The UK Ministry of Defence Looks at Post-Brexit Future: The Case of International Cooperation

07/19/2018

With the uncertainties of Brexit, the UK government is looking for ways to enhance its global industrial relationships.

One example is the recent agreement with Australia to build new frigates.

Those frigates will be built on a new UK design, a global ship in the eyes of UK defense and industrial officials.

What remains to be worked out is the reciprocal arrangements with Australia embedded in the new frigate build.

And at the Farnbourgh Air Show on July 16, 2018, the UK Ministry of Defence announced a new patterning relationship with Lockheed Martin.

According to a UK Ministry of Defence article published on that date, that new relationship was described as follows:

Under a new Prosperity Framework, the UK Government and Lockheed Martin will work together to identify new opportunities to generate value to the UK and to Lockheed Martin.

The Framework will work on the creation and exploitation of innovative ideas and technologies; strengthening supply chains; and supporting the development of the advanced manufacturing and technology sectors.

This will bring considerable benefits to the wider defence, aerospace and space sectors of the UK economy, creating and sustaining high-level technology jobs and skills in key industries.

Supported by investment of £38 million from Lockheed Martin, opportunities for potential collaboration will be identified across defence and commercial sectors including in autonomous systems, space, artificial intelligence, cyber security, electronic warfare and underwater technologies.

Defence Minister Guto Bebb said:

“Lockheed Martin’s commitment clearly demonstrates how they view the UK as a top country to work with, with our world-class defence industry, supported by powerhouse universities and a wealth of high-tech and innovative small businesses.

“As we look to our post-Brexit future, it is crucial that we create, develop and strengthen our relations with international partners across defence. Foreign investment in defence stimulates robust growth across a host of sectors in the British economy so this should be at the forefront of our international aspirations”

Lockheed Martin has been a partner in UK Defence for almost 80 years and currently adds £1 billion to the economy every year, supporting 1,000 suppliers (75% of which are SMEs) and 10,000 jobs. This mutually beneficial relationship provides the company with its second largest international market. Both the government and Lockheed Martin want this partnership to grow from strength to strength.

Rick Edwards, Executive Vice President for Lockheed Martin International said:

“We greatly value our partnership and see this agreement as a way to strengthen our relationship and help the UK to prosper. Our expertise in developing new technology like autonomous systems and exploring new frontiers like space will be invaluable in helping the UK to be a world leader in defence and aerospace”

Minister for Investment, Graham Stuart said:

“This partnership with Lockheed Martin, a major global defence company, is great news for the UK, and further reinforcement of this country’s position both as the European leader in technology and the number one foreign direct investment destination across the EU.

“This is a vote of confidence in the UK’s R&D capabilities, its innovative companies and a fantastic commitment from Lockheed Martin to support the development and expansion of their UK supply chain. It is also good news for current and future jobs in the sector whilst ensuring the UK can continue to develop its world leading defence and aerospace industries.”

Phillip Dunne’s independent review of the prosperity benefits that flow from defence, reinforced the importance of building strong relationships with companies such as Lockheed Martin. This Framework will drive growth and investment in the UK and develop technologies and capabilities which can be exploited for the benefit of defence, the 500,000 jobs it supports, and for the broader UK economy.

Initial objectives for the Prosperity Framework include:

  • Activities to assist UK companies to understand Lockheed Martin’s business, and technology roadmaps, enabling them to contribute to Lockheed Martin programmes worldwide.
  • Activities to improve the performance, resilience and competitiveness of UK supply chains, which will inform Government’s wider business and supply chain improvement initiatives.
  • Building on Lockheed Martin’s work with the UK Space Agency and £13 million investment to develop launch and small satellite capabilities.
  • Growth of the UK investment pipeline for LM Ventures, Lockheed Martin’s $200 million venture capital fund.

The featured photo shows Defence Minister Guto Bebb and Rick Edwards, Executive Vice President for Lockheed Martin International signing a new Prosperity Framework.

Lockheed Martin copyright.

 

 

 

 

Prevailing in a Disrupted and Degraded Combat Environment: MAWTS-1 Works the Challenge

07/15/2018

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to MAWTS-1 shortly after the completion of their latest WTI course, I had a chance to talk with Marines involved in the WTI about their combat focus.

In the strategic shift, an adversary clearly has access to a variety of advanced combat capabilities and techniques.

In a session led by Captain Michael Jacobellis, the Ground-Based Air Defense Division head at MAWTS, we focused on the threats and efforts to prevail against those threats.

One of these is the ability to degrade the combat force of the Marines and to disrupt the combat rhythm to the adversary’s advantage.

Here the Marines were thrown a series of jamming and other EW challenges which disrupted their normal C2 and ISR data links and communication tools.

Clearly, part of that challenge is learning what is simply equipment malfunction versus a deliberate adversary disruptive strategy.

Part of it is learning to work with a diversity of targeting and communication tools to do work arounds when disruption comes.

Some of the new equipment is clearly designed to provide a combat advantage for the Marines, such as the new G/ATOR radar which provides targeting tracking information which can inform the air element as well as work with the ACE to provide redundant capabilities.

As one Marine noted with regard to G/ATOR: “We are working with a family of systems that will allow us to provide a recognized air picture across the entire MAGF so we can pass targeting data across the MAGTF as well.

“This system is the Composite Tracking Network or CTN.

“This was the first time we failed G/ATORS at WTI and they allow us through use of CTN to integrate all of the sensors together and empowers integrated fire control.”

The shift from counter-insurgency habits, equipment and operations is a significant one and is clearly a work in progress.

It is about shedding some past learned behavior as well in terms of shaping more appropriate ways to operate as a force in a contested tron warfare environment.

The cracking of the Enigma code in World War II by the allies involved in part German soldiers and sailors using techniques which exposed the enigma system to intrusive learning from the British and the other allies working to break the Enigma Code.

In today’s situation, the Marines are facing a similar situation in which a combination of technology and appropriate combat techniques in handling data in a combat environment is a key element of the combat learning cycle as well.

And disruptive technologies, which the adversary might use against the Marines, were being fielded to test the USMC approach.

One example is the use of multiple drones or UAVs against Marine Corps forces and testing various technologies and approaches to attenuating that threat.

The Marines are working closely with the US Army and this effort, and our visit earlier this year to Fort Sill highlighted progress, which the US Army is making with regard to fielding a new capability to deal with UAVs disrupting the battlespace.

Similar to the Army, the USMC is working new systems onto a combat vehicle to shape more effective ways ahead as well.

The USMC system is called L-MADIS or the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System, which is designed specifically for counter UAS missions.

It is a two vehicle system which works the ISR data, and C2 links and delivers a counter strike capability against incoming UAS systems.

The L-MADIS system is very expeditionary and can be carried by MV-22s or C-130s.

The Army’s version is being built off of a Stryker vehicle, and the Marines off of a JLTV vehicle.

The same instinct is in play – use a core vehicle in use for the ground forces, shape a flexible management system on the vehicle and have modular upgradeable systems providing what BG McIntire at Fort Sill referred to as the “toys on top of the vehicle.”

https://sldinfo.com/2018/04/the-us-army-innovation-and-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-missile-defense/

https://sldinfo.com/2018/01/shaping-a-21st-century-deterrence-in-depth-strategy-the-role-of-ada/

In other words, combat learning can shape the systems being put onboard the vehicles and working commonality with the US Army can provide for a broader deployed capability dependent on how the force will operate or build up in an objective area.

The Marines are building the ground vehicle and systems infrastructure within which they can plug evolving counter-battery fires capabilities as those develop.

And clearly, they are looking at extended range as well for the counter-battery fire.

The C-RAM system of systems approach used in combat in the Middle East is being taken forward into the new phase of preparation for combat.

https://defense.info/video-of-the-week/c-ram-a-case-study-of-army-transformation/

We argued earlier with regard to the combat learning from the Middle East Wars, that one needed to “harvest the best and the leave the rest.”

Clearly, one aspect of the combat learning has been that Army and Marine Corps ground forces need to tap into similar capabilities when they have them to provide for enhanced joint capabilities.

The C-RAM opportunity is clearly one of them.

And generally, active defense capabilities have been highlighted again within combat preparations. The Marines rely on an upgraded Stinger missile and are looking forward to the introduction of directed energy weapons, again working closely with the US Army.

In short, the shift is a significant one.

It is a work in progress but clearly the Marines are working to reshape the force to be a more effective one in a force-on-force battle with peer competitors.

And given the worldwide working relationships of Marines with key allies preparing for the similar transition, the Marines can both contribute to allied learning and to learn from those allies as well.

The featured photo shows an AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar starting up at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., Feb. 26.

The AN/TPS-80 will replace the AN/TPS-63 andreduces set up time from eight hours to 30 minutes for the system. Marine Air Control Squadron 2 recieved the first G/ATOR issued to the Fleet Marine Force following testing to improve the squadron’s readiness and expeditionary capabilities.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ethan Pumphret)

Royal International Air Tattoo 2018 and the Indian Fighter Competition

07/14/2018

By Gulshan Luthra

New Delhi. The Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition for the Indian Air Force (IAF) has started afresh, this time at the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) show in London where five of the six contenders in the fray will flutter their beautiful machines before the most important man of the moment, the Chief of Air Staff of the Indian Air Force (IAF) who has to pick one of them for a rather large order.

Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa is there July 9-15 at the invitation of the Royal Air Force (RAF) to mark its 100th Anniversary and Annual Air Power Conference, and not really to make any selection of an aircraft.

But his timely presence at the event does give an opportunity to the participants to showcase their technologies, and hope their powerful jets would catch the eyes and ears of his delegation.

With a declared requirement of 110 combat jets, India is the biggest buyer in the market now, and there is an unstated but understood requirement of another 100 to 200 aircraft once the production of the selected machine begins in India with Transfer of Technology and Manufacturing knowhow.

IAF Selection Process

Under the IAF procedures, while the nod of the Air Chief is crucial, the parameters are laid down by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS) and the selection process is executed by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (DCAS).

Only after due diligence and flight trials carried by younger Wing Commander, Group Captain and Air Commodore level officers, does the file move upwards for technical qualifications and approval.

And then, the financial consideration is left to the managers in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). A Tender has to be submitted in two parts, Technical and Financial.

Royal International Air Tattoo

Held at RAF Fairford, Gloucestershire, the annual Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) is the biggest military aircraft show in the world. Combat jets, Transport aircraft, Helicopters, Unmanned systems are all there.

Proceeds from the show are given to the RAF Charitable Trust.
This year, the Air Tattoo is being held from July 13 to 15, while the Farnborough International Airshow (FIA) will begin a day later from July 16.

Foreign OEMs and Collaborations

In an interview with India Strategic, Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa officially confirmed that six vendors have responded to the Request for Information (RFI) issued by IAF on April 6.

He did not specify which ones, but they are understandably the same who took part in the 2007 competition for 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA).

The deadline for submissions after a three-month period was July 6. IAF now has to examine what is on offer, in terms of ToT and manufacturing capability, and then send the Request for Proposals (RfP), or tenders, to all or some of them, selected on the basis of their submissions.

Fifteen percent of the aircraft, meaning 16 or 17 machines, will be bought in flyaway condition and the rest will be gradually made in India by foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) in collaboration with Indian companies.

The F 16 and Gripen are single engine aircraft, and the remaining four, twin engine.

Significantly, IAF would place orders only with the Indian entities, which would be expected to mature into self-sufficient aircraft or aerospace manufacturing industries.

That is the most important element of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016 stipulating Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Make in India programme.

Four OEMs have already announced partnerships; Boeing with Mahindras and HAL, Saab with Adani, Dassault with Reliance Defence and Lockheed Martin with Tata.

Newer Technologies

It’s been 10 years since the 2007 tender was floated, and as technologies have leapfrogged, the OEMs have added some newer elements in their combat machines.

Lockheed Martin for instance says its newer F 16 Block 70 shares some Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities with its F 35 aircraft while Boeing is presenting the F 18 Advanced Super Hornet with extended range, better EW engagement and fuel efficiency.

The same for Swedish Saab Gripen E.

Rafale, which has already made its mark, is hoping for this order as also that of the Indian Navy’s for 57 shipboard fighters.

Besides these four aircraft, the others in the fray are European Consortium’s Eurofighter Typhoon and Russian Mig 35, a newer variant of IAF’s Mig 29.

IAF has done away with the classification ‘Medium’ as in the 2007 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft competition and its officials have stated that it is the onboard capabilities and ToT that would help determine the winner.

Another factor would be who helps in development of India’s own stealth Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

Notably, the 2007 tender was cancelled as Dassault, the selected manufacturer, declined to accept responsibility for the quality of production at India’s state-run HAL, which was mandatory.

The Government then bought 36 Rafales, or two Squadrons of 18 each, in flyaway condition to meet IAF’s urgent requirements along with infrastructure support at two airbases.

Their delivery is due to begin from September 2019.

Except for the Mig 35, all the other aircraft are taking part in the Air Tattoo.

Some of them will also fly across to the Farnborough International Air Show (FIA), opening on July 16. Both Civil and Military aircraft are showcased there.

Sixth Generation Aircraft

Informed sources tell this writer that at both the Air Tattoo and Farnborough shows, the Talk of the Town will be the futuristic 6th generation systems.

Nobody is clear yet what this aircraft would finally look like or what its capabilities would be.

But Lockheed Martin and Boeing have already been working on them, and there are reports now of the BAE Systems joining hands with Swedish Gripen to develop it for the European requirements after 2040, a long time away.

France hasn’t been behind, and its scientists are further developing on the capabilities of Dassault’s unmanned aircraft Neuron. But again, who knows what will be will be!

The Conference at Air Tattoo should touch the subject, and what comes out should be interesting.

Fundamentally, the 6th gen should be less about the platform’s own flight and more about the hypersonic delivery of its onboard missiles or laser weapons.

India is far away from considering acquisition of 6th generation assets. But the decision on the current requirement of 110 aircraft will have implications for IAF’s 5th Generation technologies.

Lockheed Martin’s F 35 has a mention in discussions with no firm commitments, while talks with Russia seem to be on and off due to Moscow’s reluctance to share engine technologies.

Nonetheless, in the current 4-plus generation competition, help in developing AMCA could give a winning edge to the one selected.

This article first appeared in India Strategic and is published with their permission.

http://www.indiastrategic.in/2018/07/11/the-combat-jet-dogfight-for-indian-skies-begins-afresh-in-london/

The competitors are shown in the slideshow below.

 

 

NATO, Russia and the Black Sea

07/11/2018

By Stephen Blank

At NATO’s summit, the heads of state will discuss security in and around the Black Sea.

No subject could be timelier for Russian threats and the capabilities needed to realize them are steadily growing.

Indeed, Moscow’s activities in and around the Black Sea appear to be part of a broader military strategy that has a substantial naval component that must be understood in that context. 

Although the Navy is receiving the least spending of any Russian serviced through 2025 programs now in force demonstrate Moscow’s intention of striking at allied navies or restricting their access to critical waterways possessing significance for European security.

The first step was the conversion of the Black Sea into a Mare Clausus (closed sea) after 2014.

Since 2014 a sustained and unceasing buildup of Russian forces air, land, and maritime forces in Crimea and the Black Sea has gone far towards creating a layered A2AD (anti-access and area denial) zone in that sea although NATO has begun to react to the threat and exercise forces there.

That layered defense consists of a combined arms (air, land, and sea) integrated air defense system (IADS) and powerful anti-ship missiles deliverable from each of those forces.

Moscow has also moved nuclear-capable forces to the Crimea and Black Sea to further display its determination to keep NATO out.

It serves another purpose as well.

The objective is to use the umbrella it has created as the basis for an even more expansive strategy (resembling that used by the Egyptian Army in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to cross the Suez Canal and attack Israeli forces) from which it can project power further out and deny those areas to NATO or at least threaten NATOI with heavy costs.

For example, in response to talk of NATO exercises, Andrei Kelin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs labeled such exercises destabilizing and further added that, “This is not NATO’s maritime space and it has no relation to the alliance.”

Just recently, Russian defense establishment has announced that “Kalibr”(SS-N-27) ship-based missiles will be “permanently based“ in the Eastern Mediterranean, thus providing a capable and reliable reach for Moscow’s forces in the region.

Such missiles, with a range of up to 300 kilometers, give even older Russian vessels a sufficient offensive as well as defensive counter-punch to strike at naval or even shore-based targets.

Thus Moscow’s reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet and surrounding forces enabled it to build a platform for denying NATO access to that sea, Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus and to serve as a platform for power projection into the Mediterranean and Middle East.

And since the intervention in Syria in 2015 Moscow has started to fortify the missile, air defense, and submarine component of its Mediterranean Eskadra (Squadron) to impart to it a capability for denying the Eastern Mediterranean area and access to it by NATO fleets in the Mediterranean.

These moves delineate a coordinated well-conceived sea denial strategy against NATO and other fleets in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

This buildup not only interdicts foreign intervention in Syria’s civil war; it also places the entire Caucasus region along with Ukraine beyond the easy reach of NATO and Western air or military power.

It also allows Russia to surround Turkey from the North, East and South with Russian forces and capabilities that can inhibit any Western effort to come to Turkey’s aid, should another conflict – however unlikely at this point- flare up between Russia and Turkey.

Russia’s capabilities also include the naval and A2AD capacity in the Caspian and the deployment of Russian ships with Kalibr’ or other cruise missiles there, and the possibility of introducing nuclear-capable systems like the Iskander into the Baltic Sea – an already highly volatile theater – if not the Black Sea as well.

Russian threats go beyond this and clearly reflect a direct line between their threats in the Baltic and the Black Sea. 

In the Baltic Sea recent Russian exercises revealed the Russian Navy operating with sovereign contempt for Sweden and Latvia’s exclusive economic zones, forcing a partial shutdown of local commercial air and naval traffic.  This show of force representing Moscow’s contempt for the sovereignty of its neighbors and is habitual among Russian officials and military.

But it is not confined to the Baltic Sea.

In Ukraine, Moscow has built a bridge to unify Crimea with the rest of the Russian Federation that deliberately excludes the possibility of Ukrainian commercial vessels operating in the Sea of Azov.

Thus its activities combine both military with economic warfare.  And Moscow has now on several occasions detained Ukrainian commercial vessels operating in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov that are “internal waters” of Ukraine by force.

Beyond this the Black Sea Fleet has been deployed to protect Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian energy platforms, again combining these two forms of warfare.

But Russian vessels have also seized Ukrainian commercial vessels in the waters around Odessa and announced that it has the capability to mount amphibious operations against Odessa and Ukraine.

Finally, in June Moscow staged troop movements in areas of Moldova contiguous to the border with Ukraine that clearly showed the potential to attack Odessa from the land, as Moscow appeared to intend to do in 2014.

In this context, we should remember that in 2014 part of Moscow’s original invasion plan was to incite disturbances and an uprising in Odessa and then march in 2000 special forces troops then stationed at Tiraspol airport in Moldova, 80KM away, in order to seize the entire Ukrainian coast, and essentially torpedo Ukrainian statehood.

So clearly this threat has been resuscitated at least in the form of an intimated threat, combined with the maritime threats to the coastline and Odessa.

Beyond Ukraine, Romanian officials observe that having occupied Crimea and thus gaining direct maritime border with Romania, Moscow is also making incursions into Romanian territorial waters and threatening Romania’s vital energy platforms in and around the Black Sea.

Those platforms not only ensure Romania’s self-sufficiency in energy, they are also part of what could be a coordinated European response to M Moscow’s strategic use of the energy weapon..

Therefore these Russian threats generate considerable alarm among Romanian authorities who are increasingly anxious for NATO to upgrade its permanent presence in the Black Sea and assign as much importance to that area as NATO does to the Baltic.

In this case they have good reason for their anxiety given Moscow’s threats and the fact that most recent Russian deployments have gone here and against Ukraine rather than into the Baltic.

Thus throughout the Black Sea we see a similar Russian contemptuous attitude as in the Baltic Sea to the other littoral states’ sovereignty and direct threats to both Ukraine and Romania’s economies, territories, and overall security.

The resemblances between Moscow’s naval probes in these waters as it simultaneously seeks to forge a network of bases and permanent deployments across the Levant and the Mediterranean oblige NATO and Ukraine to take a hard look at the Black Sea and maritime security more generally.

Neglecting the Black Sea to concentrate on threats in the Baltic is neither sound strategy nor good policy and given NATO’s greater superiority over Russia, such behavior is ultimately inexplicable.

This is especially the case when Russia’s newest deployments are going here and many analysts think this area rather than the Baltic is the most likely to come under direct Russian threat.

It is important for NATO to address the need for a larger, more robust, permanent, and possibly maritime Black Sea sooner rather than later.

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Dr.  Blank is an internationally known expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union, who comes to AFPC  from the US Army War College where he spent the last 24 years, 1989-2013  as a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA.  Dr. Blank’s expertise  covers the entire  Russian and post-Soviet region and has also written extensively on  defense strategy, arms control, information warfare, energy issues, US foreign and defense policy, European, and Asian security.

He is currently writing a book on Russian policy in East Asia and is the author of over 900 publications, books,  monographs,  scholarly and  popular articles and has appeared frequently  on television and radio and at professional conferences  in the US, Europe, and Asia.

Prior to joining the Army, Dr. Blank taught at the University of California, Riverside, University of Texas,  San Antonio, and was a Professor of National Security Studies at the US Air War College’s Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.  He holds a B.A. in Russian History from the University  of Pennsylvania  and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago.

The featured photo shows Russian warships are seen during a rehearsal for the Navy Day parade in Sevastopol, Crimea, July 24, 2015.

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-admiral-declares-comeback-of-russias-black-sea-fleet-48523

The F-35, the Iron Dome and Saving Lives

By Edward Timperlake

As Herman Kahn once noted: “Anything that reduces war-related destruction should not be considered altogether immoral.”

There is now the demonstrated promise of advanced weapons systems integrated together in an offensive and defensive enterprise to actually save the lives on innocents on both sides of combat action.

The Israeli Defense Force is pioneering such lifesaving con-ops of reducing the term “collateral damage.”

Collateral damage is a euphuism that can capture two parts of the loss of life.

Often in so called “friendly fire” incidents, which is actually not “friendly,” one’s own forces come under attack by their own forces.

The second, and most widely used expression for collateral damage, is hitting non-combatants with munitions.

Tragically in global war, at times, “collateral damage” really isn’t a mistake in ordinance delivery but rather a deliberate direct targeting of a  civilian population to achieve a strategic outcome.

The Cold war debates about how to fight and win a nuclear war had two building blocks of strategic thinking that defined a generation of intellectual turmoil and weapons development.

The two words on how to target ones opponent was “counter-force” (CF) and “counter-value. (CV).

At times many vicious debates were engaged in by very smart people on the issue of CF or CV targeting and Herman Kahn tried to always bring enlightened thinking  to that intellectual debate.

Fortunately those very public strategic debates had a desired effect of actually freezing the use of nuclear weapons by the USA and of our nuclear armed allies against the USSR and to a lesser extent the PRC.

Inside that construct President Reagan and his defense and foreign policy team prevailed and the Wall came down.

Sadly the proliferation of  nuclear weapons to places like North Korea and Pakistan, and the growth of PLA arsenal now complicates deterrence thinking and in not a good way.

The rumored removal of devices from South Africa, the actual removal from Ukraine and the IDF’s strategic ambiguity is often seen as positive steps but in different ways.

Hopefully the process of dealing with North Korea will led to de-nuclearization, and  Iran can be dealt with effectively to abort completely its quest for a workable weapon system a warhead married to a delivery vehicle, aircraft or missile.

Inside the issue of debating nuclear deterrence, since 1945, conventional wars and flash point combat engagements have clearly continued.

Tactical wars with strategic implications flourished from the dawn of the nuclear age to this day.

Combat engagements, including terrorism in the name of religious ideology sadly have followed the lyrics of a song  “and the beat goes on,” from the 20thCentury into this one.

But unlike the counter-force and counter-vale debates at a strategic nuclear level there has been so far an unspoken, for the most part, merging of 21st Century offensive and defensive conventional tactical weapon systems that have allowed for reduced collateral damage with the context of defending key interests against adversaries.

And this approach saves lives.

Conceptually, this can be understand in terms of changing how to execute the payload-utility function of warfare. A distributed  kill web can deliver a combat effect with reduced collateral damage and has the  tremendous promise in saving the lives of innocents in a limited conflict.

Employing OODA loop thinking can capture the two elements of fleet wide payload utility (Pu)and it is very simple to explain and difficult to execute:

Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target acquisition, and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement.

Thus there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

The Israeli Defense Forces are on the cutting edge of understanding, developing and employing advanced payload utility kill web capabilities.

The new capabilities begin with their Iron Dome.

The Iron Dome missile defense system, designed and developed by Israel and jointly funded through the United States, is a response to the threats Israel faces from short and medium-range rockets and mortar shells fired by Palestinian terrorists in Gaza.

The system has the capability to identify and destroy such projectiles before they land in Israeli territory and is considered one of the most effective anti-missile systems in the world.

Iron Dome is comprised of three key components:

(1) the design and tracking radar, built by the Elta defense company;

(2) the battle management and weapon control system, designed by the mPrest Systems software company; and,

(3) the missile firing unit, manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.

One of the most advanced features of Iron Dome is its capability to determine where an incoming rocket will land and to only intercept such projectiles that pose meaningful threats to populated civilian areas.

Note the emphasis on directly focusing on threat to populated civilian areas.

A few years ago I was given the opportunity to be part of a press call by a senior supporter of the IDF/Iron Dome and he made a brilliant point. Because their Iron Dome resulted in fewer deaths of innocent Israel citizens, included targeted schools, the IAF could more accurately target their counter strikes to the identified point of origin.

The counter force strike had the potential for collateral damage because their very nasty opponents often launched from high value civilian areas where it was almost guaranteed innocents would die.

But with the introduction of the most accurate bombing aircraft to ever fly, the F-35, a new chapter in fighting in civilian –military conventional hybrid-wars is opening.

The Iron Dome not only saved Israeli lives but gave the IDF much more accuirate aim points in their appropriate retaliation.

Enter the F-35 or as the IDF calls it the Adir or “Strong  One”

Israel has struck targets in the Middle East with the F-35 Adir jet twice, making the Jewish state the first country to use the stealth fighter in a combat role in the region, Israel Air Force Commander Maj.-Gen. Amikam Norkin announced on Tuesday.

“We are flying the F-35 all over the Middle East. It has become part of our operational capabilities.

“We are the first to attack using the F-35 in the Middle East and have already attacked twice on different fronts,” he said during the IAF Senior Air Force Conference in Herzliya.

https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IAF-commander-Israel-first-to-use-F-35-jet-in-combat-558030

For the first time in history, individual IAF F-35 pilots will have the best database of real time knowledge in the history of combat aviation.

And all of this is internal to their cockpit and enabled by advances in computer processing and sensor information fusing.

Each F-35 pilot combined with human sensing (seeing visual cues outside the cockpit) will be enabled by machine driven sensor fusion to allow combat “situational awareness” (SA) better than any other opponent.

Concurrent with their ability to look-see, which is limited by physical realities, the F-35 pilot will be able to “see” using cockpit electronic displays and signals to their helmet allowing them not to just fight with their individual aircraft but be able to network and direct engagements at significant range in 360 Degrees of 3 dimensional space out to all connected platforms.

A fleet of F-35s has the inherent capability to share their fused information displayed at the speed of light to other aircraft and other platforms, such as ships, subs, satellites, and land based forces, including UAVs and eventually robots.

Marrying the Adir with Iron Dome is the dawn of this next chapter of 21stCentury Kill Web integrated war fighting that will actually save lives on innocents on both sides.

Today over the skies of the Middle East a “tactical” aircraft is evolving into a key technology for strategic operations and impacts.

The Payload-Utility dynamic executed within a distributed kill web is leaving the legacy kill chain in the rear view mirror

Payload utility as practiced by IDF/IAF can be a driver for understanding the future development of combat systems.

It is the process of understanding the huge complexities in such a simple Payload/Utility formula that is the challenge.

Understanding the technology and human dynamic through an analytic filter of a Payload Utility function consisting of weapons (kinetic and TRON) and the dual components of Target Acquisition (TA) and Target Effectiveness (TE) effectiveness in a fighting fleet engaged in high or low intensity combat in the unforgiving cauldron of battle and mitigation of unfortunate collateral damage maybe a war winner.

Either in one platform, or melded into a unified fighting force to bring all different types of appropriate “weapons on” for the kill shot is a powerful concept.

America must always appreciate that no platform should fight alone if the Wynne Doctrine, named for 21st Century Secretary of Air Force, is employed: “If it is a fair fight someone failed in planning.”

A very simple filter to look at platform and weapons development within the integration of current weapon systems and platforms is asking the largest questions possible and pursuing force design and operational answers to these questions:

What does weapon or system add to fleet Payload/Utility?

How does this system help in TA?

How does this system help in TE?

What is the best weapon for the highest Pk against the target?

Is the TA, TE and Weapons (kinetic and Tron) carried together F-35 or separate?

So far every nation flying in the F-35 global enterprise can learn from the IDF combat leaders merging the Iron Dome and F-35 into a demonstrated and formidable building block in Kill Web con-ops, while saving lives or otherwise known by the military acronym, “collateral damage.”

 

 

 

 

The Latin American Challenge and Shaping a Realistic Way Ahead

07/10/2018

By Stephen Blank

The revelation that President Trump has seriously considered the desirability of invading Venezuela ought to focus our attention on that unhappy country and others like it in Latin America.

While Venezuela’s crisis is an extreme manifestation of the kleptocratic autocracies masquerading under the socialist or Chavista sobriquet in Latin America; it is not the only such regime there to be on the edge of collapse.

Venezuela may already be a failed state but by all accounts Nicaragua now teeters on the edge of civil war thanks to the persisting illegitimate governance (a term coined by Max Manwaring formerly of the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute) of President Daniel Ortega.

Indeed, Ortega prompted the present crisis by trying to have his wife become the co-ruler of the country.

These linked but non-contiguous crises could engulf Latin America in multiple simultaneous and even overlapping crisis phenomena ranging from failed states, massive refugee flows within the continent if not towards the U.S., and civil strife.

Equally pertinent is the fact that these two states are Moscow’s Latin American poster children in Latin America and these crises could embroil Moscow further in Latin American affairs and pose direct military challenges to the U.S.

Trump’s musings about intervening forcefully in Venezuela, however dangerous they might be, are founded in the inescapable reality of the repressive and utterly corrupt Maduro regime’s epic state failure.

Already 1.5 million refugees have fled Venezuela, inflation reached an annual rate of 41,000% in June and Venezuela’s energy production, the basis of the economy, is falling due to epic corruption and epic mismanagement. So it seems that a default on its huge debts is inevitable sooner or later.

And as we know from past Latin American history default often triggers external financial if not other forms of external intervention.

One factor that has held back what seems to be the inevitable day of reckoning is the fact that Venezuela has sold off large parts of its equity to Russia in order to obtain cash with which to meet its immediate debts and expenses.

As a result, Rosneft now has what appears to be a majority stake in the national oil company PDVSA. And if Venezuela goes into default Rosneft could then step in and take control of PDVSA’s assets, not least of which is the Cities Service (Citgo) oil company in the U.S..

Beyond that negative outcome it is, entirely possible, as this writer has already observed, that Moscow, who has long sought a naval base in Venezuela, may demand that as apart of another “debt for equity” scheme, much as it has done in the former Soviet Union.

Further adding to the potential danger of this situation is the fact that under Hugo Chavez and Maduro Venezuela has been a haven for terrorists, Iranian operatives, and insurgents as well as a major recipient of Russian arms sales, largely intended to destabilize American allies like Colombia.

Though that destabilization was averted the country is presumably awash with weapons and we know from experience elsewhere that a failed state scenario often leads to civil war and foreign interventions

Nicaragua boasts of no less of a Russian military presence.

Moscow has sold the country T-55 and T-72 tanks, provided police and military support ostensibly for counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean (one suspects it is just the opposite, inasmuch as Venezuela was and is a notorious conduit for drugs and its regime is equally notoriously corrupt), and have discussed buying MiG-29s.

Most importantly the Russian Ministry of Defense has publicly announced its desire for a naval base in Nicaragua, along with those it seeks to obtain in Venezuela and Cuba, along with a resupply base.

Meanwhile Nicaragua already hosts a Russian space satellite tracking installation. In 2015 the Washington Post observed that,

Current and former U.S. officials suspect that the new Russian facilities could have “dual use” capabilities, particularly for electronic espionage aimed at the United States. — Others worry that Russia could be pursuing ambitious spy goals, such as intercepting Internet traffic in the ARCOS 1 fiber-optic cable that runs from Miami down the Caribbean coast of Central America.

Speculation is rife that the new Russian satellite site on the lip of the Laguna de Nejapa crater will be a spy facility, even though Nicaraguan officials have said it will be used for GLONASS, Russia’s equivalent of GPS.[i]

It is quite unlikely that President Ortega will simply yield power to his opposition or change his policies as nothing in his past record suggests a real commitment to democratic governance.

Thus there is a real possibility of a civil war breaking out in Nicaragua very soon with the same kinds of risks we’ve seen elsewhere.

But inasmuch as there is a substantial Chinese investment in a new canal to unite the oceans, as well as a large Russian military presence there and in Venezuela the confluence of these two crises may spell much more than a massive refugee crisis.

Of course, under present circumstances that is a big enough headache for Latin American governments and the U.S.

But the fact is that the security challenges posed by these grave examples of illegitimate governance are not isolated phenomena.

The ongoing flood of Latin American refugees across the continent, not only to the U.S. bespeaks the failure of governments in many places across the continent even if none of those cases is as extreme as Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Even if invasion was no longer in fashion it is clear that this response also does not answer the challenges posed by such states.

Neither does the U.S. have the resources to undertake the reconstruction of entire polities in Latin America by itself without any support from the rest of the continent.

In other words, in responding to what are genuine crises brought on by governmental malfeasance, Washington needs to orchestrate continental wide approaches along with other Latin American countries who share its anxieties and concerns and are directly menaced by either state failure or the preservation of these kleptocratic autocracies in power.

Neither war nor unilateralism suffices to answer the call to confront complex “gray area phenomena.”

That is the urgent lesson of these crises.

While military assets and means may be needed, the crisis is fundamentally not a military one and other means must be found to overcome it.

[i] Joshua Partlow, “The Soviet Union Fought the Cold War In Nicaragua. Now Putin’s Russia Is Back.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-soviet-union-fought-the-cold-war-in-nicaragua-now-putins-russia-is-back/2017/04/08/b43039b0-0d8b-11e7-aa57-2ca1b05c41b8_story.html?utm_term=.53cbf69cd80b, April 8, 2017

And for a discussion of the featured photo, see the following:

http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/390845-putin-on-new-shirtless-photos-no-need-to-hind-behind-the-bushes

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Dr.  Blank is an internationally known expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union, who comes to AFPC  from the US Army War College where he spent the last 24 years, 1989-2013  as a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA.  Dr. Blank’s expertise  covers the entire  Russian and post-Soviet region and has also written extensively on  defense strategy, arms control, information warfare, energy issues, US foreign and defense policy, European, and Asian security.

He is currently writing a book on Russian policy in East Asia and is the author of over 900 publications, books,  monographs,  scholarly and  popular articles and has appeared frequently  on television and radio and at professional conferences  in the US, Europe, and Asia.

Prior to joining the Army, Dr. Blank taught at the University of California, Riverside, University of Texas,  San Antonio, and was a Professor of National Security Studies at the US Air War College’s Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.  He holds a B.A. in Russian History from the University  of Pennsylvania  and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago.

The featured photo shows Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua, meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin after arriving at the Internal Airport in Managua in July 2014.

All of the countries on Putin’s Latin American itinerary abstained from voting in March on a United Nations resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

On Saturday Putin also made a unscheduled stopover in Nicaragua, one of eleven countries that rejected the resolution altogether. The small Central American state is also one of the few that, like Russia, have recognized independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Putin met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who referred to Putin’s arrival as a “historic visit.”

“It is like a ray of light, like a flash of lightning. This is the first time a Russian president has visited Nicaragua,” he told Putin in his opening remarks.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in February that Russia was in talks with Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, among others, to allow its navy ships dock at their ports. That same month, Reuters reported that a Russian intelligence-gathering vessel had docked at a port in Havana.

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/ortega-celebrates-putins-nicaragua-visit-as-a-ray-of-light-37267

MAGTF Transformation and the Role of the CH-53K

By Robbin Laird

With peer adversaries emphasizing technological change and force modernization, focusing on strategic advantage for US and allied forces is a key element for combat success.

At the heart of such an approach, clearly will be the ability to operate more effective distributed forces and to leverage the capability of US and allied forces to operate flexibly and not relying on a rigid centralized system with a core emphasis on combat mass.

Working ways to distributed force but concentrate fires is at the heart of the transformation necessary to prevail in the strategic shift.

For the MAGTF, this means taking the core approach around which a MAGTF has been crated and extending its reach with integrated fires, as is conceived of with regard to F-35-HIMARS integration or the use of the new G/ATOR system, and building effective force packages which can operate in an integrated but flexibly deployed distributed force.

The CH-53K comes at a time when this transition is being worked. 

As the heavy lift member of the MAGTF team, it will provide a key element of being able to carry equipment and/or personnel to the objective area.

And with its ability to carry three times the external load of the CH-53E and to be able to deliver the external load to different operating bases, the aircraft will contribute significantly to distributed operations.

But the digital nature of the aircraft, and the configuration of the cockpit is a key part of its ability to contribute as well.  The aircraft is a fly-by-wire system with digital interoperability built in.

And with multiple screens in the cockpit able to manage data in a variety of ways, the aircraft can operate as a lead element, a supporting element or a distributed integrated support node to the insertion force.

A key change associated with the new digital aircraft, whether they are P-8s or Cyclone ASW helicopters, is a different kind of workflow.

The screens in the aircraft can be configured to the task and data moved throughout the aircraft to facilitate a mission task-oriented work flow.

In the case of the CH-53K, the aircraft could operate as a Local Area Network for an insertion task force, or simply as a node pushing data back into the back where the Marines are operating MAGTBs.

Marines carrying MAGTBs onboard the CH-53K will be able to engage with the task force to understand their role at the point of insertion.

The K as a digital aircraft combined with the digital transformation of the Marines create a very different ground force insertion capability.

This is a commercial tablet with an encrypted link to provide a means for the MAGTF to handle the transfer of relevant data throughout the Aviation Combat Element and Ground Combat Element (GCE). 

The Marines have taken an off-the-shelf commercial technology and adapted it to provide core data communications capability within the USMC, and as one Marine put it, “have shown others in the joint force that you don’t have to write a complicated requirements document to get a cutting-edge capability. This represents significant progress in terms of understanding how we can leverage commercial technology in the current fight while still meeting requirements to have low risk in terms of data protection and transmission security.”

 https://sldinfo.com/2018/06/working-the-way-ahead-for-the-usmc-how-mawts-1-supports-change/

To put it bluntly, with a change in the workflow enabled by the screens in the cockpit and the ability to task shift across the screens which can be connected in various ways to other key platforms in the task force, the Marines in the back are now part of the workflow and not simply Grunts jumping out of the back of the aircraft at the point of arrival.

The K without digital interoperability could not do this; but then again without the K, the heavy lift component is limited to being an air transport asset, rather than integrated combat asset for the ACE.

The featured photo shows the flight crew gathering around the first CH-53K King Stallion at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, May 16, 2018.

The aircraft’s delivery to MCAS New River marks another on-time milestone for the U.S. Marine Corps’ future heavy-lift helicopter program.

Personnel with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 will bring the CH-53K into the supportability test plan, where they will conduct a logistical assessment on the maintenance, sustainment and overall logistics support of the King Stallion. The CH-53K is meant to replace the Marine Corps’ fleet of CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters.

The King Stallion has several upgrades over the legacy aircraft including a digital glass cockpit and fly-by-wire controls.

It can externally transport 27,000 lbs. over 110 nautical miles and has a max external lift of 36,000 lbs., three times that of the legacy “E” aircraft.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Leynard Kyle Plazo)

The Russians and the Nordics: Intimidation Deflected by Mobilization

By Robbin Laird

Putin has clearly focused on expanding Russian influence in the areas of strategic interest to Russia.

While the United States has diffused its efforts with an over emphasis on stability operations and counter-insurgency in the Middle East, the Russians have focused on their core interests and how best to reshape the strategic environment to their benefit.

A key area of strategic interest is clearly the Northern region where they have the most concentrated military force on earth operating from the Kola peninsula.

The Russians are building out their arctic capabilities, while both Canada and the United States have essentially ignored the Russian Arctic force modernization effort

And for the Russians the area from the Baltics to the Nordics is a key zone of influence.  They have generated major military exercises designed to influence behavior, such as last year’s Zapad 2018.  They have used the nuclear threat against the Danes and the Norwegians at various times over the past few years, indicating that defense modernization in the Nordic region would subject these states to nuclear annihilation.

Last year, the Russians simulated military strikes against Norwegian territory and very recently have sent a large naval task force from the Kola peninsula without notificationThese actions are clearly designed to intimate and to isolate.

And certainly, the Russians have hoped that European conflicts with the Trump Administration would further isolate the Nordics as well.

The Nordic response has been very different than the Russian script would wish to write. 

The Nordics have strengthened their relationship with Washington, with each other through enhanced cooperation and have focused on the mobilization of their societies to deal with the Russian efforts to intimidate.

The Norwegians have notably focused on mobilization and crisis response.  This year’s Trident Juncture 2018 exercise which NATO balls as a major NATO exercise is from the Norwegian point of view more than that. It is about the testing out and enhancement of their Total Defense Concept. For Norway, the total defense concept is a focus on the ability of the civilian side of society to support military operations.

For example, the Norwegians do not have a specialized military medical service. The civilian side is mobilized to support both Norwegian and allied medical needs in times of conflict.  This will be exercised during Trident Juncture 2018.

In my recent visit to Norway, I discussed the Norwegian preparation for Trident Juncture 2018 with one of the organizers of the exercise, Col Lars Lervik.

The Colonel emphasized that “We need to be able to support NATO allies when they come into Norway. I think we’re making real progress with regard to civil society’s ability to support the Norwegian and allied militaries.”

“For example, when the US Marines arrive in Undredal, Norway (in the middle of Norway), it could be a civilian bus driver on a civilian bus who will transport them onward to their next location. They might pick up fuel from a local civilian Norwegian logistics company.”

“It is about the resilience as well with regard to civilian society to support military operations.

“We need to understand and to enhance how the modern society is able to function in a time of crises and war.”

The USMC is in the midst of a major transformation process and with that effort, key allies view them as key partners in shaping an effective crisis management process to deal with peer competitors.

Both the Australians and the Norwegians have formalized working relationships with the USMC to broaden their crisis management capabilities.

Notably, the Norwegian government announced on June 13, 2018 that they were enhancing their working realitonship with the USMC.  “The Norwegian government has decided to welcome continued USMC rotational training and exercises in Norway, with a volume of up to a total of 700 marines, initially for a period of up to five years, says Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen.”

Norwegian Minister of Defense Visits U.S. Marines from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

And how did the Russians respond?

Predictably with intimidation and threats.

“In a statement on its Facebook page, the Russian Embassy said it made the Scandinavian country “less predictable”, while warning it “could cause growing tensions, triggering an arms race and destabilising the situation in northern Europe,”

“It added: “We see it as clearly unfriendly, and it will not remain free of consequence.”

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-norway-us-marines-nato-border-moscow-ukraine-crimea-a8399601.html

The Russians used their embassy in country to threaten the Norwegians much like they did with the Danes in 2015.  This is part of their approach to information warfare as well whereby they use local tools as well as national tools to shape perceptions within other countries.

But the Norwegians are not the only ones mobilizing their societies to  deal with the Russian coercion efforts.

And if one compares this to the period of the 1930s where the Nordics simply did not respond to the growing threat from Germany, this time around, the Nordics are seeing a threat, mobilizing and working together.

Conscription has been an important part of Finnish defense, but there is an increasing emphasis on enhanced readiness as well as part of a mobilization strategy.

This means shifting emphasis from training conscripts to getting as well better combat readiness out of the mobilization force.

In my discussion with Janne Kuusela, Director General, Defense Policy Department of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, during a February visit to Finland, he argued that one advantage of the conscription process is that the Finnish government was in a position to identify candidates for the professional military and with the increased “tech savy” required to man a 21st century force, this also allowed for exposure to some of the best candidates to serve in the military to provide for the relevant expertise for a 21st century force.

According to Kuusela: “It is a two-way street with the population. The reservists bring back a lot of current information about technology and society which can then be tapped by the professional military as well as the professional military providing up to date information on the evolution of military systems. I think this is a key capability as new equipment is more technologically sophisticated.”

Exercise Aurora 2017 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

And Sweden last year held its largest military exercise in more than 20 years. Exercise Aurora 17 involved s the forces of several other nations, including  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Norway, Lithuania, and the United States. Notable, was the close cooperation between Finland and Sweden in this exercise, as the only non-NATO states involved in the exercise. And along with new exercise comes a new Swedish policy about conscription.

And as far as the Trump Administration goes, the Finns and Swedes have signed a new trilateral agreement with the United States this past May.

In other words, the response to the Russians illegally seizing Crimea and inserting their forces into the Middle East, have gotten the attention of the Nordics.

And their response has been national, regional and working with core allies, including the United States to strengthen crisis management capabilities as well as deterrence.

As one senior Norweigan defense analyst put it during my visit, the Nordics are cooperating more effectively with one another in part through their regional organization, NORDEFCO, which includes Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland.

According to this analyst: “I think the discussions among ministers have been taken to an unprecedented level. We also discuss crisis management. We have to prepare ourselves for handing a situation without the Swedes and the Finns, because they are not members of NATO. But we think that it is more and more likely that they would be fully involved in such a situation.

“I think our western partners realize this, so the American footprint in Norway could also be used to reinforce the Baltic states. Having access to Norwegians territory, and perhaps for a door in Sweden and Finland makes a big difference.”

A version of this article was first published by Breaking Defense on July 3, 2018.

The featured photo shows Norway’s first three F-35As being escorted by a RNAF F-16 fighter jet when entering the country’s airspace

(Credit: Heige Hopen/Norwegian Armed Forces)

The Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) on Nov. 3 formally took delivery of its first three F-35A fighter jets. The three aircraft, the first to be delivered to Norway, took off from Fort Worth, Texas at 06.35 AM Norwegian time November 3rd and landed at 03.57 PM the same day at Ørland Air Base, the country’s Ministry of Defence said on its website