Upcoming Russian-Chinese Military Exercise: September 2018

08/21/2018

According to the Chinese press:

The Chinese military will take part in the Vostok-2018 (or East-2018) strategic drills in Russia from late August to mid-September, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced on Monday.

Military forces from the two countries will hold joint operation exercises at the Tsugol training range in the Trans-Baikal region in Russia from September 11 to 15, said the ministry.

“The drills are aimed at consolidating and developing the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security,” it said.

“The military exercises are not targeted at a third party,” the ministry said.

China will dispatch about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, to conduct fire strike and counter-attack training, among others, it said.

According to an article published on Business Insider, the exercise was described from the Russian side as follows:

Russia’s military forces in the country’s east were put on high alert Monday ahead of massive war games that also involve China and Mongolia, the largest show of power in nearly 40 years, the Russian defense minister said.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the five-day “snap inspection” of the troops will pave the way for the massive exercise called Vostok-2018, or East-2018, which will be held in August and September.

Vostok-2018 will be “unprecedented in scale, both in terms of area of operations and numbers of military command structure, troops and forces involved,” Shoigu said, according to The Moscow Times, adding that it will also be “the largest preparatory action for the armed forces since Zapad-81.”

The Zapad exercises in 1981 were the largest war Soviet war games ever held, according to the CIA, with about 100,000 to 150,000 troops participating.

In 2009, Russia re-initiated the Soviet-era quadrennial Zapad war games, which were most recently held last year…..

 Moscow and Beijing have conducted a series of joint military maneuvers, including exercises in the South China Sea and navy drills in the Baltics last summer.

The two countries have forged what they described as a “strategic partnership,” expressing their shared opposition to the “unipolar” world — the term they use to describe perceived U.S. global domination.

And the Moscow Times in an article published on August 20, 2018 highlights the coming exercise as follows:

The Russian military has announced the start of a five-day “snap inspection” testing the combat readiness of troops ahead of massive maneuvers in Siberia and the Far East.

Russia is holding war games dubbed Vostok-2018 (“East-2018”) in the central and eastern military districts in August and September, with some 3,200 Chinese troops scheduled to join the exercises in Siberia’s Zabaikalsky region next month. 

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu called the upcoming games “the largest preparatory action for the armed forces since Zapad-81,” referring to war games conducted by the Soviet Union in 1981. The minister said that the upcoming games would be “unprecedented in scale, both in terms of area of operations and numbers of military command structure, troops and forces involved.”

Airborne Troops have been activated as part of the Aug. 20-25 snap inspection with long-range and transport aviation in the regions, Interfax quoted Shoigu as saying Monday.

Shoigu said that the mass inspection involving 16 special drills was launched on the orders of President Vladimir Putin.

The featured photo is from The Moscow Times article cited above and is credited to Alexander Demyanchuk / TASS.

 

A Visit to EOS in Australia: A Payload Company Innovates for 21st Century Operations

08/20/2018

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia, I had a chance to visit Electric Optical Systems (EOS) in Canberra and to meet with the founder and his senior team working on space systems.

EOS works closely with global customers, including the United States, and provides cutting edge lasers and sensors to provide for a variety of military solutions.

My colleague Edward Timperlake has written about the central significance of what he calls the payload-utility function for 21stcentury forces, and the reversal between platforms and payload utility capabilities within the kill web, which various platforms in the combat force integrate to provide the desired, combat effect.

To understand Payload/Utility with full honor to John Boyd, it can be noted that Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target acquisition, and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement. Thus there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

And within this focus, the roles of classic platform providers and payload enablers are shifting. Increasingly, the platform is about being able to operate, empower and to operate upgradeable payloads.

Or put another way, payload/utility companies are becoming either the new prime contractors or the key systems houses enabling platforms.

EOS is a payload/utility provider.

They provide a range of systems from enablement of space-based capabilities to a variety of land capabilities as well.

EOS operates in two sectors: Defence Systems and Space Systems.

EOS Defence Systems specialises in technology for weapon systems optimisation and integration, as well as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) for land warfare. Its key products are next-generation vehicle turrets and remote weapons systems.

EOS Space Systems specialises in applying EOS-developed optical sensors to detect, track, classify and characterise objects in space. This information has both military and commercial applications, including managing space assets to avoid collisions with space debris, missile defence and space control.

http://www.eos-aus.com/sites/default/files/Space%20Update%201%20August%202018.pdf

EOS 2018

During my visit to Canberra, I spent an evening at the Mt Stromlo Space Research Facility where EOS has a laser tracker for space systems.

The entire facility is robotized with only about 30 persons needed to service the operational facility.

The laser tracker at Canberra is connected with remote locations throughout Australia where similar robotized laser trackers create a significant capability to provide for space situational awareness.

Of course, such a laser capability provides a base line for growth in the laser-based engagement area with regard to space as well.

I met with the founder and well-known scientist/entrepreneur Dr. Ben Greene as well as the CEO of EOS Space Systems, Professor Craig Smith and the key software engineer, Dr. James Bennett.  They provided an overview on the capabilities and the growth path for their systems directed to space-based SA and related capabilities.

At the end of the evening, I had a chance to interview Dr. Greene and to get his perspective on the way ahead.

Question: Let us start by talking about your approach to land systems. 

You are a payload company and how do you see the evolution of the platform/payload relationships going forward?

Dr. Greene: In the land warfare sector, we would characterize our payloads as weapon systems.

They are modular and designed to be external to the vehicle.

We are optimized when the platform design approach focuses on modularity, which clearly is the way ahead for vehicles for ground forces.

We have a weapon system family that doesn’t require changes to anything in the platform and we can change the payloads rapidly.

For example, one could have a payload which was the standard 12.7 millimeter machine gun, an M2, or you could have a 30 millimeter cannon firing fused rounds and equipped with a javelin missile.

The two payloads would be interchangeable within 30 minutes on top of that platform, and nothing in the vehicle would change.

The internal software in the vehicle that we supply would sense exactly what the new payload was and adapt to it and adapt the user interface accordingly.

Question: How does this affect the classic relationship between the vehicle prime and the payload provider?

Dr. Greene: There clearly is a change underway.

Our payloads typically cost more than the platforms that they would be fielded on.

And so in some cases we are invited by the customers to be the vehicle integrator or what you would call the prime.

Customers generally are becoming quite savvy about the fact that the payloads are the core value, and the mission is in the payload.

Yet the platform has got to be a viable platform to deliver that payload into combat, but at the same time, the customers are increasingly recognizing that the payload performs the mission.

Question: Another aspect of the payload focus is an expectation that you’re designing the payload with regard to ongoing modernization or put in other terms, you are building a more rapidly upgradable payload.

How should one view this dynamic?

Dr. Greene: Our customers have moved from playing checkers to chess, because they’re thinking six moves ahead.

As we build a capability with a blue team, we have a red team engaged throughout to anticipate obsolescence and needed upgrades.

We’re now expected to deliver the technological architecture, which can deliver continuous upgrades, but ones which can anticipate changes which the reactive enemy might well make.

The opposing combatants are becoming more intelligent in the way that they deploy forces. And in particular, in asymmetric theater operations, you do find that the smaller irregular forces are incredibly innovative,

They’re often supported by major powers, so they have very good intelligence capability. They have what we would call a back room that’s supporting them with great intelligence on how to exploit weaknesses and what’s just been fielded in the last six months against them.

This means that the sophistication of some of the asymmetric combat forces is quite remarkable today.

And so that’s the environment that we are working in as a payload provider. We’re delivering payloads that have had to be pre-mapped to at least to at least two levels of response to what we will field currently.

Question: Let us turn now to the space side of your business. Could you describe the focus of your payload business in this domain?

Dr. Greene: We have built core capabilities to enhance situational awareness in space. We irradiate certain areas of space with lasers, and we then analyze the reflected returns.

We can determine range from that. We can also determine other elements of the spacecraft from a light signal directed at that spacecraft.

We have been in this business area for 40 years.

Question: How would you describe the complementarity of radars with lasers in terms of providing key ISR performance?

Dr. Greene: They’re very complimentary. Radars are exceptionally good at detecting anything that’s moving in a large area of space. Lasers are very good at characterizing that object and that motion very accurately.

For example, we can detect UAVs with radars and kill them with lasers.

The same thing applies on a much larger scale in space.

So space is really consists of two domains. There’s 2,000-kilometer zone around the Earth, which is the lower Earth orbit.

In the space domain above two or three thousand kilometers, only optics applies, and so the lasers can operate to two or three times the range that radars can operate, and beyond that we have passive optical techniques with extreme range, where both laser and radar techniques fail.

And so the entire space domain from 3,000 kilometers to 50,000 kilometers is managed optically with lasers and light.

Question: Your work is rooted in a very strong working relationship between Australia and the United States.

How would you describe that relationship?

Dr. Greene: I think that there’s a very strong two-way relationship.

Australia can offer special aspects of territory in terms of where we sit in the world physically, in terms of our geography. In addition, our technology combined with operating within our specific climate, means that if we deploy optical technologies from Australia, they are of immense value in terms of the information captured from the platforms that we deploy here.

That information can complement and support the intelligence database that US would apply for space information. And we would like to contribute to space information superiority for the alliance in that sense.

We’ve had a very strong program here that has always been a joint program with the US from its inception.

There’s always been significant US participation in our program.

Question: But I would note that talking to you and to your staff and looking at your enterprise, as a whole is like a trip back into time for me in one key sense – you have a very lean operation and you are not afraid to test and fail. 

It is like going back into time in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States.

How does it feel to be both a time capsule and a key driver for 21stcentury innovation?

Dr. Greene: I would tend to agree with the sentiment, The processes that we operate here are a linear extension of the process that we developed jointly and in complete harmony with the US during the ’60s and ’70s and ’80s.

And those processes were very efficient.

We’re talking about a development process for advanced technology that was aggressive. It was well risk mitigated. It had woven into it an integrated operational concept.

The red team analysis was at the table through every design review, so the entire design process was red teamed continuously, not at the end.

The processes are not risk averse.

They are risk mitigated.

We have never been risk averse, but every time we fall over, we have to recover very quickly.

And so I think one thing that we still have, which I see missing in some parts of the world, is that tremendous technological aggression that the US had in the ’70s and ’80s.

And I’m not saying it’s not there now.

It’s just not as evident, and I think it’s muted by a lot more administrative process now than it was previously.

And we haven’t been encumbered by that here.

Appendix

May 30, 2016

Space conference at Mount Stromlo

CLOSE to 100 of the world’s top space environment researchers will this week congregate on Mount Stromlo to discuss ways to clean up the masses of space debris currently orbiting earth; the same debris that recently cracked a window of the International Space Station.

The Space Environment Research Centre’s (SERC) International Research Colloquium, to be held from 31 May – 1 June, is the premier event of the year for the Canberra-based international research organisation.

SERC Chief Executive Officer, Dr Ben Greene, says the Research Colloquium will bring together researchers, industry and space agencies to collaborate, share resources and knowledge to enhance their research outcomes. The purpose of SERC’s collaborative research programs is to develop methods to remove the estimated 170 million pieces of man-made space debris that currently orbit the earth endangering vital space infrastructure.

“More than AUD$1 trillion worth of global space infrastructure is currently at risk from an ever increasing amount of space debris,” Ben said.

“Globally, space infrastructure delivers essential and highly efficient services including communications, navigation, resource management and climate change monitoring. This infrastructure is at risk from space debris ranging in size from spent rocket stages as large as busses, to flakes of paint measuring millimetres. This debris can travel at speeds in excess of 20,000km/h, so even a single flake of paint can badly damage or destroy a vital piece of space infrastructure. The dangers of space debris were highlighted earlier this month when the International Space Station’s Cupola window was badly damaged by a minuscule piece of debris thought to be a paint flake.

“Working at SERC’s multi-million dollar research facility, SERC researchers are tackling the problem by enhancing capability in tracking, characterising and identifying objects in orbit, orbit determination and predicting behaviours of space objects.

“SERC is a joint public, private partnership between the Australian Government and organisations including Canberra based company EOS Space Systems, the ANU, RMIT University, Optus Satellite Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems and the Japanese National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT).

“International collaboration is essential for a global problem such as space debris.

“There are estimates of more than 300,000 items of debris orbiting the earth greater than 10cm. There is so much debris that it is colliding with itself, and creating more debris. A catastrophic avalanche of collisions which could quickly destroy all orbiting satellites is now possible.

“Our initial aim is to reduce the rate of debris proliferation caused by new collisions, and then to remove debris using ground-based lasers. There have been strenuous efforts in many countries over the past decade to develop space debris mitigation technology. SERC brings together leading debris mitigation programs from around the world to create a team with the required critical mass of researchers, technology, funding and equipment. The resource commitments for SERC have come from every tier of space activity and are an indication of the international importance of this initiative.”

[Photo: The EOS Space Systems Satellite Laser Ranging Facility at the Space Environment Research Centre (SERC) in action tracking space debris, Mount Stromlo, Canberra. Credit: EOS Space Systems]

Dr. Laird is a Research Fellow at the Williams Foundation.

Recently, the ADF has picked EOS to work a new capability for the Australian Army.

EOS Wins Australian Defence Program

Canberra 24 August 2018

Electro Optic Systems, (ASX: EOS), acting through its subsidiary EOS Defence Systems Pty Limited, is pleased to announce that it has been selected as the remote weapon system provider for Phase 2 (Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle) of the Australian Army’s LAND 400 program. EOS tendered the R400S Mark 2 D-HD remote weapon station for this acquisition. This latest R400 variant is commencing full rate production to meet existing contracts in early 2019. It is expected that approximately 80 remote weapon stations for Land 400 Phase 2 would enter an existing manufacturing process from 2021.

Additionally, the LAND 400 Phase 3 tender released today requires that all tenderers ‘include the integration / use of’ the EOS Remote Weapon Station in their responses for the next Phase of the program. Phase 3 seeks to deliver 450 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles from 2024/25 onwards.

These two events represent a significant step forward for EOS Defence Systems as the primary RWS provider to the Australian Army. Combined with the existing in-service 230+ EOS remote weapon stations these additional systems will create a larger EOS RWS fleet across multiple vehicles and deliver significant improvements in operational effectiveness and cost of ownership for Australia’s combat forces.

The R400S Mark 2 Direct Drive-Heavy Duty (D-HD) remote weapon station is the latest high precision product from EOS Defence Systems and can mount different weapons up to and including the M230LF lightweight 30mm cannon and anti-tank guided missiles.

The LAND 400 program comprises four phases which are summarised below:

  • LAND 400 Phase 1 – Project Definition Study (completed);
  • LAND 400 Phase 2 –Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Capability
  • LAND 400 Phase 3 –Mounted Close Combat Capability; and
  • LAND 400 Phase 4 – Integrated Training System.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar August 2018

Background

For over twenty years the F-111 provided the Australian Defence Force with a strike capability with the  strategic reach to provide Australia with an independent strike option should deterrence fail. With the retirement of the long-range F-111, Australia’s future air strike capability now rests in the capabilities of the F/A-18F Super Hornet and F-35A, both equipped with appropriate long-range strike weapons and supported by a capable air-to-air refueling force of KC-30A aircraft; the air-to-air refueling force necessary to extend the unrefueled range of both the F/A-18F Super Hornet and the F-35A to achieve the desired strategic reach.

While Australia’s geo-political circumstances and regional threats are much changed from those which existed in 1963 when Australia committed to acquire the potent F-111 air strike capability, they are now more complex and much less straightforward than the Cold War heritage scenarios of the 1960s. But one aspect remains unchanged; Australia’s strategic geography, where strategic reach continues to support the case for an independent strike capability. The ability to strike at range brings a new dimension into any unfolding strategic scenario which, in itself, may often deter escalation into armed conflict. While in the event of escalation occurring, the absence of a long-range strike capability both limits Australia’s options for strategic maneuver and concedes to an adversary the ability to dictate the terms of engagement.

An independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends; signals a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security; and has the capacity to influence strategic outcomes short of resorting to armed conflict.

Joint Strike

Conceiving, planning, programming and delivering a credible strike capability is not easy.  While some elements such as long-range strike weapons can be bought off the shelf, the integration of the various elements of a strike capability is complex and takes time before the conception develops into a mature and credible military capability. But a strike capability without the enabling capabilities such as electronic warfare support, surveillance support and air-to-air refueling is of little utility, hence enabling capabilities must also be part of the acquisition plan.

Plus, there are the doctrinal, C2, training and sustaining elements of the capability to consider. In short, the complexity and time required to build a nation’s strike capability is such that a government has little option other than to retain a strike capability within a nation’s force structure as, like many other elements of national power, the maturation timeframe for a strike capability is measured not in years but in decades.

There are also important lessons flowing from the last two decades of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations have illustrated the need for an integrated and sophisticated targeting process, for without perceptive and sophisticated targeting, strike operations achieve few useful outcomes. Targeting is intelligence-led and fundamentally joint in nature and the experience gained from the past two decades of air operations will be invaluable in establishing Australia’s future long-range strike capability.

While the speed, reach, responsiveness and flexibility of an air strike capability are compelling arguments for Australia to retain an air strike capability within its order of battle, there are also other military capabilities that extend strike operations into the joint arena. The evolution of Australia’s strike capability will also need to consider the contribution from evolving technologies, such as electronic warfare, unmanned systems, and of the contribution from new technologies which not only seek to employ traditional kinetic effects but also non-kinetic effects. A sophisticated strike capability seems a continuing and essential arrow in Australia’s quiver of national power.

Aim of the Seminar

This seminar seeks to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent.  It will highlight the impact on the national, campaign, operational and tactical levels, and discuss the ways joint strike can add a further dimension to future Australian Defence and national security policy.

It will provide a historical perspective on the development of the Royal Australian Air Force’s strike capability dating back to World War 2, and look to partner air forces as to how they have developed and employed a strike capability in recent campaigns.

We will hear the perspectives of the Australian army, navy, and the joint commanders, as well as contributions from our coalition partners in the United States and United Kingdom, with the emphasis on gaining a better understanding of the strike options available and of the best way of delivering a balanced range of strike capabilities across the Australian Defence Force.

The seminar will highlight some of the emerging technologies, not just in the weapons but also in the enabling support, planning and targeting systems.  It will assess the impact on training systems and on the role of modelling and simulation in the optimising and developing a mature and sophisticated long-range strike capability.

The seminar will also serve as an opportunity to provide an industry perspective on joint strike and, in particular, the role industry can play as a fundamental input to capability. It will highlight the opportunities associated with co-operative programs and the potential to contribute to payload and seeker technologies.

Above all, the seminar will emphasise the impact of a joint strike capability on a broader strategy of deterrence.  This will involve discussion of both conventional and nuclear strike options and the ways and means of delivery, and their potential impact on the balance of power in the region.

WillliamsStrikeSeminar23Aug18 2

The hypersonics photo is credited to NASA.

Combating 21st Century Authoritarian States: The Perspective of Ross Babbage

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia, I had a chance to continue my discussions with Ross Babbage about the challenges of dealing with 21st advanced authoritarian states.

Recently, he co-authored a study entitled “ Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare,” and with that as the predicate we discussed the nature of the challenge posed by 21stcentury advanced authoritarian states and how to deal with that challenge.

https://sldinfo.com/2018/08/information-warfare-and-the-authoritarian-states-how-best-to-respond/

Question: Your new report lays out the nature of the challenge.Where is your project now headed in terms of working both the challenge and response to what I would call 21stcentury advanced authoritarian states?

Babbage: This is a starting point but we need to dig more deeply into their own thinking, their own literature, their own doctrine, and their own practices in political warfare.

We are proceeding by generating a series of case studies to highlight what those methods and approaches are so that we can assess them more concretely.

There is a lot of history.

Both the Chinese and Russian approaches are rooted in their history but using modern methods to execute their templates of political warfare.

Question: How would contrast the authoritarian approach to our basic liberal democratic mindsets?

Babbage: For the liberal democracies, there is a pretty clear break between what we would consider war and peace.

For the Chinese and the Russians, there is not quite the same distinction.

They perceive a broad  range of gray areas within which political warfare is the norm and it is a question of how effective it is; not how legitimate it is.

They are employing various tools, such as political and economic coercion, cyber intrusion, espionage of various types, active intelligence operations and so forth.

For example, in Australia, certain Chinese entities have bought up Chinese newspapers here so that there’s very little Chinese language media in Australia, which is not pro-Beijing.

And they are leveraging their business people, students and visitors to work for broader political means within Australia as well.

In contrast, the West is employing very traditional means such as diplomacy and military tools.

Our tool set is clearly constrained compared to the innovative and wide ranging tool set with which the Russians and Chinese are working and they are learning to use their presence in our societies to expand their influence on our policies.

Aaron Friedberg at Princeton really got it right when he said words to the effect that “a primary driver of Beijing’s international policies is to make the world safe for all authoritarianism.”

And that’s what we’re seeing.

What we’re confronting is a new version of a long-standing theme in Chinese strategic thought which emphasizes the importance of shaping the strategic environment in your favor by reaching a long way into the enemy’s camp, and putting him off balance, and getting him focused on internal problems and exacerbating those internal problems.

The goals are to distract and weaken the enemy and get him to not focus on things other than the main game.

The political warfare approach is one of interfering, disturbing, distracting, confusing, disrupting the institutions and the normal operations of democratic states.

The head of the Australian  Security and Intelligence Agency (ASIO) has stated that the scale and pace of foreign intelligence and  espionage activities in Australia is now higher than they were at the peak ofthe Cold War.

Question: What can be done?

Babbage: A key aspect of meeting the challenge is to recognize it exists and encourage the public focus on its existence and operations.

Regardless of domestic political persuasion, our people do not like to see this kind of authoritarian coercion operating in our society.

When they realize what is happening, they’re upset , they’re angry about what a foreign country could be trying to do, these sort of things, and they want to galvanize action.

And many pose the question of “What can we do to actually stop this and fix it?”

At present we are not telling the story of foreign political warfare broadly enough within our political and economic sectors.

We’ve got to improve our information operations. We need to throw sunlight on what these guys are doing and do so in a comprehensive and sustained manner.

Beyond that effort, I would identify a number of potential components  of what one might call an effective counter strategy.

First is a denial strategy.

Here the objective is to deny, not just the operations and make them ineffective, but also to deny the political benefits that authoritarian states seek to win by conducting their operations.

Second is a cost imposition strategy.

We need to find ways to correlate their behavior with an imposed cost.  We need to make clear that if they are going to behave like this, it will cost them in specific ways.

Third is focused on defeating their strategy, or making their strategy counterproductive.

We can turn their strategy on its  head and make it counter-productive even within their own societies.

Their own societies are fair game given the behavior of the of our combined assets Russians and Chinese.

Fourth is to make it damaging, and even dangerous, for authoritarian regimes  to sustain their political warfare strategy.

Authoritarian regimes have their own vulnerabilities and we need to focus on the seams in their systems to make their political warfare strategies very costly and risky.

And we need to do this comprehensively as democratic allies. 

There’s no reason why we can’t coordinate and cooperate and make the most of our combined resources, as we did in the Cold War..

But do we have the right tools and coordination mechanisms for an all-of-alliance strategy to work well?

In my view, the Western allies have a great deal of work to do.

The featured photo comes from Alan Porritt/AAP

For past discussions with Dr. Babbage, see the following:

The Changing of the Threat Envelope for Australia: The Perspective of Ross Babbage

The Chinese Challenge WITHIN Australia

Dealing with Reality Shock: Refocusing on the World We Have Rather than the World We Wish We Would Have

 

 

Transferring Training from Jacksonville to RAAF Edinburgh: The RAAF Moves Out on the Aussie P-8 Fleet

Recently, the officers responsible for P-8 training in the RAAF have returned to Australia from JAX Navy.  The Aussies are now doing their training at their main operating base in South Australia, namely RAAF Edinburgh.

Second Line of Defense recently visited the base and discussed the transition with Wing Commander, Darren Goldie.  That interview will be published shortly.

According to the text released by the Australian Department of Defence on August 17, 2018 at the time of the official opening of the Australian based training facilities:

Training on the Royal Australian Air Force’s fifth-generation P-8A Training System officially begun on 17 August 2018. Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Marise Payne and Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC, toured the leading edge training facility and experienced first-hand the Air Force’s newest and most advanced training system.

As a fifth-generation Air Force, we are investing in building our people’s capabilities so they can fully harness the incredible potential of our modern platforms.

The P-8A Training System has transformed the delivery of Maritime Patrol training for our Air Force personnel, be they pilots, aircrew, technicians, maintainers or support personnel.

August 17, 2018

Australian Department of Defence

Some of the training aides in operation at RAAF Edinburgh are shown in the photos below:

Dealing with the Hypersonics Challenge

08/19/2018

Hypersonics has been a key priority for the US until the last Administration pushed the work done to that date into dormancy.

But neither the Russians nor the Chinese went to sleep while the US focused on and resource the land wars instead.

They continued to make progress on this new capability, and with the coming to power of a new Administration, the US is returning to the hypersonics realm.

The new head of Pentagon R and D clearly has highlighted both the threat and the need to focus on hypersonics research and capabilities.

“It is our adversaries, not us, who have chosen to weaponize this type of capability,” Griffin said, adding that the U.S. would not be eclipsed by Russia and China.

Griffin’s comments came on the heels of Chinese reports announcing the first successful testing of a hypersonic aircraft, a feat the U.S. has yet to accomplish.

When asked about China’s sprint to deploy this new breed of weapon, Griffin described Beijing’s efforts as “much more thoughtful” compared with Moscow’s developments.

“The Chinese have been much more thoughtful in their systems development because they are developing long-range tactical precision-guided systems that will be really influential in a conventional fight,” Griffin said. “The Chinese ability to hold our forward deployed assets at risk with very high speed and very hard to intercept precision-guided systems is something to which we have to respond,” he added.

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/space-force-pentagon-blames-russia-china-for-militarizing-space.html

But there is a key question: how best to pursue and deal with the hypersonic threat?

With the President’s emphasis on building a new space force through a space corps, naturally, the space element has been heightened as a key element to deal with hypersonics.

And with the appointment of Griffin and loading the Pentagon with space stalwarts, the emphasis could really be narrowly focused on space as the venue and instrument.

Sandra Erwin of Space News recently highlighted the space dimension of the hypersonics dynamic as follows:

The Pentagon’s panel of four-star generals known as the Joint Oversight Requirements Council will be briefed this fall on potential solutions to a major national security vulnerability: hypersonic weapons that fly into space at supersonic speeds and descend back down to Earth directly on top of targets.

Current sensors could track some portions of the flight but more coverage is needed for the midcourse.

China has been testing hypersonic glide vehicles successfully, and is advancing the technology at an alarming pace, warned Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin. 

The hypersonic threat brings a “new urgency” that the United States has not seen since the Cold War.

A defensive shield would require global coverage and the cost of doing that with ground radars would be prohibitive so this has to be done in space, Griffin said.

“Our response has to be a proliferated space sensor layer, possibly based off commercial space developments.”

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is reviewing proposed concepts for a space-based sensor layer from nine companies: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Atomics, Maxar, Draper Labs, Leidos, Millennium Space and Boeing.

Industry sources said the studies will include options such as constellations in low and medium orbits.

Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, who chairs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, has asked MDA to come back with an “assessment of the sensor requirements.” What will the sensors have to be able to see? How large should the constellation of sensors be? How would sensors in space connect to command and control systems?

“Those are big hard requirements,” Selva told SpaceNews last week at a Mitchell Institute breakfast. “We asked for a systems engineering assessment for how they will link all that together.” The JROC expects to see a more concrete plan this fall.

During a roundtable with reporters last week, Griffin cautioned that the traditional approach to developing “exquisite” military satellites is not going to work.

The Pentagon already has a network of early warning heat-detecting satellites in geostationary earth orbit that can see missile launches.

The new layer of sensors will be aimed at low-flying hypersonic glide vehicles.

What’s needed: “persistent, timely global, low-latency surveillance to track and provide fire control for hypersonic threats.”

If the solution is in space, Selva suggested, “Wouldn’t it be interesting if a commercial constellation of satellites actually had some capacity? If that’s true why would we build our own?”

(SN Military Space, August 14, 2018).

But shaping enhanced sensing in space or an ability perhaps to strike before or during the early launch cycle from space is only part of what is required.

The core problem is how to defend deployed assets through effective endgame strategies leveraging  a kill web.

How does is the fleet admiral and the surface warfare officers empowered to kill incoming hypersonic threats?

To know you are going to be killed is not enough; it is to have the means, processes, procedures and information for the weapons officers on what and how to execute the kill function.

Ed Timperlake addresses this challenge in both of his pieces in this special edition focused on hypersonics;  first in his S cubed piece and secondly, in his discussion of the kill box challenge.

It is important to put the challenge in perspective.

As one leading researcher on hypersonics put it with regard to U.S. dormancy during the last Administration as well as the evolving Chinese and Russian threats:

The magnitude of the Chinese investment, the number of people they have, the facilities they are building, the ties to their academia, make it all real.  

They are flight-testing regularly, and with amazing success.

And hypersonics fits in perfectly with their doctrine.

The Chinese saw Hypersonics as an area that they could develop and surpass the US, and we made it easy for them. 

Frankly, an enemy intelligence operative couldn’t have disrupted our progress in the field more effectively than we have done to ourselves.

The USAF flew its X-51 successfully in May 2013- what have we done since then?

Instead of continuing and building on that success, we were penny wise-pound foolish; the Air Force gave away most of its money in this area to DARPA, which effectively started over from scratch.

As a result, in the year 2018 we are farther away from flying a scramjet-powered hypersonic craft than we were in 2010.

How insane is that? 

The Russians are also a threat, but in their case it is more hype than worry.

And as a senior retired USAF officer put it with regard to the Chinese program on hypersonics:

First, they have a long way to go to operationalize this vehicle.

Second, the US should already have an operational hypersonic military aircraft, but neglect by Congress and past Administrations to ensure our military was funded to capitalize on advanced technologies, and instead shifting those funds in the 90’s and 00’s to the “peace dividend;” explosive growth in entitlement spending; and strategically misguided Army occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan squandered our military technological advantage.

That misallocation of national resources is still continuing today.  

Unfortunately, it will take another catastrophe to wake up America to the need for the advanced capabilities and capacities that are required to achieve military preeminence to deter high-end warfare in the future—and to fight and win if necessary.

Featured Photo: Starry Sky 2, China’s first experimental hypersonic waverider vehicle, is launched inside a rocket on Friday. China Daily

Our current edition on defense.info is focused on the hypersonic challenge, and can be read as a single report as well.

The Coming of Hypersonics

 

The Next Phase of Missile Defense: C2 and Multi-Domain Sensor and Strike Capabilities

08/18/2018

By Robbin Laird

Missile defense capabilities have grown over the years, and have become important elements of the joint force.

But they have operated largely as organic assets supporting either tactical or strategic operations, but not as an element of C2 integrated force.

As the US forces shift from a primary focus on counter-insurgency to force-on-force peer adversary conflict, a significant effort by US and allied forces is being placed on reshaping their forces to fight effectively in the integrated battlespace.

At the heart of such capabilities is an ability to develop, deploy and execute C2 in a multi-domain battlespace.

Active defense is becoming a key requirement for combat success for a maneuver force and ability to insert forces into combat areas an adversary may seek to deny or defend.

But for active defense to be effective it needs to be integrated with offensive forces into an offensive-defense enterprise directed by effective C2.

How best to accelerate progress in this effort?

What changes need to be made on the side of the development of missile defense systems?

What changes need to be made to the evolution of C2 systems?

What changes to how offensive forces can leverage the defense to expand the effectiveness of the overall combat force?

This is a work in progress, one that is central to the future and the evolving capabilities of US and allied forces.

How best to proceed and to maximize combat success?

But like the famous line in Moliere’s play, where the main character is characterized as speaking prose but not knowing it, there is a case study staring us in the face of how to shape an effective way ahead.

That case is the C-RAM capability and approach.

The main thrust of the literature that describes C-RAM focuses on its coming to Iraq and then Afghanistan to provided sensors and shooters to protect forward operating bases.

And what tends to be highlighted are the radars or the shooters.

But this really misses the point.

It is the C2 system which enables the sensor and shooters to provide an integrated system of systems, one in which the adversary shooting the incoming strike asset can be targeted, the incoming strike asset destroyed, and the troops on the ground warned.

During our discussion with the BG McIntire at Fort Sill in April 2018, he highlighted a success story the Army had in the Middle East in developing and deploying the Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) system within 11 months from the Warfighters call for a solution.

According to BG McIntire, they were effectively working integration of defense fires with offense fires within the Army just prior to a ramp off of the control of operations and response efforts from the US Military to the host nation Iraqi government.

“We already started working offensive and defensive fires with the C-RAM system. We linked C-RAM into a network of sensors by leveraging the field artillery sensors and the air defense radars and we were able to determine where the enemy rounds were coming from, the point of origin (POO).

“Then, we were able to effectively provide localized warning for our troops in the vicinity of the Point of Impact (POI), while intercepting the incoming round when it was appropriate to protect the defended asset.

“Simultaneously, we responded with an appropriate level of reaction force: counter-battery fire, Army attack aviation or local ground forces towards the launch point for further investigation or defeat.

“Now, we need to take these Fires concepts already demonstrated at the Tactical level and experiment with them at the Operational and Strategic levels.”

What the US Army has done working with Northrup Grumman is to build a C2 system which is scalable and can build out from what has been done in C-RAM to incorporate what the Army as well as the Marines are building in the ground base short range active defense environment.

And they are building out integration capabilities as well to the coming of the ICBS C2 system, which will provide a system of systems solution for medium-range missile defense systems as well.

To be blunt: C-RAM is a key success and provides a harbinger of things to come and certainly to be highlighted in shaping a way ahead in the post-stove pipe weapon systems world.

And it is about C2, which is really at the heart of shaping forces crucial to prevailing in the strategic shift.

The C2 at the heart of C-RAM is FAAD C2 or Forward Air Defense Command and Control.

According to Northrop Grumman:

As the technology in air- based aircraft and weaponry advances, the need to protect against low-altitude air threats becomes more urgent. The Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Command and Control (C2) system was developed by Northrop Grumman to provide command and control (C2) for the U.S. Army Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Systems.

FAAD C2 receives air track data from multiple local sensors as well as multiple external track and C2 sources. All track data is correlated, and a single integrated air picture (SIAP) is distributed to all SHORAD weapons, along with engagement orders and weapon control status to provide complete situational awareness (SA). FAAD C2 also provides both its local air picture and the status of SHORAD weapons to higher echelon air defense and maneuver elements.

Originally fielded in 1993, FAAD C2 continues to be actively employed by the U.S. Army as well as several foreign nations. Northrop Grumman’s sensor/ weapon independent architecture, coupled by our years of experience developing FAAD C2, facilitates the integration of new local sensors, weapons and external track/C2 sources, per the needs of the customer.

Not only does FAAD C2 currently interface with many sensors, weapons and external track/C2 sources, it can also be expanded to interface with other new or legacy systems. Depending on customer requirements, Northrop Grumman can either support the system developer in implementing one of FAAD C2’s standard interfaces or can implement the other system’s legacy interface.

FAAD C2 may be incorporated into a wide variety of platforms from a mobile command center such as the Air Defense Air Management (ADAM) Cell to a transit case for maximum versatility.

The FAAD C2 scalable network architecture enables the air defense force protection unit to provide support from a standalone battery to an entire battalion, while still providing connectivity to higher echelons

FAAD C2

The Army was using a common weapons interface to tie new weapons into the C2 system. In other words, the C2 system is the epicenter for the integration process. “

The Army is taking this C2 system and working outwards into the new short range air defense system which is a priority for the Army and which will be deployed on top of a Stryker vehicle. The Marines are working closely with the Army on this effort, and will deploy a common C2 system on a JLTV in what is called the L-MADIS system.

When I was at MAWTS-1 I had a chance to get updated from the USMC side on the approach, which Gesellschap highlighted. The USMC system is called L-MADIS or the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System, which is designed specifically for counter UAS missions. It is a two vehicle system which works the ISR data, and C2 links and delivers a counter strike capability against incoming UAS systems.

The L-MADIS system is very expeditionary, and can be carried by MV-22s or C-130s.

The Army’s version is being built off of a Stryker vehicle, and the Marines off of a JLTV vehicle.  The same instinct is in play – use a core vehicle in use for the ground forces, shape a flexible management system on the vehicle and have modular upgradeable systems providing what BG McIntire at Fort Sill referred to as the “toys on top of the vehicle.”

The same software is running for both the Army and Marine Corps air defense systems.

This means that L-MADIS and SHORAD should be interoperable on day one.

In other words, what the Army-Northrop team has built is a C2 template which can evolve over time to end new sensors and strike capabilities to the active defense system, both fixed and mobile.

The Army-Northrop team works as an enterprise. The government has full rights for the use of the Northrop software. As the prime contractor, Northrop provides the software and documentation, namely, the technical and training manuals.  The government does independent software testing and requirements determination.  And the government tests out the software for its full material release as a new block of software.

What this enterprise approach allows is for Northup working with the Army to incorporate additional systems into the software build.

In short, the FAAD C2 software and its evolution is at the center of a C2 multi-domain dynamic which will help shape the next phase of missile defense development, one in which active defense is part of being able to support a distributed force operating in a force-on-force fight.

It is a case study suggestive of the future; not simply an historical footnote to operations in Iraq in the mid first decade of the 20thCentury.

NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One Works in Norwegian Waters: August 2018

One of NATO’s naval groups visited Trondheim on Friday (10 August 2018), and from there it will go on to search for sea mines dating back to World War II.

The operation will make the waters safer for fishermen and shipping in the area.

Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One (SNMCMG1) currently consists of four ships from Belgium, Norway, Latvia and Lithuania.

During their port visit to Trondheim members of the public will be able to visit the ships to find out more about their work. After leaving Trondheim, SNMCMG1 will begin historical ordnance disposal operations along the Norwegian coast.

During this mission the group will search and identify sea mines and other dangerous ordnance left over from World War II.

All the data collected will be handed to the Norwegian authorities to improve maritime safety. This year the ships have carried out mine clearance operations off the coast of France, the United Kingdom and in the Baltic Sea.

NATO has four standing maritime groups which are made up of ships from various nations, a demonstration of Allied solidarity.

These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operations.

They also serve as an on-call maritime force as a part of NATO’s Spearhead Force – the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

In June and July, NATO’s major anti-submarine warfare exercise Dynamic Mongoose 2018 was held off the coast of Norway.

In October and November Norway will host Trident Juncture 2018, one of NATO’s largest military exercises in recent years. It will have more than 40,000 participants from more than 30 countries.

Credit: NATO

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_157640.htm

The featured photo shows BNS Godetia, with LVNS Rusins and LNS Kursis in background, crossing the Geiranger fjord.