Digital Twining and the Loyal Wingman Program

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Digital Twining and the Loyal Wingman Program
01/02/2022

By the Australian Defence Business Review

Boeing Australia has revealed that, in conjunction with the Royal Australian Air Force, it has advanced the operational readiness of its Airpower Teaming System (ATS) being developed for the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman program in a digital environment.

Using a ‘digital twin’ of the actual air vehicle system, the company has been able to successfully demonstrate multiple payloads, semi-autonomous behaviours and crewed-uncrewed teaming in the digital environment. In a multi-day exercise that expanded upon a similar activity, RAAF operators worked with the digital twin to develop and test autonomous behaviours in operational scenarios and against threats provided by Defence.

“We are working closely with Boeing Australia on the integration of advanced payloads and operational requirements to ensure the Airpower Teaming System capability will be mission-ready to support air combat operations,” RAAF Head of Air Force Capability, AVM Robert Denney said in a December 8 Boeing release. “The state-of-the-art digital twin concept is allowing us to evaluate and integrate smart human-machine teaming systems in our force structure.”

Testing included validation of the teaming aircraft integration and payloads as they operated alongside Defence crewed platforms, as well as the effectiveness of the distributed sensors across the Airpower Teaming System uncrewed team. The test scenario involved several aircraft operating in a threat environment, executing mission aims in co-ordination with crewed aircraft being operated by RAAF personnel, and builds on work to develop the crewed-uncrewed interface during earlier activities.

This work has also contributed to the development of the Boeing ATS being offered to global customers.

“Our digital engineering expertise has enabled us to accelerate the Airpower Teaming System’s product lifecycle development of the aircraft design through to production,” added Brad Thompson, Airpower Teaming System Chief Capability Architect. “Creating the digital environment has also enabled us to test the mission systems code in a realistic operational environment so we can rapidly iterate our crewed/uncrewed teaming concepts and payload implementation to meet the threat environment.

“Taking a digital twin approach delivers an agile, cost effective test program to keep pace with the future battlespace, and we’re well along the path to drive towards initial operational capability,” he added.

Progress on the Airpower Teaming System’s mission system and payload development has included ground-based hardware and software in-the-loop testing, followed by surrogate flight testing of the on-board systems to support verification of the digital models.

“We’re excited to test elements of payloads against appropriately spectrally representative targets in field trials,” Thompson said. “This enables us to rapidly roll in lessons learned into our digital environment to accelerate development towards an operational capability.”

A digital twin of the entire aircraft has been ‘flown’ thousands of times under different battlespace effects to test aircraft performance and maximize its deployment capability independently and in support of other aircraft.

This article was published by ADBR on December 9, 2021.

Featured Photo: Credit: ADF

UK 16 Regiment Royal Artillery Now Deploying Advanced Air Defence System

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According to a UK Ministry of Defence news story published on December 6, 2021, sky sabre, a state-of-the art air defence system is replacing the legacy Rapier system.

16 Regiment Royal Artillery is now accepting into service the first tranche of Sky Sabre and further procurements will be configured to operate in all parts of the globe.

Defence Procurement Minister Jeremy Quin said:

“Sky Sabre’s spearheading technology has significantly upgraded the protection of our forces from threats from the air. This cutting-edge of defence system is a clear demonstration of our warfighting capabilities to those who wish to do us harm.”

Sky Sabre has three key components expected to operate up to 15km apart in the battlespace:

  • A Giraffe Agile Multi Beam 3D medium-range surveillance radar that rotates 360 degrees on an extending mast and can scan out to 120km for threats.
  • A pioneering computer system linking up the radar and missiles sending them to their targets. It also provides ‘Link 16’, a tactical datalink allowing Sky Sabre to share its information with Royal Navy vessels, Royal Air Force systems and our allies providing full integration across UK Armed Forces and joint NATO operations.
  • At 99kg each, the Common Anti-Air Modular Missiles (CAMM) are double the weight of Rapier and have three times the range. They can reach speeds of 2,300mph eliminating fighter aircraft, drones and even laser-guided smart bombs. Eight missiles are mounted on the launcher, which fire in a unique multi-directional manner that significantly reduces its signature making it less of a target for adversaries. The launcher also re-arms in less than half the time of Rapier.

Commanding Officer of 16 Regiment Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Lane, said:

“We will be able to compete with our peers and take on some of the toughest adversaries. It gives us a capability we have not had before; this new missile system with its new launcher and world-class radar will absolutely put us at the forefront of ground-based air defence.”

Operational since 1970s, Rapier has seen service in Kuwait, the South Atlantic, and most visibly when it deployed to numerous London parks to combat any security threats during the 2012 Olympics.

Senior Training Officer, Major Tim Oakes said:

“Sky Sabre is so accurate and agile that it is capable of hitting a tennis ball sized object travelling at the speed of sound. In fact, it can control the flight of 24 missiles simultaneously whilst in flight, guiding them to intercept 24 separate targets. It is an amazing capability.”

Sovereignty and the Australian Space Effort

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Sovereignty and the Australian Space Effort
12/31/2021

By Robbin Laird

Sovereignty is a tricky term, notably when it comes to global economies and to allied based national defense. The COVD-19 crisis and the conflict with the 21st century authoritarian powers, notably China, have reminded the liberal democracies of how vulnerable they are.

And when American allies talk sovereignty what they are talking about are two interrelated dynamics: the first that they have as much independence in decision making from Washington as feasible and retain necessary alliance links; and the second is to ensure that they have as much capability to act decisively against authoritarian adversaries to ensure that escalation control is possible to defend that nation’s interests.

I have a lifetime of dealing with the French, who are the U.S. allies who talk the most about sovereignty and their freedom of action vis a vis the Americans. But what is sovereignty for a state like France when embedded in the European Union, dependent on a U.S. led Alliance for their ultimate security, and embedded in the global supply chain?

I dealt with this question of what sovereignty in the current period is even for a large power like the United Sates in my edited book 2020: A Pivotal Year. Several of the essay’s deal with this question or theme. Essentially what we are talking about is shaping decision making capabilities for the nation to make choices within the shared sovereignty of modern defense and economic relationships facing the major liberal democratic nations. It is about getting allies and adversaries alike to go down paths favorable to a particular nations policies or identities.

But how did the speakers at the space conference define what sovereignty meant to them regarding Australia and its way ahead in the space domain?

The core point was relatively straightforward. And that point was made by Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: “For the first time in a major policy document, the 2020 strategic update emphasized the importance for Australia to have our own capabilities in the operational space domain. That update made clear there is a requirement for space control that is not only about space domain awareness from the ground, but also about an ability actually to assure access to space and counter threats to our space systems and boosted the funding to do so.”

One member of the key panel was very aware of how important the sovereignty focus is regarding how to focus what Australia does in the space domain and this is how he put it: “Exactly how do we define sovereign? Sovereign means different things to different people. We need to decide what degree of sovereignty we need to do the job. That might not be total ownership from start to end. It might be sovereignty of decision making. It might be sovereignty of the networks. It might be sovereignty of the data. I think there’s no one size fits all approach to sovereignty, and it really just depends on what is required actually to do the job in an assured way.”

It is an interesting exercise to go through the presentations and to carefully look at how the speakers defined or used the word sovereignty to shape what course of action they then advocated. It is interesting above all because how one defines the focus of sovereignty indicates what a realistic course of action for Australia might be, given the high cost of space, the relatively limited skill sets in Australia in this industry, the tradeoffs between working in a globalized commercial space sector, or a targeted Australian funded effort tailored for the ADF.

The moderator for the day highlighted the importance of sovereignty as referring to Australian-based firms, but whether these are outposts of foreign primes or Australian-generated firms is an interesting question. This is how Darin Lovett put it: “The impact of COVID has fundamentally reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Do we divest and, again, rely on a foreign provider or do we invest and build sovereignty? We have an opportunity to leapfrog the old operating system, which we’ve relied on and gain traction against emerging issues, but we need holistic capability development in Australia to bed in the seeds that we’ll provide for the future.”

AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan, Director General of the Space Domain Review, identified various concrete manifestations of new capabilities which Australia needs to achieve to have sovereignty. The first is clearly on the launch side of space. The second is to build out a sovereign space industry, but again one of the challenges here is that companies in the commercial sector and the defense sector do not operate in the same manner and there is the key challenge of foreign primes and local companies in terms of what they build for the global market or for the ADF.

This impacts directly on the question of the workforce and the skill sets to be developed to build out an Australian based space industry. There is clearly growing overlap between the commercial and military space sectors, but it is more of Venn diagram than single workforce, notably because of the requirement for security clearances in the national defense arena.

Terry van Herren, the former Air Attaché in the United States, focused on the challenge of building an effective sovereign space industry. Here he cited the experience of Australia in building indigenous fighter aircraft from 1921 to 1939 which resulted in not very good fighters, but it did generate the infrastructure which then allowed Australia to license build Spitfires and Hurricanes.

He pointedly used this example to underscore that sovereignty is not about “designing, developing and building everything but it is about doing what you can do well and take advantages of working with partners and allies around the world to work on what you’re not so good at doing.”

He then cited a concrete example, namely of a company doing very innovative work in space domain awareness. LeoLabs is building a network of ground-based, phased array radars that provide a unique capability, and have approached space domain awareness from a perspective different from partners and allies.[1]

CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General for Navy Intelligence and Warfare. Made a very similar point to that of van Herren. “In our endeavors to set the conditions for long term success in the space domain, we must remain cognizant of maximizing efficient use of our resources, because the reality here in Australia, unsurprisingly, is we only have a limited number of resources. If we are to achieve our goals and ambitions, we’d have to really understand what our sovereign capability should be. But more importantly, we have to work efficiently. We have to work collaboratively, across defense, industry and academia. It’s our relationships through all aspects of our capability development, that will enable us to achieve our goals.”

But the most comprehensive examination of the relationship between a realistic definition of sovereignty with how Australia should proceed was by AVM Chris Deeble, now CEO Northrop Grumman Australia, but when serving with the RAAF had extensive experience with working with advanced programs, such as the F-35. His experience clearly guided his judgements on how to achieve both enhanced sovereignty but to do so with a regard to a practical way ahead.

“What is sovereignty? The pursuit of sovereignty shouldn’t be an excuse for wanting to do everything. Sovereignty and resilience go hand in glove from my perspective and how we build that strategy. When we think about space, we often think about the things that make for great photo opportunities. A launch, a satellite, those great pictures of a satellite orbiting around. They make the great photo opportunities. These are going to be important that supply chains that underpin that, will remain important for us. But we must prioritize our effort and investments.

“We must ensure that from the get-go, we create that viable, scalable, innovative, and sustainable space ecosystem. And it must be underpinned by business cases that can goes to the viability and sustain sustainability at the end of the day

“This will be a significant challenge for us as we move forward. Defining things in requirements terms is going to be difficult. We will have to be thinking about that in outcomes terms. As a space nation, we must have a clear strategy that articulates our sovereign security and resilient space capability outcomes. We must develop a cohesive and aligned national strategy that meets both the civil and defense needs now and into the future.

“We must ensure that we prioritize and align our investments. We cannot lose sight of the underlying business cases. We can’t do it all. We have to create a sustainable viable outcome for us as we’re moving forward. The lexicon is changing, it’s a great first start.

“But if we want to be a space nation, if we want to create space ecosystems for the nation, if we want to have a viable, enduring, sustainable, scalable industry, from now and into the future, we have to turn that rhetoric into reality.”

BRIG Langford brought up a really key point about the impact of having sovereign space or bits of sovereignty within an overall allied space enterprise: “Does a hostile act against a space-based asset, or indeed a cyber intrusion against national infrastructure constitute an act of war under international law? And noting that blood has not been spilled, which is the traditional sort of convention around a hostile act, hostile action, hostile intent, is that now in international law, is it an act, a license, indeed a mandate to prosecute war on the physical domain. To some, it seems obvious, but like most things in life, it’s not that simple.

“What is the policy framework, when an Australian owned commercial or military space-based space asset is potentially interfered or destroyed as it relates to an attack on Australian sovereignty, and what we might do about it, in terms of our obligations to assert the security versions of ourselves in that sort of environment.”

[1] https://www.leolabs.space

The Featured Photo: AVM (Retired) Chris Deeble, now Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman, Australia

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Space Enterprise

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Space Enterprise
12/30/2021

By Robbin Laird

Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise.  Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration.

Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities.

The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the December 1, 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades.

I will publish a report on the seminar early next year, but in this article would simply wish to highlight some key elements of the discussions.

The first point made throughout the presentations by speakers was that Australia has a long involvement in space activities through its working relationships with its core allies, first Britain, and then the United States. The Australians have been engaged in several support activities for the American space enterprise and that domain knowledge and engagement will continue to be critical in shaping Australia’s own efforts for enhanced sovereignty In space.

The second point is the need to indeed enhance Australian independent space capabilities. As AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space put it: “I would compare our position in space with being a frequent flyer who uses that service. And as we in defense are on the journey from being a consumer of other people’s space products to a contributor owner and operator in our own right.”

The need for shaping sovereign capabilities comes not only from the enhanced importance of space payloads for both commercial and military activities, but from the nature of crises and the nature of allies. Gordon put it succinctly: “It’s relatively easy to have access to space capabilities from alliies when there’s plenty to go around. But if times are tough, if assets are under attack, if bandwidth is reduced, if satellites and ground stations are targeted and there’s just not enough capacity to do all the things we want to do, then where are those priorities going to lie?” This then means for Gordon: “we have to be able to have control and access of our space capabilities without needing to ask someone else’s permission.”

The third point was embedded in various presentations but put most directly by BRIG Ian Langford. Director General Future Land Warfare. Even though space clearly has its own specific requirements, skill sets and capabilities, it is part of the overall transformation of the ADF and of the next round of the revolution in military affairs, or perhaps we could go back to the term used throughout the Williams Foundation Seminars, namely, a fifth-generation force but now with greater reach.

Langford put it this way: “ Two years ago, I was talking to a US Air Force retired four-star general, and we were talking about the revolution of military affairs, which was demonstrated in 1991 during the first Gulf War. And that was demonstrated in that context through the effectiveness of GPS and the use in application of precision strike and advanced munitions, as it related to the ability of US-led coalition forces to be so effective and so profound in the context of that capability overmatch. Now we are on the edge of a significant defence recapitalization are we now on the edge of the next round of the RMA? And what are we to do about it?”

The fourth point is that shaping of a new Australian space enterprise which started with the 2018 standup of the Australian Space Agency and will see a new ADF command to be stood up in January 2022 is occurring in the context of evolving strategic environment. And that environment as I noted in a recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, the well-known strategist, is characterized by ongoing limited war with the authoritarian powers and the challenge of escalation control and management.

Space assets are crucial to be able for Australia to shape effective crisis management in the ongoing conflicts with the authoritarian powers. Several speakers spoke about the militarization of space and space war. The challenge is to know when it starts. Both the cyber and space domains are domains within which conflict is ongoing, signaling difficult, but the need to be resilient crucial.

Dougal Robertson of the Williams Foundation highlighted the interaction between space and the various dimensions of the evolving strategic environment. And he underscored this crucial point: “Gray-zone traditionally means we are not at war, but we’re not at peace. The gray-zone actor might be pursuing national objectives, certainly in relation to nation states, and when we talk about gray-zone activity, they’re often pursuing objectives that are linked to military advantage or political or strategic advantage.” If this is the case then, Australia certainly needs space capability which can give the ADF and the government decision making tools to evolute conflicts and crisis management options, occurring in space and cascading out to the entire combat force.

The fifth point, and a major part of the day’s discussion, was on the nature of the space eco-system which Australia needs to shape going forward to have enough sovereignty to have decision making capabilities for both security and defense needs.

Space is expensive and payloads are dynamically changing under the impacts of new initiative sand capabilities generated by the major space powers. So, what can Australia realistically do and how best to do it?  That discussion was a significant part of the seminar and will be a major focus for the upcoming report on the conference.

But in general terms, the focus was upon several key aspects which Australia can or needs to clearly do. One aspect is leveraging the dynamics of change with regard to new versus old space, which means new ways to launch space payloads, and to leverage the various ways to shape new satellite payloads and constellations.

That effort will be generated as the major space powers refigure how they are working GEO, MEO and LEO payloads, and as they shape various kinetic and non-kinetic ways to shape warfare in space capabilities. That is why working with the United States and enhancing working relationship with the UK as they have launched a new space command, or with India, or Japan or ESA all will become parts of shaping the space ecosystem for the Australian space enterprise going forward.

Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provided a particularly robust and clear discussion of what Australia’s way ahead in space might look like. “We need to think about space resilience, and we need to think about space deterrence, and they should complement the existing projects in space. Sovereign launch is clearly going to happen, and I’ve always been an advocate for a high, low mix, where Australia contributes a low end in terms of small satellites that can complement the large geo birds. These small satellite systems could contribute new types of capability and new missions for the Australian defense force.”

The sixth point is the central role which Australia’s geography has and will play going forward. The cooperation between the United States and Australia in part is based on Australia’s location and its extensive geography. The establishment of Pine Gap is a case in point. This location is strategically significant because of the ability of the facilitates there to work various high value satellites as they pass over one-third of the globe, including China, the Asian parts of Russia and the Middle East. And going forward launch locations and ground-based space capabilities will grow in importance as Australia builds out its own capabilities and works with partners and allies in the liberal democratic world going forward.

In the panel, the former air attaché to the United States, Terry Van Herren noted: “If I was a Chinese general, I’d be worried about three things from Australia. First, I would be worried about nuclear powered submarines. Second, I would be quite concerned about long range replenishable strike. The third thing that would worry me would be a robust counter space capability developed and supported in Australia. Why? Because Perth and Beijing are on the same longitude. They would hate to see us develop real space power in this country.”

Speaking of geography, there is the broad question of the changing nature of Australia’s defence geography. When I was last in Australia in March 2020, I started my return to the United States as the COVID wave started to pass over Australia in Perth visiting the subbase and a major shipyard. When you combine the need to operate from Western Australia to the first island chain, with the coming of a nuclear attack submarine, almost certainly to operate from Western Australia, and the already extant space capabilities in the region, which will be expanded, the thin population belts in the West will need to see growth in order for many of Australia’s defense plans to be realized.

A good way to conclude this initial look at the seminar was a comment made by the moderator of the seminar, Darin Lovett, who is the Director of the South Australian Space Centre.

“Most of us are here as professionals in the business. We understand the importance of Sovereign Defense Capability in the mission statement of the ADF to defend Australia and its national interests.

“A Sovereign Defense Space Capability is somewhat harder to articulate. And there are two reasons for this. First, the Defense Space Capabilities we still rely on are largely to many people, largely still highly classified and unknown to the general populace. And secondly, our human capital, the professional cadre who underpin any capability are relatively few and they’re new. And compared to the rich heritage of land, maritime and air, we just don’t have that depth and that backbone and strategic thought that has permeated the other domains.

“But space is no longer just viewed as a conduit for three things, comms, imagery, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). It’s now seen as a domain in and of itself, to be monitored for belligerent activity and an essential element of a complex society and a way that, and a domain that underpins our way of life on earth in ways we actually don’t understand. The system is too complex to unravel.

“The impact of COVID has reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Now it’s a pivotal moment, billions of dollars are slated for defense capability. And we’ve got a small but dynamic space industry growing, but also large primes who are investing in this kind to build capability.

“We’re unencumbered by the legacy approach to space. This is an advantage we’re not pushing 20 tons to GEO. We’re not a big player like Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed, L3, et cetera. We can move relatively fast. We’re changing the paradigm that space is primarily the playground of big powers.”

WF_SDSC_1DEC21_SynopsisandProgram

Also, see the following:

 

The United States Clears EMALS Sale to France for Their Next Generation Carrier

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The United States Clears EMALS Sale to France for Their Next Generation Carrier
12/27/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The US state department has given the green light for the sale of electromagnetic aircraft catapults and arresting gear, worth an estimated $1.3 billion, for a French next-generation aircraft carrier, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said.

“The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the government of France of Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS),

Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.321 billion,” the agency said in a Dec. 21 statement.

A required notification to the US Congress for the sale was delivered Dec. 21, the agency said. France has requested procurement of one electromagnetic system with two launchers and one advanced arrestor gear, in a three-engine configuration.

The Direction Générale de l’Armement was now waiting for the US Congress to approve the deal, a spokeswoman for the DGA French procurement office said.

“This is excellent news,” said navy captain Eric Lavault, spokesman for the French service. “This is what we were looking for.”

The prime contractors will be General Atomics-Electromagnetic Systems and Huntington Ingalls, the agency said. There will be no offset deal on the deal, which calls for some 40 US government officials and contractors to spend 10 weeks a year in France, from 2033 to 2038 to support installation, certification, and sea trials.

“This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe,” the agency said.

“The proposed sale will result in continuation of interoperability between the United States and France,” the agency said, with the electromagnetic catapults and arrestor gear to be installed on the French next-generation aircraft carrier.

“France will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces,” the agency said. The prospective deal includes land-based testing, installation, training, service, and spares.

From an operational view, the electromagnetic system delivers a Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) capability, allowing the planned next-generation fighter  and Rafale fighter jets to carry more weapons and more fuel – to fly greater distance – than fighters flying off ski-jump carriers, a French source said.

The British fleet air arm flies the F-35 fighter in its vertical and short take-off and landing (VSTOL) version. The F-35 takes the Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) approach on the ski-jump deck on the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth carrier.

“You can’t compare,” the source said, pointing up the differences between the two ship designs.

There is growing interest in catapults, with China building a catapult on its third carrier, project name 003, the source said, while the Indian navy has shown interest in building a third carrier equipped with catapults, rather than the ski jumps on its first two vessels.

For the French navy, the electromagnetic catapults will allow a higher operational tempo, the source said, allowing more launches of heavy aircraft – such as a planned new fighter carrying nuclear weapons – and lighter remote carriers or combat drones. The arrestor gear will bring less stress on the aircraft landing gear.

The new fighter will be a key element of the European Future Combat Air System.

There will be continuity as the Charles de Gaulle carrier uses US-built catapults, the source said. The French fleet air arm flies the Rafale, which can carry nuclear weapons, off the nuclear-powered capital ship, which carries a US navy officer to oversee the catapults.

The testing of the electromagnetic system on the US navy’s Gerald Ford carrier meant the French service would be acquiring a “sea proven” catapult, the source said, adding that if France developed its own system, that would cost more.

The Charles de Gaulle vessel is due to retire in 2038, so the new 75,000-tonne carrier is expected to enter service around that time. The new nuclear-powered carrier is expected to carry some 30 fighters, which would combine the Rafale and the new fighter.

The new carrier will be a “strategic asset indispensable for France,” said a video produced  by the French navy and the DGA.

EMALS Launch USS Gerald R. Ford, November 17, 2020 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Nov. 15, 2019) Chief Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Equipment) Louis Mountain Jr., from Seat Pleasant, Maryland, assigned to USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) air department, signals the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) to launch during no load testing on the ship’s flight deck. This was the first test of Ford’s EMALS since the end of its post shakedown availability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Melvin)