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2017-09-30 This month, our partner India Strategic published two articles, which provide updates on the Indian Air Force competition to add new fighter aircraft.
This would be in addition, to the already decided acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft.
The government is looking to acquire a single engine jet to build up its fighter force.
The frontrunners in this are Saab’s Gripen and Lockheed Martin’s F-16.
The first article addresses the F-16 and the second the Gripen offering.
Lockheed Martin in Jet Speed to Make F-16s in India
By Air Marshal VK Jimmy Bhatia (Retd)
During the Paris Air Show, on June 19, the company announced a coproduction agreement with the Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TATA), and now it has disclosed that in anticipation of a contract from the Indian Air Force (IAF) for a single engine aircraft manufacturing facility, it has already initiated steps to create the required ecosystem in the country.
Diplomatic sources indicate that the US Government is also aggressively backing the Lockheed Martin proposal in Government-to-Government (G-2-G) talks with the Indian Government.
Mr Abhay Paranjpe, Executive Director, International Business Development and Mr Randall L Howard, Business Development head for F 16 said during a recent tete-a-tete with Team India Strategic in New Delhi that the company had already worked out the best available systems that could be integrated in the aircraft, assuring: “We will provide whatever the IAF asks for, and our technology will be unmatched and unprecedented.”
An artists view of F-16 Block 70 with nose-mounted IRST on take off roll. Credit: India Strategic
We pointed out that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, had told us in an interview that IAF now logically expects better specifications than were asked for in the 2007 tender for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The F 16, which was the first to bring a powerful Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar on board in its Block 60 aircraft delivered to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) way back in 2004, does not yet have the Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) system.
IRST, which is there on board the French Rafale already taken by IAF, is a passive system and can detect hostile aircraft and targets between 60 to 100 km or so without being detected itself, unlike any radar system including the AESA. As the world’s biggest military hardware company, “we will be able to offer whatever the IAF wants, on time and cost,” said Paranjpe, adding that the Lockheed Martin proposal will include assured periodic upgrades.
AESA is a key component for contemporary and future aircraft, and can look up to 400 km depending upon the radar’s power and aircraft’s height.
Paranjpe also said that the new AESA, to be acquired from Northrop Grumman which had made it first for F 16 Block 60 and later for F 22 and F 35, will be of a new 4th generation, and compared to the earlier versions which are liquid cooled, will be air cooled and still perform better. It will be multimode, able to lock onto 20 targets simultaneously, and a pilot can priorities which targets to engage first.
Randall said that the company will meet any specs required by the IAF. The aircraft is comfortable in power and weight and can accommodate whatever is needed. Lockheed Martin will leverage some future technologies from its F 35.
“As the F 16 Block 70 will be a new generation aircraft, it will also share some components and latest technologies with those of the F 35 to the extent of 70-75 percent. The Block 70 will also have conformal fuel tanks for longer range.”
The company will shift the entire factory and production line from Fort Worth in Texas to India if – repeat if – the Ministry of Defence (MoD) selects the aircraft.
Notably, the global standard for aircraft availability is about 70 percent. This, or whatever is required by IAF, will be matched, Randall said
Paranjpe pointed out that IAF’s urgency in aircraft requirement is no secret, and the Indian order for a minimum of 100 first to be followed by many more later will be huge. “We have a great partnership with TASL, and we should be able to produce three to four aircraft every month for Indian and global requirements. We will create a big defence industrial base, a supply chain for not only India but for the world, and that will include spares.”
Asked about how much investment the company will put in, Panajpe and Randall said that they hoped that India will follow the US business model. There, a runway is shared by the US Air Force (USAF) and industry, the two being on either side of it, and that will determine how much Lockheed Martin will have to invest. Sharing facilities will help save costs and production and testing time.
With TASL and IAF working with us, it will simply be great, Panajpe observed, adding: “We are also ready to pass on the required knowledge and knowhow to local partners.”
Randall said that Lockheed Martin had produced nearly 4,600 aircraft in 138 variants and sold to 27 countries, including the US. Sixteen of these countries placed repeat orders.
He also pointed out, significantly, that while the Indian Ministry of Defence is yet to place the order under its new policy of Make in India and having a Strategic Partner, Lockheed Martin is doing its homework in anticipation of winning it. We have worked out the technologies onboard, Display Systems, Software, Air to Air and Air to ground Targeting Systems, and what to do with whom as part of our effort to create an enabling ecosystem and move literally at jet speed.
New Delhi. Swedish Saab has literally offered a sweet dish to India, saying it will share the best of its aerospace technologies for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and give it full controls like the vital source codes on aircraft equipment and components so that IAF can play with them for modification to its requirements now and in the coming decades.
Pitching to sell the latest variant of its combat jet, Gripen E, Saab CEO and President Hakan Buskhe announced his company’s partnership with India’s Adani Group to Make the aircraft in India, observing: “ We are committed to the India-Sweden relationship and in bringing the latest technology and skills to India.”
Asked specifically about the source codes by India Strategic, Mr Bukhse indicated that the Swedes would give unfettered control over technologies to India, and hopefully meet whatever demands the Ministry of Defence (MoD) makes with regard to technologies.
The Saab Chairman addressed newsmen September 1 along with Adani Group Chairman Gautam Adani, pointing out that Saab had finalized this partnership as the “Adani group is one of India’s largest conglomerates … with a long history of entrepreneurship spanning through decades of dynamic growth.”
“We are committed to the India-Sweden relationship and in bringing the latest technology and skills to India,” Mr Buskhe said adding: “Our plans in India are to create a new defence eco-system that would involve many partners, vendors and suppliers. To achieve this, we need a strong Indian partner who can help create the framework for the infrastructure and eco-system to come into place.”
Mr Adani said, “We are proud of our enduring relationship with Saab and look forward to partnering in major projects such as Gripen. Our various collaborations in aerospace and defence sectors will help establish new production lines in India, generate employment and build sustainable skills.”
He expressed confidence that his rich team of engineers and professionals, engaged in oil, infrastructure and other projects, would do well in defence industrial infrastructure also, and meet any specifications and timelines set by the Government for manufacturing the aircraft. The Group has several global partnerships already and employs 50,000 people.
MoD is looking for a single engine fighter to be produced in India, and the two companies in competition are the US Lockheed Martin and Sweden’s Saab. One of them will be picked up under the Strategic Partnership model with an Indian company to produce a minimum of about 100 but over the years some 300 to 400 or more Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) with periodic upgrades both for the Indian market.
Mr Ashish Rajvanshi, Head, Defence & Aerospace, Adani Group, said that the Group was firmly placed in expanding in the defence industrial sector. It is not just an opportunity for the industry but the need of the country which has to induct new and futuristic technologies towards self reliance.
Source Codes to a system are important, so that IAF and Indian engineers can integrate its own private algorithms in onboard computers and maintain its exclusive maintenance and operational control over the aircraft.
Sweden’s new envoy to India, Ambassador Klas Molin, who arrived only that day in the morning from his previous posting in Thailand, graced the occasion but declined to make any comment.
Notably, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa had told India Strategic in an earlier interview that IAF was looking for technologies newer than those stipulated in 2007, when the MMRCA tender was floated among six global aircraft manufacturers. Mr Bukhse promised that, saying that the latest generation Gripen E would meet the Indian expectations.
The aircraft will be equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) combat radar, the passive Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) system to locate hostile targets, Anti Radiation attack capability, a powerful Engine for longer range than before, and Stealth features.
The 2007 Request for Proposals (RfP) had included all these specs. At that time, one requirement for an anti radiation missile was available only from the US war technology giant, Raytheon, which produced its High Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) for attack on radar facilities. It was integrated then only on board Boeing’s F 18 Super Hornet.
A similar system is now available though in Europe.
Besides better specs overall in the new requirements, five key systems are the heart of any deal, that is, AESA, IRST, Anti Radiation Attack capability, Range, and Stealth. Saab has promised all of them in its Gripen E.
The 2007 contest for 126 combat aircraft with an option for 63 more, included both the single engine aircraft now in competition for Make in India, the US Lockheed Martin F-16 and Swedish Saab Gripen.
SAAB Gripen. Credit: India Strategic
The contest was however scrapped and the Indian Government decided to buy 36 twin engine French Rafale, which led the competition, first in technology along with Eurofighter, and then in price.
In a joint statement, Saab and Adani said that their collaboration plan (is) within aerospace and defence in India, aligned with the Government of India’s Make in India initiative. The intended collaboration would encompass design, development and production of Gripen for India and other high-tech products of national importance for India and also the creation of joint ventures in India in line with and in support of the Make in India policy.
“Saab, in partnership with Adani Group, will discuss possibilities to offer solutions to bring required design and manufacturing capabilities in defence and aerospace to India. A collaboration between Saab and Adani will combine the technical and product excellence of Saab, along with the industrial engineering, system integration and mega project execution capabilities of Adani with the intention to manufacture defence systems locally in India.”
The two companies would keep in mind India’s focus on creating future-proof and home-grown capabilities across all industries, explore how to cooperate to develop a wider aerospace and defence ecosystem in India and encourage the development of small and medium sized enterprises along with a robust national supply chain.
The statement added: Gripen would be offered to the Indian Government as the best solution for India’s single-engine fighter aircraft programme. The collaboration would also include projects, programmes and technologies of national importance to India. The parties’ plan to develop the relationship into a structure of joint ventures in India for execution of the programmes, including the single engine fighter program, in order to support the Make in India policy and exhibit the parties long term commitment to be jointly successful.
Gripen is a modern multi-role fighter aircraft featuring state-of-the-art technology, including advanced data links and sensors plus a unique extensive electronic warfare suite. Gripen can perform all air-to-air, air-to-surface and reconnaissance missions with the most modern range of weapons and systems.
JCS General Joseph Dunford informed the Senate Armed Services Committee at his Sept 26, 2017 hearing that DPRK is assumed to have the capability to attack the US mainland with a nuclear armed ICBM.
While it is not yet proven or demonstrated that North Korea can do so with a thermonuclear warhead that will survive re-entry and accurately strike a target, General Dunford noted it is a matter of time.
This brings to the forefront the question of what DPRK will do with their nuclear strike capability in the future.
Every nuclear weapons state prior to North Korea have used their WMD capability as a defensive, last resort insurance policy.
No nuclear weapon was used in anger since 1945.
US policy makers since 1994 have wishfully hoped that DPRK is an anomaly that will go away on its own. (Bracken, 2017)
But that has not happened.
Is, or will North Korea be different or will they be the first of a new breed of “Second Nuclear Age” powers?
DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Young Ho’s UN speech on Sept 23, 2017 (which few read in full), unambiguously and clearly laid out their aims and objectives.
Minister Ri said at the UN:
“Through such a prolonged and arduous struggle, now we are finally only a few steps away from the final gate of completion of the state nuclear force.”
This statement make clear that things will change when DPRK is a nuclear armed state.
They are willing, able, and intend to use it to achieve their goals.
These goals are not just geopolitical, but economic.
“The day will certainly come in near future when we settle all damages inflicted to our peaceful economic development and improvement of the people’s livelihood and all the sufferings imposed on our innocent women, children and elderly by the heinous and barbaric sanctions against our Republic.”
Minister Ri’s stated goals here are limited to damages caused by sanctions.
However, this is not narrowly defined to UN and member state (e.g. US) sanctions dating from 2006 when DPRK went nuclear.
Minister Ri elaborates by stating:
“The U.S. had put sanctions against our country from the very first day of its foundation and over the 70-year long history of the DPRK..” (p. 7)
Thus, the claim for damages dates from the first day of the founding of DPRK (September 9, 1948).
“The DPRK already organized a national damage investigation committee to make comprehensive study of total damages inflicted on our Republic by all kinds of sanctions.”
Note the reference to “all kinds of sanctions” rather than to specific sanctions (e.g.) against their missile or nuclear or WMD programs.
This is broadly defined by DPRK to include sanctions at the outbreak of the Korean war (1950) that included UN Security Council Resolution 82 that “Calls upon all Member States to… refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”
What kind of damages?
“This committee will thoroughly investigate and compile all physical and moral damages imposed upon the DPRK by the U.S., its followers and also those countries that submitted to the U.S. coercion.”
There are two key points here: precisely how DPRK intend to “investigate and compile all physical and moral damages” and, what is the list of “all those countries that” that damages will be sought from?
Claims will be made to each and every nation that participated in the Korean war against DPRK, and participants in sanctions or other perceived wrongs against DPRK since.
It is not known how DPRK will assess damages from sanctions from countries like PRC and USSR/Russia that effectively switched sides and joined sanctions.
Claims that DPRK have against just about every country in the world will likely amount to multiples of the claim against the US at $65 trillion (to 2005).
How will DPRK enforce these claims?
Minister Ri answer this question:
“When this racket of sanctions and pressure reaches a critical point, thus driving the Korean peninsula into an uncontrollable situation, investigation results of this committee will have a huge effect in holding those accountable.”
The “uncontrollable situation” in this context is likely to mean the start of hostilities that DPRK expects to end with a North Korean victory so they can dictate terms.
North Korea’s damage claims will be used to extract tribute (or compensation) from just about every country in the post Korean war world.
How might a war start once DPRK is sufficiently well armed and confident of victory?
DPRK makes clear their intent is to preemptively strike “U.S. and its vassal forces” that “show any sign of … military attack against our country.” (p.6).
What is not defined is what constitute “any sign”?
Would it be routine military maneuvers?
Increasing defensive capabilities like deploying more ballistic missile defense systems?
More sanctions?
A bit more rhetoric?
Kim Jong Un’s speech on September 22, 2017 that the US have declared war on DPRK and “will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech calling for totally destroying the D.P.R.K.” in this context leaves no doubt that North Korea will use their nuclear capabilities offensively against the US.
DPRK Foreign Minister Ri’s speech publically stated in front of the UN General Assembly that North Korea intend to handsomely profit from their ability to enforce settlement of their alleged grievances against the world with thermonuclear weapons.
That much, is perfectly clear: North Korea will be the world’s first nuclear armed extortionist.
Editor’s Note: If you wish to discuss this article, please do so at the following:
Recent PRC and Russian military exercises suggest both preparation for and a policy stance towards the Korean crisis.
Sino-Russian exercises this week held outside of Vladivostok and the Sea of Okhotsk included anti-submarine drills with 11 surface ships, 2 submarines, ASW aircraft and helicopters. Drills held September 5 involved a “surprise attack” with multiple missiles being shot down in Bohai Gulf.
The exercise was described as “boosting the forces expulsion mission capability”. This follows another large scale exercise in August in the same area.
Anti-submarine and anti-missile exercises by PRC and Russia are tailored to prepare for preventing a repeat of the cruise missile strike on Syria during the Trump-Xi summit with the added twist that it be launched from US submarines on either side of the Korean peninsula. It can hardly be aimed at the DPRK submarine fleet.
It is clear that PRC (and possibly Russia) intend to enforce their policy to come to the aid of DPRK “if the US attacked”.
For the PRC, this is also supported with a formal mutual defense treaty that require China to “immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal”. Although PRC’s commitment to treaty obligations, like UNCLOS, however, is open to question.
What is known and demonstrated repeatedly recently is PRC and Russia’s insistence on “peaceful settlement”, which expressly supports the continued expansion of DPRK WMD capabilities beyond the point of no return where they will be too dangerous to be stopped without all out nuclear war.
Russia and PRC’s support of DPRK’s goals is explicit in their opposition to a US led military solution.
No matter what they do at the UN to “support” the US, it is clear that neither party are neutral and both are well on the way to becoming belligerents on DPRK’s side.
PRC and Russia have extensive radar and other sensors monitoring the approaches to DPRK on either side of the peninsula on land, air and sea. Space based surveillance assets are in turn supplemented by commercial satellite imagery that are readily available.
Formal assets are in turn, backed up by a well-organized maritime militia, spy network and open source intelligence that will give early warning of any major or irregular activities at allied airfields, military bases and ports.
These ISR networks communicating via commercial channels and will be able to work with Pyongyang in real time, including activating pre-positioned agents and forces outside of DPRK.
Thus, OPSEC is going to be a major problem for allied forces.
Early warning will facilitate the axis forces deploying and other assistance to support DPRK: making surprise difficult to achieve.
PRC have been actively preparing for preemptive S/MRBM and cruise missile strikes on US and allied bases with both conventional and almost certainly nuclear weapons. PRC has a veto backed by military force on US action against DPRK.
The question is, will they use it when such overt moves will have major consequences?
Intervention by PRC and Russia this time, however, are tempered by two major factors. Russia is not USSR that have limited economic ties with the west. Russia relies on western markets and additional sanctions would pinch the Putin regime further.
PRC, on the other hand, is in a bind.
As a member of the UNSC, PRC cannot undo the UN resolution 82 and 84 which remains in effect after it was passed by ROC with USSR absent. Furthermore, Russia and PRC’s recent string of votes in favor of sanctions on DPRK affirmed the past resolutions validity which PRC would violate if they entered the war with DPRK.
The deep and broad economic links of PRC to the world economy is another problem.
Formal entry into the Korean war will immediately impair these relationships, likely leading to a World War style full embargo including US and Allies locking belligerents out of the western financial system and seizure of their assets abroad.
The economic consequences will be to almost certainly plunge the PRC economy into severe recession — with its debt load exceeding 300% GDP.
Thus, in as much as PRC and Russia both used military exercises to bluff, actually crossing the line of initiating hostilities will require deliberation.
It is potentially severely destabilizing domestically. Thus, cold war style massive intervention that include movements of troops, material, and PRC/USSR military operations similar to Korean War I, or the Vietnam war is unlikely at the first instance.
During the Korean war, support came from USSR and PRC via detectable movements of troops, equipment, and trainloads of supplies. Aircraft, experienced and highly trained pilots, and equipment that can have no other source beside USSR or PRC are traceable.
Notably, the PVA forces had excellent OPSEC and did not reveal themselves until October, 1950. This longstanding strength of CCP should not be underestimated.
Once can expect a repeat of this scenario where substantial technical and material aid will come from PRC via difficult to trace in real time channels.
Covert, or at least, plausibly deniable intervention by PRC (whether Beijing-China or other elements) and Russia in support of DPRK is a foregone conclusion regardless of any pledges by Beijing-China to “stay neutral” if DPRK attacked US.
It is almost certain that the PRC and Russia will disguise any physical movements of material as “humanitarian” aid ostensibly to prevent DPRK refugees from flooding across the border.
The lame excuse that PRC is afraid of influxes of refugees has, to date, not been challenged by the US and allies even as PRC deployed troops on the border in anticipation of occupying DPRK to prevent a US victory.
The most probable aid will come in the form of ISR on behalf of DPRK conducted by PRC/Russian systems to aid their defenses. This will, in turn, be supplemented by EW and interference with allied systems by means ranging from jamming to cyberwarfare against both military and civilian networks.
In other words, the US and allies should be expecting to encounter an enemy with state-of-the-art capabilities — not a poverty stricken and backward military machine.
Other aid like provision of hardened and secured facilities across the border for DPRK C2 is to be expected. From there, could “people’s volunteers” be far behind?
The question that such intervention by axis allies of DPRK raises is central to the Anglo-European world’s relationship with the PRC and Russia:
Can we continue an economic relationship with them and turn a blind eye to great power and ideological conflict when it overflows into a proxy war against an offensive minded nuclear state?
That is the problem of the 21st century that must be resolved.
Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please do so here:
2017-09-14 The Williams Foundation has been a thought leader in bringing together the key players in the Australian military as well as allies to shape a way ahead for the integrated force.
Since March 2014, the Williams Foundation has conducted a series of Seminars that explored the opportunities and challenges afforded by the introduction of next generation combat capabilities.
Topics that have been explored prior to the latest seminar have included:
Air Combat Operations – 2025 and Beyond
Battlespace Awareness – The Joint Edge
Integrating Innovative Airpower (held in Copenhagen)
Training for an Integrated ADF: Live, Virtual and Constructive Design-Led Innovation
New Thinking on Air-Land
New Thinking on Air-Sea
Integrated Force Design
On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.
In this report, the major presentations at the Williams Foundation seminar on the evolution of electronic warfare, notably from the standpoint of shaping an integrated force, are outlined and discussed.
Additional materials provided during interviews prior to or during the seminar are included as well as relevant background and analytical materials building out key themes introduced and discussed in the seminar.
With the introduction of the Growler, this has provided a natural hook into the broader discussion of the evolving payloads, which need to be part of an integrated 21st century combat force.
The seminar background and focus was described in the run up to the seminar as follows:
An increasingly sophisticated and rapidly evolving threat with ready access to advanced, commercially available off-the-shelf technology is transforming the operational context in which the Australia Defence Force must now survive and fight.
The next generation battlespace will be contested across multiple domains with control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum becoming just as important as control of the Air if the Joint Force is to operate with the freedom of manoeuvre necessary to ensure campaign success.
This Seminar seeks to build a common understanding of how the EA-18G Growler, in particular, will impact the Australian Defence Force at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and how Airborne Electronic Attack is likely to shape future Australian Defence and Security policy.
It will provide a historical perspective on the development of the Royal Australian Air Force’s Electronic Warfare capability dating back to World War 2, and describe how today’s Air Force personnel are raising, training and sustaining the Growler Force in partnership with the United States Navy.
We will hear the perspectives of the Australian Army, Navy, and the Joint Commanders, as well as contributions from our senior coalition partners in the United States and the United Kingdom. The emphasis will be on gaining a better understanding of the key enablers and technologies, such as C4I, Electronic Warfare Battle Management, and training systems, which turn the manned and unmanned platforms into Joint Capability delivering sophisticated battlespace effects.
The Seminar will also serve as an opportunity to provide an industry perspective on Electronic Warfare and, in particular, the role they can play as a Fundamental Input to Capability. It will highlight the importance of disruptive technologies, speed to market, and the increasing emphasis on non-kinetic effects to gain operational advantage. Industry participants are invited to address topics including Electronic Warfare Battle Management, training, and the emerging technologies associated with networked, force level effects.
Above all, the seminar will emphasise the need for a new attitude to Electronic Warfare and, in particular, a need to embrace the arrival of the EA-18G Growler as a catalyst for change. In doing so, it provides an opportunity to make Electronic Warfare more accessible and understandable to the Joint Force, and develop the Information Age Warfighters necessary to deliver campaign success on future operations.
In effect, this Electronic Warfare (EW) seminar was a case study of the tron warfare piece of building an integrated force which can operate a variety of payloads in a diversity of conflict situations.
At first blush, the Growler and its integration was the focus of attention; but in reality, the seminar was much broader than that due to the focus of attention of the speakers and the interactions with the audience throughout the day.
The heart of the seminar was provided by a fascinating and wide ranging presentation by the RAAF and US Navy Growler participants.
The presentations highlighted the very flexible and innovative working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF in delivering Growler to Australia.
This effort provides a model of how to deliver joint combat effects by an allied force.
But both highlighted, that Growler was in many ways a means to an end.
Group Captain Braz emphasized that the RAAF did not want stovepipe EW specialists but rather the delivery of EW or what we call Tron Warfare payloads in the battlespace.
And even though the Aussies are just now getting Growler, the US Navy is just now working beyond the land wars to sort out how Growler fits into the high intensity battlespace.
And it is clear that the US Navy has much to learn from Australia, a point driven home by the US Navy representative, CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack ‘Wing, Pacific Fleet.
In an interview with Group Captain Graz last Spring in Amberley, he highlighted how he saw the Aussie approach.
We need to get the experience which Growler can deliver and share the knowledge.
The difficult thing with Growler is that it delivers non-kinetic effects, and sometimes they’re difficult to measure. We’re used to being able to deliver effects through other systems where the outcome is tangible and measurable.
For a Growler, if you’re attacking a threat system or the people operating that threat system, then often it’s difficult to truly assess how much you’re affecting that system.
You can do trials and tests in certain scenarios, but it’s never quite the same, and so you get a level of confidence about what immediate effect you can achieve, but it’s the secondary and tertiary effects that we’re often looking for that are sometimes harder to measure.
The difficult challenge will become knowing how degraded the network is and how reliable the information is at any given point.
If you create enough uncertainty in the operators, then you can achieve an effect even if it’s not degraded.
Lt. General (Retired) Davis, recently the Deputy Commandant of Aviation, built from the core perspective of these two Tron Warriors to emphasize that for the USMC, electronic warfare capabilities are something which the insertion force needed as a core capability, not a specialized asset to be flown in from time to time.
He highlighted the Marine Corps approach to enabling the MAGTF with integrated EW capabilities, ranging from Intrepid Tiger pods on aircraft, to the F-35B, to the payloads on Blackjack, and to the coming new UAV which will be payload configurable.
The seminar organizer, John Conway, highlighted during the seminar and in talks after the seminar, the centrality of building EW into the operational art for the evolving combat force.
It is about reshaping the payloads, which can be delivered by the integrated force across the spectrum of warfare.
The introduction of the Growler is an important jump start to Australian capabilities, but it comes into the force as the Aussies are working force integration hard.
This effort will inform how they use Growler and according to CDR Mike Paul will be very helpful as the US Navy transitions from a kill chain to a kill web focus.
In short, the seminar provided a case study of shaping a way ahead for broadening the capability, which the evolving 21st century combat force, can deliver.
And as Lt. General (Retired) Davis put it with regard to the Williams Foundation contribution:
“Hats off to the Williams Foundation for what you do.
“You provide a venue where you can share your ideas, be challenged, and to do so in a joint community.
“And it is done in public so can inform a broader discussion.”
The next seminars will address the challenges of transitioning and shaping a combat force able to operate in and prevail in high tempo operations up to and including high intensity warfare.
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The United States has fought relatively slow-motion wars or “slo mo,” land wars for more than a decade and a half.
This does not mean American and Allied combat troops have not experienced the violence and threats commiserate with engaging against a nasty and skilled enemy.
It does mean that the tool sets and concepts of operations are very different and harken back to wars prior to this generation of warfighters.
Not since the Vietnamese War has the United States Military really had a peer-to-peer technologically adept opponent.
And during that war, the Vietnamese put U.S. pilots clearly in harm’s way by shaping their own version of multiple means of trying to destroy U.S. aircraft. From flying capable Russian fighters, the Mig-21J was actually a more advanced close in fighter then the F-4J.
But perhaps the biggest deadly surprise was North Vietnam’s Air Defense Artillery capability, from the ground up.
Whether facing guns or missiles, or enemy fighters for US pilots the sky over Vietnam was a very deadly place to be.
A hit! An F-105 trails smoke after contact with shrapnel from an SA-2. National Museum of the USAF.
After the war in Hanoi in 1994, Ed Timperlake was able to meet some Vietnamese Army Air Defense (ADA) commanders. In 1994 the war was over so when they expressed their Air Defense pride at in defending their country, I listened intently. After all the Vietnam Air Defense mission had been the most technologically adept fighting force in that combat domain for the 20th Century.
It is often said by experienced “Asia Hands,” never underestimate the Peoples Republic of China for they are very clever, but underestimate the Vietnamese at ones mortal peril for they are very smart.
With their national capital attacked from the sky, North Vietnam’s Air Force embraced the Soviet interceptor con-ops of rigid Ground Control Intercept (GCI) doctrine, until they learned from practice that the approach did not work effectively.
Soviet GCI doctrine was what could be called today in the American Military as “kill chain linear” thinking,.
At the height of the air war over Vietnam, successful Vietnam fighter pilots followed a very different approach Being very smart and combat adaptable the North Vietnamese evolved into what today would be called “Kill Webs” concept of fighting. The term wasn’t exactly in their language as “Giết Webs” but sadly for a lot of fellow American combat aviators they had success.
As one source characterized the Vietnamese approach to dealing with American airpower:
The threats had a synergistic effect. The small arms and automatic weapons fire drove the aircraft out of the low altitude arena to higher altitudes where other AAA, SAMs, and enemy fighters were more effective.
At the same time, the heavier AAA, SAMs, and fighters drove the aircraft back down to lower altitudes where those threats were less effective but the small arms fire was murderous. But the most effective North Vietnamese air defense had always been weather.
The North Vietnamese created an integrated air defense system focusing on rapid interconnected Target Acquisition and then executed Target Engagement by empowering the kill shot being made by different “payloads” guns, exploding flack, missiles and fighters to protect their homeland. There approach was to focus on payload-utility by the kill web, rather than a hierarchical kill chain.
There were several “take-aways” from Ed Timperlake’s conversations in Hanoi 1994 when he was representing the Vietnam Children’s Fund in building the first of now fifty one schools pro bono:
The officers and troops manning both Air Defense Artillery Batteries and Missile launch sites were highly selected troops, especially the officers. Often both skilled and sons of North Vietnamese Military/Political leadership class.
The Russians (Soviet Union) did not hesitate to allow the Vietnamese access to their state-of-the art systems. PLA military equipment considered “modern” wasn’t.
The Russian “tattle-tale” ships present in the middle of the US 7th Fleet Yankee Station, chasing the carrier tracks for launching “Alpha Strikes” (as many aircraft heading feet wet as possible) were invaluable sources of strategic and tactical advanced warning.
The Vietnamese ADA commanders perfected not only radar tracking of both arty and SAM guidance but they also knew when to not put signals in space.
The Soviet Union Interceptor/Fighter engagement strategy, of much more rigid Ground Control Intercepts was a real weakness during the Cold War.
The flexibility of having an integrated ADA doctrine, both active and passive was very successful inside a total Air Defense Umbrella was effective and actually avoided fratricide.
They recognized U.S. Air Power was a war winning deciding factor which required them to shift from the Soviet kill chain approach to their early version of the kill web.
It was also evident from their perspective that U.S. domestic politics during the Vietnam War was the asymmetrical weakness to be exploited ultimately leading to the NVA Flag being raised over Saigon in April 1975.
It is not just about the technology; it is also about the political dynamic within which the technology is used which can shape a significant war winning strategy.
The nature of what it felt like to fly against the North Vietnamese “kill web” was captured in an interview we did with the leading USAF “Ace” of Vietnam Chuck De Bellevue.
And this sense of reality in dealing with a peer competitor needs to inform how we shape our way ahead in dealing with the challenge of peer competitors as we shift from a primary focus on the land wars.
Question: Chuck, did your raw gear and did your “tron” warfare (short for all electronic warfare capabilities) in those early days, useful both for a warning and in other ways such as disabling SA-2s and other missiles as far as a tracking solution?
Can you talk a little bit about that and what you had available in those days?
Answer: In the F-4 D model we had a 107. It provided good warning and it also saved my life a couple times.
Question: Was it visual and audio?
Answer: On the raw gear, it was yes. Audio gave me a rattlesnake in my headset.
If the missile was in the air the raw gear itself would start flashing at you.
And then we had a scope and if it was a missile in the air, you’d get a moving break in the strobe.
Col. Charles B. DeBellevue, USAF, Ret., a member of the famed “Triple Nickel” 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron during the Vietnam War, is credited with downing six North Vietnamese MiGs. Here is seen as one of the honored guests Memorial Day 2010 in Columbia Mo.
Question: All of this was coming into your eyes and ears. And then did you have to physically do something in a cockpit to activate any kind of countermeasures or was it just visual – calls to make turns break hard, break – how did you handle the engagement process?
How did the airplane handle it?
How did the “trons” handle it?
Answer: We usually kept our jamming pods in standby. There were repeater pods and they would talk if they heard anything. I didn’t want anybody to know where I was. So we kept them in standby.
We had an occasion to go up to Yen Bai about 70 miles north of Hanoi. We used that as a holding point because Intel said there were no SAM sites there so you could see – on a clear day you could see the river.
One night, there was loop in the river that you could see it pretty easy. So we used to use that as our holding fix. And we loosened up the formation a little bit for me to kill ten minutes. So we loosened up the formation in this holding pattern and as soon as you rolled out going away the raw gear lit up – when I was sitting down in the cockpit doing something – probably planning on the next moves into Hanoi.
And all of a sudden I got a rattlesnake in my headset, raw gear was flashing, and instead of looking up I reached down and turned both jammers from standby to on as I’m looking up.
And had I done it the other way around looking up first I wouldn’t have been here, in between me and three, and there was just about enough room to put a missile between us.
It was an SA2; and that missile was followed by his buddy. And you know how things slow down in combat–Well, I could see their designation on the side of the missile. I couldn’t read it but I could see it.
Question: Are you saying you’re over an area that Intel said that there were no active SAMs?
Answer: Yes but they had mobile SAMs back then. They moved two mobile SAM sites in the bay area and they locked them optically and kept them close to the ground. The missile is non-guided for the first six seconds.
After that the booster falls off and then the antenna is now able to receive signals. And at that point, they fished them up into us. And at that point they were right under us too.
Now with a new administration in power, it is time to really focus again on peer-to-peer high intensity warfighting and how to prevail.
With this forceful return to having to think about how to prevail in a high intensity conflict that now includes much more complex global nuclear weapons threat, there is no gentle transition from “slo mo” to high intensity threats. We need to refocus now and time is very short.
A key element of preparing for the kind of threat posed by North Korea clearly has been missile defense. But missile defense by itself is not enough – there needs to be integrated C2 for the strike and defense force to deal with a state like North Korea.
C2 integration is crucial to allow for the U.S. National Command Authority to have options across the Pacific chessboard to shape the battlespace in order to prevail in times of conflict.
And to do so, requires integration among missile defense systems to provide for integrated solutions across the battlespace.
Adversary missile strikes cut across domains from strategic and tactical “defense” in protecting infrastructure and combat platforms in a classic defense strategy to a more proactive role to enabling more effective strike capabilities by the offensive forces. The challenge in the Pacific demands more and more ADA to enable offensive strike con-ops.
Integrated C2 across the missile defense domain allows for leveraging the particular strengths of individual systems but allows the Combatant Commander to mitigate weaknesses of any particular system in shaping a battlefield wide approach.
There is the need for essentially fixed point defense for facilities, such as airfields and other fixed targets up to and including defending strategic continuity of government sites.
But there is only so much hardening and dispersal that can be accomplished, and tragically there are many soft targets, which cannot be hardened.
This is the situation on the Korean Demilitarized Military Zone (DMZ), which on the North Korean side is anything but “demilitarized.”
The issue of preemption is always on the table, but America really tries to avoid shooting first.
A combat capable Air Force flying from protected air fields and Carriers can use air strikes to take out the adversary’s missile strike force, but “surprise” launch is always a factor especially if not fully mobilized and “hot pad ready.”
The melding of active hardening with aviation “Hot Pad” ready aircraft as well as sea-based cruise missiles is something the American military does very well.
And U.S. Army ADA must be well positioned and ever ready. It is an insurance force that can be a real advantage in prevailing during a “high-intensity” initial engagement and in high intensity conflict the first actions can shape the outcomes.
During a visit by Robbin Laird to the Pacific in 2014, the importance of shaping integrated options and integrated C2 for the offensive-defensive enterprise was highlighted by the then PACAF Commander, “Hawk” Carlisle who later became head of the Air Combat Command and by the Commanding General of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Brig. Gen. Daniel Karbler.
The two Generals underscored that there was clear imperative to integrate air and missile defense systems throughout the Pacific to enhance combat effectiveness.
According to General Carlisle: “The PACCOM Commander has put me in charge of how we are going to do integrated air and missile defense for the Pacific theater, which represents 52% of the world’s surface. This is clearly a major challenge and is clearly both a joint and coalition operation.”
In an earlier interview, Brigadier General Daniel Karbler, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, highlighted that the task of the Army role within an integrated enterprise as follows:
The role of having active defense or an interceptor force is to buy time for [Lieutenant] General [Jan-Marc] Jouas (7th USAF Commander in the Pacific) or General [Hawk] Carlisle (the PACAF Commander) to more effectively determine how to use their airpower. It also allows the National Command Authority to determine the most effective way ahead with an adversary willing to strike US or allied forces and territory with missiles.
General Carlisle focused on the way ahead to achieve the overall integrated air and missile defense mission designed to achieve the objectives outlined by BG Karbler.
General Hawk Carlisle, commander, Air Forces Pacific sits with AFN-Pacific Hawaii News Bureau, to get the general’s thoughts and messages on the state of Air Forces in the Pacific. Credit: Defense Media Activity, Hawaii News Bureau, 4/613
We are pursuing an approach that combines better integration of the sensors with the shooters with command and control.
Command and control are two words.
The way ahead is clearly a distributed force integrated through command and control whereby one develops distributed mission tactical orders (with well understood playbooks) reflecting the commander’s directions and then to have the ability to control the assets to ensure that the sensors and shooters accomplish their mission.
The U.S. has deployed a number of key missile defense systems to enhance the capability to defend the force.
This includes bringing THAAD to Guam; Pac-3 into Japan, Aegis deployed at sea theater wide. In fact, each of these systems – individually — has been highlighted by the US Department of Defense as part of the response to the North Korean threat.
As important as these individual systems are in an of themselves, there is a key need to get on with integrated missile defense which then can be combined with the PACOM Commanders strike force to ensure maximum effectiveness against a real and present danger.
The importance of integrated C2 for a missile defense capability within an overall offensive-defensive enterprise could also be a key contributor to providing tools for a more effective political response to peer competitor threats.
Clearly, crisis management will be a key part of dealing with any challenge like North Korea.
If the National Command Authority has an integrated capability deployed throughout the Pacific this provides a range of options when working with allies, rather than having to rely on systems on allied territory which may or may not be available at the optimal time during a crisis.
In slow mo acquisition thinking, we can take years to get integration done; but with the arrival of a different era, one of peer competitors, and second nuclear age powers, such dragging of feet on building out integrated software solutions to shape a reliable common defense capability is a near term priority.
And because we are talking software upgradeability, whatever the near term capability which can be deployed, it can grow over time as the integration from the ground up further develops.
The US Army has been developing an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System which clearly can provide for the foundation going forward; without such a system we are left with a Tower of Babel approach to integration which makes little sense in dealing either with the clear and present danger of North Korea or the threats from peer competitors or other Second Nuclear Age powers.
To deal with high intensity threats modernization needs to be combined with mobilization. By having several different locations of builders of missiles within the defense industrial complex geographically dispersed ensures the ability to ramp up missile production. This is a crucial part of getting ready to deal with a high tempo threat.
At the same time by working software commonality across the C2 system, the force commander can then leverage the diversity of launch systems to get a significant punch to the defensive part of the offensive defensive equation.
Cacophony in C2 systems needs to be replaced by an integrated software solution moving forward into which the different defensive launch systems can participate to give the combatant commander the kind of options he or she needs to deal with the near term or longer term threats.
The future is now; we need to move forward on integrated C2 for the defensive forces enabling the offensive-defensive enterprise.
Editor’s Note: Shortly after the Army moved THAAD to Guam, we did an interview with the Army commander involved in THAAD operations in Guam.
2014-01-02 The emergence of the second nuclear age is one of the core challenges facing the US and allied forces in this decade of the 21st century.
Successfully navigating these challenges is not a given, and shaping an effective response is a work in progress.
During 2014, our Second Line of Defense Forum will focus initially on the challenge of the Second Nuclear Age and our guest editor will by Paul Bracken, the author of a book with the same name.
The core point is rather simply put: the rules that applied to the first nuclear age do not necessarily apply to the second.
The new nuclear powers are acquiring nuclear weapons or on paths to obtain them as part of a re-shaping of global dynamics within the 21st century and to re-shape global power balances.
Rather than relegating nuclear weapons to the dust bin of history, the new nuclear powers are seeking to make them center pieces of their global aspirations and ability to position themselves within their regions and beyond.
In his presentation to the Air Force Association Pacific Forum, the PACAF Commander, General Hawk Carlisle, highlighted the contribution made by the US Army in moving a THAAD Battery to Guam in record time.
Instead of a 6 week deployment cycle, the battalion was moved and operational in two weeks time!
We had a chance to follow up on Carlisle’s introduction of the subject with an phone interview with Task Force Talon Commander, LTC Cochrane, the THADD Task Force commander who is currently based on Guam.
Cochrane has been in the US Army for 26 years, six and half years as an enlisted air defense solider and the remainder of the time as an air defense officer. He has spent the majority of his career in divisional units, doing short range air defense.
According to LTC Cochrane: The task force itself is comprised of about 205 soldiers.
There are several different elements to the task force.
The first, of course, is the THAAD battery. This is Alpha 4, THAAD battery out of Fort Bliss, Texas.
Additionally, I have a security element that is out of the 472nd MP Company, out of Fort Wainwright, Alaska.
I also have a couple of different communications elements from units based out of Hawaii and, I do have a captain here from 1-1 ADA in Okinawa.
So, we really are pulling the best from multiple different units to accomplish this mission because we are in a deployment status here on the island of Guam.
SLD: What is your mission?
Lt. Col. Cochrane: The mission here is to defend the island of Guam against the North Korean tactical ballistic missile threats. If the strategic deterrent should fail, our task is to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles. We are here to defend the entire island of Guam.
SLD: General Carlisle highlighted the rapidity of your deployment and considered this a key part of the deterrent structure. Could you discuss the approach?
Lt. Col. Cochrane: This was the first ever deployment of THAAD.
We had a planning timeline of about six weeks to get to any place in the world and to set up and be operational.
We looked at that planning cycle and said: “You know we can do better than that.”
With a real mission on the table, the intensity picked up. We cut the deployment time by 2/3s and pulled in the elements from different locations into an integrated and coordinated force with the Air Force and with Joint Region Marianas (JRM). We were successful because the Air Force, the Navy and the Army pulled together as a joint force.
We initially moved what we call a minimum engagement package by air to Anderson Air Force base. It came in a very rapid timeline on a relatively small number of aircraft (C-17s and C-5s) and allowed us to establish our basic operation and to achieve our initial capability to defend the island. The remainder of the equipment came by sea.
A clear theme in the discussion was how the workings of the joint force or what General Carlisle referred to as cross-domain synergy was a key element to shaping capabilities for the second nuclear age.
Lt. Col. Cochrane: Missile defense is more than just one platform or system. It is a classic case of what you call no platform fights alone. It is a system of systems.
We combine Aegis, with THAAD with short-range defense systems, etc.
For example, at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, the 94th AAMDC and the 613 AOC coordinate air and missile defense fot the Pacific Theater. The Navy and the Air Force all come together and conduct that coordination in terms of how we protect and coordinate our defense so that we are maximizing our capabilities.
It is not just a single system standing alone or operating independently.
It is the inter-dependence and the inter-operability of all these systems to all three of the branches that are actively engaged in missile and air defense.
In my unit, we are looking aggressively at how to cross link with Aegis, for example.
I have been extremely fortunate that Brigadier General Garland, who is the commander of the 36th Wing here has emphasized: “Welcome to Guam. What do you need?”
He has put his wing and their resources at our disposal to execute our mission so when we first came in, we were welcomed with open arms by our Air Force brethren and we are now part of their family.
We interact with the wing commander and the wing vice-commander routinely, several times a week, talking about these missile defense issues.
Additionally, we are integrated into Wing exercises to practice coordinated actions before, during and after TBM engagements.
And we clearly do not want the Aegis and the THAAD firing against the same inbounds just because then we are wasting ammunition on two very capable missiles when they can be used elsewhere.
This is where the jointness of this whole process must come into play.
As we get to this “purple force” concept where all of us are working under a joint task force or a joint commander, it becomes extremely important that we actually do that cross coordination.
I believe that missile defense is only going to become more important as we continue to rebalance to the Pacific strategy that has been directed on us.
I think you are going to end up seeing more and more emphasis on the continued growth of our cooperative joint-ness between the Navy (Aegis ships), the Air Force (Defensive Counter Air) and the Army (Air and Missile Defense).
SLD: In fact, your entire effort is part of what we have referred to as the Second Nuclear Age.
Lt. Col. Cochrane: It is clear that our operational capabilities are important in and of themselves and as part of strategic messaging to North Korea and to our allies and friends.
We tell them, “We are capable. You threaten this island specifically, we are going to defend this island,” and by doing so we are not only sending a strategic message only to North Korea but also to other friends and allies in the area and any potential adversaries.
THE Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery deployed to Guam nine months ago remains on the island, though long-term plans have not yet been determined. The THAAD battery was deployed from Fort Bliss, Texas in April in response to threats of a missile attack from North Korea. The group, Task Force Talon, is stationed at Andersen Air Force Base.
The task force comprises about 175 personnel. “In addition to the THAAD personnel, Task Force Talon is made up of various soldiers from the 94th Army Air Missile Defense Command, 32nd Army Air Missile Defense Command, 472nd Military Police Company and 311th Theater Signal Command working in a collaborative effort to ensure mission success,” according to Maj. Gabriella M. Mckinney, public affairs officer for the 94th Air Missile Defense Command.
It has not yet been determined whether the deployment will be permanent, according to McKinney. “We will continue to evaluate the requirement for this capability as real world threats continue to unfold to determine the best course of action,” she said. “The specifics of the deployment will be determined at that time.”
In the video above, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Army Soldiers from the 94th and 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC); U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and airmen from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center are seen successfully conducting the largest, most complex missile defense flight test ever attempted resulting in the simultaneous engagement of five ballistic missile and cruise missile targets.
This is what a system of systems approach is all about.
The photos below provide a look at the system.
Credit Photos: DOD or Lockheed Martin
The first photo provides a sense of Guam in relationship to North Korea.
The second and third photos show the TEL for the THAAD.
The fourth photo shows the launcher at rest at sunset.
Photos 5 through 7 show the THAAD being launched.
The eighth photo shows U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks takes a photo with the A4 THAAD during his visit to the unit at Andersen AFB, Guam on Sunday, Aug. 18, 2013. The A4 THAAD deployed to Guam in April as a part of the 94th AAMDC Task Force Talon Mission.
The ninth photo shows U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks speaking with soldiers of the A4 THAAD about numerous personnel and operational issues during his visit to the unit at Andersen AFB, Guam, on Sunday, Aug. 18, 2013.
The final photo provides a graphic with regard to how THAAD works.
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Putting President Trump and European Union leaders together on the same page may seem an anomaly.
The love the President has for baiting the EU is only matched by European transatlantic assertion of European values and interests against American “revanchism.”
In the real world, the interests of both the US and the Europeans remain significantly convergent.
Nowhere has this this become more evident than in recent responses to the Chinese penetration of their economies.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made it a key element of his global outreach to portray his regime as a core driver of 21st century globalization.
In January at Davos World Economic Forum he portrayed himself as the new defender of global order and the polar opposite of the iconoclastic nationalist disrupter, President Trump.
Just as Donald Trump was about to be inaugurated as President, one analyst portrayed the appearance of the Chinese President at the World Economic Forum in January as a new alternative to fading American global economic leadership:
China’s president will preach the advent of a new world order in Davos next week before the high priests of globalisation, who are facing an uprising from voters against their orthodoxy of open markets and borders.
The annual conclave of the World Economic Forum in the Swiss Alps, grouping 3,000 delegates from the worlds of government, business, science and the arts, has created the caricature of “Davos Man”, a rich, rootless globetrotter who worships with fellow disciples in the church of free trade.
But populists are singing from a radically different hymn sheet. Their hostility towards both unfettered trade and immigration has already yielded Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and the rise of once-fringe parties across Europe, including in France and Germany.
The globalist President of China was soon seen in an ascendant role at the moment when President Trump rejected the global climate change Paris agreement (ignoring, for convenience, the Chinese did not have to comply with specific commitments of that accord until many years later).
As Andrew Rettman wrote in a recent EU Observer article:
US president Donald Trump is seen in China as a “gift” for closer EU relations and for tipping the “geo-strategic balance” of power toward Asia.
That is the feeling in Beijing and beyond, according to Alicia Garcia-Herrero, a Hong Kong-based economist from the Bruegel think tank in Belgium, who co-wrote a new study on how to unlock tens of billions of euros in China-EU investment and trade.
“Last year, my children, who go to school in China, didn’t know why so many of their classmates wanted Trump to win the [US] elections, but it was because even normal Chinese families understood the implications. He [Trump] just looked so dumb and so creepy,” she told EUobserver on Tuesday (12 September).
“Trump is the greatest gift that we [the West] could have given to China”, she said.
This Chinese baseline for global expansion of course hid major inconsistencies, particularly the embrace of liberal values within democratic open debate.
When taken into consideration together, this profound division between liberal democracies and a centralized command economy did not suggest future convergence, but rather an historic inflection point in the global distribution of global power.
The first point is rather an obvious one.
The Chinese have little in common with liberal values.
And whatever one think of Trump’s America, the democratic side of the nation has if anything been demonstrated as his agenda becomes redefined through a complex U.S. political process.
For example, there is growing realization in Australia that China is a penetrating power, not a partner in High School Musical globalization.
In a recent interview with Dr. Ross Babbage during a visit to Australia in August 2017, the deep divide was highlighted as a great challenge at this time of history.
The Chinese, the Russians, the North Koreans and the Iranians, just to mention the most prominent authoritarian powers, have little in common with our values. We are paying a big price for not highlighting the true nature of the illiberal regimes to our publics.
“Recently, the Prime Minister of Australia, despite his difficult initial discussion with President Trump, made it clear that the North Korean threat to the United States and Australia created common cause and the need for a common response.
“The fundamentals of the ANZUS alliance remain as relevant as ever. The PM was very clear that a thuggish regime with nuclear weapons threatened our way of life.
“We need more recognition of this and preparation for the contest and conflict starring us in the face. This is the real world; not the world we wish we were living in.”
“Part of the problem here, in my view, is that we have not done a good job of telling our publics about the appalling track record of the Russians, and the Chinese, and the others.
“There are some notable exceptions.
“For example, a really good series of reports on ABC Australia in June highlighted the Chinese penetration of Australia, their cyber operations, their attempts at bribery and corruption and the threat which these operations pose to Australia.
“This series triggered further press reporting and to government decisions to review policies and legal frameworks to deal with the internal espionage, cyber and broader challenge posed by the Chinese and others.”
“There is, however, a long way to go. We need to focus much more strongly on the global competitors who don’t share our values and who are working actively to damage us seriously or bring us down. We need to make our own public’s aware of what’s going on, but also project information and other operations back into the counties that are dominated by these kinds of regimes.
At this moment, in back to back announcements, the Trump Administration and the European Union publicly revealed growing concerns with Chinese penetration of their economies.
According to The Wall Street Journal in a story published September 13, 2017:
President Donald Trump on Wednesday blocked a Beijing-backed fund’s attempt to buy an American chip maker, signaling his administration will closely scrutinize Chinese efforts to invest in U.S. semiconductor technology.
Mr. Trump rejected the transaction after the would-be deal makers—Chinese government-backed Canyon Bridge Capital Partners and Lattice Semiconductor Corp. —made a rare, direct appeal to him. They had hoped he would overrule an earlier negative recommendation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a multiagency panel that reviews deals for national-security concerns.
Instead, the White House said Wednesday that Mr. Trump believes the $1.3 billion transaction could have risked U.S. national security due to “the potential transfer of intellectual property to the foreign acquirer, the Chinese government’s role in supporting this transaction, the importance of semiconductor supply chain integrity to the United States Government, and the use of Lattice products by the United States Government.”
Ironically, in his state of Europe address, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker ON THE SAME DAY underscored the need to tighten foreign direct investment rules to protect the national security interests of Europe.
“We are not naive free traders. Europe will defend its strategic interests with an EU framework for investment screening.”
And Trump-like, the Commission President had this to say about the European steel industry and China:
Being European also means standing up for our steel industry. We already have 37 anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures in place to protect our steel industry from unfair competition.
But we need to do more, as overproduction in some parts of the world is putting European producers out of business.
This is why I was in China twice this year to address the issue of overcapacity. This is also why the Commission has proposed to change the lesser duty rule.
The United States imposes a 265% import tariff on Chinese steel, but here in Europe, some governments have for years insisted we reduce tariffs on Chinese steel.
I call on all Member States and on this Parliament to support the Commission in strengthening our trade defence instruments. We should not be naïve free traders, but be able to respond as forcefully to dumping as the United States.
It is doubtful Juncker consulted with President Trump on the timing of this statement, but the simultaneous public expressions of concern about China’s ventures and interactions with the economies of Europe and the US should be noted.
Clearly the new President of France has had an impact.
As David Hutt wrote in Forbes on August 17, 2017:
Macron wants to build an “alliance” in the EU to limit the ability of foreign companies to take over European strategic industries. By “foreign” he chiefly means Chinese.
One such takeover happened in May when China’s state-owned ChemChina purchased the Swiss agrochemical giant Syngenta for $43 billion, the largest Chinese overseas takeover to date.
(Berlin and Paris were reportedly angry that the European Commission approved the takeover.)
And now Europe fears that if more Chinese state-firms purchase its leading developers of advanced technology then it will put the continent at an economic and technological disadvantage.
Underlying the overall Chinese global reach has been its expanding economy.
But there are growing indicators that the Chinese economy is not only slowing down but also perhaps facing severe financial troubles as a result of its shockingly large reliance on expansion of debt to drive its growth through the continuing consequences of the Great Financial Crisis which gripped the world in 2008.
Until that global crisis and the world recession it set in motion, China’s growth was primarily reliant on growth of exports to the rest of the world to power domestic growth at a much higher pace than domestic incomes could sustain.
For decades until the 2008 global financial crisis, world trade had grown much faster than the individual national economies, lifting global growth. In late 2008 world trade started collapsing, remaining stalled for a sustained period for the first time since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Since then, world trade recovered partially, but at a rate of growth well below the slow growth experienced in recent years throughout most of the world.
This prolonged world trade slump poses a major challenge to Europe, but especially to Germany, the largest European economy.
Germany is heavily reliant on global trade as its primary engine of economic growth.
In the past few years, its exports to China in several key domains, including autos and heavy machinery, have been copied and leveraged by the Chinese to start ramp up their own exports. China was for several years Germany’s biggest export market.
Now China is not only cutting its imports from Germany but exporting to Germany’s other important markets in around the world.
In short, the Chinese economic slowdown and its ripple effects into Europe and beyond, combined with growing concern of how China leverages their economic investments in the economies of the liberal democracies is creating a strategic inflection point which will have profound effects on the pattern of global development in coming years.
China’s heavy reliance on debt, borrowing from its future performance, is placing new strains on how far it sustain its extraordinary growth rates of the last few decades.
Under President Xi it is extending its direct interests far beyond its neighborhood to the rest of the world in its focused attention to One Belt, One Road expansion into Africa, the rest of Asia, Latin America, Central Europe, and even to beyond the gates of Western Europe requires vast new financial support for its global ambitions.
China is seeking to become a global giant, but it is suffering the limits of what it can do posed by the same realities that are constraining economic performance now being suffered in the US, Europe and Japan.
Its economic limitations are partially revealed in its apparent inability to apply force to alter the behavior of its troublesome neighbor, North Korea.
China may now be facing limitations imposed by excessive borrowing from its future, and may be facing a world also beleaguered by debt and unsustainable financial markets, with continuing slump in world trade.
China may be facing a world which is much less than the Davos globalist Chinese President might have envisaged when he took on the mantle of the world’s new globalist economy leader.
As a Danish colleague put it with regard to China in the North Korean crisis: “Isn’t the problem that China exerts no real power over North Korea and if Xi shows this, China loses all fake cards they are holding.”
The UK has announced its new shipbuilding strategy, one which seeks to leverage the modularity approach introduced by building the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
Now the First Sea Lord has addressed the question of the role of the maritime sector in generating broader defense transformation.
He did so in his speech to the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) Naval Technology Conference on 12 September 2017.
His core point was that the modernization of the Royal Navy went far beyond simply building of new ships.
With most of the Royal Navy’s most important projects now in train, we can now look beyond the platforms, to the weapon systems, sensors and other technologies that will keep us at the forefront of capability in the decades to come.
Within that we have the opportunity to work in partnership to help meet the relentless demand for skills in science and technology.
And this, more than anything else, will be the foundation for our nation’s security and prosperity in the years ahead.
He highlighted several key developments both generated by defense and leveraged by defense from the civilian sector: artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems, transformation of the man-machine dynamic and the need to expand the capability for more rapid introduction into service of new capabilities.
And one key way to do that is a theme we have emphasized for several years — leveraging software upgradeability.
The Royal Navy has been at the forefront of open architecture in our submarine combat systems for many years and during Unmanned Warrior, a single command and control interface was central to our success.
Now, we must look to introduce open architecture into operational service far more widely.
To that end, later this year HMS Westminster will go to sea fitted with an Open Architecture shared infrastructure which enable the rapid integration and development of new capabilities.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Philip Jones, at DESI, September 12, 2107.
The First Sea Lord was looking forward to an apps based solution approach for combat systems.
What this means in practice is that the Type 31e will feature different app-based tools which can access the ship’s data.
These will be operated from a series of touchscreen displays, Siri-style voice controlled assistants and perhaps even augmented reality technology.
This is not a gimmick or a fad.
As modern warfare becomes ever faster, and ever more data driven, our greatest asset will be the ability to cut through the deluge of information to think and act decisively.
He concluded by going back to one of the great innovators in the Royal Navy, Admiral Fisher.
In the early part of the last century, Jackie Fisher fashioned the Royal Navy into a focused fighting machine that could meet the growing challenges Britain faced in an era of global political upheaval.
He did this by sweeping away the ornaments of Victorian imperial power to make way for new technology, from the torpedo and the turbine engine to the submarine and the destroyer.
Most of all he is remembered for HMS Dreadnought, the battleship that was so revolutionary that it rendered all others obsolete at a stroke.
Today, we stand on the cusp of another great technological revolution.
It’s not because of a single ship, like the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers or even the new Dreadnought-class submarines, revolutionary as they will be.
The real revolution comes from a combination of different technologies and trends that are moving forward at the astonishing pace.
They are shaping the future of warfare before our eyes.
Editor’s Note: The speech of the First Sea Lord as presented at DESI.
Admiral Sir Philip Jones, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, spoke at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) Naval Technology Zone on 12 September 2017.
‘Courage and skill – the next steps in the Royal Navy’s technology journey’
It’s wonderful to be surrounded by examples of the maritime expertise found within Britain’s defence sector at DSEI, as I set out the next steps in the Royal Navy’s journey of technological innovation.
When HMS Queen Elizabeth departed her builders earlier this summer I described it as a new era of maritime power and that was not a term I used lightly.
These ships will sit at the heart of the Royal Navy and, alongside the nuclear deterrent, will shape the UK’s authority in the world for the next half century.
But the reason I used the term maritime power – as opposed to purely naval power – is that this is not a journey we take alone.
It is one we share with the maritime industrial sector and the wider defence supply chain.
The Queen Elizabeth-class project sustained hundreds of businesses and thousands of jobs. Together, we proved that maritime investment can be a force for economic prosperity and regional growth as well as national security.
Meanwhile, at Barrow, submarine construction has settled into a steady drumbeat stretching into the 2030s and with the cutting of steel for the future HMS Glasgow, the same is now true for complex shipbuilding on the Clyde.
And what this programme of maritime investment provides us with is a basis to further strengthen our partnership.
Most obviously, the publication of the National Shipbuilding Strategy last week charted a course towards a more sustainable and competitive industrial capacity.
With the Type 31e General Purpose Frigate, we have the opportunity to better align the Royal Navy’s requirements with those of the export market to help support that ambition.
But the opportunity extends far beyond shipbuilding.
Because with most of the Royal Navy’s most important projects now in train, we can now look beyond the platforms, to the weapon systems, sensors and other technologies that will keep us at the forefront of capability in the decades to come.
Within that we have the opportunity to work in partnership to help meet the relentless demand for skills in science and technology.
And this, more than anything else, will be the foundation for our nation’s security and prosperity in the years ahead.
TECHNOLOGICAL AMBITION
At DSEI two years ago, my predecessor outlined the Royal Navy’s technological ambition in bold and ambitious terms.
It is a future based on exploiting rapid developments in autonomy and robotics, additive manufacture, novel weaponry and the power of data, underpinned by continued investment in people and training.
We said we would explore the market to identify new capabilities that could be introduced into service quickly and that in doing so, we would use the Royal Navy’s global reputation for operational excellence to open up new opportunities for British firms and for British R&D.
Over the past two years, I’m pleased to say we’ve done just that.
Last year’s Exercise Unmanned Warrior was a case in point.
We brought together technology firms from around the world to show us what their kit could do when put to the test, with UK companies leading the pack.
Together, we broke records and pushed the boundaries of innovation further than ever before, the ripples of which continue to be felt today.
Six months later, we returned for Exercise Information Warrior, doing the same for cyber, ultra-modern communications, information exploitation and artificial intelligence.
In both cases, we knew that industry was far ahead of the military in exploiting the latest developments, but we were surprised by just how far.
During Information Warrior, for example, chest x-rays were passed through a handheld SATCOM terminal. Normally, this would take 30 minutes to transmit – but using IBM’s ASPERA bandwidth acceleration technology, it took less than 5.
The benefits this could bring to medical teams deployed at sea with a Carrier Strike Group or 3 Commando Brigade ashore – or indeed with any force deployed at range – are obvious.
Of course, other bandwidth accelerators are out there, but time and again we saw examples like this of commercially available technologies that could have wide application across the armed forces.
And of all the many things we learnt from these exercises, the one lesson which stood out more than any other was the need to be faster and more agile in how we develop and introduce new capabilities into service.
NEXT STEPS
I’m proud that the Royal Navy took the initiative to challenge ourselves in this way.
Without doubt, we established the Royal Navy as a leader of innovation within the UK Armed Forces and internationally.
I’d like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, whose instinct and enthusiasm was the driving force behind both these exercises.
But the question now is where we go from here.
Having demonstrated the art of the possible, the real test of our ambition is to bring these capabilities into service alongside or in place of existing equipment.
In some cases, the way forward is clear.
A good example is the Compact Deployable IT System.
It’s small, light-weight and takes just minutes to configure – perfect for use at sea or in the field.
The Royal Navy’s own innovation team – ‘MarWorks’ – joined with DSTL and Antillion to help accelerate this technology through the development phase.
We put it to use in Information Warrior and, liking what we saw, we’ve decided to introduce it in place of 3 Commando Brigade’s current IT straight away.
But this isn’t simply about swapping old kit for new and carrying on as normal. The full potential of the technological opportunity before us is far greater.
From autonomous systems operating in squads to Artificial Intelligence-assisted decision making, what we’ve glimpsed over the past two years has the potential to entirely change our approach to operations.
This requires big decisions, with far reaching consequences.
Are we, for instance, prepared to remove existing platforms from service in order to create the financial and manpower headroom to introduce new systems which, in time, could deliver truly transformative advances in capability?
Of course, change on this scale can be disconcerting, but if we hesitate, then we risk falling further behind.
So, for example, based on our experience from Unmanned Warrior and Information Warrior, we know that remotely operated and autonomous systems can make a far greater contribution to operations than is currently the case.
As a first step, we are ready to shift the process of trial and experimentation from the exercise arena to the operational theatre.
That’s why we have deployed three Unmanned Underwater Vessels on board the survey ship HMS Enterprise during her current NATO deployment.
But I think we can go further still.
So today I can announce the Royal Navy’s aim to accelerate the incremental delivery of our future Mine Countermeasures and Hydrographic Capability (MHC) programme.
Our intention is to deliver an unmanned capability for routine mine countermeasure tasks in UK waters in two years’ time.
Similarly, from what we’ve seen over the past two years, we know it should be perfectly possible for the Type 31e frigate to operate a vertical lift Unmanned Air System alongside or perhaps even in place of a manned helicopter from the moment the first ship enters service from 2023.
And as a precursor to this, we plan to work with our partners in the aerospace industry to demonstrate such a capability on a Type 23 frigate next year.
So, just as I challenge the Royal Navy to take the next step forward, there’s also a challenge for you – our partners in industry – to meet us half way with credible solutions that can fulfil our requirements.
And mark my words: other navies will follow in our wake, reinforcing the reputation of British technology and expertise to a global audience.
OPEN ARCHITECTURE
The pace of technological change is relentless – iteration is constant.
Our current processes – whereby software updates can take months to introduce – simply aren’t fast enough to match our ambition. We need to find an alternative.
The Royal Navy has been at the forefront of open architecture in our submarine combat systems for many years and during Unmanned Warrior, a single command and control interface was central to our success.
Now, we must look to introduce open architecture into operational service far more widely.
To that end, later this year HMS Westminster will go to sea fitted with an Open Architecture shared infrastructure which enable the rapid integration and development of new capabilities.
If successful, we will roll this system out to the rest of the Type 23s by 2020, and the remainder of the Fleet thereafter.
And because this will form the basis for the integration of all weapon systems, engineering sensors and off-board logistics in the future, we have specified that the new Type 31e General Purpose Frigate should be designed with open architecture from the outset.
What this means in practice is that the Type 31e will feature different app-based tools which can access the ship’s data. These will be operated from a series of touchscreen displays, Siri-style voice controlled assistants and perhaps even augmented reality technology.
This is not a gimmick or a fad. As modern warfare becomes ever faster, and ever more data driven, our greatest asset will be the ability to cut through the deluge of information to think and act decisively.
Equally, we need to recognise the aptitudes and instincts of young people leaving schools and colleges today – the so called smartphone generation – and design systems and processes in a way that plays to their strengths.
Open Architecture provides the means to do just that – melding technology opportunity with human ingenuity and skill which, incidentally, is the secret behind the Royal Navy’s success over the past 500 years.
Artificial Intelligence is also an important part of this future.
Under Project Nelson, the Royal Navy aims to develop a ship’s ‘Mind’ at the centre of our warships and headquarters to enable rapid decision making in complex, fast moving operations.
But these opportunities also require us to change our approach to how we design and develop systems, by adopting and defining the Royal Navy’s open standards to bring about a more iterative and collaborative approach.
The Royal Navy must work more closely with SMEs and start-ups. We need to tap into their entrepreneurial expertise and, in return, we can help give them the big break they need to succeed.
We also want to find people who might not have trodden the usual conventional career paths but who have the creative and disruptive approach we need.
During Information Warrior we brought together some of the UK’s leading experts in artificial intelligence for the UK Armed Forces first ever AI hackathon.
We provided them with more than a terabyte’s worth of information – including radar and sonar data – as well as access to an Open Architecture infrastructure with standardised data formats and Royal Navy defined interfaces.
Over 3 days they were able to use this information to develop astonishing solutions to real problems at extraordinary speed.
We proved, for example, that a drugs smuggler is no longer a bobbing needle in an oceanic haystack but has an identifiable algorithmic fingerprint. In the engineering world, we can predict, and therefore prevent, component failures.
So, in future, hackathons and agile sprints will become regular events, and we are programming a regular series of Information Warrior exercises between now and 2021.
Scoping for Information Warrior 18 is already underway and we will need your help, through MarWorks, 700X Naval Air Squadron and others, to make it a success.
It’s encouraging that a number of industry partners have already begun to plan their involvement – and their investment – accordingly, and I would welcome your thoughts on the possibility of an Unmanned Warrior 2020.
INVESTING IN SKILLS
Underpinning all of this is our ability to meet the demand for skills in science, technology, engineering and maths; both within the Royal Navy, and more widely.
I expect most of you saw the images from Nautilus 100 project last month, through which we challenged some of the brightest apprentices and graduates in UK industry to imagine what the future of submarine technology may look like fifty years from now.
From drones that dissolve on-demand to algae-electric propulsion, science and engineering doesn’t get more exciting than this.
Last week, the Government launched its “Year of Engineering 2018” campaign with the aim of inspiring the next generation and Nautilus 100 is proof that Royal Navy can make a huge contribution to that objective.
But I know we can do more than simply inspire – and in truth, we can’t afford to wait around in the hope that the education system produces the people we need. We’re prepared to play a much more active role to steer more young people to careers in these areas from an early age.
That’s why we’re working with companies from across the defence and maritime sectors to sponsor a growing number of University Technical Colleges.
The latest of these – a purpose built, state-of-the-art College in Portsmouth – opened its doors yesterday, just a stone’s throw from QinetiQ’s soon-to-be built facility at Portsdown Technology Park.
The initial tranche of 140 students will eventually grow to 600, from which 150 STEM qualified students will enter the local and national economy every year.
We have also met with the Scottish Government to identify ways we can support the promotion of STEM skills north of the border.
Today I can also announce that the Royal Navy is to shortly affiliate with four further UTCs, in Aston, Reading, Newton Abbot and Peterborough.
Unlike Portsmouth, none of these places are traditional naval towns – only one of them is near the sea – but that’s not the point.
The Royal Navy’s future success is indivisible from the UK’s strength in the design and manufacture of advanced systems, and the associated research and development. It’s in our interests to help support the national requirement for STEM skills, as well as our own.
We don’t expect every student we work with to join the Navy, but we do want to play our part to help them develop the skills required for a successful and rewarding career – and whether they ultimately choose a career in uniform or in industry, we still gain in the long run.
CONCLUSION
I’ve spoken a lot about the future but, in drawing to a close, I want to dip into the past.
In the early part of the last century, Jackie Fisher fashioned the Royal Navy into a focused fighting machine that could meet the growing challenges Britain faced in an era of global political upheaval.
He did this by sweeping away the ornaments of Victorian imperial power to make way for new technology, from the torpedo and the turbine engine to the submarine and the destroyer.
Most of all he is remembered for HMS Dreadnought, the battleship that was so revolutionary that it rendered all others obsolete at a stroke.
Today, we stand on the cusp of another great technological revolution.
It’s not because of a single ship, like the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers or even the new Dreadnought-class submarines, revolutionary as they will be.
The real revolution comes from a combination of different technologies and trends that are moving forward at the astonishing pace.
They are shaping the future of warfare before our eyes – but they offer the opportunity to keep Britain safer and more prosperous in the years ahead.
Of course, letting go of the familiar to make way for the new is never easy.
A degree of risk is inevitable, but then nothing in innovation or warfare has ever been achieved by playing it safe; and as I see it, the biggest risk of all is carrying on as we are.
International security is deteriorating and demands on the Navy are growing – public spending remains tight – why would we not adopt new solutions if they can help us square the circle?
Ultimately, it’s about courage as an organisation. The Royal Navy has always succeeded by being bold.
We’ve seen what the technology can do.
Now we must take a brave step forward to embrace the opportunity before us – and I intend to lead the Royal Navy to do just that.
2017-09-22 The USS America is the new kid on the block in terms of amphibious warfare.
It has been joined in the Alligator Dagger by another new kid on the block as well, the aviation modified support ship, the USNS Puller.
USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3), (formerly USNS Lewis B. Puller (T-ESB-3)), (formerly T-MLP-3/T-AFSB-1) is the first purpose-built Expeditionary Mobile Base (previously Mobile Landing Platform, then Afloat Forward Staging Base) vessel for the United States Navy.
It’s one of two Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) variants of the U.S. Navy’s planned fleet of Expeditionary Transfer Dock vessels.
We have visited both ships during their construction period and have highlighted their contributions to the evolving amphibious task force which the USN-Marine Corps team are crafting for 21st century operations.
According to an article by MC2 Alexander Ventura II, USS America Public Affairs, the USS America has recently completed Alligator Dagger 2017.
GULF OF ADEN – Marines and Sailors aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) with the embarked 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 3 rehearsed amphibious operations and combat sustainment in the vicinity of Djibouti during Alligator Dagger 2017 Sept. 4-20.
Alligator Dagger is a dedicated, unilateral combat rehearsal led by Naval Amphibious Forces, Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, in which combined Navy and Marine Corps units of the America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and embarked 15th MEU were able to train and employ integrated capabilities available to U.S. Central Command both afloat and ashore.
The exercise also involved the amphibious dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) and amphibious transport dock ship USS San Diego (LPD 22) of the America ARG, along with the expeditionary support base ship USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), the newly commissioned afloat forward staying base variant of the mobile landing platforms.
As additional support, the ARG also utilized the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Howard (DDG 83) and USS Kidd (DDG 100). Training with a wide range of ship types and classes during Alligator Dagger allowed the ARG to refine their maritime capabilities and preparing them for tactical requirements and future operations.
“As we entered the 5th Fleet area of operations we were well aware that we had to acclimate as an ARG/MEU team to both the environment in terms of weather and the threat,” said Capt. Rome Ruiz, commander, PHIBRON 3.
“We have a wide range of capabilities between our ships, aircraft, logistical equipment and personnel, which enables our blue-green team to handle multiple missions at one time.
Alligator Dagger has been a valuable opportunity for the ARG/MEU team to not only rehearse for new and ongoing operations but to also demonstrate our combat proficiency and flexible combat potential in support of crisis response and regional stability.”
The rehearsal focused on amphibious assaults; helicopter-borne raids; visit, board, search and seizure operations; air strikes; defense of the amphibious task force; integrated ground-and-air fires; tactical recovery of personnel; ground reconnaissance; medical casualty evacuations; combat marksmanship and quick reaction force and casualty evacuation rehearsals.
“We have trained extensively to enhance our methods and responses to possible scenarios that we may see,” said Capt. Joseph Olson, America’s commanding officer.
“I’m very proud of the team work throughout this training evolution. I’m confident that through the crew’s grit, tactical knowledge and competence, we’ll be ready to meet whatever challenges lie ahead.”
The 15th MEU consists of the command element; aviation combat element, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 161 (Reinforced); the ground combat element, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; and the logistics combat element, Combat Logistics Battalion 15.
While in the region, the southern California-based Navy-Marine Corps team falls under CTF 51/5, and will help ensure the free flow of commerce, provide crisis response and support ongoing missions in the 5th Fleet area of operations.
The role of the USS Puller was the focus of attention in a story published on 9/21/17 provided by the US Navy:
U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF OPERATIONS – Sailors and Marines aboard the expeditionary sea base USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) and Marines assigned to the 15th Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team Central Command completed combat rehearsals for Alligator Dagger 2017, Sept. 16.
Alligator Dagger, led by Naval Amphibious Forces, Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Expedition Brigade, is a dedicated, unilateral combat rehearsal that combined Navy and Marine Corps units of the America Amphibious Ready Group and embarked 15th MEU to practice, rehearse and exercise integrated capabilities available to U.S. Central Command both afloat and ashore.
The exercise also tested USS Puller’s maritime capabilities for crisis response and contingency operations within U.S. 5th Fleet.
“We deployed with the ability to embark other forces including the mine hunting unit, which allows us to sweep a safe path to the beach for the amphibious forces,” said Lt Cmdr. Douglas Ivey, the Puller’s combat system’s officer. “Since then we’ve been used as a support vessel for various aviation assets, acted as a target vessel for visit, board, search and seizure exercises and provided the mine hunting boats for surface exercises.”
Commissioned Aug. 17, Puller is the first U.S. ship to be commissioned outside of the United States and the first of the expeditionary sea base variant. Due to its versatility and range of capabilities, the ship continues to be assessed for use in a variety of potential mission areas.
“A lot of what we’re doing in Alligator Dagger 2017 is learning what this ship can do,” said Ivey. “This is a new platform. It was originally designed for aviation mine counter measures and special operation forces support, but now that we’re using it in an operational environment, we realized that USS Puller has the potential to support operations in a lot of different ways. ”
The ship also demonstrated its ability to support training for the 15th MEU’s Low Altitude Air Defense Detachment (LAAD), further strengthening its blue-green team integration.
“While we were onboard we had the opportunity to conduct live fire gun shoots, weapons training with Puller Sailors as well as establish training plans for defense from low altitude air threats for the ship,” said Capt. Thomas Rees, officer in charge, LAAD. “Any time we have a chance to train our personnel on a different platform or environment it improves their ability to defend no matter what the surroundings.”
Expeditionary base USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) is forward-deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to extend U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s maritime reach in 5th Fleet by supporting a wide variety of missions including counter-piracy operations, maritime security operations, humanitarian aid, disaster relief and crisis response operations.
U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses about 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The expanse comprises 20 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.
And in an article written by Captain Maida Zheng, 15th Marine Expeditinary Unit, and published on 9/21/17 , the role of the 15th MEU was the focus of attention.
DJIBOUTI (Sept. 21, 2017) – The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) concluded Exercise Alligator Dagger, the largest regional amphibious combat rehearsal, Sept. 20.
Alligator Dagger is designed to integrate and synchronize capabilities that are available to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) both afloat and ashore to ensure forces are postured and prepared to execute operations at sea, from the sea, and ashore.
The 15th MEU has been the first to fight, both from the sea and ashore. The MEU spearheaded Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992, launched the longest amphibious-heliborne assault in history into Afghanistan in October 2001 and established Camp Rhino, and boarded German-owned hijacked Motor Vessel (M/V) Magellan Star in 2010 to swiftly regain control of the vessel, detaining nine Somali pirates.
“Our distinct ability to gain access to critical areas anywhere in the world with ground, air and logistics forces enables us to counter the actions of non-state actors who may threaten the security and stability of the region,” said Col. Joseph Clearfield, the 15th MEU commanding officer.
“The dangers we are seeing in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility are extremist ideologies that have complete disregard for humanity and pose a serious terrorist threat to this region and to our homeland. We are looking forward to working ‘by, with, and through’ partner forces to militarily defeat violent extremist organizations in the area of responsibility,” Clearfield added.
Alligator Dagger provided an unparalleled opportunity for the ARG and MEU to practice critical mission sets that enhance capabilities inherent to the Navy-Marine Corps team. Marines and Sailors rehearsed various water and land-based exercises, ranging from live-fire events and explosive ordnance disposal missions conducted on ranges in the vicinity of Arta Beach, to visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations on static and motor platforms off the coast of Djibouti.
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The 15th MEU’s Force Reconnaissance Detachment completed two VBSS full-mission profiles, practicing the same mission set the Marines conducted for MV Magellan Star. First, the Helicopter Assault Force fast-roped via an MH-60S Sea Hawk onto USS LEWIS B. PULLER (ESB 3), an expeditionary sea base designed to provide dedicated support for air mine countermeasures and special warfare missions around the globe.
The Reconnaissance Marines quickly descended and searched the vessel, detaining any hostile individuals in the process. The next day, the Boat Assault Force moved into position via rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and latched a ladder onto the side of the ship to begin their assault.
“During both operations, the Sea Hawk served as an aerial sniper over-watch and close air support (CAS) platform as the Marines took control of the vessel,” explained U.S. Navy Lt. Laura Starck, the MH-60S Sea Hawk pilot who flew during the mission. “This is a typical integration piece for us and proves our capabilities as a multi-mission platform.”
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (Reinforced) recertified several CH-53E Super Stallion and MV-22B Osprey pilots for night systems qualifications in high-light level and low-light level, as well as AH-1Z Cobra and UH-1Y Huey pilots in close air support during Alligator Dagger. These qualifications enable the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) to provide the six functions of Marine Aviation to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
“The ACE’s Marine Air Traffic Control Mobile Team provided air traffic control functions while training with Djiboutian tower personnel, enabling safe air operations in the area as well as developing working relationships with the host nation airfield,” explained Maj. Bjorn Thoreen, the operations officer for VMM-161.
AV-8Bs, RQ-21As and H-1s conducted CAS and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) mission rehearsals while MV-22s and CH-53s conducted forward arming and refueling point (FARP), TRAP and casualty evacuation training. The ACE externally lifted a 21,600 pound aircraft tow tractor from USS America (LHA 6) to USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52), which helped enable the LSD to become an air capable ship.
“Having the LSD as an air capable ship enables the MAGTF commander to have another afloat forward staging base option in the area if desired to conduct operations from,” explained Thoreen.
The training achieved by the ACE during Alligator Dagger was critical to prepare for expeditionary operations in the CENTCOM area of operations.
Throughout the course of Alligator Dagger, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines focused its training on core infantry skills.
“The austere environment presented a unique opportunity to rehearse infantry actions and employ weapon systems in support of maneuver in the world’s roughest terrain and in an environment most of our Marines are not accustomed to operating in,” said Maj. Joseph Fontanetta, the BLT operations officer. “We employed all organic weapon systems and conducted supported live-fire attacks up to the squad level, sustaining skills for possible real-world employment,” he explained.
The BLT’s motorized units, made up of the Combined Anti-Armor Team and Light Armored Reconnaissance, conducted static gunnery for all crew-served weapons systems as well as fire and maneuver up to the section level.
The BLT also conducted a fire support coordination exercise that included all of the BLT’s Fire Support Teams as well as artillery, mortars and integration with the MEU’s Air Naval Gun Liaison Company, the ARG’s MH-60 detachment, Hueys, Cobras and Harriers with the ACE. The BLT practiced combined arms employment to support maneuver, conducting basic call for fire, immediate suppression, illumination, and suppression of enemy air defense missions.
“By integrating the above elements to support the maneuver of ground forces, we were able to demonstrate our ability to bring all elements of the MAGTF to bear on enemy forces,” said Fontanetta.
The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) provided combat logistics support and sustainment for all elements ashore throughout the execution of Alligator Dagger. Support ranged from food and water resupply to the execution of convoy operations that helped sustain forces ashore.
Engineers produced more than 46,000 gallons of water over a period of eight days. The Landing Support Detachment established a Landing Force Support Party executing 77 hours of operations during a 10 day period — serving as a central hub for entry and exit of equipment and personnel for the America ARG.
“This training enabled the LCE to conduct expeditionary operations providing combat logistics support from the sea and facilitate the operational tempo and reach of the battalion landing team to operate deeper into the Arta battle space without delaying or degrading training opportunities,” said Maj. George Steinfels, the Combat Logistics Battalion 15 operations officer. “The CLB provides a unique advantage which enables this MAGTF to sustain operations afloat and ashore for extended periods.”
Within 48 hours of arriving ashore, the LCE commenced water production and the establishment of a beach support area/combat logistics support area that provided a command and control hub for all elements arriving ashore.
The LCE quickly and effectively transitioned inland, conducting more than 40 combat logistics patrols for over 120 hours of convoy operations, transporting an impressive 25,400 gallons of water, 590 gallons of fuel, 7,800 meals, approximately 3,500 kilograms of ice and 18 pallets of ammunition, supporting more than 400 personnel movements covering a total of 3,870 miles of road.
The LCE’s ability to sustain the MEU during Alligator Dagger demonstrated its ability to sustain the MEU in real world operations – demonstrating the expeditionary prowess of the amphibious force.
“The ARG/MEU’s ability to rapidly maneuver integrated Navy and Marine Corps forces from across the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to provide immediate response options is key to ensuring command and control of forces at sea, from the sea, and ashore,” said Brig. Gen. Frank Donovan, commander of Naval Amphibious Forces, Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
“Alligator Dagger is a critical combat rehearsal that ensures our Sailors and Marines are fully capable of conducting operations across the full spectrum of conventional, unconventional and hybrid warfare. After seeing the ARG/MEU complete a series of complex rehearsals in austere conditions, I’m confident that they are postured and prepared to execute any crisis response mission within the AOR at a moment’s notice.”
Serving as the nation’s premier crisis response force, the 15th MEU and America ARG are forward deployed and poised to rapidly respond to crises in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility.
An artists view of F-16 Block 70 with nose-mounted IRST on take off roll. Credit: India Strategic
SAAB Gripen. Credit: India Strategic
Col. Charles B. DeBellevue, USAF, Ret., a member of the famed “Triple Nickel” 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron during the Vietnam War, is credited with downing six North Vietnamese MiGs. Here is seen as one of the honored guests Memorial Day 2010 in Columbia Mo.
General Hawk Carlisle, commander, Air Forces Pacific sits with AFN-Pacific Hawaii News Bureau, to get the general’s thoughts and messages on the state of Air Forces in the Pacific. Credit: Defense Media Activity, Hawaii News Bureau, 4/613
