This special report brings together in one publication our recent pieces published on Second Line of Defense and Defense.info, since the coronavirus crisis became a significant crisis management challenge.
We cover a number of topics, indicated in the Table of Contents for the Report:
By Robbin Laird
On February 7, 2020, the US Navy officially received its first CMV-22B Osprey, the replacement for its venerable C-2 Greyhound aircraft.
I attended the ceremony held at Amarillo, Texas and had a chance to talk with a number of the participants before and after the ceremony.
Having followed the Osprey since 2007 and observed its impact on the USMC, it was never a simple case of the MV-22 replacing the CH-46 ‘Phrog’ and its mission.
The tiltrotor is not the same in any real sense as a traditional rotorcraft, and the increased range and speed of the Osprey and its unique operating envelope has proven to be a significant capability for the Marine Corps which they have been able to leverage to transform their core operations.
Now the US Navy will be transitioning from a fixed-wing aircraft configured to operate with the cats and traps system onboard an aircraft carrier (the C-2) to an aircraft (the Osprey), which is not limited by that system will not operate in any way like a C-2.
It is undoubtedly going to also be a significant opportunity for the Navy to manage the transition and to understand fully how to make the most of the new aircraft’s capabilities to conduct Airborne Logistics from the Sea Base in new and innovative ways.
There is another major aspect or indeed opportunity, that has nothing to do with the COD (Carrier On-board Delivery) mission.
The Osprey has proven capable of a wide range of operations, from Special Forces transport to performing a Medical Evacuation off of a submarine, but the US Navy is not buying it for those missions.
Yet, given the demanding strategic environment in which the fleet is operating and going to operate, it is difficult to believe that the Navy will not wish broaden the envelope of what the Osprey can do for the fleet.
To do so will lead inevitably to the demand to buy more than a simple COD replacement would dictate.
Because the Osprey is a multi-service, and multi-national asset, there will be opportunities as well to leverage collaborative investment as well.
This has not been possible with the C-2 because it was and is a uniquely Navy plane.
How then might the Navy use the aircraft beyond the classic C-2 ops rhythm?
And how might the Navy take advantage of a broader investment or production set of opportunities posed by multi-service and multinational partners?
What is clear is that the challenging path of transition which the Marine Corps took from CH-46 to MV-22 will not be as difficult for the Navy.
They can already build on the experience of the Marine Corps.
Nonetheless, it is clear that there will be unique aspects of its fleet introduction.
During my visit to Amarillo in February 2020, I had a chance to talk with a retired Navy officer who was involved throughout his career with the C-2 as well as becoming involved in the process of working the C-2 replacement effort.
Currently, CAPT (ret.) Sean McDermott is a commercial airline pilot who served in the US Navy for 26 years. He was involved with the C-2 during the majority of his career, starting as a Greyhound pilot and eventually commanding one of the Navy’s two fleet logistics squadrons.
In the final years of his service, McDermott was involved in working through options for the Navy as they considered C-2 replacements, with an eventual Osprey selection.
In our discussion, McDermott highlighted a key point which logistics pilots are keen to underscore: “You don’t care about logistics until you don’t have the supplies you need at the time you want them.”
He noted that when he became part of the C-2 community, there were two squadrons, based at three locations.
One, VRC-40 ‘Rawhides’ was located on the East Coast at Norfolk, VA, and the second, VRC-30, ‘Providers’, on the West Coast in San Diego California. There is also a permanently forward-deployed detachment of VRC-30 based in Iwakuni Japan.
Both squadrons fall under Airborne Command & Control and Logistics Wing (ACCLW) headquartered in Point Mugu, CA. The wing was traditionally led by officers with an E-2 Hawkeye background.
This meant that there was little opportunity for C-2 pilots to lead the community beyond the possibility of becoming a squadron commander or O-5 (Commander) rank, vice O-6 (Captain/Commodore) rank.
Lacking the upward mobility, post-squadron command has made it more difficult for the C-2 leadership to become involved in future planning and to be able to be in the best position their assets for more robust mission opportunities.
As a story published in 2010 in the Virginian Pilot newspaper noted for the 50th anniversary of VRC-40:
McDermott and the other members of his squadron, known as the Rawhides, aren’t used to being the center of attention. In naval aviation, glory usually goes to the fighter pilots and their jets, not to those who deliver mail, spare parts and passengers.
“We’re a light switch. We’re the Internet.
They expect us to be there all the time,” McDermott said.
“The only time we’re visible is when we’re not there.”
McDermott underscored the challenges facing C-2 leaders getting into a position to shape the future of their mission within the overall world of carrier aviation.
“In general, there is no upward mobility for C-2 COs.
“In general, the preponderance of the leadership of the wing are E-2 Naval Flight Officers.
“This means that you’ve got somebody who’s your boss who’s never flown your plane, never done your mission, doesn’t have a complete understanding of the challenges that are unique to deploying detachments across the planet.
“They had about 140 people in their squadron when they were commanding officers and a C-2 squadron is 400 people.”
McDermott noted that one of the encouraging signs with the CMV-22B transition is that a new Wing, COMVRMWING has been stood up, and its Commodore who is in charge of the Osprey team now being charged to take over the COD mission.
This CMV-22 wing should provide a more dedicated voice to implement new ideas for airborne logistics operations as well as exploring how the aircraft could be used to support other missions for the Navy in a distributed maritime environment.
We discussed at length his experience with the challenges of getting the Osprey engaged with the Navy fleet and eventually on to the carrier for a fleet battle experiment as well as in support of humanitarian assistance missions.
He was also involved in the efforts to deploy Ospreys onto foreign ships, and he worked closely with the Marine experimental squadron VMX-22 and Col. Michael Orr, who we interviewed often during the time frame when the Osprey transition was accelerating, to leverage the Marine’s experience with the aircraft to shepherd Navy interest.
On the cover of our book, Rebuilding American Military Power In The Pacific, we chose a photo of Col. Orr landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.
McDermott was on that carrier during those trials and highlighted how challenging it was to get support to land the Ospreys onboard the large deck carriers.
The Marine aviation leadership created VMX-22 to lead the way forward, first with Ospreys and preparing the way for the next round of aviation innovation.
Because they worked under strong leadership, they could partner with a Navy leader like McDermott to create an opportunity for the Osprey to become a large deck carrier asset.
As McDermott noted about Col. Orr: “I have a lot of respect for Mike, clearly a leader who is willing to support change and innovation.”
But as the trials evolved, there were opportunities to demonstrate how an Osprey could do things a C-2 never could do, given the flexibility of the aircraft and its speed and range.
He provided several examples of this.
One involved when Orr’s group arrived back in Norfolk on an Osprey, and when taxying, out came a chief petty officer blocking their way. They stopped and the chief said that there was an urgent need to get a part to an F/A-18 Hornet so that it can fly off of the carrier prior to getting to port.
The ship was pulling in the next day, and if they did not get the aircraft off of the ship, the aircraft would need to be craned off the ship while in port, not something the Navy likes to do.
The catapults have already been shut down on the ship and were not available.
Obviously, this was not a barrier for the Osprey which flew to the ship, delivered the part and left within 90 seconds from the ship.
McDermott recalled: “The Air Boss on the carrier was an E-2 guy and he underscored, “Let’s see a COD do that!”
We concluded our discussion by focusing upon the potential impact of the multi-mission Osprey to the fleet.
McDermott put it this way: “With the C-2 we did one thing – Carrier On-board Delivery.
“With the Osprey, Combatant Commanders already know the multi-mission capability of the V-22 and will be tempted to utilize them for a variety of other missions.
“This is not something that would happen with a C-2. Carrier leadership will eventually struggle to fence off their logistics assets from outside tasking.”
In other words, there is an anticipated operational demand that they will want to leverage fully the new versatile capabilities of the Osprey.
He noted that with the new platform being introduced to carrier aviation, it will be possible to leverage it to shape a greater range of capabilities for the COD asset.
He noted that as the Marines began to get comfortable with the MV-22, they shaped the unique Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF), which has become a highly demanded asset.
He argued that such innovation was certainly possible for the Navy as it worked with its new COD aircraft.
One area he noted were forward deployed locations that would benefit like operations in Bahrain.
Ospreys deployed to these locations could not only better support logistics but would also have the flexibility to support other mission sets for combatant commanders.
“With the coming of the new platform into the fleet, one innovation which might be considered is how to use the new Navy Osprey as part of a broader sustainment effort encompassing Marine Corps and Navy Ospreys.
“It also is an area where the multi-mission capabilities of the aircraft for the Navy can be explored as well.
“In other words, where the Marines leveraged their Ospreys to build and equip SP-MAGTF, perhaps the US Navy can leverage the Bahrain anchor from which to build regional sustainment and explore ways to build out the multi-mission capabilities it would want from its CMV-22s.”
This clearly might require the Navy to consider from the outset ways to ramp up the buy and to prepare for ways in which the fleet commanders will employ it to leverage fullythe aircraft capabilities, and, at the very least, utilizing its capability to provide improved logistics to Navy and Maritime Sealift Command ships.
But that is a subject for another article.
Carrier Air Wing innovations highlighting platforms coming onboard which will shape clusters of innovations driving forward innovation onboard the large deck carrier. Credit: US Navy
Featured Photo: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Aug. 9, 2018) Two MV-22 Ospreys, attached to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (HX) 21, fly over the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). The ship is underway conducting routine training exercises to maintain carrier readiness. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brooke Macchietto).
Also, see the following:
Shaping a New Capability for the Osprey: Delivering the F-35 Engine to the USS Wasp
By Robbin Laird
My recent discussions with Major Thomas Duff and Mr. Michael Manifor, HQMC Aviation, APW-53, Attack and Utility Helicopter Coordinators, about the Viper maritime attack helicopter provided insights into how this asset is evolving as the MAGTF itself is being reshaped for its broader spectrum missions beyond the land wars, to maritime operations, and support for embarked Marines being inserted into various types of land operating bases, including distributed expeditionary bases.
The APW-53 leaders underscored that “the Viper contributes to the entire span of assault operations. Marines are inserted in places where they can influence the fight, and it requires synchronized assault support operations involving aviation assets to do it quickly and effectively.”
They emphasized as well that the two-man team in the Viper works closely with the Ground Combat Element and with their training and operational experience are an integrated part of the C2 process with the GCE commanders. As a result, “with the Viper crew you’ve got a dedicated fires team that lives, breathes, eats, and thinks ‘how do I destroy the target, and support the ground scheme of maneuver’.”
As noted in the last article, “the Viper is involved in the entire span of assault operations. Prior to an assault, they prep the battlespace, including doing armed reconnaissance. They support fixed wing aircraft in a deep air support role, and when the Ospreys and CH-53s advance to the objective area, they provide an air escort role. With Marines in the objective area, they provide direct ground support for ground movement working directly with the Ground Combat Element.”
What I am going to do in this article, is to look at the organic systems on the Viper which allows the 2-man crew to be able to deliver this wide-ranging mission set, and then to highlight how the additions coming with the digital interoperability upgrades allow the Viper to expand its capabilities to both contribute to the fight and to pursue an integrability con-ops which allows it to play an even broader role within the evolving maritime domain.
The baseline NAVAIR chart of what is currently on the Viper provides a catalogue of the systems onboard the aircraft, but by discussing with the APW-53 team, these systems come to life in terms of how operators work with these systems to be able to be “involved in the entire span of assault operations.”
What follows is my interpretation of what I have learned about the systems onboard the Viper and how the Marines have used them and in the case of the impact of the digital interoperability upgrades, how they could be used in the return to the sea and enhanced priority on maritime missions.
A good place to start is that this is an attack platform with two crew, each with their own cockpit, placed in a front to back position. Each cockpit with the exception of about a half dozen switches is essentially the same.
But in each cockpit, the Marines can fire weapons and do so in support of one another. The Marine aviator can fly and fight from either cockpit and can fight simultaneously from those cockpits. And they can track different mission solutions, such as an air-to-air mission for one, and an air-to-ground for the other.
The systems slide above refers to a fully integrated cockpit and fire control system. The sensors and the fire control system onboard the aircraft allow the two-man team to take on multiple targets using a variety of weapon systems simultaneously. In other words, the two-man teams have a flexible ability to use the onboard weapon systems because of the nature of the fire control system on the aircraft.
The fire control system is capable of tracking multiple targets which allows for efficient engagement. This can be especially useful against moving targets in the maritime environment,
With the upgrades coming soon via the digital interoperability initiative, the Viper through its Link 16 upgrade along with its Full-Motion video access upgrade, can have access to a much wider situational awareness capability which obviously enhances both its organic targeting capability and its ability to work with a larger swath of integrated combat space.
This means that the Viper can broaden its ability to support other air platforms for an air-to-air mission set, or the ground combat commander, or in the maritime space.
A key capability which the Viper has is its high-powered machine gun. Given that the Viper can easily land on virtually any ship which the Navy or MSC operates, it can bring its machine gun as well as its Hellfires, or its rockets with a laser seeker into the sea control domain.
The increasing threat from small boats and unmanned air vehicles or the coming threat from unmanned surface vessels highlights the importance of having a platform which can use a variety of strike capabilities to destroy these relatively low value assets with potentially a high impact on the fleet.
Unmanned assets may look smart, but when running into a machine gun, they return to simply being drones.
The combination of what the organic asset can do with its expanded span of SA and shared targeting information through the DI upgrades provides a new role for the Viper within the maritime force.
This role is inherent within its current configuration coupled with the DI upgrades.
The systems slide above highlights the organic weapons capabilities carried by the Viper.
The first is the M197 20mm turreted gun.
The Viper carries a three-barreled machine gun. for close-range (up to 2km) engagement and 750 rounds of ammunition.
“With the gun in a fixed-forward position, the pilot can aim by maneuvering the helicopter.
“Either crew member can slave the turret to the helmet-mounted sight and aim the gun by looking at the target.”
The second is the AGM-114 Hellfire. This missile provides a significant ground attack capability which has been used throughout the land wars, but also has a significant capability to strike maritime surface targets as well.
The Viper will soon (IOC FY20) have the ability to fire the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM). This missile provides increased lethality through dedicated maritime modes, enhanced moving target capability, and selectable fuzing; providing capability against both fast attack craft and small surface combatants. Millimeter wave (MMW) guidance increases survivability by providing a true fire-and-forget capability, removing the requirement for a terminal laser.
The third are APKWS rockets which is a 70-millimeter rocket with a laser guided seeker.
According to its manufacturer, BAE Systems:
There are other precision-guided weapons on the market, but few consistently hit their intended target with pinpoint accuracy, while leaving minimal collateral damage. Our guidance section is designed to lock onto targets from over 3 kilometers away, keeping your aircraft and laser designators at a safe distance from threats.
Innovative by design, the APKWS rocket includes advanced DASALS seeker optics located on all four guidance wings. Once fired, the wings deploy, and the optics lock in, guiding the rocket to the target – delivering accuracy when it matters most.
To date, 17 of the world’s most utilized rotary- and fixed-wing launch platforms are qualified with BAE Systems’ APKWS laser guided rocket system, including:
The fourth is an AIM-9M sidewinder.
This is a premier air-to-air strike missile, and is widely used by the United States and its allies in that role.
According to NAVAIR:
The Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-9 Sidewinder is a supersonic, short-range air-to-air missile developed by the U.S. Navy in the 1950s. Entering service in 1956, variants and upgrades remain in active service with many air forces after five decades. The U.S. Air Force purchased the Sidewinder after the Navy developed the missile at China Lake, California.
The Sidewinder is the most widely used missile the U.S. Armed Forces, employed on the Navy/Marine’s F/A-18A-D, F/A-18E/F, AV-8B, AH-1 and the Air Force’s F-16, F-15, F-22 and A-10 aircraft. Additionally, the Sidewinder is flown by over 30 international customers on over 12 different types of aircraft.
The missile’s main components are an infrared homing guidance section, an active optical target detector, a high-explosive warhead, and a rocket motor.
The infrared guidance head enables the missile to home on target aircraft engine exhaust. An infrared unit costs less than other types of guidance systems, and can be used in day/night and electronic countermeasures conditions. The infrared seeker also permits the pilot to launch the missile, then leave the area or take evasive action while the missile guides itself to the target.
And a story by Dylan Malyasov published on April 3, 2020, highlighted a recent USMC exercise which highlighted the Viper’s air-to-air warfighting capabilities.
A few months ago, the U.S. Marine Corps demonstrated the power of Viper attack helicopter through exercise “Viper Storm” that was held at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton.
The Viper Storm exercise took place in Southern Calif. Dec 11, 2019. The attack helicopters flew from two separate locations – one on the coast and one inland – and struck simulated enemy targets representing peer and near peer threats capable of denying naval and joint forces the freedom of navigation essential to maritime control and enhancing operational-level flexibility.
A feature of the exercises was the demonstration of the AH-1Z’s little-known capability to attacking drones, other helicopters – and, even fixed-wing warplanes.
The 12 Vipers employed AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, emphasizing the versatility the Viper provides. With larger stub wings than its AH-1W Super Cobra predecessor, the Viper can carry a combination of up to 2 Sidewinders, 16 Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM) or Hellfires, auxiliary fuel tanks, and up to 76 rockets with various fusing options, including the newest Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) LASER-guided rockets. This allows the platform to be tailored to any mission whether it be sea, land, or air related.
The AH-1Z Viper is more lethal and survivable than its predecessor in large part because of the modernized ordnance, sensory, and communication equipment. For example, it can carry the JAGM, which will replace the Hellfire missile. The JAGM is a multi-sensor, aviation-launched, precision-guided munition for use against high-value land and naval targets. It provides precision point and fire-and-forget targeting day or night, regardless of weather.
The AH-1Z’s glass cockpit provides pilots with superior situational awareness and the upgraded Target Sight System has an incredible range that enables the Viper to detect and engage targets from distances not previously possible for Marine attack helicopters.
In short, the onboard weapons for the Viper provides a wide range of mission mixes which the aircraft can perform.
They range from air-to-air, to air-to-ground, from air-to-surface in a maritime domain provides a significant mission flexibility to which the aircraft can provide.
And because it is fully marinized, it can land and refuel with virtually any ship operating in the fleet, which means it can contribute to sea control, which in my view, is a mission which the amphibious task force will engage in with the expanded reach of adversarial navies.
See also, the following:
Note: U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters are seen in the video below firing Hydra 70 Rockets and M197 20mm Cannons at ground targets during a close air support exercise (CASEX) at Mt. Barrow, Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range in California. Filmed on October 6-8, 2015.
Film Credits: Sgt Daniel Kujanpaa, Sgt Juanenrique Owings. October 10, 2015.
By Pierre Tran
Paris – Dassault Aviation has resumed training flights for Indian pilots on the Rafale fighter jet, as the aircraft builder seeks to meet contract requirements despite the deadly spread of coronavirus.
“At Merignac, the (conversion training center) activities started on Monday with a daily mission for two Indian Rafales, in order to meet our contractual obligations for delivery,” executive chairman Eric Trappier said April 8 in a note to staff on the company website.
Merignac is the main Dassault factory, a suburb of Bordeaux, southwest France.
Flights have also restarted with the ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft and Falcon 900 light jet, both flying from Istres, southern France, he said.
The national quarantine will be extended a further four weeks to May 11, president Emmanuel Macron said in an April 13 broadcast to the nation, as he called for continued strict observation of the lock down.
On the training flights, the Merignac authorities had posted a schedule to address local noise concerns, with Indian pilots due to fly from October 2019 to March 2021, with take-off and landing from Bordeaux airport, Monday to Friday between 8.30 am and 6 pm (local time).
Qatari pilots had flown their Rafale training missions from April 8 to June 7 2019, with three to four flights per week, the Merignac website said.
France was due to deliver the next Rafale to India in May and it remained to be seen whether that hand over will go ahead as scheduled, in view of uncertainty sparked by the pandemic, an industry source said.
That government-to-government Rafale deal led to the Oct. 8 formal delivery of the first aircraft in the Indian order for 36 units, worth some €7.9 billion ($8.7 billion).
Clients normally pay the last instalment on a deal when delivery has taken place. That payment will be welcome in view of strain stemming from a shut down of production.
Dassault’s industrial re-set follows requirements of the defense ministry and Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, Trappier said in a video to staff.
The return to production reflected priorities agreed with clients, he said. The top priority was to support the French forces, flying Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighter jets, and ATL2 aircraft. Development for certain programs would also be pursued.
Export clients are also important, particularly India, which is seeing serious effects of the pandemic, he said.
The company has adopted SMS texts to keep personnel up to date.
Dassault has gradually re-opened its nine factories and offices around the country.
The ATL2 flights relate to a program to upgrade the combat system to standard 6. That modernization covers 18 units, with Dassault upgrading the first seven, and the SIAé aircraft maintenance center working on the remaining 11 units.
The upgrade included Thales Search Master radar with active antenna, acoustic subsystem for sonar buoys for anti-submarine warfare, and a Dassault navigation console. There are also new consoles developed by SIAé and software for information processing from Naval Group.
The first two upgraded ATL2s were delivered last October, with the last upgrade due in 2023.
In the financial disruption, Thales said April 7 it was cancelling a planned final 2019 dividend of €430 million to conserve cash, and signed a €2 billion bank loan to boost access to funds. That bank credit was available for 12 months, with an option to extend for six months.
Those funds were in addition to €2.9 billion in cash and cash equivalent, and a €1.5 billion credit facility.
In France, there were 14,967 deaths due to Covid-19, with 137,779 confirmed cases, according to John Hopkins university.
Of those fatalities, 5,379 were in rest homes, and 9,588 in hospitals, afternoon daily Le Monde reported April 14. The health ministry said April 13 there had been 335 deaths over the last 24 hours, compared to 310 on Sunday.
Among the measures Macron announced in his broadcast were distribution of face masks to the general public, and schools and colleges to re-open from May 11. Museums, restaurants and cinemas will remain closed under the lock down.
Macron sought to inspire hope in his speech and his delivery was seen as an attempt to show a gentler, more human face than his previous broadcast, which invoked a martial spirit with six references to war.
“The results are there,” he said. “Several regions have been spared. In the last few days, the number under intensive care has fallen.
“Hope is reborn.”
Featured Photo: GUILLAUME HORCAJUELO/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
In an article by Eszter Zalan published in the EUObserver on April 15, 2020, the general challenge of the Europeans returning to some form of normalcy in terms of work was highlighted.
The EU commission on Wednesday (April 15, 2020) is set to roll out a set of recommendations for EU countries to better coordinate easing lockdown measures to avoid spillovers between member states.
While the EU executive cannot force member states to act in unison, it wants to make sure counties take into account the situations of neighbouring countries, according to a spokesperson.
The recommendations call for member states to notify each other and the commission before measures are loosened.
It warns that “any level of gradual relaxation” of measures will “unavoidably” mean increase in new coronavirus cases.
It argues for a gradual easing, starting small and local, with opening schools and universities, while restaurants and mass events should only allowed at a later stage. The EU’s internal borders should open first before its external borders are accessible again.
The EU executive argues that three conditions should be met to ease restrictions: “the spread of the disease has significantly decreased for a sustained period of time”, the health care system has sufficient capacity and there is effective monitoring including large-scale testing.
The commission also recommends contact tracing by the use of mobile apps, which should respect data privacy and should be voluntary.
German foreign minister Heiko Maas on Tuesday called for a single smartphone app to be used across the EU.
Countries should also be ready to revise their approach if more data comes in, or there is a risk of another wave in the spread of the virus, the comission says.
“We will have to live with the virus until a vaccine or treatment is found,” the commission’s document warns.
Bataan, with embarked 26th MEU, is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points.
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Gary Jayne III)
By Robbin Laird
The Coronavirus crisis and its management by the liberal democracies is clearly and inflection point. Moving forward choices will be made shaping the decade ahead in terms of basic national strategies as well as with allies.
A key aspect of shaping a way ahead clearly will be how to deal with the 21st century authoritarian powers. There is little doubt that the crisis has highlighted what was in plain sight prior to the crisis, namely, the challenge of supply chain security. This is notable in a number of areas, but probably nowhere more so than in dependence on China with regard to medical production and supplies.
A key part of the reshaping of strategy towards China going forward will clearly revolve around the question of supply chain security, and how to reshape how the liberal democracies deal with this challenge.
It is within this context of shaping a new strategy towards China that any U.S. or allied military strategy towards China will need to be placed. The last thing we need is a cacophonic single service set of strategies to warfighting in the Pacific which do not fit into a national strategy towards China overall.
For example, we learn that the U.S. Army is developing a very long-range canon.
The U.S. Army is pushing ahead with plans to field a cannon with an astounding 1,000-mile+ range. The cannon, along with hypersonic weapons, will allow the service to attack long range, strategic-level targets far beyond the reach of existing Army systems.
According to Defense News, the Army’s program manager for long range fires, Col. John Rafferty, the service expects the gun to have a range of 1,000 nautical miles—or 1,150 statute miles. The technology behind the cannon is described as “cutting edge” that’s so advanced that the service is not sure if the gun would be affordable.
This may or may not be a good idea, but where does this fit into a warfighting joint and coalition strategy in the Pacific?
To get a sense of how, we might shape a military strategy that fits into the evolving strategic context I talked with nuclear arms expert Paul Bracken of Yale University.
For one aspect which seems often to be neglected is that China is a nuclear power and like all nuclear powers, adversarial warfighting strategies which highlight operations deep within the close in periphery of a counter tend not to be considered in conventional military terms alone.
Question: How would you characterize the Chinese situation?
Paul Bracken: A number of leading scholars on China underscored that China was facing a real economic crisis prior to any U.S. backlash against it. Their point was that China could not continue to grow from 2015 onward, simply by doing more of what it was doing.
The global economy was becoming much too complex for Chinese economic mass mobilization manufacturing strategies to work going forward.
In other words, China was facing a branch point.
What would they do?
Then with the U.S. backlash against China, the branch point changed as well. The branch point, plus the U.S. and broader allied reactions to China are going to force Beijing to rethink what they’re doing.
They can’t simply do more of the same.
This is the reason China faces complex new challenges which are unprecedented.
Question: With regard to the military side of the equation, where might we start?
Paul Bracken: China is a major nuclear power.
And they are one which has missiles of various ranges within the Pacific region.
What they have done far exceeds what the Soviet Union had against NATO Europe during the Cold War.
With the end of the INF treaty, an end driven in part by Chinese missiles which would have been excluded by an INF treaty if they had been party to it, Beijing’s long-range missile threat needs to become a focus of attention, and not just by counter military responses.
This raises the question of the possibility of having at least three power nuclear talks (US, Russia, China) to provide both public diplomacy and cross-government considerations of how to manage the missile challenge. Obviously, such an approach is challenging but certainly has its advantages of finding a place to discuss ways to crisis manage as well.
Moreover, China would like to constrain U.S. nuclear modernization, and for this they simply cannot ignore arms control.
Question: This does raise the question of how to craft an effective and realistic military strategy towards China, with recognition of the nuclear reality of any confrontation in the Pacific.
You and I both entered our professional lives and worked with military and political leaders who understood that large scale conventional operations always contained within them the possibility and in some cases the probably of the triggering of nuclear use.
I simply do not see this with the generation of leaders who have lived through the land wars as their existential reality.
Do you?
Paul Bracken: Nuclear war as a subject has been put into a small, separate box from conventional war.
It is treated as a problem of two missile farms attacking each other.
This perspective overlooks most of the important nuclear issues of our day, and how nuclear arms were really used in the Cold War.
It should be remembered that China is the only major power born in a nuclear context. The coming to power of the Communists in China was AFTER the dawn of the nuclear age. And Beijing learned early on the hard realities of a nuclear world. Soviet treatment of Beijing in the Taiwan Straits crises and in the Korean War with regard to nuclear weapons, taught China the bitter lesson that they were on their own.
This led directly to China’s bomb program.
China is also the only major power surrounded by five nuclear states. It’s true that two of these states are, technically speaking, allies (Pakistan and North Korea).
But there can be little doubt that both target China with atomic weapons.
More, at senior levels of the Chinese government they understand that their “allies” are a lot more dangerous than China’s enemies.
When discussing defense strategies, it is crucial to understand the nature of escalation. One of the fundamental distinctions long since forgotten by today’s military leaders and in academic studies is the zone of the interior, or ZI.
As soon as you hit a target inside the sovereign territory of another country, you are in a different world.
From an escalation point of view striking the ZI of an adversary who is a nuclear, crosses a major escalation threshold.
And there is the broader question of how we are going to manage escalation in a world in which we are pushing forward a greater role for autonomous systems with AI, deeply learning, etc.
Will clashes among platforms being driven by autonomous systems lead to crises which can get out of control?
We need a military strategy that includes thinking through how to go on alert safely in the various danger zones.
Question: This raises a major question for strategy: How to manage military engagements or interactions in the Pacific without spinning crises out of control.
How does the nuclear factor weigh in?
Paul Bracken: The first thing is to realize it is woven into the entire fabric of a Pacific strategy. You don’t have to fire a nuclear weapon to use it.
The existence of nuclear weapons, by itself, profoundly shapes conventional options.
The nuclear dimension changes the definition of what a reasonable war plan is for the U.S. military.
And a reasonable war plan can be defined as follows: when you brief it to the president, he doesn’t throw you out of the office, because you’re triggering World War III.
Also, see the following:
By Robbin Laird
In my series focusing on USMC and digital interoperability, the first piece focused on the interaction between platform innovation and integratability.
With the evolution of the capabilities of the new combat platforms generated through Marine Corps aviation, the ability of the Marines to operate in an integrated, air, ground, and sea environment have been enhanced.
To take the next step requires investments in the core platforms to enhance their integratability.
The Marines refer to this as building out digital interoperability and have a plan in place to shape an effective way ahead.
And this way ahead entails both shaping core capabilities to manage networks and the data they can provide as well as to build into existing assets greater capability to participate in the networks most relevant to the operational envelope of particular platforms.
The challenge is a highly interactive one. New platforms shape new opportunities to define new concepts of operations and to shape new combat capabilities. Driving such innovation is crucial which means that new platform introduction will often be disruptive of the existing concepts of operations. New platforms can provide a forcing function dynamic for change.
At the same time, new platforms need to operate with other elements of the combat force, and that tension between platform innovations and inherited concepts of operations is an ongoing dynamic driving change.
What digital interoperability provides is an opportunity to both enhance the capabilities of the existing platforms as well as to share the benefits of what new platforms bring to the combat force.
A key question is posed: How do new platforms interact with and shape integratability challenges, and how digital connectivity can enhance what these new platforms bring to the combat force as well as how can the “legacy” platforms make greater contributions to a combat force being driven by change from new platform introduction?
A clear case in point has been the introduction of the Osprey.
If integration with the legacy force was the key mantra for the USMC, the Osprey would never been introduced. But it was and it introduced range and speed considerations to the insert of the Ground Combat Element which have been historically unprecedented.
If a CH-46 replacement had truly been that disruption would not have occurred, and significant innovation in concepts of operations driven by the disruptive force which the Osprey has provided would not have as well.
The US Army is the lead on a new Future Vertical Lift helicopter which is being designed to have similar reach and range to the Osprey. How this will impact the entire approach to shaping the future US Army is a key strategic question.
But the Marines have already been living in the world of FVL for a decade and a half.
Thinking outside of the helo defined operational box has been a key game changer in thinking about the concepts of operations for the USMC for some time, and adjustments to their concepts of operations have been driven by its operational capabilities.
In order to get full benefit from the Osprey forcing function, the Osprey needed to become a more integratable capability within the MAGTF. Digital interoperability provides a key bridge to do so.
In the next piece I will return to my discussions with Major Salvador Jauregui and Mr. Lowell Schweickart from the USMC Aviation Headquarters who are working on the digital interoperability effort.
And in that piece will focus directly on the question of what DI brings to various platforms in the MAGTF, and how what that brings to those specific platforms can lead to further capability enhancements or changes in concepts of operations.
But here, I want to return to a number of pieces we published in 2014 which highlight how the digital interoperability piece became highlighted as a significant opportunity for Osprey nation.
The speed and range of the Osprey has meant that it can outrun the embarked Marines capability to have the situational awareness they needed when disembarking in the objective area.
How then to solve that problem?
In the following piece published on January 18, 2014, we identified why C2 innovation when coupled with the capabilities of the Osprey created new options for the MAGTF.
With a new system, as innovative as the Osprey, it takes time to shape the course of change.
With its successful use in combat, its ability to work effectively with other elements of the MAGTF, and its core role in shaping innovations such as Special Purpose MAGTF-Crisis Response, the Osprey is becoming a key change agent throughout the MAGTF.
Although the Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft, its heart and sole is in supporting the Ground Combat Element (GCE) differently than any airborne capability seen before.
The Marines work the relationship between the GCE and the Air Combat Element (ACE) to shape a capability, which is expeditionary, flexible, and with the Osprey more rapid with greater range for force insertion than before.
But to get to the next phase requires further innovation, this time in terms of how the MAGTF (GCE and ACE) can better use the new emerging capabilities, specifically C3I and fires, to execute its mission more effectively.
The Osprey and KC130J pairing provides an ability to operate at distance and to rethink various missions such as force insertion, extraction of embassy personnel, TRAP and others, to include limited objective MAGTF strike operations.
By not being a relatively slow-moving helicopter that typically requires forward operating bases to conduct long-range operations, the Osprey allows the USMC (and the USAF) to think about how to use the speed and range of the Osprey when paired with organic tanking capabilities to operate fundamentally different from past approaches.
Over the past year, during three separate, long-range, Marine Air-Ground exercises, the Marine Infantry Officer Course (IOC) has worked closely with multiple aviation units to attack this required culture change.
During these experiments, the combined air-ground team has sought different approaches to achieve more effective outcomes, and have used these exercises as means to shape future technological adaptations.
A recent example of this approach was seen in a long-range Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) that IOC, serving as a simulated Company Landing Team(CLT), executed into a semi-permissive environment from 29Palms to Fort Hood Texas.
The exercise was called TALON REACH and was the culminating event for IOC Class 1-14. This event was conducted under one period of darkness between 29 Palms California and Ft Hood Texas.
This exercise was made possible by the teaming of the USMC MV-22s and KC-130Js.
During this experiment and those previous, the long-range insertion method proved interesting, but the innovation to drive enhanced capabilities is even more so.
To get a sense of how this innovation process is unfolding, I talked with a participant in the exercise, Lt. Col. Bill Hendricks.
Hendricks is a Cobra driver, and currently is assigned to USMC Aviation Headquarters as the air-ground weapons requirements officer.
A key element of the discussion focused on how mission planning can change significantly with the new configuration of insertion forces and how that approach can, in turn, significantly shorten the time from launch to operating in the objective area. Rather than several hours on the ground planning the mission and then launching the force mission, now the time associated with the Rapid Response Planning Process can be significantly reduced. A new process is being developed.
The insertion force takes off and then does the planning in route (given the range and time in transit) and provides real time information to the GCE and ACE commanders aboard the Osprey prior to going into the objective area.
And this most recent experiment is really only the tip of the iceberg so to speak. Given that the Ospreys are paired with KC-130Js there is no inherent reason that the bigger planes cannot carry mission planning and management support systems.
And as the Harvest Hawk configured C-130s return from Afghanistan, these planes could be used as the lead element in the insertion of a long-range insertion package as well.
Lt. Col. Hendricks started by explaining the role of the CLT within the insertion force.
The CLT is based around highly trained, educated, and equipped infantry Marines, basically pulled out of the regular battalion and they tend to be your more qualified individuals.
The CLT can do raids of duration that are a little bit longer than a standard company could do; but shorter in duration than a battalion could support.
And they could do that because they have the best equipment and they have the best or most highly trained individuals.
The CLT is somewhere on the spectrum between a standard Marine rifle company and a MARSOC unit, as far as the skills that they bring.
It is clear that the CLT requires good ability to have systems for C2, ISR and an ability to work effectively as they move off of the air asset.
The CLT, combined with the MAGTF’s 21st century ACE, provides the nation a unique capability that already is (South Sudan) and will increasingly be in great demand.
To make this happen, the CLT’s current legacy equipment needs to change. The concern is that a lot of their equipment is legacy at best, and very heavy and bulky and not very effective.
And the red force, that they were up against, were outpacing them, as far as their ability to command and control with their own personal IPhones, chat, text messaging, and widely commercially available systems.
These opportunities and concerns bring us back to the focus of Talon Reach. A key focus of the exercise was upon how to close the gap and to give the GCE, in this case the CLT, more effective tools to support force insertion. And to exercise also allows USMC Aviation to better understand the technology, which is most desired and effective for the GCE in their missions operating off of aircraft.
A key shift is from the GCE being primarily voice directed to a combination of voice-directed AND image enabled, combined with a data capability. In the past few years, the GCE receives via voice communication from intelligence officers conclusions about the situation in the objective area determined by data obtained from systems like UAVs.
The approach used in the exercise was significantly different.
Lt. Col. Hendricks :
We had a command center set up in Miramar and via satcom we were sending information updates, via chat messaging that was then received in the back of the airplane on hand-held tablets.
These were all scripted (for it was an exercise) but they would see things like:
“At 1350 zulu time, a crowd is seen gathering in front of the embassy.”
This comes across the net and the four V-22’s that were carrying the infantrymen en route could all see that on the tablet.
We could do the same with regard to imagery as well. We had Harriers out in front of the package that with their lighting pods were taking photos of the objective area where we were doing this insertion and these images were now being sent to the back of the airplanes and distributed as well.
And we had on the airplane full motion video as well. The video was coming from the lightning pod of the Harrier into the back of the lead V-22 with a subsequent re-transmission to the other V-22s.
This allowed as well what one might call the John Madden capability. Referring to John Madden used to call the football games so he had that magic pen that he could circle on the screen. We had the same capability where we could turn it into a still image, circle a certain part of it and then distribute that image amongst the CLT on these hand-held tablets.
You could literally just draw an arrow on the screen, hit send. Just like you would a text message and now everyone has a visual image.
Clearly, this is a work in progress and sorting out the value of still versus full image video is part of the challenge and to get the systems working fully.
Nonetheless, this was the first time that we were able to demonstrate this capability to close to 75 infantry officers to get their feedback.
It is clear that these new capabilities present a great potential for the MAGTF.
This change in equipment will force a re-examination of the current mindset and culture of warfighters accustomed to relying largely on voice-to-voice communications. The addition of imaged enabled communication and data capability will force operators to re-think how current mission profiles are planned and executed.
In the future, infantry squads will be able to plan in flight with regard to what they see and what they think the first approach should be.
Additionally, decision-making will likely be significantly improved as these same units work through what to do while in route to the objective rather than simply receiving intelligence inputs prior to departure.
Lt. Col. Hendricks highlighted the significant impact on time to departure to time on mission.
It is four hours to get there but you are not leaving until you have done up to six hours of planning.
This means that your real response time is ten hours from the time you receive something to actually being on station.
Based on mindset and culture shift, largely based on information and imagery and an enhanced ability to communicate, the future MAGTF could conduct planning en route to the objective area and thus cut response time in support of combatant commander’s requirements in half.
The package, which deployed on this experiment, reflects that the effort is one in progress, moving forward at a rapid rate.
Lt. Col. Hendricks indicated that the six MV-22s included 4 to carry the troops and 2 from VMX-22 to facilitate the innovation in communication and information exchange.
The VMX-22 Ospreys were used to empower the network for the insertion force.
The kind of innovation needed for the next phase is clearly based on continued and effective collaboration between the GCE and the ACE.
According to Lt. Col. Hendricks:
As we go forward with developing these new capabilities we need a collaborative effort between Aviation and the GCE.
They tell us what they need, and we work to provide that to them.
The GCE is going to be a key driver for innovation within the MAGTF being reshaped under the influence of the Osprey and the F-35.
The above article and several accompanying articles which we published in 2014 highlighted the opportunity of combing the forcing function of the Osprey with new approaches to C2 reach to shape a more integratable force which would then have its own tactical and strategic impact.
In my view, this is really the opportunity being opened by the digital interoperability effort.
On the one hand, recognizing that new platforms provide forcing function opportunities.
But on the other hand, working more directly integratability in the C2/ISR domain to both take advantage of the forcing function drivers of change but also providing enhanced capabilities for the new platform by enhanced C2/ISR reach.
Note: In an interview we did with the Major Cuomo, the head of the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at the time of the 2014 interview, we generated a graphic which highlighted the learning path to doing the Talon Reach effort, an approach which the leaders of the DI effort highlighted as an important on with regard to combat learning and the evolution of specific technologies being woven into the DI thread.
See also, the following:
Talon Reach: Shaping a Combat Cloud to Enable an Insertion Force
Re-shaping Ground Force Insertion: The USMC Leverages Tilt-rotor Technology To Continue to Innovate
USMC Long Range Raid: Shaping an Insertion Force for the 21st Century
UH-1Y Venom helicopters assigned to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (REIN), operating from the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay (LPD 20) in support of Exercise Cobra Gold 2020, March 5, 2020.
America Expeditionary Strike Group-31st Marine Expeditionary Unit team are seen participating in Cobra Gold 20, the largest theater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and an integral part of the U.S. commitment to strengthen engagement in the region.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Vincent E. Zline)
