Crises Learning: The Australian Case

04/13/2020

By Michael Shoebridge

Australian governments at all levels have learned a lot between the onset of the bushfire season and the first stages of the novel coronavirus pandemic.

There’s a clear understanding that national crises require coherent national responses. And that the seams between and among the Commonwealth and the states and territories that are tolerable during normal circumstances become unacceptable when the situation isn’t normal. Australians look to their prime minister to lead and to other leaders—including state premiers—to work coherently, positively and constructively together, if only for the period the crisis lasts.

Such crises empower prime ministers well beyond the letter of the constitution and beyond any political conventions.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has recognised this and clearly knows that we need more than periodic Council of Australian Governments meetings to make our way through the coronavirus crisis, so he has formed a national cabinet with premiers and chief ministers that will meet as often as needed.

But there’s more to managing crises nationally than creating greater coherence and coordination at the political level. Below the waterline, ministers expect public-sector leaders and agencies to work across portfolio boundaries and, like the public in their expectations of state–federal relations, have no patience for jurisdictional or portfolio-based boundary claims. That’s a good thing.

As important as national leadership and improved inter- and intra-government operation is the return of the experts. In an era of dismissal of expertise and subject-matter knowledge, during crises governments and publics look to experts for guidance. We saw this with the rural fire service and emergency services chiefs during the bushfires and we are seeing it now with chief medical officers. These experts also become key to trusted communication with the public.

The good news is that the new national cabinet has support from respected experts and senior officials. Australia’s chief medical officer, Brendan Murphy, and the governor of the Reserve Bank, Philip Lowe, both participated in Friday’s emergency COAG meeting. And the new cabinet will receive continual expert advice from the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, meaning this expert body will be a primary driver of national policy and action throughout the pandemic—which is all to the good.

This new national machinery will provide consistency of advice and decision-making. Once it gets into stride, we’ll have less of the discordant actions and advice we were starting to see—like some political figures recommending particular measures such as school closures or avoiding handshaking, while others still promoted large public events like Melbourne’s Formula 1 Grand Prix.

That’s a big step forward, and will help meet Australians’ need for clear and consistent messages from our leaders during this time of anxiety and uncertainty. National decisions are complex, so we should expect the national cabinet to expand or to at least have sub-groupings that bring in key private-sector leaders—from the food and logistics sectors, for example.

But there are differences between what we saw during the bushfires and what we are already seeing with coronavirus, so there are new lessons to be learned.

The bushfires generated a great surge of community spirit, with neighbours helping neighbours evacuate, strangers opening their homes to and feeding people in need, and a whole set of small businesses from motels to restaurants offering accommodation and free food.

The recovery phase, now interrupted by the coronavirus, has been bringing out similar qualities—from the Business Council of Australia’s BizReBuild initiative that has the top end of town helping small businesses in regional communities, to the huge public donations to charities, like the $180 million donated to the Red Cross for bushfire recovery.

Unfortunately, the coronavirus has already brought out some of the opposite behaviours: fights over toilet paper and panic hoarding show a tendency for this crisis to drive our community apart rather than be a source of unity. Disease outbreaks in history show that fear and anxiety drive people to narrowly selfish behaviours, even within families. And the unfortunate fact that social isolation is a primary public health response to the virus means that what we’ll all need to do in coming days and weeks will make it harder to reach out and help those around us.

Toilet paper skirmishes may seem trivial, but there’s real work for leaders at all levels of government and society to do to tend to the sense of community and cohesion that we’ll need during and in the recovery from this global pandemic.

As we saw with our firefighting volunteers, we know that Australian medical professionals—community nurses, GPs, staff and specialists in our hospitals and aged care facilities—will provide countless examples of service and compassion to their fellow Australians. Similarly, the behind-the-scenes work of people across essential supply systems—from fuel to food, and from health supplies to waste removal, will be invaluable.

The work these Australians do matters on a very practical level, but it will also matter as glue to hold our communities together. To encourage what Abraham Lincoln called the ‘better angels of our nature’, perhaps the communications campaign the federal government is putting together needs to portray their work. Healthcare workers and essential service providers must not be taken for granted; they need to be made visible to us as we live out weeks of social isolation.

And for all our public cynicism, the visible presence of our national leaders and their words and behaviour will be a source of comfort and reassurance.

In the middle of this national health, societal, financial and economic crisis, it’s hard to look ahead. But we need to.

One thing we need to learn and keep from both crises is that events now routinely cross our fixed organisational boundaries. The national cabinet machinery will need to be kept and improved and probably exercised more often than we expect. This has redesign implications for the machinery of government at the federal, state and territory levels and is probably best thought through with the lessons from this crisis fresh, but outside the crucible of the crisis itself.

A challenge we have yet to comprehend or deal with is the likely future where different crises overlap, with effects that compound and interact. My colleague Robert Glasser’s report Preparing for the Era of Disasters shows how regional disasters will likely not be isolated but will cascade and escalate. An example we are experiencing now is that communities damaged by the bushfires are simply in a worse position to cope with coronavirus than those left unaffected by the fires. They will need particular attention in broader plans.

And one other major challenge will be how we tune our national systems to spot indicators of potential crises earlier and empower ourselves to act rapidly and decisively at the earliest stage.

A last element will be revitalising our international engagement. That means more investment in our diplomats and diplomacy as well as currently derided international organisations like the UN, NGOs and more prosaic ones like international standards and regulatory agencies. This is a necessary reinvestment in experts, including in our public service.

It is also part of a recognition that, no matter how elegant Australia’s national crisis machinery becomes, our interconnected world requires a sense of global community and a structured system for this community of nations to act together.

Michael Shoebridge is director of the defence, strategy and national security program at ASPI.

Credit Image: Brook Mitchell/Getty Images.

This article was published by ASPI on March 16, 2020.

 

 

The Charles De Gaulle Returns Home Early: Managing the Coronavirus Impact

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and its frigate escort were due to arrive at Toulon on April 12, a return to base earlier than expected due to the coronavirus hitting 50 sailors on the capital warship.

“The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and its escort will arrive at their home base in the afternoon of Sunday April 12, at the end of almost three months tour of operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the North Sea,” the ministry said in an April 11 statement.

“The first concern of the ministry and the navy is the health of the sailors, their families and our citizens,” the ministry said.

The Charles de Gaulle had been due back at Toulon April 23, before the break out of coronavirus on board the flagship of task force 473.

An April 8 emergency medical test of 66 sailors on the carrier showed 50 had fallen ill with Covid-19, the ministry said April 10. The test led three sailors with the virus being flown April 9 on an NH90 Caïman naval helicopter to Lisbon airport, where they were transferred to a Falcon 900 jet for flight to Toulon military hospital.

The Falcon was adapted for medical flight, with two doctors and a nurse on board.

Three specialist doctors flown out to the carrier attempted to track the infection and limit the spread of the disease.

The carrier sailed from Toulon January 21 on its three-month operation Foch and had stopped over March 13-15 at Brest naval base, northwestern France.

A sailor on a Belgian frigate, Leopard 1, was confirmed March 24 to have contracted Covid-19, while the warship was sailing with the Charles de Gaulle task force, reported B2, a Brussels defense blog. The Belgian vessel, which also docked at Brest at the same time, left the task force and sailed home to arrive March 27. The Belgian crew went into quarantine.

The crew and fleet air arm unit on the French flagship carrier, and the crew of the Chevalier Paul frigate will go into a two week quarantine in military bases, the ministry said. Health and logistics specialists will take steps to deliver the “best conditions for health and accommodations.”

Further tests will be made during the quarantine and before the sailors return home.

A 1,200-strong crew sailed the Charles de Gaulle, with a further 560 personnel to command the task force, and fly and support the 18 Rafale fighter jets, two Hawkeye spy planes and three helicopters.

Some 195 sailors sailed the Chevalier Paul, a Horizon class air defense frigate.

Other ships in the naval task force – the Somme fleet auxiliary tanker and La Motte-Picquet anti-submarine frigate – will sail to Brest after a health check on board.

The fleet air arm will send the aircraft and their crew to their bases, with helicopters to Hyères, southern France, Hawkeyes to Lann Bihoué and Rafales to Landivisiau. The latter two airbases are in northwestern France.

In response to Covid-19, the troops deployed in February to the Barkhane operation in sub-Saharan Africa will continue their tour for a further one or two months, the defense and foreign affairs committee of the French senate said April 10, following  appearance of armed forces minister Florence Parly by video.

There are an estimated 3,800 “probable or possible” virus cases among the services, with 369 confirmed by health tests, the senate committee said.

The deadly pandemic has claimed the lives of at least 13,832 in France, of which 4,889 were in retirement homes, afternoon daily Le Monde reported April 12. There were fewer deaths on a daily basis, with 353 deaths on Saturday compared to 554 on Friday.

The number of patients in intensive care was declining for the third day in a row, with 6,883 patients, 121 fewer than the previous day.

President Emmanuelle Macron was due to give a nationwide address on April 13 on the pandemic.

The lock down, which started March 17, is expected to be extended beyond April 15. The question is only how long, with debate on how the tight restrictions will eventually be dismantled.

Featured Photo: French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle cruises at the coast of Frederikshavn in Denmark on March 29. The carrier is returning to home port after suspected cases of COVID-19 were found aboard.

Henning Bagger/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images

Editor’s Note: Here is how some French citizens are viewing the French government approach to managing the crisis:

Algeria Modernizes its Air Force: Upgrading its SU-24s

by defenceWeb

The Algerian Air Force is overhauling and upgrading its Su-24 strike aircraft fleet, with the first six at the 514 Aviation Repair Plant in Russia.

Photographs show six Algerian Air Force Su-24MK/MK2 Fencer aircraft being overhauled at the 514 Aviation Repair Plant near Rzhev in Russia, Scramble Magazine reports.

Algeria’s Air Force is understood to have some 35 Su-24s in its inventory, with the whole fleet to undergo modernisation and upgrade at the Rzhev facility. They will be upgraded to Su-24M2 standard – the same as Russian Air Force aircraft.

The upgrade includes the addition of the SVP-24 Gefest navigation and attack system incorporating new sensors, GLONASS global positioning system and other modifications (trajectory computer, atmospheric and inertia sensors, encrypted data link and head-up display) for greater weapons delivery accuracy.

The system allows the Su-24 to use older unguided munitions but with far greater accuracy, thus keeping costs to a minimum. It calculates the aircraft’s position while monitoring weather, speed, angle of attack etc. for optimum weapons delivery from up to 5 000 metres altitude. No laser markers or modifications to the bombs are required, allowing old stock weapons to be used.

The SVP-24 system has been used by Russian in Syria and apparently its success there prompted Algeria to upgrade its aircraft. The SVP-24 system has apparently been fitted to Russian Su-24, Su-25, Tu-22M3, Ka-50 and Ka-52 aircraft.

This article was published by defenceWeb on April 3, 2020.

 

The USMC and Digital Interoperability: The MANGL Approach

04/12/2020

By Robbin Laird

As highlighted earlier, USMC aviation is focused on ways to enhance its ability to connect with the MAGTF and to work integrated solutions at the tactical edge.

But how to start the process and to shape greater digital interoperability (DI) within the MAGTF?

Recently, I had the chance to talk with Major Salvador Jauregui and Mr. Lowell Schweickart from the USMC Aviation Headquarters who are working on the digital interoperability effort.

At the heart of our discussion, was the central importance of MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link (MANGL).

The approach is to shape a template for enhanced connectivity and the Marines are focusing upon MANGL as the foundation from which DI will be enhanced over time.

Their role is to build upon the direction provided by CD&I (USMC Combat Development Command, Combat Development and Integration) and the larger naval force.

The focus is upon coordinating the implementation efforts across the aviation combat element in support of the larger MAGTF and joint force.

There are a number of key takeaways from our discussion as well as insights gained from working through a number of background documents which focus on the digital interoperability initiative.

According to the USMC:

MANGL is designed to be installed aboard airborne assault support platforms to enable better connectivity and persistence in the areas most in need. From a hardware perspective, it is simply a collection of radios that will be shortly replaced by a singular SRP, or Software Reconfigurable Payload which can:

  • Receive network signals from multiple networks,
  • Translate them from their specific message formats and protocols, and
  • Retransmit specific information exchange requirement over other networks that reach different users or by using waveforms that are more suited to long distance or that have greater available bandwidth

MANGL consists of three primary technologies.

The first is the gateway or the mesh network manager.

The second is the software programable payload. MANGL is focused on a transition to SRP to replace the “collection of radios.” SRP-2 will be re-programmable and in the initial instantiation will support the four key waveforms highlighted in the graphic below.

Third is the interface or the MAGTAB which is the Marine Air Ground Tablet.

What the Marines are highlighting is the importance of shaping a template for ways to enhance connectivity and integratability without having to acquire a new all-encompassing C2 system. Rather than funding a whole new highway, they are looking to find ways to work around any bumps or holes in the road.

As the DI team put it: “We have designed an ecosystem where new technologies can be on-ramped with a minimum amount of time, and well inside of the typical acquisition structure, and everything has been done with a focus on speed, right down to our acquisition approach.

“While we are developing iterative technologies and we recognize that our first go-around is not going to be perfect, the acquisition approach to accomplish that has to be complementary, because if we took a traditional acquisition approach, then we wouldn’t also be able to execute in a iterative technological approach.

“The two have to be paired.”

They are looking to provide additive capabilities by adding modular, extensible kits in already existing air platforms, while leveraging the advantages of software upgradeability to evolve the software defined radios in pace with the evolution of networks.

And they highlighted that key part of the approach was working with the fleet, with warfighting centers to test out new options, to get feedback and then to bring new capabilities into the force within a relatively short period of time.

They provided an example of how they are working with MAWTS-1 at MCAS Yuma.

“For example at WTI, we have engineers down there twice a year, knee-to-knee with Marines talking about, does this application work for you? How do you want this thing to work?

“Would it be better if the sensors were here or there?

“And then they go and do a refactoring phase over the summer and they redesign a system, or they field the new applications and they come back in the Fall and they ask them again: is this what you expected?

“And the by the next spring, a year later, they are already flying. Not just a prototype, but a fielded application, or a new fielded feature.”

There is a key question of size constraints which comes into play.

Given the limited space on any combat aircraft, size, weight, and power (SWaP) must be managed and reduced to improve operational efficiency and logistics, increase mission life, and reduce the total cost of system ownership. System upgrades are driving added functionality and increased performance, placing additional attention on SWaP.

Because the team needs to work with a wide range of aircraft, each of which has its own dynamic of upgradeability, the approach being taken to connectivity is to have an upgrade path across the fleet but not tied to any particular platform.

Hence, the logic of separating platform upgradeability from C2 connectivity upgradability but finding ways to cross link such dynamic developments.

In shaping the way ahead, the Marines have identified what they believe to be the four key pillars for each interoperable platform.

Those four key pillars are relevant sensors, processors on board to process data to be part of the C2 loop, interfaces which allow for interacting with network generated data and information, and network radios which are normally designed for specific environments whether air-to-air, air-to-ground or ground-to-ground.

This four-pillar template is how the Marines hope to be able to address any innovations to be woven into the DI architecture.

The four pillars are really about configuration management and understanding the essential elements to consider for DI.

As the DI foundation is shaped and executed, moving forward with software upgradeability in the C2 hubs will allow for innovations going forward.

The strategic goal of the MANGL approach is to step out of the platform approach and look at the MAGTF as a whole.

In my view, what the Marines are doing is shaping a template to move forward, which is not a final statement of where they are but rather a trajectory of change.

The Marines are shaping an approach which allows them to have ownership of their digital infrastructure and leverage contractors as partners in shaping code evolution for various pieces in the software upgradeable systems working together to deliver DI.

The Marines are bridging stove piped systems which have been built for tailored tasks or missions.

With the coming of new software defined systems, there is a growing capability to think beyond task-oriented networks and towards cross cutting integratability.

The goal is to use existing radios and find ways to work these existing capabilities to work more effectively together, rather than laying down a new integrated approach and then buying new C2 sets to execute a new integratable approach.

Every Marine Corps aviation asset will have a way to access the MANGL system.

It is clear that the coming of the F-35 has driven this change in part because it is a flying combat system or server rack if you will.

In other words, gateways are the key enablers of the approach.

Processors within the gateways translate all messages and pass them on to the correct radios.

Gateways allow the data to be shared across disparate networks across diverse networks using existing radios and waveforms.

MANGL currently is deigned to link four tactical networks and communicate using different wave forms.

The first is Link-16 which is used primarily for airborne command and control.

The second is BE-CDL is the standard for relaying imagery and video.

The third is ANW2 which is the primary wave form for Marine Corps ground and assault support platforms.

The fourth is Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) which is a key waveform used by the Navy and is a high bandwidth waveform for sending large amounts of information over long distances.

It is important to understand that data is generated via various networks, not by a single combat cloud, and that the users of these networks clearly have levels of confidence in the data, which is in part driven by their experience with various networks.

It is about networked enabled paths of communication so certainly in my view, it is about how users in various combat environments make decisions and which data sources will have the most credibility to support those decisions.

This is why in my view; it is information confidence and not just about C2.

It is about Command, Control and Confidence in that information.

When making decisions at the tactical edge, what information do the tactical decision makers use to decide to act?

And this is about judgements about the reliability of information from a particular network versus another network. In the intelligence community, it is widely understood that not all networks deliver the same reliability of information; this is also true with the information coming through networks in the combat force.

It is clear that is shaping a foundation for moving forward, but not the end of the process.

And that process was described by the DI team as one working integratability across the MAGTF.

According to the team: “We are constantly consulting with both MCSC and NAVAIR programs to prevent any one platform from fielding a capability that makes them into a “digital orphan.”

“Some programs are adequately funded and pursue cutting edge technologies which are great for some unique task relevant to that platform, but oblivious to the fact that they fight in concert with the MAGTAF and might be creating digital divides that less adequately funded programs will never be able to overcome.”

“The opposite is also true; some programs which have transitioned to sustainment can neglect the information environment and the gains that can be made with incremental investments.

“They eventually find themselves decades behind and little chance of bridging the digital divides.

“With this in mind, we focus on being “fast followers” of CD&I.

“Because of how we’ve architected the MANGL systems, we are never more than 1-2 years of funding away from implementing the newest waveform, application, or protocol.

“When the Service decides on a future LPI/LPD waveform, MANGL will be well positioned to implement it quickly and at scale with common SRP radios waiting for software updates.

“When the Joint Tactical Grid implements a new application to enhance sensor sharing, every MANGL processor will be a candidate for the new software load.

“In this way, we have designed a technical capability that reflects the institutional paradigms and acquisition realities of the real world.

“It’s never going to be perfect, but it will be agile enough to provide a foundation for the information environment that with the Marine Corps’ will need in future conflicts.”

See also, the following:

Rethinking the Amphibious Task Force: Digital Interoperability and the Transformation of USMC Aviation

The USMC and Digital Interoperability: Shaping an Integrated Distributed Force

Working the Way Ahead for the USMC: How MAWTS-1 Supports Change

 

USAF Works Cruise Missile Defense With APKWS Rockets

04/11/2020

A F-16C flown by Maj Jeffrey Entine, 85th Flight Test Squadron test pilot, fires a rocket at a test drone at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., Dec. 12, 2019.

This test successfully demonstrated shooting a small drone at low altitudes.

EGLIN AFB, FL, UNITED STATES

12.19.2019

Video by 1st Lt. Savanah Bray

53d Wing

In an article by Brian W. Everstine published December 23, 2019, the test and its significance was highlighted.

An Air Force F-16 recently shot down a targeting drone with an AGR-20A Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rocket queued by the Viper’s targeting pod for the first time in a demonstration of future cruise missile defense.

The 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron at Eglin AFB, Fla., conducted the Dec. 19 test. The APKWS laser-guided rocket was originally developed for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a low-cost, low-collateral weapon. By adapting the rocket for cruise missile defense, it can serve the same role as the much more expensive AIM-120 missile, according to an Air Force release.

“The test was unprecedented and will shape the future of how the Air Force executes CMD,” Col. Ryan Messer, commander of the 53d Wing at Eglin, said in a release. “This is a prime example of how the 53d Wing is using resources readily available to establish innovative ways that enhance combat capabilities for our combat units…..”

The idea of using the APKWS in this role stems from a January 2019 weapons and tactics conference, and was planned with support from across the Air Force, according to Eglin.

“This proof of concept can have implications for homeland defense missions, combined defense of the Arabian Gulf, and beyond,” Messer said.

 

The Coronavirus Crisis and Its Impact: Update Report

04/10/2020

We have just published our follow up report on the coronavirus crisis and its impact.

The report contains our most recent articles on the crisis and its impact, including a look back at the London plague in the 17th century.

We provide a range of conceptual looks at the crisis and how it is playing out in geopolitics, as well as initial tasks to consider going forward.

For a PDF version of the report, see the following:

Coronovirus Update April 10 2020

For an e-book version of the report, see below:

And for the e-book version of the earlier report, see below:

Operation Irini: Or Operation Cassandra?

by defenceWeb

The European Union is stepping up its efforts to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya through the launch of a new CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) military operation in the Mediterranean.

The European Union (EU) Council on 31 March adopted a decision launching Operation EU Navfor Med Irini.

“Diplomacy cannot succeed unless it is backed by action. This operation will be essential and a clear contribution to promoting peace in our immediate neighbourhood through a permanent ceasefire,” said Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and President of the Council.

Irini, (Greek for peace), will have as its core task the implementation of the UN arms embargo through the use of aerial, satellite and maritime assets. In particular the mission will be able to carry out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected to be carrying arms or related material to and from Libya in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016).

As secondary tasks, EU Navfor Med Irini will also monitor and gather information on illicit exports from Libya of petroleum, crude oil and refined petroleum products;
contribute to the capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea;
and contribute to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks through information gathering and patrolling by aircraft.

Irini will be led by Rear Admiral Fabio Agostini as EU Operation Commander, and its headquarters will be located in Rome, Italy.

The mandate of Operation Irini will initially last until 31 March 2021.

In parallel with the launch of Operation Irini, the existing EU Navfor Med operation in the Mediterranean, Sophia, will permanently cease its activities, the EU said. Sophia was launched on 22 June 2015 as part of the EU’s approach to migration, and was to cease permanently on 31 March.

A number of countries have violated the arms embargo on Libya and in January, the United Nations said numerous cargo and other flights have been observed landing at Libyan airports in the western and eastern parts of the country providing the parties with advanced weapons, armoured vehicles, advisers and fighters.

“The mission condemns these ongoing violations, which risk plunging the country into a renewed and intensified round of fighting,” the U.N mission to Libya (UNSMIL) said in a statement.

The United Arab Emirates and Egypt support eastern forces of Khalifa Haftar which have been trying to take Tripoli. The internationally recognized administration based in Tripoli trying to fend off Haftar’s forces is backed by Turkey.

UN experts accuse Jordan and the United Arab Emirates of supplying military material to Haftar’s forces, which they said then prompted Libya’s Government of National Accord to ask Turkey for help. Haftar is also backed by Egypt and more recently Russian mercenaries, according to diplomats and Tripoli officials.

This article was published on April 1, 2020 by defenceWeb.

And in an op ed by Tarke Megerisi published by the EUObserver on April 7, 2020, the author characterized this as the EU’s Operation Cassandra. 

With a typically forceful announcement by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on 31 March, the EU marked the launch of its new naval mission to Libya. 

Codenamed Operation Irini, the Greek word for peace, it probably should have been called Cassandra after the mythical Trojan girl gifted with foresight while cursed to forever be ignored. 

As with Cassandra, the operation has clearly ignored Libya’s reality and all expert advice. 

The same myopia which has led to such a fundamentally-flawed mission will now mean the potential gains it could provide will almost certainly go uncultivated.

This mission, touted by Borrell as a solution – with a small s – to Libya’s ever-devolving crisis, was ostensibly designed to enforce the UN Security Council Arms embargo in place since 2011. 

An embargo once described by acting UN special representative Stephanie Williams as ‘a joke’ due to the extent that it has been violated. 

Enforcing the arms embargo and preventing the regional actors driving Libya’s war from continuing to do so through arms and mercenary deliveries is a prerequisite to any kind of peace or return to a political process.

In principal, this sounds good. In truth however, the mission statement is about as far as this naval operation gets at resolving this issue as the vast majority of weapon deliveries to Libya do not come via the sea. 

They are either flown in at the behest of the United Arab Emirates or driven over the land border with Egypt. 

In fact, the only foreign actor that usually ships arms to Libya is Turkey, and these are to support those defending Libya’s capital as part of a security pact with the Libyan government. 

The fact that Turkey not Libya seems to be this operation’s focal point highlights the real driver of operation peace, at the expense of Libyans that are currently suffering through devastating escalations in the violence as those air freighted weapons bombard Tripoli and its over two million inhabitants on a daily basis.

Borrell may have been at pains to remark how Libya is a priority for him and the geopolitical commission he is representing. 

Low priority

However, this operation has instead become a glaring example of just how low a priority Libya is for Europe despite the huge threat Libya’s conflict poses. 

And, unfortunately for Borrell, he can only act where member state interests lie. In this case, the only passion the EU’s foreign affairs committee could muster during its meetings on Libya were familiar pantomimes of Greek ire towards Turkey and Austrian-Hungarian obsessions with migration.

Greece’s attention turned towards the Libyan conflict after Turkey teasingly leveraged its relationshipwith the Libyan government to lay a dubious claim to the eastern Mediterranean gasfields that Greece sees as a golden ticket out of economic hardship. 

It found a quiet ally in France, who is not only similarly disenfranchised by this quarrel in the east Mediterranean, but has also long sought for a wider European mission to facilitate its apparent goal in Libya – seeing the renegade general Khalifa Haftar conquer Tripoli and set up a governing administration. 

In this clumsy great game taking place on the shores of Tripoli, Europe’s latest move seems likely to marginalise it and damage its credibility as an honest broker. 

It will also further cripple the painstaking diplomatic efforts of Germany over the last six months. 

To those in Tripoli it will be hard to avoid the impression that Europe has taken the side of Haftar and is seeking to penalise Turkey for supporting them. 

It is especially grating for them given their repeated requests to Europe and the US for support or diplomatic intervention to stop the war before formalising their relationship with Turkey. 

In exchange for this, Europe will most likely not even stop Turkey’s military support. Instead it will push Turkey away, towards a closer partnership with Russia going forwards. 

These eventualities would only further undermine the Berlin process, costing Europe a chance to lead a multilateral front for a solution. 

Given the Berlin conference was held in a rush last January to maintain European relevance in the face of the ceasefire announced by Putin and Erdogan, this is an increasingly incoherent and self-defeating move from Brussels. 

Despite the misplaced objectives behind the operation, there is still the chance for a positive impact for Libya. Europe must acknowledge that it cannot fully enforce the arms embargo, but what it can do is use its satellites and other assets to track every violation regardless of the transgressor. 

They can then publicise this, show evidence of violations to the media, and crucially to the UN sanctions committee. This would provide some much-needed accountability to the free-for-all that is Libya’s war. 

It could even be backed up by lawsuits from member-states or EU-level sanctions against repeat offenders, or other targets like the arms smugglers and freight companies used to violate the arms embargo.

Sadly these steps – as well as wider European support for Germany’s diplomatic engagement in Libya – are unlikely to be taken for the very same reason that the operation took the shape it did. 

Europe as a whole must overcome its general foreign policy apathy. It must directly engage the new and very real threats it is facing otherwise we will have a lot less peace, and a lot more warnings falling on deaf ears.