By Robbin Laird

During my July 2021 visit to 2^nd Marine Air Wing (2d MAW), I had a chance to visit again with Marine Air Control Group 28, the Marines who provide command and control (C2) and air defense for the distributed force.  I met with the Commanding Officer Col. McCarthy, the Operations Officer Lt. Col. Mui, the Operations Chief Master Gunnery Sgt. Braxton, and with the Assistant Operations Officer Capt. Megliorino. MACG-28 deploys personnel around the world as part of II MEF.

MACG-28 consists of around 2,000 Marines who collectively enable 2d MAW to fight as a cohesive and highly lethal force via the establishment and employment of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS).  The MACCS, a collection of C2 agencies supporting the six functions of Marine Aviation, is often referred to as the Commanding General’s weapon system because it provides him with the sensors, communications, and situational awareness necessary to employ aviation in support of II MEF in a decisive manner.

Col. McCarthy elaborated on this by stating “this is an incredibly exciting time to be a C2 professional, more than any other time in my career I’m seeing an appreciation across the Service for the capabilities MACCS Marines provide to the Marine Corps.  When you look at the kill webs we are trying to establish, how we need to integrate long range fires, and how we are going to C2 in a degraded environment; these are the challenges we are currently getting after with a group of incredibly talented and innovative Marines.”

Marine Corps C2 has historically been focused on the concept of centralized command and decentralized control; this philosophy nests perfectly with how the Marine Corps plans to fight in the future via distributed operations integrated around mission command.

They have a core template which they are building from as the Marines shift from the Middle East land wars to shaping a crisis management force which can fight as a globally deployable Naval Expeditionary Force in readiness against potential adversaries.  With regard to naval integration, connecting Navy and Marine Corps C2 systems has historically been a challenge but that is being worked.

As one participant put it: “One of the key things that’s happening right now is that all the L-class ships are being outfitted with the same C2 system that we use to do air command and control ashore. Our primary system for C2 is a system called CAC2S, the Common Aviation Command & Control System.”  Integrated operating concepts, capabilities, and training will ensure the naval team cannot be excluded from any region in a contested environment.

“Now the Navy is putting it on their L-class ships, and the program is called CAC2S Afloat. It’s our program, but it’s integrated with the ship. It’s the blue side of the comm architecture and it’s going into all the L-class ships. That’s a big win for us in terms of Naval integration. We’re excited to see that thing come online, and it’s going to help us in the future.”

And the Marines are working innovative new ways to work with the U.S. Navy. One example is an upcoming exercise off of the Atlantic Coast. The Marines are working a number of vignettes with the Navy to explore ways to integrate more effectively to deliver meaningful combat effects.

A key example is taking the core USMC sensors, and deploying it to an expeditionary base within contested maritime terrain in support of fleet operations to disrupt, deny, and deter aggressor actions. As one participant underscored: “We’re going establish a sensor expeditionary advanced base. And we’re going to control intercepts. We’ll provide an air defense function in support of the fleet during this exercise. It’s a good chance for us to work with the Navy in an integrated air missile defense role.”

One of the participants I had met during a visit to MAWTS-1 in 2018. And during that visit, what was being addressed is how to deal with the challenge of working C2 in a degraded and disrupted environment.

As I wrote in that piece: The shift from counter-insurgency habits, equipment and operations is a significant one and is clearly a work in progress. It is about shedding some past learned behavior as well in terms of shaping more appropriate ways to operate as a force in a contested electronic warfare environment. The cracking of the Enigma code in World War II by the allies involved in part German soldiers and sailors using techniques which exposed the enigma system to intrusive learning from the British and the other allies working to break the Enigma Code.

“In today’s situation, the Marines are facing a similar situation in which a combination of technology and appropriate combat techniques in handling data in a combat environment is a key element of the combat learning cycle as well. And disruptive technologies, which the adversary might use against the Marines, were being fielded to test the USMC approach.”

Since that time, the Marines are working TTPs to deal with the reality of operating in the contested communications space. As one participant put it: “I was at WTI when we started to focus on contested communications. Since then, we have been working our TTPs and our understanding to deal with jamming and radio interference. And the Marine Information Groups are clearly helping in our learning process.”

A final issue we discussed is how technology is shaping new capabilities to operate at the tactical edge and for C2 to shape force capabilities. The miniaturization of C2 technologies allows small groups of Marines to deploy in support of a distributed force and bring C2 capability that historically required large operational basing to deliver.

With an increasingly small footprint, how best to leverage this capability to support an integrated distributed force? And as the Navy and Marine Corps finds ways to integrate more effectively how can force distribution enable dynamic strike and targeting?

The question then remains: how best to operate the force to work organically or integrated with joint or coalition forces to deliver the desired crisis management or combat effect?

Answering this question will define the evolution of the USMC over the decades ahead.

Credit Photo: Maj. Gen. Michael Cederholm, commanding general, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, speaks with Col. Michael McCarthy, commanding officer Marine Air Control Group 28, and Lt. Col. Howard Mui, commanding officer, Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron, during a command visit at Cherry Point, North Carolina, July 23rd, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Ochoa)

By Robbin Laird

The Marines are re-focusing their efforts from the Middle East land wars to shaping their way ahead to build a purpose-built force to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of fleet and joint operations against potential adversaries.

One way they are doing this is working with the U.S. Navy in new ways to operate together.

Because the U.S. Navy is itself undergoing fundamental change as they return to a clear priority on blue water operations and littoral engagements, this means that the Marines are changing with a sense of urgency while the Navy is itself.

It is really an interactive engagement exploring ways to shape more effective crisis management and combat capabilities to deal with strategic competition.

During my visit to 2^nd Marine Air Wing in July 2021, I had a chance to discuss the evolving approach with the G-3 or operations team at 2^nd MAW.

I met with Col. Eilertson, the head of G-3, Maj. Barnes, the G-3 Future Operations Officer which involves the planning and engagement in exercises, and Col. (Ret.) Michael Watkins, the newly appointed senior civilian advisor in G-3.

We focused most of our discussion on the upcoming Naval exercise to be held in August. 

This exercise will focus on a variety of operational vignettes testing out a variety of ways the Navy and the Marines can work together in enhance joint maritime littoral warfare capabilities.

Maritime power is an essential element of the National Defense Strategy, in light of increasingly capable maritime adversaries it is absolutely critical to the success of our nation.

During the past two years, I have asked a number of Naval officers what they considered to be contributions which the Marines might make to the maritime fight and one of the most often capabilities highlighted was the possibility of deploying sensors as part of an inside force to facilitate sea denial and sea control in support of fleet operations and the joint force.

And this is going to be done in the August exercise.

They referred to the Marine Corps side of this as training to deliver maritime capabilities “far from the sea.”

A case in point is bringing the major sensor deployed by the Marines and setting up a sensor expeditionary base.

There they will be strategically postured to provide counter-air situational awareness for the Navy and operate from an expeditionary base within an enemy’s Weapon Engagement Zone.

Another example is refueling Navy aircraft from Forward Aerial Refueling Points or FARPS or expeditionary refueling points.

But here they are testing the ability of Marine Corps AAVs to do refueling of rotorcraft for the Navy.

A third example is training with P-8s.

One clear trajectory of change I have seen over the past two years is the Navy realizing that the capabilities onboard the P-8 in terms of sensors can be used more broadly for the joint force.

In terms of works with the Marines, this means working ways for what have been different data management and communication systems to be worked to become more integrated.

In the exercise, the Marines will work with P-8s in a variety of ways, including FARP refueling that will optimize sustainment of land operations ashore.

This is about Marine-Navy cross training which has not been done with regard to the P-8.

As one participant put it: “It’s a data sharing experiment.

“The Marines deploy in the littorals with our unique capabilities.

“And they integrate with the fleet in order to provide data which the fleet might not otherwise have access to.

“By so doing, we can paint a more accurate picture for the commander and joint force, so better targeting decisions can be made.”

As one participant noted: “We will have 2 TACRON representatives onboard on a ship and two deployed to the expeditionary base.”

As one participant noted: “The biggest thing with that exercise and that experimentation and training is working the targeting process.

“How do you speed up the process of target identification using machine aided decision making tools.”

In short, as the Marines undergo modernization in preparation for strategic competition, a key part of the effort is working more effective integration with the Navy and leveraging innovation being generated within the joint force.

By Robbin Laird

The Marines are undergoing a change with a sense of urgency associated with the strategic shift from the Middle East land wars to being effective in strategic competition. The Marine Corps exists to provide a globally deployable Naval Expeditionary Force in readiness, this means preparing for initial engagements in contested areas of operation and working within the Joint Force and our alliances to support the high-end fight if called upon to do so.

This is a strategic shift, but in many ways, it is a strategic shock moving away from the combat conditions and training associated with the Middle East to a wider variety of mission engagements in the Pacific and North Atlantic areas of operation. One noticeable constant is II MEF never stopped training to fight in any clime and place, to include spending more time training in the Nordic region with the Nordic allies.

But the blunt fact is that this generation of Marines have been engaged in the Middle East in counter-terror and related operations, not focused largely on operations in the littoral against strategic competitors. And to be clear, this requires crisis management skill sets specific to a wide diversity of situations which are likely to occur dealing with competitors in any region.

There have been new phrases coined suggesting how the Russians or Chinese operate in the new strategic environment such as hybrid war and operations in the gray zone. Clearly, the reset of the USMC involves being able to dominate in those situations as well as enabling the Joint Force and our allies to ramp up escalation capabilities as required.

During my July 2021 visit to 2^nd MAW, I discussed this shift and its challenges with Marines, and with the CG of 2^nd MAW, Maj. Gen. Cederholm. When I met with him last December, he highlighted the importance of increasing readiness for the force, and we started the July meeting by focusing on the Wing’s success in readiness over the past few years.

According to Cederholm, “We are in the process of approaching readiness levels that have not been seen in decades. On some days, our readiness rate has approached 73% of all our assets being flown. Marines at all levels have contributed to this success, one which is critical to enable us to meet our mission of being able to fight today.”

He then indicated that this was one of four key priorities being pursued by the Wing going forward. “Our first priority is to continue increasing our readiness rates by adding more combat depth through our formations. The second is to drive more lethality into our training and readiness (T&R) manuals. The third one is a combination of force preservation and force development, ensuring that we are training Marines, protecting Marines, and understanding risk, both organizational and institutional risk. The fourth is alignment to the future, or alignment to the 2030 force design effort.”

2nd MAW is clearly focused on the training piece as a key part of the way ahead. Major General Cederholm highlighted the need to train to fight today but to find ways in reshaping training and the T&R manuals to better position the Wing for the future fight.  What he argued is that even though the Marine Corps continues to clearly have capabilities to engage with peer competitors, the T&R manuals over the years of engagement in the Middle East appropriately focused largely on the operations in support of CENTCOM.

This clearly needs to change going forward. The Wing leadership is focused on finding ways to do this more effectively going into the future. “What types of missions do we need to do for the evolving peer fight? How can we write T&R manuals that train to those missions, and not just what we have done over the past twenty years?”

He argued that there is a clear need to shape an understanding of predictive readiness to be able to do the evolving missions which are required for the peer fight, something the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have written about. “If we take our target as 2030, and we plan back from that, we can better inform our force design and development efforts.”

“2D MAW currently has planners in the EUCOM AOR who are looking to smooth out any inhibitors or barriers that would hinder our ability to operate in and around the European continent, but they’re also eyeballing the future to fall in alignment with our priorities, which is alignment to force design in the future.”

“How do we plug into the 2030 operating concept, what tools do they need, and what missions do they need to train to?   How do they integrate more effectively with the Joint Force and our alliances? How do they integrate into the kill web? We are working on that roadmap right now, and it will require a significant shift in how we educate and train our formations.”

“We are retooling for the future fight. At the same time, we’re prepared to answer the phone, time now, takeoff, and beat any and all potential adversaries out there.”

Although F-35s are in 2^nd MAW, they are there as part of the training effort. 2^nd MAW will be receiving its F-35s over the next five years, and will see the CH-53K as the latest USMC aircraft come to 2^nd MAW prior to the rest of the USMC. Given that the VMX-1 detachment working the operational testing is actually at New River this makes a great deal of sense.

But given the approach which Maj. Gen. Cederholm outlined, he clearly thinks the Marines need to look at their new platforms in a specific way. That way was highlighted in a quote he cited from an individual he described as an “incredible defense leader” who asked him several years ago: “Why do we stuff the F-35 into our current operating concepts? Why don’t we take our current operating concepts and revise them based on the capabilities which the F-35 brings?”

Ed Timperlake and I would certainly agree with this point as we have been arguing such a point for more than a decade. I would quickly add, that the ability of an 8-ship F-35 wolfpack to fight as one, is not appreciated for the impact it could have if multi-domain warfare con-ops change.

But the Wing is receiving a new aircraft soon into the operational force, namely, the CH-53K and the CG had recently flown on the aircraft. He underscored: “I was amazed at the automation that’s built into the aircraft. To be honest with you, I can’t stop thinking about what the different possibilities are of how we can make this platform support our operating concept on the battlefield of today; but not just today, but on the battlefield of the future.”

And that is the real advantage of the reset which Maj. Gen. Cederholm is highlighting and working with his team at 2^nd MAW: focusing on evolving missions, leveraging new capabilities to expand their capabilities to execute those missions, and to build out the Marines so they continue to be able to be a highly-effective and lethal contributor to the defense wherever and whenever our Nation may need.