Defeating “Weapons That Wait” With Unmanned Systems

01/16/2020

By George Galorisi

The November 15, 2019, a Latvian Public Broadcasting System article headline was as stark as it was disturbing: “NATO ships clear more than 50 mines from Baltic Sea.”

The subtext was more explanatory: “November 14 saw the conclusion of the Joint Hod ops (Historical Ordnance Disposal Operation) exercise organized by NATO’s 1st Standing Anti-Mine Squad and the Baltic Minesweeper Squadron (BALTRON) which began November 4.”

As the article noted: “During the Hod ops exercise, approximately 20 square nautical miles were cleared, finding 56 explosive items at the bottom of the sea, including various different types of mines.  Currently, 43 mines have been destroyed, and the Navy will continue its work on neutralizing the remaining 13 mines.”

The fact that these mines, some of which were WW II German-made mines weighing almost 1000 kilograms each were discovered, is a vivid example that the mine threat that exists in 2020 is real.

Few would disagree with the statement that mines represent one of the most vexing military challenges. Sea mines are perhaps the most lethal form of these weapons, as they are hard to find, difficult to neutralize, and can present a deadly hazard to any vessel—even those ships specifically designed to hunt them.

These “weapons that wait” provide almost any adversary with an effective means to thwart even a major naval power.

Even the threat of mines can stop any naval operation dead in its tracks. The use of sea mines adjacent to maritime choke points presents a threat that is at once ubiquitous and deadly. Further afield, sea mines have broader repercussions for global maritime trade routes as well. Sadly, western nations have given insufficient attention to dealing with the threat sea mines pose to naval and merchant activities worldwide.

While the United States and many of its NATO and other allies are laying up and “sun-setting” their mine-countermeasures (MCM) capabilities, peer competitors are enhancing their MCM inventory.  In late 2019, Russia christened a new Alexander-Obukhov-class minesweeper, adding to their already substantial fleet of Aleksandrit-class and Natya-class minesweepers. China added new Wozang-class mine-countermeasures vessels in 2016 (Rongcheng and Donggang types) and in 2017 (Rudong type).

Mine Countermeasures Is an Ongoing Challenge

In the past several decades, rogue states have employed a wide variety of sea mines.  Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.  Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.  During Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the threat of mines hazarded coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf.

Today, especially given the tensions between the United States and Iran, U.S. and allied military professionals are evaluating the ways that Iran could threaten the west. Many think that the most serious threat is that Iran could mine the Strait of Hormuz. The mines themselves would not only take an extended period to clear, but the minesweepers could only do their work once the Iranian navy was sunk and its anti-ship missile sites destroyed.

Beyond the Iranian threat, the challenge posed by potential adversary mining capabilities is real and growing.  The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades.  More than fifty countries possess mines and mining capability.  In addition, the types, sophistication, and lethality of the mines available on the world market are increasing.

This threat is not lost on Navy and Marine Corps leadership.

During the November 2019 NDIA Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Vice Admiral John Miller, former commander of Naval Forces Central Command, noted that developing MCM capability is critical as the Navy faces increased mining threats from adversaries worldwide.  During this event, Major General David Coffman, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade noted, “The threat of mines is growing globally.  It is an asymmetric advantage that our enemy is trying to leverage and directly affects our maneuverability and our assets.”

It falls squarely on the U.S. Navy to provide the MCM capability to enable the Joint Force to operate forward in support of United States’ interests, as well as those of our allies and friends.

Indeed, the U.S. Navy’s strategic document A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Design 2.0) articulates the profoundly challenging strategic environment where peer competitors such as China and Russia and lesser (but more unstable) powers such as North Korea and Iran, have impressive inventories of naval mines.

Design 2.0 notes that, “It has been decades since we last competed for sea control, sea lines of communication and access to world markets.”  One doesn’t have to be a Sun Tzu or Clausewitz to understand that the threat of naval mines is one of the key challenges that drives our emerging need to once again compete for freedom of movement on the world’s oceans, as well as in the littorals.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) is one of the most difficult and time-consuming missions for navies to successfully execute.

That is likely why, through the entirety of my U.S. Navy experience (which began in 1970), I have witnessed the Navy “admire the problem” of MCM.  For example, in the late 1990s, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones, signed out the fourth edition of the unclassified and widely distributed Naval Mine Warfare Plan.  Shortly thereafter came the 21st Century Warfighting Concept: Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection.  Several years later, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Robert Natter, and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Fargo, jointly published an unclassified Carrier Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Mine Warfare Concept of Operations (CVBG/ARG MIW CONOPS).

The U.S. Navy’s MCM capabilities are little-changed today, even after decades of “aspirational” intentions to enhance the Navy’s MCM posture. While the U.S. Navy has made some important strides, such as the MCM package aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the significance of the MCM mission provides both the impetus and opportunity to do much more. And the time to do so is now.

The platforms that embody the U.S. Navy’s primary MCM capability—the MH-53E AMCM aircraft and the Avenger-class minesweeper – are scheduled to sunset by 2025.

As Captain Chris Merwin of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) pointed out at a military-industry event in October 2019, the Navy’s follow-on MCM capability, embodied the MCM package aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), is not coming on line as rapidly as anticipated, and initial operating capability is not scheduled until 2023 – a date Captain Merwin described as “optimistic.”

Based on my U.S. Navy experience—spanning half a century, first as a naval officer and now as a Navy civilian—this is not a new issue for the U.S. Navy, but one it has struggled with for decades. 

The entirety of my professional involvement with the operational Navy strongly suggests that it is not a lack of “want,” or even a lack of money (although MCM funding has lagged other procurement priorities), but rather, not having adequately mature technology to address the challenge.

Evaluating Unmanned Vehicle Technologies

Today, one of the most rapidly growing areas of innovative technology adoption by military forces worldwide involves unmanned systems. In the past several decades, the expanding use of military unmanned systems (UxS) is already creating strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that did not exist a decade ago.

While unmanned systems show great promise, most military professionals are keenly aware of the importance of not embracing every tool a technologist thinks might be of value to those in the fight. Employing unmanned systems in an ongoing series of exercises, experiments and demonstrations is a proven way of separating promising, but immature, technologies from those that will actually wind up in the hands of a warfighter as a proven capability.

Given today’s compelling mine threat, as well as the age of current MCM force, to say nothing of the rapidity with which current MCM systems are sun-setting, it may be time for naval professionals to shift to a new technology paradigm and focus on technologies—often commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies—will likely deliver an MCM capability faster than traditional acquisition processes.

For all navies, there is only one way to completely, “Take the sailor out of the minefield,” and that is to leverage unmanned technologies to hunt and destroy mines from a distance. As naval analyst Norman Friedman pointed out in a piece for Defense Media Network, “Gulf War 20th: Naval Lessons of the Gulf War,” the severe damage done to U.S. Navy ships, USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli and USS Princeton by simple sea mines is something that can be avoided in the future. In the past, unmanned vehicle technologies were not mature enough to be considered to take on the complex mine-hunting and mine-clearing task. They are today.

The U.S. Navy is accelerating the testing and fielding of unmanned systems.

Headlines such as, “Navy, Marines Moving Ahead with Unmanned Vessel Programs,” appear in the defense media. Concurrently, other articles, such as “When Will the U.S. Navy be Able to Autonomously Seek and Destroy Mines?” emphasize the U.S. Navy’s strong desire to take sailors out of the minefield.  Similar efforts are likely going on in other navies, especially NATO naval forces.

As just one indication of NATO’s concern in this area, and the reason that MCM efforts are gaining traction, the alliance has a long history of mine-countermeasures exercises, and has stepped up their periodicity and complexity. An article in Second Line of Defense in August 2018, “NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One Works in Norwegian Waters: August 2018,” presented the challenge in compelling terms.  Other articles, such as Ryan Hilger’s “The Navy Needs Agile Mine Warfare,” in the October 2019 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings addressed the challenge this way: “The United States lacks the capabilities and operational concepts to deploy large-scale mine countermeasures against a peer competitor.” Lieutenant Commander Hilger went further, noting;”

The U.S. Navy is not prepared to confront that level of mine threat, nor does it have a robust strategy for offensive mine warfare.

The current operational concept relies on manned surface platforms and sailors in or near the minefield for detection and clearance operations. The systems rely on a slow, methodical pace to complete the end-to-end countermine kill chain. The Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships and Freedom- and Independence-class littoral combat ships (LCSs) lack the survivability to conduct mine clearance operations in a denied environment—assuming the mine countermeasures module for the LCS ever reaches the fleet.

Other navies can capitalize on the work that the U.S. Navy has already conducted as it has explored ways to use emergent COTS unmanned technologies for the MCM mission.  Given the severity of the mine threat, all navies would be well-served to leverage and build upon mature technologies that have been examined by commercial and other government agencies in the United States, and tested extensively in exercises, experiments, and demonstrations to field a near-term MCM capability.

Building on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Experience

Earlier in this article I quoted both a U.S. Navy admiral and a U.S. Marine Corps general, both of who spoke of the severity of the mine threat as well as the challenges of fielding an effective and affordable MCM capability. This was not a set of random quotes, but rather an indication that the Navy and Marine Corps are united in their mutual efforts to deal with the worldwide mine threat to naval expeditionary forces.

The reason for this unity of effort is clear: Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary strike groups operate in the littorals close to shore, often on a coastline that the adversary defends with mines. That is one of the reasons why,  over the past several years, in a series of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps events as diverse as the Ship-to-Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation and Advanced Naval Technology Exercise, the Battlespace Preparation in a Contested Environment, the Surface Warfare Distributed Lethality in the Littoral demonstration, Dawn Blitz, Steel Knight, the Bold Alligator exercise series, and Valiant Shield, operators have field-tested wide range of emerging technologies, many of them adaptable to the MCM mission.

One of the technologies that performed well was the MANTAS unmanned surface vehicle (USV).

Over the course of the events described above, the MANTAS was scaled-up from a six-foot, to eight-foot, to twelve-foot version. During Exercise Valiant Shield, MANTAS was tasked with re-supply mission, carrying cargo to the troops ashore. As a result of that mission success, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officials have asked MANTAS’ manufacturer, MARTAC Inc., to scale-up the MANTAS further and design a thirty-eight-foot version.

It is this USV—one that closely approximates the size of an eleven-meter RHIB used by many navies—that can be combined with surface and subsurface mine-hunting and neutralizing equipment to provide an over-the-horizon “single sortie detect-to-engage” MCM capability that takes the sailor out of the minefield and provides a potential solution for this vexing mission. While there are any number of USVs and UUVs that the U.S. Navy is testing, leveraging one that has been thoroughly wrung out for hundreds of hours during years of Navy exercises, experiments, and demonstrations provides the most important building block for a comprehensive MCM capability.

Achieving a Near-Term MCM Capability with COTS Technologies

The essential building block for a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a scaled-up version of the twelve-foot MANTAS high-speed catamaran proven in the events listed earlier.  This USV—nicknamed the T38—is virtually identical in size to an eleven-meter RHIB carried by many naval ships.  The T38 can operate in up to sea state five, has a cruise speed significantly greater than that of an eleven-meter RHIB and a range four times greater than the RHIB.

One of the most important attributes of this building block is the fact that the T38 has an aft-mounted twin tow station which houses both a mine-hunting sonar system and a mine neutralization remotely-operated vehicle (ROV).  These towed subsystems are installed on two rails aft.  The catamaran hull enables the MANTAS to conduct an angled submergence of the stern tow station. This unique configuration results in a flooded well-deck that facilitates a straightforward launch and recovery of the tows.

The first key component of a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a towed-body-mounted sonar.  A sonar for this mission must have a resolution sufficient to search for mine-like objects (MLOs).  Such a sonar is also programmable for obstacle avoidance, bottom following and terrain referencing.  Another important feature is automatic target recognition to identify likely MLO anomalies.  At this stage, an operator can verify the MLO designated as such by the MANTAS sonar.  Verified MLOs are then added as a waypoint for validation.

The second component of a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a Mine Neutralization System (MNS) Remotely Operated Vehicle.  Mine-like objects that have been verified will be continuously updated.  Once this is complete, the system will recommend a route for the MNS ROV.  This route can be changed as needed as priorities shift or the tactical situation evolves.  Once the area search is complete, the T38 transitions from hunting to neutralizing by conducting a well-deck recovery of the towed-body.  This is followed immediately by the launch of the tethered MNS ROV.

The Mine Neutralization System Remotely Operated Vehicle then performs the work previously conducted by various classes of ships as it provides real-time video validation of mine-like objects.   The MNS ROV autonomously executes the MLO route for final classification and man-on-the-loop validation of each MLO.  As this is taking place, the T38 shadows and supports it as an over-the-horizon communications link.  This process is repeated until the field is cleared.

If the technical and operational solution presented above sounds simple and achievable it is just that—a capability that exists today in the commercial subsystems that can be delivered far more rapidly than anything the traditional acquisition system can provide.

MARTAC is already completing the design and fabrication of the T38 MCM variant prototype for potential demonstration to the Navy as early as this summer.

The time is right to embrace an unmanned COTS solution to deal with deadly mines.

An MCM Challenge Demanding Action Today

During my decades of service in the operational Navy, I deployed to the Arabian Gulf a number of times—the same body of water where my shipmates on USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli and USS Princeton were seriously injured by mines.  Because ships and sailors operate daily in harm’s way, The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—and by extension other allied navies—need to accelerate their efforts to deal with deadly mines. The essential components for such a system exist today, and a robust COTS MCM solution can reach fruition in the near-term.

It is time to put a near-term solution in the hands of the U.S. Navy’s sailors.  While programs of record are developing next-generation technology, the Navy should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems ready to provide speed-to-capability today.  Once the Fleet sees the COTS solution that can be delivered with the system described above, the U.S. Navy—as well as other navies with the foresight to embrace such a system—will have an effective way to defeat today’s deadly mine threat.

George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator whose thirty years of active duty culminated in fourteen years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. His last operational assignment spanned five years as a carrier strike group chief of staff embarked in the USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln.

The featured photo is of a MANTAS unmanned surface vehicle (USV).

In 2015, Murielle Delaporte deployed with a NATO Mine Counter Measures Group and reported on the challenges facing the de-miners.

The “Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One Change of Command

Dealing with the Challenge of Mine Warfare: An Interview with Commander Peter Bergen Henegouwen, SNMCMG1 Commander

Enhancing Joint Seamanship: The CO of the Donau Talks About NATO Missions

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part Two

By Kenneth Maxwell

Brazilian Society

Brazil is now overwhelmingly an urban society.

Yet the countryside matters, and is now dominated by agribusiness, which is a major source of president Jair Bolsonaro’s political support. He appointed a major friend of agribusiness, Tereza Cristina, as head of the agriculture ministry.

Agribusiness likes to export, and China which has for 10 years been Brazil’s principal commercial partner. China is the largest market for Brazilian soya beans, soya bean meal, beef, and pork. In 2019 Chinese purchases of Brazilian produce reached US$ 65.4 billion. (The United States was in second place in 2019 with US$ 29.6 billion.) The Arab states are major importers from Brazil. Countries with majority Islamic populations import 70% of Brazilian sugar, 37% of Brazilian chicken, and 27% of Brazilian beef.

Jair Bolsonaro is an evangelical Pentecostal. Like US president Donald Trump he is ideologically wedded to Israel. He was baptized in the River Jordan. He wanted to move the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. He has claimed that “China was buying up Brazil.”

But Bolsonaro has already been obliged to reconcile Brazil’s material concerns with his ideological (and Pentecostal) preferences. He visited China on his way back to Brazil from the enthronement of the Japanese emperor (Brazil has a large and influential Japanese origin population, especially in São Paulo state). He was lavishly feted in Beijing by Chinese President Chinese Xi Jinping.  Bolsonaro also visited Saudi Arabia on his way back from Japan and China though he spent much of his time there railing in an unhinged televised transmission against Globo, the big Brazilian media empire.

The Brazilian mainstream press (like Trump and his attacks on what he calls the ”fake news” of the mainstream US media) is another of Bolsonaro’s favorite targets. He declared recently that the press was ”a species facing extinction.”

Chinese investment has been rising in Brazil.

Massively into Brazil’s electricity distribution system as well as into Brazilian off shore oil production.

China is at the center of the ideological split within Bolsonaro’s government between the “pragmatists” represented by the economic team under Guedes, the military ministers in the government led by Vice President army General Hamilton Mourão, and the ideologists led by the President and his sons, supported by the foreign minister, Ernest Araújo, and Felipe Martins, the president’s foreign policy adviser in the presidential palace (palácio do planalto), the environmental minister, Ricardo Salles, who is like Bolsonaro a climate change denier, the education minister, the economist Abraham Weintraub (he is greatest user of twitter in Bolsonaro’s government), Damares Alves, the Evangelical pastor, the minister of women and family and human rights, all of them backed from Virginia in the US by Olavo de Carvalho, the self-exiled verbally incontinente, foul mouthed, internet ”philosopher” and gun totting “mentor” and “guru” to Bolsonaro and his sons.

Brazilian society is profoundly unequal and the concentration of wealth at the top remains obscene, even by international standards.

The top one percent of Brazilians control 28.3% of the national wealth. 10% of the richest control 41.9% of the wealth. Only Qatar has a worse distribution of wealth at 29%.

Yet Jair Bolsonaro’s most fervent political support base is among Pentecostalists, many of them drawn from the urban aspiring lower middle class and Favala residents.

The intersection between the urban upper middle class ensconced behind their well protected high rises and heavily gated compounds, and the aspiring poor is intense, interconnected, and interdependent.

Often these connections are through household service and through what the Brazilian historian Jaime Reis calls the world of “motor boys, bike boys, Uber, the slaves of neo-liberalism.”

This is the “Gig” economy Brazilian style. These unequal segments of society are linked through the large informal economy of the drug trade especially in cocaine. This is where the middle class meets the traffickers. These connections are also international.

Clandestine Commerce

Some idea of the scale of this clandestine commerce can been seen in the extent of drug seizures. Cocaine seizures between January and October 2019 comprised 47.1 tons in the port of Santos (SP), 18.9 tons in Paranaguá (PR) which is the second largest port in Brazil in terms of tonnage and the third in container shipping and is the main port for Brazil’s agricultural products, 13.5 tons of cocaine was seized in Natal (RN), and 4.4 tons in Itajaí (SC).

These cocaine shipments were destined for Holland, France, and Belgium. The cocaine routes link the inland frontiers of Colombia and Venezuela through Bolivia and Paraguay to the Brazilian (and Uruguayan) Atlantic ports. The trade also passes from Natal to Europe through the former Portuguese colony of Guiné Bissau (virtually a narco-state).

The trade in cocaine and the routes of cocaine trafficking into and out of Brazil are a major unacknowledged contributor to Brazil economy.

It also stokes Brazil’s high rate of crime, urban gang warfare over urban territory, and the interconnections between the informal armed “milícias” which since 2000 under the guise of combatting narcotraffickers have extorted the population of the favelas and low income communities for the clandestine use of gas, cable television link ups and other services, and in the sale of property. Formed of police, firemen, security guards and retired military officers, they often live in the communities and are linked to politicians and community leaders.

According to research in 2010 the milícias dominated 41.5% of the 1006 favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The other 55.9% were controlled by narco traffickers. The corruption of the police and local politicians, and the high rates of homicides, especially among Brazil’s “afro descendent” population is a direct consequence. In Rio de Janeiro the milícia “escritório do crime” which is active in the western area of the city exploits the illegal construction and the sale of real estate.

The role of the military police along these sharp domestic boundaries is particularly shocking.

The context was captured by the iconic photograph, taken in 2004 by Tuca Vieira of the favela of Paraisopolos abutting the upper-class district of Morumbi in São Paulo, where the division between wealth and poverty was most grotesque, between the favela and the luxurious apartment bloc.

It also mirrors the division between whites and non-whites with deep roots in Brazilian history and the legacy of almost 400 years of slavery.

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part One

The featured photo shows Brazilian police seizing hundreds of kilos of cocaine in a drug raid in Sao Paulo on September 23, 2016, in which an Israeli man was arrested. (screen capture: Ynet)

The photo was taken from the following source:

israeli-arrested-in-brazil-with-300kg-of-cocaine-report

 

 

Shaping a Next Gen Workforce for Airpower: The Australian Case

By Andrew McLaughlin

The equipment is here or on the way, but what is the RAAF doing to develop a next gen workforce?

The Royal Australian Air Force is undergoing arguably the biggest transformation in its 98-year history. Not only has almost every platform in its inventory been recapitalised in the past decade and a half, the service is also having to re-skill and upskill much of its workforce to adapt to a whole new generation of capabilities.

Air Commodore Geoff Harland joined the Royal Australian Air Force in 1985. During his career, he has flown as an Air Combat Officer on P-3C Orion, F-111C and F/A-18F Super Hornet.

He has commanded 1SQN, 82WG, and Air Force Training Group as well as deploying as an Air Planner for INTERFET (East Timor), Director Air Operations Centre and Air Component Commander for Operation Sumatra Assist, and Director of the US Central Command’s 609th Combined Air Operations Centre in the Middle East.

Outside Air Force, AIRCDRE Harland spent 18 months working for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) in aviation safety culminating in roles including Australian Safety Oversight Branch Manager. He was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross in 2001, appointed as a Member of the Order of Australia and awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 2017. He is currently the Director General Personnel – Air Force.

AIRCDRE Harland is clearly an experienced operator with a clear focus on human resource management, and his role as Director General Personnel – Air Force is to oversee the transformation of the RAAF’s workforce to be able to safely and effectively operate the next generation of systems entering service.

“We’re in a phase now where we are really reconsidering what works for Air Force in terms of workforce,” AIRCDRE Harland told ADBR. “Looking forward, we’re trying to understand and anticipate the future nature of work and emerging demographics to determine how we might better prepare ourselves and continue to generate good workforce outcomes now and into the future and in doing so stay ahead of the game.”

Two of the key challenges of building a next gen workforce are the changing demographics of and demands for different skill-sets in Air Force and society in general.

“The question we asked ourselves was, ‘what would a 5th generation air force mean from a workforce point of view?’,” he said. “We asked that question against the backdrop of the changing nature of work in the wider community, given that Air Force is drawn from the wider community. We are importantly an all-volunteer force, so the way we work and the way we operate needs to make sense to the wider community, we also need to ensure we remain viable and perform as an Air Force.”

One of the opportunities Air Force has used to begin to re-shape was provided by Project Suakin which formalised the notion of a total workforce model. Launched in November 2013 by then VCDF AIRMSHL Mark Binskin, Project Suakin’s aim was to “improve the ADF’s ability to respond to future workforce challenges and changes in the security environment and the economy by giving it a more flexible workforce structure.”

By using the Total Workforce Model (TWM) the Project Suakin aimed to “provide flexible career pathways, matching remuneration and benefits with capability delivered, enhanced workforce flexibility, simplified processes and helping to build an organisational culture that is more accepting of flexibility”.

“What we’re looking at in the Air Force’s adoption of the TWM is the creation of a total workforce system which takes into account uniformed Air Force people who engage in a career in more flexible modes than in the past and may work in a casual, part-time or full-time way rather than the previous binary permanent or reserve Air Force construct,” AIRCDRE Harland explained.

“We are now realising opportunities with casual workforce, readiness part-time work force, and standard part-time workforce which allow us to leverage off previous education, training and experience,” he added. “Add Public Service, industry and contractors and we have a more flexible Air Force total workforce system”.

“We’re also exploring ways that we can consider the use of automation and artificial intelligence to deliver traditional workforce outcomes for Air Force. What we’re trying to do is basically move away from the management of a permanent workforce which has a little bit of reserve helping out, to the idea of a workforce system that has more flexibility for the people who we engage with, considers emerging technology and allows us to adapt as we look forward.”

AIRCDRE Harland says he envisions the RAAF’s workforce model operating across three key time frames. “The first frame is what we call the ‘force-in-being’, which is operating the current force in that zero to three years frame and delivering the ‘now’,” he explained.

“The second time frame is what is known as the ‘objective force’ in which the period nominally three to 10 years from now and drives the future workforce structure and development of our people to allow Air Force to realise the new capabilities that are generated through the capability life cycle.

“The third time frame is beyond 10 years from now as we look at the aspirational future force which is really very difficult to define in the current context because the environment is rapidly changing, what we’re doing is looking and saying, ‘here are the things that we might need to anticipate’.”

The RAAF has also increased its engagement and outreach to educational institutions to develop that future workforce. “In the cyber domain in particular we’re looking at generating a cyber workforce – cyber warfare officers and cyber warfare specialists as well as looking at electronics engineers who are network specialists, and also network technicians who will maintain our infrastructure.

Another consideration is personnel retention and recruitment rates. Whereas Air Force has, in the past, struggled to retain key personnel such as pilots when civilian organisations are in an expansion phase and are hiring. Air Force maintains a close watch on external markets and has recently introduced a strategy to manage aircrew in a way to improve return on investment and increase resilience.

“So right now, the macro level Air Force level doesn’t have a retention problem,” AIRCDRE Harland said. “We’re at around about seven per cent separation which is healthy, because we do need to refresh and regenerate.

“There are pockets of Air Force which we’re seeing competition for talent outside,” he added. “And in those areas I think it’s really about what we can offer as a force, and how we can differentiate ourselves from an experience that an individual might get in industry.

“We’re now allowing people to flow in and out of Air Force more than previously and in doing so we are able to access intellect and capacity of Air Force people as they’re moving in and out of uniform. So acknowledging the experience that they get outside in wider industry is actually really important to us, and it can bring some different perspectives back to Air Force which can really improve our performance.”

AIRCDRE Harland added that Air Force doesn’t currently have any trouble with recruitment. “Right now, it’s exceptionally positive,” he said. “We don’t typically have trouble getting talent in the door, but we acknowledge that as we look forward into STEM related industry there’s going to be increasing competition for talent. So we need to be very clear on what the offer is for Air Force, have a system that makes sense to people, and also have some flexibility in the way that we engage with people.

“While also considering workforce structure and policy, we’re also looking at the kind of behaviours that we would see successful people exhibiting in the future Air Force,” he added. “We’re exploring that area because, you can change structures and you can change policies, but until you actually really tap into cultural change and behavioural change, you can really end up returning to where you are now. So we’re doing work in terms of trying to understand and influence culture and behaviours.”

He said recruiters were generally looking for candidates who have good communication skills, are critical thinkers, and who are good at collaborating. “With those three things as a baseline, they will be good contributors to their joint force. Provided they have the baseline technical skills and qualifications, we can teach the skills the Air Force needs, it’s much harder to influence soft skills and attitude.”

I asked AIRCDRE Harland if, by looking for more flexibility in its workforce, was Air Force in danger of losing or degrading its technical mastery in specific trades and skill-sets.

“Air Force by its nature has always been a technical force,” he said. “The way we describe professional mastery in Air Force is that it’s comprised of three elements: technical mastery, combat mastery and social mastery. In the early part of an individual’s career, they typically concentrate on getting good technical skills and generating technical mastery, whether it be in aviation, cyber, engineering et cetera.

“Then as they move through their career they will work on their combat mastery, which is how they will apply their specialisation to generate air power effects,” he added. “And foundational to that is increasing social mastery, which is really about the ability to be able to communicate and influence in a really positive way across the ADF.

“So to answer your question, the way that we structure an individual’s career will typically build them on a big pillar of technical mastery, and then we’ll broaden their skills in combat and social so they become more broadly adaptable across the force.

“An important bottom line to our plans is that, as we look forward to increased flexibility to enable Air Force to continue to remain relevant in the future and access the talent and workforce capacity it requires, we must equally ensure that we remain fully viable as a military force. So as ever, it’s a careful balancing act.” AIRCDRE Harland stated.

“The Chief (of Air Force) and Air Force’s senior leadership are very focused on the Air Force workforce, and I think we have an opportunity to further challenge ourselves with the difficult questions and improve and prevail in the future.”

This article was published by ADBR on January 7, 2020.

 

Pacific Reach

01/15/2020

The Australian Department of Defence is contributing to a whole-of-Government initiative to further deepen Australia’s engagement in the Pacific region.

Since the announcement of the Pacific Step-up in November 2018, Defence has enhanced existing engagement across the region.

Working with her partners, Australia is increasing Defence’s presence, conducting training and activities with Pacific security agencies, strengthening their resilience.

Australian Department of Defence

December 2, 2019.

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part One

01/14/2020

By Kenneth Maxwell

Politics in Brazil are already polarized and will continue to be so in 2020.

The Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, owed his election to this polarization. He will stoke it further. It is in his political interest to do so. It is entirely in his character to do what he does best.

That is stirring up resentments, misogyny, homophobia, nationalism, and rightwing populism.

Confrontation is the new norm in Brazilian politics.

This in a country that once prided itself on conciliation.

Even if conciliation historically covered a multitude of social, racial, and economic inequalities.

Belligerent confrontation is now the name of the game.

Few are seeking consensus.

Overview

The economic situation may improve in 2020.

There are indications that the long recession the country has suffered over the last five years may be easing. Employment prospects are beginning to improve. The unemployment rate had been 13.70% in 2017.

But 2019 ended with unemployment falling to 11.20%.  This still leaves almost 12 million people out of work within a population of over 210 million.

Some legislative changes have been made in Bolsonaro’s first year in office. Much now depends on implementing radical domestic reform legislation which the multifarious special Interests represented in the Brazilian Congress (there are 17 parties in the Senate and 30 parties in the lower chamber of the Congress) have always been loath to support (or to support in return for special favors.)

An improvement in international trade and business conditions will also help, especially a resolution of the trade dispute between the US and China which could have a major impact on Brazil’s prospects.

Brazilian growth according to the most recent projections, prior to the new crisis in the Middle East, may reach 1.7% which will return Brazil to pre-recession levels.

The World Bank forecasts Brazilian growth at 2%.

Brazilian society remains woefully divided.

The on-going culture wars will intensify.

Brazil will continue to be part of the global struggle over the future of democracy, authoritarianism, populism, internationalized drug trafficking, and especially over the environment. The broad de-facto consensus between center left and the center right which has dominated Brazilian politics since the 1980’s has clearly broken down.

A stable new configuration of political forces has yet to emerge.

The lingering presence on the political scene of the two principal political protagonists of the old political division between center left and center right, former two term presidents Lula da Silva (Lula) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), complicates the situation.

Neither Lula nor FHC shows any willingness to gracefully retire from political protagonism.

Each seems determined to continue fighting old battles. In FHC’s case (he is ever conscious of US precedents) this means promoting the 2022 presidential prospects of the São Paulo TV host and entrepreneur Luciano Grostein Huck. Huck presents “caldeirão do Huck” (Huck’s Cauldron”) on the Rede Globo network, Brazil’s largest.

Lula’s continued political activism stymies the prospects for the emergence of credible alternatives on the left. It did so in his late withdrawn from the last presidential contest which undermined the prospects of Fernando Haddad who belatedly became the Worker’s Party (PT) candidate.)

But Lula’s resilience, wiliness, political ruthlessness, and instinct for self-preservation, should never be underestimated.

The Political Landscape

The political landscape is being recast by forces well outside the old networks of power (though sometimes these are old forces, like the Bolsonaro clan clothed in and weaponized by new garments.)

What is new is that these clusters of special interests have emerged in an environment which is already internationalized with the rise of cyber influence campaigns and sophisticated clandestine political interference and manipulation.

In this Brazil is well ahead of the game which marries the old surveillance mechanisms inherited from the military dictatorship to the new techniques developed in the age of the Internet.

One of the Harvard University students who co-founded Facebook in 2004 it should be remembered was the Brazilian Eduardo Saverin. He fell out with Mark Zuckerberg. His worth was estimated at US$10.1 billion in June 2019 and he is now living in tax exile in Singapore.

Jair Bolsonaro with an eye on the next presidential election in 2022 is forming a new political party, an “Aliança pelo Brasil” with himself as the President of the party and his son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro of Rio de Janeiro, as the Vice-President. Its objectives match his government’s slogan of “Brazil above all, God above all everyone.”

Like so much with (reserve) army captain Jair Bolsonaro and his outspoken nostalgia for the days of the military dictatorship, his new “Aliança pelo Brasil” is reminiscent of the National Renewal Party (ARENA), the pro-government conservative political party (or agglomeration) which between 1966 and 1979 was the” official” party of the military regime.

The Aliança pelo Brasil is mobilizing the support of leading Evangelicals to obtain the 491.000 signatures needed to make the new party a viable electoral alternative.

The Evangelicals are an important force in Brazil.

Recent analysis in one Rio de Janeiro favela found that 40% of the residents considered themselves to be evangelical and only 17% considered themselves to be Catholic’s. in São Paulo a vast 10,000 seat “Temple of Solomon” was built as the cost of US$300 million by the “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.” Its minister is the son-in-law of the founder of the church, Edir Macedo, whose worth is thought to be US$ 1.3 billion and is the owner of Rede Record, the second largest broadcaster in Brazil. The “Universal Church” is said to have 1.8 million followers in Brazil.

The old battle between “Liberalism” (or “neo-liberalism”) and “Statism” (that is the dominant role of the state in business enterprises) is also back with a vengeance.

This is a conflict that rests in part on the struggle between the power of the “official” economy, where the statisticians, the bankers, the corporate managers, and the international investors live, and the “informal” economy where most non-rich (and non-white) Brazilians survive their daily challenges, and where emotional support for national enterprises remains very strong.

The “markets” know what it is they would like to see: A successful implementation of the plans of Paulo Guedes, the minister of the economy, and the creation of a slimmed down, more agile state, with more privatizations, a simplification of the tax system, much greater openness of the economy to the world, more flexible labour rules, and the overhaul of the pension system.

Paulo Guedes is certainly trying.

He has incorporated into his super-ministry the former ministries of planning and industry and commerce and established departments of “de-bureaucratization” and “de-Stateization.”

Guedes also has under his wing the national development bank (BNDES), the Banco do Brasil, the Central Bank, Petrobras, and the applied research institute (lpea). Guedes was promised a free hand by Bolsonaro.

Not surprisingly he is most popular among rich Brazilians (58% approval according to the December 5/6 DataFolha opinion survey) than among poorer Brazilians (where his rating is 31%).

The featured photo is of President Bolsonaro and is credited to Mauro Piemtel/AFP and the original source can be found here:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-181007020716337.html

 

Russian Navy and Agressive Actions Towards the USS Farragut

On Thursday, Jan. 9, while conducting routine operations in the North Arabian Sea, USS Farragut (DDG 99) was aggressively approached by a Russian Navy ship. Farragut sounded five short blasts, the international maritime signal for danger of a collision, and requested the Russian ship alter course in accordance with international rules of the road.

The Russian ship initially refused but ultimately altered course and the two ships opened distance from one another. While the Russian ship took action, the initial delay in complying with international rules while it was making an aggressive approach increased the risk of collision.

The U.S. Navy continues to remain vigilant and is trained to act in a professional manner. We continue to encourage vessels from all nations to operate in accordance with internationally recognized maritime laws, standards and norms.

01.10.2020

Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Dawson Roth

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet

In a USNI News piece published on January 10, 2020, Sam LaGrone added:

Ivan Khurs, assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, is one of two Russian Yury Ivanov-class Russian intelligence collection ships. According to Turkish ship spotting site Bosphorous Naval News, the ship left the Black Sea on Nov. 29 before traveling to the Middle East.

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) has been operating in the region since relieving USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) as the U.S. on-station carrier in the Middle East last month.

Thursday’s incident follows a June encounter in which Russian destroyer Admiral Vinogradov came within 100 feet of a USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) operating in the Western Pacific.

In 2016, Russian Navy frigate Yaroslav Mudry (FF-777) and the guided-missile cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56) came close to a collision in the Mediterranean Sea. Mudry made multiple erratic maneuvers near the cruiser while coming within 150 yards of carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) during flight operations. Days earlier, the same Russian frigate had published a video edited in a way that seemed to show guided-missile destroyer USS Gravely (DDG-107) cut in front of it.

The featured photo shows Russian surveillance ship Ivar Khurs making  ‘aggressive’ move against USS Farragut (DDG-99). US Navy Image

 

Immediate Response Force Deploys to Iraq

Following up the insertion of a USMC SP-MAGTF Crisis Response Force to the US embassy in Iraq, U.S. Air Force Airmen load equipment assigned to 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, onto a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft bound for the U.S. Central Command area of operations from Fort Bragg, N.C. on January 4, 2020.

This deployment is a precautionary action taken to respond to increased threat levels against U.S. personnel and facilities.

The ‘Devil’ Brigade is the nucleus of the U.S. Immediate Response Force, capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in the world in response to a variety of contingency operations.

POPE ARMY AIRFIELD, NC, UNITED STATES

01.04.2020

Video by Sgt. 1st Class Jason Hull

49th Public Affairs Detachment

The photo highlights: Equipment assigned to 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division is loaded into aircraft bound for the U.S. Central Command area of operations from Fort Bragg, N.C. om January 4, 2020. This deployment is a precautionary action taken to respond to increased threat levels against U.S. personnel and facilities. The “Devil” Brigade is the nucleus of the U.S. Immediate Response Force, capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in the world in response to a variety of contingency operations.

FORT BRAGG, NC, UNITED STATES

01.04.2020

Photo by Spc. Justin Stafford 

49th Public Affairs Detachment