U.S. Marines with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232 deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June through September 2021.
They deployed to Guam as part of the Aviation Training Relocation program, designed to increase operational readiness while reducing the impacts of training activities.
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM
08.27.2021
Video by Cpl. Lennon Dregoiw
AFN Iwakuni
By Robbin Laird
The opportunity to attend the Defence 24 conference on Polish defense provided a significant opportunity to learn about Polish assessments of the current strategic situation and ways Poland should shape a way ahead.
In addition to attending the conference, I had a chance to talk to Polish defense analysts as well, including Igor Szczęsnowicz a prominent Polish journalist and editor of Gazeta Polska Codziennie and Gazeta Polska.
Certainly, Poland is in a unique situation in today’s Europe, which faces significant challenges of post-pandemic recovery, and dealing with the dynamics of change within the European Union itself.
And it faces a very active Putin-led Russia, which is engaged in ways to expand its power, its territory, and its ability to coerce Europe to get what it wants.
In Szczęsnowicz’s view, Poland plays a key role in shaping a way ahead for Europe in dealing with all of these challenges.
He underscored in our conversation that Poland is a very patriotic nation, and one which is still working through its post-Communist approaches to change. He believes that the Brussels led supra-state efforts undercut Poland’s legitimate right to work through how to shape its post-Communist future.
He noted often in the conversation that the rules generated from Brussels often are targeting Poland rather than reworking how Europe as a community of nations can work more effectively together to shape a resilient and viable future.
Notably, much of Europe is simply ignoring how direct the Russian engagement in Europe is, and the willingness of Putin’s Russia to use coercion to get what they want.
The land grab in Georgia in 2008 has never been reversed. Certainly, the same is true of Crimea. And now the Russians are working to use Belarus as a battering ram opening up more seams within Europe and doing so in ways that directly threaten the Baltic states and Poland.
In a recent piece which Szczęsnowicz wrote, he highlighted how the Russian seam warfare approach can work, and how their approach really gets around the Article V agreement within the NATO treaty. In a piece which he wrote on September 7, 2021, he posed some interesting questions about how the Russians might approach the Zapad exercise.
“Anticipating a bit of future events, I am very curious to see how NATO will react to possible military provocations of Belarusian-Russian troops during the Zapad 2021 strategic maneuvers starting on Friday (10-16 September). only 3 km from the Polish border and there is a high probability that such provocations will take place.
“It may turn out, for example, that a unit of Russian soldiers “gets lost” and unexpectedly appeared on the Polish or Lithuanian side. Then what?
“Theoretically, an incursion of a branch of a NATO enemy state on the territory of a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization triggers certain procedures of cooperation. And we are very curious together with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin whether in this case all these procedures will work properly. “
Well this did not happen, but what his question poses is at the heart of the real dilemma facing Polish defense along with her allies: if the Russians are not focusing on a classic land-air invasion of Poland or the Baltic states or of Ukraine, this does not mean that they cannot get results from salami tactics and seam warfare.
This then means in turn, that Poland needs to be prepared for frontal attacks in terms of a situation of war, but also, dealing with Russian seam and hybrid warfare, which is designed to further fragment the cohesion of the European alliances and put Putin in a pole position to get what he wants.
And the Polish government and nation have no wish to be those allowing Putin to get into such a “pole position.”
Szczęsnowicz underscored his concern about time.
Putin has momentum. How do we stop that momentum and avoid a major conflict?
He clearly is concerned that within Europe there is a complacency about Russia and Putin’s strategy which is simply not justified.
Defense is not a line item in a European budget; it needs to a core social commitment to ensure the future for a Europe free and whole, to quote a late U.S. President.
In his view, this is the case in Poland which makes it somewhat the odd man out.
But the Russian realities simply are too troubling to ignore.
Note: The quotations above from Szczęsnowicz are translations which we have made, and we have provided the link to the original piece for greater clarity.
By Robbin Laird
During my recent visit to Warsaw to attend the Defence 24 conference on Polish defense, I had a chance to talk with Dr. Jacek M. Raubo, an Assistant Professor at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and noted journalist as well.
We discussed a number of issues regarding Polish defense and its strategic environment, and in this article, I will highlight the main themes which Dr. Raubo highlighted in the discussion.
The first and a major theme throughout was the importance of Polish history in shaping contemporary attitudes and approaches to national defense.
He argued that the Poles are deeply committed to their national defense, in a way that is not seen in most cases in contemporary Western Europe.
And I would add that, the level of commitment which can be seen in Poland currently is being seen in Europe largely in the Nordic states.
The second theme was that because of this core commitment which the Poles have to national defense, significant defense spending is not at the core of political competition in Poland.
But the approach to do so is. The current government (lead by the Law and Justice party) is committed to a more expansive and more armored enabled defense force than the opposition party, Civic Platform is. They have emphasized the need as well for more diverse capabilities for territorial defense, using lighter more mobile forces.
The third theme follows from the second but revolves around the question of the role of Germany.
The Civic Platform party when in power, followed German leads on defense. The Germans are Poland’s key economic partner, and there is a challenge for Poland in terms of how to deal with both the economic power of Germany and the military threats posed by Russia at the same time.
The fourth theme flows from the German challenge.
The embracing by the Germans of Russian energy policies, backed by the Biden Administration, is seen by the current government as a major challenge. This is viewed as well by a number of Polish analysts as part of a Russian flanking action affecting Polish defense and security as well.
The fifth theme flows from the fourth.
The Poles understand that conventional defense is not enough in today’s world where the authoritarian powers have rewritten the book on how to use security tools to challenge the cohesion of liberal democratic societies internally and in terms of their alliance structures.
Raubo underscored that there was a strong and growing commitment of Poland to working cyber defense and offense as part of the Polish capability to defend their society. He noted that cyber capabilities are being generated throughout the Polish educational and commercial structures and is becoming a core focus of Polish national defense capability as well.
The sixth theme was growing realization that the Poles do not have to sit back and cower before Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities.
They and their closest allies can go after these capabilities and challenge them in times of conflict and to work to degrade them in such conditions.
The significant commitment to air modernization via the F-35 and in terms of air and missile defense in terms of their own national programs plus adapting the U.S. IBCS system are seen as key parts of such an effort.
And associated with this is a seventh theme, namely, taking a more realistic look at Russian capabilities and countering Russian propaganda and information war about their capability’s vis a vis Poland.
We discussed the most recent Zapad exercise. In contrast to earlier periods, there was a more realistic assessment of the state of Russian forces. Rather than simply noting that the Russians deployed a large number of tanks it was underscored that most of these tanks are T-80s, and not the latest versions of Russian tanks.
Raubo cited as an example of this trend of realism the publication of a recent Polish piece on the state of the Russian Air Force. In this article, the Polish analyst argued that Russian air power was in decline. The Russians immediately responded and went out their way to attack this article directly. In other words, realistic assessment by a Pole needs to be countered by Russian information war, for the Russians want to intimate Poland.
Finally, we returned to the theme about the twin challenges of facing modern Germany and modern Russia.
Obviously, facing these two states and dealing with them is not a new situation for Poland, but the 21st century strategic context is. Germany follows a passive defense strategy vis-à-vis the Russians, and follows an economic driven approach to defense, which means that directly challenging the Russians is not part of modern Germany’s approach to power.
Such a stance is troubling for Poland who along with the Nordics see the Russians as posing a wide range of direct threats and are seen as well as in the process of ramping up the threat envelope. Raubo noted that Russia would like Poland to become more like Germany in its defense approach.
It might be noted that while visiting Poland, shortly before the Finns released their defence white paper and the Nordics announced plans for expanded operational collaboration to deal with the Russian threat.
The comment made in the recent Finnish White Paper is clearly not only believed by the Poles but is a foundation for their emphasis on defense and security modernization efforts.
Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland’s neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces, and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations.
The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role.
It would be hard to find Polish dissent from this Finnish assessment.
Jacek Raubo Ph.D. (@JRaubo – Twitter account) is a security and defense expert closely collaborating with Warsaw-based “Defence24 Group”, a provider of professional websites about the military and geopolitics (Defence24.pl and Defence24.com), internal security and counterterrorism (Infosecurity24.pl), cybersecurity (Cyberdefence24.pl), space technology (Space24.pl) and energy issues (Energetyka24.com).
This group of websites is one of the biggest in the East and Central Europe region.
He also works as a senior lecturer at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.
Note: The article to which Dr. Raubo referred was written by Maciej Szopa and was published by Defence 24 on September 3, 2021.
Russian Air Force. Last Moments Before a Grand Regression
The Russian Air Force still remains the second air power globally. Nonetheless, their position is year by year, becoming weaker. Hundreds of aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union would soon be decommissioned, with no replacement in sight. Due to finances, technology, and the weaknesses of the Russian industry.
At the beginning of this year, the Russian Air-Space forces operated 380 heavy Su-27 fighter aircraft, 267 MiG-29s in a variety of variants, 131 MiG-31 interceptors, 274 Su-24, and 125 Su-34 bombers, and 193 Su-25 CAS platforms: 1370 aircraft in total. The inventory above is complemented with 124 heavy bombers (16 Tu-160, 42 Tu-95, and 66 Tu-22M), and 91 combat aircraft belonging to the Navy (22 MiG-29K/KUB, 43 Su-27/33, 22 Su-24, and 4 Su-25). This means that Russia currently operates 1585 aircraft, leading the pack and overtaking the PRC – but still being behind the US.
These numbers are far less impressive when one realizes that a certain part of this potential has been inherited from the Soviet Union. We know that the Soviet Union fell in 1991 – 30 years ago. Three decades are often defined as a term within which the expected lifecycle of MRCA comes to an end. This applies to the MiG-29 for instance – that is still being operated by Poland, to a limited extent, and with numerous challenges ahead. The manufacturing of the MiG-29 had begun in 1981. Some of the aircraft in Russian service may be 30 to 40 years old then.
The lifecycle extension process is one solution here – that may be in-depth and costly, as shown by the American example of the extension of the life cycles of the 4th generation platforms. A similar process was adopted for the fleet of 289 MiG-29s between 2009 and 2020, but only 74 aircraft underwent the procedure (24 naval fighters, and 50 land-based aircraft), including several “brand new” export aircraft that were not commissioned by Algeria, because contrary to what was agreed, Russia delivered second-hand airframes to its customer.
The above means that more than 200 of these aircraft did not undergo any works, or those works may have been limited, with their status being not much better from the 30 Polish Fulcrums, some of which have been grounded, while some are still flying, but with very limited capabilities. The replacement of the aforesaid platform may also be problematic. The MiG-35 exists.
However, only 6 examples of this aircraft have been ordered, solely to be publicly displayed as a part of the air force’s aerobatic display teams, as a marketing tool for selling the MiG-35 on the export markets. The Russians have no optimal light fighter that would meet the requirements they define. The replacement – maybe in the form of the single-engined Su-75 Checkmate – is still a plan for the distant future. No specific timeline may be mentioned here, apart from the fact that the manufacturing may be potentially launched in the 2030s.
The frontline bomber fleet is just a bit better. The Russians have managed to build 127 examples of the Su-34 over the decade (counterpart of the US-made F-15e). 296 obsolete Su-24 jets are also still operated. These aircraft were being manufactured between 1967 and 1993.
Even the youngest Fencers are reaching their thirties now. The Su-34 is not a solution here, even in a situation with another 30 jets joining the currently operated fleet soon. Even if money is available to procure more, one needs to remember that over the last decade the Russians had managed to manufacture 18 aircraft as such per year, whereas the manufacturing peaked in the mid-2010s. Only a few jets per year were rolled off the production line in recent years.
Manufacturing of the Su-30 MRCA partially fills in the capability gap expected to appear after the Su-24s are withdrawn. Only 134 examples have been built so far. Employing the Su-30 as a replacement would mean that they would not be able to carry out other missions.
The fleet of heavy fighters belonging to the Su-27 family seems to be in the best shape – relatively. During the recent decade, 134 Su-30 and 98 out of 128 procured Su-35 platforms have been manufactured. This should also include 22 modernized Su-27s – 247 aircraft in total, that may remain in the active service for a relatively long time, with satisfying availability. The Russian Air Force operates 380 Su-27 jets now.
The above means that more than 130 are legacy aircraft, that would need to be imminently replaced. 30 of them would be replaced by the not-yet-manufactured Su-35S jets. What would be used to replace the remaining 100 examples?
Theoretically – the Su-57. This would happen only if the series manufacturing of the new generation platform does not suffer from further delays. So far, 78 aircraft as such have been ordered. They are to be delivered over the upcoming 7 years. So far, a single example was handed off, even though the PAK-FA/Su-57 programme has been active since several years.
The MiG-31 interceptors’ fleet is also facing some issues. The last aircraft of the type was handed off in 1994 – it is 27 years old. The MiG-31s are upgraded to the MiG-31BM, or MiG-31K variant – the latter is a carrier platform for the Kh-37M2 Kindzhal hypersonic missile. This does not change the fact that most of those aircraft are more than 30 years old, gradually reaching the end of their lifecycle.
Only the development of a replacement platform – expected to happen within the PAK-DP/MiG-41 programme – is a viable solution here. Considering the problems emerging in the Su-57 programme, it is difficult to assess when a platform as such could be born, and whether the technical challenges, related to the engines, for instance, would be overcome
Similar circumstances also emerged in the case of the PAK-FA programme. Would proper technology be available for the PAK-DP platform (missing in the case of the Su-57 engines)? Would funds be available as well?
The CAS platforms are also in relatively bad shape – here, the Su-25 is the primary asset, 197 of which currently remain in service. Even though officially the manufacturing plant is still operational, and derivatives of the design are being offered, not a single brand new platform of the type has been delivered to the Russian Forces since 2010. Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft may be a solution here – 113 examples were delivered to the Russian Armed Forces between 2010 and 2020. However, it is far more probable that MALE UCAVs and jet UCAVs (such as the S-70 Okhotnik, utilizing a flying wing design) would replace the Su-25s.
No replacement exists for the strategic bombers. Tu-22Ms were being manufactured until 1997 – however, no specific plan has been put into place, when it comes to a potential successor. The Russians are currently running the PAK-DA new generation bomber programme, with the maiden flight of the prototype expected in 2023.
The timeline, however, seems to be highly optimistic. Even if the prototype makes its maiden flight on time, it could take years before these aircraft become a part of the Russian inventory. Not only is the PAK-DA bomber expected to replace the Tu-22M, as it would also replace, in the longer run, the Tu-160 Blackjacks. The manufacturing of the latter has been restarted, but only one or two examples have been delivered, with the use of components dating back to the times of the USSR.
The support aircraft fleet also seems to suffer. Russia currently operates 15 AEW platforms. Only one has been delivered during the last decade. Out of 19 Il-78 tankers, 6 have been delivered during the last 10 years. In the case of 114 Il-76 airlifters, only six are less than 10 years old. The attempt to restart manufacturing of the An-124 has turned out to be a failure.
As we can see – the tempo of replacement of the legacy aircraft with new ones in the Russian Air Force, and in the Russian Navy – even though portrayed as the model replacement rate, as opposed to USAF – is still fairly insufficient. The manufacturing of 4+ generation jets is not a wise alternative for the 5th generation programmes – such as F-35 or F-22. It is rather an expression of a lack of ability to manufacture more advanced platforms.
Despite the investments and financial efforts – that have led to the introduction of almost 400 brand new, or modernized combat aircraft into service in the Russian Air Force – it stills seems that maintaining the current potential would remain impossible.
Decreasing Numbers
This would not happen even in the case of the heavy MRCA/air superiority platforms, with the best available funding. The fleet would suffer from a 10-20% quantitative decrease. However, given the launch of the series manufacturing of the Su-57 here, the situation may not be that bad. Radical cuts, however, can be expected in case of the strike component of the air force – currently operating almost 300 legacy Su-24 Fencers, and only a bit more than 100 new Su-34 Fullbacks.
A complete crash may be expected in the case of the light fighter platforms, as no replacement of the MiG-29 exists. Despite the loud Su-75 premiere, there is no relevant Fulcrum successor in sight. Meanwhile, employing the MiG-35 in that role is costly (two engines), and not prospective, as the performance of that aircraft is, in the best-case scenario, comparable to F-16 Block 70/72. The situation is similar for the fleet of interceptors. However, the MiG-31BM upgrade may extend the Foxhound’s lifetime.
New Designs
The Russian Air Force currently bases its potential solely on designs dating back to the times of the USSR – belonging to the 4+ generation. The Su-57 may be an exception here – maybe the heavy fighter fleet would consist of the 5th generation aircraft. The remaining programmes (Su-75, PAK-DA, MiG-41, PAK-VTA/Il-106 airlifter programme) seem to lack the feasibility needed, at least in the immediate future. In some cases, technical problems may be expected. In all cases, the funding would also pose a major problem.
Due to the cost, the USA or China also would not be able to handle all of the aforesaid programmes at once. Especially if quality comparable to the US platforms would be expected.
The R&D cost is one thing, ordering hundreds of new aircraft to ensure 1:1 replacement of the legacy platforms, reaching the ends of their lifecycles, is another burning issue here.
Export prospects could be viewed as a potential opportunity – Russia could potentially find prospective, reliable customers, or even partners, for its development programmes. So far, Moscow did not succeed here, especially in the era of the US embargo imposed on countries importing the products of the Russian defence industry. The HAL FGFA programme, pursued jointly by India and Russia, and revolving around the PAK FA platform, may be a good example here, similarly to the announcement of a project aimed at the development of a light fighter jointly with the UAE, based on the MiG-29.
Decreasing Numbers and Significance
It seems then, that in the upcoming future we would be witnessing major cuts in Russian military aviation, resulting on the grounds of technological and financial deficiencies. The quantitative shape of the frontline bomber units would suffer from major cuts (even by 50%), the light fighter units would also suffer from reductions (this refers to the MiG-29), while the fleet of the interceptors may suffer from stagnation – in the best-case scenario. The gaps may be filled to some extent by unmanned platforms – such as the S-70 Okhotnik, flown and tested in 2018, or less advanced MALE platforms. Regardless of the above, it seems that the Russian deterrence capability is being and will be gradually reduced.
The Russian aircraft’s status, and the status of the Russian defence budget, also influence the level of training for the Russian pilots. They accumulate much fewer flying hours than their Chinese, or NATO counterparts for instance. This may have a positive impact on the number of air crashes – that were quite common over the last decade. From early 2010, Russia has lost 46 aircraft, including 8 that were brand new: 11 Su-24s, 10 MiG-29s (including two lost by mercenaries in Libya), 7 Su-27s, 6 Su-25s, 3 Tu-22s, 3 Su-30s, 3 Su-34s, 1 Su-35S, 1 Su-33, and 1 Su-57.
The aforesaid figures constitute several percent of newly produced aircraft, even though they refer solely to the disclosed unrecoverable losses – including ones pertaining to combat. They do not depict wear and tear, and damage that – in the longer run – may also contribute to decommissioning of the air force’s assets.
The featured photo: The Polish Minister of Defence addressing the Defence 24 conference in Poland on September 29, 2021. Credit: Defence 24
By Robbin Laird
During my recent visit to Warsaw to attend the Defence 24 conference on Polish defense, I had a chance to talk with Dr. Robert Czulda (whose bio can be read at the end of the article).
I had a chance to talk with him after the two-day conference and to share some thoughts on the challenges facing Poland in working its way ahead with regard to defense. We started by discussing a major threat facing Poland, one which was discussed often at length at the conference, namely, the actions of Belarus supported by Russia with regard to using migrants as a battering ram into Poland. The approach was characterized by Polish officials as part of Russia’s overall hybrid war strategy.
Question: What impact is Polish actions to deal with Belarus having in Europe?
Czulda: When a few years ago Hungry dealt with migrant flows through Serbia and Croatia by building a border barrier between Hungry and Serbia and Croatia, Budapest was heavily criticized by the EU, including Germany. Now the situation is different – the West is no longer so naïve and its decision-makers are aware that a mass migration is an existential threat.
Therefore, as we have built a border barrier to deal with the Belarus actions, we are not getting the same level of criticism as did Hungry earlier. The Germans realize where the migrants coming through Belarus would actually go – Germany. And they do not want them.
Just two days ago the Poland-Belarus border was visited by Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri, who was – and this is a quote from an official announcement – “impressed by the means deployed to secure the border”. He also thanked Poland for cooperating with Frontex. It only shows that both Poland and Hungary – so heavily criticized in 2015 and 2016 – were right in their actions.
Question: How do you see Poland within the European Union?
There is significant conflict which has been generated by responses within the EU to the pandemic which raises the specter of more national than transnational approaches to problem solving.
How do you see the way ahead?
Czulda: Within Europe today there is conflict between two visions of the future. The first is to build a super state based in Brussels which undoubtedly would be dominated by Germany. The second is to preserve national sovereignty and shape a way ahead within Europe by respecting national sovereignty in a number of areas. The latter concept was promoted by Charles de Gaulle and now by states such as Poland.
In other words, in general, the Poles want to preserve their sovereignty and independence. The Polish government does not want to leave the EU but believes that the EU should focus on economic cooperation rather than on imposing an ideological agenda.
Poland and its perspectives on defense of the nation is a threat to the super-state vision. As such, it is attacked by supporters of this approach in Brussels. That is the main reason for an ongoing struggle – to crush resistance of those who oppose a concept of the United States of Europe.
Question: What is the future of European defense?
Czulda: There is no future for a single European army.
The states have very different perspectives on foreign and defense priorities.
Cooperation among states on specific issues clearly is happening and will shape the way ahead, not a forced concept of integration. A discussion about a common European army has been ongoing since the end of World War II. We shall not forget that the EU has already formed the EU battlegroups, but their operational value is very minimal.
However, it does not mean that Europe should not increase its efforts to enhance its military capabilities – especially nowadays, when Russia is now more powerful, and the United States has been shifting away from Europe to Asia.
Question: It was clear from the presentations at the conference, that the Polish government is focused on a two-prong approach to defense: enhanced operational conventional capabilities and multi-faceted security operations.
How do you see this?
Czulda: We are focused on a concept of integrated security. The hybrid threats which Russia poses every day demands a broad concept of security, in the cyber and other realms for sure.
It is challenging to find the right balance of forces, but there is a clear recognition of the need for a broad concept of integrated security.
However, there is still a lot to be done – for instance, we need not only to continue a modernization of our military, which unfortunately still has some Soviet-era equipment, but also to create a robust mobilization system in case of a crisis (in other words – a system of reserves). Another task we need to focus on is to establish a civil defense, which now does not exist in Poland.
Question: How do you see the evolving defense concept?
Czulda: The Polish government has a much clearer idea of where it wants to end up with regard to defense than how to get there. Or put another way: The Government knows what it wants to do but does not know how to achieve it.
In part, the focus has been to buy new weapons to gain closer cooperation and buy-in from the United States. But when Donald Trump lost the elections, Warsaw’s plan was shattered. Now the Polish authorities have been trying to build a partnership with Turkey which is a very controversial plan.
Regarding a military aspect, a priority for the government was to enhance land forces – a few years ago a new branch, the Territorial Army, was formed. Within Poland there is a growing debate about this approach with critics pointing to new ways to achieve territorial defense with more mobile integrated forces leveraging new digital technologies for connectivity as well.
He is an Assistant Professor at the University of Lodz, Poland. He is a former Visiting Professor at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) under a Fulbright Senior Award.
Dr. Czulda is an Alum of the Young Leaders Dialogue of the U.S. Department of State (2010– 2011), and has lectured at universities in Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Lithuania, Turkey and Slovakia, as well as the National Cheng-chi University in Taipei.
He is a freelance defense journalist as well and has published widely on Polish defense and related issues.
Dr. Czulda’s area of expertise is international security and defense.
Featured photo: Polish Air Force Division General, Jacek Pszczoła and the moderator of the panel, Robert Czulda at the Defence 24 Conference panel on air power modernization on September 27, 2021. Image Credit: J.Sabak
The guided-missile destroyer USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) participates in FRONTIER SENTINEL alongside U.S. Coast Guard, and Canadian Allies to enhance their Arctic capabilities.
USNORTHCOM, AT SEA
09.02.2021
Video by Seaman Apprentice Theoplis Stewart II
Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet
According to a news release on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website, the Finnish government has released its latest defence white paper.
At its meeting on 9 September 2021, the Government approved the Defence Report to be submitted to Parliament.
The Report and its implementation ensure that Finland’s defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment. The Report and its implementation will extend until the end of decade.
Finland’s defence environment remains tense and difficult to predict. In addition to the land, sea and air domains, cyber and information environments and space are highlighted. The importance of the neighbouring Arctic regions is growing.
The defence administration prepares to counter broad-spectrum influencing, together with other actors, as part of the evolving national comprehensive security model. Interagency cooperation must be further developed in the fields of cyber defence, strategic communication and information defence. Threats to the cyber operating environment and related national development needs will be assessed in more detail in a new study.
The Defence Report will reorganize the force structure of the Defence Forces wartime units. In the future, wartime troops will be divided into operative and local troops. The number of local troops will be increased from 2025 by transforming the majority of the regional troops into local troops. At the same time, the range of duties of local troops will expand and the standards will rise. The importance of cooperation between authorities and the role of reservists will be emphasised.
The cost savings obligations directed at the Defence Forces during previous years and the currently available resources make it challenging to maintain activities and readiness on the current level. This also restricts preparations for a crisis or warfare of long duration.
The maintenance of readiness, training of conscripts and the development of new capabilities require a gradual increase in the number of personnel in the Defence Forces by 500 person-years by the end of the 2020s.
Close international defence cooperation strengthens Finland’s defence capability. Finland must have the ability to work together with key partners, based on a separate decision, in all security situations affecting Finland, including during a crisis.
While the President and the Ministerial Committee guided the preparation of the Government’s Defence Report, it was prepared as in a cross-governmental cooperation and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group was consulted. This is the second Government Defence Report; the previous one was completed on 16 February 2017.
In the white paper, the nature of the Russian threat was underscored and highlighted as follows:
Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland’s neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces, and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations.
The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role.
Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and maintained the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. In the spring of 2021 Russia concentrated a large number of military forces in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. Its activities, for example, in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that the threshold for threatening to use or using military force to try and reach a political goal has lowered.
During the last few years, Russia has positioned some of its most technologically advanced weapons systems and increasingly more capable forces close to Finland. It regularly conducts joint service exercises, and its ability to project military force in a swift and surprising manner has improved. Long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, enable Russia to extends its military capabilities beyond its borders, and restrict the freedom of action of other actors.
Russia conducts exercises and operates actively outside its territory, which could escalate tensions. Furthermore, it has strengthened its strategic nuclear deterrent, and hardened its nuclear rhetoric.
If you wish to see a similar view in Europe, one can go to Poland where the deep concern with the border operations of Belarus are highlighted as well as part of a broader Russian strategy.
The report was published in full on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website.
Or it can be read in e-book form below:
Finland is a key player in the strengthening of Nordic defence cooperation and provides a signifiant example of a state and people focused on resilience as a key element of defense capability.
The Australians are clearly looking at ways to enhance resilience as well as Poland in Europe. The return of Norway to a “total defence concept” goes down the same lines.
As the post-pandemic recovery process takes hold, what place will secure supply chains play in the way ahead for the European Union states?
As we wrote in our book on the Return of Direct Defense in Europe:
The Finns are shaping a way ahead for themselves, with their neighbors and are a key stakeholder in shaping a new approach to Nordic and Northern European defense. This is a long way from “Finlandization.”
Also, see the following:
U.S. Marines assigned to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, and Marine Wing Support Squadron 172, 1st Marine Air Wing conduct forward arming and refueling point operations during Indo-Pacific Warfighting Exercise in the Northern Training Area on Okinawa, Japan, August 31, 2021.
This force-on-force exercise demonstrated the ability to seize and defend key-maritime terrain and provided an opportunity to employ techniques to rapidly establish FARPs. 2/3 is currently attached to 4th Marines as a part of the Unit Deployment Program.
OKINAWA, JAPAN
08.31.2021
Video by Lance Cpl. Jerry Edlin
3rd Marine Division
By Robbin Laird
My colleague John Blackburn has focused for some time on the importance of the Australian defence forces becoming more sustainable from Australian sources. He then broadened his look at resilience to the energy and then maritime sectors. This was PRIOR to the pandemic.
With our societies facing a major challenge in re-launching after the pandemic, the question of resilience, and secure supply chains is now a key part of any effective or successful project for the recovery of the liberal democratic societies.
Recently, I have interviewed Blackburn on the launch of a new study which focuses on the challenges facing Australia in shaping a resilient society. And I will publish that interview in the near future.
Notably, this week the final report of the project is being released.
According to the team which generated the report:
“In early 2020, the International Institute for Economic Research – Australia (IIER-A), in partnership with Global Access Partners (GAP), embarked on an 18-month long project to consider Australia’s resilience in the face of a changing world. Over 250 people participated in 40 activities which included Taskforce meetings, workshops focused on specific issues, and the GAP Summit on National Resilience.
“This politically independent effort involved participants from all sectors, including retired Federal and State politicians and the heads of major peak bodies.
“This report presents an integrated view of the National Resilience Project’s nine component studies.”
The executive summary of the report highlights the findings of the report and follows:
The COVID-19 pandemic was a dual shock to our health and economic systems. The ongoing widespread lockdowns, the troubled vaccination rollout, interstate rivalries and social dislocation exposed vulnerabilities in many systems that underpin our society.
In 2021 Australians are faced with concurrent, and in some cases existential, challenges. These include climate change and the urgent need to reduce emissions, growing global and regional security risks, a global pandemic which will have persistent societal and economic impacts, a global energy transformation where we are lagging the developed world, and a global market model that has resulted in reduced resilience, as evidenced in the face of recent crises.
Our National Resilience Project posed three fundamental questions to our workshop participants: What is a resilient society? Are we resilient enough? Can we make ourselves more resilient? We postulated three key attributes of a resilient society: shared awareness and shared goals; teamwork and collaboration; and the ability to prepare and mobilise in the face of a crisis.
The Project has highlighted our lack of resilience in all three areas. Faced with a crisis that it had not prepared for; the Federal Government closed the nation down and then applauded its’ brilliance in preventing outbreaks of the scale seen overseas.
However, 18 months later we remain closed to the outside world, reactive, and crisis managing the present whilst failing to prepare for the significant health and economic challenges we will face in the next few years. We are not unique; the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a global lack of resilience because of a collective failure of preparedness and mobilisation.
We observe that there is a lack of shared awareness and shared goals in Australia and limited honesty and directness from some Australian politicians about our future challenges. This situation is exacerbated by our Federation’s political systems which has not been able to address our risks and vulnerabilities in a coherent, systemic manner.
Political reactions are often too little, too late, and too short-sighted. A complicating factor is that our Federation structure may have been fit for purpose a century ago, but it cannot deal with the constellation of challenges we face today.
Unfortunately, the prevalence of political spin in lieu of substance over the past decade has also dulled our senses to the point of complacency. Neither side of politics is blameless in this respect. Social cohesion enables and derives from social activity, especially collaborative and supportive activity built on a foundation of trust.
Strong, trusting social bonds that survive and thrive in the face of differences of opinions, beliefs, life circumstances and living conditions are crucial for a society or community to be ‘resilient’, especially when confronted by sudden change or catastrophic threats or events. Federal, state and territory governments need to cooperate on a comprehensive, evidence-based national resilience framework to assess current capabilities and future threats and set national, state, territory, and local policy objectives as part of an overall resilience strategy.
Whilst the formation of the National Cabinet in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with hope and optimism, that soon faded when the behaviour of Federal and some State leaders regressed into self-interest and power plays, compounded by the partisan elements in the media.
As Australia attempts to move on from the COVID-19 pandemic our immediate national challenges are ones of response and recovery. However, we must also prepare for future challenges.
A sovereign nation must buttress, rather than outsource, its self-reliance, and while State, Territory and Federal Governments have taken measures to protect and restore the economy in the wake of COVID-19, a broader long-term vision for domestic manufacturing and trusted supply chains would prepare the ground for a more sustainable recovery, and better prepare the nation for the future.
We are likely to see more compounding disasters on a national scale with far-reaching consequences. We need to be better prepared for these disasters. A nationally coordinated and, where appropriate, standardised, and interoperable disaster preparedness and mobilisation system needs to be developed. Business-as-usual, or more correctly businessas-was, is not an option.
Whilst this is a grim assessment there is some cause for cautious optimism. The actions we need to take are not beyond our ability to design and implement.
We have considerable expertise and resources in this country.
To address some of our resilience deficiencies, we are recommending the creation of an independent National Resilience Institute. The Institute could contribute to a deeper, apolitical, examination of the issues raised in this report.
The aim is to help inform the public policy debate, to improved shared awareness, and to offer ideas on how to improve our national preparedness.
The report can be found in PDF at the following two websites:
Global Access Partners and the Institute for Integrated Economic Research-Australia.
The report can be read in e-book form below: