Spain, France and UK Work the Next Round of Baltic Air Policing

05/02/2020

Spain, France and the United Kingdom will take up NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission starting in May, guarding the skies over the Baltic region for the next four months.

The three NATO Allies are replacing air force detachments from Belgium and Poland which have protected the airspace of NATO’s three Baltic Allies Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since January. The Spanish and British air force contingents will operate out of Siauliai airbase in Lithuania, while the French air force will fly from Amari in Estonia. Spain is the lead nation for the mission.

“We thank Spain, France and the UK for taking over NATO’s Baltic-air policing mission”, said NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu. “This 24/7 mission demonstrates that our commitment to the security of our Allies is rock-solid and that our vital work goes on despite the coronavirus pandemic,” she stressed.

NATO’s Baltic Air Policing deployment is a defensive mission that sees allies sending planes to patrol the airspace of the three Baltic States, who do not have fighter jets of their own. The Air Policing programme keeps fighter jets on alert 24/7 and ready to scramble in case of suspicious air activity close to the Alliance’s borders.

The mission which has been running since 2004 took on greater prominence following Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014. NATO aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aircraft near the Baltic States which frequently fail to adhere to international air safety norms. In 2019, Allied jets attached to NATO’s Baltic air-policing mission scrambled around 200 times to safeguard allied airspace.

NATO

April 29, 2020.

A UK Military Response to COVID-19: RAF Helo Support

Recently, three RAF Puma helicopters have been dispatched to Kinloss barracks in Moray, Scotland.

They are there to be able to respond to COVID-19 incidents throughout Scotland.

According to a May 1, 2020 story by David Mackay published by the Press and Journal:

“One of the Pumas at Kinloss Barracks has been tasked specifically for medical evacuations with one for transporting supplies and another on standby.

“The aircraft has been selected for the task because it can land in small locations with less disruption from the blades while still being able to carry two stretchers and a medical crew.

“A support crew of 56 personnel have travelled to the Army base in Moray from Oxfordshire for the mission.

“Squadron Leader Johnny Longland, the Puma detachment commander, explained the recent training in the Western Isles has involved several agencies.

“He said: “We have paramedics from the islands working with our crewmen to look at how they can integrate their equipment with the Puma.

“NHS Scotland and coastguard teams of paramedics, clinicians and planners were primarily looking at how they can put stretchers in the back of the aircraft and continue to perform their essential care for the patient.”

The SEAD Mission in an A2AD World

By Australian Defence and Business Review

The US Department of Defense defines the Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) mission as that which ‘neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defences by destructive and/or disruptive means.’

The so-called ‘Endless Wars’ in the Afghan and Iraqi theatres have seen US and allied air forces operating in a largely benign air environment. Afghanistan had no integrated air defence system (IADS) to speak of while Iraq’s air defences had, for all intents and purposes, been destroyed via the US-led Operation Desert Storm to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the subsequent enforcement of no fly zones over the north and south of the country, and the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 which removed Saddam Hussein from power.

The war in Syria has been the transitional conflict for US and allied forces as the harbinger of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategies that these forces may face in future confrontations.

Initially the conflict resembled an insurgency: a civil war pitting the regime of President Bashir al Assad against an assortment of opposition groups. But Russia’s overt involvement from 2013 saw the deployment of at least two batteries of Almaz-Antey S-400 (SA-21 Growler) high-altitude, long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

This was concurrent with the commencement of US-led air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency group, and against chemical weapons targets belonging to the regime. The latter followed Assad’s chlorine gas attack on the city of Douma in south-west Syria in April 2018.

Thus these retaliatory air strikes performed by British, French and US forces were undertaken in contested airspace, placing SEAD at centre stage as a key component to counter A2AD strategies, while underscoring the fact that the US and her allies can no longer expect to always conduct air operations in benign environments….

SEAD can be brought to bear via specific aircraft, weapons and subsystems.

The RAAF’s purchase of 12 Boeing E/A-18G Growler air defence suppression aircraft has led the field vis-à-vis regional enhancements of SEAD capabilities. These aircraft currently use the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS), reportedly capable of jamming, from 30,000ft, ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars transmitting across 30MHz to 10GHz wavebands at ranges of up to 400 kilometres.

But the AN/ALQ-99 will soon be replaced, initially by Raytheon’s AN/ALQ-249(V)1 Next Generation Jammer-Mid Band (NGJ-MB). This covers a 2GHz to 6GHz waveband and is considered a sea-change in capability by employing an active electronically scanned array (AESA) and a software defined architecture making the system more reliable and capable than its predecessor. The RAAF and the US Navy could receive these pods early this decade.

The ALQ-249(V)1 will be followed by the (V)2 Next Generation Jammer-Low Band (NGJ-LB) encompassing a 100MHz to 2GHz waveband (for which Northrop Grumman and L3Harris have been awarded development contracts), and the (V)3 Next Generation Jammer-High Band (NGJ-HB) covering the 6GHz to 18GHz band of the spectrum. These latter two pods could enter RAAF and US Navy service in the mid-to-late-2020s.

To replace the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering capabilities of the RAAF’s Lockheed Martin AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, fitted as they are with an early version of BAE Systems’ AN/ALR-2001 Odyssey Electronic Support Measure (ESM). Gathering SIGINT across a 500MHz to 18GHz waveband, the air force will acquire four Gulfstream MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft (see ADBR Nov-Dec 2019 issue).

The kinetic aspects of the RAAF’s SEAD posture will be enhanced via the acquisition of Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, an evolution of the Raytheon AGM-88C HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile). The ‘echo’ version adds a Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) and a Millimetric Wave Radar (MMW).

While the MMW will collect detailed radar imagery of the missile’s end game for later battle damage assessment, the GPS/INS addition is vital for nullifying the ‘switch off’ tactic where radar operators may believe that they are under attack and switch off their radar in hope that the incoming anti-radiation missile will lose its lock on the radar’s RF (Radio Frequency) emissions. The GPS/INS can store the coordinates of the targeted radar should it be deactivated.

The use of GPS coordinates also enables the missile to be loaded with a set of parameters within which it can engage targets but which beyond it cannot fly, thus helping avoid collateral damage. In 1999 during Operation Allied Force, the NATO-led effort to end ethnic cleansing in the Balkans territory of Kosovo, an AGM-88B erroneously hit houses and cars in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.

Some air forces may choose not to procure dedicated ARMs, as these weapons are not cheap – the AGM-88E has a reported unit price of up to US$870,000. Jamming pods offer a potential alternative. They are cost-effective as a one-time purchase open to repeated use, unlike ARMs which must be replenished.

New pods and ARMs are in the offing from European suppliers, including the pan-European Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) pod, Saab’s Electronic Attack Jammer Pod (EAJP), and MBDA’s SPEAR-EW loitering electronic attack weapon.

France, Spain and Sweden are jointly developing the AEA via a European Union initiative to develop an escort jammer to protect packages of aircraft in contested airspace. Specifically, the pod must counter contemporary and emerging SAM systems with engagement ranges of up to 400km – a veiled reference to the S-400 which could greatly restrict EU air forces’ use of stand-off weapons during future conflicts, according to the original AEA solicitation.

While not disclosed, the pod may be effective against radars transmitting in frequencies of 2GHz to 40GHz, encompassing the majority of early warning, ground-based air surveillance, and FC/GCI radars that such aircraft may encounter in a future conflict.

The AEA programme may also reflect the reality that, in future, EU nations might have to perform operations outside NATO auspices if the US is unable or unwilling to offer assistance. Hence, they will require robust electronic attack capabilities to accompany the robust kinetic SEAD assets currently maintained by EU members in the form of the Panavia Tornado-ECR air defence suppression aircraft –flown by Italy’s Aeronautica Militaire and Germany’s Luftwaffe – deploying the AGM-88.

Saab’s EAJP is designed to engage low frequency radars across a 150MHz to 4GHz waveband. Early-warning and ground-based air surveillance radars transmitting in VHF/UHF wavebands are an increasing concern – Russia has made notable investments into such systems with NIIDAR’s Podsolnukh-E and NNIIRT’s 55ZH6M Nebo-M VHF radars which entered service from 2000 being two examples.

Such radars may be able detect aircraft with a low radar cross-section. While not capable of producing sufficient track quality for SAM systems, they could indicate to fighters an area where hostile aircraft may be present. Jonas Grönberg, Saab’s head of emerging EW products, says that the EAJP is an escort jammer designed to get strike packages safely through contested airspace for use “against low frequency threats… to help get a strike package within stand-off range to fire their weapons”. The EAJP has been developed privately by Saab and a prototype is undergoing flight testing. Grönberg says the pod could complete development in the next three years.

Meanwhile MBDA has revitalised the air-launched decoy via its SPEAR-EW initiative. SPEAR-EW is an outgrowth of MBDA’s Select Precision Effects at Range-3 (SPEAR-3) air-to-surface weapon currently under development for the RAF.

MBDA says the SPEAR-EW, “will act as a stand-in jammer to greatly increase the survivability of friendly aircraft and suppress enemy air defences”. It is reasonable to assume the SPEAR-EW will transmit jamming waveforms across an 8GHz to 40GHz waveband, allowing it to engage a range of airborne, ground-based and naval FC/GCI and weapons guidance radars.

The concept of operations is for the SPEAR-EW to be launched while an aircraft is in contested airspace to jam hostile radars as and when they transmit. It could be teamed with the SPEAR-3 so that such threats can either be electronically or kinetically engaged. The UK Ministry of Defence has awarded MBDA and Leonardo a technical demonstrator programme contract, and MBDA says “both the electronic warfare payload and missile are already at advanced stages of maturity.”

A contract from the MOD to procure the SPEAR-EW may emerge, and MBDA says that the weapon could equip both the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon F/GR4 and Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning jets….

“In the past you had particular aircraft which specialised in SEAD missions.

“Will this be the case in the future?” asks Prof Baltrusaitis.

To an extent, the RAAF may have answered this question as it is already viewing the mission through a holistic prism where the whole force is employed to defeat A2AD postures. The RAAF says the service looks “across the force to support the SEAD mission”.

In addition to the E/A-18G, other platforms such as the F-35A and Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet will aid the fight by “mixing kinetic and non-kinetic effects” including the AN/ALQ-99, Next Generation Jammer and AGM-88s.

This mission, the RAAF says, could be aided by Australia’s other armed services as and when required. “We have assets across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to contribute to this mission including army and navy fires.”

This imperative to use and coordinate other segments of the RAAF and the ADF writ large is mirrored at the international level. “Due to platform commonality with the US Navy, we often look to them for doctrine and leadership, particularly in the context of the E/A-18G. The integration of the F-35A into the force also gives us shared interest with the US Air Force … Collectively, we train together with the US services in exercises such as Red Flag which is a natural way to test our ideas.”

The need to coordinate the force and work closely with allies is imperative vis-à-vis SEAD and A2AD. Any future confrontation with China or Russia is almost certain to be executed by a coalition, most probably under US or NATO leadership. Using SEAD to defeat A2AD, particularly at the campaign level, will require the close coordination of assets.

For the complete article, see ADBR, April 29, 2020

W recommend that our readers become frequent readers of Australian Defence and Business Review, both in terms of their article and video websites.

This excerpt as does the original article remains the copyright of ADBR.

Featured photo: A RAAF KC-30A Multi-role Tanker Transport from RAAF Base Amberley provided refuelling operations for USAF B-1B Lancers in addition to RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers during Exercise Lightning Focus. The B-1B Lancers’ participation in this exercise was part of the Enhanced Air Cooperation program, which aims to increase the interoperability between Australia and the United States.

The Evolving Role of Rotary Wing Platforms in the Integratable Carrier Air Wing

05/01/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my last meeting with Vice Admiral Miller in San Diego, we discussed the way ahead with regard to the air wing as it become integrated into a wider kill web concepts of operations.

In that conversation, we highlighted the shift as one from building an integrated air wing to working an open ended and evolving integratable air wing.

A key element in such a shift is when new platforms come onboard, the carrier or parts of the air wing, work with non-organic combat asset with  integratability as key challenge and opportunity to be  worked across the force to ensure that the distributed force can exercise maximum effectiveness.

Carrier Air Wing innovations highlighting platforms coming onboard which will shape clusters of innovations driving forward innovation onboard the large deck carrier. Credit: US Navy

This focus creates a major training challenge but also significantly expands the impact which training can have on operations.

I discussed this challenge with VADM Miller and Rear Admiral Brophy, the head of NAWDC or the Naval Aviation Warfighting Center, during my last visit to San Diego.

The head of Fallon, Rear Admiral Richard Brophy, joined the conversation with the Air Boss, and clearly underscored the challenge: “How do we best train the most lethal integrated air wing preparing to deploy, but at same time, prepare for the significant changes which introducing new platforms and concepts of operations can bring to the force?

As the Air Boss put it: “We need to properly train the integratable air wing and we are investing in expanded ranges and new approaches such as Live Virtual Constructive training.

“I often use the quote that ‘your performance in combat never raises to the level of your expectations but rather it falls to the level of your training.’

“This is why the training piece is so central to the development for the way ahead for the integrable training.

“It is not just about learning what we have done; but it is working the path to what we can do.”

NAWDC is working with the key American warfighting centers to shape a way ahead for Naval aviation within the broader world of building an integrated distributed force operating across the spectrum of warfare.

This affects each platform or core competence being worked at NAWDC.

Recently, I had the chance to talk with CDR Jeremy “Shed” Clark, Senior Leader at the Naval Rotary Wing Weapons School (SEAWOLF) at NAWDC.

The Seawolf School focuses on Romeo, Sierra, and Fire Scout training, with Romeo being the sensor rich ASW/SUW/EW and related tasked focus helo onboard the Navy’s large deck carriers.

We discussed the shift which the Admirals had outlined in my San Diego meeting and how it affected the training approach for the helicopter communities.

The shift from focusing largely on a targeted task for carrier defense and upon how the organic capabilities on the Romeo and Sierra could play their task most effectively to one where the focus is on broadening the sensor and strike partners of these platforms who can contribute to carrier strike and defense is a significant one.

Rather than quote the CDR directly, I will identify a number of takeaways which I drew from the conversation but for which I am not going to hold him responsible for.

The first point is that the aperture of considering the role of all rotory wing assets expands significantly as one shifts from a legacy carrier strike operation focus to broader support to a distributed maritime force.

Due to the nature of where helicopters deploy this means that the sensors onboard these platforms can see their reach significantly expanded by being able to integrate with other sensors in the battlespace.

Rather than being platform focused, the shift is to empower the Romeo/Sierra/Fire Scout and their reach with an expanded sensor network.

This sensor network will be found both onboard each helicopter as well as with other aircraft onboard the carrier, but more broadly into the interactive allied working capabilities in the expanded battlespace.

The second point is that new assets coming onboard the carrier are going to be looked at from the outset in terms of what they can contribute to the sensor network and decision-making capabilities of the strike force.

For example, we discussed the coming of the MQ-25. The Romeo community is already looking at how having sensors onboard the MQ-25 can expand the reach and range of what the Romeo’s onboard sensors can accomplish for the maritime distributed force.

It is also the case that as sensor demands currently made on the Romeo can be shifted elsewhere.

The Romeo can refocus its task priorities and enhance its contributions to broader mission sets such as ASW and to focus on contributing capabilities that other platforms within the strike group are not prioritized to perform.

The third point is that the new generation of Navy operators are clearly thinking in kill web terms – they are not focused simply on what their platform can do based on how they were  trained, but how they can work in the broader battlespace to deliver the desired effects working closely with partners in the sensor, decision-making and strike web.

He argued that this meant that NAWDC is looking at how to change the entire dynamic of the strike group with such an approach.

The fourth point is that with the distributed sensor network being built, manned helicopters can reduce the amount of time they need to be airborne to provide a core sensor set of tasks.

The so-called unmanned revolution is ultimately about expanding the sensor network and allowing the manned operators within that network to operate more efficiently and more effectively; it is not primarily about replacing them in the battlespace.

The fifth point is that the kill web learning curve has a major impact on thinking about acquisition.

Rather than focusing on the systems proprietary to a specific task oriented platform, the focus is shifting towards integratability: what system can I tap onboard my platform via integratability with other combat assets, and what systems do I have onboard which provide a specific capability which the kill force needs to be able to leverage to enhance combat effectiveness?

The sixth point we discussed was the repurposing of the Fire Scout unmanned system.

Originally, this was platform tasked, namely, to support the littoral combat ship.

But with the new approach of utilizing all assets within a kill-web, the question is how the helicopters working with Fire Scout can add the fleet needed capabilities, and where might the Fire Scout operate from within the fleet to gain maximum impact?

This a significant shift and part of the dynamics of change unfolding at NAWDC.

And CDR Clark highlighted that his team is working on ways to deliver some EW capability via Fire Scout integration with assets onboard the Growler EW aircraft.

In short, the shift is dramatic.

Historically, training was done in stove pipes.

One would train to be the best operator you could be on that platform.

Now, that is not enough; obviously critical but the foundation for working a different way.

The focus is upon working in a kill web and cross-linking capabilities within a distributed integrated force.

Featured Photo: Singapore (May 29, 2015) An MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and a MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aircraft system are displayed on the flight deck of the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) while the ship is moored pierside in Singapore. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. James Arterberry/Released

 

Sea Mines and the Chinese Threat: An Australian Perspective

By Greg Mapson

In mid-2018, the Chinese navy conducted one of the largest mine warfare exercises in living memory, involving some 60 minelayers and minesweepers, aircraft and submarines practising laying and countering live mines. This unprecedented exercise, supported by some of China’s top scientists and mine development specialists, increased the already growing unease about China’s expansion into the South China Sea.

Some 10 years ago, a US Naval War College study revealed that China possessed over 100,000 sea mines, and that their use was fundamental to its strategy of constraining US naval forces operating in Beijing’s area of interest.

While, at the time, most strategists saw this as a direct reference to the Taiwan Strait and North Korea, that’s no longer so.

With China’s expansion into the South China Sea and its militarisation of several reefs far from its shores, its minelaying forces have a more expansive role to play. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has a fleet of ships and conventional submarines with crews that are well practised, and indeed lauded, for their minelaying skills.

They also possess very capable minelaying aircraft. The exercise demonstrated China’s commitment to mine warfare as a pillar of its naval strategy.

Notwithstanding China’s potent capabilities in laying mines, many strategists wrongly believe they’ll be used in offensive operations, but they’re more versatile than that.

One possible scenario is that China will use its growing mine stocks in a period of tension to further control access to areas surrounding its South China Sea claims by laying protective minefields—or even just claiming to.

International law allows for protective mining in a nation’s own waters, though an international court has ruled against part of China’s claim after it was challenged by the Philippines. By announcing the presence of such protective fields, it would provide the necessary warning to all comers. The answer, then, is for concerned nations to do something about the mines.

In 2018, Senator Jim Molan and the chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Andrew Hastie, drew attention to the parlous state of Australia’s fuel stocks with only three weeks’ supply in the country.

All of Australia’s imported fuel passes through the Malacca Strait via Singapore and through other narrow passages through the Indonesian archipelago. We are particularly vulnerable to the closure of any of these vital seaways.

So how well prepared is Australia to counter a mining incident to our north, or near our priority ports or trade routes? After six Huon-class coastal minehunters were built in the late 1990s, two of the ships were laid up in 2014 due to defence cut backs. Both were so badly cannibalised that they have since been sold. The Royal Australian Navy once had a world-class minesweeping capability but it’s seldom used now.

It was recently announced that the four remaining Huon-class vessels will not have life of type extensions but will be retired within five years. A very modest program to introduce a minesweeping and mine-hunting capability is running years late and will provide an almost experimental-level capability of small individual technologies.

The government announced last year that two steel-hulled ships, based on the offshore patrol vessel, will be built in Western Australia and designated for mine countermeasure operations to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of the Huons.

It appears that these ships will be built without any shock hardening, magnetic degaussing system or acoustic silencing and will carry some autonomous systems augmented by other systems yet to be announced. So, it would seem that the answer to the question ‘how prepared are we?’ is self-evident.

Close to two decades of underinvestment and neglect has once again rendered the navy’s mine-clearing force impotent. The last major strategic review, in 1991, was highly critical of the lack of attention to the mine threat and called for action. Out of that inquiry came the six coastal minehunters, a command support system, new sweeping systems, exercise mines and a completely rebuilt headquarters at HMAS Waterhen in Sydney.

Fast-forward to 2020 and we now face a much greater mine threat in our region than ever before, with most of our mine-hunting capability in decline—even though Australia remains totally dependent on sea-borne trade. A potential adversary to our north has the mine stocks, aircraft and submarines to completely shut down all sea traffic into our ports or sea lines of communication.

If our strategic situation turns bad, our maritime lifeline can easily be targeted, and we don’t have the means to stop that happening.

Greg Mapson, a former commander of the Royal Australian Navy’s mine countermeasure forces, has carried out specialist training in a number of world navies and conducted extensive work on autonomous mine countermeasure systems.

This article was published by ASPI on April 15, 2020.

Image: Australian Department of Defence.

 

Instant Eye

U.S. Army paratroopers got the chance to learn and operate the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s newest acquisition, the Instant Eye in Pocek, Slovenia, March 04, 2020.

The Instant Eye is a quad-copter (drone) with multiple options for reconnaissance, quick employment and movement that makes this Small Unmanned Aerial System very versatile.

The controls and layout of the system were modeled off of video game controllers making it easier and more familiar for operators to use and master.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade is the U.S. Army’s Contingency Response Force in Europe, providing rapidly deployable forces to Europe, Africa and Central Commands areas of responsibilities.

SLOVENIA

03.04.2020

Video by Staff Sgt. Jacob Sawyer

173rd Airborne Brigade

Leadership Lessons Which Should be Learned from the Crozier Case

04/30/2020

Editor’s Note: We excerpted the eight lessons which should be learned from the complete article by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. on the Crozier case.

But Dunlap’s comprehensive article published in Lawfire should be read in its entirety and we are posting this excerpt to draw our reader’s attention and suggest they read the full article, which can be found here:

https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/04/27/eight-leadership-lessons-from-the-navy-carrier-captains-case/

Dunlap starts his article by putting the Crozier case in context:

Regrettably, the hagiographic narrative surrounding Captain Crozier is creating the very real risk that the wrong leadership lessons will be learned and propagated, irrespective of what does or does not happen to him personally.  If that occurs, the success of future military operations is imperiled, and troops could die.  Some things really can be that simple.

To be clear, everyone agrees military leaders have the responsibility for the health and safety of those entrusted to them.  Accordingly, Captain Crozier is to be rightly commended for being so concerned about the threat of COVID-19 to his crew.  That doesn’t mean, however, that he handled his responsibilities the right way.

Later in the article he highlighted lessons which he suggested should be learned from the case.

  • Senior military leaders should not assume a “peacetime” mindset in the midst of the risks intrinsic to 21st century “grey zone” conflicts.
  • Military leaders need to maintain situational awareness in a crisis.
  • In crises especially, military leaders need to be careful about the example they set in their civil-military relations
  • In crisis situations, leaders need to think inclusively in terms of the organization as whole and not about particular career fields.
  • In crisis situations, leaders need to put aside concerns about their own careers.
  • Senior leaders, especially in complex emergencies, need to communicate in an effective way, and understand their options if they believe their concerns are being wrongly ignored.
  • Commanders (as well as the media and the public) shouldn’t confuse popularity with good leadership.
  • Don’t trivialize potential civilian casualties as a mere “political” problem.

He concluded the article byframing a set of key questions:

“It would appear that Captain Crozier had zeal, but the question for General Milley and, ultimately, Secretary Esper, is whether the zeal was the right kind, and was it properly vectored?

“Or was Secretary Modly correct that Captain Crozier lacked sufficient appreciation for the “larger strategic context” and competing “national security imperatives”?

“Did emotion make him too impatient about the pace of the Navy’s action and the leadership of civilian superiors?

“Did he allow adversaries to seize the initiative in grey zone conflicts?  Did he overestimate the risk to his crew, and underestimate the risk to civilians?

“Overall, did Captain Crozier make the right decisions for the Navy and, more importantly, the nation?

“To be clear, Captain Crozier insisted that he was ready to take his ship into combat and fight adversaries if the nation was at “war”, but to what extent is he prepared to take risks to wage grey zone “war” when that’s the mission in our complicated world?

“The stakes are high as our adversaries are closely watching how the U.S. military deals with the pandemic.”

Editor’s Note: We thank Secretary Wynne for bringing this article to our attention.

Featured photo: Snow covers the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Class Matthew Young/Released, January 29, 2014.

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Small Ship but a Significant Shift

By Robbin Laird

When I first came to Australia in 2014, I was asked to write a report for the Williams Foundation on their seminar on the evolution of airpower, which focused in a significant way on the coming of fifth generation aircraft and their impact on airpower modernization.

 From the F-35 to working on the new build OPV may seem a strange journey, but the connectors were set in place during the several years of Williams Seminars in which I participated and have written the reports.

Over the past several years, the focus of attention broadened from air power per se to the process of transformation of the Australian Defence Force, and the shaping of what has been referred to as the process of building a fifth generation ADF.

The focus has expanded to a broader process of transformation, enabled by the coming of the F-35 and associated processes of change.

For the Royal Australian Navy, this process of change has been upon what the former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett has referred as building not just an integrated navy but a navy able to contribute significantly to an integrated ADF.

During his presentation at the August 2016 Williams Foundation on air—sea integration, the Chief of Navy argued that

“We are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”

He drove home the point that ADF integration was crucial in order for the ADF to support government objectives in the region and beyond and to provide for a force capable of decisive lethality.

By so doing, Australia would have a force equally useful in coalition operations in which distributed lethality was the operational objective.

The Australian military is shaping a transformed military force, one built around new platforms but ones that operate in a joint manner in an extended battlespace.

They also recognize a key reality of 21st century military evolution in terms of shaping an integrated information-based operating force.

Interactive modernization of the force is built around decision-making superiority and that will come with an effective information dominant force.

To achieve the goals identified by Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett, a new shipbuilding approach has been envisaged to shape the capabilities which an integratable force would need to have going forward.

Several new platforms emerged from the commitments of the Australian government in 2016, namely, a new Offshore Patrol vessel, a new ASW Frigate and a new build submarine.

Just listing these three patterns would in the normal course of affairs appear to be three platforms, which would be built sequentially but with separate tasks, missions and hull forms.

But the continuous shipbuilding approach articulated at the time of launching these projects has a more ambitious goal – linking these builds into a continuous modernization process in which integratability is a core capability of the evolving force.

The Arafura Class Offshore Patrol Vessel is the first of the new build platforms.

It provides the template with regard to the entire reset of how the Australians are seeking to build out their integrated distributed force.

The new build OPV is not just a new platform; it is the spearhead of a new approach.

This report draws on my recent visits to the Henderson shipyard, to Adelaide, to Sydney and to Canberra where I have discussed the new approach to shipbuilding, in general, and the new build OPV in particular.

And the importance of this effort is not just about the ADF and its way forward; this case study has significant relevance as the United States and other Australian allies work their own ways ahead with shaping an integrated distributed force.

For example, one Marine Corps aviator put it this way after reading the report:

“This is a a very interesting and informative report. I enjoyed reading it and took away a lot from their approach and emphasis on upgradeable mission systems and fusion of C2/ISR.”

You don’t just come to Darwin to kill snakes and crocks!

I did this report as a Research Fellow for The Williams Foundation.

And the report published on The Williams Foundation website is highlighted by VADM Tim Barrett AO, CSC, RAN (Retd.), Former Chief of navy and Williams Foundation Director as follows:

“The Williams Foundation research fellow, Dr Robbin Laird, has opened the aperture on the debate around an integrated 5th generation ADF with an insightful examination into the development of the Navy’s new Offshore Patrol Vessel.

“Conceived not simply as a replacement platform but as an adaptable and integrated capability within a joint force, Dr Laird presents the OPV program as a model for future capability development.

“This report compliments his previous work on 5th Generation air power Concepts within the ADF.”

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/News/8937002

The featured photo and the slide show below are the first shots of the first OPV being built in the Osborne shipyard at Adelaide, South Australia.

In a further milestone for the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) program, the two halves of the first of class ship, Arafura, built by Luerssen Australia and its partner ASC have been brought together and welded to form a complete hull.

In what was the largest block move in the history of the Osborne Naval Shipyard and a considerable engineering feat, Australian Naval Infrastructure’s (ANI) operations team manoeuvred the two mega-blocks together, with only millimetres between them.