vessel has not enabled its AIS or has deliberately mis-characterised itself. RF sensors may provide enough of a clue to tip and cue an all-weather SAR capability or a good weather/daylight hours EO capability to classify or identify the vessel.
“The use of more novel sensors can also prove valuable in MDA. For example, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) is a sensor on board the Suomi National PolarOrbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP) and United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) NOAA-20 weather satellites. The sensor has the capability to detect lights on vessels at sea that are often used to attract fish.15
“Because MDA is an international issue that transcends national borders and spans issues of national security through to economic interests, information sharing is often fundamental to its success. No nation can sustain 24/7/365 full situational awareness of the oceans in isolation, so the most efficient way to achieve the desired level of knowledge is to share information with partner nations. Indeed, counterintuitively, national sovereignty frequently depends on the sharing of data, information, and intelligence between likeminded nations to achieve MDA.
“Commercial space-based ISR data is unclassified, has high resolution, and is capable of 24/7/365 availability across the gamut of EO, IR, SAR, AIS and RF. It is therefore of great value to nations such as Australia in its efforts to facilitate the MDA of developing nations because it will generally have fewer constraints on its use.”[2]
The main presentation outlining the current state of the Australian space eco-system and the projected way ahead was provided by Anthony Murfett. Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency, which was launched in 2018.
The purpose of the Space Agency is “ to transform and grow a globally respected Australian space industry that lifts the broader economy, inspires and improves the lives of Australians – underpinned by strong national and international engagement.” And “the Australian Space Agency aims to triple the size of the Australian space economy (from A$3.9B to $12B) and create an additional 20,000 space jobs by 2030.”
The current situation finds the Australian space business operating at a level of AU$4.6 billion with 11,560 jobs existing across the Australian space industry. The investment in space capability growth is AU$7 billion with AU$800+ coming from investment by the Australian government in civil space and AU$2 billion coming from a pipeline of investment across all the Australian federal states and territories.
Growing civil space provides a significant opportunity to expand the capabilities for the Australian defence sector as there are a number of key areas alignment between the two sectors. Murfett identified four key areas: satellite-based capability and services, Space Domain awareness, Position, Navigation and Timing and Earth Observation.
In the following slide from Murfett’s presentation, the extant capacity in adjacent industries within the Australian space industry eco system were identified:
He highlighted as well key infrastructure investments being made in Australia which can be leveraged as well to enhance the evolving Australian space industrial eco system. This includes the AU$1.3 billion in the modern manufacturing initiative of the Australian government, the establishment of a robotics, automation and AI command control centre (Fugro Marine), a space data analysis facility (Pawsey supercomputing Centre) and a missional control at Lot Fourteen (Saber Astronautics).
There is an agreement with NASA which is part of the way ahead for Australian space as well. The agreement with NASA means that Australia is part of the Trailblazer program of the Moon to Mars initiative. A semi-autonomous, Australian-made rover is to be included in future NASA mission to the Moon. This effort draws on Australia’s world-leading remote operations capability and the Rover will collect lunar regolith and NASA will extract oxygen from this.
Shaping a way ahead for Australian space launch capability is a key part of the way ahead. And in this slide from his presentation, Murfett highlighted the perceived way ahead:
A number of international agreements are being worked to open the doors internationally for the Australian space sector. The first is a technology safeguard agreement with the United States which is establishing principles under which U.S. spaceflight technology can be licensed for export to Australia for use in spaceflight activities. The Australians are working with India on India’s first human spaceflight program where the Australian Government and ISRO are working together to track the Gaganyaan mission from Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands (CKI). And finally, there is an Australian-UK space bridge framework arrangement which Increases connection, exchange, and investment across AU-UK space sectors.
Murfett concluded his presentation by identifying what he saw as the next phase for the Australian civil space effort: Deliver the remaining technical roadmaps to highlight opportunities for investment; support industry to scale; connect across government to highlight how space can support growth, safety, and security; connect with the Australian community and show the value of space to our everyday lives and to inspire the nation and support the future workforce.
This last point was underscored in other presentations as well, for example, in the presentation by David Ball, regional director, Australia/New Zealand for Lockheed Martin Space.
“The young folks these days aren’t coming into space as we would need them to. In numbers, the Space Agency has some very aggressive numbers from government in terms of the numbers of jobs they need to create. To do that we need to inspire our younger generation and give them the path and show them there are real, tangible jobs in the space sector in this country.”
Murfett provided a fitting comment to highlight the way ahead for defence working with the evolving Australian space industrial eco system: “There is an Australian industry here that can actually deliver on Defence’s future ambitions.”
I would add that the challenge is to ensure that this happens in the way which fits as well into the evolution of the ADF, its forces, its strategy and its concepts of operations.
The featured phot is Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency speaking the Williams Foundation seminar on space.
Boeing Australia has revealed that, in conjunction with the Royal Australian Air Force, it has advanced the operational readiness of its Airpower Teaming System (ATS) being developed for the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman program in a digital environment.
Using a ‘digital twin’ of the actual air vehicle system, the company has been able to successfully demonstrate multiple payloads, semi-autonomous behaviours and crewed-uncrewed teaming in the digital environment. In a multi-day exercise that expanded upon a similar activity, RAAF operators worked with the digital twin to develop and test autonomous behaviours in operational scenarios and against threats provided by Defence.
“We are working closely with Boeing Australia on the integration of advanced payloads and operational requirements to ensure the Airpower Teaming System capability will be mission-ready to support air combat operations,” RAAF Head of Air Force Capability, AVM Robert Denney said in a December 8 Boeing release. “The state-of-the-art digital twin concept is allowing us to evaluate and integrate smart human-machine teaming systems in our force structure.”
Testing included validation of the teaming aircraft integration and payloads as they operated alongside Defence crewed platforms, as well as the effectiveness of the distributed sensors across the Airpower Teaming System uncrewed team. The test scenario involved several aircraft operating in a threat environment, executing mission aims in co-ordination with crewed aircraft being operated by RAAF personnel, and builds on work to develop the crewed-uncrewed interface during earlier activities.
This work has also contributed to the development of the Boeing ATS being offered to global customers.
“Our digital engineering expertise has enabled us to accelerate the Airpower Teaming System’s product lifecycle development of the aircraft design through to production,” added Brad Thompson, Airpower Teaming System Chief Capability Architect. “Creating the digital environment has also enabled us to test the mission systems code in a realistic operational environment so we can rapidly iterate our crewed/uncrewed teaming concepts and payload implementation to meet the threat environment.
“Taking a digital twin approach delivers an agile, cost effective test program to keep pace with the future battlespace, and we’re well along the path to drive towards initial operational capability,” he added.
Progress on the Airpower Teaming System’s mission system and payload development has included ground-based hardware and software in-the-loop testing, followed by surrogate flight testing of the on-board systems to support verification of the digital models.
“We’re excited to test elements of payloads against appropriately spectrally representative targets in field trials,” Thompson said. “This enables us to rapidly roll in lessons learned into our digital environment to accelerate development towards an operational capability.”
A digital twin of the entire aircraft has been ‘flown’ thousands of times under different battlespace effects to test aircraft performance and maximize its deployment capability independently and in support of other aircraft.
According to a UK Ministry of Defence news story published on December 6, 2021, sky sabre, a state-of-the art air defence system is replacing the legacy Rapier system.
16 Regiment Royal Artillery is now accepting into service the first tranche of Sky Sabre and further procurements will be configured to operate in all parts of the globe.
Defence Procurement Minister Jeremy Quin said:
“Sky Sabre’s spearheading technology has significantly upgraded the protection of our forces from threats from the air. This cutting-edge of defence system is a clear demonstration of our warfighting capabilities to those who wish to do us harm.”
Sky Sabre has three key components expected to operate up to 15km apart in the battlespace:
A Giraffe Agile Multi Beam 3D medium-range surveillance radar that rotates 360 degrees on an extending mast and can scan out to 120km for threats.
A pioneering computer system linking up the radar and missiles sending them to their targets. It also provides ‘Link 16’, a tactical datalink allowing Sky Sabre to share its information with Royal Navy vessels, Royal Air Force systems and our allies providing full integration across UK Armed Forces and joint NATO operations.
At 99kg each, the Common Anti-Air Modular Missiles (CAMM) are double the weight of Rapier and have three times the range. They can reach speeds of 2,300mph eliminating fighter aircraft, drones and even laser-guided smart bombs. Eight missiles are mounted on the launcher, which fire in a unique multi-directional manner that significantly reduces its signature making it less of a target for adversaries. The launcher also re-arms in less than half the time of Rapier.
Commanding Officer of 16 Regiment Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Lane, said:
“We will be able to compete with our peers and take on some of the toughest adversaries. It gives us a capability we have not had before; this new missile system with its new launcher and world-class radar will absolutely put us at the forefront of ground-based air defence.”
Operational since 1970s, Rapier has seen service in Kuwait, the South Atlantic, and most visibly when it deployed to numerous London parks to combat any security threats during the 2012 Olympics.
Senior Training Officer, Major Tim Oakes said:
“Sky Sabre is so accurate and agile that it is capable of hitting a tennis ball sized object travelling at the speed of sound. In fact, it can control the flight of 24 missiles simultaneously whilst in flight, guiding them to intercept 24 separate targets. It is an amazing capability.”
Sovereignty is a tricky term, notably when it comes to global economies and to allied based national defense. The COVD-19 crisis and the conflict with the 21st century authoritarian powers, notably China, have reminded the liberal democracies of how vulnerable they are.
And when American allies talk sovereignty what they are talking about are two interrelated dynamics: the first that they have as much independence in decision making from Washington as feasible and retain necessary alliance links; and the second is to ensure that they have as much capability to act decisively against authoritarian adversaries to ensure that escalation control is possible to defend that nation’s interests.
I have a lifetime of dealing with the French, who are the U.S. allies who talk the most about sovereignty and their freedom of action vis a vis the Americans. But what is sovereignty for a state like France when embedded in the European Union, dependent on a U.S. led Alliance for their ultimate security, and embedded in the global supply chain?
I dealt with this question of what sovereignty in the current period is even for a large power like the United Sates in my edited book 2020: A Pivotal Year. Several of the essay’s deal with this question or theme. Essentially what we are talking about is shaping decision making capabilities for the nation to make choices within the shared sovereignty of modern defense and economic relationships facing the major liberal democratic nations. It is about getting allies and adversaries alike to go down paths favorable to a particular nations policies or identities.
But how did the speakers at the space conference define what sovereignty meant to them regarding Australia and its way ahead in the space domain?
The core point was relatively straightforward. And that point was made by Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: “For the first time in a major policy document, the 2020 strategic update emphasized the importance for Australia to have our own capabilities in the operational space domain. That update made clear there is a requirement for space control that is not only about space domain awareness from the ground, but also about an ability actually to assure access to space and counter threats to our space systems and boosted the funding to do so.”
One member of the key panel was very aware of how important the sovereignty focus is regarding how to focus what Australia does in the space domain and this is how he put it: “Exactly how do we define sovereign? Sovereign means different things to different people. We need to decide what degree of sovereignty we need to do the job. That might not be total ownership from start to end. It might be sovereignty of decision making. It might be sovereignty of the networks. It might be sovereignty of the data. I think there’s no one size fits all approach to sovereignty, and it really just depends on what is required actually to do the job in an assured way.”
It is an interesting exercise to go through the presentations and to carefully look at how the speakers defined or used the word sovereignty to shape what course of action they then advocated. It is interesting above all because how one defines the focus of sovereignty indicates what a realistic course of action for Australia might be, given the high cost of space, the relatively limited skill sets in Australia in this industry, the tradeoffs between working in a globalized commercial space sector, or a targeted Australian funded effort tailored for the ADF.
The moderator for the day highlighted the importance of sovereignty as referring to Australian-based firms, but whether these are outposts of foreign primes or Australian-generated firms is an interesting question. This is how Darin Lovett put it: “The impact of COVID has fundamentally reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Do we divest and, again, rely on a foreign provider or do we invest and build sovereignty? We have an opportunity to leapfrog the old operating system, which we’ve relied on and gain traction against emerging issues, but we need holistic capability development in Australia to bed in the seeds that we’ll provide for the future.”
AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan, Director General of the Space Domain Review, identified various concrete manifestations of new capabilities which Australia needs to achieve to have sovereignty. The first is clearly on the launch side of space. The second is to build out a sovereign space industry, but again one of the challenges here is that companies in the commercial sector and the defense sector do not operate in the same manner and there is the key challenge of foreign primes and local companies in terms of what they build for the global market or for the ADF.
This impacts directly on the question of the workforce and the skill sets to be developed to build out an Australian based space industry. There is clearly growing overlap between the commercial and military space sectors, but it is more of Venn diagram than single workforce, notably because of the requirement for security clearances in the national defense arena.
Terry van Herren, the former Air Attaché in the United States, focused on the challenge of building an effective sovereign space industry. Here he cited the experience of Australia in building indigenous fighter aircraft from 1921 to 1939 which resulted in not very good fighters, but it did generate the infrastructure which then allowed Australia to license build Spitfires and Hurricanes.
He pointedly used this example to underscore that sovereignty is not about “designing, developing and building everything but it is about doing what you can do well and take advantages of working with partners and allies around the world to work on what you’re not so good at doing.”
He then cited a concrete example, namely of a company doing very innovative work in space domain awareness. LeoLabs is building a network of ground-based, phased array radars that provide a unique capability, and have approached space domain awareness from a perspective different from partners and allies.[1]
CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General for Navy Intelligence and Warfare. Made a very similar point to that of van Herren. “In our endeavors to set the conditions for long term success in the space domain, we must remain cognizant of maximizing efficient use of our resources, because the reality here in Australia, unsurprisingly, is we only have a limited number of resources. If we are to achieve our goals and ambitions, we’d have to really understand what our sovereign capability should be. But more importantly, we have to work efficiently. We have to work collaboratively, across defense, industry and academia. It’s our relationships through all aspects of our capability development, that will enable us to achieve our goals.”
But the most comprehensive examination of the relationship between a realistic definition of sovereignty with how Australia should proceed was by AVM Chris Deeble, now CEO Northrop Grumman Australia, but when serving with the RAAF had extensive experience with working with advanced programs, such as the F-35. His experience clearly guided his judgements on how to achieve both enhanced sovereignty but to do so with a regard to a practical way ahead.
“What is sovereignty? The pursuit of sovereignty shouldn’t be an excuse for wanting to do everything. Sovereignty and resilience go hand in glove from my perspective and how we build that strategy. When we think about space, we often think about the things that make for great photo opportunities. A launch, a satellite, those great pictures of a satellite orbiting around. They make the great photo opportunities. These are going to be important that supply chains that underpin that, will remain important for us. But we must prioritize our effort and investments.
“We must ensure that from the get-go, we create that viable, scalable, innovative, and sustainable space ecosystem. And it must be underpinned by business cases that can goes to the viability and sustain sustainability at the end of the day
“This will be a significant challenge for us as we move forward. Defining things in requirements terms is going to be difficult. We will have to be thinking about that in outcomes terms. As a space nation, we must have a clear strategy that articulates our sovereign security and resilient space capability outcomes. We must develop a cohesive and aligned national strategy that meets both the civil and defense needs now and into the future.
“We must ensure that we prioritize and align our investments. We cannot lose sight of the underlying business cases. We can’t do it all. We have to create a sustainable viable outcome for us as we’re moving forward. The lexicon is changing, it’s a great first start.
“But if we want to be a space nation, if we want to create space ecosystems for the nation, if we want to have a viable, enduring, sustainable, scalable industry, from now and into the future, we have to turn that rhetoric into reality.”
BRIG Langford brought up a really key point about the impact of having sovereign space or bits of sovereignty within an overall allied space enterprise: “Does a hostile act against a space-based asset, or indeed a cyber intrusion against national infrastructure constitute an act of war under international law? And noting that blood has not been spilled, which is the traditional sort of convention around a hostile act, hostile action, hostile intent, is that now in international law, is it an act, a license, indeed a mandate to prosecute war on the physical domain. To some, it seems obvious, but like most things in life, it’s not that simple.
“What is the policy framework, when an Australian owned commercial or military space-based space asset is potentially interfered or destroyed as it relates to an attack on Australian sovereignty, and what we might do about it, in terms of our obligations to assert the security versions of ourselves in that sort of environment.”
