Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

U.S. Paratroopers Drop in on Talisman Sabre 2021

Posted on September 29, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/29/2021

United States Army troops from the 3rd Batallion, 509th Infantry Airbourne conducted an airborne assault dropping into ‘Kangaroo Dropzone’ near Charters Towers, Queensland for Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

The paratroopers, based in Alaska, jumped from RAAF C-17A Globemaster aircraft, testing interoperability between Australia and the U.S.

Held every two years, TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States, aimed to test Australian interoperability with the United States and other participating forces in complex warfighting scenarios.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Greece Signs Agreement to Buy French Frigates, September 2021

Posted on September 29, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France and Greece signed Sept. 28 a memorandum of understanding for the sale of three French frigates for defense and intervention (FDI), with an option for a fourth unit, in a deal worth some €3 billion ($3.5 billion), the armed forces ministry said.

“This Tuesday September 28, in the presence of the minister of the armed forces, the Greek defense minister signed with the executive chairmen of Naval Group and MBDA a memorandum of understanding, which envisages the acquisition by the Greek navy three frigates for defense and intervention built in France, with an option for a fourth, as well as their service and related weapons,” the ministry said in a statement.

Announcement of the prospective sale to Greece came almost two weeks after Australia cancelled a project to build 12 French designed conventional attack submarines, and switching to nuclear-powered submarines in a partnership with the UK and US, dubbed AUKUS.

Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the ministry, said that Australian cancellation was the “exceptional rather than the rule,” when asked in a press conference on the timing of the announcement of the Greek deal.

The defense and foreign ministers of France and Greece also signed a strategic partnership agreement, which included a pledge of mutual assistance, the spokesman said.

Tension between Greece and Turkey has risen in recent years, with conflicting claims over territorial rights in the eastern Mediterranean.

The warship sale to Greece was worth around €3 billion, shared between Naval Group (NG) and MBDA, and included three years of service, the spokesman said. The weapons included Aster 30 and Exocet missiles, and MU 90 torpedo. There will not be naval cruise missiles on the warship.

Talks on the deal were due to run for some three months to allow a contract to be signed.

The spokesman declined to say how the overall €3 billion amount would be shared between Naval Group, a shipbuilder, and missile maker MBDA. Those companies declined to give the value of their shares of the deal.

Asked about the absence of the corvettes in the expected order, the spokesman said the Gowind could meet the requirements of the Greek navy, and although there was no announcement today, that did not rule out talks with the Greek client.

French and Greek media reports had reported before the official announcement the naval deal would include the FDI frigates and Gowind corvettes, boosting the value to some €5 billion.

The FDI was designed for the export market, and Greece will be its first foreign client, if Athens signs the order contract.

There will be no change for delivery of the first FDI for the French navy, which will receive the first of class warship in 2024.

The French navy will then wait for the following two ships, as both will be redirected to the Greek navy in 2025, with the third vessel delivered to Greece in 2026.

The priority for delivering to Greece meant the second and third FDI for the French navy will be a few months late, with delivery respectively in early 2026 and late 2027, the spokesman said.

The fourth and fifth FDI for the French navy will be delivered as scheduled in 2028 and 2029.

Steel has already been cut for what could be the first FDI for Greece.

Talks will open with the French navy and the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office for the new delivery timetable, the spokesman said. A previously announced upgrade of the Lafayette stealth frigate will bridge the gap for the French navy until all the FDI are delivered.

The French navy is expected to sail 15 first rank warships by 2030.

All three FDI for the Greek navy would be built at Lorient, Brittany, northwest France, and Naval Group has held talks with Greek companies to act as local partners.

That shipbuilding in France differs from a previous plan NG set out in a May 28 statement with an Athens dateline. In that plan NG offered four FDI – with three of those built in Greece, two second hand French frigates as a gap filler, and modernization of the Greek navy’s fleet of Meko warships. Weapons offered on that batch of FDI included 21 rolling airframe missiles from the US. NG usually offers European missiles on its warships.

The offer of two used warships was later withdrawn as the French navy needed those vessels.

An upgrade of the Meko fleet would cost around €1 billion, while NG was offering the Gowind 2500 corvette at some €350 million per unit, Naval News website reported.

NG executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellett went to Athens last week to make the latest offer, Challenges business magazine reported Sept. 27.

The Greek quest for new warships drew rival offers from Babcock, Damen, Fincantieri, Lockheed Martin, and TKMS. Lockheed Martin pitched its HF2, based on the Littoral Combat Ship, and that offer was reported in French media as a serious contender.

The potential warship deal with Greece reflects the rising importance of French arms export within Europe, with sales to European allies accounting for 25 percent of all foreign sales of weapons last year, compared to 10 percent in 2017.

Greece has ordered 18 Rafale fighters, 12 of which are second hand from the French air force and six are new aircraft, in a deal worth €2.5 billion. Greece has also said it would order a further six Rafale.

Greece would receive a 4,500 ton warship with the Thales Sea Fire radar, and MBDA 32 Aster 30 B1, and Exocet MM40 Block 3C missiles. There will also be an anti-torpedo decoy.

The warships will be interoperable with European and Nato allies, NG said.

Featured Photo: Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (left) shakes hands with French president Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPA

Source for Photo: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/28/greece-to-buy-french-warships-in-multi-billion-euro-defence-deal

And according to the source cited above:

“The Greek navy, which had overseen the deal, had taken stock of tenders from countries that included France, the US and UK. Although the French bid was costlier, it was subsequently improved in the aftermath of the collapse of the submarine sale to Australia, according to Greek media, which reported that under the accord France had also agreed to offer military assistance if necessary.”

Marine Corps Leadership Focuses on Ground-Based Ship-Killing Missiles

Posted on September 28, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/28/2021

By Ashley Calingo

Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.—The Marine Corps’ top modernization priority is fulfilling the requirement for a ground-based anti-ship missile capability.

The operational requirement for this ship-killing capability is a relatively new development stemming from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts.

“As the Marine Corps’ first Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile capability, the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System is a force modernization priority central to the Marine Corps’ contribution to the Naval expeditionary force’s anti-surface warfare campaign,” said Lt. Col. John Fraser, Fires branch head at Marine Corps Combat Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration.

When integrated into sensor and communication networks supporting a naval or maritime kill chain and synchronized with the employment of other missile systems, the Marine Corps’ medium-range missile battery will serve as a component of the Naval expeditionary force’s stand-in force in support of the naval sea control effort, said Fraser.

MCSC plays a critical role in equipping Marines with the next-generation, modernized capabilities needed to meet and defeat an evolving threat. In two years, the Long Range Fires program office at MCSC has acquired NMESIS, an anti-ship missile capability meeting the GBASM requirement. Medium-range missile batteries serving as part of Marine Littoral Regiments conducting expeditionary advanced base operations will employ NMESIS, said Fraser.

“In a nutshell, NEMSIS is the ground-based launcher that gives us the ability to fire the Navy’s latest anti-ship missile, the Naval Strike Missile, or NSM,” said Joe McPherson, program manager for Long Range Fires at MCSC. “While the GBASM requirement can encompass multiple materiel solutions and systems under the GBASM requirement, NMESIS is the first system for the Marine Corps providing that ground-based, anti-ship missile capability.”

While the Department of Defense possesses ships and aircraft with anti-ship missile capabilities, McPherson said that the NMESIS uniquely complements these efforts.

“Everything our adversaries have designed over the last 20-30 years are intended to counter [the DOD’s] ships and aircraft,” said McPherson. “The Marine Corps bringing a ground-based solution complicates [the adversary’s] ability to counter our anti-ship capabilities since ground-based launchers, as we’ve found in previous wars, are hard to find. This is what NMESIS brings to the fight—a launcher that is survivable inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone.”

A key element of the system’s survivability is its teleoperated transport vehicle, called the Remotely-Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires.

“By going with a teleoperated vehicle, we increase the survivability of the crews because they’re not co-located with the launcher, which tends to be what gets targeted,” said McPherson.

Marines can control the ROGUE-Fires with a gamelike remote controller or command multiple launchers to autonomously follow behind a leader vehicle. The ROGUE-Fires vehicle, built on a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle platform, provides the Corps with a robust expeditionary system capable of operating anywhere.

Maneuverability and mobility are critical components of NMESIS, and Marines’ ability to operate ROGUE-Fires in both autonomous and teleoperated modes provides the operational commander with strategic options in his battlespace. The ability to displace crews and vehicles in a remote manner apart from one another is a critical step in increasing the survivability of Marines.

McPherson made sure to point out that the NMESIS is not considered an autonomous launcher; Marines are required to directly interact with the fire control system in order to fire the missile.

“The actual fire control system that fires the missile is completely separate from all of the self-driving and autonomy,” said McPherson. “There’s always a Marine who does the mission plan and actually fires the missile.”

The program office selected the Navy’s NSM after extensive market research and analysis on options within industry and the DOD. McPherson noted that missile development is a costly and potentially risky endeavor. The program office used a proven missile solution to eliminate that extra cost and mitigate risk.

“[The program office has] made excellent progress by adopting the Navy’s missile,” said McPherson. “We’ve been able to focus on developing the launcher itself. We’ve built multiple prototypes, successfully conducted multiple firing tests, gone through our initial mobility tests, and we’re on a good path to transition into the next phase of the program.”

The Marine Corps successfully demonstrated NMESIS during Large Scale Exercise 21 in August. The system launched an NSM that flew a non-linear flight path covering over 100 nautical miles before successfully hitting two targets.

“We made it fly a [non-linear] route to simulate what Marines would experience in a real-world situation, where they may have to navigate around friendly and neutral shipping or any other impediments between the ground-based firing position and the target,” said McPherson. “The ability for us to provide waypoints and plan a complex route improves the survivability and utility of the system before impact.”

Though the NMESIS launch at LSE 21 was not an official test associated with MCSC’s acquisition of the system, it provided an opportunity for MCSC and CD&I to gain valuable user feedback from the Marine community who will use the system in the future.

“We hope to get this in the hands of more Marines so we can get that operational feedback, and so they can get more reps and experience on the system,” said Lt. Col. Ryan Collins, Rockets and Artillery Capabilities Integration Officer, Marine Corps Capabilities Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration. “Because this is a new operational concept, we think it’s very important for them to get involved early in the process.”

In October, the program office plans to send NMESIS assets to Marines in Camp Pendleton, California, so they have additional opportunities to familiarize themselves with the system.

“They’ll be exercising with the system continuously for the next two years, so we can gain user feedback and develop all of the technical techniques and procedures for this new operational concept,” said Collins.

“This will also give us the opportunity to tie in all of the [command and control] and higher-level capabilities that are going to be needed to fully implement the system. Ultimately, Marines are slowly transitioning into getting the system in their hands and getting an understanding of it.”

The program office anticipates deploying their initial set of launchers to a Marine Littoral Regiment by the end of 2023, achieving a significant milestone for Force Design.

This article was published by the Marine Corps Systems Command on September 14, 2021.

For a recent interview with Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC who discussed Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific, see the following:

Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific: Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC

An artillery Marine from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines maneuvers a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher across the beach aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. During Large Scale Exercise 2021, the Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship with two Naval Strike Missiles which flew more than 100 nautical miles before striking the ship. LSE 2021 allowed Marines to refine concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment in order to provide sea control or contribute to sea denial near key maritime terrain. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Artillery Marines from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines escort a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher vehicle ashore aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. The Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship Aug. 15, 2021, with two Naval Strike Missiles, which flew 100 nautical miles away before finding their mark. The live-fire sinking exercise was part of Large Scale Exercise 2021, which saw 25,000 Marines and sailors from five numbered fleets and all three Marine Expeditionary Forces working together in a global full-spectrum scenario. Marines refined concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment in order to provide sea control or contribute to sea denial near key maritime terrain. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Pfc. Guerby Destine, 22, number two cannon cocker with 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and a Westbury, N.Y., native, drives a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 15, 2021. The Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship with two Naval Strike Missiles after sensing and targeting the vessel from their fires expeditionary advanced base while participating in Large Scale Exercise 2021. The exercise allowed Marines to support distributed maritime operations by providing expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment. More than 25,000 Marines and sailors took part in LSE 2021 from five numbered fleets and all three Marine Expeditionary Forces. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Japan’s Minister of Defense Address to Vietnamese Defense Ministry

Posted on September 28, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

On September 12, 2021, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo delivered an address at the Vietnamese defense ministry during his visit to the country. He referred to China’s new law, which authorizes its coast guard to use weapons. Kishi said Japan will never be able to accept the law, which he said is problematic in terms of its consistency with international law.

The defense minister also referred to Taiwan. He said Taiwan is located in a key position. He said the position links the East and South China seas, which have strategic importance for maritime security in the region. Kishi said that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are crucial for the region and the international community.

The defense minister highlighted the importance as well of redefining defense cooperation between Japan and Vietnam.

What follows is that address as published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence.

Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation Reaches “New Level”: A Globally-focused Partnership”

(Provisional Translation)

Xin chào. Nice to meet you, I am KISHI Nobuo, Minister of Defense of Japan.
It is a great honor to visit Vietnam on my first foreign visit as Minister of Defense. First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Vu Chien Thang, Director General of Foreign Relations Department, Ministry of National Defense, Vietnam, and all of today’s attendees for giving me this opportunity.

Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation is robust and has great potential to grow. Today, I am here to convey my thoughts on how we can further develop this partnership for the peace and stability of the region and the international community. For that reason, I would like to state my views candidly, including those points we, Vietnam and Japan, may not be on the same page.

Let me take this opportunity to talk about my special memories in Vietnam.My personal experience with Vietnam began nearly 20 years ago. Before becoming a member of the Diet, I traveled around the world while working for a trading company. I worked here in Vietnam for a year and a half from the summer of 2000. I ran around to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Can Tho in the Mekong River basin, Kamau at the southernmost tip, Phan Thiet by the sea, the Dalat Plateau, and the mountains near the border with China.

At the time when the “Doi Moi Policy” began to take off, I remember feeling that people and the city were booming and that the country was truly developing. And today, I am continuing to witness the development of Vietnam, which is a powerful leader in the region.

I distinctly remember an interaction with a generous and kind Vietnamese colleague. At the time, I had a dispute at work, and when I complained that “you said you could do it at that time,” he answered with big smile, “Mr. KISHI, if I said I couldn’t do it at that time, you would have been sad. I didn’t want to see your sad face”. I had no choice but to forgive him.

The fellow was not only easygoing and humorous, but also he worked hard. We were able to read each other and build a good relationship of trust, even if we were quarreled due to differences in thinking. Vietnam, where I worked hard with many people, is special to me. This is the reason why I made Vietnam the destination of my first foreign visit as Minister of Defense.

I am convinced that it is because of the people of Vietnam that we can further develop defense cooperation between our two countries. This belief hasn’t changed since I visited here as Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense in 2009.

“When in trouble, we help each other.” This is a virtue that the Japanese have long cherished. Friends help each other in times of trouble. In the unprecedented challenge of the pandemic, and in order to confront this difficulty together as a friend, Japan provided about 3 million doses of vaccine to the people of Vietnam, with whom we have a long and deep friendship.

If we recall, 10 years ago in March 2011, in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake – which was an unprecedented natural disaster – Japan received an extraordinarily large amount of donations and heartfelt condolences from many people in Vietnam. We received warm support in various forms such as letters, writings and drawings. Japan will never ever forget this.

“Gian nan mới biết bạn hiền”, how encouraging we Japanese are to be impressed and encouraged by the virtues of everyone expressed in this Vietnamese language. I would like to thank you again. And this was also an opportunity for us in Japan and Vietnam to realize once again that we share the virtue of helping our friends in trouble and how strong our “ties” are.Bilateral relations between Japan and Vietnam continue to develop. Since Japan-Vietnam relations were elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2014, the two countries have been developing strongly in all fields.

This extends to the field of defense. Based on the cumulative achievements of the various cooperation and exchanges to date, when I met with Defense Minister GIANG in June this year, he proposed raising defense cooperation between the two countries to a “New Level”.

I would like to make this visit a milestone marking the beginning of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation moving to a “New Level”.

Earlier, I mentioned that we, Japan and Vietnam, share the virtue of a commitment to help our friends in the face of difficulties. And, like this virtue, we share other universal values that are essential to regulate international relations. One of them is the “rule of law” at sea.

What has connected Japan and Vietnam since ancient times was the vast and abundant sea. From the 16th to 17th centuries, Japanese merchants freely navigated from the East China Sea to the South China Sea on the “Goshuinsen”, Japanese merchant sailing ships, seeking widespread trade with Southeast Asian countries. The “Raienbashi”, also known as “Nihonbashi”, which still remains in the ancient city of Hoi An, the hometown of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, is reminiscent of the lively exchanges between Japan and Vietnam at that time. Free and open seas have been the cornerstone of our prosperity since ancient times.

The precept that Japan continues to advocate for at sea is very simple and basic. Japan has consistently promoted the “rule of law” even at sea. Our prosperity would not be possible without the freedom of navigation and flight, and the safety of sea lanes.

Vietnam, which is geopolitically located at the overlap of Southeast Asia and East Asia, plays an important role in the region. We, Japan, highly appreciated Vietnam’s leadership in the region during its ADMM Plus while emphasizing the universal value of the “rule of law”. Those of us, who share values, have a common mission to protect the peace and stability of the region.

We are now facing an unprecedentedly severe reality, including in the security arena, in addition to the difficulties of dealing with COVID-19.

Especially in the sea and airspace of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, there are cases where actions are being taken, based on one-sided assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order.

Freedom of navigation and freedom of flight must not be unduly violated. To that end, it is important to repeatedly promote the importance of the “rule of law” and the basic principle of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and above all, to put it into practice.

In the East China Sea, attempts to change the status quo by coercion continue, including in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, which is an inherent territory of Japan. The situation is becoming more and more serious, with repeated cases of vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard that have intruded into territorial waters, approaching Japanese fishing vessels.

In the South China Sea, China has continued to militarize disputed terrain, frequently conducted military exercises, and is believed to have launched ballistic missiles, escalating its actions. Japan strongly opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion and any activities that raise tensions, and shares concerns with Vietnam.

In February of this year, the Chinese Coast Guard Law came into effect. This law includes problematic stipulations in terms of consistency with international law, such as its application to ambiguous maritime areas and regarding the authority to use weapons. The justified rights of all relevant countries, including Japan and Vietnam, should never be undermined due to the Coast Guard Law, and we can never tolerate anything that could heighten tensions on the water, such as in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Additionally, Taiwan is located at the nexus of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, which is a key point for regional maritime security. Peace and stability in the Straits of Taiwan are important to both the region and the international community. It has been a consistent position of Japan to expect that it will be peacefully resolved through direct dialogues by relevant parties.

Furthermore, it is a hard fact that there are various challenges to ensure the peace and stability of the the Indo-Pacific region.

First, the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea, regardless of their range, is a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions, which not only threatens regional peace and stability, but is also a serious issue for the international community as a whole. Japan is working with the countries concerned to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions toward the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program – and cooperation with Vietnam is important.

Regarding the situation in Myanmar, Japan is strongly demanding the immediate suspension of violence towards civilians, the release of detained parties, and the early recovery of the democratic political system, in cooperation with the international community. Japan regards the “five consensuses” as the first step toward a breakthrough, and welcomes the appointment of H.E. Erywan, Minister of Foreign Affairs II of Brunei, as a special envoy to ASEAN. In the future, it will be important to achieve concrete results by implementing the initiative.

It is also necessary to respond to global issues such as cyber security and the spread of new coronavirus infections.

The Indo-Pacific region, where we live, is at the heart of the vitality of the world. And therefore, the peace and stability of the region is essential for the prosperity of the world.

The attempts to change the status quo by coercion that we facing, can affect not only this region but the entire international community, and should be seen as a global challenge that threatens the existing international order.

However, there are naturally limits to what we can do as a single country. It is important to utilize all partnerships to deal with this.

Above all, we need to work together to maintain and strengthen the rules-based, free and open international order, which is grounded in international law and has brought us prosperity. Under these circumstances, what we are witnessing now is that like-minded countries share this vision of what the Indo-Pacific region should be, and are concerned with and working toward regional peace and stability. It’s something we’re trying to strengthen like never before.

Countries that are key partners of Japan are also paying attention to Vietnam. From the United States, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin visited the region at the end of July and Vice President Kamala D. Harris visited the region in August. Both senior officials chose to stop in Vietnam as part of their travel. This clearly demonstrates that the United States recognizes the strategic importance of Vietnam.

And this year, of particular interest is the increased involvement of European countries in the region. UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace, who visited Japan in July, visited Hanoi for the first time as the British Defense Minister. The launch of the “Tilt to the Indo-Pacific” policy is groundbreaking for Britain.

In order to strongly promote Japan’s vision for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, cooperation with European countries – that share the ambition to uphold the “rule of law” – is indispensable. Since taking office as Minister of Defense, I have been actively working to make Europe’s commitment to this region even stronger and permanent

In 2019, Vietnam together with all other ASEAN countries, announced the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)” as their own path. In it, the rule of law, openness, freedom, transparency, and inclusiveness are promoted as the principles of action. Japan fully supports AOIP, which shares essential principles with FOIP. Going forward, we will continue to encourage tangible, cooperative efforts to realize AOIP, while supporting the centrality and unity of ASEAN.

The expansion of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific will help ensure regional peace and stability.

What should the irreplaceable friends, Japan and Vietnam, do in the midst of this expansion of global partnerships?

My answer is to evolve Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation to a “New Level” that is suitable for the present era. And by doing so, I would like to walk together as comrades holding hands, to fulfill our obligation to protect the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Until now, the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam have strengthened their ability to protect their homelands by continuous endeavors. Based on their respective abilities, we have promoted cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of fields between the two countries, and the results have brought great benefits to both Japan and Vietnam.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces are now contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, and the existence of the powerful Vietnamese People’s Army – which continues to further enhance its capabilities –has become essential to maintain peace and stability in the region. In light of the stark reality of the security environment surrounding us, our cooperation must aim for further heights.

In other words, in the spirit of “when in trouble, we help each other” and “Gian nan mới biết bạn hiền”, we are friends who give our hands to other friends facing difficulties in this region and in the international community. We should say that we have entered that stage.

Here today, I would like to “redefine” that Japan and Vietnam defense cooperation aims to contribute more positively to the peace and stability of, not just our two countries, but to the region and the international community. This is the intent of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation in the “new stage” I mentioned earlier.

Both Japan and Vietnam will cooperate to address various security issues in the region while emphasizing the “rule of law”. We will work closely not only bilaterally, but also with regional countries and ASEAN for the benefit of all countries. We would like to provide a lasting peace of mind to the local and international community. For Japan, it should be said that Vietnam is one of the important countries with whom we are sharing the same boat

With cooperation reaching this “new level,” let’s strengthen Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation even further while shifting our attention to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific and the world.

Now we have a new tool for that. It is the Japan-Vietnam Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement signed yesterday.

In the future, under this agreement, we will accelerate discussions toward the realization of tangible equipment transfers, such as cooperation in the field of vessels that contribute to regional maritime security.

And we will expand the scope of cooperation to unprecedented fields and new domains.

For example, responding to threats in cyberspace is an urgent global security challenge. Last December, I announced efforts to improve cyber security capabilities with ASEAN countries. We will work closely with Vietnam to improve cybersecurity in the region so that this initiative will serve as a model case for Japan-Vietnam ASEAN defense cooperation at the “new level.”

The global spread of coronavirus infections has also had a major impact on security. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministers’ teleconference in November last year, we agreed to promote cooperation in the field of infectious disease control.

In light of these developments, the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam will continue to coordinate the signing of a memorandum of understanding in these two important fields, in order to promote cooperation in the fields of cyber security and military medicine.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are also a field in which Japan-Vietnam cooperation is remarkable. In order to improve the capacity of PKO personnel, Japan launched the United Nations Triangular Partnership Project (UNTPP) with the United Nations in 2015. So far, the Japan Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces have dispatched a total of about 230 instructors, and trained about 360 personnel – from 17 countries in Asia and Africa – for UN missions.

Since 2018, with the full cooperation of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Japan Self-Defense Forces instructors have been training personnel from Asian countries here in Hanoi, and under the banner of the United Nations. Such cooperation between Japan and Vietnam strongly supports UN peacekeeping operations.

In addition, Japan and Vietnam have been co-chairing the ADMM Plus Experts’ Working Group on PKO since this year, and held their first meeting in April. Over the next three years, we will lead constructive discussions between participating countries and PKO experts.

This kind of cooperation between our two countries shows the strong will we both share to actively contribute to the peace and stability of the international community. We will continue to promote further cooperation in the future.

Today, I have a grand and ambitious vision of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation at a “new stage.” Some of you who have heard this aspiration may wonder, “Is it really possible?”

But I’m very convinced. With the steadfast Vietnamese people I know, I am sure that I will be able to overcome many challenges and achieve this immense and lofty goal.

Today, as partnerships that are stronger than ever expand in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and Vietnam will work together to foster positive outcomes. Furthermore, in cooperation with associated countries, we will work together to address common issues, and to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the international community.

US Air Force Special Operations FARP

Posted on September 27, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/27/2021

U.S. Air Force Forward Area Refueling Point personnel assigned to the 18th Logistics Rediness Squadron refuel an MH-60 Blackhawk with U.S. Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 at Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal, Northern Territory, Australia, July 18, 2021.

TINDAL, NT, AUSTRALIA

07.18.2021

Video by Lt. Travis Weger U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office

France, the EU and the Indo-Pacific

Posted on September 26, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/26/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The temperature in the Indo Pacific region has risen for the Western allies in general and for France in particular.

President Emmanuel Macron clearly sees a pressing need for a switch to a new principal partner after Australia cancelled a planned order for the French designed Barracuda conventional attack submarine, deemed by Canberra to be inadequate to meet a perceived rising threat from China.

A highly public sign came with Macron’s Sept. 21 phone call to the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, to discuss cooperation in the Indo Pacific.

Macron pointed up French commitment to a strengthened strategic autonomy for India, including its industrial and technology base, the Elysée office said in a statement.

The French geopolitical tie to the Indo China region will not be weakened by the loss of the Australian submarine contract, the armed forces minister said Sept. 24.

“We are a nation of the Indo-Pacific and breaking off a contract will not change anything,” Florence Parly told Le Monde afternoon daily. “We still have some two million French nationals in the region, 7,000 service personnel, and 93 percent of our exclusive economic zone.”

The European Union also sees the importance of the contested region, as could be seen in the publication on Sept. 16 of the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific.

“The irony is that the Europeans had drafted a strategy on the Indo Pacific when this AUKUS partnership was announced,” Parly said. “That proves the Europeans are capable of deciding collectively where their interests lie.”

The minister was referring to the AUKAS alliance between Australia, the UK and US announced by US president Joe Biden on Sept. 15, with the center piece news that Canberra would acquire nuclear powered attack submarines in place of the French diesel-electric boats.

The EU Indo Pacific strategy showed member states saw the need to intervene outside the borders of the European Union, she said, and this was part of building European defense.

That wider role of the EU will be set out in a white paper, dubbed strategic compass, due to be published next year when Macron takes up the rotating six-month presidency of the European Union on Jan. 1.

“We have to make a choice: either Europe stands up or Europe fades away,” the defense minister said.

It remains to be seen the extent to which EU member states will step up to deliver a European military presence, one that would project power into the Indo Pacific, where the threat from Beijing was seen as great enough to prompt Canberra’s opting to acquire nuclear powered submarines with US and UK backing.

“The German government understands the French anger on the submarine decision,” a German diplomat said. “The decision showed the need to intensify work on a European Union multilateral policy for the Indo Pacific.

Indo Pacific Poses Problems

There is the law of the sea, right of navigation, and there is also the risk of poking the bear with China and the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

The diplomatic and operational sensitivity can be seen by the German navy’s dispatch of a frigate to fly the flag in the South China Sea.

A German frigate, the Bayern, sailed out of Wilhelmshaven naval base, northwestern Germany, for deployment in the South China Sea, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle reported Aug. 2. That would be the first time in almost 20 years a German warship would sail in those contested waters, in which China claims vast stretches of open sea and islands.

However, the German frigate’s voyage to the far side risked sending an “unclear” message, a research note from Chatham House, a London-based think tank, said May 4.

“Due to internal differences within the German government, the original plans for the deployment appear to have changed to specifically avoid antagonizing Beijing,” the note said.

Germany said it would not sail the frigate within 12 nautical miles of any territory claimed by China, the note said, although “maintaining ambiguity” about the Bayern’s deployment would have made “strategic sense.”

Despite the German statement of maritime intent, the Chinese foreign ministry warned that the principle of freedom of navigation “should not be used as an excuse to endanger the sovereignty and security of littoral countries,” the note said.

The German defense ministry had appeared to change the frigate’s course, so the warship would sail anti-clockwise rather than clockwise as previously planned, the note said, and that ruled out the Bayern engaging a naval passing exercise – or passex – with the British carrier group led by the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier.

“So, rather than coordinating with European allies, let alone the United States, Germany is doing its own thing – a ‘missed opportunity’ according to one German official,” the note said. Berlin appeared to be sending the Bayern in response to pressure from France, the UK, US, and Japan, rather than standing up to China.

“It is therefore trying to square the circle of how to deploy a warship to the South China Sea without appearing to challenge China,” the note said.

China refused to allow the Bayern to call in at the port of Shanghai, the Agence-France Presse news agency reported, signalling displeasure at the German warship.

The German foreign ministry published last September its Indo Pacific guidelines, which pointed to increasing German naval activity in the region, including more liaison officers and sailing warships, South China Morning Post reported April 25.

China also issued a warning to the Royal Navy as the Queen Elizabeth carrier group prepared to sail into the South China Seas last month.

“The People’s Liberation Army Navy is at a high state of combat readiness,” reported the Global Times, a daily close to the Chinese communist party.

Reliving Trafalgar

The Australian submarine switch was a Trafalgar moment for France, showing Paris had perhaps overestimated its ability to “win partners in the Indo Pacific,” French website AeroDefenseNews reported. France was not a major power as it lacked the means, and therefore the influence over local actors in the region.

“Naval Group and France paid the price of being actors too small in the Indo Pacific, where there are two great rivals standing face to face – China and the United States,” the report said.

That Australian cancellation and the AUKUS alliance of the three English speaking nations sounded a wake up call for Europe, the report said, and it was up to the European Union to step up and play a full role, and make its voice heard, the report said.

Featured Photo: French President Emmanuel Macron and Indian PM Narendra Modi at a meeting in the Chateau of Chantilly, near Paris, on August 22, 2019. © Pascal Rossignal, AFP

Source for Photo: https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210921-macron-and-modi-vow-to-act-jointly-in-indo-pacific-as-submarine-row-intensifies

You Have Heard of AUKUS: But What About Wedgetail?

Posted on September 26, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

The news this past few days has been filled with discussions, arguments, “fake news,” and other desiderata about the Australian decision to enter the nuclear attack club.

But what can be missed is that the Australians have been driving innovations in the United States and the United Kingdom far before they sought to work with the nuclear attack submarine states.

A clear example of this is the E-7 or the Wedgetail.

During my years of visiting Australia, I had the chance to watch the RAAF bring a new air combat system into service and then maturity, namely, the E-7.

This was a trail blazing effort by the RAAF which has led the way in many respects with regard to a new generation of air battle management C2 aircraft, and one which enters into the world of tron warfare given the software evolution driven by the Commonwealth’s partnership with Northrup Grumman.

The author during a visit to RAAF Base Williamtown in August 2016 standing by an E-7.

The RAF became convinced of the E-7s capability to move out from a path of modernizing their AWACS to procuring the Wedgetail.

There is a clear desire for PACAF to do the same.

This is a case of the RAAF leading the way with the RAF and the USAF to follow, so to speak.

And an industrial partnership between the United States and the Commonwealth which has spearheaded this effort.

In a piece by Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, published on September 24, 2021, the interest of the USAF in the Wedgetail was highlighted.

“[The E-7 Wedgetail] is already a proven capability, and having seen it in action, I think it’s something we do want to use. And at the same time, if this becomes a (budget) line, we’ll probably start to replace some [E-3s].” – Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Charles Q. Brown Jr., 21 September 2021.

Yesterday at the Air Force Association gathering in Maryland, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force put forward the top unfunded requirement of the Pacific Air Force for the Indo Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) – the E-7 Wedgetail.

The Wedgetail is the most effective in the world today as an airborne Command and Control center with radar capability to see low profile, low heat cruise missiles at extensive ranges, enabling cross-domain tracking to warn and effectors to negate. Australia, South Korea, and Turkey have them in service today. The United States Air Force had not chosen to invest in this capability, due to the promise of space-based capabilities to do a similar mission that have still yet to be developed and operationally deployed.

Further terrestrial-based over the horizon radars have also yet to be developed and operationally deployed for this specific mission.

The Wedgetail is a far more capable and reliable replacement for the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Besides upgrading to a new 737-based platform from the 1950’s era 707 platform, the E-7 replaces the E-3’s Cold War capability and age with a more powerful radar and the newest battle-management and communications technology, and it provides significantly longer detection range and vastly better target discrimination and combat identification.

Since the 1970s, the AWACS has been the US Air Force and NATO’s primary airborne battle management and aerial target tracking platform. The USAF has an inventory of 31 E-3s, operationally assigned at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, and overseas at Kadena Air Base, Japan and al-Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates.

In previous decades, the AWACS has been a capable command and control platform, seeing extensive combat use in engagements like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, but its advanced age will require us to phase it out in the 2030s.

The markedly increased reliability of the 737 platform variant, with a global logistics system to support, will result in more consistent and frequent aircraft availability for operational and training missions. The AWACS is also poorly equipped to detect cruise missiles, as the AN/APY-1/2 radar inside the E-3’s rotating radome is limited in its ability to detect hypersonic threats and those missile threats with a small radar cross-section.

Long range aircraft launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles from our near peers of China and Russia can range the territories of the United States, and these weapons are very difficult to track with ground-based radar due to their low radar profile and the curvature of the Earth obscuring their low trajectory.

This leads to these cruise missiles escaping detection by ground-based radar until they are at close range, with much less time for our effectors to engage and intercept the target. With hypersonic cruise missiles currently in development by both Russia and China, this is no longer viable, due to the target’s extreme speed; there is simply not enough margin of error with such a close, fast-flying hypersonic missile. In a rapidly evolving threat environment, our ability to defend the US homeland is degrading, with Guam and Alaska at the highest risk.

“[China has] missiles with very long range, low radar cross-section that can evade our legacy warning capabilities. Missiles with the range to launch from over Russian territory and strike all of Canada, all of Alaska and well into the United States of America without even leaving their home territory.” – Gen Glen D. VanHerck, Commander, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

Over-the-Horizon radar, airborne early warning, and space-based sensors will be increasingly critical for missile defense in the coming years. OTH radar uses high frequency radio waves bounced off the ionosphere to increase detection range and provides persistent capability.

To maintain constant airborne early warning for the homeland would not be cost effective, as mentioned in this congressional research report, which means that effective long-range over-the-horizon capabilities or space based sensors and satellites must be the primary choice to defend the CONUS. Airborne early warning E-7s can fill the gap and most appropriately defend Guam, Alaska and our forward deployed assets along with our Allies.

The E-7 is a proven platform, on a standard, commercially available Boeing 737-700 airframe, in current production which will speed up procurement and cost efficiency for the United States. Australia has participated in exercises in the Pacific with the United States using their Wedgetail with great success and exponentially advanced capability. The United Kingdom expressed its intent to retire its E-3s in 2021 and has ordered three E-7s. There is a warm production line that the United States will use, to further boost efficiency and lower costs.

In the interim, with the AWACS reliability running low, we need a capable airborne early warning and control platform. The Navy currently operates the carrier-capable E-2C and E-2D, the latter of which achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in 2014, and the platform is expected to be sustained for another 30 years. The E-2 can be used in the defense of carriers and other naval assets against incoming stealthy cruise missiles.

Guam is currently inadequately defended and air and missile defense of the island is Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander Admiral John Aquilino’s #1 priority. While we wait for the E-7 to be procured and become operational, E-2 wings on shore could be detailed to Guam for overhead cruise missile defense detection.

In effect, AUKUS existed many years before the recent variant was announced.

The featured photo: Airmen from RAAF No.2 Squadron designed and painted ‘nose- art’ on an E-7A Wedgetail whilst deployed on Operation OKRA in the Middle East. The art commemorated the 50th anniversary of the downing of the No. 2 Squadron Canberra bomber, ‘Magpie 91’, on 3 November 1970 in jungle on the Laotian-Vietnamese boarder during the Vietnam War.

Vice Admiral Mike Noonan Explains the Australian Nuclear Submarine Decision

Posted on September 26, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mike Noonan said the announcement was the single most consequential decision made in relation to the navy in his lifetime. In this video, he explains why.

We have published a four part series on defense.info focused on the shift from the new conventionally powered attack submarine to a new nuclear powered attack submarine.

In the first piece in that series, the logic and context of the decision was the focus of attention.

The recent announcement of the decision by the Australian government to cancel their diesel submarine contract and to acquire nuclear attack submarines is a significant one.

There is much already written about the announcement and its consequences, but what can get lost in the noise is really the key point: this decision launches the next phase of Australian strategic development, but down a path which as been evolving for some time.

At the heart of the reason the Aussies have done so is clearly the Chinese behavior and virtual war with Australia. Australia as a continent is a key challenge for Chinese ambitions in the region. They are a continent which can stage long-range forces against Chinese military operations. The Chinese Communist leaders have done what they should not have: Awakening the quiet power in the Pacific to shaping a longer range defense force, closely allied with the major competitors of China.

Only Australia really counts in terms of deterring China in a fundamental geographical way: they are a firmly liberal democratic country which rejects Chinese Communism. And as such, the Chinese economic and political engagements in Australia, coupled with the political and cyber warfare that the Chinese have engaged in with the clear desire to destabilize Australia has been met with firm resolve. And the Chinese have responded by escalation up to an including direct military threats against Australia.

This is the driver of the decision. Full stop. It is not about not loving the French, and an inability to work with France or ignoring their contractual obligations under the contracts signed earlier. When Australia made the decision to go with the French Naval Group and build a long ranger diesel submarine, the strategic context was very different than it is today. I will deal with the French and other issues in aa later article, but here I am focusing on the core issue which is the strategic context in which Australia sought to acquire nuclear attack submarines.

When the premise of your decision changes, it is important to recognize that and to re-calibrate, re-load and rethink what you are doing and why. For the Australian government, the expensive effort to build a new class of diesel submarines was a key part of dealing with the regional dynamics changing in their region. But in only five years, the Xi government has pursued a course which is changing the course of Pacific defense by the liberal democracies and their allies.

I am writing this article while in my digs in Paris, France. But I have spent the last few days talking with a number of my Australian and French colleagues. This is a strategic event which in the words of one Australian colleague: “This is the most significant defense acquisition in my lifetime by the Australian government.”

But it also is a launch point for the next phase of Australian strategic development which is itself part of a trajectory which was launched earlier.

During my visits to Australia since 2014, I had a chance to work with the Williams Foundation and then became a Fellow with the Foundation. I have published a book which lays out what I learned during my visits in terms of shaping a narrative built around the seminars held twice a year by the Foundation. Those seminars and my book provide a very clear record of how the ADF has rethought its place in the world and how to operate more effectively.

The F-35 acquisition decision at the beginning of my visits was more than a platform choice; it was the next step in RAAF modernization but one which reached out to the joint force and has driven the ADF voyage on building a fifth-generation force. Now the nuclear submarine decision is the keystone to the next phase of this journey, one which is about extending the reach of the ADF throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region.

The precursor for this decision lies not in submarines but a growing concern with the need for the ADF to have longer-range strike capability.

In 2018, one of our seminars dealt directly with the long-range strike requirement.

In the terms of reference for the seminar held on August 22, 2018 this key point was made: “The ability to strike at range brings a new dimension into any unfolding strategic scenario which, in itself, may often deter escalation into armed conflict. While in the event of escalation occurring, the absence of a long-range strike capability both limits Australia’s options for strategic maneuver and concedes to an adversary the ability to dictate the terms of engagement.

“An independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends; signals a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security; and has the capacity to influence strategic outcomes short of resorting to armed conflict.”

The Morrison government announced its defense strategy in July 2020 and that announcement is where I started my book and then looked backwards. I labelled that strategy as a strategic reset.

And that reset began with weapons not platforms.

On March 31, 2021, the Prime Minister announced a new effort in the weapons area.

“The Morrison Government will accelerate the creation of a $1 billion Sovereign Guided Weapons Enterprise, boosting skilled jobs and helping secure Australia’s sovereign defence capabilities. The Department of Defence will now select a strategic industry partner to operate a sovereign guided weapons manufacturing capability on behalf of the Government as a key part of the new Enterprise. The new Enterprise will support missile and guided weapons manufacturing for use across the Australian Defence Force.”

In doing so, the Australian government opened up discussions with the Trump Administration with regard to acquiring not only weapons but an ability to produce those weapons on Australian soil.

A key element of this discussion revolved around naval weapons. Which also highlights a key aspect of how the ADF has worked with the United States military over the past few years. The ADF has a close working relationship with the U.S. Navy and the USMC.

In fact, the RAAF has bought and operated a number of naval air platforms over the years in addition to the close working relationship which the Royal Australian Navy has with the U.S. Navy in operations and training. And the RAAF is currently operating a number of key systems which will interact nicely with the new submarine, notably Triton and the P-8.

In the course of these discussions, the aperture opened on the possibility of the acquisition of a platform which could carry some of these weapons deep into the Pacific, namely, the nuclear submarine.

Because the nuclear navy is in many ways the crown jewel of the U.S. military, the ADF leadership has full confidence in them as partners. For the U.S. Navy, having worked for a long period with the British Navy, and in the case of the Astute class having engaged through its contractors in direct support for the UK at home in building the new nuclear attack submarine, a template was available which could be applied to the Australian case.

The re-set of Australian defence is wide-ranging and includes re-working Australia defense ecosystems for greater resilience, logistical depth, and shifts in geographical focus, namely towards Western Australia and the Northern territories. Having visited Western Australia in 2020 and the Collins submarine base just prior to the pandemic shut down of Australia, it is clear that a buildup of infrastructure in this area up to and including the Northern Territories is a core aspect of any strategic reset.

And the logical next step for the RAAF to join in this journey would be to acquire a long-range bomber.